SOVIET STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN: PLAYING FOR TIME

Created: 10/15/1987

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

OIRECTOMTE OF IHTELLISEHCE IS7

Strategy o

Afghanistan: Playing 'or Time

Summary

offerinimal hdramal timetable at lestnd Its presumed approval ot assumption of thet the momenthe stability moves are likely to undermine the shift the diplomatic focus from issue of the composition of a

apparentof this shifto buy further time for the regime to consolidate aad get Its 'national reconciliation' policy off the ground. The Soviets undoubtedly hope that thair nam diplomatic tactic mill convince the international audience of Ratal's conciliatory fmteatleai aad stimulate divisions within tht resistance and between the resistance and Islamabad. Hoscorn may also calculate that. If It caa get tha vetted actions or Pakistan te initiate talks ea tht future Afghan government. It will bt able tocommitting 1tstlf--tht termsesslhlt fact-saving arrangement should It decide dome the road te accept lessoalition dominated by Its clients

The Soviets are unlikely it the near future tealtsr fundamentally their present condit ons or J ot f^^Utirs^irclIdSngote on the

visit by first deputy forelj.* us-sovutth.sselwr

become apparent.

recent diplomatic developments

for most of this year, moscow'sd1pi omatlc policyfghanistan ms featured an internatlonal^bllc rotations

national reconciliation initiatives ane

campaign touting kabul,

forthcoming geneva posture. this olplonatic effort hat beai designed to augment tha soviet-afghan campaign of terrorist botiblns* inside pakistan to pressure islamabad iito accommodating soviet interests. at the same tine, however, tht soviets evaded efforts by pakistani, w, and us officials to engage the* in detailed, formal discussionossible coalition. moreover, the outline of the coalition proposed by kabul would leave the people's democratic party of afghanistan (popa) in control. indicating that the soviets are not yet prepared to accept lessovernment dominated by their clients as the price for extricating, themselves. r

last month's hastily convened round of um-nedleted talts in geneva, called at kabul's request, ttas almost certainly intended by ho$co* as pirt of its campaign to court international opinion and undermine pakistan's resolve< the soviets hive portrayed thi session's minute narrowing of differences on the withdrawal timetible--kabul't offer dropped tvo months to it and islamabad moved up by one month to elght--as significant progress in the negotiations and as proof or soviet and afghan sincerity and flexibility. noscov's geneva gambit fell flat, however, because the soviets themselves had encouraged widespread expectation in the weeks leading up to the meetingubstantial reduction ineteble--toe offered

a timetableear would haveoldshifting the onus for lack of progress onto islamabadthe soviets uncommitted on the date and conditions of the kremlin may simply have elicalculatedreaction to its meager offer. it is alsomoscow intended to have kabul make this proposal bvtafter the geneva session was scheduled that thewas too weak to sustainommitment in principlea

Moscow has apparently altered tts strategy on tha UK resolution as well, probably In recognition of the negligible gains that It now would be likely to register In next month's vote on the resolution as It stands. The Soviets are lobbying to waterown with an amendment calling for an end to foreign interference In Afghanistan's Internal affairs, language that would reflect their accusations of Pakistani and US responsibility for the conflict. They are also setting to Introduce an anendment that acknowledges the necessity of national reconciliationhange that alight be

Interpreted at International pressure on Pakistan to get the

resistance to the negotiating table with the PDPA.

Tht Situation In Afghanistan

the same timt, the Soviets have allowed Afghan Party Secretary Haiib to have hiestlf chosen htad of

otrtce hasigureneaa post heldon-party Acting president and mentioned by Kabulossible roleesistance or exile participantgovernmett of national unity.' Under the new constitution about to be adopted, however, tht president will hold strong powers. By allowing Raj lb to position himself to assume then, Moscow runs the risk that tht move will bt seen as evidence that the Soviets and their clients have no Interestenuine coalition or have given up on the national reconciliation policy. It could therefore undermine Soviet efforts to promote direct talks on the future governnent.

Moscow may have Judged that, despite this danger, tht situation In Kabul requiredove. Endemic feuding among the factions of tht ruling party hat beea Intensified by the opposition of some tlemtnts to hajib and his Soviet-mandated national reconciliation Initiatives and by recriminations over Its poor success domestically. The Soviets may hope that hajib's elevation to the presidency will strengthen his position and undtrline their determination to pursue the policy with which ht Is identified, while at the same tine reassuring PDPA cadrt that their "leading role" will be preserved in any coalition that is negotiated. The Soviets may have aimed In particular to put Nejlb flraly In the driver's seat for the upcoming PDPA conference, which they undoubtedly hope willhow of party unity behindnd the national reconciliation policy.

ere also concerned max me United States will supply Increasingly sophisticated weaponry the resistance, intensifying the problem with which Soviet troops will have to deal. They probably PMllM that te maintain the stalemate they will have to carry even more of the burden of fighting, devise better tactics to counter Insurgent air defenses, and Increase their efforts to interdict Insurgent logistics. But there is no Indication that Moscow has concluded that the war hasecisive turn for the worse requiring fundamental revision of their goals, f

The Soviet*

What Does Moscow Seek?

The Soviets have apparently determined that because of Kabul'sramatic move on the withdrawal timetable cannot be risked. Moscow probably has turned to encouraging discussion of possible talksuture government between the Afghan regime and the oppositionumber of purposes:

o To provide the appearance of movement while the regime gets Its Internal house In order and produces sone concrete resultshe national reconciliation campaign.

o To turn attention from the timetable question.

0 To offer evidence to the International audience that Moscow and Kabul are sincere and flexible inegotiated solution and to sustain pressure on the other side to demonstrate equivalent "good will."

o To stimulate disunity within the resistance and between the resistance and Pakistan by forcing then to grapple with the possibility of compromises mnd the necessity to come upommon negotiating position. Moscow might even hopeplit will occur, leaving the moderate resistance parties, supportedPakistan, prepared to accommodate Soviet Interests.

At the same time, Moscow may ba trying to prompt Pakistan and the United nations tohich it canwithout committing 1tself-*how far the other side night be ready to bend to provide the Kremlinace-saving arrangement. Thereew indications that the Soviets may ba thinking about other avenues to pursue should circumstances eventuallyowering of their minimum requirementoalition government In which the PDPA Is the dominant participant:

>or OCORET

o Recent discussionoviet domesticof the

excesses of the original revolutionfghanistan, the prt-*oc1el1st stage of it* development, and the necessity for compromises nay be designed to prepare the ground forettlement.

The Soviets have continued to Insist that the regime cannot be shunted aside or by-passed and that the resistance will have toh It. Nejtb's elevation to heade and the apparent last-minute abandonment by the Soviets of their plan tomonth timetable at 6eneva, instead of contradicting their professed interest Inegotiated solution, could be interpreted as efforts to shore up the roaliie for the purpose of serious negotiations.

It is noteworthy that In shifting the diplomatic focus to discussionew government, Moscowoncrete suggestions on Its composition nor Itself nak no, proposals to set up talks among the variousthe Soviets are angling to have Pakistan,

propose arrangements In Kanul and TnTTTate forma

calculate that this Posture "J"

a sell-out. The Soviets nay also hope by maximizing the

u nore rooh to maneuver and eight do.less to fanears

role In the settlement process to reduce the damage to Soviet prestigeompronlse might entail.

Original document.

---

---