S rj achi... Ipecillc fortiori
I IO ertva US too WllWn lnlluanc*-owr o> in* Middle -- lo -Mimia.t. in*Gulfo andupport for Ira to allmin.t. opponents of in* Khomeini regime, and Id promoit Islamic fundament.'
r.n'a diplomatic Isolation.
har* ar*nions It* franlan Ladanhlp regarding in* utility of larroriamanrum.n. ol tariff, poHcy. W.h. ability of ,h.n. tolh*ue. Ir.n'a diplomatic laolailonit til*ranian-sponsored larroriai attacks.
sen In in.
I ll uncertain wnaiha'ta ccittnu. to restrain Hi via ofc* ofawadontacts aadr.da. and financialall aa m. pa.siii.nto' milU.rylon-shouldowards aof terrorist *CtJvity.
O Iran provides significant supportUbalfah In Lab.non and hasincluding terrorist otwaMoas. tr.n's iff oris to gromati Hlabali.b.orn^^by rlvairlas amono Iranian officials andltnin
grouoi and w.
. Lebanon Tehran
-and benefitsholdtng olt*rn ho.taya, In oeiommttiatag* situation and has. auccaa.lu. Inl upon tn.to... Holding wasiernfl chip, forn Kuwait, and protection of ils sanctuary In ih.alley.
lkal financial andupport (n4 .oilv
v liacy to unify th. vatioua radical rM(w,
li f th.comniKiuti bv n*
totluonc. evo,riBMnaldoly. ouncilII <h., of
the Persian Gulf tree eied msfnorlim to pursue Ioik pnnciBel objective i
2 olao atop aiding, In ma war
I o prosecute lha war raq;
o to Indue* ihem ioavored by Iran- and
to further radicalize Shla populations Ino
ae-oi Arabiang Us oil policial mora In lln with] III deeJros. Wo have noowever. Matieleterious to Iranian kuorartliwould resort to terrorismool of persuasion.
Iranian CaJloa and Olsa-danu
iAnother principal focus Of ban.en-supported tarrorlal ecii.it.at Mas own suppression ol opponent, ofhauler- re
Khomeini likely recoonlrea the potential fcr exile loaders to promoteomestic discontent arising from the dismal economic situation and Increasing weerlness with tho war,
Having soeni years in exile Mmielf. ho Is wary of th* ihraat that* individuals poao
At present however,poorly orgamied end posa no real threat to in* regim.
1 Motiovir. Iranian energies are focused on outline tho regime in of Ih* war Is likelylonillcent influence onin eedilonause or terrorismntimidate Ola Gulf aiaiai per.te .conorMctho proso.ctwill turn io the ulo ofan* terrorism to On rh* other hand the moderetes cowWf'omotic
and selective l terrorism hava proven successful Inhange In Gutr Oil andould aga.r, bring world focuf on Iran aa atat* sponsor of larrorlam.
continuerovide significantn* remain ihe preemieent outi.deo the radicals. owever writ furthero other groups, penicuierlv the rtO. providing it an etternata source of support should fcmnue aid bo withdrawn.
I , Hubaluh likely will not release all of Its Western hostages, with or without Iranian helps long ea It feelsaking aervea fts own agenda. Particularly. Hizballah will continue to .use the hostages as bargaining chips (or the Oe'weuwait androtect Its incauery In Ba'labakk from Israeli or US air st'ikei.
cause Iran to itop others Irom Those to argue for
Serious reverses In tho wer or the perception orn ell eved.PI. capons.terronem. In attempt elding itan Thet.on would be the most nkaiy proponent-ofooking ip tn. post-war and post-Khomen. ere. hp-ever. mightect.d
restraint In the hope of qu.clly renewing more levoreoie relations with th* West and bringing an innu- of de.per.tely needed currency and highly desired Western technology into th* country ampaign of terrorism would obviate such aspirations. Theseay actempering lector. The peih chosen, we believe, willgely on the strength of (hehln the factions at that time.Original document.