Created: 12/19/1986

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National Intelligence Cour


KErDSANOCji fo?.: Dr. Alton G. Keel

Acting Assistant tggg] President for National Securigggfairs

E. Allen


IntelHge^^ficec for Counterterroris* Director, KI-Hostao^Location Task: Force

DCI-Hostaoeorce Report

6 on theLE hostages in Lebanon. Key poi^gf this report ore:





The two leaders of the US Arab-American cormunity who recently visitedxJln an effort to secure the release of the US hostages, met with representatives of the National Security Council, the Department of State, arrf the Hostage Location Task Force onece-ber. The two Arab-Avnerleans conceded they wereWTg the results-of their trip and could not verify that they evITgn^epresentatives of the captors, despite tSeir puhllc^Tatra to have done so.


ft-fort As Stated

S'JSJECT: DCI Hostage Location Task Force Report DCI/SIC/CTAAJ.len[_ i9istribution:

.- Alton C. Keel, KST

LTC Robert Earl and LCDR Craig Coy, KSCJ






el. 0 IO/CT



Director of CentralFORCE


^ dtnied in toto citing MIAB).

j ki4

AU3 Presidentn stated that lettershe was taken hostage have been pushedprivate residence for passageKF hC CC

Fathef Jenco has described tctmi KasrallalraTa "forrer iajssym ofho sor-ehcv was involved with the kidnapers." T I

E_ 'IV-



mbassyrvascus*has reported that official Syrian reaction to the visit by Dr. Kehdi and Kr. Shaheen was publicly correct but privately reluctant. Dr. Ahmad Saker at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Syrians "had" to give Hehdi sore press play, given his position In the United States and his stand on regional Issues. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara made it clear to all his ministry officials that Mehdi and Shaheen were not "welcome visitors".

Merrisers of the Department of State, the National SecuritySoTjnci and the Hostage Location Task Force met with Hehdi and6 to discuss thelc trip. Principal points th that meeting were as follows:

Hehdi and Shaheen met personallyan in Dama presented hL-nselfepresentative of therovided no bona fides, but Hehdi obtained the man's knowledge of the situation that he claimed to be. Wiile he was In Beirut, Mehd telephone twice to an alleged representthe same ran that visited*SinTin I



Hehdl characterized the captors as stubborn, independent, self righteous, and paranoid. Ke believed they operated ln snail groups of about Consequently, they have been able to maintain tight security, according to Dr. Mehdi, "not like the PLO."

ee sees the captors as spiritually but not politically related He doubts thats,ues direct orders to then. the situation toican's influence with

Hehdl reported theas provided to htm were broadly political, centerir^-on US relations with the Muslin world and Israel. Ke said^tSefca'wa prisoners were mentioned, bet it was his impression Jjjc^rankednumber ten" on the captors list of priorities^"

The captor representative "sdldche hostages were all in qocd

Hehdl was not treated well by the Beirut press. Heicture was published of hira beside Israeli Heir Kahane, with whom he hadebate. According to Mehdi, the caption attempted to connectith the controversial Israeli political figure, asking, "What Is this can doing here?"

Wille in Beirut, Mehdi met with the wives of three US hostages: Mrs. Peed, Mrs. Cicippio, and Mrs. Sutherland, none of there had any news of their husbands.

Mehdi stated that the fact that Reed and Cicippio are Muslinsignificance to the hostage captors. They see theas Americans, not%

Mehdi met with Shayhk Fadlallah while in Beirut-^Pa^lalsh offered little hope about the hostages, althou^ht's^gested that some altruistic gesture on the part of th^uSJwight be-helpful, for example, feeding the Shis poor lngoutn Ubanb'ff, The phrase "Marshall Plan" and figure ofas used.

Hehdl said that as long as US policy prohibiGfGlkLng^ietajs hostage captors, there is no hope. When tepartrxnt of State* representatives pointed out that that was rftsf policy, ax*l_ we were ln fact anxious to talk to the hostage captors--though would not be willing to make concessions or pay

" mot-

Iranians Allegedly Withhold Buckley Confession

An article (seeor complete text) published on5 in the Kuwaiti Arabic language newspaper Al Qabas, alleges that President Reagan has requested thetIrar.ian Government to withhold releaseconfession" by US hostage WirilarSBuckley and that Tehran had screed. The Al Cabas articlehat Buckley had died in "earlv (U)

Theresumably obtained while Buckley was being held hostageizballah elementori, was described0 page written statement allegedly provldKS^etails about CIA activities in Lebanon and other Arab countries. Bx??arsicle also reported that Buckley's captors had recorded hlsj*Sflslonselevision tape. (U)

Iranian officials who were in contact with the United Stateslaimed that the Iranian Government had in its possessionof Buckley's confession. The date given by Al Cabas ofis approximately correct, {lased on the debriefings of Jenco belies Buckley T NC

Da'wa Party Reported to be Separate Organization fron Hittallah


absorbed into the Hiiballa.*

believen The Da^ ^clique with'Ln:the


t3L 2

3 W

efforts to normalise re government appears resignedssue. The Iranians ray, hcveverjbeforeake further concessions. TJ


with Iran continue, butf stalemate on the hostage

the release of a

to persuade the French to




The ruling IsraeliMinister Shaalr^Vi^^Ptenitc Peres, and Defense Ministerall publicly jus&fTe^'cs motives for the Iran arms shipments. Rabin told two USIsrael earlier this month that he agrees with the rwncy'5&adir^*arTns fo: hostages. Israeli leaders' objectives on future aafstance would! remain much the same as they have been to assist thesutesTa>>i. possibly thereby gain the release of Israelihere areo sevenslnce^jsffin fighting'in Lebanon-held by Shl'a and Svrian-all PmR


1 H

r i



.RaDln told.

the OS Ambassador In Tel Aviv this week that his recent comments on this' issue were misrepresented by the press, and that he had intended to leave open the question of whether Israel might carry out such attacks. Responding to US concerns, the Defense Minister said he would try to clarify the issue publicly. F)





tanw 1

Test of Al Cabas Article,S, Regarding William Buckley

Knowledgeable Western sources revealed to Al Qabas an Important secret related to the American-Iranian operation which is that President Reagan has appealed to the IraniaSgdsncials not to publish or broadcast the admissions ofuckieyTgTrector of the" CIA network in Lebanon who was kidnaped by the "Isla-aic4 and whose death was announced In

These sources also disclosedagan's administration has carried out several secret attempts to safede! Buckley in different ways and means during the period he was hejtgjx&tage, which extended for moreear, for fear that he might leSHBcortant secrets on the CIA activities in Lebanon and the ri

These sources said that shortTy-Sr^er the abduction of Buckley in4 in Beirut, the Director of CIA William Caseypecial envoy from the agency to Beirut to collaborate with some Lebanese parties in order to know where he is. held and try to save him at any price.

The reason for this is that Buckley was not only the political advisor of the American Embassy in Beirut but he was also actually the first official tn charge of the CIA activities in Beirut and he had been working with this agencyong time and he knew nany secrets.

imited number of people in Lebanon knew the reality and role of. Buckley, the sources said.


Casey did his swift rove to save Buckley before the USer started, during investigation with hin, admitting his activities and'Activities of the CIA In Lebanon and other countries in the Kiddle East^fS&rding to the sources. But this first attempt failed asRe Lebanese parties cooperating with hla could not save Buckley,

The knowledgeable sources told Al-Cabas that'* had carriedttempt when it delegated secret Colonel Oliver North whose mission was toxceeding LSD one million to save Buckley, but agai*"*

due to significance of Buckley and his role.

Reagan's administration had also sought the help of sone Arab parties but to no avail, then it sent an envoy to seek the help of Israel.

The Israeli Prime Minister Ftret had personally interfered in this question upon the request of Shultz and after consulting with his aides,-he advised Reagan's administration to contact with the Iranian officials as they could secure Buckley's release. Theani an contact was carried out consequent uponO* anti-tank missiles were sent to Iranrice for releasing Buckley. The missiles arrived in Tehran inet Buckley was not released but rather Reverend Benjamin weir.

Then "IsU-nlc Jihad"5 that it had executed Buckley being Director of the CIA lr. Lebanon.


After the announcement, the African officials received detailed Information Of great significance'on Buckley revealing the following rajoc questions:

Buckley gave detalledfcltten admissions on his roleand the actlvitiffgfjthe CIA in Lebanon and otherand that his cagorsjrecorded his admissions or aof then by his voice and pictureelevision tape. written admission came inages.

Prior to his going to Lebanon, Buckley was in charge of the . American Intelligence network in Egypt during Sadat's era and heajor role in bolstering the security cooperation between Washington and Egypt. Therefore, he knows much about the situation in Egypt and the Egyptian-Israeli relations.

Those who carried out the Investigations with Buckley are experienced in this line and not amateurs.

Buckley actually died in earlyothere Is likelihood that heeriod of

This means that the Iranians deceived the Americans convinced them that Buckley was still alive so they got anti-tank missiles then Islardc Jihad announced Buckle

The Western sources told Al-<frbas that the Reagan* feels very embarrassed at the publishing of Buckley's^ response of the Iranian! to the American demando cut the bridges of contact and dialogue between IS

In the opinion of the sources, the publishing of theilletback In the American-Iranian relations.

5 7

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