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Readiness of Soviet Forces in Central Europe: Implicationsapid Transition to Wai
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ibend especially in lhc Usl decade, ibe Soviets have made significantto their forcei in Central Europe These imptovemenu aie designed to raise the peacetime icadineu pcuture and combal power of ibe force, and io make ihem more suitable for protracted nonnuclcar war. Progress hai been neat pronounced in weapons modern ization. lociand command and control:
The SovieU have established and esercised ihe command structure necessary to direct lhc full preparation of all theater forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations. This theater-levelwould, in lime of emergency, assume command of all forces. Soviei and non-Soviet, in therdicve the Soviet General Staff of much of Ibe burden of managing ihe mobiliaiion andof these forces.
Tbe combalof Soviet theater air and ground force* hai improved mail.ally through the iniroductmn of Urge* numbers of more modern -tapnm In hit Germany the typical Sc-net raane-rer division hai roughly ISmore combat po-cr than. and Soviei laclvcal air icf imenu there arc currently being rccquippcd wiih the newest generation aircraft
Since. ihe Soviets have augmented their ic-giiiicaw Germanyevel lhat. by Soviet sundards. ts sulfieieniupport combat ooernlnjnioice iwice as large aa thai now in place foroay* These levels are such lhai lhc Soviets would probably not need io buulen their lines of ra-nmujiicalions with large quantities of bulky tupplies before hoilililie* began
In port, 'bcae improveitvenu in preparedness were made because the Soviets had come to believear wiih NATO was likely io be fought initially with only nonnucleat wraptrns and thai conventional conflici mighl be piotractcd During ihe, tbe Sovieu had expected war to cilirei begin wiib large-scale nuclear exchanges or to escalate qukkly from conveniional to nuclear conflict Thus, the forces of that period were configured mainlyiadear war But with the clevelc-^meniATO doctrine nre*smg "IWibte rc^mse" and the adveal of NATO ooorcnlKKial forceuring the early and. the Sovieu began toa war with the Weal as iiycrcasiojly likely lorotracted amvcnl-xtal confltct Tbcir military wiling* indkaitd lhai
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they saw ihc change, in NATO strategy and force improvements as threatening theecurity posiiton in Central Europe, because iheir forces in Ihe region were noi luflieicnlly preparedake pail in sustained ronvenlionalcoeidilioo Ihey undertook IO conect-
One consequence of the changes ihey have made io Iheir forces in Ccnual Europe, however, hasizable increase in ihe manpower thai must be mobilized lo bring these forces io full strength We estimate thai Soviei air and ground forces in Central Europe tola! slightly moreen. This is aboutercent less than intended wartime strength. While ihe number of personnel assigned to ihese forces has remained -roughly constant during the lastears, the number of wartime personnel slots has grown substantially with the enlargement of Ibe structure of divisions and the addition of more support units.esult. Ihe gap between the force's intended wartime strength and its peacetime assigned manpower has widened significantly over the past decade
Although Soviei aircrews, tank battalions, and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile units are close to their waiiimc manning levels, and arc fully equipped, mosi of ihe other units, which arc also fully equipped, have sizable pcisonncl shortages ranging fromoerceni of Iheii intended wartime manpower. For example, motorized lifle and lank divisions today are manned atoeicent of intended wartime levels, compared with aboutercent in. Peacetime manning levels in support units such as front-level hospital bases, ammunition depots, and heavy engineer conslruction brigades are considerablyranging frojji aboutoercent of intended wai time strengths
By distributing their peacetime manpower in Central Europe as they have, the Soviets are able to maintain the eiiuciurcarger wartime forcetatus thai permits the force lo be fleshed out wilh reservists in less time than would be neededransport whole new military units from the USSR. The Soviets' decision to maintain theater forces in peacetime substantially below full wartime readiness levels is consistent wiih their appreciation of NATO's modesi level of peacetime military preparedness and their ex pert at ion thai an extended period of rising poliiical tension would precede hostilitiesNATO, providing Ihe Pact with enough limemobilizentegrate reservists and deploy forces in the region.
To fully purpart Soviei forcesnlial Europe for corn bai opei ations al full wartime ittength. we estimate ibe Soviets would need lo augmentesenisis. tnotl of "bom would be called up innde ihe USSK and iraruporicd to Central Europe. This rxecess would lake from one lo two weeks, depending piim.fily on ihe extent lo which il received priority for use of airlift. Furthermore, to achieve an acceptable degire of coherent military organisation and rllcctivcncss, tbc Soviets would need at least an additional week or so to integrate tbe rescevisii into the force and conduct some training. Given tbne considerations and assuming the relatively tntooih functioning of tbe rrvobi lira lion ptoccst. we estimate thai Ihe Soviets would raeetj ato ihree weeks to prepare fully their forcca in Central Europe foe stuiairtee) offensive operations al planned wartime
The Soviets would attempt to conceal preparationseneralinin order lo achieve some degree of surprise We think, btywever. that, unless ihey feared in imminent attack or believed lhal further delay would permit NATO tootentially decisive strategic advantage in mobilization, ihey would be unwilling to accept the risks of committing to combat unprepaiod. undcrstrcngth forces lacking sufficient size and logistic infrastruciuie to sustain large-icale offensiveonse-Quently, we ludgc Ihat ihey would he unlikely lo go to war without eomplettng nioti, if not all of ihese steps required to flesh out and prepare their forcca
We cannot rule cut ibc possibility lhalrisis Ibe Soviets might choosereemptive .Hack on NATO without taking lime tofully their forces in Central Fuiope. They might, for example, mistakenly conclude that precautionary miliiary steps taken hy NATOeriod of political tension wan precursorshort-warning attackgaimthe Warsaw Pact We believe, however, that ihe Soviets do not have plans for preemptive conventional attacks wilb little or no lime givenrepare iheir forces. Ratface, wc expect ibe Pact, when fjced with such an rxucnic emergency, to lake hasty defensive actions loATO attack, then go over to an offensive*
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