NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW FOR 22 MAY 1987

Created: 5/22/1987

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Near East and

Sottth Asia

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Near East, ind Soulb Asia Re

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AspectsForeign Polky Miking In the Arab Wort

Man rorcign policy decisions In thc Middle East ire predictable and can be captained in ihc conicala systematic, approach lo protecting national interests. There a. however, considerable latitude for foreign policy actions based oncombinalice^of faaors unique to the Middle Eastern dcciiioomaking

Theummit meeting between King Hassan of Morocco and Algerian President Bcatdjcdjd failed to bridge their differences over the Western Sahara conflict. Although they will probably concentrateilitary resolution of the dispute,ill bring

IJ

dernonitralions by Itlamic fundamentalistsgoveriuneat repression were the most serious breakdown inorder linct4 and generated harsh police reprisals.crackdown on Islamic fundamcnuliftn by the Bourguiba regimepartroader effort to eliminate all independentL

King Hussein has introduced several reform measures to ameliorate student frustrations while simultaneously Increasing surveillance of political and religious activists on campuses since last year's student riots. Even so, student discontent persists, and antiregimc groups" maintain their potential to exploit student concerns

4

25

Kurdish iniurg eacscs have periodically threalened ibe stability of Iraq for decades. The Iranian revolution and the Iran-lraq war have allowed Kurdish mllitanu in Iraqevive Iheir rebellion, resultingignificant increase In military and political cooperation between various Kurdiih fitfiont.flpV

3)

Qatar Feeuoutle Slo-do-r.

Qaur's oil-cJependenl economy has limited prospects for growth uniil demand for OPEC oil picks up in the early IWOs. projected oil revenues snd stfll substantia) foreign tnvestmenu ihould allow ihe regimeorestall serious deterioration in most sipects of Qaur's extensive social welfare system over the next several years.M

41

lax*a Pwal-Sc-ieS Afghanisatfja. S

in* Afghan LoyaCouncil" of iribal, religious, and civic leaders-^has been described by. both tbe Afghan( regime leaden ai Ibe key to legitimate power Inartiihdrawal amngemeni mayhe rssost jpdvjaeaaa of farmingJ

Karen: Drwg

Accumulating circunuunilil evidence linking North Korean diplomats in illicil activities. Including drug trafficking.lrain onclaiions with P'yongyang. Nepal is unlikely lo Ukc strong oounlermcasures. fearing revdilioru of illegal activities by high-|cvrl .Ntpalcse officiab and damage to iu regional poli '

SuJIybsgtfce

Sear East and .

^oulfi Asia Rriic*tfJ|lr]'3

Articles

Aspects of Foreign Policy Making in Ihe Arab World.

foreign policy decisions ia tbc Middle East arc predictable and can be espiained in the cornealblc. even systematic, approach to protecting

national interests Others arc dictated by regionalolicy shifu and seem outside tbe contiol of any one 'country. Beyond these areas, however, there Is conj-leribk latitude Tor foreign policy act .on. that are suscipected in the West aad basedombination of factors thai ere sometimes eaiqBChe Middle Eastern decisionmaking process:

f&m .

is highly pcrsoniliicd, micromanaged. and largely unencumbered by institutional and bureaucratic constraints.

l" i' i

The strategic scope of Arab foreign policies lends lo be narrow, often not extending much beyond neighboring countries and often viewed wiifa aa eye to solving domestic problems.

Decisions are based on skimpy, often faulty, intelligence and. at times, gross mrsperceptions of foreign Intentions and capabilities.',

Once policies are formed. Ibe leadership receives liule feedback from public debatc'a critical bureaucracy, or honest advisers ihai would confirm ihc success or failureolicy coon* I V

' ll ^'i

leaden embody lo varying

traditional mindset that is fatalistic and This reinforces the tendency toelsewhere,eactive rather thanand favor subjective over >w, "

takenEgypt Democratic cipcrimcnis in Kuwait and Bahrain have failed. Popular iavolvcmcnt in politics, let alone foreign policy, is practically aonciistcai. aad the government circle of decisionmakersonfined to thc rulerew key11

Tha focus of power aad personalisation affects ihc process by wbich foreignonsidered and made in thc following ways:

Intrreit ar defined by an ob/eetire national tetvrity polity beeomei lubordlnate to perianalIwo key elements of which arc staying alive and staying in power. Thc component of Saudi foreign aid (hat b, in effect, protection money against terrorist intimidation it an

example,

rtletlontkipi bei*retn rula are oftendeterminingRatherin terms of bsucs, Arab leaders oftentheir neighbors in terms of personal friendsExamples include lhe personalSaddam Husayn aad Khomeini, AssadAssad aad Saddam Husayn. andeverybody, or. conversely, ibebetween Sultan Qaboce andand King Hassan aad many of theAsretell, personal favors oftenforeign policy, and actions are taken that areprerportion or in no apparent relation loS^udf support for (he Contra* iscaamplc of personal favor as

autocratic and persons Sited nature of Middle Eastern governments is perhaps Ihcir most universal Quality. Real power-sharing arrangements have not

m** i

Arab ttadt's generally are axxrse to delegating^ I

authority.esult: lhc power associatedWesicrn mind with someone of ministerial rank%jvexceedsthe reality In thc Middle Halt, andureaeratk itruciures under the miniOcr^areTcvenV

foreign Mimiiern Oman, former Sat Petinister ^Vainim. aad Foreign'Minister Tiritjin'Iraq'lt ii doubtful, however, that 1 an. delegate iheir hard-earned authority

" 'I

poiury positions Im ike Middle East are

tsy

the Arab penchant for public condemnation ycl private aupport of many US

* Nearly every Arab ruler is leader for life. If he to chooses, thus eliminating the Impact of domestic election cycles on foreign policy calculations. The automatically recurring Western problemearning period for new leaden is absent, as are electioneering-dominated windows for foreign policy Initiatives. Thc current Arab leaden generally haveong tenure in office and many yean of foreign policy experience. No key Arab leader has died or been overthrown since Sidat was killed in

less relevant

The Middle Eat tern Mindset

Given the independence of action of Middleve might expect more frequent andmoves than actually occur. Two tendenciesimportant role in dampening thenature of Arab foreign policies:to be fatalistic and conspiratorial.reinforce prevailing potilical pressures

Fatalism The belief to predestination is an Arab ouahi) thai iseinforced by Islamicenet of fundsascatalist Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia, for eaampie. testes thai "TMtuate in alleppered with phrases crediting God for an<ast, present or future, good or bad. Thetcmeni In policy deliberation* can be the unstated premise that the regime kt lhe victim of events more than lhe controller of events.can-do"aking the Irtliislivc. being ianovatlie, ot trying to force change can be viewed negatively In lhc Middle East as tempting fate and. io tome ca*cs, bordering on heresy. Sadal was rnucb more popular ia lhe West lhaa In hi* own country partly because be embodied chancier traits viewed positively ia Ihe Westgatrvely in ihc Middle East- There is widespread nluctaace. especially in the more trad mortal scciettes. to take action* thai imack of effort* to bypass Tate. Examples include the aversion to taking out insurance policies, spending much time on maintaining equipment, and, in thc foreign policy realm, engaging In military contingency planning.

Conspiracy. Related lo fatalism is (he tendencyoncoct and accept conspiracy theories, whichften credit the superpowenaster plan Into which aH events neatly fit. One analyst suggests ihai thisegacy of the British colonial period, when Great Britain exercised sweepingl as not unusual to hear Libyans aad Iranian* state without any doubt that thc United States put Qadhafi and Khomeini, respectively, into power lo serve Washington'* own

[Political cartoons in the Arabic press often ihow an outside hand pulling the strings of Middle Eastern events (or an Israeli hand controlling (he American hand controlling the Arab world)

These tendenciesmong Middle tautenlo education krtl and thr catcni oflon-deoeW. Moat of therulers had iridltional educationsin lei turround themselves withtcchnociaiic tubordinalct wiihoffkiali conduct most of ibeir businesslent an impression among foreigners oflhan.actually cum

region arc adept ai changingestern facade when dealing wiih Westerners to an Arab facade when dealing with Arabs.

Strategic Scop* and Thinking

Thc range of foreign polky concerns of most Arab

s limited lo lbc region and key outside nations, mainly theurvey of tbe administrative breakdown of foreign ministries in ihe region reveals this limited scope, as major portions of Ihc world are completely neglected. Middk Eastern relations with the superpowers, although mutually beneficial, arcunction of thc global reach of ihc superpowers lhan lbc reach of the countries of lbc Middle East. Tbe caceatior. thai proves thc rule is Libya's Qadhafj.

mmJ'ir pcesurpea lo have global interests, or at least pursues intdVests(in the Caribbean, Sub* Sahara'n Africa, Latin America) that arc far oui of proportion with any objective assess merit of Libya's national power.

Especially applicable to the more domestically troubled Arab states Ia the notion that polley ii formulatediew to protecting domestic flanks.

.whether, within Iheir more limited sphere. Arab leaders are Sirategk thinkers. In the. Egypt's Carnal Abd al-Nasir told an envoy of Ptesideni Kennedy thai the tendency in she West is to overanalytc the motivations of Arab

lenders. Natlr maintained mutt were not sophisticated strategic inintei* buteactive poUe>making

HuSSCin. Prcsadeni Mubarak, the kale President Sadal. and PrctsdcRtAt*adjifien appear to be sophist tea led strategists Aho. ihe conspiracy

eited

kind of sirategsc thinking with ill grand and intricate schemes.

The information Base and "Operatise

Subjectivity is prcfeircd

over objectiviiy, and Arabic writing styles knd thernscives io rhetorical caceas.

Arab leaders receive link objective domestic feedback to confirmolicy course is working. Thc put ic discourse that presides important feedback in ihc West is almost universally squekhed in the Arabolicy is successful because the public is told so. Abo, many Middle Eastern leadersoterie of sycophantic advisers whose objectivity is cuairortabk As an Arab pro*etb says. "If lbc King laysight at midday, behold ihc liars."

Inadequate information can often leadross rmi percept ions of foreign capabilities and intentions upon whkh leaders base major foreign policy initiatives. These operative misperccptlons can be ihe source of major Middk Eastern fiascos The Iran-Iraq war is aa ctampic. Saddam Husayn entered thebelieving thai ihc Khomeini government would collapse and ihat Iran's ethnic Arabi -ousd quickly join hb side Neither occurred, and afiei tit years he cannot cairicaie Irae from ihc war Poor intelligence or misperceplions arc likely lo become increasingly dangerous at weapons of man destruction becoms^ more common in thc aica

w?

f ,

Western Snriara: Possible Typesenlemenil

summit meetingMoroccan King Hassan and Algerian Presidcnl Bendjcdid enay failed io bridge iheir differences over the Western Sahara conflict. Although the two countries probably will continueave lower-level meetings, it is unlikely ihey will be able to resolve thc conflict in thc near term. Tbey will probablyilitary resolution of thc dispute. Nevertheless, we believeolitical solution will bring lasting peace. The most likely settlement would be based on tbc concept of federation involving Hassan's sovereignty "over the Western Sahara in returnegree of Polisario autoflomyajaf/jLTafa*ar> >

ust and President

King

<' -border under the auspices of Saudi .

(King

'srsoctiag* The only

']-'Fabd ostensibly_to discuss mutual problems,-euwr ia thc .Westernitting Morocco'againat Algerian-backedeen working toit*.to both countries inhe two leaders reached ino hold further meetings on

Prospectsiatcouatk Settlesawul

W< believe tbe recent summit meetingetbackegotiated solution. Indeed, thc chancesettlement during thc nest several years arc slim. Even though there have been occasionalUniiy talks ant, the view* of Morocco and Algeria, have converged In recentaccept the Idea of UN mediationeferendum of tbe native inhabitants of thc Westernneither side is willing to orxTtpromisc on thc specific sditioes necessaryettlement^

Morocco.repared to pursue thell cootrob aboulercent of

territorylanning to extend thc berm again. 1*

la vocable p

>3

swnaswT Wc believe Rabat's focus on berm construction reflects its pessimism about the chances ofavorable political settlement In the near term.g-

King Hassan's apparent diplomatic0 stall for time. Despite hb refusal to compromise and his firm miliury commitment, wc believe he realizesilitary victory is not achievable or will not resolve the dispute and thaiolitical solution can end tbe conflict. He believes, however. Ihat his strong military position enables him to pushetlemeni on his terms.

h3

in our

aiting game, believing ihai Morocco cannot bearnoctic burden of maintainingroop* in Western Sahaia indefinitely.^

iless he is .

President Bend ted id's posnroo has evolved fromsupport for lhc independence of Western Sahara to some sort of federation involving autonomy for the region under nominal Moroccan control Behind his changing attitude arc Algeria's economic probkms due to falling oil revenues, as veil as the rising costs of supporting00 Polbartb refugees Irving in southwest Algeria. We believe Bendjedid realizes military options are limited an willing io risk war with Morocco.

Most of Algeria* key leader*olitical settlement, but theyace-saving compromise.

lime bui will eventually choose to make diplomatic concessions.S he offeredederation

--Another issue that could spur progressepatriation

progress on oivbive bilateral problems could help resolve ihe Western Sahara disputeample, moat ofilometer border separating Morocco andot demarcated, and there have been periodic clashes along lhc frontier.abat and Algiers agreed lo delineate the border, and Morocco abandoned in _claims to small portions of Algerian territory. Hassan, however, has yet to ratify2 accord. Although the two regimes have notirect link between border problems and tbe Western Saharaemarcation of the frontier could provide Algierserceived victory thai would help Bendjedid eatract himself from the Western Sahara conflict Alqier* may even require Moroccan tagi&caiion of thc accord. Since any settlement of thc Western ^Sahara problem would lend to favor Rabat

regional he;right

aovercigoty. but onlypecific period of Itnxe. This solution would represent an Algerian concessiono recognize'Moroccan sovereignty

Sahara, while Rahai would have io rights'for the Polisario. These couldeparate budget, and

io form their'o-ra police force. ThisN uustecship. such as lhe US.

of Microncsia^Thc transition period miGreat Britain's agreement withontrol of Hong Konghe end of the

they would have no

eof Western Sibar

objectives, iwuse probsfm wiTee Polisario would bcoliowedf-governmcni wiihia lb* MoraCCaa pod ivould have eo representation abroad. EvenIhc Polos no leadership would not be pleased svith this arrangcmcnl. they would have no choice bui lo follow Algeria's lead.

Moroccan locoewsratioe al western behura If King Hassan continues to rely principally on miliury force io absorb Western Sahara, be will continue lo face harassment from Polisaiicased in Algeria. We believe the current level of harassment laerious military challenge toMorocco and will not bring Rabat lo thc negotiating

We believe-Bendjedio's frustration over the stalemate and th* nearly complete enclosure of the region by berms could eventually impel Ihc Algerian* to raise the miliury stakes. Algiers, for example, could allow thc insurgents lo engage in terrorism inside Morocco Alter is mighi also decide lo become directly involved In Ihc fighting. In either case, Algiers would kope to force Hassanbe bargaining labic wiihoul provoking an unwanted war between tbc two countries We believ* such actions would generate dangerous tension wiih link hope of forcing an endhe fighting orolitical tctilcmcnl

Territorial Partition Although it is probably too late for this option, Morocco and Algeria could decide lo partition Western Sahara. Wc do not believe ihe earlier territorial proposals, such as the French plan8 which called for Mauritanian control of lhe southern

portion of Western Sahara. Moroccan control of ihe northern portion, and Algerian acoaisirion of parts of northern Mauritania, would be acceptable to all parlies. Any future pa nil ionM neede heavily weighted in favor of Morocco, since Rabat already holds aboutercent df Western Sahara, Rabat would renin ihc most useful areas of Western Sahara, while Algiers would gain territory in ihat pari of Western Sahara outside ihc berm. Thb plan could also lead Morocco and Algeria io compel Mauriuniamall amount of its northern frontier area to round out Algeria's boundaries. Algiers's aoqubition of ibis terrain would case its concerns about Moroccan encircleendjcdid would have to compel the Pottsario to accept resettlement either in Algeria or in Ihe areas ceded by Morocco or Mauritania.'

ivl

ideal Western Sahar

Aa lade proa rat Western Saner* The least likely outcome of ibe conflici wouldew suic governed by thc Poiisaiio Net only isrorpeel implausible, given tbc miliury situation in Western Sahara,nacceptable lo King Hassan, who has lUked his prestige on thc issue. Wc believe that Haasan would not evenoiisaiio Stale whose independence was heavily circumscribed by Rabat'seto over its domcstk and foreign policies. An independent state would not be viable economically, given its small population and lack oft would be highly dependent on foreign support and vulnerable to subversion,ur judgment. Morocco and Algeria would eventually resume Ihc conical for control of the territory, gfjaaaa

h3

Tunisia: Implicitionsof RiotinR in Tunis

The violence in late April was the most serious breakdown la public order since ihc bread strikes inemonstrations by Islamic funda men la lists against government repression 'generated harsh reprisals by thc police. The crackdown on fundamentalism by the Bourguiba regime is partroader ciTofXto eliminate allpoliiical activity

Suppression of outlets for political dissent in ahasood deal of diversityviolence and could unitegroups. Thc Tunisian Governmentwill face another round ofif trial* scheduled for June handsentences to fundamentalistactions pose serious dilemmasAticanpts by thc United StatesTunis's repressive actions will be construedfor the opposition and anger Bourguiba.in the face of widespread violence onhand would identify Washington wiih aj|

Students Take loth* Streets

Tbe rioting in Tunisia onpril, involvingslamic fundsnsenulists. was well organized and spearheaded by Islamic fundamentalist students carrying pictures of Rachid Ghannouchi, thc arrested leader of the Islamic Tendency MoveMTft The US Embassy in Tunis reports that the dernonsitationi spread to include other youths and even tome older Tunisians' Otic'policeman and one student may have been killed. Some police cars were burned.'telephone wires cut and several policemen and foreigners attacked.'Thc government responded with tear gas.nd armored personnel carriers and helicopters were- 4

The Crackdavin on ibe Opposition Tke TmmiomMoioliiis. The violenceeaction to the government's persecution of Ihc Islamic fundamentalist movemenu

,9

ic govts cspccialli concerned about ihc disruptive activities of Islamic-oriented univcrsiiy students. Fundamentalist students, who are generally sympathetic with the MTI but not necessarily controlled by it. dominate youlb politics.

rcspcraaic

forseries of student bervcottt of classes and vsvtent clashes with leftists ihai have led io the closure of some campuses

As part of ils campaign against tbe (undamenialists, ihe government broke relations with Iran ia late March, atlng cooperation between Tehran and the MTI.

In our view, the Tunisian Governmcni is looking forto justify its repression of thcIran has some contacts withlists, primarily in Europe, andsupport for the MTI. butmovement In Tunisia

Opposition Ponies. The government also has become more intolerant of lhe legal political opposition. Before tbe riots Ihe police temporarily detained Ahmed Mestiri. leader of the main oppc-rilioohc Social Democratic Movement, and officialsther minor panics. We believe this is attributableroclamation by ihese groups condemning government repression of the funds menu lists.

Othtt Poliiical Greens. In recent months the government hat increased its censorship of lhe press, arrested labor activists, threatened human rights

'The government huew ^hurnan ri|hu association ihai will uke the place of "'the LTDH and support regime pctlktes.

BociBdb.'iTheyear-old President fean idling control jj;i" of tbe country and leeing itundamenlaliitlirnilar to the one that brought down the

| the MTI hu grown in popularity in recent

tfyean andhe largest opposition group.

argutDaprbbably

believed tbe MTI would disappear "hen he fim

incited iuieadeo1 after Utey rxtitkned to

econtealegalparty, y.

aVi-S

Tne President's hanh stance toward legal opposite

v: groupa andof whom were former

polrticalargely due to hu increMtng

tiueulence toward any rjppoMiion. Bourguiba hu not.

i overly concerned about thc legal political parties

: of Iheir limited popular Handing. He may -f

have come to believe, however, that their tendency In'

ibe part few years to speak with one voice.

particularly in Ihe face of the government's restrict ion

on political freedoms, presents the regime with t

another

Doeaeslicook

Tbe government's repressive altitude indicates ihai it it abandoning "Bourguibbm"President's traditional policyelatively open and benign autocracy lhat permitted opposition panics and oansiderable free speech. There are even indications

In our view, unitta will become increasingly unstable asor opposing views arc dosed and distent is not lokraied.

We believe the fundamentals* will be more inclined to ose violence in the future- Following the disturbance onpril, (he MTIommunique reaffirming its oppenitron to terrorism but warned lhat government repression might force it to respond In kind. Even if the MTI kaden continue iheir nonbelligerent nance, they may not be abk to control the more radical rank and 6k. We believe the prospects for further violence hinge on bow the government treats the arrested MTI leaden at trials expected in Juneeath sentence Is handed down for MTI head Ohannouchi, we would expect another icrious eruption of violence thai could result in the government's use of troops to restore order.

In addition, wc believe that Bourguiba bopposilioo parties, labor leaders, and lhemovement at thc same timerushingThe consequences for thebe catutrcethic if these disparateevelopment would threatenof the

Implications for tbe United Stale*

Asourguiba continues in office, wc believe thai Tunisia will retain its pro-US policies and will look to Washington for economic and military aid. Close Tunbian-US relations, however, are lied to Bourguiba. To date, criticism of tbc Uniied Stales in Tunisia has been limited,opular vkw that the United States did not do enough to prevent the Israeli airstrike against tbe PLO headquarters in Tunis InS. We believe, however, thai

10

close US lies lorepressive Tunisianwill Increase lhe prospects foe

ctionserious dilemma (or Ihc United Sum On lbc one hand, my attempt by Washington thai tooted to Tumi like Icelunag on human rigbu won Id anger Bcwrgaibe He would tec itignal Ot* US support for lbc opposition. On ihe other band, US silence raas ibe rilk ihat many Tunisians will identify Washington wiifc lheincrea*LAglv repressive and disliked regime. Such criticism couldesponsive coord among ihembers of disadvantaged Tunisians.

after student* at the University of Jordan in Amman challenged lhc university administration andajor strike. Thc unions were replaced by elected "student committees" organized for each faculty. They arc strictly social societies that arc carefully monitored and prohibited from engaging in political actiritics. The resulting leadership vacuum on campus has been filled over the past five years by fundamentalist students, who now control virtually every student committee at the Universities of Jordan nd Yarmuk

ntn' aawusaai,

me Palestinian student radicals and leftists also have ctploiled political frustrations. Demons!rntions that took place last spring ai Yarmuk had political overtones, with many In the crowd denouncing the government and thc King's speech innnounced an end toJtls dialogue with PLO Chairman Arafai

King Hussein hai introduced icvcral reform mcaiurci to ameliorate student frustration* while nm uitineousli increasing survcilUncc of political and religious activist* on oampusei lince lasliudcnt riots Campus aarcsi lasl May al Yarmuksecond Largest university located pentb of Amman reaulied in ibe deaths of three itudcuU daring eonffootslions with Jordanian security. Despite reform measures and security precautions, the student discontent that sparked Ihe violence persists, and antircgimc groups maintainheir potential to optoii student coneernsj

l The government attributed the demonstrations lo;drseooteat with academic policies but Ihclso demonstrated student frustration with King Hussein's ceo trained governing style, poor employment rapport unities, and subversive effortsinority of radical aclrvtsia (MaW L_ 'fS

Student discontent ai Ysrmuk last year festered over increased tuition fees and demands for greater involvement In university decisionmaking. Accordingniversity fifllcial. initial protests began in early March whenngineering students protested fee increases assesaed for the summer session. Many Yarmuk aludents come from low-income, predominantly Palestinian families whocannot afford tuition hikes. The protests grew violent when Islamic fundamentalists,alestinian agitator* generated antiregimcnd government security forces ervcrrcacted in pelting down thc oetnemsuaton

Islaudc

.The majority of Jordan'* approum"-'; rC.CXX uniucnity students arc not involved actively in political or religious issues,adical minority continues to .draw lupetort by eaploitinggrievances

tougher ai Jordanian etpatriaie* return (torn ihr Gulf Allimeihe job marhci for univcrtii) graduates Is com ratting. Jordanian iludcnii are earning caginccring and medical degrees in record numbers. Thia dilemmaneervasive sense of gloom and cynkism among sliadcmi .

my

' Wc believe lbc government hat eHedivclytubversive poliliCal activily on Jordan'* camputca detpite economic stagnation and continuing cfTorttsmall numben of Itlamic funda menial mi.alestinians, and kfiiits toexploit lhe iltuetioo.

it wiih ihc government may be widcapread, but motl itudcnta appear preoccupied with academic and personal, not political, punuiuejgggga) J^

Nonetheless, csUemitu have proven abk to generate esr.os.ve confrc*latkmi ai Yarmuk University and have the potential to do to again, particularly at Lan. lord*n't economic cceidilabrts worsen apnaawaV undent body at Yarmuk la SO peroral Palestinian, and many recognize ibey will be unabk to find jobs after graduation. Given such bleak economic prospects, many undents may eventually believe Ihey have nothing to lose by protesting, although they do not yeterious threat to lhe stability of thc icgurtc.aggggg* *Lgaa it

King Hussein's success in preventing thc spread of student unreal will hinge on bis ability to deal with demands for greater political participation al lbc grataruott and to had acautiona to Jordan's unemployment problems. If either effort fails. King Hussein eventually may face an increasingly restive, potentially radical group of uncnJiploycet_or_^M underemployed pioft isioeuis ej^nVtuhfl H

y

IS

Israel: Muddling Through in South Lebanor

over the Von* term threat presented by the steady, continuing reinfilimioa of PLO fighters into southern Lebanon ft 4 'nd tbe butdcr tactics displayed by HiibalUh there. Di- tVaVtnaV'Lir-ive worned by COOptrsiion between

some Amal elemeaii and the more radical Hiiballah.

'l-

a|taaa1aaBaaw alternative continuing reliance on iheirjircseot South Lebanon tecuniy policy Im urn iwaxxfc^aw* the lean evil of several unpalatable options. head's policy ta based on.Malnteataacer Ifsecurity strip manned by Gen. Antcnne Lahad's Army'of South Lebanon

'

ity ofpposedsrael's painful'presence inhroughstill strong, and

A limited number of Israeli troops operating in the rone with occasional operations' by larger ground forces when necessary.^ ferg" Selected use of airstrik.es airiksng-range artillery bombardment. -

One oLibe few public advocates of deeper Israeli involvement is Knesset Member Rafael Eilan. Chief of SUIT during Israel's invasion of Lebanon2rincipal planner of the war.eader of the hardline Tehiya Party, has publicly recommended extending Israel's security gone to the Litanl River. Conversely, some of Israel's small, leftist parties demand complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Opinions within ihc IsTattiihai iwe

cevosiiion of Vict Prcmkrv,crewand Defense Minllter Rabin to greater involvement in Lebanon assures lhat the military will remain subservient to criilian political dircction.

DUruplteg the Pl-O's Return Israel aiucbes eatremdy high Importance to preventing the PLO from reestablishing the aiad of conventional military force thai exit led in South Lebanon before lhe

Israel has taken especially active measures to head off seaborne rrinfilintlion of PLO fighters into Lebanon.

b(3)

|no moreewersonnel have been brought into Lebarvii b) boat in the pat!-

Fatahool of thousands of potential ecruits among tbc young, male refagees in tamps round Sidcn. Tyre, and Beirut, gflpx* interdict ion effort focuses orfutterceoting Fatah officers in hopes of stopping ihem from recrulling and organizing among this large group.

. Hol.Jir* BackHUbtJUk'i bead attack, ia Soaibnclsiding iu first raidointpoaJilo*rtsecond major cooceraIsraeli policymakers. Israeli defense planner*by ibe ASL's improved showingin raids since February. Hiiballahbadly In ihc April attack, sufferingroup nevertheless appears determined to continueattacks ia the security

, .

Hiiballah willore serous problem in tbc longer term. Israeli leaders have become increasingly concerned abool lhe growth of Islamic extremism In Lebanon generally and ihc possibility ofooperation with Hlrballah of both Ihc PLO and some elements ofmoderate Shia Amal.

The IDF has badreempting Hiiballah attacks ia South Lebanon because HubaHah doesaintain fixed poaiiions there and because it 'aha heto blend ia wiih ihcopuUtfon. Former Chiefbf Staff Levi noted In April ihai Hiiballah had not esiabllihcd myamps or beadciuaritrs ibal could be accurately targeted by Israeli air or.ground forces. Levi notedthaibility lo blend in with ihc civiliaa' community and. when necessary, io retain ioase camps in ihe non Kern Bckaa VaUcy. has' given them considerable freedom io strike and withdraw io fighi another day.

aV

We believe that Israeli defense ofliosli "ould like lo sirske Hi/ballah bases in lbc norikera Bckaa lo dmun Ihc groups operations The Iliads Government, however, is concerned over the impact such raids might have on Western hostages held b) Islamic eiircmisis. In public comments. Defense Minister Rabin and Levi haveoted ihat ihis consiraini has prevented Israeli si lacks on HUballah bases in ihc aottbern Bckaa. particularly iht Shaykh Abdallah barracks in BVItbakk.

AtttaL ASL, aad UNIFIL:

Fee Whal They Art .

UNIFIL at signilVcaai adjuncutone policy, but ibey are not willing lo depend on any oneombination of them as ihc primary means to defend Israeli northern border.

ASL Israel will continue to strengthen ASL positions, oa tbe isorthern edge of ihe_*ccurily lone but

Amal. Amal,*u% wmW-determined to minimlie tbe presence of PLO fighters in South Lebanon. Amal'i snowing in recent battles with ihe PLO during tbe camps war" and its increasing fragmentation in the south however, maleeak i

lingering hope ihat Amal can functionacit ally in helping lo control the Palestinians and Hiiballah. according io General Levi. Ironically. Israeliiacka against the PLO in

ihe 'south have taken mal. allowing ii to attack bothbe south sad the ASL. Fore being. Israel win probably reftairi from retaliating against Amal. especially wbile thai organisation holds an Isradi airman captured durlm fighting last Crctober. If Amal elements coniinue lo cooperateHiiUllaa.nually is likelyccmphasicc Amal's roletcii ally in its security plans and tared hostile Amal anils.

)

- "ebated bj. whether UNIFIL coniribulcs marginally so Israels security, detracts from It, or hai litllc effect. Moat firmly bdicre thai UNIRLalbcsi helpilas another security buffer thai preventsrtinlmturi number ofla attacks. Il ia htghly'unlikely that Israel would allowreatly increased rote la shoeing ap security in aoutberu Lebanon or deploying to Inonhem border, i

b(3)

Kr-rt'i' IM

^iW'Tb* Kurdish Prob

Kurdish insurgencies have periodically threatened (he siabilily of Iraq forhe Iranian revolution aad tbe Iran-Iraq war have allowed Kurdishraq lo revive tbeir rebellion, resulting insignificant increase in military cccperation between virionsharp upsurge in Iran's and support for the Kurds in Iraqai led toflcrcc fighting in that.

Stl' ll

The Kurdish rebellion in Iraq hi two poutacal

llaVhtrifStic Union'of KurdistanUser groupa' irseJuding the Comm.aist Party Of Iraq/play snaWroks. Tbe/ Mas'ud Barzani and, until his death earlier ihu year. hHbrother Idcomposed ofighters of "largely rural and tribal origins. Under the leadership of Mas'isds hu father, tbe KDP fought for Kurdish autonomy labe secondebels of the PUK led by Jala!Marxist and has since iu creation ia thcppealed"mare to Kurdish intellectuals and city

ingle has waTixJ at

The Kurdish struggle has wared and waned forpct>dcrrt ia large pan oa foreign assistance aad weahneases of lheaghdad After bring crushed by lbc Iraqi armed forces in IMS. ihe insurgency was revived in Ibehen lhe reaalignment of Iraqi troops to the Iranian war from weakened Baghdad's control of the north. Kurdish rebels hope to exploit Iraq's struggles with Iran lo ciiract major political and economic concessions from Baghdad that include increased auloaomy sad ihc possible separation of the Kurdish homeland from lbc real of Iraq.

Deep splits among ihc^urtlfBlfrcbel groups limit their ability to work together. Thc two main groups have foughl each other repeatedly for two decades over ideological, tribal, leadership, and strategic

issues. From3 until late IvoaTTle PUK even joined with Baghdad againsi ihc KOP. This alliance collapsed over Baghdad's failure to meet Talabani's demands for greater Kurdish autonomy. PUK dominance over the emire Kurdish region,hare of government revenues from Ihe Karkuk oilfields located in Ihe Kurdish at

After years of feuding, the various Kurdish groups are cooperating, and this poses an increased threat to thc government. The PUK resumed atucks against thc government5 and entered into an un (ire wiih the KDPJl

The government has adopted aapproach to the Kurdish problem, (dying mainly on thc stick. Baghdad has actopularly elected Kurdish assembly wish limited authority ever Kurdish areas and has provided subscantial fuads for economic development. The regime, however, refuses so provide greater powers, ll has bought off many Kurdish tribes by paying tribal chiefs to man Kurdish irregular units or "furiir The regime also seems to recognize that the demands of thc war wiih Iran limit its ability io commit mfbeient forces to crush ibe Kurdish insurgency. Birites arc to keep open Ibe vital oil pipeline sad road link lo Turkey and toovernment presence in major northern cities At least for now, ii is willing to cede lo thc Kurds control of much of the countryside and even the major roads by nightl

MiBury Strategies and Trends Unable to agree on political objectives. Iraq's Kurdish insurgents have focusedilitary strategy aimed ll eliminating thc government's control over Kurdish lerriiory. Rebel operations generally hive been limited io small-scale raids of greater symbolic

importance than itraiegtc value. Government centera: miliury patrols, outposts, and convoys; and economic facilities have been the insurgenu* primary targets. The Kurds have received support fromesser *1

border, and is moving villager* Joto rcsculcmcnietiiiinr village* have been tr-raicd with unidentified chemicals, mullingumbcr of civilian'

Outlook

Weurther escalation of fighting in tbc Kurdish areasetermined to maintain control over the Kurdish regions, but It must deal simultaneously with more intense Iranian attacks andpreading insurgency ia tbe north. The regime probablyrief, aggressive campaign will contain the Kurds until the Iranian attacks are dcfeatedjptllt Jp 7}

Iran wiU probably continue to provide crucialto Iraq's Kurdish rebels and may cspaudwith Insurgent forces. ThU wouldoffset any lot* of support from Syria,Jiivt-overtures toward better relations Mom

11

borders and Utoilcarge aad poteuiialty rebellion! Kurdish popelalion Turkish forces-Baghdad'sconducted limned trw-border raids and aimrikcs against Kurdish rebels in iblycontinue toJgnfJhn,

will be tbk to contain dcfcai b> tbejwar wriibignificant Iranian >uld further atrainould ibifl the balance of power in favor o( the Kurdish Insurgents io tbe northern provinces,evelopment would help the Kurds expand

ibeir control of tbc region aad make it far nsorc difficult tor Baghdad lo reverse their gainst)'

27

t

eiixihcr

eductior

tin lhc North (jeopardize ind till ty and. Doha

ji bO "I

" 'Projected oil

lubiiariiul foreign inveaimcnu, howcvci. shouldregime to forcttall scriou* deterioration in moil aspects ofxtensive aocial welfare system overhe neat several yean. The Amir's autocraticin probably be lhc focus of greater attention al the economic decline coniiauca and ai better educated youth attempt tony in Qaur's! iv ii" developmcni.oyal tceurily irrvice and tbc great wealth of meni Qatarii will probably preclude leiioui domestic.challenge* toegime in the near term

Dealing Wllh Decline The slowdown thai hit Qatar's oil-de pendent economy2 ia continuing. We estimate that real GDP has fallen by overercent lince thc recession ilsrted. PcVcapita GDP ha* tumbled fromo aboutthe eipatriiie populauon. Nevennejeas^ petioleum continues to account forercent of GDP.ercent oTeaporr receipts, nnd abouteroral of government revenue* The sharp contraction of the economy has had ihe positive cfti of eliminating lhc modest level of inflation'

Pricing problem* helped hold Qatar's oil producti about half of il* OPEC quotaast month. Tbc government ha* Steadfastly held lo oflVial salespertu crude in tke.facc of lower spot market prices,

iUnlike most olher Gulf oil producers, ihefQstar General Petroleum Company does notoreign equity partneriable outlet for and interest In marketing Qatar's high-quality crude oil.Moremet.

Qatar's small domestic uil^cTujjjig capacil* limit*bility to ciccumvcnt OPEC pricingy marketing petroleum products. Doha's three main oilCorp. and Mitsubishi of JapanSnot lifted contracted volurnesjn favor of

J evert he less, at recem'prrxluclionillion perforcing the government to draw down financial reserves to cover current expenditures.

Soft oil ma'kel conditions haveharp downturn In Qatar's foreign trade position. Despite the sharp eon traction of imports, IMF estimates ihow thai Doha's trade iu-sr!us fell by over half. The cut in imports has noi been even, wiih indastrial goods suffering the biggest decline. Import* qf industrial machinery fellercent below2 peak lan year, while impoflt of consumer gcods areereciccni0 million, underscoringregime'i interest-in maintaining consumer morale. The downturn* is even more pronounced in real termsof the depreciation of Ihc US dollar. The value of Qatar's currency and primarypegged to ihe dollar, which has illen byunercent against the currencies lajor trade panne

t

f

Ihc lots o! one bank would not cripple Ibe economy, the departure of several major foreign banks could hinder govern mem cfTorts to initiate new development projects such as tbc North Field gasmajor scheme to develop one of thc Largest natural gas deposits in Ihc world.

Y>2>

The JO-percent drop in oil export recdpls also haseavy toll on the national budget2 and foe eM The government lo adopt stringent fiscal .policies. Despite national belt-tightening in recent years, projected revenuesi billion and capenditureait billion will push thc deficitecord levelillion for the current fiscal year. The largest cult have come in capiiil expenditures, with Ihc exception of spending on defense projects such at thc completion of public works ai tbe Sayhyah military bate, additional improvements atrmy camp, and the installationew radar system ai Doha international airport Most operating etpenses have beeneaving government salaries untouched. The (all in coniraci,woik bai cut .deeply Into tbe living standards of expatriate workers,

Defense concerns arcrowing buiden on th. budgetime of reduced revenues. The continuing border dispute with Babraia over the Hawar Islands and ihe proposed sale of6 aircraft to Manama have raised defense concerto in Doha. The overnment it taking delivery of more0 million in French arms including surface-lo-alr missiles andradars, according lo the US Embassy in DohaVThc governmcni alto is consideringquadron of6 aircraft to offset (he Bahraini purchase. Dona arranged an oil barter with Paris to nuance its arms package, buiealdiscatniinued last November beca use of oil pricing problems. The government svill probably be forced io pay cash for new arms deliveries, furihi straining foreign etchange reserves^

55

* CaM

rN discouraging evwnomic performance over the pan sicijl >ear> txir.nils Millational wealth. ForeignprobsbK cunc SI2 billion. Protd crock oilrc wnteicnian ii current run of rtccwery* and Qaur's virtually untapped natural gas reserves arc trc fourth larfcti in Ihc world. The govemmeni hat irked its oil earnings io provide lheative-erceni of Ihe loulone of the mowsocial welfare systems in ihe world indodini substantial education, health.nd eitipsoymeni benefits. Natives also receive monthly -stipends ranging up to

senior positions thateconomic functions are pet foe r

Dealing with Ibe inflated expectations populationeriod of waninglmost certainlyrimary coacern^of the ;

mily members foVTshare of busitsess^spoilson-AI Thani

in family unity and alienate non-AI' are denied similar

Qataris

imponant. emerging demogrsphic trends will focus greater attention on tbe autocratic rule of lhe Amir. Qatari youih returning from siady abroad mayore meaningful rose in national politics Failure to provvde social outlets for increasingly affluent young Oataris raises the risk Ibai ihey will become alienated and engage in grealerpolitical activism. Moreover, the greed of rulinf family members and iheir abuse of authority could enhance the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism or other

m

ull If miSystem

fpururmi* (Af vrhrv Cuff aretesmg lam oednfird reswearsadeira1 on far iwopre- btuortary System. Partly bexeusr ofht LS dollar* detlinr. executive affictrs. front ihrall jit mrmbrr itatei of thr Gulf Cooperation Counell iCCCl have formally agreed on the principlroini exchange rareGCC goal liner In integrumystem mould provide additional nobility to Qatar's monetary sisiem ond foreign tradr poiition. Progress probably will be slow, however. because ihr GCC ileus muii first resolve

common monetaryUS dollar, ihe SDR,rade-wtighud boskei of International currencies. The SDR is the most likely peg because ll circumvents bargaining on lhe compositionurrency bosket and ihe linkage to the US dollar.

dogmas and open the door lo foreign specially from Iran. The Amir silll commands the loyalty of Qatar's small security forte, which has becn-succcssful in controlling social discomcni. bui lhe force would have difficulty dealing with coordinated or widespread endregime disturber

Tbe slowdown ia Qatar's economy will probably persri! ur.r* ihc iniicipaied rebound in oil demand and prices early in ibe aeat decade Although petroleum prices have firmed in recent months, we project that reduced capon volumes will cause real GDP to decline again ihis year. Nonetheless. Qatar's stjll-substantial wealth should allow ibe Amir to maTfliata living standards among ihe naiive population and preclude significant discontent over ihc economy during lhe neal several years.

Mote troubling it the government'* shaip teductionspending' Ovcrieilo.it fiscalttuV prospects foeno*nic growth.lo tun conn ruction ot the North fieldhat been delayed for several yeanof limited resources and the weak demandgas. Further delays in this importantadversely affect supplies of gasstar'sas indigertous supplies will declinein this decade. Thc drop in oilhas ledharp fall in the productiongas tsscd to fuel water desalinationprovide feed itoci for Qatar'sGas shortages reducedto as little si one-third of capacily fortwo years. Evenecision is reachedcheduled, industry ciperts doubt that gasBowing beforeocal gas shortage* inmeantime will probably force Doha to burn oil Instead

'^V ofgas. therebyducing crude oil revenues,

i

A decision io develop North Field gas for

require Qatar to make concessions on price

South Korean. Taiwanese, and Indiant well at Turkey aad several West European countries, ha

estpretaed Interest in buying substantia! quantities of North Field gasrice competitive with coal.rice would fall well below Doha's price basedasket of crude oils.ompromise on price will be necessary lo ensure growth of long-term hydrocarbon revenues and the reonornji lt*.

bi

Loya. Jtrsa: Key 10

inPost-Sosiei

The " an Loya"Great Count ii" of tribal, religious, and civichas been described by both thc Afghan resistance and regime leaders us the key to legitimate power in Afghanistan. Loya Jitgas have been calledew times in recent Afghan history, usually toew king or approve aruler's new policy direction, but the jirga has served as thc model for most Afghan legislatures arid advisory councils. Local government has traditionally beenout by smaller, more frequent meetings among village or tribal leaders known simply as jirgas. while tribal jirgas have been used for centuries lo seitkdisputes or decide tribal policy.ajBaaaa, <

Thc Kabul regime has triadc several alternpull three forms of jirga to enhance its kgiiimacy'-The0 Fundamental Principles of thcepublic of Afghanistan, which serves ai |aieonstitution. describes the jirga asighest organ of state power ofut one that cannoi be iere ripe."Theabul's currenti. i; Afghanista

jirga format. Tribal and community rejsrcscnialives in thc refugee camps have also made oicntivc use of smallersome cases with as few us five tribalsolve camp disputes or devise camp policies.

A Loya Jirga designed as partithdrawal arrangement may prove the most likely meant ofost-Soviet governmcni. Pakistani President Zia-ul-HiQ has oftenoya Jirga of delegates from Afghan resistance panics, refugee camps,People's Democratic Party of Afghanistanho would drawew Afghan constitution and allocate' governmcni positions. Although resistance leaders Ahmad Gailani and Sibghatullah Mojadedi willing io join such a.

fundamentalist leaders such as

.Gulbuddin Hckmaiyarand Abdul Ratul Sayyaf have proclaimed that they will never meet with Communist leaders. Resolving the question of who would participate inirga and what powers it would have mayoadblock to peace second only to that of lhe Soviet presence iiself. but wc believe itne thai must be resolved for Afghanistan tochanceiable post-Soviet government.

y

J>3

litkal Power t

oya

the Loya

i. probably in hope of unifying ihc (esisia nee.rue government-in-ciile, and furtherlhe Kabul regime's lack of legiiimacy. 'Arguments over who would be eligible io participate, 'however, haveesistance-led jirga from Attemptssd itd resistance leaderGailani to form Loya Jirgas0*

There have Iradillcinallyabeen three sources of law In Afghan society: Islamic law, tribal codes, and (he decisions reached by tribal and Loya Jirgas. Obedience-and respect in iradirional Afghan society arc based lesseader's lineage lhan on how well ihat leader fulfills his duly according to Ihc dictates of Islam and ihc tribal codes. Historically, Afghan kings ruled by divine sanction raiher than by divine right, 'Vtoovernment-in-eaile under former King u'er who disregarded Isjamjcandtriba^odes .

Zahir Shah fell through alter boycott ih/eais from ^aaiuipe- stwWnwawawaaMfSBWtPrciist^ncc ^

7 by fundamcntalisi leader Gfulbuddin to call jirga that has limited the power ofepresentative assembly in

camps in Iran and Pakistan and In "liberated.e. . >

of Afghanistan seems to be closely modeled on ihc *v .

47

The fill! recorded Loya Jirga look place inand elected Ahmad Shah Abdalj ai paramount chief and ihe fint king of Afghaniitan. Subiequcnt jirgat -ere called to itecnglhcn various rulers' claimi to Ihc throne or to approve controversial programs. The rnosi biattempt tooya Jirga's decnion wai made by King Amanullahirst jirga off Afghaniiian'i moil influential tribal eihnk. and religious leaders rejected the King'sincluded calls for separailon of mosque and state, thc unveiling gad emancipation of women, enforced monogamy, and compulsoryKing dabursded thc jirga aadmaller jirga ofovernmeni employees and luoporter* who promptly pa tied hb program. The first gathering was widely perceived ai

defying the Loya Jirga had proven himself an un-Islamicdeposed.ear's turmoiline-month reign by Habibutlab, tbe "Bandithe new King Nadir Khan astembled yetanother Loya Jirga to confirm his rule and revoke Amanullah'* hated reform program.1

the true Loya Jirga, and Kingby ' votes, while newspaper photos of thc jirgsi show small

children raising their hands to be counted along with

"-mm

Despite this bcffTttfEport. lhe Kabul regime appear* intent on using jirga-type assembliesemons irate mass, support for its program'

Jirga and Democracy .-

Traditionally, all adult men were eligible toelegate*oya Jirga. and all delegates had an equal right lo apeak Votes were taken cither by consensushow of Junes The decisionoya Jirga wat binding on all participants, regardless of their r'c-ium petition. Those dekcatett regarded ihe ruling were, severely puniihed. Despite ihc ilmilariiy between the jirga and thc New England town meeting where all members of acommunity may have their say. the jirga wai not an entirely democratic institution. Jirga were usually lhc tubal and religious elite and^ were often appointed by the very king whose policies theyere tu judge The Loya Jirga reinforced ihi* elite** ontrol over lhe populationihe .

woman who later Red to Pakistan claimi lhat her own "election" con listedummons from thc local parly headquarten. where she wailane ticket io Kabulrepared speech lo deliver upon her arrival Few Afghani take these staged jtrgas tcriovtii'jJlj'JfllBalVBlsa^HfllBtfafiBV and Kabul rctidcats joked that mcrraagn5 tribal jirga were probably resistance lighten Uking advantage of regime bribe*lee trip to Kabul.

f

The Loya Jirga in Afghan History '

_ Loya Jirga elects.Ahmad Shah Abdall as paramouiuthief and first king ofr "

mi

Amir Sher All summons'a Loya Jirga to approvc?lhc'suppreiilon Of his brothers

if .

Amir Abdur Rahman convenes a

Jirga to servepermanent advisory body.

"Amir Abdur Rahmanoya Jirga to approve his statevisit to India, If '

HI" * ' '! Abdur Rahman again cellsoya Jirgashaa rebels.

Klug Amanullahoya Jirga to approve the firstonstitution

King Amanullahoya Jirgaajor program of moSerntting reforms.

Hodtr Khan callsoya Jirga io confirm his elevation to the throne after deposing Amir Hablbutlah.

A Lore Jirga approves the cancellation of,he Anglo-Afghan treaties concerning the Duraad Line and demands the creation of -Poihlilniilan" oui of Pashtun lands on both sides of theorder.

A loya Jirga approves acceptance of Soviet military aid for Afghani item

King Zahiroya Jirga to approve aconstitution for Afghanistan costve'iing the countryonstitutional monarchy.

President Daud calls upon ato approve aAfghanistan into_

Bebrek Kermeloya Jirge to approve the Sonet -pmence in Afghanistan. Shsenters were thrown Into prison, while resistance fighters cut off both hands of two signetorlts two days after the proclamation's release.

ing Zahir collioyao approve the expulsion of Axis'. -nationals as demanded by Briimin and Russia.

'.ii

represented by local party members in regional jirgai. Representatives eiectcd by ihcie regional jirga- then .take part in dialrict-level jirgai- which in tarn report to provincial-levellystcm closely modeled on toe Sonet party lyitem bat given an Afghan eueer-witfa tbc nameI - y^^fr

Resolute* Aitrapuirga

cooperation between Insurgenuj resistance panic

kes.nar.ee attcanpti.to convene all seveninsurgent parties have been derailed by feuding between tbe groups, but smaller jirgai within Afghanistan have been successful In increasing

different

The resistance has also used thc jirga to adjudicate differences with Pakistani tribes and to win over previously pro-Kabul tribes.

Iniew, the greatest roadblockoya Jirga Is Ibe question of the council's Fundamentalbt leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar oppose thc panicipaiion of A'i have not taken direct part in lhe resistance osition wc believe it strengthened by lhe likelihood that thb group would support Gulbuddin'i traditionalist rivals. fA new, younger Afghan '

Icadcr-hip of baltle-tested commanders it also likel> to contest ihe chiefs and mullahs whoade up many jirgai" membership. We alto believe that traditionalist grourn such as Ahmad Ga Hani's National Islamic Front are likely to contest the legality of any Loya Jirga not formed alongiraditi-mal lines anducceed in blocking an> council not to their likin

Prospects

A Loya Jirga offers the best chance of setting up an interim government that has wide rcpretcntaiion while mil retaining the greatest appearance of legitimacy. It alioeutral formal thai would allow retiitancc and regime figures to work together without lotmg face. Representatives of both thc Kabul regime and lhemembers of lhe various ethnic, regional, and interestmeei to drawew Afghan constitutionlate of candidates for government positions. Tbc jirga might also agreeeutral figure inch ai former King Zahir Shah to leadovernment until elections could be held flh*aaV Jr*J

A successful Loya Jirga could alio help containactional violenceikely lo break outoviet withdrawal by-giving members of alln the new regime. It will take morereat Council" to heal tbe hairedi and divisions separating Commuabt Party members from the resistance and members of one ret itee party from another,raditionally legitimate institution thai brings members of all factions together and presses holds at leaituhc hope of a

ZahiroyoJirga willt the mosi appropriate model for an Interim or ju-ga. Unlike most previous Loya Jirgus. were sucked wiih kings men.4 Loya featured delegates who were appointed aad elected frurfn ihrocghout Afghanistan (including.h* first iTme. titebates were broadcait "daily, and. in anoiher first, dissenters wereo pui their arguments into writing, which wrre ihjn

i

circulated throughout Kabul.

jirga were later.nominated foreleeiioriftothe newisl athich wasatself^cdclcd on the

m

oya Jirga remains thai of

The crucial question^

- Odll Even'"

Afghanistan.

fundarnenl'alimiuch as Gulbuddin willingly lit down to negotiate.wiih .former PDPA memberi. it ia problematical.whether thc groupa could reach anoya Jirgaidely rccogaiiednac caiiooal assembly can. wc believe, serve ai the basis for mutual recognition between warring Afghan factions,irga begun hastily wit boot common ground for debate or the appearance of legitimacy is more likely to lead lo continued warfare and to servereteit for continued Soviet involvement in

0

rp

Nepal-North Korea: Drug. AllcrHion>rlatioiuhipajaj-aat,

Accumulatingvidence linking North Korean diplomat* to illicit ectrviiiei. ineludini drug trafficking, itrain on Katbmandu'> relation* v. iih P'tengtang. Revetaiiont in7 suggest thai Nonh Korea continues to abuse diplomatic pouch privileges io move signifkani

; of valuable contraband into and through Nepal. The practice has led tome off-tub ia KaihEiMa'to consider espelling Nonh Korean drpioensls or even call.nc for lbc entire mission to beNepal it unlikely to do eiiher. however, fearing revelationi of illegal activities by high-level Nepalcse officials and damage to its regional politics.!

i

1

NtpaktK Enforcement lieUbitiona Although"NonIi Korean connection" probeblr accounts for onlysmall part of ihc dmp Ihat caorc trtrougtt Nepal, iht involvement of ihc Nonh Korean minion with Ncpalcse underworld ftf ares luch ai Sharma underscores the challenge lo effective drug enforcement in Nepal. Antidrug dToru rauit contendopcusticatcd network ofi highly placed pairoru. international businessmen, and corrupt dipiomati. Thc government appears unprepared to take the mcaiurca necessary lo break the strong links protecting both drug traffickerssmugglers. Recent changes in drug interdiction procedures will do little more than harass small-time couriers and street dealers and have Utile influence on drug and smuggling kingpii

'Thelanned I'ipelegation to North Korea Hrbda>orth Koccan Prnidcal Kirn ll-song. No member of the royal family attended North Korean Embassy cerebral loos in Knlhmandu lo mark Kim's birthday.

V.'- -

The Government of Nepal is also backing away from commit menu to Seoul

o have

is declare Nepal]andearloKing':

. iorth Kor

ly are witling to take the risks

iplomau

involved in smuggling io make fast profits and to accept an occasional diplomatic casualty when patronage and diplomatic pressure cannot preven public disclosure. fJjggggw /

to joopardiK support for the countries by breaking diplomaticcvel punitive action.wantb,

Kathmandu responded to US_ndsiern pressures to improve its antidrug programnnouncing personnel shifts and evolutional

changes In latebc pioposed improvemems in ihc current amidrug corps could empower local officials iooreole

"ecu i

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