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Soviet Strategy on Afghanistan Summary
The Soviets have adopted new tactics on Afghanistan. Including suggestions that they will accept some linited torn of power-sharing with regime opponents, an International public relations campaign designed to portray their policy as reasonable, end Intensified pressure on Pakistan. The proposals aade by the Soviets aad the Afghans so far, however, indicate that Moscow is not prepared to accept lessovernment dominated by Its clients, and the Soviets have deflected attempts to set up discussions on the compositionew government, f
Moscow Bill probably have the Afghansroop withdrawal timetable of aboutonths during the next Geneva9 September). The Soviets almost certainly calculate that this might seriously erode support for the resolution on Afghanistan scheduledote in the UN General Assembly latemonth. They presumably hope thatesult would induceime when It faces possible suspension of US aid over the nuclear proliferation issue and Increasing domestic pressure for aagree to Soviet terms for resolving the conflict. Moscow may also Judge that this tactic will weaken arguments to the US Congress that the Importance of the Pakistani conduit to the resistance should override nonprol 1feration concerns. Moreover, the Soviets probably hopehort timetable proposal at Geneve will strengthen their position heading into talks with us officials this monthossible summit this fall.
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Soviets might even be prepared at Geneva toate to startithdrawal. This would ilnost certainly be contingent on acceptance of its conditions for corwendng wl thdrawal--agreementew government and the cessation of outside support for tee resistance. Noscox has no reason to alter these conditionsegotiated settleaent fundamentally until Its efforts to exploit current opportunities have played themselves out.I
Soviet Moves Since the Last Geneva Session
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bogachevews conference in Moscow onugust that specific dates for the withdrawal of Soviet troops would be set at tne next Geneva round. Soviet officials have said frequently this year thatithdrawal timetable requires not only the guaranteed cessation of "outside interference" but establishmentoalition in Kabul tobloodbath' after Soviet troops leave. UN negotiator- Cordovei and the Pakistanis believed that high-level meetings were essential to pave the way forhort withdrawal timetable at Geneva. But, since the last Genevaarch) the Soviets and their Afghan clients have deflected the efforts of other parties to arrange high-level, formal discussionsuture government--an Issue not up for negotiation In the Geneva talks themselves:
abul made excuses this suneer when Cordovez tried to set up shuttle negotiations to discuss the questionew government.
he Soviets have frustrated Patlstan's atteapts to hold bilateral talks focusing on the sane Issue, In particular stallingate for First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov to visit Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the Soviets have adopted several measures designed to weaken Pakistani and International support far the Afghan resistance snd to sow dissension within the reslstaace
Itself:
ressure against Pakistan has been intensified.ash of crossborder attacks earlier thisharp
beyond the frontier provinces.
Afghan leader flajtbonth extension of Kabul's ceasefire, elaborated on the positions that
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Soviet domestic media have focusedecent nonths on thecult.es In the way or national reconciliation as well as the justification fop the Soviet presence indefense of Afghanistan's revolution and national integrity and the defense of the Soviet Union's own southern border. Much was made this spring of Insurgent Incursions Into Soviet territory, and these are still occasionally cited. Nevertheless, the media also continue to claim that national reconciliationaking progress and to stress the necessity ofrealistic* political settlement. Much of this commentary, however, seems aimed at domestic critics of the concessions entailed In this policy and could reflect an effort to prepare foresolution of the conflict that hardliners will find distasteful. Hedla discussion of ties* issues is presentedesponse to readers' and listeners' concerns, and we have no solid evidence that ftdivisions Tn the Kremlin,
Events on the ground this year--includfng successful Insurgent use of Improved weaponry, the lackluster results of several Soviet-Afghan offensives, and the continued poor pcrfcrnance of the Afghancaused Moscow concern
but do not substantially alter CTUirerTTYta^ySoviets probably realize that totalemate they will have to carry an even greater burden of the fighting, Tliey will need to devise tactics to counter Insurgent air defenses and Increase their efforts to Interdict Insurgent logistics. We doubt, however, that the Soviets have concluded that the war hasecisive turn for the worse requiring fundamental revision of their goals.
What Are the Soviets Up To?
Moscow's political moves have been aimed this year primarily at breaking Pakistan's resolve and reducing international support
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Is unclear fron Rogechev's state-sent whether Kabulbeyondignificantly shorter timeframethe date on which It will be Implemented. Thesuffice to score International public relations points Pakistan on the spot, but the namingpecific datepossible. It would, however, almost certainly benetting Moscow's standing conditions for implementation. might calculate that this move would soand Pakistani domestic expectation! thatbe forced to make concessions on halting aid toand to pressure the resistance tc take- part Inwith tlie Afghan
Hosco* may hope mat any appearance of Soviet "reasonableness* will undermine those arguing that the IS Congress's threatened suspension of aid to Pakistanuclear proliferation issue should be overridden in the interest of sustaining Pakistan's vital roleonduft for military aid to the the Afghan resistance* moreover, the Soviets may also expecthort timetable at Geneva will Improve their position Heading into the US-Soviet experts talks on Afghanistan and the meeting between Secretary Shulta and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze this month, as wellossible summit this fall. The Soviets will probably press US officials to reduce aid
tec an
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to the resistance In response to Kabul's offers at Geneva.
Outlook
Me do not believe that Moscow is prepared to accept lessovernment dominated by Its clients. Host of Its political and diplomatic moves this year hive, however, risked demoralizing and further fragmenting the regime. Najib's visit to Koscow In July, during which he was almost certainly directed toeneva resumption, ltd to rumors in Kabul of Inpendlng regime changes and the Imminent withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Soviets probably believeny case, their chances of Inducing the present regime to become more effective and capable of defending Itself are negligible over tht short run and that the risks to Its cohesion entailed In seeking to secure Soviet goals through alternate tactics can be contained,
Moscow conceivably might agree to have the issue of the future government of Afghanistan placed on the agenda at Geneva, seeking to exploit tensions within the resistance and between the resistance and Pakistan on this subject* Such dissension could serve to place the onus for Inconclusive and prolonged negotiations on Islamabad and the resistance, either because disunity within the resistance or Its disagreements with Pakistan became public or because this inability to agreeosition was widely taken as intransigence. By raising the issue atorum, however, Moscow and Kabul would also cone under pressure to deliver something that went beyond their current offers and the cohesion of the regime would be further undermined. It Is probably Tor this reason that the Soviets have so far refused to schedule formal, specific discussions on the compositionew
Moscow is unlikely to alter its bottom lineettlement until it has been able to assess the results of Its current Initiatives* including the next Geneva session. Even if their reasons for wanting to extricate themselves from the Afghan conflict are as compelling as some Soviet officials have suggested, the Soviets probably judge that gains In the UN General Assembly, Pakistani domestic problens, and the outcome of the preseit US-Pakistani nuclear proliferation dispute night make fundamental adjustment of their negotiating position unnecessary. I
Original document.
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