JuneItaly: The Election and Its Implications Summary
Italian voters vlll go to theear earlyunes Co determine whether the five-party coalition that has provided Italy with unprecedented stability and prosperity will bt reinstated or whether Italy will again experience revolving-door governments that provide the Communist Party with new openings. Opinion surveys and political necessity suggest that the coalition will eventually be reconstituted, but onlyeriod of protracted and bitter haggling. In the meantime, therehanceinority center-left or center-right governmenton outside Communist support could come to power.
The election Itself is not likely to produce dramatic changes in the balance among Italy's five governing partiesthe Christian Democrats, Socialists. Social Democrats. Liberals, and Rttpubl leans. The Communists, Italy's second largest party, are not likely to see their share of the vote change significantly, although the party could emerge as Italy's largest If the Christian Democrats stumbleituation that would give the Communists new politicaleven though the Chris1:ian Democrats and Socialould almost certainly still oppose awith them. umber of Factors .nake It harder than ever to predict
individual party returns, together the five parties of the pcntapactJto coalition will almost
certainly again win enough.seats, to torn a
majority government.
is whethe governmen over thei and Socia struggleonths wi difficult
dqe^JsuLldi-
major question hanging over thehey have the will to form another - together. The Last coalition fell, not ostensible dispute over policies, but tter fight between Christian Democrats lists for the Prim* Ministership. f. not resolved, and the fierce personal hat have characterised the past fewake brildirta even more than usual
the two sides can patch up their differences, this election could bring down the curtain on the era of the pentapartlto. The Christian Democrats, far and-away the'Largest party in the coalition, are determined to recover the top spot after allowing Socialist Bettlno Craxi to hold It for four years. Personal ambition and fear that hia party will be totally overshadowed under Christian Democratic leadership make Craxi equally determined to reassert himself.ignificant realignment of votes, however, parliamentary arithmetic will ensure that neither side canajority government without thethey turn to the Communists. No one at this stage Is talking seriously about bringing the Communists into the government, but both the Socialists and the Christian Democrats may entertain the possibilityinority government supported from the outside by the Communists.
Whatever the outcomeune, we brieve the christian Democrats and Socialists will first try lo reconstruct the five-party cimIi< ion. Neither wants to give thend neither relishes having to depend on Communist support. Negotiations, however, will be painful and prolonged, perhaps dragging on throughsummer as Craxi and his Christian Democraticick their way through the minefields of
ernonal ainem.
that
further liberal!
and cut back on
public spending.
Th* bitterness engendered by partisan maneuvering over the past year makes It likelyeconstituted fivt-party coalition would be less cohesive than Its predecessor, but we believe it would generally continue the policies of the last fo*ir years regardless ot who was Prim* Minister. In foreign policy, Rome would continue to demand Coroice equal to that of the larger countries In Western political and economic councils and would adhere to the EC and NATO consensus on key Issues such as trade and arms control. Domestically, th* coalition would
Should the Socialists and Christian Democrats fail to reach an accord, both will scramble toinority coalition with the smaller parties. The fate of their *fforts will be decided largely by the Communist Party. ocialist-led coalition would probably be more attractive to the Communists because it would exclude the Christian Democrats from national power for the first time since World War II. It might also benefit the Communists over the longer term by breaking down the old voting patterns that have kept them from rlsing.ro.uch aboveperc*nt celling.
A Christian Democratic-Socialist deadlock that forced one or the otherinority coalition with the smaller parties would resultess stable, less prsdlctsbl* government. To be sure, Craxi or another experienced, responsible politician would probably be at the helm, and this would guarantee considerable continuity. Becauseovernment would require parliamentary support from the Communists, however. It would be more timid In supporting Western security policies and less likely to Implement tough domestic austerity measures. hristian Democratic-led minority government might alsoore Independent and pro-Arab policy In the Middle Fast, which both Christian Democrats and Communists favor, f
3
Background: Bizarre End too
The election is takingear earlier than required because the five-party coalition failed to implement the Prime Ministerial "relayagreement reached last summer under which Craxi was supposed to have handed over his office in Marchhristian Democrat. Although Craxi resigned in March, he immediately began to impose new conditions that effectively stymied attempts tohristian Democratic Prime Minister. The Socialists subsequently Insisted on holding referendum* on nuclear energy and Judicial reform, knowing that the Christian Democrats were adamantly opposed.
President Cossiga's efforts to resolve thehis unprecedented decision toommunist. MiIde lotti, to actediator among theIneffectual In the face of growing acrimony between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats. The crisis cameixarre end when the Christian Democrats combined with the Communists to bringovernment headedenior Christian Democratic figure, Amlntore Fanfanl, while the Socialists, hoping to pin the blame for an early election squarely on the Christian Democrats, voted to support the government. Cosslga subsequently appointed Fanfani toaretaker government ofd Christian Democrats to presideew election,
The failure of the relay agreement put an endoalition which most observers agree proved more effective than most of its predecessors despite frequent internal bickering. its most notable accomplishment was to bring down Italy's chronically hlqh rate of Inflationelativelyercent, chiefly by reducing cost of livingin the face of Communist and trade union resistance. Under Craxl's decisive leadership, the coalition also made progress In tackling the country's widespread economic inefficiencies. Including curbing taxion, ami soiling off parts of the bloated public sector.and 'it her measures such as the liberalizationpiiai and financial markets increased business confidence ami investment and enahled Italy tourrent growth
ne of the fastest In Western
The acrimonious breakup of the coalition does not. In our judgment, necessarily imply the collapse of that governing formula. The Socialists, Christian Democrats, and three smaller parties remain sufficiently close on most domestic and foreign policyon civilian nuclear energy and judicial reform, the ostensible causes of the coalition'spermit compromise it they are so inclined. The main stumbling block will again be control of the Prime Mlulstershlp. The Christian Democrats are anxious to recover the office after allowing Craxi to hold it for four years, while Craxi fears both he and his party will be totally overshadowed if^the Christian Democrats were to control the top spot.
An Issueless Campaign
The continuing broad substantive agreement among the members of the former coal Ition--as well aa the decline of i'looiogiral differences In Italianhy the absence of any real debate on Issues In the current campaign. Roth the Socialists and Christian Democrats have taken the low road so far, concentrating on accusing each oiher of inLaadlna.toost-election alliance with the
Cnmmiui Ills
Thr- onlyon which they have put'ilectoral law reform. The Socialists
r popular election of the President of the fli'tiiltlir wtiile ihe Christian Democrat* have proposed that
ni onir.t he formed prior to an election. Theselakimjlnd little enthusiasm among the
perhaps, because they are so blatantly
i: ihi> Socialistsclearly trying to facilitate
The coalition also scored an important success In combatting domestic terrorism: last year there were only about ncidents compared with an average of overear In the. In the foreign affairs area, the coalition enhanced Italy's prestige within the Alliance by .il lowing IMF deployments in Sicily and expanded Italian involvement in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean region hy contributing to peacekeeping forces In Lebanon and the Sinai. The coalition's one outstanding failure was its inability to reduce the public sector deficit, which at overercent of GDP Is the highest among the major economic.threatens the country's continued prosperity
Craxl's eventual elevation to the Presidency while the christian Democrats are seeking to prevent the Socialists from trying to play them off against the Communists after the election. Even the Communists are confining themselves to the blandest of generalities, probably because they are trying to support recent efforts to.portray themselvesoderate, mainstream party.f
The Parties Weigh Their Chances
Italian voting patterns have traditionally been among the most stable In the Western world, and we believe It unlikely thst any of the major political groupings will experience large swings In this election, given the absence of sharp divisions among the parties and general public disinterestontest that la widely perceived to be the result of maneuvering for narrow partlaan advantage. Prior to the breakdown of th* five-partyariety of electoralparty performance in local government elections, opinion polls, and the overall performance of thethat both the Christian Democrata and the Socialists could score eodeat gains over3 results in this election, while the smaller parties and the Communists appeared likely to suffer losses. Christian Democratic and Socialist optimism about their electoral prospectsey factor prompting Craxi and Christian Democratic leader D* Hita to harden their line and force an early election.
o The Christian Democrats, who won just underercent of the voteppeared to have reversed their decline In$ local and regional elections where they rose toercent. The party has also generally done well In pre-election public opinion polls, scoring often Inpercent range. Party leader* wer* also buoyed by public approval of the five-party coalition and may have been optlalatlc that De Kite's reformlat leadership, which has Included the appointment to prominent national posts of younger leaders untainted by charges of corruption, has improved the party's crumbling image.
o Although the Socialists won4 percent of the vote they are now scoring regularly Inercent range in opinion polls. Craxi has been the party's key asset: according to some
opinion surveys, as many as three out of five Italians approve of Craxi's performance, and he has been consistently rated the most effective Italian politician. The Socialists' ability to translate Craxi's popularity into substantive gains In this election has always been in some doubt, however, becsi-se the party has failed to make significant progress in local elections held) and is besetange of organisational problems that could diminish its ability to get out the votes.
The three smaller coalition parties have been generally down in the polls and have failed in local elections to match their3 showing1 percent. Some of the disenchanted Catholic voters they won over from the Christian Democrats3 appear to be returning to their traditional party. The Social Democrats, moreover, may be losing some traditional anti-Communist supporters
because their recently chosen leader. Franco Nicolazzl, Is trying to expand the party's base of support by moving It to the instance by raising the posslbllty of oalition with the Communists.
by
settled economic conditions which discourage theq that often boosted the party in the past.
The Communists, whose support dropped from their all-time high ofercent6 to just underercentouble setback5 when they fellercent in local and regional elections andeferendum they had sponsored. In pre-election polls, the party has done no better than hold evenercent, and In some It has fallen back again to aboutercent. Perhaps the most glaring problem for the Communists has been the decline In morale and the sense of drift that has prevailed since the death of party leader Enrico Berlinguer4 and his replacement
rty bureaucrat,robably also been hurt by
Confoundjng Factors
<-alcus about their prospects Inuve been thrown into some question by several
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recent developments. The most important has been the acrimonious and premature breakup of the five party coalition. Italian conventional political wisdom holds that the party responsible for forcing an early electionenalty at the polls. That penalty could be especially severe this year due to the popularity of theone poll has indicated that SS percent of Italians believe that the current election Is unnecessary. Although the Christian Democrats played the most prominent role In forcing the election, recent polls suggest that the public has seen through Craxi's backstage maneuvering and blames
*" the breakup of the
1 on.
If both the Christian Oemocrats and the Socialists pay an electoral penalty, the smaller parties which tap into the same broad pool of centrist voters could benefit. The Communists too, could gain from the current perception that the pentapartlto might not be able to regroup following the election. For the first time since the, thereossibility that the Communists could participate In governance, and this prospect hase sagging morale of party workers
Communist Party fortunes may also have beenoost In recent months by Italian voters' Increasingly benign view of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's domestic reforms and arms control initiatives have lent lusterore moderate Image that could help the Communists retain hiqher-lncome voters who have supported theotential Instrument for socioeconomic reform rather than for ideological or class reasons. It could also harm the Christian Democrats who have traditionally been best able to rallysupporters when they could portray themselvesulwarkear-Inspiring Communist party.
A final confounding factor may be the appearance for thr.mf>green" list on the ballot. The greens, wh'< amrganixod locally, wonercent In localons heldnd may have particular appeal forleftist voters increasingly Interested In environmental questions.. If the greens and the newitral Pany are able to go beyondercent gainedir| ra'lii'Aln ini, they could cut significantly intoin- tha" might ot herwi -oo -to the Socialists andin "nmmunista.
Alternative Electoral Outcome ImplIcatlong
Electoral prognostication is even more difficult for Italy than for other Nest European countries because opinion polls cannot accurately gaugeooint swing that can mean the difference between "victory" and "defeat" for each party in the Italian political contest. Moreover, Italian opinion polls are notoriously inaccurate;une, Italy's premier polling agency, Doxa, announced that It would not perform any surveys for the election because respondents are so unwilling to indicate true crefauencea that the results are Inherently unreliable.
For what they are worth, the results of recent opinion polls show (all plus orercent]i
o The Christian Democrats Calling aa low asercent or rising to aboutercent.
o The Socialists rising to anywhere froa aboutoercent.
o The combined vote of the three amaller coalition parties falling to aa littleercent.
o The Communists either holdingalling as low as ercent.
An informal survey taken by tht Italian Interior Ministry just before the dissolution of Parliament showed local prefects predicting that the Christian Democrats and the Communists will both falloint3 levela while the Socialists will gain about two points. Although
based solely on subjective judgments, this "poll-
historically proven as accurate at any othtr.
Cour own best "guesstimate" It that Crail't popularity and the effectiveness of hit governaent will translate into at least modest gains for the Socialists despite the party's
and organisational problems. The Christian Democrats may alsolight Increase in supportortion of those who defected3 come back to the fold now that the party appears somewhat less corrupt and divided, but therehance they will falterisproportionate numher of voters punish them for the coalition's demise. The smaller parties, which are beset by organisational and
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irtv ir
identity problems, are likely to lose support. The Communists, pressed by the Socialists in the south and by the greens throughout the country, could drop belowercent, although they could conceivably still end up as the largest party_in the unlikely even the Christian Democrats stumble badl
Restablishinq the Five-Party Coalition
Whatever the electoral outcome, both the Socialists and the Christian Democrats will most likely try to reconstruct the five-party coalition, despite the acrimonious breakdown of Its predecessor and the harsh rhetoric over the past few months. They are driven in that direction because nearly all the alternatives to-this formula tequire_aome form of Communist Involvement In governance.*^
Although Craxi has publicly refused to rule out working with the Communists after the election and the Christian Democrats have been suspiciously careful about treading on Communist sensitivities, both parties will avoid dealing with the Communists exceptast resort. Craxi realizes that ending the Communists' prolonged Isolation from power would giveoliticalhat would ultimately harm Socialist chances for gaining Increased support on the left. Christian Democratic leaders are avare that any attempt to revive thehistoric compromise" formula of Christian Democratic-Communist cooperation would provoke strong opposition from the more conservative elements In the party.
is theoretically possible that the Democrats, if they were to gain two to three points in this election, couldoalition parties and perhapsariies th.ii could survive In Parliamentide suppr-rt of the neo-fascist MSI. Thef*veineri very briefly and unsucces m:n 'he, but It ist >hny .me) especially the smallering in ir-iiv even informally with the, rn rjghijtjnq terrorism and Us
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The reconstruction of the five-party coalition will not he easily accomplished, however, because the Socialists and the christian Democrats are likely to clash once again over coalition leadership. Barring an unexpected collapse In tneir electoral support, the Christian Democrats will almost certainly insist on reclaiming the Prime Ministership, with De Mita, oneof his allies, or possibly Andreottl as their candidate. (CraKi. an inveterate political risk-taker, will probably reject this demand initially, if only to seeobstinance will force the Christian Democrats to cave inj The process of coalition formation could thus drag op tttmCughailt th* summer and Involve several false starts.
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eight, the decline In small party strength that would almost certainlyhristian Democratic advance would probably sap the morale of the leadership, dashing any effort by Craxi tocpnt with them against the Christian Democrats. |
If the socialists and the Christian Democrats both gain support, the outcome of their battle over the Prime Ministership would become much less predictable. Both would be likely to believe that their relative claims to the post had been strengthened. Craxi might be somewhat more likely to cave in eventuallyi he cannot afford to alienate the Christian Democrats entirely because he will need some Parliamentary support from them to achieve his ultimate ambition of becoming President. More likely, the two parties would compromiseandidate from the smaller parties. Thar* Is,air chanceeadlock would ensue, leading to the collapse of affonts to reconstruct tha five-party coalition.
A Soclalist-Dominated Minority Coalition with Outside PCI Support
The Communists would probably see clear advantages in providing external support In Parliamentoclallst-led
A complete breakdown In negotiations between Socialists and christian Democrats would send both parties scrambling to try toovernment on their own. Neither is likely, at Uaat initially, toormal coalition with the Communists in view of tha political risks Involved. Instead, each will aiminority coalition with the smallerIn the Soclallata' case, the radlcala and greens. Their success would depend less on the preferences of th* smaller parties than on the attitude of th* Communist Party,upport or acquiesenc* in Parliament would be essential to the government's survival.inority government emerges ia llkaly to hav* any precariousaua* the Communists would probably b* unwilling to provide firmof external supportn exchange for concessions onif th* party were to eclipse th* Christian Democratslurality of th* votes. The party'st In such anhistoric compromise with th* Christian Oemocrats In the lateiai-^Internal discordoss of voter support.
t disposar
coalition. They could portray this arrangement to their supporterstep toward the creationdemocratic alternative" coalition of all le'tlst forces, which is their current declared political objective. More important, they would probably view the unprecedented exclusion of the Christian Democrats from national power as an historic reshuffling ol the Italian political deck that could create new opportunities for them, especially among left-leaning Christian Democratic voters. Finally, they would probably hope to be able totrong Influence over the policy of the coalition, which would at best dispose of aboutercent of the votes in Parliament
A Christian Oemocratic-Dom_inated Minority Coalition with Outside PCI Support
The main advantage for the Communists ofhristian Democratic-led coalition would be that they would avoid boosting craxi, who makes no secret of his desire to weaken and marginalise them. The Christian Democrats might also be able to counter the apparent advantagesocialist-led coalition by offering theeal one electoral system that would work to the advantage of both parties. The Issue of electoral reform is likely to become unavoidable following the next election because the Iconoclastic Radical Party will almost certainly succeed ineferendum in the next two years aimed at abolishing the current proportional voting system. Although the Communists have thus far responded cooly to Christian Democratic proposals for modifying the electoral system, both partiesommom Interest In working ormula that would reward larger parties.
Policies and Implications
("ir elf I'ilt
recd,ve
no utieil
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five-party coalition would"foreign and domestic policies Its it would probably be less cohesive worsened relations among Its
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l
East and would tone and the PLO because appears now to be view
of these forces.
though, if /tht; strong-willedlCraxi ratherhristian Democrat orffepubl ican leacTer Spadolini emerged as Prime Minister. It would continue efforts to build bridges with the more moderate forces in the Middle down earlier Italian courting of Libya Craxi, who once favored these efforts, vinapadollnl's skeptical
mp
in the domestic area the coalition would probahly concentrate on reining In public spending. It would also proceed with efforts to liberalize capital and financial markets and sell off parts of the state industrial sector, in the hope of stimulating investment in hi-tech Industry, an Italian weak spot. .It would probably try to compromise on the contentious nuclear energy question by imposing a, construction moratoriumafety review.
a Soctalist-Led minority coalition with outside Communiit support would probably pursue foreign and domestic policies similar to those of the five-party coalition, albeit with some subtle but Important differences. The key figuresovernment would be Craxi and Spadolini, and both would ensure that Italyaithful US ally and NATO partner. Moreover, the Communists would be anxious to enhance their credentialsesponsible party and demonstrate the genuineness of their moveore pro-Western stance. But the Communist party remains neutralist and pacifist at heart and would therefore try to prevent the government from allowing participation in SDI research, permitting use of Italian military bases in oui-of-area operations, or accepting SHINF* missiles If pressed to do this by NATO. Domestically, the coalition might have trouhle even trying to rein In public spending, because thesupported by an emboldened Socialist probably be reluctant to limit wage increases or approve new restrictions on social pr'tqrams for lower income groups.
A Christian Democratic-led .minori ty_cpalitjone-party coaTitidn paYtcies and fi ih" nam- tof problems arising from dependence on."nminiii piioit. overnment miqhl actually be less likely indown the Communists on Issues such-as SDI andiiiicthan a st-led government because Itsloitlial- le.ideis lark Craxi's strong will. It might also i ure activist and independent policy in the
3 Eleciion
Indicates member of governmenl
Seal* in Chamber of Depulir*
Total
liberals 16
Giber parties 50
Socialists 73
Social Movement41
Republicans 29
Social
Dcmoerais
2J
Chnsiian
Original document.
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