East and Soulh Asia Retiev, it.i
8 Maj Iva7
e refugees, both
Sudanese and foreign nationals, are being blamed for the country's economic ills and rising crime statistics. |1
b3
Option* In ibe Beirut Quirts,^jtmtt |J
The0 Syrian troops sent to West Beirut io February have succeeded somewhat in imposing order but have yet to confront their toughestIranian-supported Hiiballah and ihe pro-Arafat Palestinians. Syrian Presidcm Assad wants toirect miliiaryeonfrontation. but he cannotlsowdown indefinitely asMM'* >x
Stay run.'
)
announced economic reforms, designed primarily io improve ihe efficiency of Iraqi indusiries. are also intendedhow Ihai ihe governmcni can embark on bold economic measures while siopping Iranian invasion attempts. In the process President Saddam Husayn is weakenir* the influence of economic rar Ramadan and the Ba'ih P* jaaaaaa j.
Relipioui Aip
The regime of Ayatollah Khomeini has demonsiraied remarkable ^resilience in the face of economic hardship, political stress, and war weariness. This resilience stems in pan from religious elements peculiar to Iran including ihe cull of martyrdom and lhe notion ofa constant struggle between cock! and ggtlgfc-'
India's Think Tanksajjaajasf ,
India'sinfluenced by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's penchant for "expert"looking increasingly to think tanks for policy research and advice- The thinkinfluence is limited, however, by thc lack of institutional lies to the governmcni and the competition .of thc federal boruiKracygajaajjaj
31
Bl, &3
Sudan: Khartoum's Refugee Problems
| Theoth Sudanese and foreign nationals, are being Mamcd for the coumrjr'i economic ills and rising crime ita titties JgnBBuuauasnV UanuBHaaUBBUBaam lhe iaiemaiional concern mi: hasr ikeorcing ihc government to be more cautious in its approach.
With international pressure increasing and with the onset of summer heat and the Ramadan fail which impede government action, we believe Sudan will refrain from further action* against the refugees in ihe near term. Unless tome effort is made to resolve ihe country's refugee problem, however, icpiesiion mayecurrent feature of. lhe government's
response io the refugee influx.
Khartoum's
Khartoum's refugees include displaced persons primarily from southern Sudan, who have fled north because of thc war in lhc south, and political refugees from inriouncijnc oiuniric^nfMaaUuaWlHholitical refugees come primarily from the Eritrean province of Ethiopia but also from Other African states nr-:neir.Tii civil political
international aid
study estimatedthiopian refugees alone in Sudani three Largest eat ternPort Sudan, and Kassala.
Thc fighling in southern Sudan is contributing heavily lo (he body of refugees at displaced Sudanese flee north lo escape thc effect! of the conflict Both thc insurgent! and tbc government arc using food luppiieseapon Farmers in the south have refrained from planting became lhe ciops are regularly pillaged Many from the rural areas have taken refuge in cities, abandoning ibeir land, further reducing food
j the lack of food and security and thc desire for schooling and steady jobs have encouraged southerner) to etcape io the north where there is ai least hopeelter life
Fleeing wars or political harassment, most foreign refugees arrive In Sudan by walking across ihe country's unmoniiored borders and making iheir way to Khartoum. Many of the Ethiopians first go io camp* on Sudan's border with Ethiopia and (ben make their way io Khanour
There are three leveli of refugee life In Khartoum. The best off are ibosc that have relatives who will help support them until (hey caa find work lo support :hem*clvcs The next arc those in refugee utile menu strategically placed nuuidc city limits, often in garbag'et supplied wllh food, waier. and some medical aid. Thc last group I* forced to set up makeshift huts in unfinished houses within thc city. These are usually unregistered refugees, primarily Ethiopians, and arc Ihc most in need of aid.
Deteriorating living condition* have contributedowing tension irr*Kbartoum- Sudaa't capital city, which due* not have the public services to supportin ihc best of circumstances, ii caracially burdened with the growing influx of refugees. Food prices have increased, pulling an adequate diet out of reach of the poorest groups. Government ultima claim criminal behavor neb ai alcohol production and talc and prostitution have men Local resident! regard refugees a* compctitoi* for Jobs. food, and medical eare.
RecrM Go-erwmewt Action*
The government, insing lhc refugee populationcapegoat for Khartoum's economic illi Beginning in7 Ihe government ordered
hi
(he police Io reduce (he refugee population, according (opress rcporl. The main focui wa* on foreign refugees because displaced Sudanese have advocates wiihin Ihe governmeni who uefend iheir rights. All. however, were ^ffeee police fcv^ ^ircttinx refugees as well as forcing whole neighborhoodsove away from Khartoum.P"
-t- . of (he
arrested refugees were beaten, aad sometreatment Homes were entered andwere hearsay reports of women bong(lhc women refused to be interviewed).were foe coday bribes or were robbedcash Ihey had on hand. Often Ihe police dealtdcniihcalion cardi. placing ihe refugee inMains and therefore subject toRefugees, afraid of further abuse, havelo register complaints
Outlook
If ihe war in the south escalates or even continues ai iu present pace, southerner* will continue to migrate north Mcteoi-et. ibe Ethiopian refugees will probabi) remain in Khanoum as long at thcopian situation remain* chaotic. Deteriorating economic condition*earch for *capegoaii could prompt repeated crackdown* onn lhc went case, fighting could break Out between the refugee population and (he police which could result in (be wholesale slaughter of rclugeet
a*.
12
/
Syria-Lebanon: Damascus'* Options in tbe
Beirut
1 he0 Syrian iroopa tent io West Beirut and in cmiroos in Februarysucceeded soenc*hai in imposing Older in Ihc city buiti lo confront iheir loof heatIranian-supported radical Shia Hiiballah and (he pro-Aiafat Palestinians. Syrian Piesidenl Assad views boihallied io each otherintolerable threatsis influence over events in Lebanon because neither loots to Damascus for guidance. Although Assad wants to delay direct military confrontation wiih bothpartly in hopes of reaping political gains from his iroopprobably cannot avoidshowdown indefinitely
b3
Tbe security situation in West Benin, already has begun to deteriorate and threatens to preempt Aland's efforts to use hb miliury intervention in the ciiy to exact political concessions. Pretsuit on hb troops lo take tougher militaryncreasing daily Growing tactical cooperation between Hizballah and ihc Palestinians in attacks on thc Syrians compounds ihc danger that Assad's tenuous security plan will eolUi
Picas reportsomb eaptooeoyrian barracks in "iyah. south of Beirut, killing several Syrian soldiers Syrian intelligence arrestedombing suspects rcccnily. many ofallegedly were paid by Falah lo conduct aiiscks against Syrian military personnel in Wut Bein,t,
Faciera leading te the February Uirxenlioe Assad iccognized lhe risks involved in sending his troop lo Weal Beirut bui viewed 'he move si Ihe only way to reassert Syrian influence in Lebanon. His most
import am surrogate militia in Lebanon, ihe modciaic Shia Amal. bad held Palestinian camps under aiege for siaSyrianhad failed lo break lhe Palestinian irtiitancc. With Amal growing disillusioned and ill uniiy breaking down. Assad had no other suriogitt through which he could accomplish hb objectives in Lebanon. He also mayhave estimated that by demonmatiag resolve io address common concerns inas the hostage crisis and Huballah's expandingbe could repair bb image with lhe Westparticularly ihe United Slates and Great .. najaj ^
Al the lime of Ihc Syrian troop deployment to West Beirut, signs of Syria's weakened position in Lebanon included
The failure of Amal io crush ihc prc-Atafat neb ten in ihe Palestinian refugee camps.
Tbc growing strength and autonomy of radical Lebanese Shias in the pro-Iranian Hiiballah organization.
The re* merge nee in Weal Beirut of leftist Lebanese
that *ainauaua%aVaa'M
aiding the Palestinians in ihe battles against Amal.
inability to influence Hiiballah regarding lhe foreign hostages in Lebanon aaVwgaW . "i
la out view. Assad alsoparticularly eager to
'mprove bis international image after lbc Kindawi
trial bi London last October eiposed Syria's ccniral
role in lhe attempt to bomb an El Al passenger jet six
months eat her. Assad almost certainty hoped that by
restoring order in Wetl Beirut and possibly seeming
thc release of some of the hostages, she United Slates
and Great Britain would relas seme of ihcir
nd commercial restrictions imposed on
Syria afletgg>
Assad's Stralegy PaysFar
Assad's decbion la send troops inioBeirut began io pay off almost immediately, providing him with new leverage in lhe Lebanon arena. Brig. Gen.
i)
4
Gii an'an, Syrian Miliury Iniclligenccn Lebanon, warned thai Da mat cut would "tinke with an iron hu at all ihoac wbo upset publicyrian troop* carried oui Kan'an'* ulumat'jm. shooting any militiamen daring lo carry weapom on Weat Beirul itreeit.eek tbe troop* had succeeded in getting moat militiamen oR Ihc tirecta, forced ment Hizballah fighters to abandon (heir ttroegrtu'Ciu it the predominantly Shia southernnd pressed Amalift thc aiege of the Palestinian cam pi
Assad almoatllied from the ou.act that hit plan could backfire and drag hit troop*ong and bloody light tn the iiiecta of Beirul. To diicouragc potentiale demonstrated bit readmeai to we loece by sendingrmoredand infantry fightingBeirut International Airport and Ihcf Khaldah. ;uit touih of Beirut. Nonriheleit. teveral limtlationi toon became evident.
S
Th* Syrian interveniiori ditilius.oned many Anul miliiiamcn who taw ii a* preventing victory againsi Che Palestinian camps. They -etc tlowooperate in Syrian-
The Syrians could not seize all weapons caches and small arms from Weal Beirut miliiiamcn. They conducted
bui did not resort IO lhe bruial mopping up laeiics they have used in the pasi against Sunni residents of Tripoli and againsi Muslim Brotherhood suspect* in the Syrian city of Hamah
Battles
Syria's distribution in April of several true Heads of weapons and ammunition lo Amal fighters in thc Sidonmain stronghold inand siattoniag ofyrian troops along the coastal road north of ibe eiiy suggest ihai Assad will encourage Amal lo renew Its siege of the Pateitlnian camps around Sidon. Assad probably will move gradually againsi thc Palestinians, however, because he does act wan! to rrovcie criticism from Arab lit lea and tbc Soviet Union, especially so soon after the Palatine Nationaleeting in Algiers and his own trip to Moscow. Asiad probably will continue bolstering Amal miliiiamcn in Sidon by delivering more weapons and supplies io them and infiliraiing more Syrian irnopt as advisers, if iweeistry
Although Assad prefers to use Amal in attacks againsi the Sldon-bascd Palestinians, he itmotl certainly is gauging Ihe riski involved in deploying
Assad is unlikely toignificant number of troops from ihe Beirut area to Sidon. particularly if Syrian-Hiiballah relations in the capital remain potenlially explosive. If be decides the situation in Sidonore direct and sizable Syrian military commitment, he probably would have to deploy additional forces into Ubanone almost certainly wants to avoid aasjau
b3
Sldetlrpplng Hizballah
In our view, Assad wants to delay military confrontation with Hiiballah as long as possible, preferring to reap whatever political gains he can by appearing to have tbc upper hied in West Beirut Accordingly, he appears so far to have dented, at least publicly, lhe seriousness of attacks againsi his troops in West Beirut in order lo sidestep an immediate need for Syrian miliury action. Syrian officials in West Beirut even denied ihat the Jiyah barracks weie bombed onpril, despite press reports on casualties tod ibe ambulance traffic between Jiyah and Beirut. Barring continued meerCation by Damascus with Hizballah leaders or Ihcir Tehranackers, thereigh risk ihat ihe isolated clashes occurring between Syrian soldiers and Hiiballah flghlcit will expandosilier confronution in lhe-Hiiballah-dominated southern i'l '/
Asiad may recognize ihat any attempt lo eradicate Hiiballah by force would be ceenterprodactire Attacks would weaken Hirballah initially, bui over lime the orginiuikon probably would profit by attracting sympathisers from ihe already splinteied Lebanese Shis community and. possibly. Lebanese leftist' Thc cosis to Damascus would be high and
4
*>
Include broken relation! with Tehran. Hiiballah terrorist attacks Initde Syria, and increased radicalism among Lebanese Shias. To increasedifficulties and embarrassment. Jitballah might also kill some or all of ihc hosuges.
Assad's strategy instead may be to iry to press Tehran to abandon its support for Hiiballah He might threaten to prohibit Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel, their supplies, and Hizballah officials from transiting Damascus Airporl between Tehran and Lebanon He may also more mote forcefully lo shut down Iranian and Hiiballah facilities around Ba'la balk,major clement* of lhed Armored Brigade irzed wguVHET
Crcalar Beirul Security
Syrian leaders hav spoken of expanding their security planast Beirut by baring the Lebanese Army take control of the Christian areas and removing- -by force ifLebanese
Forees miliiia. This propotal wiltong shot, in ourtang a* ihc Syrian-Lebaneie peeridentialal Icdjfasjlaja,
We believe Assad want*void deeper commiiment* in Beirut, but eventt beyond hi* coniroi may force him further into ibe morns. Although Ghaii Kan'an ho* said "Lebanon it only Quicksand foi enemies, noi for those who arc of thc samet is unlikely that Syria can control theeirut while occupying only parts of the city. Should Assad decide thai he must move against Hiiballah or the PLO. we believe hi* assessment of the potential gains in his relationship with lhe United Slates will be an important, although not preeminent, factor in hit deciuon ma king 'ugMouT
Recently announced economic reforms, designed primarily lo improve lhe efficiency of Iraqi industries, are alto intended to show thai the iovermen! can embark on bold oconomic mcaturci while (topping Iranian invasion attempu. Ia tbe process. Iraqi President Saddam Hutayn appear, to be weakening tbe influence of Brn Deputy Prime Muunr,economic oar Taha Yasin Ramadan, hit strongest rival on the RevoiuUooary Command Council Tbe tncaiarta arc alto likely to erode lhe decaioeuriaking authority of ihe ruling Ba'ih I
HHi Ecwnomlc Ideology The Iraqi Ba'ib Party's allegiance i'o socialism developed during thc dayi when it wai out of power. The Be'lbuu grafted roclaliim onto Iheir main unci. Arab natiooalttm. to broaden tbetr appeal in ccmni.iion with leftist gol.ticai partis ia lhe lateaccessingcademic ttudtca. The Balhim. for example, (bared an ideallatform with Egyptian Presidentunity, freedom, and
BiUilU have never frirccenfortablowith socialism, and it hat remained Ihe vaguest of (He. manor"
Tbe Ba'lhiats have grown increaiingly unhappy with Ihe ineffideascies in Iraq's social Ul economic system. These ine Pice noes tare butdenaoroe by wartime strains. Because of these factors and Saddam's light grip on power, he batery aome eoonomk experimentation without undue concern for sniping from the party's ideological hardliners. Al tbc last regular party congress1 lhe need for greater economic efficiency was stressed. Several of the recenl changes sought by Saddam ware floated at thai lime. High war casualties and reduced government revenues from lower oil prices have increased thc farce of these arguments1
Projecting Cc^&dewce
We Seltcve lhal Saddam's mention io the economy it intended not only to Improve its operaiion but alto lo periuade the public thai Baghdad can both nop
jtanjanjound attacks and focus on civilian concerns.Iraqi Government Itood of almost pugnacious confidence, bragging about Tehran's failure to dcfeai Iraq during Iran's widely louitd Year of Decision, -nidi ended in March. In our view, caieasivc domestic media coverage of the economic reforms and calls for greater effort by lhe populace are intended to rdnrigoraic civiUan mpport for the war by underscoring the importance of indjyidusli' effort, rewarding their work, andI holding out hope of an eventual return to normal $aaa%
A Target uf the Reform* The economic policy changes have led to ipcculation Ihc power aad tutus of First Deputy Prime
ey player In Iraq's politics
far beser- tbe surface, cr.pted last 'July aad led. in pan. to aa extraordinary regional congress of the Ba'lh PanyJ
Moreover. Saddam probably grudgingly valued Ramadan'i decisive handling of economic mailers and his willingness and ability to implement ir bul necessary austerity measures.
The Economic Change!
Baghdad's rttrti economic pclicy changes Include:
steie supervisory organisations that
" f'i Tkll -nil remove t
layer of bureaucracy between the ministries and stale-Ownedfirms.
rules and regulations thru these enterprises riew as excessively burdensome.
Giving more authority lo public-sector Industrial enterprises, which will be allowed lo plan and implement production, expansion, modermsatton. and Import-export policies.
ShutHlnt several ministry posit. Including oil, heavy Industries. Industries, and transport and
reater financial Incentivesmployes. Managerswill receive SO percent of any Increased productivity. Salaries and promotions will be based more on performance than on seniority and loyalty. In most coses, the Incentives ctfer the possibility of eajsettlng reductions lit wages and benefits.
public-sector unions and eliminating lhe distinction between public-sector managers (technocrats! and blue-cottar workers.
The elimination eg me aitiiniiiontechnocrats and workers probably will enable workers to move into lobs where they are needed mart.
I
Lifting limits on investment by the private sector to top private wealth. Private firms probably wilt face fewer government strictures 'j
The moil rcteni economic poJiet changes suggest Saddam ii again cbippintal Ramadan'* authority, pcihaptreludeeitvWg htm from ifee Revolutionary Cetfiimaae) Council DcirWic Ramadan'i prominence ia the economic aVLL Saddam haiadoded mm from ihc timel.(hi accompanying what appear io be ihc mmi significant economic rcformi in ftao since thejuuiona lira (ion of lhe oil1
b
)
Moreover.
Saddam haireater economic role to his cousin llatim Abd al-Rasbid. tbc new Mmater erf Industrie*eading proponent of lhc reforms. This certainly is at Ramadan'* eapuitc
Saddam may also be able to eaploil weaknesses io Ramadan'i performance to reduce hi* authorityegular regional congress that could occur this year. Allhough Ramadao has not been criticisede is vulnerable to charges that he failed to introduce the reforms himself during hb long slim as economic
The continuing arrciu and execution* ofand bualoesimeoamageBaghdad has been conducting an caaspaiga forear to correctimage of the government and thcinstigations have revealeda scale that wrpriied many obacrveri.hadairly clean reputationEastern
aTehkr stewardeconomy, hi* reputation may be taintedsaocilion awaaaWa
12
_Wf.fcEoiPg of ibrjti'lb party
economy refurrm
reflect, in pan.rTorts io enhance hishe expense of die Ba'th Party
htt view
correct, the parlyoff from mastbe increasingly reduced in
Outlook and Imptica'jon* The rapid and drimaiic nature of thc economic reforms suggests ihai Saddamjs committedourse thai gives more emphasis in lhe economy io the private seccn al the expense of the public seel or. He appears confident thai he can enact them over any opposition in the Ba'ih Party. These moves arc an accelerationrend thai tbc Ba'ihitu initiated early in. Ramadan and others closely identified with centralized socialism are likely to see their power erode at the expense of reformers
Saddam's repeated public warnings to foot-draggcrs and "deviaiionists"suprisingly-thai some governmcni and party officials are resisting Ihe reforms. Saddam's shuffling ofjTunjstty posts and his readiness to replace officials who stand in his way make significant opposition unlikely, faaunun. ^
If Ramadan boosted from thc Revolutionary Command Council, thrs would remove one of the few strong figures in Iraqi politicsrincipal contender lo succeed Saddam Husayn. The remaining potential successors on the Council are Saddam loyalbls. deputy party leader tixat Ibrahim end Minister of Defense Adrian Khayrallah. Saddam's cousin and brother-in-law. Ramadan is not knownignificant following In tbe military or security services. Although many longtime Ba'thisu probably would resent the removal or demotionedicated party woikcr, they would be unlikely to move in Raroadan's defense. Many Ba'thisu. however, will be unhappy over the growing concentration of power in the hands of Saddam and his relatives, and thb could be the basis for future difficulties for Saddxm.eBJpp-
k3
7)
Iran: Religious Aspects of Regime Resilience|fM
regime of Ayatollah Khomeini hasremarkable resilience in ihc face of economic hardship, oolnical slreu. and -if weariness. This resilience stems in partet of religious elements peculiar to Iran. Key among these dements are the cull of marlyidom in Iranian Shiitm and ihe notiononstant struggle between good and evil. Tbc Khomeini regime carefully manipulates these elements in Iranian religious belief to tcgitimiic its authority The regime is helped by thc passivity of Iranians in thdr relationship with astbority. thc strong ties between tbe clergy and the people, and Ayatotilb Khomeini's unique position is arbiterheocratic republic.
Mtrtjrooe. and law Fight Againat Ell .
In Shis religious belie' ai practiced in Iran, good it constantly at war with evil, which will attemptorrupt.lh rough seduction and blandishment. Thc faithful, therefore, must engage in an active campaign toevil.
The Khomeini regime has manipulated ibis belief through Its encouragement or martyrdom and its vilification of thc West. Iran is presentedastion for theepublic dedicated to upholding tbe Islamic way of living As sucharget for tbc crscroaching forces of evil, personified by tbe Western countries and their surrogates, the Iraqi Ba'thisu. The Khomcml regime maintains that under the Shah Westerners were given full control in Iran Western culture corrupted Iraasan youth and brought disruption. This situation was rectified when Ihc Westerners were expelled by the Islamic revolution Only by constant vigilance, following Islamic strictures, and behaving in ways that encourage others to follow can Ihc forces of evil be kept distant.
Iran's cult of martyrdom is tied to this notion of vigilance The Islamic revolution modified ihe Iranian perception of Imamrandson of Muhammad and lhe preeminenl many of Iranian
efore lhe revolution, Iranians viewed Husayn in almost mystical termsoly person. One could at tempturry hb favor by honoring htm and invoking hb name. With the Islamic revolution. Husaynigure to be emulated. Khomeiri compared Ihe Shaharid. Husayn's opponent andIhc personification of supreme evil in Iranian Shibm. Khomeini likened thc anil-Shah dcmontirators to Husayn for their willingnessacrifice themselves to fight oppression andust society. In becoming martyrs they, loo would be worthy of emulation
Tbc Iranian Government hat exploited this martyr cult to gamer popular support for thc war with liaq. Thc Ba'thlst Iraqiresented as ihe surrogate for ihe Western forces of corruption Tbc Kbeencini regime calls on the Iranian people to sacrificehe manner of Husayn. As Husayn gave his life, so must ibe fighter; as Husayn's partisans suffered deprivation, so must ihc Iranian people. Only then can evil be thwarted and Iran remain pure. Tbc Iranian prcas prints Stories of martyrs, their final wishes and aspiraiious. and present! ihem as models to be emulated PuMicaisons oriented toward children call on ihem to prepare themselves for manyidom
The FJenvmtal Role of (be Orrgy The Iranian clergy hate strong connections among the people, particularly wiih the urban and rural poor Through religious gatherings, the clergy take pan ia ihe life of the people. To those who have recently migrated lo Ihc city these religious riluabense of community In return, the urban poorumber of clerical organizations, such as the
Stua manias. Iw Mubib un<
UMHe Istaawi SSUassSVUhss, He mm linfe -ai
se-oc. hr
KiaaiwiUwa MefciWrre*wi a*
c.ii-ji" lornr'aiiwtMailimi is imrinsl
ImammallIM IwraiaiM ai KtrMla i*
fA- Islamic republic makescVr models to entourage children to ottept martyrdom In oelieht prepared for children, ike Hones of moeiyri of it' ate
at children'sioniline soldier tells lhe Interviewer thai he ihlnks not of his brother who was seriously wounded, but of his friend who was martyred In closing the interview, ihe soldier states that he. too. wishes to be martyred
Another example contrails the tires of two Iranian women Zahra. who follows Islamic strictures, and Feronk. whoestern lifestyle. Zahra is the perfect Muilim student. She observes Islamic dress codes and hasocal martyr. Mohsen. as her role model. She supports the sending of adolescents to the front and draws pictures of shelr
military exploits Feronkife of friwtlity She
does noi observe Islamic dress codes or seek
good example for others. Instead she is
merely with laughter and beauty.
fundamentalist Feda'yin al-Islam (hu carded cut assassination of tovernrrttnLotficiaU deemed ami-Islamic during tbe Shah's reign.
The komiteh system, whereby the mcaque cares for local needs, is an outgrowth of these religious gatherings andechanism for regime
controlhe revolution rationingomlrations were coordinated through IV mosques, and man) of Ihe pwut look nSlhe local clergy for guidance. The clergy's role is reinforced by ihe Shia belief in acquiring merit by doing gaud-norks and by the faci that in tbe tight social environment of ihe nilagc or neighborhoodudged by one's peers The regime sets standards for behavior that are then transmitied through the komiteh network. Viri tiers are liibttuffer immediate clerical and popular rebuke. This system enhances the regime's leverage to aa at tbc ultimate arbiter of society. Became thay art sohe Iranian Government attempt! to control the appointment! of Friday prayer leaders.
Khaaarkd as Arbiter
Ayalotlah Khomeini derives much of bis power from his position as marjacleric qualified to lule on theological issues. Credulous Iranian Sbias levere marja taqlids as intercessors with ibe divine, and ihey believe that following (he teachlrtgi of one will bring Ihe believer special rnerii Through tab position Khomeini can legitimate the notion of Itlamic governmeni.o sanctions revolutionary hagiography that identifies him wiih Imam Hutaynestroyer of evil. Thb has exploded the ingrained Iranian traditionuler, one who does not submit to anyone, lo provide supportslamic rule.
26
India's Think Tanks
eJicinjl
in: looking increasingly io think links to* policy research and advice. Gandhi moeis occasionally wiih leaeaichers lo discuss political and government issues, and hu sccrciarialumber of forme- think lank slalT members. Nonetheless, governmcni olllcials use private policy research and analysis onlyersoneliied. ad hoc basis, and India's large network of independent foreign, defense, and domestic policy institute* does notradition of close ties to theThink links compete wiih brers of federal bureaucracy Ihai irate them from government occasionmakers
Ho. Think Tanks Work la India X
Indiauliitude of think tanks largely staffed by nodal scientists, ca-journalists, and retired military personnel who publish research and analysis on political/securtly issue* and domestic tad economic policy. Although thc central governmcniesearch clearinghouse designed lo solicil attalytis from think tanks.4be instiiutes" influence la largely restrictedersonal access their members moy
foundations, public-sector companies, and state goveinmenia also back think tanks. The ICSSR's mandate covers research, fdtowshtps. foreign cotuberalion, and funding for aboutesearch institutci The cssis. government Insiiialc for Defease Sled tea and Analysis, perhaps India's inott influenl.il ihink lank, rs Ihe only mayor institute Ihat does not follow the ICSSR funding pa Hern.
Hew Candy nedMrt Usealks
Theesignederve onlyeansorward governmcni research proposalsonsultants, who Ihen advise ICSSR which proposals should beigurehead directororps of powerful research department heads administer the
ough Gtndhi has not changed
government and independent policy researchers foimally interact,ore open lhan his predecessors to nongovernment ideas, and he sporadically calb in members of various Ihink links lo discuss policy options. For example, bsi March the Prime Minister's secretariattudy of Gandhi's performance during hit firs! two years in
*1
iwi
for Poliry Rrtearek iCPRi One of lYetrf Delhi's moil luiifiiful social science reieo'ch Institutes, CPU's Influence has grown underandhi, who occasionally meets with ils stoS to ducuit pollllealfphtloiophieal issues, according to thr Embassy. Thr Centers naff includes well-known foreign affairs commentator Bhaboni Sen Gupta and former IdIT etonomiii like, Ahlvwahtio. wtfr of hfonietighly respected economist in the Primeecretariat.
Ceaierfoe the Study of India* Development In the Modem World (CSDSl CSDS. lhe grandfather of Indian think tanks, was creased}andful of academics left tracking for fvtl-iime
Economic Instilutei-.
tight mom economic research institutes around Now Delhi hare more established inslilutional tin than those of the social science and foreign policy think tanks. The economic institutes also have more influence in few Drlhi ikon other policy institutes. Whenandhi came to power, h, ttafftd key finanre. planning, and industry poors wHh. rconomic theorists, and the. associated with the research institutes pnrtde intellectual backing for tketrolisailon policies designed ond implrmrntrd by their gomrnmemhe mofor economic research Institutes include ihe Indian Council for Rctroreh on International Economic Relations. Notional Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Economic Statistics Research Ctnier. and National Council of Applltd Economic Research.
iry of External Affair*apci oe India'* re*datMni and atvcral minUtrlet submitting draft policy papers on education and public- sector priring for review by reseirch Inst itutra ksanatwat
We believe Indian policymakers also value press articles for Ihcir alternative policythe same -ay they use think tanks The Indian press often runs articles -riuen by senior think tank analysts outlining alternative viewpoints and crytialiitini
debates en key naues. For eiampit ibe Timet of Indiaujwkith ankle by tDSKubrsmaniam attributing the lisoo-Pakistani borderonfrontation in January to Pakistani "provocationThc paper alsoebuttal from Pran Chq
)
)
btt)
Pakistan:roblems!
Unemployment is bcoamin, annt_econormc problem and political nsiiebased On poo-
qualtly data, suggestillion people-almostercent of the laborbe without jobs by (he end of Pakisun's ncsi five-year planJ.fromercentS. Long-ierm. trends (oward ircatcr capiul intensity in industry and agriculture, as well as Ihe return of workers from lhe Middle Eait. captain much of (he opecicd deterioration. Political leaders arc emphasizing (he need to create more jobs, especially for educated
m* emu w
doaianilnjannt
In Use. accordinf inPakisuai
employment almoti kept pace witfc
perceni annual gro-th la (hebor force.
Until recently, net migration of workers lo jobs ia the
Mieldle East also pnsvided signmcani relief from
nemployment problems. Real wages for
skilled workers and for agricultural Ubor probably
rose during Ihc decade before
survej
da la. I
Overall unemployment in Pakjitan is almost surely greater thanere*ot rale reported in government surveys' Survey dauarked increaseJ5 in unemploymem among educated workers in urban2.J
Ji..
a.inn,li. iIn mnmmbjuW rat*' "
percenierceni for university graduaiea andeiccnierceni for workers wiih some postsecondary education ajajann ^
Ciuses
Initrnnlionnt Mittmliem,1 oveneas employment wai oquivilent toerccntofthedorr.es tic work ' gttneBw>laaTe eaodus of these workers not only reduced thc supply of labor, but remittances increased incomes and ihc demand for goods BadthereforePakastan.
J So far. bowewei, moti returning wcukers seem lo hire reentered lhe Pakiruai labor force without great diffiCuliy.J
A sharp reduction in the number of workers leaving for2 to0 inmarked the suns employment situai
ercent remain jobless for eitrnded rxriods, according to the more pauimlsttc of6 surveys, but Palciiunl officiab believe ibey do so by choice until iheyob lo their liking. According6 surveys, workers bring back acc.mulaiedtronger self-image, and sometimes new ,uiu. so that many attempt io shift fiom unskilled labor to small
erm TWnafr. We believe population growth and changes in demand for labor ar; causing more unemployment (ban the change in inicrnaiionei migration Because fcttsliiy rates were high la IkestillPakistan's labor force has been growing rapidly Ai the same lime, changes in
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Afghan Rtfugees
Afghan refugees art probablyajor factor in ihr national unemployment problem, although in northwestern Pakistan their casual and teascmal work to supplement refugee benefits may hare driven down wage rates somewhat. Puihtun competition for Jobs In other pans of the country, sometimes attributed lo refugees, probably comes. Pakistani.
pretence of the refugees may have spurred Pushtun migration from lhe northwest, adding to unemployment problems In olher parts of Pakistan
agriculture and manufacturing nave been rcdudnt thc number of worker* riecclcd per unit of output.
Mechanization and comnvereialiiatioo of agriculture are mating it profitable for large- and medium-size fantct to replace permanent hired with fewer tours of carnal lat
Ihese labor diiplacing
corucxiucnca of changes rnlgrtcultura! technology are becoming increasingly itnportani. Censusndicate that nonfarm workers have alreadyarger share of the rural labor force, rising fromercent2 toercentfgRfgh
Earlier steps to moderntce agriculture increased demand for labor. Extension of irrigation brought more land under cultivation. Technical cbanges thai began with the Green Revolution ofpermitted imensified use of land to yield more than one crop per year and required more hours of labor to make effective use of purchased inputs such ai
b3 ,
Ir^usirial trends presage growing difficulty In adding employees at Ihe same time as the population shift from rural areas to towns and from towns to eiiies in Punjab andpparently accelerating. Even small-scale industries, which account forercent of the Industrial labor force and need much less itlvesiment per employe, are becoming more capital
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internee
Entrepreneur!BneTrnachnwa easTcTtocaller to lay ofl or wort,than poorly trained, liberate -orkcri*eangjK
Political
Governmeni concern aboutisingPrime Minister ,unejo hat directed that top priority be accorded projects thai create additional employment, particularly for the educated unemployed. Hb Five-Point Ecottontic Program for ruralnd social services, which was announced inncludes comprehensive employment plans, and, inunejo promised to offer jobs to all unemployed doctors and engineers. The chief ministerf the North West Frontier Province hu repeatedly described unemployment as the biggest problem facing hb government. President Zia. less alannist, . ecently noted that uncmptoymeni may become a major problem during tbc neat few years. afwhW
Opposition parties have also taken up the unemployment theme
Benazir Bhutto notedthat job creation would befocus of her economic policies. Thc laborber Pakistan People's Parly announced inhowever, focuses on benefits for workersalready
Outlook
Pakistan's unemployment probjarm is likely toloere over thejgxt icveratc! labor use
ercent armuaTgrowth in gross domestic rxoduct indicate (hat lhc national unemployment rate could grow loercentJ. Faster overall growth or lower real wages would provide more jobs. Foreign payments problems that resulted in austerity -ould lead to even hijrieTffgbfi In'^j
The politics of unemployment is likely lo become an increasing problem for the government. Pan employmentMkaraaaau*tiM* lUggcsl that youth with some secondary education bul no professional qualifications will bea- the brunt of ihr
so
problem. This is (he grouprobably moi( prooriolence and mosi readily available for poliUcal agnation Vggnnnb
tmploymcei problems and ethnic ccmfict an Karachi, in pantcwlar. may intensify aa more workers rtlura from fobs in lhe Middle Fsst Pushtuns arc ovcrrcpresented among overseas migranli compared wiih ihcir share in (heopulation, and man) lived in Karachi betore leaving for overseas employment Lack of growth in employment opportunities in northwestern Pakistan could aboa an increase in the Pushtun share of Karachi's population and therefore in the potential for conflict. Karachi already suffers far greater ethnic violence and has more disaffeciedjrowjii Jbaj},any other city in the country.
Ebcwbcre In Pakistan, probtcsns cacaed by Changes ia inteinational migration may not be severeJMHkawMBSB^skPakisiani officials do not see unemployment of returning workersotential cause of political unrest in the near1 SnV .the number of
reluming workersbe loo small and iheir return stretched over tooeriod to lo-er'national wage raies sagnihcandy.^ggnV >
political focus onbUc^ecTo<^obsicscbcn. and engineersanto pressuremall group and ismoney through OversiarTmgrevbion of trade and industrial policiescapital-intensive production. It also callstraining aad credit lo proosote smallaad Klf-csriploymcni in
17"
oils Complicatebk msufjMk1
Daoot'try (the Souih Allan term for banditry) bat become one of the moai persistentnd-order problem! in Pakistan. Oacoit gangs terrorize local citizeni. primarily in Sind Province, wjlh almost dail;urgiancs. and highway robberies.
arr of Cultural Hbtocy acoiu are deeply rooted in Sindhi socieiy. they have kmc served landlords and religious leaders in rural Sind as protectors of property and enforcers of authority within areas under their control. In return for sustenance and sanctuary, the dacoils harassed their patroni' rivals and kept the peasants in line.
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In recent years, the ties between dacoiu and landlords have loosened, and ^fji'toiit have asicned their
factors have contributed to this newfound aasertjsxness but point to the demonstrations3 by the Movement for the Restoration ofthe primary opposition alliance inihe most significant. They believe the government's failure to suppress tbe dcmoostrationi exposed iu weakness and emboldened existing gangs to expand Iheir activities.
I -may number more'
There arc occasional suggestions ittfiMttA:he
daooits arc politically monvai
During the last year, dicolu have expanded their membership by recruiting studenu on univenily carrousel
(The dacoiu guaranlee theiromhly incomeupecs^pproximately SI50lo Pakistan's annual per capita
income.)
Successful taeiies and better arms are heartening the dacoiu. Joo.oal.iu say the dacoiu stormed the Sukkur prison and freedeath row prisoners Msreh Ii
ajSjSfjjBBfjfJ Tbe dacoiu have also gained access to more sophisticated equipment, including Kalashnikc rifles aad even some rocket launchers^aaaaaaaaaaastaxusM
i expanded market In part reflects the war in Afghanistan. * N
The dacoiu operate primarily in (he forest areas along the Indus River in the northern and centrat regions of Sind Province. C
I The sou (hern pari of Sind
area immediately aiound Karachi hat not been troubled by lhc bandiu
h<eet common
regularly attack cars, buses, and trucks traveling e
4
4
itf highway. They establish roadblock* and -equeotly impersonate police officers. Few people
-.nw iravel Sind highways after dark. Truckers havessorted lo forming convoys io iransii lhe roads and.
on One occasion lasi fall,hree-day strike io
underscore (heir need for protection.
^^Jlt is not
gangiage ihc kidnaping
and ihen sell its eaplive to more powerful gangsortion of ihc capected ransom. Thc groups lum lo intermediaries. uioatly local land lords, to negotiate the release.
Police CovuKenoeasiim
The polict have not been effective in curbing dacolt activity.|
Thc dramatic Mpansido of dacoit activity6 prompted Primeuntje to asrthorixe sterner measures. He ordered Pakistani paramilitary forces into Sind last fallajor crackdown oneavy ha tided approach thai Included hundreds of arrests (many of those arrested were believed io be innocent by local raid ems) and the destruction of several villages raised concerns about lhe government's inclinationetort to what was interpreted as martial law lac lies Tbe art ids con drive also prompted accusations that it wat staged primarilyntimidate political opponents.
Security officials continue to conduct periodic campaigns against da axis, but in recent months Ibey have concentrated on -inning the cocoeraison affected village
At part of ihcir antidicoit campaign, the police arc harassing villages In which ihc majority of inhabitants traditionally have made their living through criminal activity and have encouraged villagers lo form small raiiiiias to protect tbeir region. With lhe assistance Ofparamilitary forces, patrols have been increased along (he main highways.
Outlook
Despite improved police efforts. Islamabad is unlikely ioigniRccm dent in dacoiliy any lime soon. The tradition of banditry is well entrenched in Ihc region. Local residents fear dacoit reprisals mere than bey fear police action ami probably will continue io proride support lo the bandits to ward off attacks
Tbeprovincial authorities andcome under increasing attack for its inability loolutionhe problem. Thc opposition particularly will tryiploii the issue to press ita position thai ihcreeed for change ia ihe administration lo make Use PaYitltni people feel secure. Nevertheless, ihc da cod problem docs not threaten Pakistan's internal stability, although it complicates ihc already volatiletd-order situation in Sind Province created by eihnic liots in Karachi.
The Awami National Party-New Leftist Forcein PakislanaVpMfk.
)
ANP's Nine lifts
Thehc latest incarnation of the Khudaiofthatformed9 by Abdul ChafTar Khan, who camerominent Pushtun family In the Nodh West Frewticr-t'rovince. The Khudai party, wajch was popularly known as the "Rcchhirts" because of their reddish colored uniform, advocated independence from the British eotonialbu and autonomy for the Puihtuns, the predominant ethnic group in the North West Frontier Province. GhafTar Khan and his followers rejected lhc creation of Pakistan7 andnsisteparate "Pushtunbtsn
aanawaV'
Chaffer Khan and his son, Abdul Wall Khan, merged the RedshliU with several other parties7 to form the National Awami Party. Tab new organisationeftist platform that called for autonomy for Pakbiaa's ethnic minoriiica and iCCiltUt economic policies favoring Ihe working class and the poor. The National Awami Party was frequently harassed by tbc government and wai finally bannedali Khan and hb supporters joined other leftist parties untilhen he formed "he Awami National Party (ANP).
Thc ANP enuncialcd its political platform whea it held iu first pubbc rally in Karachi last July. Wali Khan and other party leaders demanded an end to "US imperialism" in Pakistan and cr it idled Islamabad's policy of supporting thc Afghan resistance and refugees. The party also called foe direct talks between Kabul and Islamabad. Oa domestic matters. ANP spcaken at the rally condemned ihe "domination" of Sind, Balucftlitan. and the North West Frontier Prrjviace by Punjab. The party calledew Pakistani constitution thai would give greater autonomy io Ihc smaller provinces.
Tti mm
4 Mi, IW
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The Ministry ofTribal
Kabul's Tribal
Afghan Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs is ihci primary vehicle for faiaini Afghan tribal supportsnlb the utefee ctatabiji ring lb*Thc Minitnry.dJanlataBlrt
limited success in achieving Its long-term goal of reducing tribal supportbe insurgents flahaVv*
Oriuiiatlon aid Hisior>
Thc Ministry for Nalionalitiei and Tribal Affairsformed1 when the Afghan icgime icoiganited the Ministry for Frontier and Tribal Affairs MNFA Minister SoUymaa Laeqember of thc Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Part* of Afghanistan (PDPA) and is said lobe an intimate of PDPA General Secretary Najib,
s*estern tone includes Herat. Farah. and Qandahar Provinces: the eastern rone Konarha. Laghman, and Nangarhan the northern zone Bamian. Samangan, Balkb. and parts of Ghowr and Orurgan: thc southwest zone Paktika, Paktia,a wit
Finance
financed from three different budgets inhe first budgetillion1 ai the baiaar rate)ublicdeveloping" budget probably aimed at gaining tribal support
consistedillion argbanisslUon) Tbc Minis! ty of State Securityillion
additional2 million) most likely for join
Operations .nvolving militia forces and cross-border
activity, aaaaaajs
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4
Near East and South Asia Brief
Locust Infest at
Swarms of desert k* usts have been sighted In Bgypt. Jordan. Mauritania. North Yemen. Saudi Arabia, and Sudan ovr theonths Tbcmoat icriouiil! become moreroblem by June because of recent heavy raim. which have produced favocabk conditions for breeding and egg hatching Locust swarms hate inederaiely damaged sorghum and millet crops thougbout the region, but food availability has not been arTecied. North Yemen faces tbe most serious threat because il does not have enough peatkides to undertake effective ground and aerial spraying against thc peatsesult. North Yemen's banana and date crops could be severely da.
l*2>
May lit
Original document.
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