?
Tbe Persian Gulf: ImplicationsS-Iranian Confrontation (u)
Is
this estimate is issued by the director of central intelligence.
the national foreign intelligence board concurs. except as noted in the text.
rgonio'-omitm enporof-on of Hw
CMvj SoMr
WSMI I*IIH .IOttwftjr af Mr* WJ|iw.l-tow CWsin*
THE PERSIAN GULF: IMPLICATIONS OF A
SCOPE NOTE
irmule pretermraw of potential imuia (or the drtetopmrnt oi theini SiMn and Ira* II rumim how lhe outcome ol ihnr icma oauld affectitfrrrati in the re*wo and ihr IS poMioahren The kftimale alao examine* ihr impact of ihr vanou* ouUomniul powerhe ohMctiva of the Soviel Union andthtie arepunued in the current liiuation, and lhe receptivity of the realate* loan increased Soviet role)
Became they depend to heavily on US policy dcctiions. the Estimate doe* txx rank the likelihood of the various tcenaiioaj
We do not protect the dynamic* of the US-Iranian confrontationmonth period, ilthouah thr continuation oi lensbnj could wellthai time horizon. The implications of lhe various scenarios arc protected asossible into the future.^
(REVERSE BLANK)
KEY JUDGMENTS
The Increasing US military presence in ihr Persian Cull is prrceitcd by tiantrecl challengr lo Kt vital IMrinti and ha*Ihe margin (or error cm both sidn fllun* (ration* and the proiimKi ol the opposingncluding notand Iranian, bul FreneK Bnllsk. Sonet, aad Arab) haveincreased lhe probabthl> of armed confroniation and. in lhe -or* ease the poaabdrii of armed conflict
'.We heve eiamined five scenarios for ho* lhe current situalun might develop in the order of the level of IS commitment thev require The paper li not Intended to predict the outcome or rank the likelihood of the various scenario* presented but lo esamlnc Ihe range of
implication*.)
VS Tanker taeorttoder Prettarr. ThU scenario *ouldrofound blow for IS intere*ti II would
Damage severely US credibillli id lhe renon and hevond
Make Iran Ihe pemec to be reckoned with" ia the Culf
Provide opportunities for the Soviet* "ilh the Cutf Arab*.
TVnrioru Do/mad. In view of our aiarnmenl ot Iranian reserve and Iraq's opposition to this outcome if it Included delinking lhe tanker and ground wars, wr believe this scenario would be difficult to attain. Nonetheless, it woukJ multignificant benefits lorini States bv:
Confirming US commitment to theib*
Checking the eipanuonannlurncr. while preserving opportunities for ultimate US-Iranian rrronciliation
Although Ihe United Slate* wouk) get the credit for theof force aad diplomacy, the Soviets would retain their recentthe moderate Arabso try to build on thrirwith
Simmeringon a. This scenario would have nuied effects on US interests On the positive side, it draws lhe line lor Iran, reinforce* Culf Arab willingness to mitt Iranian pressure, and ilrrngthem Arab
I
mceotiowa of CS commitment lo ihrn ihr iirajtivr MoV.oslrs and opeinitoVd (onmiimini lhalorcaasanria) mililar. ckshr* and terrorism, and itrata of miscalculation and escalation In tho scenario,would maintain idrcunls rnlrts abiiatylo both Iran and
nthnioUlicm. We believe thiseii liluHt Kenarm because we do nol believe Iran can he casih intimidated Nonetheless, most of its implication* would be posllive for ihr I'nited Stain. Il would:
Dramalically urvderscore L'S capability and commitment lo the Gulf Arab Main
Check Iranian eipansion in ihe Cull and Nigral) damage Iran's self-imageajor player on ihr world Hagr
Lessen oppnrluniiin for the Soviets lo improve relations with the Arabs.
There would be negatives, however
The chaatcr. already distant,S/lraaun rapprodiemeol could be delayed even further
The Iranians wouldeed lot astillwith Moscow
The Soviets would be concemrd. however, lhal Baghdad would move even closer tol on and that lubataelial L's form wouldhe region
Eicaialion/Open ComJIicl. Thisigh-stain scenario for all parties The potential costsarge-scale and protracted US-Iranian military confrontation are considerable
United Stain would incur heavy economic cosls and could suffer considerable casualties
of world oil and financial market! could mull
Iran would probably turn lo annd iter iminalr use ol terrorism against IS targets
Iran could be successful in ihr Muslim world in portraying ihe conflict as part of an anti-Islamic campaign bs llie United sum
hi
Thiierve Soviet interests tit lorrstillina;rnurarnce ol US influence i" Inn. bul MmcM would hive lo chouse MM* iWwIy between Iran and thr Arabs Nonetheless. ihr1 it Ihr scenario lhat coma in* thr hrel wmprdajor Imprneriwrnl nt SewsiH-Iranian tpbriiora Thr further kHHM Mi thr US mahun preaeric* and majoract ion in nrar Hostel borders could prompt Moscow lo aBn Iran some support We do not brlme Ihr Smsrltgo too provide Iran maWr weapons systems, although wc would nnl rule oul rr lumption ol deliveries of spare parti. emrounilion. and military (nicks
Wr believe lhat European mvolvrmeni. whatever Ihr motivation,et iiaiinr lo*ated Slain bul that ihr Europeans arr notma ax players that thrit irealer invo!irmmt would wbUanlulh change oar ludsrmcMs about ihr implication) of any of ihr scenaikm It would, howrvrt. arlecl thr hkrlihood of Ihr various scenarios. Europran involvement makes ihr mote positive scenarios icmrrally rtioir llkrlv and Ihr negative srrnirii* (enerallv Ira likely. Thr European presence alao .mi" ihr possibility lhal ihr tniled Slain could br drawnonlvclull ol an Iranian-Europranmust likely begun bi an Iranian action OvrnH. however thr Lnitrd Stainbr under Im pressure lo withdraw, andan um will br Ins hkrlv to conclude that confrontation wilhnited States will accomplish thrlr
Beyond ihe specific scenarios. Iran'sstrength is its unity of purpose To this are added rtt revived revolutionary teal, drmrm-strain) ability to absorb pain, confidence tamedlung of wcwMUH uncompromising showdowns wilh the United Slain, andirvrn-year-long national mobiliulion for war These make hostilities wilh ibfJiiuiedhreshold lhat Iran could well decide to
Iran abo haa considerable weaknesses in the current situation
erious polilKaJ infighting al hash levelshe government
Ih military capabilities have delcrloratrd liner the rrvolution
ll ii economically weak and vulnerable.
lit international isolation ii now in*
Wr do not brlirre (he Iranians will br rawl> convinced lo ther their pobtmulh aware of ihr hkrlihuod$ miliars responseaior provocation At least initialls. an ncalation would
- i
DN
I Thradian prnentr tnrrreivrdIranirect challenge to id vidl iMnnii and luu rrducrd thr martin lor rrmr
On both ikJri Allhouih Ihrrrhanrr thai in
wnlacl willtdrd. riiine. teroioni and Ihr
prmimlti of ihr oppmlna. ir>rcri lincluriina not only
I'S tad Irtnian la* French. Brillih. Soirl. (nd Aiabl have ifgniBraitlh. incrraird Ibr probabilny olonlronlition could drtrkv In i
numhrt. with widely virvtnRia equally nnar ii implicit mi (or Ihr liwlrd
ran, thr olhrr rraional min ind ihr SonetW*alio netr lhal. due lo Ibr growing mirrmiioful nature of ihr uiuatmn (thr drploymral of thr Frrneh atrrtaft raniri. th* pretence of Bn'iiihpoulbH othrrwarfare cootingrnli and brightened CCOlrumn teniiiwl ihr mail lorunlroolilkin could come Irani acton other than ihr Cnried Stair* or Iran.l thai Diioiaion riaminri theto nrtili iand lh* currant Utuation- Pail II ramumbrr c( pouible xcnanoi lor (ulorr dcvelopmenti and their onoact on the Uaed Stain, lhe USSR, and Ihr "Bioui acton. Part III tupport* part II bv laiina nit thr rttdrnlUrv hair and aruItUr liamnork for Ihr ratimiiii* ludamroti lhatbeen made Pari
ill ita) diKuun Icngrr Irrm timd) ind njl
n il* ni. ilma with thr goalihrayer* and thr roil andlor thr areahe USSR and lhe
Portond Currarrt Situation
1Iran and iheIn la* Cuff, rewarding Iran* pruba-hie fractionontinuing LSrnrnt ia ihr Cull remain vatd In particular
Irannot irdncriminilrly attack t'S and I'VSit target* bul -ill irv So ur terra inn. tabotaae. and nib art action trlrcti'rli lu ten* ill hmadrr nbtrctlvfr
rrtared II*rtlal km il i
pntvplinn Mhnr inaoWuile In
torn- Ihr LaM ftatrt ha hart
1 KryIhr rtiblinaiwi ot ihr FnaD SMC iartudV il.l Ihr aad -on mimna rarnaaaaan ihr rawaar d Vnrli
(Mlil at* ami ihrtJm ir. Urrraibrar nraa* laa Miliar rea-anaa.hrWl bantkt rialiraa thr ISlatn nfrwarhrwrdanraaan of la*aataarr anI apfuwbIbr aVtraanr Thr fcidaaaania
ran al ihr narretatrl ir-itiilii- al I'S
imoablr haaah' aad ihr t'raaW SUir*
no* often crimed tnant TV I
inolutwi i> irnTehran ai airrdrd aaimM Iran and crrhralralrd tn Ibr LniBrd Ulaln At ihr aiinr
ii. uaaalari mnhnailnl IS
helped rnlor* toanr oli rrrdihlHi -ilh Ihr Cull Arabs horn thr IV[.an ifli.r. fno>ed la*peuiiiiii (Wanrdun morr IMa Unr la suoomt ol thr US areietiee. and ledn lit mJQ
i ihii lamr pr'Ual In* Inrl ol Indeprndetil EurDoraahaa inrrrairii wpiibianlli and
hu Hleclivrli rrinlorrrd ihr iuhlinn ol Inn Thr Bnlih *rr arndlna miarelrarinl io*rr* loif
and ihr Dutch and tvareinsil^iaaosi la rrtpaaaj lohv
.Irhraa thr Frmrli harr
an aircrali catrin and are
to ihr -eaaon w'hrihrr an iramtian af thr Ir^triia aa aaa. ihnr artiara hair Wnrlrd b> lahaan Ihr rf rc
ol ihr LS difan ta rrlaettl> tanhmaaaed atanfadHt thai aaniajafjr whiched Vaan hai huh- naWncr coaad
t Mt itanlnniainniInn Thr*
pooiliAit applin potnarih in Frame -hgte ariiona
will brrinovlr -ilh Iran W*
brhnr. bowr>t* thai Ihr tjraaaaaa, lachidinf lhe
Frrach. will br rUrrmrit canlul abnul uiira Ihnr
at lhat Iran -oald arnrH* aiaalns fcrit prmnlnlan.|
S Thr Mmima. I"
hr Curl
Iran lailrd ta iii allranpl In anrirai ihr hiVS mrnfmi tad aa pH anaahrr rtarnplri- ihr trolroraaovaarin aaal tabm Mm blamac sain hold haa <wvw lorab
. Thr larmarai haaaan> eWanmra aa Saadi-lraaHiB las aad prohahti aal hadCall tub rretrar aaa van (or
military areirnc* in ihr I
kraa It tocnniurd to rrtiibulion aaaintt Saudi Arabia and the Untied Slain, who Trhrati claims It dtirrth issponaiMr lot lhe thil lathi d.
6t ihrilaati' pmrner in iheaa rhalWrtalna lit Undaanrnlal aoab .J*
ihr in ar.
rhinglial tar rrasetal balance ol power and rsttb lii hint banian Star many
lhaut ol thr Cull.
other
Spread tog Iran intra
In purniuai their toab Iran hai trird ba brral ihr reserve ol lha CtXpartimLwIi Saudi Aiataa andIrtc In ihr war and to iJTanaaaa* ihr taatt al thr CCC thata actuhtalii hha. ll hnaH Iran'a brrina- ewer
aaamadar lhal Sana* and Kuwaiti mpparl Inr Iraq in ihr war il arm. Trhi*n
hrlleveaan br brokenlmidalkm Irani apptoach olo Oman and nicks lo Kuwait hat arhaned tomr Miia UCCC
aaatrJ-
7 baa aho nrai thrhr CuH aa
uDcnrtiiai Iraat war Stbtant atanrt Iraqi ttratrtic advantage In lh* Iran-Iraq war Ian in Ihr air warii key batata eroncanlc tarerli intlwdina rank-era, not In thr around war whrrr it hai ceded lhe inHativr to Tehran lieu hat bint tuu|hl la prrtturr
ban and intrrralsnatiir Ihr Culf aar Inroaath ihlp
tXtacka. rrranuiu that ant oat-dr faaarnhrnata thr war an hoqt aairj
S iar IS ler-
unoa bt dlctalina ihr parr ol thai allarat in lhe Cull Inched, ihruld Baghdadhal ihr INSC
i In* till ihri il*i> al
Mio* an Iranualo ihrnl
Wmi influence Inre*miim le helpilim' in Uaronbtan. and laoiUair thr
ol Iranian Iumlanur.|alnni 'iiKlndira north'
oiid tc ihr rrnttal Aun irpaUlnmu SMhmiihId ircrnl Iranian mrilam. ihr SoisrltMlo tot ihni sntucore in Iraq ahra iWrr trrnu little anr-lrem prtaprd nl tainta* caanpanble mlurn in lianai uimntrdI'S rfJc.li tlcd Niltoro andrioted
ihr doon ID othri) lo inerraie thr pressure on Iran M
end Ihr liaia-lnor al ihr same time attempt-inf to arnrcalr rraioiutto atUitanaltoi menM to ihr refton Altbnuth ihr Soviet* cnild brnrfil on thr martHao double aamr. irveM Iraqi protests about Spurt brhaviot demoniJrile ihr
. ii: ii o| tha apprarh|
Port
IIum ihr leira chain,lirm IV Iranian clash Ihr mail Handcart da nhipifiit In ihr
n amor ihr anaui SME ha* been ihrirmaMvr taaaari lhal lashaehate aa tSmdJalu,-hast -ante iW resSoaFraa> bsaiW ISat aahaaaihr reamsa ahaael thalreqe to ihrpafcrtclI- lakart. bath iW
lartrd SUfa andat - lo irantailen
bul ihr raal ofata* lea rarh Wa brhnr
thai larl -J laKirwr ihr lhal
adt lead aa ratUnoa. mthadlaa opm mre tsrl tnd. it Ihr tamedecrease thr tkaarr that
certain irrnaiin -at all
IS In addition, while mmr arrnaixx air brllri Im
ated Slain thaai olhres. rarh aould present
diieaimu il broader i* IraerrUi In ihr nkv a" conaidrred i.rro. imhaii
Maamafa iW aH al at I- - aVCal
Sippi itaa attaintad n> ihr
liar*r
Liawuaa So.ini aad prrsnirr
Irawrs-iliai put nan Inturnrenv
luaned anil rualh anlttart
Heroine open future notions with Iran
st?bj^
IT In ham nl ihr ,
prrwuir' wis lltn Hvidiri ainihli I'S -ii. 'in. ll Wi-jLI
-DamaarK ih.
*nha and umkaiM ihr tiidilauialalim
ind wrurrti haraw huiud
led Matn anal . of ihr Clli Haan
r-.hh.lmtnrraad
n aulaidr ihr ration
di.-wlic.il>flarwrr ol bam mat
hr pawn aa br ntkeaeilhr
Cast, hartna lha aweaahrm Cm* Araba.
iMahhawd liab Emaiaan lI'AU aad
Omaa. an mf* ihrmarrin in liaaun
and aaampi ir. ma ihr bra dral UVi
Iran
ihr rrlaliir mmmri af awtaart rhfarno
m Ihr Daman Iradmfaip rnalnarr ihrrand iacrrair
rnpl lta I'S wall
w mival In prmtdina ilnmilli1nl ihr "poweram in ninhnaMint "Wntrm decadence and irnperiallinV andmr ItlamY' lurarrkoiwt
1- 1
engnrhimilM lor ihrrrrair
ihrii inSurm with lha fiuH Araha
lihpMih ihr irnrral Irrnd linn would br simdar. Ihr particular nrcumitancn InS wrthdraaalon-urrrd aould ilrii greatly ihr alliraalr drfrrr ot damaar lo t'S ccrdrbililv Onrralli. ihr marenure and act-om wereue broken I'S letolvr. ihe t'ralcr the dannapj
ecame ubimale lelianeeS terurMy umbrrlla ii lev to CCC'S reweiaroi on cummrtmenrt in the region would leave Ihne itatn badh thaarn and vulnerable Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, and Oman in rnitiruau. would have InI. reaateu ihrlr tceuratv rehlWnthtpa Thrv would intensify eflorti to Hnrmnr trlf-defmne and joint CCC raoabilitin. and leek lo broaden support Irom olhrrEuiTpean. bat aha im etudinR couDlrin nch asr China ai wrapcan uipplirn andornccn. or Pakiilan Inr adviirit and eien pmonnel. Aaainal Ihrw Innarr irrm eHoru. thrCCCilatn aoald more liiiawediately In locoocil-lair Iran lo ihe eUcnt it la ircecanr.. ia* iheri vital inlnevttl
30 Iran aiaild rominurIhrlraw rlfnrl) la lie
liraadalr Ku-arl to anhdaaa inin baai Iran Ilhal ratnnal Shiarih Unum
IraamtituuhJIhr fnatw al-Sabah
faenihI'S withdrawal in lla-lfpriaalm ma la- luffirW-nt la pnampl lian Inomrataauvl
.nl
I in
r climilr ol bmlllllk between Iran and
Saudi ArahaU-ill lank lo drib- al Saudi Arabia at aril, pari mi lad) il Iran atill feu ihr ieote had nol hrrn aillrd om thr Mecca rrati Wr believe thr primary Ihrral aould br
al Saudi nil and noramli lirllltln Wr do
brlteve lhal ihr lor.liai of ihr Saudi rrair br ihrralrard. howevn. bvth Iran I
t2 IW rnipmi m. thrwouldamifacant
1um for Iran. Al minimum Tehran would de>ar more ol ill rforu lo Iraq aim Ihe t'S
ihlnl had brrn nrvlralnrit. allhouah il mat hair
oacd caoabiltietail ol IS Kilora In ihr (mindIrani mrceu anadil hailra ac-xhet maiaS -ilhdfa-al would drmnrabir Iraq bat. Hi iltelf. would nolllapae and Iran -oald ptobaoli rrimiawair ecoaocrac altarb in thr
Calf, whrrr il hm thr iralialivr
SV TheSnvieii aould tain uimhtiotlv under ihu
laaaaie ol Ihr wilhdiawal ol ihe I'S form
auoriaied with ihr etcorlad the bio* In IS rrrdibiblf. The SovieU wnuld beoeot from ant drtemralion ia lSAial> ircuriti eoooeraliEn. and
improve thru ownpmi*liirtl-
iht mute wrtpm lo Ihe Cadfwe doihev would rrpuee ihr 1'aitrd Stain at the tiiprrma er patron ol ihr CCC. Moreover, theo not warn lo tee Iran "in the war ot emrrtr at thr dominate power ia ihe CaH (See "Protpeeti lor Soviet Calm'etailed diteuaarai of ihii iudianrnl.l
il Thr ISSn would ibo lace wane difhcuh polict traaVofli in litini lo riomil ISKuwail would probalili requnl tnorr Smlrt auppott In lanli-lallrat the Dim ol alt ml eiporu II thr SovwU reircl the rraueii. thei would rul the rveem aim thrt have made wilh ihe Coll ilatnihr Kuwaiti
rrqimtt. hnaever. rura Ihr iui ut trvonima engjard
illlleo confronlalion with Iran f"
Scanono Two. laniiom Datutad
rlai* It toiihl ni'.la (nailillnnrnl nf ihr "itrruatmiuliialioii rJ ihr
iraipar. ihr rtiwrarnreirndi ia ihr n rod la ihr I'S rtrwl plan allri a
i irtliUr drrlaralmp that piotnlmn aai ixt binvrr
nrcnuanl-
f nir aanaanral id Iraaaaiiadna Jhnanna tnrlmkina idter andnan ar hritrve iht nmaiio anuld hr difanur la attainH waaaldatnaWaal bnwwt. Iraurd Vale* h.
-Caafc-iaaihr .aima-rwatipartemahiaatan airrhaM. andi camera!idhr lane of Ihr faagbrna Ita alaa and ihrraii
ISrrli.rli (Itrrtlaal aa
lnl "natation nl lha Call alaln and aWrrnine ihr rai.rnl rruonal power habarr
Sorrcafultvred hne" uf I'S totrranrr ol Ii -rid lo Ihe Bow ol oil nut ol the Cat lla>int eaane dear to open mnfhrl wilhlled Slain and areawt Ihe IS Imildup of formthe region. Tehran would al leaat partially, rranru ill contempt lor I'S rnohr.
Pmening opportunitinnner range IV
[raman rreoncillalinn. mating II harder Im ihr
ISSH to tain major advantage in Tehran I-
ar raajatiar effect of thii icenano on IS Intrmli amid beeaae-Gre in ihr CuH teeter alnne would mauve thr urgency lor effectiveartiora to end the war and Iraq would are itow to Hi mrarareti la ihr war. Havingtmt (Ii abiUv lo eiport oil bv tankn. Baihdid perceiineptadenrr nn oil ctpnrtl at an important vulruwabaai lhal can be en-VNted Baahdad belann bringing an red only lo lha* part of the war would denymportant lever and forte it lo antt It nul In Ihe tround war whnr lean hu the initiative In trimi ol tangible effect on Ihe Iranian war effort and ceonemt. Iiiq could do ai much or onae da mate bi target mi Iranian larllilin on ihtae. luch aa leGneriea. pawn ptatltv and pipeline pumping llalintn Wr hehrie It Ii. hnweiet. highly unlikely that Iraq wouldtr.ii areaark> In wvlo'd Aa Iraqtrmoaatraled ia the allemalh ol UXSCntil rnume alttehi acaimt Itaaiancetiraw lire ia net coenprehemlve.
Ihn wrnarnt aiadd heatnl alaln rrbiivr In ihr Vnarla Irani aalaal nwlalri
maintd erltawm mlfaaee
leading i- ihaa oatnaamurreafal rar.aamm aaaatd aftawaaed 'latw mpntttaiaemdnr mr ai pawn ka pa Meet aralri ilatn
eanaaJ bath tktaamw tawhmr
amiaanl ita-mrnn arl In* lha.ail lwr
if Ihr tardahr
1'aaard SWeaW
wear abb turam IreknadetW Arabp' "Hi I'aa havemedrwurlinaah Hdn. Itiirlatiir anated Matrnt anX imrmrfab
an- ilhaaaww la aWm Hite.;
hbarahard Stain main aaim in ihlaI heir ate iwnefili from Monro*'i tmaprclivr brratoe rt aho rrduem the prmprcbmtrarled andS naialhe reainn Ahhouthiled Stain wnatldrab and Iranian em ai the mote effeetiie tuprrpowcr. we believe the Smirti aouldew renrnl taaw wilh the *rah modnaln Trartho try lo build on iheir intrmitrd dialogue with Iran, allbouch Iran
have IcU ihe immediate imprralnei that we
believe have driven Iheir recenl opening) lo Shacow.
Scaaerio Thraa. Simmaring Tiaiioni
hii would cnrnlUmontinuilion ol Ihe en neat tiiaation. reairldnr rn an nprn 'naVJ I'S tl nllA rmtlinwrdtirteVnii. The Inel of viobare and direct isnlruatatuai would be law enough that neitheriDing lo concede bat neithern Hi
IfilrrmI lOrlcaUlr.
tra>ceaarioinch>dVithe current vHuataoti thai, il continued would have tniird cBreti oa I'S inter-nh Thr LS and Iranian commltmrat la thantlna ihr otheri paltry white tryiraj toarteon mainlrorai puilbillly. On the poalliveoMloualion of ihr correal commit'
men! lorrfiajfliij.nrialin
Cull Arablo leiiil Iranian
ptruum
ihr pnreplirin of IS mewl in Arab ilatn in thr aakeel damage frnm LSamu tain In Iran and inabihli lo delner inphiiliratedpom in the Aiala
thr hnr Ita Iran Iran hsi
lin Ithr rraiaitrr tilmlh
liii1 haa lauilli hrnrfilnl (rnai KaWnaUjIaat aadnlioal u> raai^aaitwiraaraMLr ax ana*aa*nd. aaal preaawcl. adare* ajf| aaah.hr, tncrraar baaaanIta tnpalaldin
peruutr on ihr rnlriiurtmrail rornnau nail Mrnd Ihr Iran-Iraq
hrtr air uinaVranl tnki far IS tin neat how Iranhr tatted Slain
riprnall a II manilaim anianment lhal o>
political hlor WaahiaaaMl Thai .irw.
combinra ailh ibar allrnUmf pxHci deoem
Irarh Trhaaa w> hriavt-an an to breaa LS
rranhr aania irnataaar laaaaaa
bark 'B-na artaaaa aar* at aaaaaa or (hr rrrrni
"Mali faaaaornar nl naminrr* hoalilif n rlntt In alertohn it'hjir
Al Miliary IntU and termor* continue lo flar. ihrnaaratralalioa on thr ptrl ta* all hrt Mde
H
ran could perpetuate ihr bidden haatt"by toc*nceiar uroitnbuublr
inf. m-on lanrli holh in and ixil nl ihr
immediate rrtwn Such altarlu would have Inlrat aaauutlon with thr VS prrarnc* in lh* Cull without brinanclraih anted to Tehran lhal II caunn Waihirwicm to retaliate Thlt tcrrori*rvrl ol contlnard flnr-tariliai lhat auy br daScull to Hntiin
raq aould brain In ttra at itlaimr. i
CS .invi'r lo abatain learn ihip all art i. particularly il lh* iroaaraad Irano atall inCSJC RewJ.it am SM Iraqi atucti aianrd al hen kin* ihr atalmale andran
<Ko-Jo-an raadd aril badaarriaa.
ther raa, aod caatthat arenaOu lord Slain nvb-Jr
eeaaurnrnttrpr ISt 'r- as rilndrd and ayarnralf prttnd daartraaa aattl-
tail ardarti Iranirraa
near IS and Arab intrmti mil dnrrae
- Iraa nut Inctrair Hi eiorti in pinaurr hu-all
iiaSivetlnn tahntapr ol "uaatli k* nrn Saiirlil rul larililin ni rllrnl .IU. kiuwaiti
mamThr turl imm al ahah ihu ihanhnlil n
leiirTidt an armel taiuMn. lame nl ahull
I'll', -
ilttr a/ piav a/ Iraniann -iU card in all at tar urenariaa ia hhmeaiai'i death II hr iUI die in the maht al aa aalnld.a.
nralalaai nun. aa all hair fa lay unreclainlin
ihr darettan al Irtaaaa ia matin and lorrwn palxta. a* aall aa iiaaaiaMm
rearra euara TW panaaaai al form ia
IbbalraNarlr
n arm*thr atariHnilarli. thrla Sierra while iratnaalld ia
Tehran. paJatli unartcnctatioru la
rtralma nra uauet ilat eiaiaplr. ihrlanar* thai ratal br aderriacd and
lanoml into broader aalvi caraadrraiiani
f ihr I'S aVhglr Ihr Iranlaroai Ihrlr primarird IS molvr andit-iota
3ft IrarWaaarce Kanruj laieo
action auKrural lo aaitanl LSar dn nut brflat* Ihr IratHaraill Ir raaiil nmaml lo alter
thra-coaiw Iranrnarr rapirili
k> abaarbaaala. nampb In add.
mmx -heieaa Ikr aa. ol thrad aad arm mom an Oadhahdaarhrd Qadhat aaaiart I. reduced ha rnrdjdrnra mi ha anlat an
'S artaaaa. ha* Itrr ol ihr likelihood'S miitari rrtganeeiioa At
ifhr ilriru aould pint*
bit be ilrrngthrnrd la an race latum, aad maw rlr-mnai raktht nra brlmeat ailhated Stain would itrrnaihrn thru poliural ptaition Iran
would br meat aflrslrd ht . thai I
Impaired Hi atnllii la rontiaot to prourevte ihr Iran/Iraq war or Iranian public lupoorl lot ihr ir-
liairP
Srmorloiemtm/lmimicmt.on of Iron
nder thia trrnaria tfur VnUrd Slainei /or franlaa prosoca'lcni and mlalinn inulla la Iran'a talking ouaa/rom lit acttt* oppoaiiUn ihr t'S pretence la (hr rrjrton or from III ihtrml foh aqn ni,ohmaital /uirV' eacura Iron.!-
Ai i- lan w*. .
ahrrnalitr ircnafin al ll naild in-tir it naer ivaa
ii 11 i. i.'M taai in the waler ll ihr Iranian arm at mem hr hard bt lhal Ihri waren
Mi-ihr irnplHalama id Ikaa wanariuhr
I Main I. I.I
I>aiwala-all>raaaaaiilk -aderarm tolf<aaan panwaar ihrit
tintm ihr Cal aad inrirh da-aaar liaalarfJ aaaarua plain aa the
aaa.
rrbaaam-ith ihr Haa
ihrhal ar aaiimJauat
Idaa-re Irnot rrpieinui an .rmmhlr Ham
larrrward mnaair oa Iiaa to
hi an ihrI i-iU aho br nraallm harm
-Ihra IV Iranian lapptnchrmrnl eould he delated men further
The llamara wnulderd lor ait ill hnt.ii'irelalianihap wttli Mncow
Vhur ambmumatntrml. Iraq aaU m
Ihu Krnaimama narrna It* ill lonrUind-inm aim nl corn >rwlofa prnaarr
od ihr war Baghdad aauld pbi on ihrfirment ta amfc lar ilailai kaaaaa cme
hr Hill aat. rraatiag ewara W
drhrh ihe taahn aad amaad aam|S ataarfj aa baa -add aam
prabltma lor tha Vmrtt hnaamined Stem wsald art thehe eraam non alli ai Aaaidad (or irdnnag Ihe Iranian thrral aadIS form uinbabli wouldhr rrtmn
The SDatrta would aim he euarnaadmrrrtJ
uv cfb| the 'i'. inehne
Waihltunon to tuether Uluatiem oatadr the arra Thr ipeed aith -huhlraraaa ronBlti
amid la pined oul In ihu urnarai oiaild ilioa
hlaarnw India illlle more thanropaaaaua bar and en Althmiah the I'S atlartuuatrt butdet-
It- ISS" wmild latae leaHaaii btlaerli Vhntim
nuHi il ii orcuiird Mat* *
itinuiul ihnr would hr lilllr iianiriraal
Lii.t- ininrl mi ihr IS Smart irtattonihto Ihnr
r> )b" pdrnlul iilun lot Muatna lhal imluuV.
would pmbahl) remain amiird .ln-ot ibr
t tilted Slain in ihr eftnmath and. a> In ihrcvaarao nrnl In farnom medal ina towardSnrirtt.
brim biouihl In hrrl would hrh> Iraa and
..mi-iil Iran'" ah In* In Ipread Krt+ilnxuin
lilam
1 pfoonbl) irducipriu-
prrti lorraition oln oral-
hhonirini Irani
Stenorieonnid
ndrr ihit trrttario. Iranian or t'S art loutplril ni ncautioo Ralhrr lhan barlina down, fata
re-malna rrnlulr Old iiirartohV. 'rvHi* toihr
mlFe/ the I'Mied Stom j
Itlthiuno lor all panrnrnnlirl. lb* IMain aould farr nam ii' vIhr probatilr nul-
ceatr. Trhranam ihr IS Uvealn ttiliboraiionliau and lit lupporirrt and.it trraarlo. mat thill III ptlmaiiun ibr
dvi'li"!SoiVum ilo Ihr Mpubaon of Ibt
Iniird Slain bona lha rrplun In Trhran. ihr ban* Iraq ear could linomr ibr ban AS aar. wkh Iraq
S wlBliajnru to Indict bran Iranian catuallin aad dainaar would probably thocl Trhran and dia-
rnallralli allrr lit -Irw ol US rnihlaiy
mob*.ihli. hownrrot
(hanar in pobcm Indrrd. Iran aaithl aril brltnr lhal ihu birl ofl alrnrhoa;
id Stain at lor Iran, which tai barnar lootlaa lor nralli aim iran aad haa abradyard amaretlorr Bali Mat lh on ati aai laapaaulraaa el iphhm ihr pofaaaalaan oa
lo tf*ahrt aarriBc*m Ik* rrlapoui prnpntlir.
olih* rraardiora War|
ranpobttn probably would oad) br allrml afterhad iiiHnrd iMMfcram economic and nydilaii'-mmlh*nf caaaahin Thn* would picbaotilo lacliadr diiruplion ol oa nporti or atmt imperii ni aclmnilmilat rruiHiiin* Av
temporarily at Irtnl.al Ihr arrandiry
aith liai| ihr U1 ttaln aad ta ihr trait -Nonrthrtrni.hr amkara* lhalre* el at ihr hrat faiaaaataaae* aaaprr-raaral aa
-
SO TV larer Is aaahlari penrarr a* ihr fraud and aurf aunt an act mao. trl hradrn naaUaria* ta .Iran aair lloirtnl uiia'nt in
thn -iai. BaBtMi incltnhnc
IWrlliarnr* on IS miliiaci nwnr-nrnta anal
ar aloute, arraaa ihr
Itaet thr faaaraathaa al rraaw earn.
haaitrrr Europe Libia aaal Si ib la
iiaaalrr add* tonal Sra Irl-ma-lr araja-aa lo Itaa Thr lonen ihr ronlxl continued thr nance hhrli
Mow* anuld br ta offer rurh Hippcal IV* do not hrbrr* Ihraould iw Tat aa In directly provide Iran ma a* weapon* iiMe-iru aahnuah mt
a raid notout remol deh.ertei ol aaarr para,a and mitiUr. Iruchi II ihr Snrarla
brarveat ihMiard Saaan laarnalrd aa aeeuari in arraaa* It an ihrar .aaldraaai pn it la, ihr,
annulrtth Sonet lorm la thr Tiaat-
caacaauara-anaVr lo Washington lhalraald aaa arl ailli Irnpunaieaion yo ckM mI M
SIf brlirir lhalEaro-
praa inaohraaral. ahalrrri ihret
or ihr lOUed Stain bul lhal ihr Fiiroprin'
are aot aarh aaarar pleimew arrater
aarai aoaaVl aabatantaaah eaaaaajr aaa ntatpairai abnal
Ih* eaaphnliiaaa tal an af lh* arnaaraoa It aoaU hoanrr. aflrrieil hood ol the vanoua lerrjiea European Injirmrni ma Ira thr name poaltirerneiili I'm. hhrli aaad Ih* iterator acrciarMe
Itahe European cm at ore aha cream lh* potNblliti lhat ihr Lnatrd Stain could br dtaaaonOirlnull ta! an Iraalarv Europran tool rantl-lrli brcun bi' ao Iranian action ArTntitaa lh* uou.lt.In> ofbut alio constraiaae* Ih* aclntnt lhal miahl pradur*
incrtaard aanhlpO make a
difncuh lor haa (ata Iraqi ha dSarioaimn
rwrrttli lh* taahaaaahrt al aaaraaaal tararte Farther
Trara. >al hen- ha la-iadai thr tpiitillv thai the
ire hiitplian France and other Europran aalWH aould ran ihr t'ntted Slainrtahatori itrlkr In rnpnnu- lo aa airrl learner, action atainO thr refaa-
ttnteafJurd Slain ail far under
iling.unning
rn irai<
ataui ha aw IKv mala laatJ
aedlaraWM lhat i.
>rl JrraJr ha ,na> Ofcrtn.
mHudr
VViBingneaa acid rmi"n tur
jhm dnnuaiaphl' aaa1 (rographK Mir
eddi ia aanHmanalr aahcn ia thr
rmrarr al warn tramrd ytaa .a
aaaa* al ihr Call natn
lnriahlp irratmrat. andotertial filrha tapper! ol Iran
WartJlhujh ihrrr arr ugnikant
hanas la Ha aa Whalr Iran mat aggremnrhlrmday. anlbr
at nahr aaraaeaaaaBtmrafi rarrplhr HUM arra naatlrf haw
badblor Iiaa. Trhna la
untatrhrlihrt airlyurr al laDwrarr la ihrbmawlnomilmarl eipaiwooUm ind traditional Vlua-
apOKHon la Urniaaa"
ah Patataa. Chma aad Tar
H 1
M lian aha haa torataVraWr weahneuan la Ihr
rurrral litmnmv
Iran't ideological unity ol pwpoar. thrrr
u arraaa pulilral eitgrtinth lei eh ai ihr iwiaart im umahan afaaal thr irg'aa 1
atalai to agree an laclm thai -Jl head *r> andei
a.'- Iraaaated Main
aoabillla*etrriorited tinre Ihr ''ui ini.t mach wrain al art and in Ihr all ihan ihram in thr region
roroalralh art* and iwharabr
iniimatml aabtiai land aa thr
Slrrraicrerxr da.amat.aled.ading
it ,'-nd uapperlrei lotrvrn In ihr Third
i" hkaeaa bnn rlanri ta aa rMrrral aaimM
an thr mt liahir ntaaiaiili tl thr tr-aiaSIt Owrt Ihrtrrai. ihr Sroeta arr* Is rrdarr am
In ihrrabra Ihr militarily Iraaa Ihr
return amltae ihr pra* ion ihr I'Mrd Stain nmr brld
a ihaauialt laalndr iwluraar in Iran and aaaMi Lain aad nlrral ihr-ndhniai rhrwhrtr ai a
:npartami la tmr
" r" Thaw al.nding Smat aah hair iU
nder ihr 1ream*nd
larlm ham Thr irtiinirdma
aaarr laammaly aad miagmalMlirnate*diia pattirv mpiadid
aorniaat ranrr qiaahh aad .ppri/n! mm alunrd
Inmbtklira lhaa Coabarhnprnlrmaai
Sh Wr brhrvr lhal thr So*aria arr lihrlyrr-tav ur In iw.tr saint In Ihr (XXJ Matra Thr tanirli arr
plaiiiia alanprrrrdriilrd imtritinhanala praatioa aaaHna aai thr CCC aaaa naihrt andaiTrv laarr aa an napoataniramnal laai Mr ahnj - lhat ihrrr arr maaar hmm on
baliri to improvr diarnaliraly thrir pni-lion laail hrtiiar of thr dllrmmai and
hard rhnarn thaionror ihr
kthrt oaaM lorrr an thr Saaapb
,i thr CCC *aan raa thr
Ifinuaa arr aillina lo align ihrmarhn witha rbarly ai thrt art tuna, ea oner "nr. itanrd
nilh Ihr In.ird Stain Although ihrrr arr atmrtrro wjra gamr" ai VS ai Sonin aairu
and Uaan *i m liatw* viaatuni lhal arr
gla thrtailati mlEgypt arnted SUaei .maaar ba ai Ihranr huinrieal haahr lull al Ihr Shahi. in ihr Bad.'Warn eumnl thr I haa
ouldhrnnVl ibrSovirli We do not brlmr. huaeirt.
i-
lhal our loo would mail Hi Ihni latmi our plarr inrrmmi At drmo-aiiated by Inn aim ihr Fall ol thr Shah, aad raatrrbaaoa, aat rlrawd dam nut atwayi innahtr aaaa Smart
AO Mnarnw rrgaidi Iranihr meat onpnitant
I Mar and bcllrvn lhal US kmn iheir an* a
maior Miilrglc wtbarh lor ihr I'lwtrd Slain Although rarli aa Sluarow had hagat ol iuta*braarat IS hCv-enrr aa Tehran aim thr Shah fee wa brlmr Vagarow
now iMahi ao uatarde pawtt laa br iblr IP
etert maaninalul iapUanrr or ihrrr-
glm. in Tehran al Watl at lunaaielenei like Khomrim
reraarn in ranlrol Thr Snairli irallally allrihaard a
peoprramr' inthaatinn mihi IranlaB miolutna. but
thet had ehiaprd thrar prnprttne ear IMS andihrrirrgy Ivr bring "nrartaaaaan" and lor abaanarang ami imta-nalitm hnng naeniialr, blnrkrd from nukina lignllWini iaroadt in In- Ihr
SctviHl em "WtrHnilir. onSfufc m* ol maintaining ihrW influence in Iraq ind Irving in improve Ihrti rxaatkai In ihr CCC aim while num-
ialceur wilh Iran al lh> lamr hmr thai ihr)
hWk lha npandon of Iranian migrate
Al. Ol Ihr firm nl oaironwi ofan'Iraq aw. an Iranian rUinry would br moat dareuaDna ia avtrall Sotirl ohrerti-et An end lo Ihr war an Iraniindlral down of hoMihtbri would art* Sonet Hi tat-naanudid Smrat lardhllaa rferl -oold
irprnrM tha ail allhannaaH lorroa
nl ci aa tha aaaaan We radar that aa lahiiliprreabb do rha Snage farhraaryni llna la lha wahrurrcadullon. ihr Sovim rauld afengthrn ihrw rrlannra wWh Iran continue Improving ilea lo Ihr Aiibaan Prnlraala
gala and ohd rrlatlnaakip with Iraq
AS IW.uariihat rmJaary weak
armr CCC Bain profm to reli aaaad Vanhlihbvv paaWtl and ulialagtral thrrat .haa don rh.a iWagfc thrv amiaiad Steinihr- aaarepnarn "patronmorr aptly. ialrham aoror lamurkrI acini mearuirrtng brtaMaihr currentroldin ebb and low of eoniarti. dnh. and irmn mradalloca aa ihnr nalnmira-ataam ahab pratocliag Ion* teem iaereaa Thrt ailhtola aaairraomImh-hng tahlagof LSSoayolmw iheSUm more reerpbtr aa trat ahei abut af rrdararnra thr I'S aabtvJWaq Serin
mraada that could teegnroW the aabib. nf thrir
Internal i
We believe II irmrliabb lhal othrr CCC re-flann will follow Kaaaal'l bad, oflertm a'cafoa a
ndr in ngWalddaian lo tncrewlng dlpto-
auaac aad cow met rial nra Tan aar aha arr aano
unlay m pbtimi thr aff igaual aw
another TV Sa-ieta ahaitli Ma CCC ivecartsnet rob anr>bnab oaara peoDrmrrairra CCC armyof regime rhanpa thai -maVJ dmaaaimlr
re anal and ae eagret aa regime to
realhtn meel tkael. wtihane it wrier-h*
ihrratenod bv IrllUt.
rae eurm , abaol thr
Sovietated bv lbI Irar of Soviet npnnacmUm and Mutilm raprailKw lo Com-muniim Nonet he Ira. the Khomnni ragimt pottrara icirrf ai impervtoui lo Inlimldaltan by So>Wt prniure or ibrrali of rmlialton Trhrm prohihlt taaoam lhat
lb Mratrnrwa lo Hraeow aad tht Srwirti
drairr not to drive Iran lo ml better nltlioaa -ribhr VSSR.ilhagna. ta .niimidur
Iran r
(ft Them arr hey oratncla lo ngnlBcamlr wa tin. however, intrudingBPporl ef Baghdad and Tohran'i oppinition io iht Soviet octoration of Alghanitlaa W*tanlndal impravenntnl In bdattral rrlatrorn remaiml tent until after Khomeini dim. unlen rconorme or mllitiry totbpte ihrriicn the renlme'iienl cate wr believe haoacow would br raullnui at com.-yghe aidahrrini regime in Tehran htuaco. waaM br iriocta-U. to rhl in Dovtua an Iran, and lb imoroyirw poailion wilh ihe CCC Oatn. uorVn ilga*-einl gain* in lian wnr htihlt llleh. Soiirl overt urn
DISSEW'SATON MOf-Cf
,aid
i Ih.M
pttrwrn urdv hit Orii4fal-wi o* oto
iA-LaTiiol Sim forffc. frooort-rwr* al Motv
LVrtmv.tr* Oflkr oltwitvy of
erd tho orgomxoM* ol Wfi of Slo-f
fl forco, to* it*otwo Amr/
olo, for tW ^oi UmM of th* Ho**,
Omll tito A* Fore*
ol InioKpotio, lor Hipjjtaufgtw-i, MorWko Corp*
AUrtant Sacfttary loriionf ol ffWyy
of WwlWiwdg^
r it* Ncrtiord
fo Wotot. lorth-ho
Doptity Oitoctor lor tilili|infifW pojomorii- r
bo rrlar-d. OTybfith Dfpfeofjfe
lo tho Dwoctoio^w
t
otfJU olr#Or At ftp*
rf a"or OHo rjrxi#tl-*fi>to -ho lorwordirig ogm*cy, oriiiTrW Jjjn1 1nl olorwwding rtoro-* 1
Wion irtod toporotofy frorooot
Original document.
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