SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SEEKING PRAGMATIC RELATIONS WITH ROGUE STATES

Created: 9/9/1998

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

DATE:3

Intelligence Report

Office of Near Eastern. South Asian, and African Analysis

98

africa: seeking pragmatic relations with rogue states

Ubyathe most active in broadening diplomatic and

ties. f

on Sahetian ana yyesiAjncan countries.

yjoya's activities concentrate

Repaymentfor Previous Services and Assistance. Some African leaders arc indebted to rogue states, particularly Libya, for aiding them when they headed rebel or exile groups.

Relations with Libya have taken center stage among South Africa's dealings with rogue states, in pan because of President Mandela's gratitude for Libya's support during the antiapanheid struggle,

Ugandan President Museveni has longstanding ties to Libyandating back to Museveni's daysebel leader in the

Liberian President Taylor began receiving arms from Libya in the, when heaction leader, and the lies continue.^

Economic Development and Trade. Most African leaders are willing to deal with almost any country or group willing to provide aid and advantageous trade terras.

With Libya. Chad. Mali, Niger, and The Gambia cunently seek and receive aid, credit, and jobs for tens of thousands of workers in Libya,

i South Africa

to bc cultivating Tripoliarket for: goods and capital equipment.!-

retail

Building Political Solidarity. Sovereignly concerns and Third World solidarity figure in Ihe decisionmaking of African leaders, especially in multinational forums. They also are aware that it is in their interest to remain on reasonably good terms with rogue states that could fund opposition groups'

| Some cooperation may be an attempt to stave otT rogue support for exile or insurgent groups.

Chad, Mali, and Niger appear to have agreed to the new Libyan Sahara-Sahel bloc formed in February largely to avoid alienating Libya, Tripoli continues to provide military and financial support to

ethnic Tuareg and Toubou I

Thesewith Thefear

renewed expulsions of their guest workers in

African countries often support rogue states in international forums. In the United Nations, Africans have supported several issues important to rogue Slates, including opposing condemnation of human rights abuses in Iran. Iraq, and Cuba; calling on the United States to end its

*

embargo on Cuba: and calling on developed countries io ease economic sanctum on developing countries, including Iran. Iraq, and

Ubya

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Juneesolution taking exception to the UN-mandated sanctions against Libya, callinguspension until the International Court of Justice rules.

Leveraging the Relations. Public pionounccmcnts and private comments by Sub-Saharan African officials suggest they calculate that dealing with some rogue statcs-particularty Libya and| allows them to extract more assistance from thentagonists. Moderate Middle Fastem countries and Islamic noitgovernmental organizations often vie to provide Islamic education and development aid to Muslim poriulatioris in Africa to counterorts of Iran and Sudan. African leaders repeatedly have told diplomats and visiting officials of donor government that they deal with the rogue states for economic development when Western or other aid is unavailable or insufficient.

Malawi early this year publicly announced Ore recsuMishment o( diplomatic relations with Libya because Western donors arc not meeting its development needs. Tbe Gambia and Chad also have played the Libya card in hopes of spurring donors and international financial institutions to ease condilionaliu'es and to provide financial assistance. Al) three have received some Libyan aid but no additional Western aid

mi* jptrreiurne aidhran, he has recently turned lu Libya, despite Libyan support for the insurgent Revolutionary United Front.

Most Rogue Statesntinuing Interest in Africa

Rogue slates differ widely in their agendas and approaches toward Africa, butwilling to capitalize an Ihe needsn some cases, greed ofThe need for economic

and social infrastructure, investment, and loans and grants by many Sub-Sabnraii African countriesoo states with opportunities to serve as alircs, military suppliers, and economic partners. The scope and depth ofl ^nd Libya's activiiics make them highly visible in Africa.

EfTec* ofInternational sanctions have complicated rogue stale activity in Africa.

UN sanctions against Libya have diverted Tripoli's efforts and forced it lo concentrate diplomalic arid policy resources on trying to lift sanctions.

Western sanctions and conditions on aid. however, have helped push African leaders into greater cooperation with the rogue stales.

Nigeria, and The Gambia have lost most Western economic and military' aid after their regimes took power by force. They have long lasting lies to Libya anil sumi' increase with Iran.

programs lo convince iis African interlocutors, ]Libya's permanent representativel

""ira Nations; nmma Uorda. In also aggressively pursued contacts with African countries there since heyc tenure in1

esc ellorts to weaken African wpfnii

UN sanctions fuvt achievedn several fronts.

The OAU in Juneesolution authorizing flights to Libya for humanitarian, religious, and OAU-reJated reasons in contravention of current UN sanctions. The nonbinding resolution also encourages the United Nations to suspend sanctions until the International Court of Justice rules on ihem.

Expanding ties to South Africa provided benefits to Libya when South Mandela visited Libya in7 and publicly called for lifting UN

Qadhafi undoubtedly views the formation of the Sahara-Sahel blocpositive development in his efforts to gamer supportin the

Libya's other longstanding, but secondary, objectives in the region are to promote its regional leadership and to check French and US influence while bolstering its own. The formation of the Libyan-sponsored Sahara-Sahel organization this year indicates regional deference lo Tripoli's role. Libya also has successfully expanded diplomatic tics to several African countries.

Kenya, Malawi, and Eritrea earlier this year agreed lo establish diplomatic relations with Libya.

Dakar agreed toibyan People's Bureau to reopen this year.

Tripoli's attempts to improve and expand ties to African countries may bc. in part, to help Libya's external intelligence agency monitor Libyan dissident activity in Sub-Saharan countries. African leaders' lingering distrust of Qadhafi's motives will hamper Libya's efforts to expand its influence. His failure to follow through on past pledges of financial or military support has cost him good will and has reinforced perceptions among skeptical Sub-Saharan leaders thai he is untrustworthy.

Original document.

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