KEY JUDGMENTS
ola)merican servicemen are unaccounted lor in Southeast Asia The governments ol Indochina assert thai no Americans aic held captive To date, the analysis of information available to the US Government has not produced credible oievidence thai any hie American POU'sndochina. Hum ever, until" the governments of Indochina are more forthcoming inthe POWt trill be difficult to conclude unth absolute certainly that Americans are not being held against
onsiderable body ol evidence that the Vietnamese have detailed information on the laics of several hundred personnel. We estimate that the Vietnamese have already recovered andemains Thus, Hanoi could account quickly for several hundred US personnel by returning warehoused remains and bv providing material evidence that could aid in determining the fate of other personnel
Unfortunately, in the bna) analysis, because of such lactors as ihe circumstances ol loss and the passage of time, many missing US personnel will never be accounted for. regardless of the level of cooperation byovernments
We believe Hanoiatisfactory resolution of the POW/ MIA issue in order to remove an impediment to eventual normalization of relations with the United States. Although we doubt that Hanoi hatbois expectations of significant US aid following normalization, it believes that impioved relations with the United States will facilitate Vietnamese access to the World Bank and other sources of Western aid. Hanoi realizes, however, that achieving thesenlikely so long ihe Cambodia issue festers 4VBkeS
In fact, we cannotanyhorthange of US policy regarding either Cambodia or conditions attached toof relations, that would draw Hanoiatisfactory early resolution of the POW/MlA issue For Hanoi, the PQW/MlA matter, though important, is clearly subordinate to its larger goals 41
Although Hanoiolution to thessue as being in its long-term interest, it also sees tactical benefits in manipulating the issue in the interim. For the short term, keeping the issue alive provides
2
a useful vehicle fo' contact with WjtlunjttAiiariety of issuessame Uttit, huwevur, Hanoiol waul lhe issue lo impede
progressolution in Cambodia and the eventual normalization of relations with Washington. We believe these competing impulses will continue lo produce fits and starts in Hanoi's cooperation on POW/MIA questions over the near term, with the chances for sustained progress improving if Hanoi senses that progressambodia settlement is being made fpjpjpjl
Hanoi will nol hesitate to use POW/MIA matters to pressure the US Government directly on unrelaled issues In fact, we expect that Vietnam, while continuing to hold out the prospect of crash site excavations and the repatriation of remains, occasionally will resoit lo suspending such cooperation lo indicate displeasure with US actions, as it did in6 in response to the US bombing of Libya.^PJpJJJ
Vietnam is highly sensitized Io the high governmental andin the POW/MIA issue in the United States and canto time cooperative gestures to coincide with USconditions in hope of obtaining maximum concessions.at manipulating US public opinion lie also likely torecord suggests, for example, that Vietnamese intelligencebehind many of the spurious reports of both "newlyand alleged sighting of live i'OWj in Vie! lam
Should Vietnam decide to give an earlyigher priority, we believe significant obstaclesull accounting would still remain:
We doubt that Vietnam has sufficient knowledge or thecapability to account for the fate of the majority of American MlAs
Even if they did, the Vietnamese woulderious image problem should they suddenly try to return substantial numbers of remains.
The most difficult problem of all for Hanoi would bc the return of POWs should any still be alive. Hanoi would certainly be embarrassed by international reaction to its behavior and would have to be convinced that its rationale for "discovering" live POWs in Vietnam was sufficiently plausible and acceptable to minimize any such US reaction
Although evidence of Vietnam's manipulation of Laos andin POW/MIA matters is lacking, the foreign relations of both countries are closely aligned with Hanoi's policies. Laos, like Vietnam, has sought to gain maximum benefits for ils cooperation but. unlike
OMfM?
Vietnam, thric is no evidence ih.it the Loo have "warehoused"In the; Cam bod to riu- <in;uiion has beenthe absence of diplomatic contact between Washington andPenh regime, and by security conditions that inhibit accessparts of the
The Soviet Union, because of its importanceource of aidis the one foreign power with significant influenceMoscow probably sees advantagesegotiatedthe Cambodia problem. But, we do not believe the Sovietsto risk their influence in Vietnam by pressinc Hanoi eithersignificant concessions to ASEAN' or to be more forthcomingUnited States on POW/MlA
While no radical changes in the Chinese-Vietnamese-Sovietare likely in the nearignificant shift in the current iclationships between any of these nations could dramatically alter the situation in Southeast Asia and. in turn, our assessment of the POW/ MIA equation. M
n
DISCUSSION
otalI3 American servicemen are unaccounted lor in Southeasl Alia. From the US pom: ofoqIuiKhi o( ihc fates of ihcse individualsriority humanitarian inue. TWalio pubtkh eharacieriie svch an accounting,umanitarian.issue, bul rt is. in fan. closely tied to Hanoi's political *nd economic agenda
he US Intelligence Community continues to cmphtsize the collection ol Information that might prove useful In determining if Americans are itill being held iu Indvchina5 through; firsthand live sighting reports had been received In theirource claims lo have seen one or more persons theyo beunder tome decree of incarceianoei While sightingontinue lubeand aiiilyteiJ, none hat yei proved lo be the sighting o( an American still held captive. The analysis of these reports has shown consistently lhal:
oercent were sighting* ol Americansho are accounted lot (for example, relumed POWs. rnlssMiuiies. civilian detainees. USMC deserter Robert Car-oodl
oriccnt fabricat-orj
) 0lanv particular nine. Bill
under analyst!
lie govemmenu iA Indochina assert lhal no Americans are held captive. To date, the aneli/tii ofailon available lo the VS Covcmmcnr ho* nol produced' credible or conaneing evidence lhal anyAmerican POU'a rrmoln tnowever. unit! lAe goor-nmenci of Indochina art mott forth-eommf in reaofong iha POW nine, tt win beo eonctW* wlih abtoluie certainty thaifytti can* arc not being, keldagaini: thenV
' Inlornuiiort an liveand ifc* locukmi at inruim
ilir tourcn ot Iffotirtilterior motivesrumoU. lenynlnim trrtnn rocHlfffiml."then
On the other hand, there is considerable(hi* the Vietnamesedetailed information w. die hM of kho' liundied personnel North VWnamese and Via* Cone, force* had policiesthe handling of L'S remains lhat included rcmov* ing identifying data. burying lhe remains, and sending the identification and location ol the graveslie to Hanoi. We estimate that the Vietnamese haverecoiled and are warehouiincemains Thus. Hanoi could account Quickly loihundred US personnel by returning warehoused remains, and by pro tiding malerial evidence lhat cvuid aid in determining the fate of oilier personnel.
he V'irtiamese indicated iheir intention lo -txVrewlving the POW/MIA issue by ihe endhis message was conveyed thiough Indonesian Foreign Mimaer Mochtai and was wclconied by the United Stales. Allhough more remains have since beentotal ofat any* other period since the end of Ihe war,to*aid accomplishment of the so-called "woyui work plan" has fallen victim lo the same polilital vicissirtdes that marked earlier eHoru at resolving the
mayinority in (he Vieinameae Covernmenthelieve lhat Vktaaa should neier have treated POW/MlA mattershumaruianan" Haue,o feel thai Vietnam has given upleverage with lhe United Slates in so doing Most, however, probably regard the humanitarian appioachseful fiction, one which permits both sides toegree of contact without formal relations. It permiu Hanoi to demoaMiaie lhat it is dealinguperpower on equal term*atter of "humani-Uiian' concern. In thti regard. Hanoi has on occasion sought lo portray iu dcalioss with ihe United StatesOW/MIA matters as ouasi-diplomatic negotiations
ariety of regional& )
e have also seer lhatilling Ic use POW/MIA matter! lo pressure lhe US Covcrruneni directly on unrelated Issues Inietnamese officials, for eaample, protested the US sale of artillery counterbatlery radars to China and the establishment of L'S war reserve stockpiles jn Thailand and indicated
lhal these actionsc if: advenecoupr.
ial Hanoi. while wldint oul ihe prospects of crash nit ocavauom and the repatriation of remains, occasionally will continue Io impend iuchu did tiller lie0 USofindicate displeasureUS actions
Vietnomese Manipulation of POW/MIA Isiuei
S Publicity surrounding all aspects of the POW/ MiA issue certainly affects Hanoi's decliionnuking. and pail revelations over reported manipulation ol human remains are no exception Hanoi is highly
viuiutcd to il* hijli xutt-riiiuental arid nvbl'Ci!hI nited .
9 Not-siiwanel'tg Hanoi's- poi. thai POW/ MIA millers are rsonpofitical. thereons histon of Vietnamese mirupuUlwn of this issue Vietnam can be expected lo lime coopeiitiit? B'.Uures lo takeof US domestic polilical conditions In ihe hope of extracting greater concessions from ihe Untied Slates There ii evidence that Vietnamese intelligenceare behind many of the spurious reouri* of both "newly diMMkctcJ" remains and of alleged fighting* of liveietnam. IS interest group*urge Washington te cuke conorwom lo Hanoi ace the primary targets of sues manipulation | | jftyfj. }
Ihe Hitioricol Reco-d: Twotword. One Slep Bo:*
K" I'niled Sum demanded *ulI piKondilior. la any iwrtilm-
lion ofdiltnm.urn, deoiardecj Uit ila Ihe lata nTOv.s hi"WW* rlui ihe tattedo
WhenUS nauon headed b. LeonardHanoi inhe Vietnameseusual include Vilhal normaliulloR of dipinmelic irlaliont andof US aid were interrelated. Thetold, however, tha: Ihe Paris Agreementthai ll* POW/MIA issue tuusl be solvedrather than politicil grounds. Intha timing and compotitK'i of themthai tbe Lnted States oughtill paw act iocs Tbeoffoar was (bstorted. and il eowribuiedUrea's shall (roan iei.buViarderetnamjar were countingo Use praM of traducing anytnighl receive in their budttl olanmngVietnamese also mumterpfHoc the America nmood during in* period hi ufideiettimillngbacllatli ovei the notion ul .iunul-
in* publtc deiire to fotglte andB
Progrou inward norrruliuuon -ai dealt anCangrei. ioaaardUS aid todirect repudiation ofBetter DcjpaK ihe d'plonaur icttneki.Min groups or mdi'iduaat paroal-adthe oeamoi for lb* return
of aeoaiJ aumaen J. remainL^^
In IheS-Vieinameae retailor*erolt of Waihintloni continued cultivation ol China. Victnun's rival, and rubteQUcnllvesult of the Vietnamese iitvailon of Cambodia.
6 in^anon of Cambodia and ihr lubsetiuent Chinese "leuori" coniamed Vieinamea* enarglei and reordered pnorltlrs for Itanoi'i policvmakei* The Cambcdian oampatgn and concomitant threat Irorr. China (oread Hanoi to double the hi* of 1T1r- the leauhaM diversion of aiiantion froeB the ?rocrst of natior. building Mutur Soviet aid took up oiwch o( i'* balarte bui drove Hano*deeper :etc ihe artu otanoi failed lou unme-diate loaL in Cambodia and diedragfrd on Weaiern eondemnaliOiiktnam'i occunation of Cambodia hrouihtoli lion. Deiwaen IQTSand 1SJ6C. their were no fiinhci returns of remains io L'S aulhonU
In. Vietnam axreedLS popoul irut technical eir^-rti froer.egu-'ar baau to tuseuss POW/MIAVietnamese airred ioleth-iital nseetingsthe brsi ofeld Doccnbermeeuogi Wd lo the return of the remains ofIn. but ahoniv iheiealietto keep lo the schedule. Sincealtcmin which, under proddim from US the issue 11 strictly
a nan. releasesmall number of additional remains, and agree lo future cseetinga. Hwtm. llie praees- hai freouerliy beeni; j:ctiom it ccm.d'ied arrogant or unfriend lyggta
nv rfarfl ttVCtf thatH Vietnamese manipulation
The sources have been sponsored by onei Vieinamrie emigreS cHlienshie
The sources Irefjuentlieen wr faced by this soceoot inpublic(he media ind/orthe source can be com acted bv (be US Government
The soune utovidi' tUrries dial inilialfi ire plausible but, uponieaiicr< areabricniions
Several ml the sources have oUicr diieei or indirect Iinki to Vietnamese intelligence ind/ot security lervitei
Several ri the soutcn have made public acevvs-tioas (hai USrepresentativesbrowbeat, or Ihieatened them for having come forward vtiih their reports I
ii VVewiairc any plausib'c motiveplaliimaheirf;cr tne end of hosuliliej In (act. mention of yQW't would work in contravention ofet na mete naiinngl goals. Suggeiliorn thai Vietnam might tlill be "prolec-tinc" US deserters, or that Hanoiumber ofolriical hedge arc speculative and uniub-Hanttiled by any reliable cadence fJ^J X*)
The View From Horse*"'
li Vicinoin. ofiews the POW/MIA iiiue and its overall relationship with ihe United Slates as on'v one elementuch larger agenda of goalt and objectives The results of ihe 6th Congrrai of ihe Vieinimeie Communist Parly held inilli its 1on Vietnam's economic shortcoming? and leadership changes, sugecat thai domesticwill be very much ceruer sragf inhinking cner the neat few yean As ir. (he Soviet Union and China. Hs-.c. is attempiing to implement sweeping inieinal economic and minagenal reformsthese Interna) efforts are aitempli by leading
Don loo Bapc-ls
hen thehe US Covernrrcetitdog lagt these lessortv anul usuly lo Viettser-i. cbjri ioia Kb peaiaanrn the recaioa of one orrnerieari rxnonos- Asbis claim, tbe individual prot^dei tbe mformanop found on military Itle nlili cat (onnumber, banodreli-Ctcm preference (u)
Analysis ol ihe names shows thatCiCenl ol (hose named in ihe reporls scr-ed in Southeastbut returned lu the United Slatesnd at no tune vera sMtartnunted lor AtMtberewit of the sub-rets of dog lagtc Lilted ia Southeastbeit
en-ami and adenufsad. usually irame-
.fter'. Further enderice of the spurious nature of iho reporting it that rnaiiy of the US ne'annnel named In the reports ale "repeat en'la. tbeir termifit are icpotled lo have been recovered Mswal limes anrl/nr al vndal. scatlered locations (u)
Theercent of US personnel nameddoc Ug reports are unaccounted fur.ingilui their remaiirs have beenoM of Ihesc ind.wduelslikely lhal Useir re-
main!nroii ru] by eneraiuring lb* war. Commune* forces had strutihe disposition of US rernain* lhal came Into their possession They were to remove idt.it: Scat ionnd aend detaib of the aiavrsita to central authorities
Thus,t^amcs* Governmenl probably bai rudi-metwarr info.-rn.lKxi o- tbe fatef thetiled ia dot lag rrpoets faj|
In vii dog Ug reposi. ihe usdivsdual
beieparsng loVietnam ui<der theO'derli Oeparturc Program orclativc abroad Such individuali are approached by another peiion shortly befote (hev leave Vietnam, ate liven the dog tag data, and arc told to provide the Irdormation to ihe US Governmenl at tha But opportunityliving abroad fieuuenilv receive letters from family members in Vietnam with deg Ug informatioo that has been provided io ibe faaailyhird party with -wt.-octwei ia an iheso ih* US Go-ara merit Recent evSCence indicaiei ibat the tlaaajsjaayajif tneirectly crmuotunt the dog lag reporting uslni the Orderly Deparltie Program
The Vteuiamnse Government haseluctant eilher loopend iliowp reaouices in (jta-stwi of crash sites or io permit US technicians tbe necessaryhelaim that searching foraint wouldoni. be difscuJt andt ther alioibat sucr. Marches are not hkcfv so be very Oroductne becaaar rraaP sites are often plaitctered by ihe local Dooulaisoneports may beastoobrmalioii" that ibe Vietnamese Covemmenl dm face problems in attemntmg to raoivrr US remains
ffforini'l" lil't1 PjHi Ii-jHci Ncnvcn Van
i'fCIIli" NiilJirl O' 'i II1 t>l'f H .iitrl
broaden economic contacts with japan and the WbI that have been largely blocked became of Hanoi's Cambodia policy, Reformists are warning that failure bv Vielnamake advantage of scientific andadvances in (hose countries will leave ibe country even further behind in its development.
conomicherefore, ate shaping Hanoi's Strategic rnitlnnkar greater extent trtan before, moderating somewhat its earlier preoccupation with security issues such as Cambodia and the China-Vietnam border. We believe, for example, that Hanoi has probabiv loweredopeciaUoos in Cambodia from insistence on outright control to some form oi compromiseone that meets itsbecause continued rigidity blocks the important goal oi normalized pa lues! and economic relations with the United Stales. China.
IA Over the nt*xt few years. Vietnamsatisfactory resolution of contentiousblock or impede access to WesternVietnam's leaders will also desirerelations with the United Statesignrespectability and as de factoHanoi's poliiic.il dominance in Indochina. Although
we doubt that Hanoi harbors expectations olUS aid following normalization, it probably believe* that improved relations with ihr United Slates will facilitate Vietnamese access io the World Bank and other sources of Western aid However, Hanoi apparently realizes that no breakthroughs likely so long as the Cambodia usuc
n view of its other priorities, especially lhe Cambodia problem, we cannot visualize any sel of rationaloffered apart fromon broaderare likely to draw Hanoiatisfactory separate resolution uf tlie POW/ MIA time. For Hanoi, the POW/MIA matter is clearly subordinaie to larger goab Hanoiolution to the POW/MIA issue to be in its greater long-term interest, but it also sees tactical benefit! in manipulating it in the interim. For the short tetm, keeping the Issue aliveseful vehicle for contact with Washingtonariety of issues. At the same time, however, Hanoi probably calculatesambodia solution it believes likely in the next few years will remove the principal obstacle to normalization wilh Washington, and we believe it will not want, what is the far less important POW/MIA issue, to impede lhat process.
Wei;ill continue to nrnJll.'? titstarts in Haiinl'j tuoneralion over tin' mar lenn. bul chances iu: sustainedifli'un will improve if Hanoi senses that progressambodia
settlement is being nude On the Otherhat If?
ietnamese authorities lo date have been much less than forthcoming, even in regard to cases thai arc susceptible ol resolution The most convincingthat Hanoi desires to resolve the issue Quickly and separate from other objectives, would be for it to repatriate all remains already reclaimed from crash sites. Although unlikely in lite absence of substantial Headway on broader issues such as Cambodia, there are. other steps as wellelieve Vietnamese ajthorities could lake toureposture. These include:
to the regularly scheduled technical meetings.
Providing written reports on alleged sightings of live I'OWj. ashave tcQuesled.
Proceeding on an agreed schedule of joint eica-
ven if Vietnam were to accord the highest priority to resolution of thelA issue, however, significant obstacles would remain. First and perhaps most important, we doubt whether Vietnam hasknowledge or the technical capability to account for the faic of the majority of. American MlAs. Ofersons no! accounted for, approximately one-half arc listed as killed in action/body not recovered (KlA/DNP; The evidence al tlte lime of their loss led tc the conclusion by the United States that they had been killed but their remain were not recoverable. Unfortunately, in the final analysis, because ot such factors as the circumstances of ioss and Ihe passage ot time, many will never be accounted for, regardless of the level of cooperation by Ihe Indoehmese govern-
anoi would alsoerious image problem should it suddenly try to return substantial numbers of remains Hanoi could maintainspite ol iti needs lo concentrate on its ownshow their good faith and for humanitarian reasons, they had intensified their search and located American remains. Hanoi could also "discover" remains that had been located by villagers earlier but had not been brought to the attention of the authorities Remains could be rebunedoint US-Vietnamese team through the cooperative efforts ol
Vietnamese vilUeers The Vietnamesef USllillUtU nut
dittcult problem would be imPOWj shouldstili be alive. There are Millo! "discrepancy"ack oflo inquiries concerning them, ai wellreport* of live sighting* The greatestfor Hanoi in revealing the cnitence ofhe in providing adeguaie iusribcation ofto defied US public criticism andfutureJJ
ther (actors mitigatingudden shill in Hanoi's POW/MIa polio include
An innate suspicion of L'S good faith
Absession fur USuest for L'S concessiuni
A strcrg reluctance toolitical leverage
Popular hostility to beld ievestigatioai
A distorted view of US willingness to offer ever greater concessions over ihe course of lime-
n ihe cunieat of Vietnam's current political priorities, it is highly uahLfly Hanoi could oveicorse all thesein the marthe absencetrong eirernal push or domesticExternally, mamr shifts in bilateralSino-Soviet. Si no-Vietnamese, ot Vietnamese-Sovietcould havesecondary or. mote likely lesser, impact oc disposition of the FOW/MlA issue Vietnameseri Cambodia is, by far. the overriding issue lor the Chinese and Vietnameia while preservation ol access to Cam Ranh is important to the Soviet Union barring resolution of the Cambodia question,of Chinese tears of Vietnameseollapse in Vietnamese-Soviet relations. Hanoi rs unlikely to elevate Ihe POW/MIA issueiority sufbeient to stimulate satisfactory ptogress-
Ctio'io-'O oid toes
Initial efiu(i> toCirafacdn and Laosthai tbeStares considereduj all American seflcemen missingIn the ewe of Cambedia. lh* ntvatitrafurther complicated bt ihe abseoc* ofbetween Washington and llir Hinomand by ihe ashling uace
inhibrteeto maavhe ceuauy )
In Cambodia. BS US personnel are miningfor. for the most pan in portions olpartialAopealt to the Vietnamese Covarnmentroultco in n'-rriion ccocernini theseo! the remote leeeiwiiendlo oh-rK poliiical aurhem mightKspansibie lor (he md'vidaali in quell an.coTctrrurtflio Cambodia willbe dlfoculr io
InS personnel are missine andor The utoaison with retard touperteiafly more pronuaag. ri thattence oi diplomaiic relationsom mi. mean oci*Moreover, in tbe past two vein the Vientiane eo>rrnmeni hatesire for improved rela-tioru with tlie United Siatai and 'o that end hai permitted thef two craih irei one5 and .neateree then, moves* hai beeaee return preoabli LnaeeJ to itetnaaslargeragenda Laos hai not vet agreed lo anduring7 dry leaior. and has been Incteaiinsly disposed to LnV cooptrinon inOW/MIA mailersesumption of US aid
Ahhouchn Uctmc ofenan of Lao* and Carrbod**POvt'/MlAiclatioiu ef both countrxa arc rtoiclvHanoi* policies InhrIndcchina forennonferencethree eeunirles on record ai oreourd lotbe United States on POW/MIA mir-rr.Vwiumoughi to (io rainiwafor it* cooperation, but there is no e> idence lhathas* warehoused lemmim
Influences
be Sovsei Union is the one foreign powerngmfacant inGuer.ee in Vietnam To lhe best of otu knowledae. however, lhe Soviets have rarely al-lempted to influence the specifics of Vietnamese foreign policy Theie are some signs that Moscow has indicated to the Vietnamese lhat it wouldoie accommodating posture on Hanoi's parta negotiated solution in Cambodia, butnlikely that Moscow hasosition on Viet-nam's limited dealings with tbe United Stales on MIA/POW matters. Baeause Vietnam represents such an aid drain on theas much as tZ billion petbelieve that the Soviets would have no objection to Increased contacts between Viet-oass and the West, particularly if such contact might resulteduced require men; for Soviet aid. It Is possibie that the USSR might be willing to play a
positive rosetiiitx-lion wiili ibr> POW/MlA issuefl>il notKVinuiiHj: ihcl! ally In -iljiii.iu'-
Alienate. But Unlikely1 Scenario*
hile no radical changes in ihe(elitionsh-pi are likely in lhe nearignificanthe eurteru relationships between an> ol these nationt could dramatically altei the situation In Southeast Asia. and. U) turn, the POW/ MIA equation Several (acton would beneill Vietnam and allow that country to concentrate on its economy, work to resoKe the Cambodian situation and pave the way for better relation* with the United States, other Western nations and
A rspp-ochement withuch leadshinas drawdown of troops on the Sino-Vtel-naitune border, cessation o! aid to the CamboJf
an renaaii.'v and pressure on Thailand not to
m ui it* bices would facilitate Vietnam's resolving its problems
approchement between the USSR and China, which did not compromise or eaclude Vietnam's interests, couldore stable Southeast Asia, particularly if the Soviets and Chinese provided economic encouragement combined with the appropriate amount ol pressure tor,nihe tmrum'iiii faate.
A warming of relations between Vietnamand/or China and the USSR and aeffort to exuicate itselfore favorable view ofASEAN' and the West and pave theimproved
he Koreo Connection
is not the only Aiun country Hying to exploit POW/MIA issuesCX) Aniailcamnever accounted (or after the Koreanuial- be ahve in GumiiiuPOW camps prior to the cease-hre. were not repatriated after3 armistice Thirti-threc years later their fale il still uiixmmn
Various sources indicate numerous stave sue)atormer POW campsddition remains of UN soldiers arein forward areai near
the Deuuliianied Zone North Korean attempts to identify some recently exhumed remains. hMViagf, have met with limited sueceai Lack of adequate records, both o! POW casualties and exact grave locations, has furthet hampered effortsangtang.
Since'orlh Korea has tried lo exploit the Korean war dead ai partontinuing attempt toorum for direct official contact with the United States Pyongyang has ottered to return remains of some of theissing andfur US POW'i believed located in North Korea However,r ihe North's unwillingness to employ the multinational Mihtart Armisticewhich includes South Koiean reneicntatives.ommunications channel
aijp
oai is toilateralW'asl'ington that will lead io the eventualof US forces iruni the peninsula InNorth hopes io undermine the legitimacy ofbv deluding the Republic of Korea ftom
Noting Hanoi's attempts to exploit POW/MIAIhe gro-inn interest ol KoreanPyongyang will continue to play itsNorth Knrea may repatriate somelo keep the issue alive or ir. an attemptan image Of international1Pyongyang is unlikeK to agree to jointin North Korea with any
he French Experience
more ilun cliiec dcvades since ihe end of the fcrst Indochina war. (he French Government has ve( toull accounting for in mining se:vice!nen-*H
elenai. the deadline fur release ofof war under (herommunists had returned aboutthe prisoners listed by the French By Maythe last French (oun polled out ofthe number of nwr. Ironi (he FrenchCorpt listed ai "missing or (ailed (ocaptivity". of
French nationals MM9
When accusedi;thoiding pnsoneis, (he Hanoi gnvwmment subsequently asserted that tt had released all POWi iniih (he Genevand thaiersonnel whom they had noi fisted as having "rallied" lo their aide should be considered as killed in action or dead from wounds. under (he supervision of (he International Control Commission {ICCX Hanoioralan-French soldiers ci the Foreign Legion far repatriation lo Central and Eastern Europe Reliable Western observers in Vietnam duriog (his pe-.o: said that hundreds more settlors nai ret were released via China without the lequiicd notice to the ICC or Ihe French Command later, during0 and, the Hanoi government repatriated hundreds of non-French personnel to their native countriesesult of actions Initiated by (heir embassies, without informing the French authorities or (he ICC There are indication! (hat some c: these persons may no: have been in Vietnam, on their own solrtton
Most ol (hose riot repatriated poo: io (he Series4 deadline were not French nationals from Me!n> pclitari France but were East Europeans. Northand other nationalities who bad served in the French Eapcdilionary Corps. The only Frenchwho are known to hove been returned to French authorities4 werenlisted men released2 and Downrance with (heirfamilies- Some if not aj reportedly were used as deserters in France MM}
inesponding roquestion in (he National Assemhlv. (he French Foreign Miniiter asserted that lo ihe to-emmenli knowledge no
French POWs were held in North Vietnam alter Ihe eaeculien of the Ccneva Accordsnd that no members of (he French Far East Eapediiionary Corps ware beingg:imt their will2
The Remains Issue
While the French Government apparently islhal all French prisoners were released al ihe end of the Indochina war, It is clear that the tlano government did no: honor (he terms of the Geneva Agieerrrsenl to accc-im lot all Ftetsch troops who were ui-CCf Vietnamese control after tne end of (he "'mMt
The remains of0 French national! and legionnaires were initially buried in Vietnambe French High Command and (he Peoples Army of(PAVN)raves agreementstablish protocols for repatriation of ihe remains of men who had fallri. on both sides in the conCtct Tbey were to take "all necessary neatjres" to txxnpJcte the taskulymonths after signature of the agreement In the followingean, as ofhe Vietnamese returned to Fiance fewerets of remains All of (he remains released by Hand bad been buried bv the French in military cemeteries in Norlh Vietnam Hanoi has not returned (he remains of any of Ihe men lisled by (beisaingr. oe as having died In captivity Despite the substantial polilical and economic cotsocssions the French have made lo Hanoirance has neverull accounl-ing for fti missing and de.
In contrast, in South Vietnam. Laos, and Cambodia, where ihe host governmentsed with the French, 'he French Craves Service wsjs able lo leintcr in (he Fiesch cemetery at Tar Son Nhut. Saigon, the remains of vyriuallv all French militaryhad died in those cound
In6 Paris and Hanoi reached anconcerning the repatriation of the remains of an0 French soldiers killed during ihe first Indochina war. The operation is expected to take two yean, with the costs,illion, being
y Tri'xx.MMt
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