THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organization$ participated in the preparation of the Estimate:
The Control Intelligence Agency, the Detenu Intelligence Agency, Ihe Notional Security Agency, ond Ihe intd-igenee orgonixotion of the Deportment of Stole.
Also Participating:
The Deputy Chief of Stofl for InteCgence, Deportment of Ihe Army Ihe Director of Naval InreKgence, Deportment of Ihe Navy The Awitfont Chief of Staff, InteB-genee, Department of the Air Force Ihe Director of InteKgenee,orine Corps
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
CHILE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIO
it
)
aoilible ji ti7 "is used In (be preMiiltoo of this Memorandum lo Hotdxv -Whapproved by Ihe NttMiialWelticmw Beard on
CONTENTS
SCOPE NOTE...
KEY JUDGMENTS
DISCUSSION
The Setting
the System
Political Maneuvering
Stimulating the Economy
The Democratic Opposition
Lost Opportunity
Regaining Momentum
The Military
Attitudes Toward theLetelier Murder.
Threat From the Radical Left
The Potential for Leftist Violenc
Looking Ahead
An Uncertain Outcome
Less Likely Alternatives
Implications for the United States..
SCOPE NOTE
The prospectsmooth transition from military to civilian rule in Chile were last assessed inatcdhile the essential judgments of that Estimate have held, the likelihood of their remaining valid through9 democratic transitionthe time frame of thefurther analysis, particularly in view of some important subsequent developments in Chile;
The Intelligence Community, for example,better-than-even" chance that provisions in0 Constitution callingational plebiscite on one candidate selected by the military would be modified to permit open presidentialThe possibility of open elections now appears less likely.
5 to be firmly behind the constitutional transitiondivided over whethershould be allowed to succeed himself. The Intelligence Community occasionally has differed over the military and the Junta's position on this issue and Pinochet's ability tothem to his benefit.
The democratic opposition, which was relatively united5 over the need for constitutional reform and direct elections, is still formulating its response to various new elements of the transition process.
Finally, the Intelligence Community correctly projectedleftist violence, but the massive arms cache discovered last year and the nearly successful attempt on Pinochets life suggest weneed to reevaluate the leftist threat to the transition processH|
The Memorandum to Holders will update the relative strengths of key actors, reexamine significant variables, and discuss new factors in the Chilean political equation, and then reassess the most likely outcome and alternative scenarios as the plebiscite approaches. It will also assess their implications for US-policy interests and the regime's vulnerability to outside pressure.
KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that President Pinochet is determined to remain in office beyond9 despite his low popularity, opposition from non-Army members of the four-man Junta, and mounting unease in the armed forces. Whether he is likely to be successful in achieving thisremains uncertain. Pinochet has all but formally announced that he intends to run for reelection in the single candidate presidential plebiscite that must be held at least one month before his term ends ine probably believes he can secure the plebisciteby adroitly manipulating his Junta critics and portraying himself to conservative sectors and the armed forces as the only alternative to chaos.
Pinochet already is campaigning throughout the country,to provide more jobs and low-cost housing and publicizing the new political parties and voter registration laws enacted earlier this year. These statutes may benefit him because they make it difficult for the poor to register, and most opposition parties may not muster enough signatures to qualify for legal status. Meanwhile, the government isitherto minor rightist party that Pinochet probably intends to useampaign vehicle. His economic performance over the lastonths hasolitical plus, and he may be contemplating expansionist economic policies next year to boost his popularity with the middle and lower classes. In our view, however, these efforts will neither significantly amplify Pinochets popular support nor erase military doubts about his chances of winning an hor.est plebiscite
We believe the moderate oppositionmade little headway in antiregime efforts over theore realistic strategy and regaining some momentum, but whether they can effectively challenge Pinochet remains in doubt Their leadersthat they must unite, promote the recently announced free election and voter registration drives, and demonstrate that theyiable alternative candidate to continued rule by Pinochet. The main opposition group, the Christian Democratic Partyas replaced their longtimeis anathema to thea respected moderate willing to try to gain the trust of the armed forces.
3
In our view, the moderate opposition's strongest card is the free election campaign, which is attracting support from most democratic
parlies, the Catholic Church,abor, and professionalThe moderates think their key lest is to register atillionotal ofillion voters by8 so that Pinochetthere is too much popular opposition to risk being nominated as the plebiscite candidate.ast resort, the moderates say they will mobilizeassive "no" vote if Pinochet obtains the nomination. Some Junta members also may try to keep Pinochet fromlebiscite until atillion votersQgflJ0 [
For its part, the far left, led by the well-organized Communist Party of Chile, continues to promote terrorism to harass the government andransition, but it is no closer to its goal of launching an all-out insurgency and is increasingly isolated politically. Nonetheless, we believe that thesubstantial assistance from the Soviettoigher level of terrorism and other violent actions overjhe next yearalf in an effort to furtherthe country^JjSFj
VVe believe there is growing disquiet in the armed forces over Pinochet's reelection plans, and he appears to be less confident about how to control the military than in the past. Pinochet's relations with the non-Army members of the Junta have deteriorated in recent months as they have openly opposed his reelection bid and announced that theyivilian candidate. In our view, however. Pinochet's most serious threat is erosion of his Army support. Disquiet is mounting among officers of different ranks over his efforts to retain power, particularly because of concern over his low popularity. Also working against Pinochet is concern over his potential culpability in the still unresolved Letelier murder case. Nevertheless, despite ample evidence of military unease, we have seen no signs yet that officers in any of the servicespljnning to confront tbe President din-ctlvjf^ljJJJj)^
We see two most likely scenarios for determining Chile'ssuccession:
Pinochet becomes the plebiscite nominee.
The military and moderate leadersilitary or civilian consensus plebiscite candidate.
get thAint
Nevertheless, no clear pattern has emerged as to which of the two succession formulas will be followed, and we do not expect this situation to clarify untilther scenarios arcmilitary and the moderate opposition might stillirect election formula, but this is unlikely because of time constraints. In addition. Pinochet himself could call for direct elections and run against several opposition candidates, or lie might try to get tlufunta totand-in to run in
Ihewe believe Pinochet is leery of these options because they are riskier than taking his chanceslebiscite. Finally, therehance that the Communists might succeedecond assassination attempt against Pinochet. We judge, however, that Communist leaders are giving priorityong-range strategy of attempting to mount an all-out insurgency in thehould Pinochet perpetuate himself
We believe that Pinochet probably could notlear majority in an honest plebiscite, and therefore he probably will try to manipulate the results if he is the candidate. This would probably provoke an outcry from the opposition, further erode his standing with the military, and perhapsonfrontation with senior officers from all the services. Moreover, it would, in our view, sharply diminish prospects for long-term stability in Chile by providing new opportunities forand further isolating SantiagoWj
Pinochets persistence in trying to perpetuate himself in power is likely to jeopardize US interests inull and stable democratic transition in Chile:
In our view, Pinochet is likely to respond minimally to external pressures on political and human rights matters and is only slightly more vulnerable to threats of economic sanctions and cutbacks in foreign lending or debt reschedulings. We judge he will not agree to step down at the end of his term in response to foreign pressure of any kind.
Other key actors, however, are more susceptible to outside pressures. Military officers are increasingly worried about their country's international pariah status and the likelihood that the military's image will suffer permanent damage if Pinochet remains in power. Furthermore, the moderate opposition will benefit from concerted efforts by foreign capitals toull democratic transition and from offers of technical expertise on election mechanics,7
DISCUSSION
Setting
unns the yearalf lint* the publication ofCfcuV PrwpKU for Democraticthe political impasse in Chile has remained basically unchanged in several key aspects President Pinochet is still determined to retain power beyond the end of his term inis personal popularity is low, and unease persist* in the armed forces retarding his intentions. The democraticalthough united on the need for constitutional reform and direct presidential elections, has nota sound strategy to persuade the military, much less Pinochet, toransition to civilian rule. The far left, led by the well-organized Communist Party of Chile (PCChX continues to promote terrorism tothe government andransition, but it is no closer to its goal of launching an all-out insurgency Finally, despite an upturn in thewhich achieved an overall growth rateercent inChileans, including moat of the lower and much of the middle class, have benefited only marginally from this growth and, judging by public opinion polls,_hold the government's economic policies
n other respects, however, the potitical scene has undergone important changes. The most dramatic the discovery*by the security
supplied by Cuba to the PCCh'f terrorist affiliate, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMRX and the FPMB's almost successful assassination attempt against Pinochet in September The military and several conservative groups quickly rallied behind Pinochet, who responded lo the asaassination attempt by reim-posing Use state of siege and cracking down on the moderate opposition He also reiterated hisnot to change "one word" of theincluding its provisions allowing him lo runresidential plebiscite
Pinochet's plans to retain power, including fears that Pinochet would be defeatedlebiscite, thereby damaging the armed forces'
n recent months, however. Pinochet hasarch on the moderate opposition by promulnaling various "liberalization" measures, including anregistration statuteestrictive law permit-ling non-Manist political parties to acquire legal status While stopping short of formalizing hisfor the plebiscite nomination, he has stepped uppresidential campaign bv barnstorminc throughout the country and promising moreand public spending on social programs Pinochet suffered an unexpected setback in February, however, because of the rcvetatiunshilean Army malot thai senior government officials planned the assassination ofChilean Foreign Minister Letelicr in Washingtonnd his stonewalling on the case mayhis standing with the Army officer corps.
4 Meanwhile, the moderate opposition remains divided over how to respond to Pinochet's recent initiatives but has gained greater credibility sincey persistently denouncing Communist violence and refusing to cooperate with tbe PCCh and other far left groups in antircgime activities. In short, the Chilean political scene remains as complex as ever, and political activity is bound to accelerate as the timethe end8 at thea final decision on whether Pinochet will be nominated for the presidential plebiscite or another formula will be used to select the next chief of Mate (see InselXt
System Potties! Monevvering
Me believe that Pinochet wants to remain in power Utde&utely. even though there is mount) n* operation across the political spectrum to hisand military restlessness on this score. This is demonstrated bv the fundamental aspects ofas hla notion that only he can "save" Chile from Communism and the disreputable
As ibe end of Pinochet'* trim approaches. Chilean! are focusing on the com* it utimetable Cotlebiscite candidate, holding eongrctsionat elections; and. powbty. scheduluig dnect pceuckntlal etecUnaa, Intern) ts abo evtdeot in iW lunta'i precise legislative and constitutional powersale in nominating the candidate,eplacement (or Ploc--apii.iiied. and ttllinc
chel If he diet or vacancies on the Junta.
atch
Key Dale)
Pinochet'* current term oft
Deadline (or designation of Candida la for president in) plebiscite
Date of plebiscite
7
Dales of neit presidential term, ami mint; plebiscite candidateW:-iiv of pocular vote
Terms of offtce of the corn-caondcrs u> cluel of theforces as of the end of the current peesadclitial period
II9
dential convocation II0 II December
Dead line for President to tchedjle congressional elee-lions
Date of congressional elec-ays of presi-tlons
Installation of Congress
Deadline leu calling direct Di evidentialwhich become necessary ifcandidate does nota mafcxlty o( popular vote
Inauguration of new
Key Provisions
Under the Constitutionresident Pinochet serves as Commander In Chief of the Army and holds the title of Captain General of the armed farces. He is represented on the military lunta by the nol ranking Army Genet al. whom he can replace at will. The lunta members (rom the Air Force, Navy, and Carabineros (national police) command their respective fervtces and arefrom automatic removal by the
The Constilutlon restricts the legislative andpowers of the lunta in relation to the presidency. For instance, its legislative role Is circumscribed by theole authority to initiate legislation on most subfects. Thb reduces the Junta to reviewing, amending,proposals from theThe Junta's effectiveness i> further constrained by the provision that its votes on legislation must be unanimous, which allows Pinochet, through the Army representative, to veto modifications Junta members, however, have periodically employed the unanimity requirement to block Ihe enactment of bills unless Pinochet accepted substantial modifications. Tbeconstitutional powers aie also governed by the unanimity requirement The Junta can initiate amend-mcnts to the Constitution, but such pioposals must be approvedational plebiscite, which only the President can convoke. Nevertheless, several timesthe past year the nun-Army Junta representatives have called publiclyonstitutional amend permit direct presidential elections
ew President. The Constitution specifies that, if Pinochets incapacitated, the Junta selects his replacement by unanimous vote. If afterours the Junta cannotnanimous decision, the National Securityincludes the four Junta members, the presidents of Ihe Supreme Court and of the Council of Slate, and lite Comptrollerchoose the president by an absolute majoriiy. The Constitutiondoes not slatethe new chief executive must citherunta memberenior line officer (ram one of the services. In all probability the Army would ensure that either ib Junta representative or Army general would be the new ]
The provisions governing the nomination of ihe candidate for the presidential plebiscite are identical, except that Pinochetthan the Army representative on theentitled to vote in the matter The Constitution also specifies thaihe four Commanders in Chief cannot agree, the NationalCouncil, chaired by Pinochet, cbooses. In practice, ft is likely thai, because ol the military's strong desire to maintain an Image of unity, the high command would resist having the decision referred to the Council. There also is considerable evidence that Pinochet himself realizes that Ihe issue of his nomination must be resolved In the Junta, where lie currently faces open opposition from at least two of itsonsequently, he has been trying fororce one or both of these officer* of[ the Junta legally he cannot simply Bre1
HowVecaaeiei MM Under thePiwxher needs ihe unanimoutof ihe)untt members loepUcementember who ieur.ni and Iheoietlcally even ihe resignationon-Aimi member musl be approved bv the other memberi. If Pinochet removes the Armr rnienrniative on (he lunlii.egally bound to replaee hlin with the neat highest ranking active-duty Army general, ah hough in practice he emild easily retire ihb officer and wtrct another generalr. theJunta memben almost certainly would not obtrcl to Pinocher'i manipulation of the Army*toavorite on the lunta beeaure they would cumlder ihii io be his prerogative as Army comchief Pinochet ha* little Inal authority iooAccr auienmeMi or retirement* in thetenlthough he canomineeIhe five most tenlor active-duty general*In the respective service to succeed anlunta member. Nevcrthelext. when theCentral Mem tor a. resigned frominochet bowed to prmure from theto replaceJsim with ihe neit ranking
whose Ineptitude ushered in the chaos of the Allende era, his concern about his own and his family's personal safety if he left power, and the fact that he has deliberately sotuccessor. In addition, we have no credible reporting that Pinochet has seriously "IflritVfltlfc'hat his failure so far to formalize his plebiscite candidacy derives from anything more than his custom ofhis Intentions until the appropriatein this case, probably when he believes he hasobjections within the Junta and among senior Army officer* to his remaining inaW
In our view. Pinochet probably expects to outma-neuver his opponents, anticipating that by adeptly rnarripilating the Junta, increasing governmentcaioling conservative sectors, and appealing to militarycan portray himself asand ensure his nomination as the plebiscite candidate. Nevertheless, he probably ii less confident of his ability to steamroll his critics than in (he past, given the degree of public opposition to his continuing in office, his failure to silence dissent from the lunta and senior Army officers, and the aggrieved and often vitriolic tone of many of his political statements. Consequently,loaking hu strategy in the legitimacy he claims to derive from the Constitution ofby popular vote but forced on him by senior military officers anxiousasic charter spelling out the mechanism and timetable by which Chile would return to civilian rule. Pinochetasserts he Is fulfilling his constitutional obligation totable, "protected" democracy and over the past (wo years has approved law* governing electoral tribunals, voter registration, and legalization of non-Marxist political parties needed tolebiscite
In practice, the highly restrictive voterand political parties' laws benefit Pinochet as he prepareslebiscite. Prospective voters must goumbersome and. for the poor, expensive process to register. Nevertheless,illion voters have signed up since the law went into effect inhich may result Inillion of the estimatedillion electorate registering byhere Is widespread speculation in Chile that Pinochet may advance (he plebisciten part to capitalizeeduced electorate that, weighted more heavily toward the upper and middle classes, presumably would favor his candidacy. Similarly, very few political parties are likely to muster the0 signatures to comply with the new party law since many members fear lhat signing public lists could cost them their jobs or subject them to other harassment. Leaders of Chile's Urges! party, theocralic Partyave staled that even they would have great difficulty in0 signatures and note lhat even prior3 PDC membership was not that large, although the party usually garneredhird of the popular
' '"
8 Meanwhile, therying to generate popular support for Pinochet's plebiscite candidacy via tbe National Advance Partyhich is funded from government coffers and managed by one of Pinochet's top Army aides Theushing to sign up party members; the government has orderedto "persuade" municipal workers to join AN, and thugs have visited tcacbors to coerce them into the parry, Consequently, this formerly minuscule radical rightist group probably will quickly obtain enough signatures to qualify for legal status and become Pinochet's main campaign vehicle.}
ling the Economy
e fudge that Pinochet also intends tothe government bureaucracy and increasefor social protects to build momentum for hb reelection campaign. Herying to enhance
bis image through povtilistromising, lo0 new (oba per month ininlensive public works projects,sionnd improve job protect km for teachers and civil servants The government also has announced il will increase byercent the number of subsidized housing starts for Ihe poor this year, which probably is desisjned to solidhe political sympathy for Pinochet evident
of Santiago's slumdwellers in recent yearsfgWmt Jj
ever the less.expect these and otherinitiatives to have relatively little impact on Pirioebcts overall popularity Opposilion politicians can easily demonstrate thai Pinochet's promise on newwhich in June was scaled back0 aunrealistic, thai the government actually
surged inhe regime's exportprogram expanded economic activity while slowing the inflation rate, increasing real wages, and reducing unemployment. The economy grew so fast during the first quaiterowever, that tbe authorities became concerned about high levels of consumption and imports. With investment at historically low levels, limited productive capacity created bottlenecks to giowlh and pushed price increases out of line with theercent goal for this year. Sharp increases in imports shrank the Hade deficit and threatened to jeopardize projected foreign exchange balances. In March. Finance Minister Buchiontractionary monetarythat dampened expansionary spending and slowed the economy. We believe that these adjustments will enable Santiago to achieve most of7 IMF projectionsrowth arounder-
Opinion polls indicate that, notwithstanding therelatively successful economic management, the public remains highly dissatisfied with lis standard of living and views the economy as therincipal problem Although the eiport policy hasoom in fruit and vegetable producing tones and his probably enhanced Pinochet's prestige in these areas, we lodge this rural eonsiituency to be loo small toignificant impact on the President's overallProsperity has not penetiated the muae pwuioua and politically influential middle clai* and slum sectors of the main urbanhich remain tusttoos of anti-Pitv^betQ
We believe that Finance Minister IlucM has (bus far Successfully Lrabbied agaiml broad hated pump pruning to improve ihe President's image and generate support for has re*let)km lie hasour viewexpansionary policies would almost certainly unleash high inflation that could setacklash even among conservative groups such as the lnninrssMoreover, tuch policies would quickly run Chile afoul of its international creditors, thus iropardizing the govetnmenl'i painstakingly fashioned eiport program.
Pinochet, however, is using more limited economic programsart of his campaign. Me recentlylan to createlater scaled back-additional public works Jobs, increase pensionand improve job protection for teachers and civil servants. Santiago also plans to increase subsidized housing starts byercent this year. The housing
program IS highly visible jr.doirl-, idfiriSrd with
Pinochetas
him some political loyalty among the poor in recent
Given Santiago's current commitmenteduced fiscal deficithe government will have to offset new spending programs with cuts elsewhere or with revenue increases. Monetary policy is also likely to remain generally restrictive, line hi. in an April reinlion with the US Ambassador, brushed aside rumors that he might resign under pressure for mote populist economic policies and charactcriied Pinochet at very cautious about programs that might destroy theimage of fiscal responsibility. He abo indicated that he thought the expanded housing program coyjd be financed without generating fiscal pioblenuP
Should Pinochet gamble and decide lo initiateexpansionary programs, however, we would not expect to see any movement beforetrategy, in our view, would become more likely if economic growth falls toercent by that time. Chile's recent commercial bank and official creditor reschedulings, which, do not include new loans, thus reducing piessure on Santiago to maintain strict compliance with the IMF targets Moreover, the current IMF three-year Extended Fund Facility ends In Augusteaving the country temporarilyIMF constraints andindow ofHowever. Finance Minister Buchi has promised Pads Club creditors and commercial banks that Chile will attempt loollow-on Fund program. The US Embassy believes that expansionary policies could make themselves felt in the economy in as little as one quarter. Therefore, Pinochet might attempt to give theimely boost lhat would have effect prior to the plebiscite but Still be sufficiently shott-lerm so as to cause no listing damage lo the economy.ffiggj
Chile:
Selected Economic'
1
7
NH Foreign
pensionew months ago. andeachers have been fired so far this year under the regime's education reform program. Pinochet also might try to pump up the economy in the months before the plebiscite, butroadly basedprobably would not generate much support for the President, especially among the middle and lower cl
The Democratic Opposition Lost Opportunity
most6asted year forpolitical opposition (seet failedthe government and the armed forcesthe National Accordasis to negotiateto civilian rule and suspendedational strike after the armsand the assassination attempt againstMoreover, moderate leaders have madeadvanceshey vacillated overto the electoral registration andlaws, torn between rejecting them asundemocratic measures serving Pinochet'staking advantage of the modest openingto legalize the parties and publicize themassive voter registration and free elections.was virtually paralyzed for months due todisputes over the electionew partyand over how io respond to Pinc*hct's latest
moderate leaders openly acknowledged theirover this disarray and voiced misgivings about whether their parties could unite to challengereelection bid and offer the generalespecially theviable alternative to the current
Regoinirsg Mermen turn
the moderate opposition'sin recent months, we believe thatare becoming more realistic about theiroptions They know thatunning outand that they must quickly resolve theamong their parties,igorousin support of restoring democraticconvince the armed forces that Pinochetbe nominated for the plebiscite. Oneof this greaterhat formerGabriel Valdes, whooreby the military than any otherhas been shunted aside. The PDCa new directorate headed by Patricio Aylwin,
iX-
Ihe Modeeote Pofilieol Opposition Porties
political parties have been technically illegal in Chile since the military government came lo powerevertheless, several dot en moderate parlies and (actions continued to (unction more or less openly. Following the emergenceasshe government became somewhat more tolerant of the activities of moderate oppositionnot of Manistcontinued to restrict their access to the media, their effort! to stage rallies and other public events, and their attempts to organ lie labor, professional guilds, student groups, and other key sectors. The moderate parties have formed several alliances or coalitioni in the past few yean, including;
The Democraticroad coalition of seven parties stretching from the moderate right to the center left foundedt is dominated by Ihe centrist Christian Democratic Panyenerally regarded as the country's largest. The Alliance's chairmanship rotates every six months among the parties. One of its key members, the Nunez faction of the Socialist Pasty, withdiew inhereby weakening the Alliance'sto the moderate left
The Notional Accord. An agreement signed byainstream paities In5 at the instigation of the Catholic Church's primate.Fresno Itomprehensive series of moderate proposalsransition logovernment- Two consefvaijve and two leftist parties signed It, along with the original members of the Alliance- The Accord has been quiescent in recent months
The National Civicoose grouping ofeading professional, labor, academic, and social groups formed inhe PDC played the key role io its creation, in response lo demands from nonparty sectorsreater voice in organized opposition activities. The Assembly has been largely inactive in recent months.
The Perfv of National Renovationstablished In7 through the fusion of two moderate right and one far right parlies Several of its key members were formerly closely identified with the Pinochet government andtime apparently favored theaRENA President TUcitdoand other leaders of the newhave publicly endorsed the freeheaded by Sergio Molina andwith members of the Junta on thea consensus civilian candidate to replace he government promulgated alaw to legalize non-Marxist politicalof the so-called organic laws thai under0 must be in place before theis held. Under this cumbersome andmeasure, paities may acquirestatus byist with signatures ofThe parties arc required, however, toembers, spread over eightcountry'segions, within the next sevenbecome fully legalized- These enrollment Ibisublicin ourikelymany potential signers, who fear thatwilh an opposition party will inviteor harassment from the government The newthe government strict control over theorganization and finances and allows ilor dissolve them with relative rase;senators elected in the future under thewill not be responsible to party directorateslegislative actions: officials of labor unionsassociations, as welt as members offorces, are barred from participating inand the parties* limited access to the mediastrictly regulated by the
As of late lune. eight parties, mostly from the right-of-centei. had begun the initial steps to acquire legal status. Most PDC leaders favor al least submitting- member list lo indicate technical compliance with the law Several other centrist and left-of-center parties appear to be waiting until after tbe PDC acts before announcing their intentions, but even if most of Ihe moderate opposition opts to seek legalization, very fewno more than two orlikely to sign up the0 men
respected. noncontroversJal old-guard party cruel-Iain who believes the opposition must gain Ihe trust of Ihe military. He harbors no national politicalby contrast, sees himselfontender in future direct presidentialsays that his primary goal is to convince ihe armed forces that they must prevent Pinochet from succeeding himself, even if that means accepting an interim military regime and postponing direct elections- The PDC is now proceeding to registerarly, and Aylwin wants to quickly reassert its leadership over theopposition, which, heust not get bogged down in debilitating personal and politieal
ost PDC leaders now sayonsensus conservativeor
4
believe thai (he Letetiei scandal is also Plncchet's overall standing wiih Army officers. Wc believe lhal concern about (he case Is undermining support lor him among field-grade officers and that Fernandez's revelallons have caused many to doubt privately Pinochet's denial of culpability in the lier murder
lier case has not reached the point of threatening Pinochet's authority. In addition, senior Army officers supported Pinochet's decision in mid-June to turn down the US request to expel Contreras and FsptnoM from the country, and he cootinues to try to rally rationalistic sentiment in the armed forces against expected new US demarches. In our view, however, the case still has the potential ofajor crisis if Pinochet overreacts and follows through with harsh measures against Contreras or others involved In the affair '
Threat From the Rodtcal Left The Potential for Leftist Violence
The Communists arc (he main subversive force in Chile, and (hey remain committedong-term strategy of promoting an insurrection to toppleaodandiniila-lvpe government under PCCh control .They do not want an orderly transition of power to civilian rule but prefer lo see Pinochet obtain the pjehiscite nomination, especially since this is likely to generate discord within the armed forces and further polarise the country Prior tohe Communists apparently were content to build up their clandestine apparetus and promote an escalating campaign of terrorism and violent protests while waiting until at least the end of Pinochel's term9 to begin an Insurrection. We believe the party calculated that Pinochet's Insistence on retainingwould so antagonize popular opinion and discredit moderate opposition groups that the latter would endorse the Communists' advocacy of armed struggle as the only way to oust
Nevertheless, the discovery of the arms caches and the assassination attempt against Pinochet in6 suggest that some elements of tbe PCCh and its terrorist affiliate, tbe FPMR. wanted to speed up the insurrection timetable. Tlie unprece-
11/
dented size of the Cuban armssupplied to the FPMK In accordance with anbetween the Castro government and thein our view, that both Havana and Chilean Communist leaden had concluded thatin Chile were ripeharp escalation of violence against the Pinochet regime and the Chilean armed forcesrelude to an all-out insurgency (seehe nearly successful attack by the FPMR against Pinochet suggests lhat some Communistbelieved that the PCCh could gain political stature and weather the anticipated severe security service reprisab by killing the
he arms caches and the failed attempt. In our judgment, have put the Communists on the defensive. Polls Indicate that the publicterrorism and Communist-led protests, and the moderate opposition paities are avoiding cooperation with the PCCh Moreover, bombings by the FPMR have declined markedly over the last year, and the Communists apparently do not intend to stage maiornochet protests anytime soon Instead, they are emphasizing the PCCh'* political tactics and trying to cultivate the moderate opposition while playing down the military option even to the party rank and file. Consequently, we believe that Communist leaders have reverted to their longer ramtc strategy and probably realize that (hev have little chance to launch an insurrection unless Pinochet holds onto power welt beyond the end of his current
believe that the PCCh plans to conductlevel of terrorism and olhcr violent actionsnext yearalf Pinochet almost certainlyany upsurge in Communist-sponsored violencehis reelection campaign by claimingmilitary government is the country'salternative. But unless the PCCh conducts avery dramaticincluding theof senior militarydoubt thaiwill gain any lasting advantage from raisingof Communist violence, especially if (hecontinue to eschew cooperation with thecriticize its lacti
Looking Ahead
An Uncertain Outcome
believe that Chile's presidentiallikely to evolve in one of two maiornow and
Pinochet may become the plebiscite candidate.
Copobtljtics and Foreign Ties of Chilean For Leit Groups
siinationatt'mi : Vj
In Septembeihe Ccmmuiutl Parly ol Chilehe bum ami berl organized far left group in the country, announced that it would seek to overthrow the Pinochet regime by violent means. Over the past (our years the PCCh has enlarged its clandestine wing, built up its military apparatus and trained several hundred members ahtoad. strengthened securityand broadened the Party'1 appeal to the urban poor. As olbe total PCCh card-carrying membership had grownnd we believe that the Party's youth wingumbers0 Moreover, in3 the PCCh supported the creation of the Manuel Rodtigaex Patriotic Fronthat sine* become Chile's main terroristlea the past two wars the Party has sought to bring the FPMR fully undet its control Although we know relatively little about the structure and leadership of the FPMR. we believe that it has gtown infromew dozen militanti at its inceptiont present. The FPMR has carried outerrorist bomUngt since3 and mounted tbe anamnation attempt against Pinochet in September l<
Several other far left groups advocate violence lo overthrow Pinochet, but nun* approaclies the FPMR in tile or frequency of terrorist action* The Front has supplanted the pro-Cuban Movement of ihei. Leftthe foreiiiott terrorist grouo in the country until the earlymilitary cadre was decimated by the security services in3 There appearse only minimal coordinationerrorist plana or action* between the FPMR and other far left groups, although most of them belong to the Communis led Papular Denxeralic Motemenl iMDP:hich itarif was folded into the new United Left (IU1 rjuanre in mid lone The PCCh has used the MDP to channel many of U> overt political activities, such as calk for street ptottsti and for liaison with student, labor, church, and professional groups The MDP wasseful vehicle for theampaign lo convince moderate opposition groups thai ita potent political force and should participate in thesr effort! to.eaceful transition to civilian
We believe that the PCCh is heavily dependent fin*orally on the Soviet Union. However, there is no reliable information on how much funding the party obtains from Moscow or other Communist capitals. We believe thai the FPMR also receives the bulk of its funding from the Soviets, either through the PCCh or directly, although there is little substantive repotling on this matter. The Cuban arms supplies discovered6 were the largest but only the latest of several shipments received by the PCCh and the FPMH over the past three lo four years from Cuba and, we believe, other Communist countries. An organization Intheund that disburses0 per year to promote radical leftist political activities in Chile. The Committee is composed of exiles from the PCCh, the MIR. the Christian Left, Almevda SocUlitts. and the small La Chispa Socialist faction. The primaryare Soviet Bloc embassies. In addition. Havana reportedly has increased its Baamial support to the n it
Moscow has been heavily involved in forming the PCCh's strategy for many yean, and itaven for top exiled party leaders for much of thoe tide period. Similarly. Cuba has long been the ideological mentor of the MIR. which has always-depended primarily on Havana for the bulk of Its funding and other materialariety of reportsarked increase in the number of Chilean far leftists receiving military or related training abroad during the past two years For instance, most members of the PCCh's internal military front reportedly have been trained In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while FPMR members were ttained primarily in Cuba and Nicaragua Reporting suggests that there is close coordination among Moscow, Havana, East European capitals, and occasionally such countries as Algeria, on the number of trainees and the type of instruction provided to PCCh, and other far left cadre. Large numbers of Chileanas many ascompleted advanced training abroad and returned to ihe PCCh, FPMft. and MIRrainees returning from the Soviet Union are said to believe that theyigher degree of military expertise than members of the Clii!can armed forces. In fact, members of the FPMR assassination team that tried to kill Pinochet, who almost certainly were trained abroad,igh Jjvel of militaryin the attack
The military and moderate opposition leaders may agreeonsensus military or civilian plebiscite candidate.
In our view, however, the interplay of key political actors and forces remains Intate of flux that no clear paltern has emerged as to which of the first two outcomes Is likely to prevail. Moreover, we do not expect this situation to be clarified untillthough ihe pace of political activity will accelerate considerably and public inlerest concerning the suc-is likely to increase in the coming months.
groups favoring, each of (hemusl overcome major hurdles Pinochetmust contendariety of
At least three members of the Junta do not favor his candidacy, ami he risks sparking dissension in the military if he arbitrarily shunts them aside in his determination to obtain the nomination.
His popularity istoercent by mosthe no longer can count on the support of reputable organ!red conservative political groups
There is considerable unease in ihe military over his reelection plans, and even some senior and middle-grado Army officers doubt that he could win an honest plebiscite and worry about ihe consequencesraudulent election.
External pressures on him lo step aside9 have increased, and military leaden realize that, even if Pinochetajority of the plebiscite vote, Chile's international isolation will persist.
The Letelicr case reverberatsons have placed Pinochet on the defensive with politicaland fellow officers concerned about the Army's irnage. which detracts from hu naiional-istic appeals against US "interference "
His advanced age. irascible temperament, and tbe public's skepticism about his intentions lessen Pinochet's chances of performing effectivelyolitical campaign lhat is focusing more and more on Ihe merits of continued authoritarian ruleeturn to civilian government.
Pinochet has severalhis
Time is on his side, mainly because of the moderate opposition's inability to date to portray itselfiable alternativeertain sense of public fatalism that, no matter what thetry, Pinochet will have his way
The Junta members who oppose (us nomination areigh-stakes game and may be forced to back down to preserve aimed forces unity, especially if the Army officer corps rallies behind Pinochet, the moderates fail to unite and show sufficient political resolve, and thereesurgence of leftist terrorism and violence.
Military officers are not prone to coup plotting, and distrust of politicians and concern about the^ military's statusuture civilianrun high.
Pinochet has considerable influence over the mass media, and his control of television is particularly strong.
Sound economic management and moderately high-growth levelsetract from the oppositions ability to criticize Pinochet effec-
this
he strengths and weaknesses of Pinochet's opponents are essentially the obverse of his In most respects, but there is the added factor that moderate opposition leaders realize that they aredo or die" situation, with onlyear to demonstrate to the military and to the general public that theyiable alternative to Pinochet. If they fail, they face an indefinite prolongation of military rule, dissipation of public support, and the danger of being supplantedeenergized far left intent on destabilizing the country. Pinochet's Junta critics and others in the military who are anxious about his plans also know that before9 they must either forge an agreement with the moderate oppositionormulaeturn to civilian rule or acquiesce in Pinochet's nomlnaiion and possible reelection. The result of this probably would be increased political instability,condcmnjatioD, and serious damage to the military's imagefJ^HPJ
Less Likoly Alternative*.
e recognize that there are several otheroutcomes to Chile's political crisis. Therepossibility that the military and moderatewouldirect elections formula, butmake this unlikely. Pinochet himselfdecide to step down, announce thatis free tolebiscite candidate orConstitution to permit an open election, andcommander In chief of the Army bv Marchbelieve this scenario is also unlikely. Wewould agree to step down onlyast,resort and only if confrontedearlykeep him from running
for:
hereumber of other formulations regarding possible last-minute tactical shifts byif he concludes that he cannot get the plebiscite nomination, that he could not win the plebiscite, or thai he must show some flexibility in the face of
Pinochet would be an acceptable alternativeompetitive election provided the new President pledge* to canyenuine political transition. This would involve modifying the Constitution to provide For free presidential, congressional, and local elections, perhaps within three years We believe that these changes in PDC leadership and orientation willimprove the party's image among senior military officers and undercut Pinochet's efforts to denigrate the Christian Democrats'hj^JJj
In our view, the moderate oppositions, most important initiative to date is the campaign forelections that was launchedlue-ribbon council of prominent citizens in March Thecoordinator. Sergio Molina, who has strong ties to the Catholic Church and is well regarded bv senior military officers, istaff, raising funds, andational apparatus to promote constitutional reform and grassroots voter registration. Most moderate opposition parties advocate freeIn May, the main moderate opposition coalitionommittee bo.iu'rJbyValcej lo push the free elections drive,that this group's activities will effectively complement those of Molina's i sj^0> ^
The participation of the Catholic Church,labor, students, and professional associations in the free election campaign almost certainly willin the comingeveral liberal Catholic bishops have lent their authority to the Initiative, but more conservative members of the hierarchy so far have held bock In mid-June the Episcopal Conferenceorceful statement calling on Chileans to register to vote while stopping short of endorsing the opposition's call for direct presidential elections ratherlebiscite. We believe this reflects the Church's reluctance to commit its prestige to the free election campaign until thereoherent, united effort by tbe moderate opposition leaders of tha two main labor confederations are louring the provinces to endorse free elections and liave approached IheConfederation of Free Trade Urliom (ICFTU)rant to help themoter registration drive in tandem with Molina's free election council Student groups and the traditionally influential guilds ofarchitects, engineers, and teachers arc allto democratic change but are not yet actively promoting ihe free election campaign, althoughfrom several of these entities belong to Molina's council^pjj^fc
evertheless, the moderates' campaign faces serious obstacles. For instance, it will be difficult to overcome the public apathy fosteredears of military government, an attitude Pinochet reinforces by constanUy disparaging the political process. In addition, Pinochet's determination to be the candidate for the presidential plebiscite, the public's perception that no clear alternative to him has emerged, and lire military's apparent lack of interest In reforming the Constitution contributeefeatist attitude among many Chileans. Consequently, moderate opposition leaders realize that their maior challenge in the months ahead is toredible grassroots organization, promote the voter registration drive, and generate sustained popular participation in thefor competitive elections. They also havethat to make headway in any of these areas they must avoid potentially violent ant (governmentand other provocative actions, and in recent months have disavowed tbe leftists' calls for popular protests.esult, all recent protests have failed.
he moderates believe that the litmus test of their campaign will be the voter registration drive. They calculate lhat if atillion voters sign up byilitary leaders will be impressed by the strength of public support for competitive elections and less inclined to sec Pinochet nominated as pieces-cite candidate They also assert that even if Pinochet is nominated, the opposition can still mobilize tovote fraud or organizeassive "no" vote against Pinochet. Finally, the non-Army members of the lunta arc also concerned about the need toegitimate plebiscite For instance. General Matthei and Admiral Merino say they Intend lo oppose any effort by Pinochet to schedule the plebiscite belore atillion voters are registered. They reportedly believeurge In voter registration mightthe Army that Pinochet Is likely to lose the plebiscite vote without the advantageow voter turnout jfH^
IB. At present, Pinochet has very little organized support from civilian groups, although the business community, some conservative intellectual and upper-class sectors, and hanking and media interests that are in debt to the government are not openly opposing his reelection efforts. Some of these elements may even he working covertly against him while publicly endorslni and func
conservalive Jaime Guzman, one ol thr originalideologues Mortified with ihe mlltlary regime, fined hit party with ihe new moderate righlwlng grouping. PARENA. last January. PAHENA leaders have made several statements supporling competitive
would aboonsensus civilian candidate for the plebiscite provided he would preside over agovernment to prepareull return to democracy I
The Military
Altitudes Toward the Trorvsif ion
isquiet is growing in all four Chilean services over Pinochet's plans lo retain power0 Many in the military would like to see the status quo maintained following the constitutionally mandated transition to beginncluding having Pinochet at the helmizable number of military officers, including many flag rank and the non-Army members of ihe Junta, believeecure transition can and should be made without Pinochet in the presidency Pinochet clearly recognizes that he needs to deal with this problem, but. in contrast to previous years when he skillfully manipulated live officer corps, his recent actions have become more defensive and, on balance, probably less effective. He has met often with groups of officers from all the services in recent monthslain hijjntcntions and court their sup-gggggggegggggtggHphc officers'ave been lukewarm, and That theyhave stood up lo him with embarrassing questions or demands. In addition, Pinochet's relations with the non-Army JuntaMatthri of ihe Air Force and Mange ol the Carabineros (nationalho have made no secret thai they oppose his nomination lor theworsened steadily in rccenl months.
e believe that military attitudes aboutand (he rote of the armed forces are Increasingly conditioned by the realization that he is not popular with most Chileans, that the country iserious political impasse, and that military unity could ieopaidirrd il Pinochet attempts to ram his notni-through the Junta. Many officers arc troubled by the incongruity- between their oath to uphold the ConstiLiiitwi ofcallsransition Io civilian rule beginning byPinorlict'sthat he must retain power for another eight years lo fulfill the mission tho military undertook3
Moreover, many officers feel that, notwithstanding Pinochets aspirations, ihe days of military rule in Chile aie numbered, and that they must consider how ^they personally will fareivilian government.
he Army and Navyoint commission in7 to assess social and political trends in Chile and enable the armed forces high command to plan for an ea pec ted transit ior> period The high command's maineportedly to preserve the "social andole of the armed forces under an eventual democratic government, and the commission is showing special interest in Ihe opinions of opposition figures and Catholic Church officials. This ilevelopment may lead to discussloni Iscrwcen military officers and moderate opposition leaders on the parameters of an eventual transition accord. In any event, the heightened military awareness thatpolitical decisions must be taken in the coming months will hinder Pinochet's efforts to manipulate the officer corps and may make II inneatinglyfor him lo use Heavy Handed measures lo gain the plebiscite nomination.|
he most ominous problem Pinochet faces is the apparent erosion of his support within the Army, his main power base In6 he ordered wholesale rrtirernents and realignments of senior Army officers and replaced the Army representative on the military Junta for the second limeear in order to strengthen his control over the officer corps. These act sons, however, evoked unusual levels ol grumbling among Army officers. There is also crowing unease among Army officers of all ranks concetningplans to run for reelection Many are worried that Pinochet is so unpopular that he probably would be defeated in
fficers are leaving the military due to poor pay. imhapmness over having lo perform crowdduties and other police activities, and anuety about their future under civilian rule Resignations in the middle grades ol the Army are worrying the Army leadership and the government Resignations at the lieutenant level, for eiample. have been so numerousomplete class of Army Academy officers was one year early to fill gaps in the service.
any lunloi officers also resent the high-level pressure they are reccivimi to support Pinochet in the plebiscite. Forroup of officers recently objected thattatement pledging support for the regime and Pinochel's candidacy violated Army precepts They also indicated they would vote against Pinochet in the plebiscite In addition, many senior Army generals have indicated they will opposes staying on as Army commander if be receives the nomination. Nevertheless, despite these and other persuasive indicators of discontent in the ArmyPinochel's actions, we have not yet seen signs that Army officers are planning to confront him rfi
he other maior hurdle thatis the Junta'sthoseMatthei andnominating himplebiscite. He hat repeatedly failed to stopcommanders from criticizing his candidacyand from holding talks with moderateIn an interview in bte May, Admiralfurther than any Junta mernber lolhat Pinochet would even seek theand added that the Junta should pick aCivilian candidate. Matthei and StangeMerino's stand, and Stance added lhatthai Carabinero personnel will not vote inbecause their maino defendorder rithei thin try to inQueoce the
In seeking
reelection is risking all that the militaryhat he is too old and has too little support, and thai he connot be. allowed to remain office1
atthei. Stange. and Merino have reiterated to other moderate opposition leaden that they oppose Pinochet's reelection and prefer competitive electionshey say they would even agree to Pinochet's running in such an election provided he resigns as Army commander in chief These Junta members have emphasized, however, that because Pinochet can block the constitutional reform necessary for open elections and the moderates remain divided, they will use their power to designate the plebiscite candidate as leverage both with Pinochet and the opposition- Their main tactic will be to convince all key civilian and military actors lhat Pinochet's designation as plebiscite candidate wouldisaster, but that the plebiscite couldegitimate way to choose Ihe next president if the candidate selected enjoys broad public support.
They have asked the moderates to support thb strategy and suggested that they shouldesponsible transition formula that includes guarantees for the armedrelated to human rights exclusion of far Icflist groups, and assur-public order and economic policies.
hatever difficulties Pinochet may bewith the military, he continues to exudeabout hb candidacy, hb relationship with hb comrades-in-arms, and tbe intimate knowledge of the military mind he has acquired in overears in uniform. He probably perceives that hb authority over theirtually absolute, and that traditional discipline and respect for hierarchy guarantee that ihe senior service will not derail his plans to remain in powern fact, he has ordered that Array officers and their families register quickly to vote With regard to the three other services, he probably realizes that he has lessree hand but still expects to prevail over their commanders in chicF. either by intimidating them into accepting hb nomination or replacing them with others who will. Nevertheless, he isareful watch on sentiment among all officers. For instance, in early May he met with large groups of Army. Navy, and Air Force officers to announce that he is running becauseecessary for him to continue to build and strengthen ChileanSubsequently, several senior Armypublicly endorsed Pinochet's candidacy. OnPinochet probably believes that whatever the reservations about hb plans, no group of .officers wi confront him or engage in coup plotting.^
The lereiier Murder
lso working againsthe stillmurderhilean exile opponentin Washingtonhe revelationstheby Army Mai.Larios, who traveled too plead guilty as an accessory inan uproar that has yet to dissipateThe armed forces reacted with shock,
officersto
clear up the case and exonerate the Army. For instance, in March the Army Vice Commander,Sinclair,elegation of senior Army officers that urged the President to force retired General Contreras and Colonel Espinoza. the former high-level intelligence officers Implicated byto testify on tbe case in Chilean or US courts. We
mounting military unease about his candulacv rino-chct is said to be considering, among other stratagems:
Dropping tbe plebiscite and agreeing to runree election against candidatesivided moderate opposition.
Bowing to the Junta's demands that he not run in the plebiscite while maneuvering totand-in selected and eipectiog to control the country for another elgbt years as commander in chief of the Army.
here is abo the ever-present possibility that the Communists and their terrorist affiliate might succeedecond asussination^ajicmpt against Pinochet. Wo judge, however, *t
leaders are reluctant to try again Pinochet They know he now has better security, they fear the certain crackdown by the scoutorces, and they continue to believe that their best chance to achieve power li at the headuccessfulParty leader Luis Corvalanj
h^vetted It with Moscow, whose advice and instructions he and other top party leaders have followed for years. Meanwhile. Havana has assured the party that it will replenish the arms caches lost last year when the PCCh and FPMR improve ihelr security practices and establish new. safer delivery routes We believe that the Communists would most likely use these new arms supplies to prepare fur an eventual Insurgency rather than for any immediate and directon lie to thearmed forcesj
hether Pinochet's efforts to retain thewill be successful remains uncertain What form the outcome will take probably will be unclear for at least another year:
We believe thereossibility that Pinochet will gain the Junta's nomination for the plebiscite by keeping the moderate opposition off bahisve and incapable of portraying itselfiable alternative In our view, however, even ifprevails, he will nol solidify his position prior tooreover, we believe it is unlikely that Pinochet couldlear majorityraud-free plebiscite, even if only about half of the eligibleegistered and be engages in peek-barreling and ecorsomic pump priming to enhance his public image
Therefore, Pinochet's prime chance of "winning" the plebiscite would be by manipulating thewhich we believe would provoke an outcry from tbe opposition and the media and further erode hb standing with the military It aho almost certainly wouldirect confrontation with senior officers from all ihe services that could jeopardize his tenure in
Implications for the United Stores
inochet's persistence in trying to perpetuate himself in power is likely to jeopardize US mlerests inull and stable democratic transition in Chile Nonetheless, we believe that Pinochet bonlyimited extent to external pressures calling for improvements in hb political human rights and labor policies, and he is somewhat moreto threats of economic sanctions and cutbacks in foreign loans or in debt reschedulingsot willing to accede to foreignmutter howthe extent of agreeing to step aside at the end of hb term, but he is likely to follow hb usual tactic of trying to deflect such pressures with face-saving and partial reforms
For instance, the measures he has authorized in recent months permitting the return of several hundred political exiles and the closing down of the National Intelligence Center's politicaldetention centers suggest that he is semitlve to foreign criticism and wants to add some substance to hb oft-repeated assertion lhatdheringliberalization" timetable laid out in live Constitution.
limes in recent years, moreover. Pinochet and hi* advisers liave shown considerablelo threatened negative votes on multilateral loans lo Chile. For example. Pincxhct lifted the slate of siege al Washington's urging5 to obtain approvalajor financial rescueEven in such instances, however, he has not made major political concessions jhat couldhis efforts to retain power^mHP
e believe ihat several other key actors in Chile are either more susceptible than Pinochet to outside influence or are likely to benefit politically from continuing manifestations of concern for Chile's future by the United States and other democratic governments:
armed forces, in our view, are potentially the most important target group for increased external influence. Many officers are worried about Chile's international pariah status,relations with Washington, and the prospects of permanent damage to the military imageransition to civilian rule is put off indefinitely. Therefore, they may be susceptible to assurances that relations with Washington and other major capitals would improve significantly if Pinochet stepped down at the end of his term, especially if this implied better overall military-to-militaiy ties and ihe lifting of restrictioiu on military sales and other exchanges. In addition. Chilean Army officers continue to be concerned about the revelations of Major Fernandez on the Letcher case and its potential for damaging theof the Chilean Army.
The moderate opposition also would benefit If Washington and other important capitalstoemocratic outcome in Chile. For example, Chilean opposition (traders believe that they will gainomprehensiveof public statements supporting the free election drive and periodic demarches to the regime and to key components such as the military, economic policymakers, and business and conservative sectors regarding Pinochet's policies. They also want more direct help, such as with technical expertise on election mechanics and related steps. The moderates have cautioned, however, thai all outside assistance must be extended in ways that do not connoteas expressing preference for aconsensus candidate for the plebiscite or directPinochet would exploit them on nationalistic grounds. Neither Ihenor the military are likely to be influenced by suggestions from abroad that Chile inevitably will follow the example of tho Philippines, South Korea, or even of several South AmericanFor his part, Pinochet would portray any such suggestions as open interference In Chilean
Original document.
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