Whither Gorbachev: Soviet Policy and Politics inu)
National lntcllinenee Estimate
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
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CONTENTS
NOTE
KEY JUDGMENTS
Whal Gorbachev Wants
How He Plans To Cet
Gorbachev's Vision
The Political System
The Economy
Defense Policy
Foreign Policy
Support and Opposition (or Gorbachev's Agenda. The USSR Through: Future Scenarios..
Rejuvenation of the Existing System.
Systemic Reform
Neo-Stalinism
Indicators of Systemic Reform: How Will Wemplications for the West..
Rejuvenation of the Existing System...
Systemic
Neo-Stalinism
The Impact of US Policy
1 3
ANNEX B: Corbachev as a 43
ANNEX C: Gorbachev and 45
ANNEX D: Gorbachev and the Third 47
SCOPE NOTE
Thii Estimate is the Intelligence Community's first overallof the reforms Mikhail Gorbachev is attempting to introduce in the Soviet Union and their implications for the United States and the Western Alliance. It was stimulated by the accelerating pace of events inside the Soviet Union since the beginning7 and by the evidence of growing debate abroad about the threats and opportunities that fundamental reforms In the USSR could present to the West.
The Estimate is designed to summarize our view of Gorbachev's pressures for change in Soviet politics and policies in. It presents our judgments about how far that change might go in domestic, defense, and foreign policy arenas. It does noi attempt an exhaustive analysis of tlte future of economic reform, defense programs, or any other specific policy area. The dimensions and prospects foreconomic strategy will be discussed in more depthational Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet economy to be published in the spring of
1
Predicting Soviet policy innd estimating the impact of Gorbachev's changes on Western interests is an inherently uncertain enterprise and there are persisting differences of view on some of the key questions within agencies, the Intelligence Community, and acade-mia. These differences are reflected in this
-6cont*-
key judgaaents
mikhail gorbachev has slaked his futureold effort io rev italize soviet society, improve moscow's abilities to compete with the west, and more effectively advance soviet influence in the global power arena. the reforms he is pressing in pursuit of these objectives have tbe potential to produce the most significant changes in soviet policies and institutions since stalin's forced regimentation of the country in the.
Gorbachev's Vision. we believe gorbachev is now convinced that he must make significant changes in tlvc system, not just tinker at the margins, if he is to achieve his ambitious domestic and foreign objectives. To revitalize the society and the economy he-.
hashorough-going turnover of party andofficials designed to consolidate his political power and prepare the ground for his ambitious policy agenda
intends to revamp the main institutions of the stalinist system. he wants tohalfway house" tlut preserves the essential features of tlte leninist system (the primacy of the communist party and strategic control of the main directions of thehile grafting onto it approaches not seen in the ussr since thepolitical atmosphere more tolerant of diversity andess repressive environment for soviet citizens, an expanded role for market forces in the economy,ose of economic competition.
On the national security front, gorbachev adheres to traditional objectives: first and foremost enhancing the security of the soviet homeland; expanding soviet influence worldwide; and advancingat the expense of capitalism around the globe. in order to pursue these goals more effectively, however, and to create the necessary conditions for his ambitious internal agenda, we believe gorbachev wants to introduce potentially profound changes in soviet strategy and tactics in the international arena. he believesore pragmatic approach toore flexible and accommodating diplomacy toward the west, the communist bloc. china, and the third world,orresponding deemphasis on military intimidation as an instrument of foreign policy will help him achieve his objectives. specifically, we believe he wants to:
the growth of defenseperhaps even to reduce spendingorder to concentrate resources
on tbe task of rebuilding the economy, improving Soviet technologicj] competitiveness, and ensuring Moscow's ability to fulfill military requirements over the long haul.'
igorous diplomatic effort to reduce East-Westin order to restrict the momentum of US arms programs and especially the Strategic Defense Initiative, which, besides Its strategic implications, could impact adversely on his plans to control defense spending.
Move beyond past Soviet positions on arms control to achieve his domestic and foreign objectives. He will not accept steps that reverse the relative gains Moscow has made, but he may be willing to trade some military advantages for commensurate military or political gains.
Exploit the favorable image created by change at home and new flexibility abroad to undercut foreign perceptionsoviet threat and better advance Moscow's influence abroad by political means.
Can lie Do It? Historically, change of this magnitude in Russia and the Soviet Union has been successfully imposed only by extremely autocratic leaderv Gorbachev does not have and is not likely to acquire such power. Herotracted struggle against long odds to bring his colleagues in the Politburo oligarchy along with him.
Corbachev has succeeded in selling the notionuddting-through mentality must be discarded if the Soviet system is to remain competitive. But there are clear differences eoen within Gorbacheo's coalition ooer how much change is needed and howhould
come.
He can count on dose colleagues such as Party Secretary Yakovlev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and Premierwell as reform-minded elements within the elite as aback his program. But others, such as "Second Secretary" Ligachev and KCB Chairman Chebrikov. represent forces within the ruling elite who want to slow the pace of change and emphasize more traditional approaches. Between these two poles remain others whose preferences vary from one issue to another, making formationonsensus on theay-to-day battle.
Progress will be uneven at best and reverses along the way are probable. While Gorbachev has scored some remarkable sue-
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cesses, the struggle in the Politburo over the pace of change in the country has lately become more intense. The cautious tone of Gorbachev's speech to the October Revolution anniversary celebrations and the removal of Boris Yeltsin as Moscow party chief indicate that for now Corbaclicv has been forced to temper his call for change. He will be under pressure toay to impart new momentum to his reform agenda in the months ahead.
Beyond the battle in the Kremlin, Gorbachev will have toariety of other shoals that could block his path and ultimately sink him as well as his agenda:
Other than overt political opposition, Gorbachev's greatest obstacle may be sheer inertia. Centuries of centralizedhaveociety used to avoiding initiative and not sure how to assume it_
His effort toegree of spontaneity in tbe political systemrotracted period of heightened political tensions that will test the limits of party control.
Thereisk that some of the reforms will set loose centrifugal forces in the Soviet empire, triggering unrest among national minorities or other disgruntled social groups. We see little chance of nationality unrest sufficiently serious to threaten the regime,ood chance of tensions that cast doubt on Gorbachev's program and slow the pace of change.
We believe there is an even greater chance that reform in Moscow will add to the potential for instability in Eastern Europe, forcing the USSR to crack down once more, and producing pressures for retrenchment at home.
Efforts toadical reform of economic planning and management over the next several years may disrupt economic performance and fuel doubts in the leadership and the society about the viability of Gorbachev's program. It is by no means certain that the returns will be sufficiently impressive to allow him to continue with his long-term program.
Failure to effectively manage relations with the West could also complicate Gorbachev's position, giving support to those who oppose his more flexible diplomacy and his national security policies.
We judge that his removal is very unlikely for at least the next two to three years. But, given the risks inherent in his program, Gorbachev will remain vulnerableolitical challenge despite the further progress we expect him to make in moving more supporters into the leadership.
s
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His polilical suivivnl will dependombination of polilical skill, effective management of the difficulties reform will Inevitably cause, and luck.
Tlte USSR in. We believe that current political and economic conditions in the Soviet Union have created an environment in which substantial change is possible over the next decade. Given the obstacles, the likely ebbs and Hows of the reform process, and the susceptibility of the outcome to unforeseen events, wc cannot predict with confidence how much change will occur:
We believe the most likely outcomeejuoenatlon of the existing system. In this scenario we wouldontinuation of the less controversial elements of Gorbachev's program: more competentriority for industrial modernization, increased emphasis on discipline and anticorruption.of limited reforms,ore adroit foreign policy. Tliere would, however, be no substantial expansion of the boundaries of political debate or the role of market forces in the economy. This scenario would bring important changes lo some sectors of Soviet political and economic life, but we do not believe it would produce the decisive improvements incompetitive position that Corbachev seeks.
Given the obstacles, the chances thai Gorbachev will succeed in going beyond rejuvenation to implement what we call systemic reform are small (perhaps less ilian one in three) Nevertheless, given what we believe to be the potentially significantwe assess in detail what such fundamental changes could look like and how we would detect progress in this direction. In this scenario the party's controlling role would remain unquestioned. But Soviet authorities wouldeasure of political diversity and dissent and expandedat the lower levels of tbe system. The economy would be far more responsive to market forces, mainly in the consumer and agricultural sectors- Such changes are Largely uncharted water for any Communist system and would be inherently risky. The process of implementing such reforms could be severely disruptive in the near term, producing political tensions,nationality frictions, and dislocations in the economy. As in Czechoslovakia and to some extent China, these problems could become serious enough to threaten the reform process itself. But if the regime managed to successfully negotiate these shoals, wc believe that by the end of the century this scenario could begin to produce some progress toward the ambitious economic and social goals Gorbachev lias set.
Even less likely than successful systemic reform, in our view,eturnore authoritarian neo-Stalinism scenario that would feature recentralization rather than decentralization of political and economic decision making. Thereertain reservoir of support in the elite and society forourse, and Us prospects could increase if Gorbachev's effort to push for fundamental reform fails dramatically, triggering significant unrest at Iwme or in Eastern Europe or severe disruptions in the economy. But we believe the odds will remain remote
At the other end of the spectrum, we believe the oddsurn toward democratic socialism,ore radical pusharket economyluralistic loclety than systemic reform, will remain virtually nil under any circumstances.
We believe Gorbachev will press ahead persistently with tlte implementation of his program, making tactical adjustments and accepting delays wlien necessary. As long as he stays at the helm, wethe prospect of significant progress toward systemic reform remains. If he dies in office or is removed, wc believe tlie odds that the leadership will stop short of fundamental change increase substantially.
How Will We Know? We believe that progress toward truly fundamentalscenario we call systemicbe measured by the extent to which:
The proportion of enterprise output dictate! by centraldeclines substantially.
The regime follows up on its promise to deregulate prices byenterprises to engage freely in buying and selling at negotiated prices any production beyond that allotted to the state.
Werowing role for private entrepencurs and cooperative enterprises operating relatively independently of the state.
more open debate of problems and unorthodoxto expand Into new areas and is effectively institutionalized.
Failure to see continuing movement along thesetoure sign that the push for reform was in trouble.
Implications for the West. Given its superpower ambitions, military power, and ideological predilections,USSR will remain the West's principal adversary whether or not Gorbachev is successful in
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rejuvcnating the system or introducing systemic reforms. But wc believe the impact on Western interests and on the nalurc of the Soviet challenge would differ in important respects
Rejuvenation of the Existing System. In this scenario, tlie nature of the Soviet challenge to Western interests would not significantly change- While the USSR wouldormidable military threat, we do not believe the expected modest Improvements in economicwould give Moscow the wherewithal to significantly improve its ability to compete with the West in the economic and military arenas over the longer term. We would coniinue toore adroit foreign policy, but conservative pressuresetreat at home would also be likely to limit bold innovations In diplomacy, undercutting the Soviets' efforts to improve the image of their intentions and lessening the political challenge to Western interests.
At the same time, re/uoenalton would be likely to bring less change in traditional Soviet policies and institutions than systemic reform.
We would expect little change in internal repression or in the boundaries of political dissent.
The military establishment would be better insulated from change thanystemic reform scenario. The intrusion of glasnost into military affairs would be sharply limited. The economy would generate sufficient resources to fund growth in military programs, albeit not without forcing the leadership to make difficult choices that could undermine tbe effort to increase Investment in the economy or provide improvements in the standard of living.
In the Third World we believe the Soviets would continue to rely on military power as their primary means of influence. We would see little change in the nature of East-West competition in the region.
Traditional approaches to East-West issues would remainintact. We would be less likely to see major departures in arms control diplomacy or negotiations leading to significant reductions in Soviet conventional or strategic forces thanystemic reform scenario. Soviel economic ties to the West could expand somewhat in this scenario, but there would be no significant change in the barriers that seal off the Soviet economy from the world market.
Systemic Reform. The impact of this scenario on Sovietpolicies, and behavior could be much more substantial, and we have therefore examined its implications for the West in considerable
B
detail. We believe this scenario would pose new threats as well as opportunities.
On the one hand, expected technological and productivity gains would enhance the Soviets' long-run competitive position and broaden the base of the challenge to the West:
Given the slow rate at which we expect change to occur, wethat successful systemic reform would produce only modest improvements in Moscow's ability to compete in the economic arena in this century. Although we do not believe the Soviets would make much progress in improving their ability to innovate and assimilate advanced technologies, Soviet defense industries would nevertheless benefit more than under any other scenario and the military competition would continue.
The political challenge could prow substantially. Overturning important features of the Stalinistchange-wouldore credible backdrop for Soviet diplomacy and propagandaejuocnatxon scenario alone could offer, forcing the United States and the West to reexamine traditional strategies for containing Soviet influence. Relations within the NATO Alliance would be complicated as shifting perceptions of Sovici intentions weaken the glue that has lield its members together.
On the other hand, we believe changes in Soviet policies and institutions in this scenario would also open up new opportunities for Western diplomacy:
more open political climate would make it easier for the West to get its message across directlyider cross section of the elite and the population.
ultimate direction of defense spending in this scenario will depend on leadership's future decisions on weapon programs as well as onas the state of the East-Westcompletely within tlieir control. Soviet leaders wouldobustrogram and push ahead to modernize their strategic and conventional forces. But they would have an incentive to constrain the growth of defense spending through
leaders certainly would not end the East-Westaccept an inferior strategic position, or draw back from
iieeiOf,ImellitenoeVr the lyUemit reform iceneuo Improve me nu In eamo-nieuaU fce litely lo uee-Me enough riaoeoca be Ihe tele IWOi /oe mUWrueipemjuvtet i-lhoul ibe coru'reMti IMuaeiiy-'t plen
pursuitlobal superpower status. but we believe systemic reform would be more likely than re/uoendtion to create conditions for meaningful arms control negotiations, leading to potentially sizable reductions in soviet conventional andforces opposite nato and china there could be significant changes in moscow's foreign economic strategy, including more rapid development of trade with tlte west.
while there would be no retreat from Moscow's determination to expand Us influence in the Third World, weeform leadership would place more emphasis on political and diplomatic approaches to regional issues and in some areas, such as the middle east, pursue more cooperative approaches as they seek to expand their political role and legitimize their presence.
we believe systemic reform in the ussr would be contagious in the eastern bloc,easure of increasedmore indigenous approaches to political and economic reform, and new opportunities for us diplomacy.
The Impact of US Policy. we believe that the fate of reform will be sensitive to the state of east-west relations. the proponents of reforms that attempt to introduce market forces and political diversity into the soviet system are more likely to be able to advance their causelimate of reduced tensions. we also believe that gorbachev's effort toarger proportion of resources into industrial modernization depends in part on his ability to manage perceptions of the foreign threat, and hence on his ability to achieve arms control arrangements that constrain western defense programs.
the push for reform is not immune to outside influence, we cannot confidently predict the impact in moscow ofpolicies specifically designed to affect the process.
we believe gorbachev's success, and the fate of reform, will largelythe outcome of power struggles, political debates, and economicdevelopments inside the ussr and eastern europe thatonly indirectly to influence from
alternative view
the director of nsaifferent view on the general interpretation of gorbachev's "vision" and the primary purposes of his domestic policies. gorbachev has staked his future not on irvitaliz.ition of soviet society, but on revitalization of the party and its ability to overcome localism and deviant behavioris central control, behavior that became so widespread during brezhnev's rule. this revitalization of the party actually began with andropov, and the
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slimulation lot it may have come as much from the decay of partyin Poland as from concern about modernity in the Soviet economy.ecay in the USSR would probably bring the prospect of major disorders and serious Questions about the ability of the regime to survive Clatnost and peiesttoikastensibly aimed at an economic and social revitalization, are primarily instruments devised by Gorbachev tooalition of intelligentsia that can break party resistance to an administrative purge and the restoration of strong Leninist standards of democratic centralism. Put in the historical context of previous reforms in the USSR and Eastern Europe,economic and social reforms do not appear to be the primary aim. Bather, they seem to bee facto party and state purge, the traditional vehicle for restoring the party's vitality.
Certainly, he would like Improved economic performance, but that is less critical than improved political control Historically, economic reforms both in the USSR and tbe Warsaw Pact states have been linked to leadership struggles and purges. The correlation in this regard is perfect. Such reforms only occasionally have coincided with poor economic performance, and just as often their result has not been economic improvement. Moreover, the Corbaclieo reforms, as they can be inferred from laws and decrees, are hardly "bold" in comparison with reforms and policy actions during the Khrushciiev years. They do not, therefore, as the text asserts, "have the potential to produce the most significant changes in Soviet policies and institutions since Stalin's forced regimentation of the country in tlien the contrary, the actions inspired thus far by glasnost and perestroika are rather modest when compared with those oferiod in the USSR.
Concerning future scenarios,s it is described in the text, amountsraditional party and state purge of cadres, greater cadre discipline,eduction of localism and deviant behavior by officials.etter name for this scenario "Systemicn order to have meaning, needs specific definition, economic and political. If it does notundamental shift to market pricing in the majority of the economy's activities, particularly in the industrial sectors, it can hardly be calledhere is no sign of such an intention in either the recent new laws on the economy or in Gorbachev's pronouncements on his "vision" of thesystemic" shift of the locus of political power through law or elections would destroy the centralization of political power Gorbacliev needs to carry through any kind of reform. This scenario, therefore, is most unlikely.
"Democratic socialism" is no scenario for change. The "social democratic" parties of Western Europe rule over market economies, not socialist economies. In the logical sense of "democraticenin and the Third International inherited the banner of 'democraticot the Western parties of the Second International. Stalin put substance under the banner by state control of virtually all property and capital. The text's use of the term "democratic socialism,"is confusing.
As an alternative answer to the NIE question, "whitherthere are two ccoceivabJe scenarios. First, he will succeed in purging the party, and in the process he will unleash many social forces which he will later have to bring back under control through KGB and party means. This is the best possible outcome for Gorbachev, and it may or may not be accompanied by moderate economic improvements. Second, he will fall In his effort to revitalize, or purge, the party and government ranks. He may be overthrown as he fails or he may compromise sufficiently to survive as the leaderew era ofhat is, internal immobilism coupled with external mobilism. The latter seems the most probable.
The Brst scenario would strengthen the Soviet political system, although it could easily lead to major disorders in Eastern Europe as the Soviet political struggle is mirrored there. The second scenario sltouldtable but slightly weakened political system. In both scenarios, Soviet external policy is likely to remain mobile, more adept and flexible than in the latter Brezhnev years,reater challenge to US interests both in the Third World and in the advanced industrial states of Europe and East Asia.
r.tcncl
DISCUSSION
Gorbachev Want*
By Gorbacltevs own admission, (he USSR is confrontingsystemic crbis. Tlte failure of histo grapple effectively wilh growing decay at home and declining credibilityhavethe credibility of the Soviet model leading foreigners as well as the domestic population to doubt that the system is capable of meaningful ir-crovo merit Gorbachev sod Kit allies have made dear that they see tbe party's leading role, the USSR'sstatus, andfuture of the Communist system at stake
Gorbachevs effort toecisivein Soviet performance is driven both by domestic and International considerations. At home, he believes economic stagnation and societal malaise have potentially dangerous consequence* for theof the system. Interim tonally, Gorbachev seesgrowing threat tn the Soviet Union's long-terraposition. He believes that Moscow's declining economic positionis tlte West (see figure I) could ultimately undermine the global gains that Moscow has achieved over Ihe last two decadesteady military buildup. He is committed to improviag Moscow's abilities to compete wilh (be West, while convinced of the decisive importance of economic power and political (acton in achieving that objective, he is less inclined than his predecessors to measure Moscow's progress In primarily military terms.
Last year Gorbachevathering of the foreign ministry elite that "economics is the deciding factor, the field of action whore we lace our enemies.-He sees economic revivaleans for achieving not only the USSR's domestic but abo Its national security objectives. In the view of the current Soviet leadership, the ability of the USSR to compete militarily with tbe West will depend increasingly on its ability to stay abreast of the global technological revolution.believes thai the Soviet economy's inability to innovate poses an increasingly grave threat to its global position and, ultimately, to Ihc military gains the USSR has made over the last two decades. Higher growth rates and an Increased standard ol living for the Soviet population are important goab forSuf toe believe he is driven in particular bydetermine!Ion toystem which can tnnooate more lutxessfully and produce advanced technology metre efficiently than the Soviets haoe ever barn able IO accomplish.
How He Plans To Got It
Gorbadiev stands out clearly from hisIn his willingness to adopt unorthodox methods to achieve his objectives. He Is determined to proceed and Impatient with rigid interpretations of traditional ideology or precedents that may stand in the way. (See an net B. "Gorbacheveader."}
The new leadershipystem lhal, despite tampering by both Khrushchev and Rrcihncv. closely resembled the essential political and economic institutions that Stalin forged in the. While Gorbachev came into office with an agenda for change, it was by no means clear at first that hts Intentions or impact would be any different:
On Ihe political from, Gorbachev's first year fealured an emphasis on cadre renewal, while his social policies fealured an attack on corruption, alcohol abuse, and workplace indiscipline
His greatest energies on ihe economic front went into manipulation of traditional policy instni' menu such as resource allocation. Heharp lump In funding for retooling the USSR's antiquated industiial base.
policies address real problems In theand were long overdue. Some have alreadypositive impact oft economicndthey will remain central tenets of theapproach. But Gorbachev and hishave been increasingly Itank in expressingthat such measures won't be enough. Tlielrthe remedies thai will be necessary hasradical as they have come face lothe challenge ofystem thatIn our judgment Cenbacheoand hu allieswell aioate that l/ thru hope to achievetheu must make fundamental chancesSlo'lnlil sysiern (hot theu Inherited.
- sscnn
USSR-US: Comparative Levels of Economic Development Were scale change
USSR
Western Europe US
i SSotfef GNP. IMO-U
001*arjer thanrv
Ihe real o/nd well beyond. (net domesllc of oin o/ the USSR will brby tht efforts of tha regime to grapple with these manifold probUmi, which will alto haoe an Influence on SoeMet foreign and nation -al iaetiHty behavior.
ssessing themaladies facing the Corbachev regime
Gorbachev's Vision
orbachev has no carefully drawn master plan Im the system be wants lo create. Ills Mikm of change will continue to evolvewetbev arc now putting in place fail to achieve the new leadership's ambitious ohiectives. But the general direction is clear.
y bis own admission. Corbachev believes that eacesalveat km. by stifling individual initiative, lies at the heart of hb problem He wants to remove the dead hand of bureaucracy and decentralize sufficient operations! authority to regional officials, localenterprises, and individual citizens tourst of initiative and creativity. To do thai he to prepared to attack aspects of the system Ihat Soviet citizens and foreigners alike have come to Identify as its essentia)political culture that demands conforinily and denies diversity, an economy that ensures control at ihe eapense ol innovation,ocial contract with the Soviet citizen that offers security and stability at the expense of dynamism and efficiency.'
'rwnriicontrol er**iinMfiuiBMi ei ihe piny ind datewon incrras-m> autonomy uihImorder inimpleoiMU Inlor dceena rati ration el operational
Q. Gorbachevhis colleagues claim lhal wiial ihey want to do is "reveal (lie full potential ofposture dictated by political necessity Bul they understand and appreciate some benefits of Western styletheir ability toindividual initiative. Innovation, and efficiency In pursuit of those benefits thit leadership manu to aaale ahouse" thai would pteteme the primacy of the Communis! Party and iirciecicof Ihe main directions of the economy, whileotlllcal and bureaucratic environment more tolerant of political and policy debate, matkel forces In the economy, competition among economic enterprise! and individual dtitant. chads on Out power of central authorities, and expanded tights fot Indiolduals In tome respects. Corbacharo wants to reject Stalinism In faoor of Lenintsm.
otable mm all current jreopomls draw inspiration from Western practice or from 'markethe direction of current thought tuggeiti that the Sovtelt, like the East European! before them, are perceiving theof Communist doctrine at appliedodern economy and that, at leastu field, ihey rtcogntie lite need for change.
. jwtiint the Bteih-nev regime's economic vision in its first months
orbachev has madestart on implement ins this ambitious vision..
His bold political and economic inilialives and radical rhetoric have thoroughly shaken Soviet dues and disrupted the status quo He has succeeded in moving further andopower andew policy aero-da than virtually any foreign or Soviet observe! would have anticipated in the springnonths. Gorbachev hasone way toward challenging the viability of the Stalinist political and economic institutions andlimate more hospitable to significant structural changr.
But Gorbachev is still only at the tVglnnlnj;mg process due to political opoeoit ton and the complexity of the issues, the rexiroe's actual reform initiatives have been carefullyto ensure that they do not depart too boldly from eiisting approaches. The ultimate fate of Gorbachev's radical agenda articulated most clcaily in his speeches ut the January and
epend on how tuc-ceitful Ite Is in pushing ahead wiih Uiover ihe neil decade.
The Ponticol System
evbaciievi plans for the political systemless well defined than hit economic agenda Out lie and hit colleagues haverowing conviction that the revitaliiatton of societv and the economy that ihey want lo achieve can succeed only if there are riniuein! chances in the political arena as well They are trying to pull back the tentacles of state control toonlrolled cipansion of local Initiative and participation in political irtMituticatv. They want to move far enough to undercut popular cynicism about Ihe leadetthip and enhance the credibility of the party apparatus, but not so far at to threatenloss of control. The recirne appeart to be moving on al least three front* lo create the new political climate ll seeks:ore ficiible approach to Ideology, eating traditional controls on public ctebale about sensitive Issues, and restructuring political institutions.
Thee It no democracy without openness. At the tame time, democracy wtlhoul limits means anarchy.
Gorbachev, sneakingroupwriters in6
deology. Gxbacbev it frustrated with the straicrUiacLet of inherited doctrine lhat opponents of change have sought.to impose on him. He teeks to eipand his maneuvering room by increasinglythe directions of iheotettcal thought In Ihe Soviet Union In the lastean and by depicting his own proposals as an effort to return toriginal Intent Tbe effort by Gorbachev and some of hb allies to invoke the spirit of Lenin's so-called New Ecotsomic Policy (NEC] (an era in which the new Soviet regime scaled back Its early pretentions to domination of the country's political, economic, and cultural life) alms to legitimize their policies and break with those inherited from Stalin and bis successors (Seend Ideology.")
lamotf. Tight controls over the Bow of Ideas and fnlormatlon are central to the Soviet system. The traditional penchant for secrecy has stifled debate, establishing the party as the sole dispenser of truth and creating an environment in which winners of political argument! have anatbernitired the losers and sought lo rewrite history to conform lo their views T
3
jndicatcs lhal the new leadership believes lhal tlx* traditional approach ii Incompatible wilh an increasingly well-educated society, comconomy, and the political needs of the moment.
campaign (or glasnostas an expose ol past (allures and abuses, aenhancing ihe regime's credibility atowerful instrument for pressuringofficials resisting his reform program.hat begun to takeoreas Gorbachevs assessment of the scopeproblem be faces has grown. Gorbachev andrecent statements suggest ihey seean essential element of their reform program,designed to rationalize an expansion ofol legitimate public debate of
Clasnost Isew concept. Lenin and Stalin endorsed iiore limited contest. More recently, the need for glasnosl in the discussion of Soviet problems predated Gorbachev's rise lo power inut Gorbachev has taken Ihc concept much further, making il theof his drive for chance. Fot Gorbachev, glasnostecessary step to achieve his longer range goals
The regime does not intend toreewdl place limits on how far gUsnost will be allowed lo proceed. Bul just where those limits are lo be drawn is not vet clear, and for now ihe boundaries on public debate arelo expand, lo the predictable andpublic dismay of some conservativeIn the leadership and tlte society.
ft it necdltara toemocratic ioav of thinking and acting, making it possible to treat peopleifferent viewpoint at mortht/ opponents, as interested allies in tha itor restructuring.
Politburo member Alekisndr Ya-kovlev, speakinglenum of the Tajikistan party Central
Gorbachev's campaignis designed tocountry's political institutions Bysanction multiple candidates for local andin ihe party and state apparatus, andsec rot ballots, Gorbachev hopes lo dislodgeofficials who are resisting his rctoims. But these
The Rob ot the Forty in Corbcc'ie-'i Reform
/ lot en %e> aovan't understand Oo you ttatltf re feet ike tine* Oo iteovle tn Moscowihlnl Me this? Sell-manauenieni. you iay.e (local party chiefs) pointo then?
A <etertn parly leader walingroponent olreforms (from an Imaijnirv dialogue publiihed In Ihe Soviet weekly Literary Cavtte fa6 by journal IH Fedor Burtatskiy)
The imeW-aul role of the party apparatus in the Soviet tvstrm will be profoundly effected if Corbaebe. Is lucmiful In implementing ihe reforms he huThe functions from which local psrly leaden havedrawn iheir power mil be redefined and reddubMrd.
idale elect mot and an ripantinn of graiwoaU nan id on ion In local parlr otBaniaa-tfacudilute llwlr abilily to control personnel aporrfitfmenti
nomnrnt of more open politicalary and tublic debate will restrict iheircontrol ulto should be criilcttvd br iho Soviet ntrdia. and will bring their own record under nrralrr teiutiuv
The rnirtiiiii on the Indepeodencc of local eaaer-pritci and an cuandrd role for mulct forces will reduce Hie decisive rule llic party has pbyed historically In local and regional econoinK man-itemere
Corbachev has yet lo lay out fa assy definitive way the tole he eiprcU the apparatus to play In Oie new lystemttempting to create,orn lome of hb own comments ai well as those of prominent reformers, Gorbachev evidently eipects the party loaway (ran its nuMu ladaMl in day-to-day manaaemu*rrslri ernpbaUt on broad drate-gic guidanceo<usoring the us piemen tat ion ofpolicies and tervlnc al ihe eyes and ear* of the central leadenhip. Thit view is not new but IU serious pursuit would force the party apparatusery different political tniiraasnant
Moit veteran party lenders are ID-equipped byor rspenence lo perform Inole. Many have responded with skepticitm and resistance. Gorbachevrotracted struggle lo overcome thai resistance and transform the pan. into an elective Instrument for managing the reviiabted teetety lhal he ae*4i
measures are abo intended toeasure of diversity and debate In order to give Soviet citlaens
and the parly rank andeme of greater partid-pallon in and commitment lo the political system Even though carefully controlled by Moscow (the party can still manipulate ihe nomination process) effective implementation of mulucandidalc elections in live party apparatus couldajor impact, weakening the ability of regional party chiefs to control pei son nd appointments and ihe political agenda.
Human fiighia. We do not believe Goibachev values the eipansion of the boundaries of Individual expressionoal in ha own right. In our view, however, he recognizes that more freedom to question authority, more tolerance of open dissent, betteragainst arbitrary justice, and related restraints on travel, among others, are necessary toevitalised society. He wand to bring dissenters intoolitical debate, adding (licit criticisms to the dash of ideas that he hopes willew consensus He is less concerned than his predecessors about the threat of political instability createdelaxation of strictures in this area.
Corbachev appreciates the international impact of the apparent relaxation of internal repression.policy censsiderations played an important role in ihe initiatives to resolve divided family cases, release some political prisoners, andodest eipansion of emigration. Some of these gestures aho respond io domestic Imperatives, such as building support within the intdligentsia, that are critical to his success. We expect tha Corbachev regime's performance onrights to continue lo fall far short of Western concepts of individual liberties. But our reporting indicates that more significant steps are on the way to adiust the Soviet legal code and ease some of the more repressive aspects of the system.
ceeaanrUaJxaaewIa. Clasnost isost substantial accomplishment so far, only here do actions match hb radical rhetoric. Glasnoat already goes well beyond anything attempted since tlieopen debate of the first years of the Soviet regime- Senior leaders are still immune from criticism, and many issues (such as the party's leading role) remain off limits. Bul Gorbachev's glasnott has ai' ready moved Intoru social poltcu and internationalremained untouchedprevious leaden. The spread of glasnost hasong way toward creating the conditions for more fundamental changes in the economic and socialin the years ahead. Glasnosl remaina at risk lo conservative elements in Soviet society, represented bv leaders such as "Second Sccielary" Ligaehev Bnd KGB
Chid Chebrikov, who fear disorder more thanBul we yudge that its impact at home and abroad has been sufficiently dramatic thai any attempt to return to the status quo ante will be politically costly.
lasnost aside. Ccboclu-v's accompllihments on the political jroni are modest Adiustmenls io the legal code have provided new channels for citiaens to lodge protests againstol power by localBut secret-ballot, multiple-candidate elections for regional party and state offices and other potentially radical political rdorms aired at the7 plenum are so far being tried only on an eiperimenlal basis. It remains unclear just how much control over the process central authorities are prepared toWhile there have been some gestures on the human rights front (Sakharov's release, modestin emigration trends, and rumors of more substantial measures) (tec figurehe legallhat provides lite basis for repression of political dissent remains so lar largely untouched
Iha Economy
orbachev's major dtallciige Is to create an economic system lhat can generate progress llirough technological cliange, more efficient use ol resources, and individual Initiative. The leadership's strategy lias three ley dementslacement of better managers and enforcement of greater work discipline al all Icvcis (ihe "human [acton") substantial new Investments in lite dvilianew quality-control bureaucracy designed to accelerate modcrnieaiion of the USSR's production base, aadundamental reform of the economy's planning and management mechanisms
he first two dements represent changes In economic policy that Soviel and Western economists ahkc believe are long overdue Success inf cuts will be critical to Gorbachev's goals of accelerating economic growth and Improving the quality ofThey are necessary bul not sufficient condl-tioos for achieving his objectives. Corbachev agrees with Western economists who fudge that the lasting gains in productivity, efficiency, and the pace of technological change he seeks will demand areform of the planning and management mechanism as well
Pulling our economy out oj ihe preensis situation in xohkh it has found Itself dictates the need for profound and genuinely rtvoiu-tionery (ronj/ormalioru
Gorbachev at the7
Figure 2
Emigration From (he USSR
Like Brezhnev and others before him,knows that to decentralize the system he must reorient central ministries toward strategic planning and overall guidance of the main directions of the economy, and shift to local authorities and individual enterprises more responsibility for running their own affairs. Where Gorbachev and his associates stand out fromdecessors is in their dfiproach tothis objective. They are more aware of thescope of change that will be required in political and social as well as economic Institutions, and more determined to push change upon the system, despite the economic obstacles and political resistance they arc certain to face.
pportunity emerges for realisingnoi through Moscow, not hu means of bowing and scraping to the highest bodies, but
tn the market, freely, easily, and Quietly, money wilt once again begin to turn into something weighty, significant, highly desirable.
Sovietikolay Shmclev. writing In the7 Issue of Noofv Mir (New World)
c believe that Corbachev and his closest advisers arapreciate that moving from "administrative" (detailed planned targets) to "economic"of pricing, financing, and credit) methods will In fact require the introduction of market forces (supply and demand)ore decisive guiding ingredient in the economy. Corbachev and his lieutenants have signaled their intentions in this regard by increasingly favorable references to the NEP; the needew, more flexible price-setting mechanism; the benefits ol
LCtfUl
lenin'i New Economic Poley
u ou>
notneaeu Saab. (Ae need joe new. during (Areriod. tfcenM LoHn iW IO tnokt greet ejTorti tothe needew economic poftcv endft taoetum to eapllallsm, butof tianutioa to toctaltttcan. and mutt, rnota taut ofessonstht tenn*wr hour rfarted.
6 speech lo Krasnodartab
Tbe New Economicat an carter.: -I. wjrxesdaL.toailed BB> mvoenxnunoroMII Ihe aoverrv ment bad natwnaUied tU taoWryIntfMotcd train rcQuiaUiooln*ihe ee^rvtld* By IMO. the eaceaac* of War Commumsm and (he ravagesour-year Choi War lad taken their tod. peasants produced at wbsuMDce leveb, Oai ration was pervasive, score* of industries closed, consumer Irade wu reduced lo barter, and political discontent Intensified. The NEPariety ofnio the tolUrnlng com-minded economy.
an agricultural ia.-in-kind wherepeasants wen lice lo mar Let their own production alterIbe laa.
many iarhl Indoatrir. to engage intrade and control ihrir Own production, wilh Lmited tuperviiion fromr.v
-LeaaiUlr,business by Irsd.-vrWl, ,Min the eoroucne. sector, idmiied rnuisbe. ol smallo private cMra-preneva and tolerating, until the mid-IMOa. prl-vile traden Inown as NEPmen
l, Lenin publidr Justified the NEP* -patty, bouigeoit" policieseam of foigin8 an alliance between lite peasant and factory workers. Out many party conservatives opposed the MEPcaoilaltflle" retreal from War Communisms socialist pellet**.
By snxcin* mariet mecWom Into the ccJIapaing economy, the NEP up-red eeonomlc po-th Under Wa,gncaakural pnsduc.im. had dropped to approUmatdy twoaJ*ds3 fcveis and IraaWoutput fcnd fallen so one-6fth3 lewh. afler seven years of NEP both agricultural and Industrial production had surpassed their pre-war levels, accord ing to official Soviet niloi
The recoverlna economy wBered from inllatloii and high unemployment, however. Insuring government Intervention andebale over ihc advisability of continuing (he reform. The debale over NEPafter Lenin's deathilb some traden (NiLolav Bsillsarin) pusliing (or an eileruion of NEP policial and otisen fTrotskys Left Opposition) preasinc instead for an end to NEPlufl lo forced pace induarialiiaiion Stata used the debale to conaohdale power, and iken abandoned NEP policies las favor ol rapid Induu.Uliiatioo and cdiccilviiation
competition among Individuals andand (in Gorbachev's terms) the goal ofharmonious combination of ihe plan and the
he. Industrial Sector. The results of the7 Central Committee Plenum are the dearest Indication yet thateterminedadical overhaul of the rommaodThe blueprint for reform approved by the plenum indicates that Gorbachev has now gained approvalhift from rjteoeraeal approachesompreben-slve. integrated economic reform program. TheU evidently the resultompromise between those who want to move now to signlftcantlyeconomic decision making and those who want to move moreha not by Utetj go far enough tn restricting the role of centra/ Insiilulloni toectstoe breed, with the command rconomu But It Obtains iht cmllinesew, more market hosed rnechenUm fot nimning the economy thai we believe Corbachev will continue to push further tn the months and yean ahead:
Cenlial planning agencies and economicwould be sharply scaled back In size and function.
Enterprises would have radically expanded rights and responsibilities. They would be required to negotiate contracts directly with each Other, clsoostng their own suppliers and eoenpeting with ooe arsother for coatoanert.
The enterprise would compile its own annual plan, to be based on contract orders placed by state organizations and other enterprises. The state would ensure its needs by sending orders to the enterprises.
Many prices would be partiallybyween consumers and suppliers, albeit under close supervision by stale agencies
he Priorile Sector. In its search lor ways to unlead. individual initiative, the regime has embarkedansioo ol the private sector at well as
a limited1 Decentralization of tbe stale sector Itself. In part this effortelated official recognition of the burgeoning semilegal "second economy" that already exists, especially in the service sector,etermination to bring it under tighter staleBut the architects of this policy aho hope lhal il willignificant aod relatively quick eipamion In the availability of consumer goodt and services without an expansion of centrally allocated Investment that the state can IIIuick Improvement in the tot ol the consumer could be critical lo Corbachev,rowth in labor productivity (giving the Soviet worker something worthwhile to spend hb money on) and eahlbiting the apparent benefits of "restructuring" rriore quickly than the planned changes in the industrial economy.
Agriculture. Unlike the Hungarians aod the Chinese, tlie brunt of Corbachev't early reform efforts liavc been directed at the Industrial sector, notChanges approved during hu first yearthe agro- industrial apparatus and gave farms the right to sell slightly more of their produce at market prices. We believe Gorbachev's early focus on industry reflects his preeminentthe technologicalwell as hu close identification withpolicies that he inherited.
lans for reform lo agriculture ate evidently still evolving and more fundamental change may be on the way. He and some of his associates have begun lo about the needturnaround- In agriculture within the next two to three years and to tout more openlyefits of private Initiative under the guise of the-so-called family contract. The family contract. If pushed far enough, could provide the basis for the most significant overhaul of the form economy since collectiviration in, replacing the collective farm with tbe family as the keyunit in fact, if not in niroe.
oreign Economic Relation! Wc believe Gorbachev will move cautiously to expand foreign trade and open the Soviet market tooncerned about excessive tcehrsologlcal dependence on the West and believes domesticreform will play the dominant role in ihe success of his effort to rejuvenate the economy. He and his advisers, however, see long-term benefitsubstantial etpansioo of trade and economic ties to the West They have hunched some sharp departures in foreign economic policy (breaking the monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and approving yoinlthat allow foreign partners substantial equity)could eventuallyignificant impact on ihe
Gotboehev'i famiy Controct
Tlie concept of family con trading, whkh atliacled scant Widtnb.il> attentionear ago, hoientral locus of the trader inio ai it searches lorm lo the troubled state ol Soviet agrtevfcurelo family contracts. We reeeotlr adopted measures promoting individual aod cooperative activity In the consumer sector, reflects Gorbachev's longcttaMiilied
i -lor small-scale organiulioo* thai oncouiice
a "iKOOrietary"amUv-focuted variant of ihe collective contract syttam la which ihe farm rnan-|gjt mbcontracli tome aapccis of lam production lo inehvidual groups of -oriov the laavilreing Introducedide variety of farming, front livestock to crops.ypical contract, ihc family "pays'" for all materlab and tervices provided lo ihc faim and gets lo keep any profit left after all eipenscs are accounted for. The wages of family contracting unit* are generally three to five limes that af ihc average stale (arm worker
While many of tlie families under contract nuta-ai to be little more lhan field hands, some lamilyncluding those singled out by Corbachev, obviously involve Urge-scale opera Inula Ooe Estonia" family livestockeported toarmheanv. fenced pasture,ully merlianiird bam. eomiaVle with milking machines, an automatic feed conveyor, andoutward features seeminglyiigutillable (tornWostein lamily farm.
Al the eiticme. If stale and collective farmiinto panels managed reialndysmall groups or fanaifacs working oa contract,luelf could Iotaelatively powerless,body. Substantial rnoverrtcnt in thiscouldowerful impact on localpotentially, on the quantity and quality ofproduction. Ooncailion lo change of thisechoeseturn to private faming, wouldApart from hSaelotpcal concerns, theof dcrisioneaaking would eliminate manyand take power awayide variety
ofonly farm level ofiictab but local and central ministry ofnciali and regional party secretaries and apparatchiks.
The future of the faovd* contract: in the Soviet Union will ultit.itely depend oa the prospects for reform of ihe economyhole. Soviet ooliectite and state lattti managers will thenvselvei have lo gain ihe kind of independence that their Hungarian counter parti have won if the lamily farm venture Is lo Boorish.
domestic economy, the role of foreign trade, and the way the Soviets interact with Western commercial, interests.
r
Whilebelieveintends to radically overhaul ihc com mindbe ii Just beginning the process aridII will tale yean. If not decades:
The June plenum has uncarted new momentum lo radical reform The promised decrees fleshica out the plenum's decisions were approved on schedule, and our repealing iodicaies ihat ihe staff and Structures of many ministries and state committees will be signibcantly reduced
Nevertheless, (be decrees are too general to serve as more than guidelines. It remains to be seen how ihe leadership will address apparent design Saws and reooncile potentially conflictingPlans for changing theemain particularly ill defined
A series of ceastacscs, from political resistance to economic constraints, have forced Gorbachev to settle for more cautious steps than he wants to lake.
Over the neit few years, ihc regime will have to choose between steps that expand on the more radical elements of the economic vision Corbachev liasor, on the other hand, steps lhal dilute lite thrust of the reforms and maintain the dominance of central planning
e are changes, but ihey are fnrffrtiTicant and not radical. The main work io form an integral system of managing Ihe economy lies ahead.
Gorbachev's report to7 plenum
Defense PoUy
Gorbachev is committed to improving Soviet military capabilities andlobal presence in an era of Increasingly sophisticated high-technology weaponry. He believes his economic policies are the key to strengthening the' industrial base that will ensure Moscow's ability to continue lo fulfill military requirements as well as produce higher quality goods in the civilian sector. But modernixation of thewill place sharply increased demands on the Soviet Union's limited supply of investment resources,talent, and technology and production potential in, Increasing competition with traditional military claims on those same resources
Wc do not believe Corbachev wants or espects to extract significant savings from the defense sector in the slsort lorn. But we do believe lietrong incenllve over the longer termonstrain the growth of defense spending, force gieatcr efficiency out of Ihe Soviet military-industrial complex, and avoid anarms race with the Unites Stales. Corbachto is not hlely lo achieve hu economic objexiiiws without constraining Ihe growth ol resources allocated to the military establishment.
Drawing on an inluslon of new plant and equipment In, Soviet defense industries are in relatively good shape lo produce what ihe military will need Into the early and. But economic reform and moderniratson willengthy process, and Soviet industrial performance will probably slow before If Improves. The need lo make decisions la the next few yean on weapon programs for theill force the leadenhip loeitically difficult chokes on resource allocation
Corbachev haseries of steps to improve the ability of ihe political leadership lo overseedecision making:
By bring the minister of defense, replacing other lop defense officials, and reducing Ihe military's protocol role in affairs of state, Corbachev has itrenglhened his control over the militaryand the process by which national security priorities arc cstabllshed-
Gorbachev and his allies have placed newon (he political and economic dimensions of national security Issues,trategic rationale for giving greater importance than in the past to diplomatic Initiatives and lo the health of Ihe domestic economy, and lesslo military power as the symbol of Soviet strength
The new leadership has put forth the concept ofrinciple lo guide its defense program. This concept Is sub/eel to differing interpretations in the USSR. In addition to Us foreign errotaganda value, it has been used to exact greater efficiency from the military aad to justify arms control reductions It could be used to rationalize far-ieaching changes in the size and composition of Soviet forces.
inimum, the military is being required to use resources more efficiently.
ccomplishments We ate not likely lo be able to assess Gorbachev's impact on defense spending for some time The future dliection of defense programs will depend in part on (actors not completely under his contioL But wc believe he has made significant
cmLi
stablishing the control and political ratio-role wceuty lo connriin growth In defense spending ovef tlie restsnot actually ieduce spendhe can al the tame time create an internal tonal environment lhal diminishes internal perceptions of ihe foreign threat.*
fee too Policy
orbachev adheres to traditional foreign policy oljfcctives first and foreinost enhancing Ihe security of the Soviet Ivomeland, eapanding Soviet InOucrvce worldwide, and advancing Communism at the expense of capitalism around the globe. He has ackricnvledgcd that what he has called the "precrists situation" In the Soviel Union threatenstrategic position In the world. Hb domestic reformntended In good part to reverse the trend and preaerve and eipand the USSR's superpower rale.
n order to pursue these goals more effective!v. however, we believe Gorbachev wants to introduce potentially profound changes in Soviel strategy and tactics in the international arena. He believesore pragmatic approach toore Beiible and accommodating diplomacy toward the West, the Communist Bloc, China, and the Third World,orresponding dcemphasb on military intimidation as an instrument of foreign policy will help him achieve hb obiectlvg*.
oving quickly toetentewith the United States helps him achieve domes tic as well as foreignlatent domestic critics of hb national security policies and protecting hb ability to concentrate on the task of reform at home.
Measures that hb opponents arc alreadyto paint as departures from socialism, suchdvancing glasnost and expanding the role of market forces In the economy, will be more difficult In an environment of East-WestIncreased tensions with the United States wouldlear risk to hb economic game plan, undermining his ability to constrainspending and devote scarce resources lo industrial modet titration
tftumrArr*ci trfcrwilfr* nitii aa aaaae an aataaff iraamhia
imhTi'I avaftoodof 'kb
Uke hb predecessors, Corbachev honesetente environment will produce politicalio the West that limit defense budgets, restrict military modernization, and contribute to frictions within the NATO Alliance over strategy toward the Communist world.
We do not believe that trade wiih the West willajor role In the revjialixation effort, at least for the foreseeable future, nor do wc believe Corbachev expects It lo But the Soviets do hope that Increased trade and techtsology transferore relaxed International environment will give their plans an added boost.
Without an awareness that diplomacy muttavorable foreign policy enoironnmt for dorncsilc restructuring, toe do not have and cannot hootualified,ompetent diplomatic tertrite.
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, speakingonference of foreign ministry officials in7
lie US-Soviet relationship poses substantial risks and orjoortunitics to Gorbachev's plans forreform, and we believe thai reshaping thai relationship remains hb first priority In foreign affairs. Hit ultimate goal remains constrain Inf SDI and flowing the oocrotl momentum of US militaryHe ts much more willing and able lhan his predecessors to move beyond pan positions onarms control Issues in pursuit of ihts objectioe. Already evident in bis approach lo INF and START, we think ithat thb new flexibility willpromote initiatives that couldignificant reduction in the size and composition of Warsaw Pact conventional forces facingreturn formilitary or political gains for the USSR.
More mnoutfioni fn Soviet arms controlof the sort Gorbachev luis alreadyare likely tf he believes they can help him achieve constraints on SDI and other USprograms.
. assessingapproach toward the United
States for ihe remainder of the
Reagan administration
1
Corbachev wants to revitalize Soviel diplomacy across the board:
By advertising bis domeslic leforrns anda more Gexlble posture on arms control. Corbachev is attempting to undercut negative images ol Soviet intentions in Western Europe and improve Moscow's ability to eiploiiwithin the Western Alliance,
Hs has given new priority lo regions such as East Asia and Latin America lhat the Sovietsneglected He wants toorepolitical role in regional trouble spots, espe-cUDy in the Middle East, wliere the USSR has traditionally been odd man out.
He Is broadening Moscow's priorities in the Third World, placing greater emphasis onties to Wcfiern-oricnted states lhat could potentially provide more assistance to Moscow's diplomatic or economic goats than Hs traditional clients We believe Moscow wiD place more pressure on its clients to use Soviet aidin the hope the burden can be reduced. For both political and economic reasons we believe Corbachev will be careful about taking on new commitments witliout the expectation of clear strategic benefits for Soviet InleresU. But we see no retreat from the geopolitical galas of. we expect CpriweAeo lo continuervinior.ua! resource* to key ebenU, and indeed to "up the ante" If these regimes are being clusUenged. (Seend annex D. "Cotfaachev and the Third World")
ef "new Th inhadertbe Soviet leadership has beguno guide foreign policy. Tills "newseveral components:*
ernphaiis on political approaches and less reliance on military power in achieving national
security goals.
The need to show more flexibility in negaXliUonj with the West, particularly on arms control
The Increasing 'Interdependence" of nations and iho Importance of solving global problems (tueh as the prevention of nuclear war, environmental pollution, and eaaanomic development) thatinternational cooperation
thinking"ubstantialIt is intended to enhance the irnage of the
' Man ol UV HmOtc component! otihianint" have raaak
orUpruf paonnneM ichabn In Uiuxi
Ionian nolle* think lanlu
Figure 3
USSR: Economic Aid Disbursements Selected
Wore scale change
Conrnwnllt LDCi Bad Third World Allies
Billion VS t
| Marun dknu
| Other Communist ldci
| veioan.
I Cuba
10ft
7.5
10
is
I9M M W ll HUH
TMrd WorldMillion US S
Other Marxist
e ihicaiagua
^fg Afihjr in;
Retire 4
Soviet andlients nebcinc
n
,B<joth.n.
l
i jfi:
&; , k
*
USSR in )Se eve* of foreign dites and assist ihe effort loaSeote environment Gorbachev wand lo further the impression thai bis leadenhip bon fundairaenial new direction* in foreign ai well as domestic affairs
ut we believe tbe proponentsewalso have an internal audience in mind. These concepts have been echoed in reports of private remarks by Gorbachev and Foreign Ministerto Foreign Ministry officiab touting ibe need for more fleilbility In Soviet negotiating positions They ate designed to dilute the "two camp" mentality that hat characterized Soviet ideology in ihearena They do not remove the East-West Ideological conflict, but byess notarized Inter national arena they rationalize the sharpfrom past Soviet pestsom that Gorbachevarc aeeded to break out of foreign policy dead ends, reshape foreign impressions of Soviet intent tons, and advance Soviet influence abroad The "newconcepts
Headv Soviet elites and the public for potentially controversial agreements in arms control or otherecurity issues.
estructuriria and rcstafllng of national security organizations lo reduce resists nee to new arjproaehes.
Provide supportidening pattern ofwith international and regional economic organizations and for an attempt toarger role in the global economy.
Sanction new aprxoacbes to countries, such as Israel aad Egypt, that will advance Moscow's hsluence In tbe Third World
Facilitate new gestures toward traditional rivals and independent acton in Ihe Communist world, such as China or Yugoslavia.
ft ti necessary toore tcelutlcio InteTnaitontf/ affaiit. When planning foreign policy we mustore tobei and broader evaluation of the specific facti, rather than dewing everything only from tlie point of view of one's own Interests. Because tf every country pursues only Irs ownand*ncapable of meeting its partner halfway, of seeking points of contact, and of cooperating with that partner, then It will be difficult to achlexe any improvement In In (erne Heme/ leldOems.
Corbachev. speaking lo Foreign Mirustry omcmb in Moscow In6
IV tftk CPSU Congress of court* did not disaffirm the evaluation of Imperialism and tit policy, the reality of the historical confronta-'lion between the two systems, or the Ideological IrreooncMabdUy between socialism and capital' tim. But whai has now come to Out fore In Pur policy ti not to much the ascertaining ofas the starch for points of contact in the world that actually exists. There it no other path to the salvation of mankind In the nuclear and space age.
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, speakingonference of Soviet Foreign Ministry offklab In May
Accomsh'shrneriff. By most conventional rr.ca-sums, Corbachev has lew tangible accomplishments to show (oi hii Invigorated efforts on lite foreign policy front. The Implication! of "new thinking"atter of debate arnong Soviet officials and foreign observers. Corbachev has imparted new flexibility to some arms control positions inherited from Brezhnev. Andropov, andthe point of adopting most US positions on INF. But on other issues the promise of new flexibility has vet lo be fulfilled.
In our view, Corbachev't motor accomplish-ment Ilea elsewhere, in the progreu he hat made in Improving tha Soviet Imagefor more tangible progreu toward Soviettn ike yean ahead. He has already better positioned the Soviet Union to put Western diploma-cy on ihe defensive and to Increase Soviet Influence In areas where their tote has long beenoroachev's vigorous and flexible diplomacy is In part responsible for his success in this regard. But his dramatic moves on the reform from at home have alsoubstantial Impact. Opinion polb showshifts in public sentiment on the USSR In Western Europe, and views among European eliles have been changing too as Corbacliev's moves on the reform front have become mote radical. While the Chinese remain cautious about Soviet foreign policy.domestic initiatives have led them lo take more seriously the possibility lhat significant steps will ultimately be forthcoming in the bilateral relationship as well.
Support ond Opposition for Gorbachev's
Agenda
Folitict oj Change. Historically, changemagnitude Gorbachev appears to want hasRussia as well as theby eatretnely autocratic leaders.does nol have such power nor Is horotracted struggle against long oddshis colleagues in the Politburo oligarchy
orbachev has succeeded In selling the notion that someecessary If the Sovieto remain competitive in tbe long run Old Guard leaden of the Brezhnev era who were content to muddle through have been swept aside.ere are clear dig fences even within the Corbachev coalition over how much change is needed and how Jast It thould come. Gorbaohev and some of his closest colleagues (Party Secretary Yakovlev. Foreign Ministerand Premier Ryzhbov) arerogram of broad political and economic change. Theyore modest approach will not effectively deal with the precrius situation inherited fromrezhnev era This agenda appeals to the intelligentsia, younger ofBciab who stand to gain from the new opportunities tlial change will bring, and those who see such change as the only way to make tlie USSR competitive over the long run.
econd group ofwe believe includes Party Secretary Ligachev. KCB Chairman Chebrilov. and Breahneveia holdoverto slow the pace of change and restrict its scope. They believe Gorbachev's reforms will unleash drxisiorunaking processes and social forces that could get out of hand and even threaten the parly's hold on power. Tbey favor more traditional efforts to increase political and social discipline and improve economic performance through modesi changes in the Stalinist model They are supported by older generation elites in moat of the mint bureaucracies who believe such radical reforms endanger them and their Inst Hut ions
etween these poles are tlie resl of Ihe Politburo and much ol the Soviet elite Corbachev has had some striking successes in getting [his middle group to sign on to the broad principles of his agenda. On specific issues ofhowever, this groupwith some more tolerant of political reform than radical economic change, for instance, andavoring the opposite. The lack of consensus on the particulars makes final resolution difficult.
an He Do It? Tlie measures that have been approved have onlyrocess of reform that will take yean if not decades. Progress will be uneven at best and reverses along the way are probable The struggle in the Politburo over the pace of change has become increasingly intense Beginning in Jury. Uga-chev and CJseorikov have become more carOpoken in defining limits to glasnost Gorbachev's own recent efforts to define limlu to glasnost, as well as the more balanced tono evident in hb speech at tbe October Revolution anniversary celebrations, suggest that he hai been (creed to temper hb call for change. The demise of Moscow Party chief Yeltsinurther setback to the reform effort CotncrvatJve opponents will be more emboldened in speaking out against reform and fence titters will be more inclined to stay put. While these events do not endanger Gorbachev's position, theyhreat to hb agenda. Gorbachev will be under prcsiure toay to Impart new momentum to his reform agenda; the leodup to tlie party conference next June will provide an opportunity to do so
n If rWHUiO.
Following major mm at the7 plenum, he thould be able lo countolid -ml ing majority (ot most of his program Hut lie si ill laces powerfulat "Second Secretary" Ligachev and KC6 Chairmanwant to slow lite pace of chance
r letefa of lire economic ln/reeucrocv stand lo lose ihe nMat iloves fororfsilly lo decenlraliieent many senior bureaucraU are ll'.-l. to Impede Ihe Implemenutlon of hit uogsxm Even if sympathetic lo ihe reforms, many of them are poorlytraining, experience, orfunction under the new conditions. Cocbachev has made remarkable strides In removing footdraggen. but he milong way to go lo turn ihe bureaucracyn obedient instrument
eve opposition from lire senior level) ol tire surly apparent*ritical problem for Corbachev. Regional party chiefs, who make up the cere of the Cental Cora milter, have traditionally been theot orthodoxy In (he Soviel tvttem, and ue suspect (list tliey are Ihe source of the uleoloftcal opposllion thai the Soviet leader lias frequently alluded to Many regard hu proposed reformshreat lo their position and liteold on power.
ational leruifry bvrcafCiaciet are ambivalent about C'-uUicbev's agenda. We believe mod military officials apnreciiie the dose corned ioctrong defenseealthy economy and in principle support ihe revKaligation program.- fear lliat his pdicigs may lead lo constralnti on defense spending and are anhappy with Gorbachev's arms controlThey an obnoat certainlyhey wtQ ace all the promised benebu in the long run The KGB's bureaucrats support Gorbachevi efforts to fightand indiscipline, snd their access to more accurate ardonnatioai than aaoat Soviet atlrlah hare* about the (rae state of aflaks at home and abroad may mile them sympathetic to economic reform as well But we beheve ihey are concerned about tlie potential for instabilriT al home and a* Eaatern Europe created byllorts to rcbt official sir Inures ondebate and individual Ireedoms In the USSR la ihe eoeni ol acriowr raceiuuagen rerusrnu, forcnr opponentl a/ Corlodiroim ine KGB and iha nil/udry could join forces muh ntmvalhailc offaeU Im the pant apparatus, peeaenimga pototrfml newcniochev
Our reporting suggests that Gorbachev's leadership genetsUr draws passive approval from tfce SoctefYet, Soviet ctUsem have seen previous cam-partm for chanaa come and go. and mam remain deeply skeptical thai Corbadiev's campaign uillmore bating results Moreover. Gorbachev's ap-parenl willingness lo tamper (by increasing the disparity la wag* rates between more and less productiveaad br reducing wlartdiei for bask necessities! with the social eontract ihey have come to expect gives large segments of sodety good reason to be concerned about tbe Impact of Corbacbev't plans on tbcsr position, especially when ihey have seen few tangible benefits Aflhevc* he hai made auUrentiaf /reoeuny in the Point/wo. ptimadlng an enenllallv conterrallvC and apatliellc xopu'elro* lo get an board with the programbf aa corn more formidable lath
The Inltillpfnltla are probably Ihe only group that comes close to giving Corbadicv wliolehearted support Their support is critical to Ms effort lo resuvenate the sodety andider range of options for solving domestic problems, but they lack the polilical clout to give Gorbachev much help if the tides begin la turn against him.
Cenrrulsonaf dljerencts are Important inGorbachev's rostUea Some reporting suggests that the post-warigninearuJy moreof dssnge In the USSR than lu elden. Mote Junior members of the party and state apparatus, frustrated by years of stsxtsaaion underre key sources ot Gorbachev's aupport.
Beyond ihe battle In the Kremlin, Corbachev will have to traverse numerous other shoak that could block hu path and ultimalely sink him as well as his agenda:
Beyond overt political opposition. Gorbachev's greatest obstacle is sheer inertia. The old ways of operating are deeply Ingrained. Centuries ol centralized decisionmaking have produced aused to avoaoang initiative and not sure how to assume it. Meal Soviets have yet lohe impact of pcrritrpfJji, and doubts peinst thatere to stay.
Gorbachev's effort toegree of spontaneity In the polilical systemrotracted period of heightened political tensions thai will test the limits of party contioL
isk that decentralizing reforms will set loose centrifugal forces In Ihe Soviet empire, triggering unrest among national minorities or other disgruntled social groups tetious enough .to undercut Goibnchev's push for reform.
mm-c T T
^
teniheant donee foe instability in Eastern Europe ihai appears lo threaten the Soviet bold and hence undermines support for Gorbachev at home
Implementing Gorbachev's economic program is likely lo bring some economic disruption before il begins lo show any signlocanl positive effects.y no means certain lhat the near-term returns will be sufficiently Impressive to allow him to claim success or provide enoughto continue wiih his long term program.
Failure to effectively inanage reUIrons with the West could also compUcale Gorbachevs position, giving support to those who oppose his more flexible diplomacy and national security policies,
judge that hbery unlikelyneat two to three years But. given thein hb program. Corbachev willolitical challenge In the yearsthe further progress we cancel htm to makenear term In moving more supporters intoHb political survival will depend onof political skill (not getting too far outof bbffective management ofreform will inevitably cause, and luck.
The USSR Tnrough, Future Scenorios
believe that current political andIn the Soviet Union have created anin which substantialossibleneat decade. Civen the formidable politicalobstacles that will have to be overcome,ebbs and stows of the reform process, andto the outcome of unforeaeen events,predict with confidence hast how muchoccur. But we believe we understand thedebated aad tbe trade-cats the leadershipto face well enough to predict theof cftange and possible scenarios
believe the most likelyelective
TltftiOn of the f SUttem. In tlUS
o we would see more competentand some new policy ditectloris that could bring about important changes in some sectors of Soviet political and economic life. Buteffort to go beyond ii.it lo significantly reform the Soviet system would dissipate well short of hb objectives We believeonservative opponent! would like to limit change to essentially this srenario
The chances of more fundamental change arc (ar tnote debatable. We believemall chance (perhaps leas than one in three) that Gorbachev will succeed in going beyond rt/uve nation to irtstitutionaliie glasnost and alter the (undairvetvtals of the StoUnist command economy, producing what we call sytltmv reform. This scenario would also include the policy changes associated with rejuoratarton. This scenario couldignificant impact over the long term on Soviet capabilities, policies, and behawor- and on the interests of the United States and the Weat Civen its potential irraphcatiom; wc assess In detail whatcenario could look lite, the risk, inherentor the USSR, and bow we would detect progress in that direction.
Even less likely than systemic reform. In our view,eturnore authortUrian neo-SiohnOm scenario that would feature recentral-
rather than decentralization of political
and economic decision making Thereertain reservoir of support In tlie elite and society forourse and ils prospects could Increase if Gorbachev's effort to push forreform (aib dramatically, producing severe disruptions in the economy or triggeringunrest at home or in Eastern Europe. But we believe the odds will remain remote
the other end of the seed rum. we believe the oddsurn toward aVrrsocnsllc socialism.ore radical pusharket economyluralistic society than systemic reform, will remain virtually nil under any clrcumstances.
s far from certain thai Out Sootei citlsen can be educatedigher level, urged ta exercise hb cum MUtailor, given Increasing opportunities foe comparison, with other comrid encouraged toignificant tnvptovemamt tn ku ttotmg standard, and at the same time submit without Questioneader strip which Incessantly proclaims, andfreouant-Ighe right to make all Important decisions for him. Eventually it mat, turn out that the benevolent totalilotianltmeek to achieve It an Impossible contradiction and that the forces released tn the search for it will rgotrirg the leadership io revert to earlier patterns of control or to permit an evolution In some new direction.
NIE ssessing the longer term outlook (ot change in the Soviet Union following KtrusiVhevsohdalton of power
ifTin l
RejuveaKition ol Ihe Cutting System
ejuvenation scenario, we would no* expect to sec any significant decent raliiation of eco-riomic decision making ot flange in the character of Ihe political system Bul the more orthodox elements of CorlacWs drive lo improve the system would probably be continued, flags; this scenaiio would not feature any fundamental institutional changes, but neither would itomplete return to Bceihnevbm:
Politically, we would espect toontinuing rejuvertation of the party and government elite An ongoing turnover of the leadenhip wouldelatively pragmatic policy orientation.
Dements of "demccrxlljalkm" and glasnost would remain in place. The regime would speak more openly of Soviet problems and continue to experiment with multicandidate elections and other political reforms Corbachev has begun to press. But wc believe In this scenario thewould stop well short of the potentially risky steps that would be lequired to give tlsesereal content The public discussion of wtrovenialasurges, col-leciivirattoei of agriculture, and market social-urn- -would rernain carefully con ti oiled. The party would block any significant expansion of political participaiion and its role In Ihe system would remain essentially unchanged.
we would probably see some portant policyodest cutback in
the bloated centraleduction in state subsidies for basic riecessities such as food and housing, and eflorts lo increase diffcrentia-lion in wages between wotken who perform well and those whoould be possible. There is widespread leadership support for increasedthe quality control program and other policies associated with the ind initial nsodermja-lion program, and these pesicset are probably here to stay. But the leadership wouldadical overhaul of the planning andmechanism. There would be no decentral-Izallon of price-sett ing authority and resources would continue to be allocated mainly bythrough central plans. While the June plenum blueprint for reform would remain oo the books, the dominance of the centralin running the economy would be largely unaffectedhis scenario, ideologicaland bureaucratic redtape would probably prevent any significant expansion of private and cooperative enterprisesag..culture and the consumer sector
We do not believe that in this scenario there would be any significant change In the way the regime now handles political dissent or human rights. Wlille there could well be some dramatic Keatures designed to serve foreign policy goals, the repressive apparatus would remain In place.
The naartcrm impact ofrdovetutionmight well be econoaxucally more favorable,lkaJly more advantageous for Corbachev. than the results of anush for systemic reform Some of the disruptive cxmseciBences of efforts to loosen the reins of central control or introduce market elctnonU Into ihc economy could be avoided. We would expect Moscow to be able to sustain modest growth rates and perhaps to achieve some improvements In the quality of industrial production.
Wlille sufficient toear-terra crisis, liowever. wc do not believetrafesjv of njuoe-nation would meet the pottticat. social, and economic objectives that Corbecheo hex sat for himself:
There could be some improvement in thes ability to innovate but ihe overall lechno-kstleal op between ihe Soviel Union and the West would continue to widen.
The economic and social policies associated with this scenario would not address the. growing societal tensions in the USSR that he Inherlled.
Economic growth would be Insufficient toease the defense burden, making it dim cult to simultaneously meet the demands of the military. Investment, and consumption
Systgetiic Reform
arc clear limits to how far the processwill go. evenuccessful systemicWe see no support in theruly pluralistic political system or aThe luisic feature of the SovietParty's monopoly on the levenoleconomicremainwe believe that in this scenario we could seedifferent system by the end of thethat would radically scale back the center'sin Ibe miaorrianagement of dailyeconomic life while preserving Ib stratecicThe effort Io introduce change of this scale could
produce serious economic dOlocatioro and ihc ptc*-peeliilical instability at home and in Eastern Europe. Bul ll ihe retime could successfully manage ihese risks, this scenario could produce segniheant piociess toward Goi'iachevs ambitious coals by the end of the century.
Political Suilem, The effort to loosen the tentacles of state control is the leading edge of Corba clsev'i reform effort Itecessary condition for any fundamental change In other areas, and we believe that reform In this arena is bkery to be the most profound. In this scenario, we believe we wouldolitical culture more tolerant of diversity, an expand ed arena of political debate,easure ofpopular participation in political instil uturther, but still limited, relaxation of controls over Information and debate wouldecessaryand in this sense we believe gsasnoat wouldermanent feature of the Soviet political landscape- We couldignificant expansion ol participation in the regional and central Soviets, but wc would expect any such change ia the party(the real focus of power) to be limited primarily to the lower levels. Legal reformentral component of the reform agenda, and the Soviet citizen would be likely lo benefitess repressive and lesssystem of Justice. Nevertheless, the state would continue to limit political dissent
In the near term. Gorbachev's efforts to create an eipanded arena of political parildpation would be likely to heighten tensions and the led both teat then dissent. Chinese authority, reform longer and proceeded further than the have abeavdy Bowed tbe pace of change la the face of political Instability fueled by tbe process.ht VSSRariety of Independent rnWronmenloi. nationality, and historical pretenta-tion group* tuggesii that Soviet authorities will in-cteastngly face Ihe seme dilemma. The regime Will findncreasingly difficult to reconcile the limits it has placed on dissenting views with the more open climate It Is trying to create UlUmatdy. however, il the regime can successfully riegotlate these shoals, we judge that the reforms Gorbachev has spawned could make substantial Inroads into political alienation in the Soviet Union, expanding the averageense of participation in the system, diverting some dissent back Into official channels, and reducing theof emigres and defectors lo the West.
Economy. Given the complexitiesthe ultimate shape of the hybrid planarrangements thatushing is uncertain Radical decentralization would In out view be most evident in agriculture and the consumer sector, where reform couldelatively rapid impact and where the experimental ground hasbeen plowed io other Communist countries. We believe lhat in this scenario there could be aexpansion of private enterprise or. more likely, the role played by small, member-run cooperativeoperating relatively Independently of the state. Price setting In this sector could be tubsUntlally deregulated, local entrepreneurs allowed to dealwith consumers and suppliers, and theof central planning organs sharply curtailed to the management of overall economic indicators The supply of food and basic consumer goods could show marked improvernent early in, If |heIn this sector are pursued vigorously aridconditions permit
Fundamental rdorms in the industrial economy will be more difficult to achieveer dote not likely to proceed as Tar as in the consumer sector, with results slower to materialize as well Ncvertlidess. changes here are essential to Gorbachev's fundamental goal (accelerating the pace of technological innovation)we believe be will aggressively push the more radical elements of the June plenum reform blueprint over the neat several years. The leadership could create by theanagement mechanism in the Industrial sector that substantially curtails live role of central organs,ore Oeaible price-setting structure, and responds more effectively to-customer demands
We and the Soviets are uncertain of the impact of the new management mechanism planned for the industrial sector Scene of the measures called for by the7 plenum--such as partiallythe pricing and supply system, paring back the central ministries, forcing enterprise* to compete for customers, and allowing unsuccessful enterprises tocreate serious bottlenecks and disruptions In the near term. In our view. Industrial performance could deteriorate rather than Improve for at least the next several years- Nevertheless, we believe thereood chance that these reforms could by theegin to make progress toward the goalshas set While the growth rates lltal Gorbachev has called for are unattainable. In our view, some acceleration would be likely More important than an improvement in growth rates per se. the mil of national output would rsrobably consist of higher Quality and higher trxhnology productstee fUlfe prospect for substantial progress in this orniii'y
toward Cenbachcvt ultimate goal of doting the technological gap with the West. At best, tht Somen might narrow the gap in selected areas. But this scenario, in our judgment, provides the best chance for ihe Soviets to strengthen their industrial bate and improve their abilities to compete in the economic and military arenas over the long term.
oviet Society. The social policies associated wilh Gorbachev's reforms attack, what many Soviel officials and citizens consider to be the mainof the Soviet regime They would increase the disparity in incomes among different elements of the work force and fuel uxieraployment and job irssecurity. Movement in this dbection may be just as disruptive to the social fabric as Gorbachev's economic reforms would be to economic pcrformar.ee.reforms would probably Irrtensify social tensions and encourage more frequent acts of open defiance:
The loosening of political controls andof the economy could also aggravate latent centrifugal forces In the Soviet empire, encouraging the USSR's national minorities to press their grievances more aetyessivelv. We tee little chance tltat there would be national unrest sufficiently serious to threaten the regime,ood dxance that there could be tensions thatoubt on Gorbachev's program and slow the push for change.
If the reform program produced substantialin the lot of the Soviet consumer and In economic performs nee, however, the ultimate effect over time couldtronger social fabricopulation more accepting of the system.
mpact on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Empire. Systemic reforms in our view are almost certain to add to tbe potential for Instability In the Soviet empire. Whether Gorbachev intends it or not. domestic opponents of traditional regimes willindeed, to some extent already are) ernboldcncd by the relaxed restraints on political expression to push their agendas more forcefully. Proponents of change will attempt to press for more political pluralism, economic decentralization, cultural atrtonomy, and individual freedoms than the party will be roclined to allow. Reporting on the impact of Gorbachev'sin Eastern Europe and among Moscow's Third World allies makes dear that tensions are already on ihe rise, and thaiastro to East Germany'sworried andFurther complicating the picture are greater Soviet demands on the East European countries to contribute to Mcocow's industrial moderniution effort through CEMA programs that limit economicavailable for their own needs.
nrest in Eastern Europe, in our view, poses the greatest foreign threat to the reform impulse in the Soviet Union and even to Gorbachev's position. We believe thereignificant risk lhal reform in IWoscow will produce pressures for change In Easterntroubled by economic and societaltlscse regimes cannot handle. Another Soviet crackdown in tbe Bloc could strengthen the arguments of conservative opponents of change al home andolilical climate condudve to retrenchment.
ver the longer term, the Soviets in thiswould provide more room for their allies to pursue internal reforms suited to local conditionsosition clearly staked out by Corbachev In his7 speech to foreign Communist leaden In Moscow) and even to expand relations with the West But we believe the Soviets will place dear limits on Ihe process and do what is necessary to maintain the Integrity of the Bloc.
Nco-StoliniMn
scenario wouldeadershipslrone central institutions, greaterandeturn loauthoritarian leadership style that manywith the Stalin era. Such an approachrecentraliratlon of political gridgreater ideological orthodoxy, and moresuppression of dissent
Any talk about how now everybodyoss is pure demagogy. One person mutt answer for everything. This to the only way you can dc-mand what is rutcessary from him. Then there will be order and discipline.
A secretary of theoscow factory,on Gorbachev's proposal that workers elect their ownmanagers7 Moskooskaya Praoda)
believe this course would bring thebenefits in the long run:
It would not solve any of the systemic problems that have (edecline in economic growthow level of technological innovation.
Strong-arm methods worked when the coal was lo boost production regardless o( cost in in era ol seemingly unlimited resources, but they will be of limited use when the ob)activelurp boost in efficiencyesource-constrained environment.
To fund any military buildup,eadership would be compelled to resort to draconian tactics at home, furtlser raising the burden of defense
This scenario would be accompanied by an increase in the InOuence of Russian nationalist elements in the elite Nationality tensions would certainly grow.
Coebacieo Factor. Corbachev is notpushing for far-reaching change he servesange of elements in the elitedetermined to overcome the USSR'sBut Corbachev himself it ihe catalutl inferment: he has tied his politicalmprovement in the performance ofand society and the tlvorough-goingbelieves must precede il He will presswiih the implementation of histactical adjustments and acceptingnecessary to preserve his ultimate objectives.stays at the helm, the prospect ofprogress toward tuttemlc reform must beIf he dies In office or is removed, weodds that the leadership will stop short ofchange Increase substantially.
indicators of Systernic Reform; How Will We Know?
reform, il it is to be succeeduLtorotracted, incrementalrogram of comprehensiveonly fust begun. Implement ion of those reformsto take years, and even more time wiHto assess the results. While theseour ability to predict the outcome, time areof specific political and policy indicatorsbe able to track to monitor (he progress ofFailure to see continuing movement alongtourethe push for reform was in trouble.
olitical Strength of the Hejormmto structural change has been aided by the continuing strength of conservatives In the Central
Whot il Gorbochav Goal?
Thr impact of Gorbachev'i riepiilurr Irons ihe icenc would depend on how and wliennpens. In any forrare able cireumtfancei. however, wceipect aprcooaeoli of radical change in ihe Politburo and adliercati tomore cautious course.
If he die* In agce- Although his power has been MgruaeaaKlr eroded. 'Second Secretary" Lie* ehrv leasatM for bow theeii cho.ee Corbacttev allies Lev Zaykov or Aleksaodr Vilo--lev would have aa caMMde chance, caprctarty if iheir mentor is martyredceeisful istatuna tion an erupt. We believe Lagachrv tiroesdetermination to rejuvenate the system, but does not (uly back the aacre radical elements of hiscaehev-led leadrnJtip would scale bee* CorbadaVs assault on tlie commaiid economy and cilstlngilil leastorbachev ally lo succeed hUn. liar regtme'tmem lo lei am would remain but the pace of rhanse would still be likely to slow.
If hellagachev would be liar most likely choiceuccenor la ihe near lerm the pace al dungc would slow tliarply. Bul Cotbaciiet-'i forced removal would be likely lo introduce an riiroded period of political irmaUUly. We believechaaeea of another chance of Icadeeiiop.oforra-minded member ol Use Polltbu-
1 ra back lo power, would remain substantial
We brhevc tke chiaccitcnalword refamaer would repbee Gorbachev will Increase ihe luiager he slays In office. Ugaehev isime willdimmish hb prospectsood poatttOB to promote adoVaaaal supporters to fail voting member ship in Ihc Politburo in the months and years ahead and to remove remaining Breilinev-era hold-overs, incieaalng the oddsurecanor leadership would push ahead aggrraawrtyropans of comprehensive reforms.
Committee, the lingering presence of lkeihnev-e" holdovers in the Politburo, and Gorbachev's slow progress In advancing the more outspoken advocates of
change;
If Gorbachev can advance other supporters to full Politburo member. it will substantially advance ihe prospects for tyttemlc reform His failure to make progress in thb regard would indicate that hb program has stalled
A critical Indicator wiH be Gorbachev's ability to alter the political completiontlie Central
core ol his resistance, according lo mostIhe extraordinary party eminence scheduled lo* next June. He was able lo turn over aboutercent of the body al the last patty congress If he can replace anotherercent ot so al the conference (without waiting for the next regularly scheduled congressigure thai seems to be in reach,couldody less inclined lo water down his program.
Reform. Clasnocteythe reform processensitive indicatorway the polilical winds are blowing Ifof glasnost. who have becomeere to succeed in scaling back criticismshottcomings or iho Increasingly radicalreform debate in Ibe Soviet press. It would besign ihat the momentum for change Litbe other hand, if glasnost continues to moveinto heretofore sensitive areas (such asof party history, the Stalin question,foreign and defense policy} and tothe Cow of information (releasing moreand complete economic and censusuller account of defense activities,or cooperative publishers independent ofit wouldood sign Out reform badvance:
An early Upon* might be tbe contentsew "law on the press" that reportedly will besoon
Another indicator wouldecbtOo lo move more decisively to rehabilitate prominent victims of Stalin's Duties.
steps that wouldeasure of diversity in the political system
include.
Legislation strengthening multicandidatefor party and state positions by ensuring that candidates can be nominated from the floor (not lust by the partyhb allowscandidates to articulate distinct policyand that Institullonallies secret balloting.
Cieater tolerance of grassroots politicaland tbe creation of official channels fee government action on initiatives issuing from those urganizationv
regime's response to the already increasing frequency of public dcrmorns rations of dbsent willensitive indicator of the momentum for reform. Indications of greater tolerance toss-aid public demonstrations, would Indicate thatb able to protect his stake in keeping open channels of debale and even dissent.
.uiomiV Reform. How the regimethe reform blueprint approved by theplenum will be the add tat of how farhas gone.
A move from administered prices to somefor making prices responsive to supply andhe key Indicator. Significant steps to implement the promiics of the plenum to allow enterprises to engage freely In buying and selling any production beyond that allotted to the state and to negotiate their own prices would Indicate thatnder way. To be effective, the number of goods on which the state continues to set prices will have to shrink substantially, and tlie limits that thellowed to place on prices negotiated among enterprises will have lo be minimal.
The rate at which Ibe relative proportion ol stale orders In enterprise output declines
Solid evidence Ihat the economic authority of the ministries and the regional party first secretaries has been sharply curtailed.
Tbe extent to which state enterprises are forced lo compete with one another for business. To be effective, the state will have lo allow the least efbeient enterprises to fail.
In agriculture, widespread Introduction of the family and other group contracts, combined with more substantial movement towardplanning of production
Eflective im pi ^mentation ol recent legislation sanctioning an expanded role for private entrc-pieneurs and cooperative enterprisesng Inelcpeodcntly of the state
be Cmbachcv regimea number of prominent political prisonersa modest cspansion of emigration, but solegislative basis lo* political repressionAny serious reform effort will entail actionplans fot clianges in the legislative code and
evidence diul Sovici authorities ateetter job Iran Ln ihe part oi abiding by the code;
Action on reported plant to repeal (rota ihe Russian Republic criminal code ol Articlenti-Soviet agitation andirculation of knowingly labe fabrl-ealiom which de(ame the Soviet state and socialrecisions which have been used to incarcerate political prisoners.
Eased limitations on emigration as well asand foreign travel
Follow!hrough on rumored plans to substantially cut bad the political police (unction and staffing of the KCD. while more precisely delineating the agency's domestic rolc
An assertion of independence by the Judiciary and official recognition of such independericc One sign of authentic independence would bease go against theand the decision carried out.
Implications for the West
lorn lis superpower ambitions, militaryend ideologicalhe USSR willthe West's principal adversary whatlierts successful tn Introducing systemtc reforms or not But we beiieve rg/uivnolion of the existing system and lysirmie reform would differ in important respects in their Impact on Western interests over the longer term and in the nature of the Soviet challenge
Rejuvenation of the Eaiiting System
/ the reform process goes no further than rejvometlon. Soviet policies toward the West will remain largelyand the Soviet system unchanged.
ompetitive Capabilities. While the USSR wouldormidable military threat, we do noto venation scenario would provide Moscow the wherewithal lo surnibcantiy improve itscapabilitiesb in the West in the economic and military arenas over the longer term. We would continue loore adroit foreign policy, but conservative pressuresetreat from systemic reform at home would also be likely to limit bold innovations in diplomacy, undercutting Soviet efforts to improve the image of Soviet intentions andihe diplomatic challenge to Western Interests.
roioects for Policy Chance. Rc,uvenation would be likely to bring less change in tiaditional Soviet foreign policies and internal institutionsystemic reform icetiano
We would expect little change in internalor In the boundaries of political dissent
Tbe military establishment would beorn change thanystemic reform scenario. The intrusion of glasnost into military affairs would be sharply limited. The economy would generate sufficient resources toontinuing growth in military programs, albeit not without (ordng the leadership io makechoices that could undermine the effort to increase investment in the economy or provide Improvements In the standard of living
Traditional approaches to East-West issues would remain largely Intact Wc would be less likely to see major departures in arms control diplomacy or rtegotiatiom leading lo significant reductions In Soviet conventional or strategic forces thanystemic reform scenario. Sovietties to the West could etpand somewliat in lim scenario, but there would be no significant change in the barriers that seal off the Soviel economy from tlie world market.
In Ihe Third World we believe the Soviets would coeiiinue to rely on military power as their primary means of influence. We would see little change in the nature of East-West competition in the region. '
We believe they would rely on traditionalof control in Eastern Europe, minimizing the possibilities (ot the growth of pluralism and the epcortnriHiei for US diplomacy.
Systemic Reform
orbachev's objective in pushing for ryjiemtco improve Moscow's abilities to cornpete with the West in the global poweruccessful systemic reform effort, tn our view, would In tlie long run produce technological and productivity gains and allow him to make real progress toward thatIt ts also the only scenario, however, thai would be likely to bring more than cosmetic changes in the tulsstance of Soviet Internal, defense, and foreign policies. The East-West relationship would remain strongly adversarial Military competition wouldbut Moscow would be likely to rely more lhan in the past on political IrutrumenU to achieve its obicc-tives.
-SW1CI-
ammmthm Cnoabilitict. Circa ihe sio. ,tte at wraiehrpeci dung* to occur. we believe iha. successfulreform would produce only mod est Improvements In Moscow's ability to compete In the economic aiena In this century. Although we do not believe lhal the Soviets would male iuch progress in improving their abiUtics to innovate and assimilate advanced lechrxOogies. Soviet defense indutti.es would nevertheless benefit more under ipiremK re-form than under any other scenario.
n the political from, the perception abroad of continuing movement in Moscow toward systemic change at home and more Beiible foreign policies would combine lo make Moscow an inooasingly formidable competitor.
Systemic reform wouldore credible backdrop for Soviet diplomacy, public relations,ejuvenation scenario alone could offer, forcing Ihe United States and the West to reexamine traditional strategies for containing Soviet influence Management of Ihc NATO Alliance would be complicated as shifting perceptions of Soviet intentions weakened tbe glue that has held the Alliance together and put the Sovietsetter position to capitalite on differences among Its members. Iteftward delft in West European politics. It could also encourage the Chinese lo moveore rxjuiduaarst stratrapc posture between the USSR and the United States.
Reform could uKlmately strengthen Moscow's hand in the Third WorU It would be likely to petwoke new sources of strain lo Moscow',oos with some of its traditional, oortservaltve-minded allies.eform-mi tided Soviet Union would have the Inclirialion as well as enhanced capabilities for ea pending relations with non-aligned and pro Western countries in regions that have up lo now been relatively Immune to Soviet inuuence.
MiliUrtit and anliSoviet force* are clearly concerned lest the Interest among the people and political quarters of ihe West indrmeninrhe Soviet Union today and (he growing understanding, of Us foreign policy erase the artificially created 'image of theinusge which they lusve beenunaboihedly for scores of years.
Corbachev. speakingrip to Murmansk in7
Vo.oect* for Folicy Oange. At the sameelieve that systemic reform would be likelv to induce controlled but significant movement in Soviet policies and Institutionsirection thatolicymakers have pressed for. creating new opportunities for Western diplomacy:
The Internal Dimenuon. We believe that irwvernentore open political and economic system, expanded politicaland an easing of restrictions on political dissent and individual rights would be necessaryts erf aaartemie re/orm. The West would have improved opportunities for getting its rnes-sage directlyider cross-sect Ion of the elite and the population
The Defense Dimension. Tbe more open and leas regimented political system would openand defense issues lo greater public scrutiny.ystemic reform en.iicrorr.errt the rdership would have an Incentive to constrain the growth of defense spending through. We believe the leadership wouldouder look than in the past at proposed defense programs, requiring defense managers to make moreuse of resoutces. Wliether Soviet defense spending In fact goes up or down by tlteepends in part on leadership decisions on future weapons programs as well a* on factors not completely under their conlrcJ-auch as Western defense programs and ihe state of the East-West relationship.'
Policy Toward the West. ProponenU of system he reform to tbe Soviel leadership want lothe hold of theental,ty that has fueled rigid arrti-Western foreign policies,foreign polity fleiibility. strengthened antl-Soviet suspicions In the West, and Inhibitedbility toarger ioterrsational io*e- They would not end tbe competition, risk the relative gains they have made over the pastears, accept an Inferior military porition, or draw back from pursuitlobal superpower status Soviet readers wouldrogram and push ahead totheir sitatccic and conventional forces. But we believe they would be more likely than their
set vatlve counterparts to invigorate arms,andconomic intei-
clunge with tbe outside wot Id in (he pursuit of theii domestic aad foreign policy goals We believe systemic reform would create cond.tions for nesotialiont leading lo potentially sir able reductions in Soviet conventional and Mrategic forces opposite NATO and China. There could be significant changes in Moscow's foreignstrategy,ore rapid expansion of trade with the West
Policy Toward, tha Third World. East-West relation! in the Third World would remain strongly competitive. There would be no retreat from Moscow! dstermlnatkm to errand Us Influence. But weeform leadership would place more emphasis on political and diplomatic approaches to regional issues The Soviets might be more cooperative in some areas (such as the Middle East) as they seel to eipand their political role and legitimize their presence.
Policy Toward Eastern Europe. Even ifdoes not attempt to impose it, wc believe systemic reform in the USSR would bein the Easterneasure of increased pluralism would allow Bloc statei lo pursue Indigenous approaches to political and economic reform and open up new opportunities for US diplomacy.
Neo Slotnism
eeo Stalinist leadership would be strongly Influenced by xenophobic Russian nationalist elements in the Sovet elite. They would Introduce roore repressive pohciej at home andore rigidly anti-Western posture abroad. We do notthe policiesseo-Stalinist leadership would produce any real Improvements in the economic performance, the technological base, or the Soviet's
long-term competitive position is tlie West The Impott of US Polky
We believe that the fair ol reform will be sensitive to ihe slate of East-West relations. The proponents of reforms that aitcmpt to introduceforces aad political diversity into the Soviet system are more likely to be able lo advance their causelimate of reduced tensions. Wc believeharp deterioration of the imernational climate would strengthen conservative elements in the regime and could conceivably derail ihe reform process, especially if it ccancided with severe disruption produced by fundamental reforms. We also believe thateffort toarger proportion of resources Into industrial modernization depends in part on his abthty to manage perceptions of the foreign threat, and hence on his ability to achieve arms control arrangements that constrain Western defense pro-grams. In this sense, wc believe Gorbachev's relative success can be affected by the Western response to his policies.
Western policies can have an effecteneral sense. We believe the prospect of Western assistance was irntrurnental in expanding the Dow of emigration Inesurgent US economic and military buildup, on the other hand,ey ingredient In creating the sense of crisis in Moscow thateform-minded leadership to power in. While the push for reform is not Immune to ouUkle influence, we cannot confidently predict the impact in Moscow of Western policies spec* Really designed to affect the process
e believe Gorbachev's success, and tin- lute nf reform, will largely rest on the outcome ol power struggles, political debates and economic and social developments inside the USSR and Eastern Europe that are subject only indirectly to Influence from outside
r i
r
orbocheveader
Mikhailhe oaost JotWable Soviet leader the United State has faced since the death of Stalin.trongly committed to his vision of radically im provingsency and productivity of the USSR and thus Increasing Soviet Influence,While his prccpects for success are uncertain, hb determination is not
Leaderthtp.etermined to lead tlie USSR, not simply serve as head of the Politburo Unlike the consensus-oulWing Brezhnev. Corbachev moves out in front of Party colleagues la hb efforts lo promote change.illing lo experiment and take rbks to breathe new life Into the Soviet system. Unlike Khnsshdiev. however, hb willingness to takeemperedaroful calculation of the potential cccneouenccs of hb acts. Re wiH pants hb gratis relentlessly, while detnc-artratlng extraordinaryflexibility.
em
View ol the Unitedorbachevs view of the Unitedore sopiuaticated lhan that of previous Soviet leaders.specially sensitive to the importance of pubhc opinion in democracies. Never-Useless, he abo harbors narrow perceptions about the United States, speaking sfmplisttcally of the power of the US "military-industrial complex' over theand Congress. We believe Gorbachev'sof tbe United Stales is evolving beyond such stereotypes, however, as Ik prof)Is from repeated personal Interactions with US political and business leaders.
' Future Behavior.ighly confident of the USSR's potential aad of hb own ability to scad. If he perceives that hb restructuringot mooting hb electa tions. we believe he will persist and Indeed escalate hb efforts. When hb duutges stir controversy and polilical turmoil, Gorbachev willon what he sees as aeoctttdary btues and alter hb tactics but persist la ptsrtuk of hb goal. We believe he recognizes he Isoterttially dangerous course but is defer mined toat the risk ofthan accept the status quo.
annex c
gorbachev and ideology
policy mi ten have always been caieful lo have Iheir actions solidly grounded In party Ideology. Throughout Soviel history, fundamental changes In dc<nesttc and foreign policy have been accomparued by corresponding ideolcanlral adjustments This phe-oornenon can be seen in the struggle (or reform in Gorbachev's USSR. Oppooessts of Ihe leforms claim lhal ihey violate fundamental ideological principles, while Corbachev and bis allies areajor effort to undermine those claims by ledeliningprinciples to lay the groundwork for their reforms.
The rapid rise of an outspoken reformer and close ally. Alekaandt Yakovlev. hasey ofeffort to change the ideological climate In recent months. Yakovlev hai taken the lead in pushingore Oeslble approach lo Ideological Issues, and bis promotion In June lo full membcrililp in ihe Politburo puts himosition lo replace the more con vent lot sally minded Yegor LJgachcv ai ibe regime's lop spokesman on ideology.
Oocrcoming the Ideology of Stagnation. To smooth the way lor reform. Gorbachev and Yakovlev areore lesjble "Leninist" view of ideology which modifies and even disregardswhich no longer conform to the nature of the times. In an article published In the7 Issue of the party's authoritative Ideological Journal. Kommun-tsf. Yakovlev identified the absence of adequate ideo-IocvcjI support for tbe "nascent and upcoming"as one of the major obstacles to their success
Corbachev and Yalroviev have thoroughly criticized past regimes for falling to update ideology to keep pace with theevelopment and for allowing it to haiden Into rigid dogma. Gorbachev told the
7 Central Committee Plenum that "the theoretical concepts of socialism remained at the level of, when society had been tackling entirely different tasks" This stagnation in ideology. Corbachev continued, prevented past leaders from perceiving the need for change and the danger presented by the growth ol "crisis phenomena" in society.
Liberating Social Science Research. Remarks by Gorbachev snd Yakovfev tuggest that the newto Ideology couldajor impact on tlie social sciences in Ihe USSR, freeing them to delve more deeply into ihe realities of Soviet life. Corbacliev complained to the January plenum that (lie ideological dogmatism of ihe past had left no room forscientific research:
(The) motive forte* and contradlciloni and the actual condition of lociety did not become the tub/ret of tn-depih scientificigorous debate* and creatloe ideal disappearedfrom theory and tocial sciences, whileevaluation! and opinions became un-eruestlonahtc truths.
In his Kommunlsl article, Yakovlev described the heavy toll he claims ideological dogmatism hot taken on economic policy
The attitude that private plots and sdl-employ-ment arco socialism deprived theof significant potential resources.
The mytholcepzlng of tbe ceratraliied form of marsagemeol fettered enterprise and Initiative and engendered buieaucratizalioo
The views of "antimarket advocates"ruke on economic growth
45
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orbochev and the Third World
Pronouncements and Academic Debate. Gorbachev has devoted relatively little public aiicitttoti to the Tliird World, focusing primarily on arms control. East-West relations, and domestic concerns. Third World issues received less attention ath CPSU Congress6 than tbey did at the two proceeding congresses and tlie new CPSU program has little ot thepromises of" support for the "national liberationin1 predecessor. This lower level of public attention to Third World concerns has led Fidel Castro and otlier Soviet allies to remind Moscow of its 'internationalist duties- lo its Third World friends.
A lively debate on numerous Third World Questions has continued in the Soviet academic and political literature under Corbachev. Many Soviet scholars and political figures have cspressed relatively pessimistic views of tlie prospects for Third World states to advance to socialism and acknowledged that Soviet actions in the Third World over the past several years have compllcal-ed relations wiih the United States. Tlie Sovietsthat changing conditions in tlie Thirdend of tlse colonial era. the emergence of regional military powers, tlie complexity of Third Worldand economicmake it more difficult for them to expand their influence using the Instrurnents they have relied on In the past, notably arms transfers and support for national liberation movements
The Corbachev Agenda. Moscow's more sober view of the Third World under Corbachev does not. in our view, pointoviet retreat, butolicy that takes Into account the realities of the developing world as the Soviets understand them. These realities may include limits on the prospects for pro-Soviet revolutionary change but they alsoarietv of new political and economic opportunities for the USSR Over the next few yean, we see the USSRide range of policies in the Third Worldaried and, in many cases, more sophisticated set of policy instruments.
Some of these policies reflect conUnuitu with pre-Gorbachev patterns:
The Soviets will provide continued, and ifincreased support to embattled clienls such asituation Moscow probably seesest of its resolve in the lace of "US neoglobaliim "
will promote leftist change in the Tliird World, though it will do so carefully, in order to avoid provoking the United States and damaging ils effort to create the imageesponsible superpower. The USSR will probably limit open support for revolutionary "armed struggle" to relatively safe situations such as Chile and Southa direct superpowerisit will keep its options open in other countries by maintaining covert contacts with antiregimc groups both directly and through surrogates. Moscow will nol forgoopportunities in countrieshift toward the Soviet Bloc would significantlythe West Moscow will probably be reluctant, however, to take on new "basket cases" as clients.
But wc also expect increasing emphasis on new approaches:
A more assertive effort to gain influence byole In the settlement of regional conflicts. In pursuit of this objective theregime will be more willing to go against tlie wishes of its traditional clients and to support negotiated solutions. But we do not believe tliev will make coiKesstons that would threaten the hold of their key clients.
Trying to break out of the diplomatic rigidity of the late Brezhnev era by improving ties to key regional players such as Egypt. Israel. Zimbabwe, and China.
A more concerted effort to expand political and economic relations with neutral and pro-Western states, especially relatively wealthy" ones such as the ASEAN countries and those in regions such as Latin America and the South Pacific where Moscow has had little or no presence.
A more tough-minded policy toward lisclients. The Soviets will attempt iogood relations with countries such as Syria, Libya. Angola. Vietnam. Ethiopia, andBut we will see stronger pressure from Moscow fot improved performance and greater williiigness to cross swords on regional andissues when it serves Soviet interests.
07
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