N0MNL
Report
Office ofNear Eastern, South Asian, ami African Analysis
Rwanda: Strugglingvercome Genocidal Past
IS September im
enocide, in whichpeople were kdled. was the productonvergence ofpolitical, economic, and social factors, matt of which continue to drive instability in Rwanda. The genocide waspoHianeout release of centuries-old ethnic hatreds, as is sometimes claimed,alculated strategy initialed by Rwanda 'i ruling etite lo counter rising challenges to thru hold on power.
Pmidenl Habyarimana's ruling clique was challenged from within by newly formed opposition parties, and without by Tutsi rebels.
Rwanda's economyurn for the worse in the, making resources even more scarce and intensifying the competition for access to those resources through political control.
Underlying these changes was an extremist ideology thai cast Tutsi as foreign invaders determined lo enslave Ihe Hutu populace.
The civil war and genocideevastated Rwanda inhands of an ill-prepared coalition government ted by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The government's struggle lo rebuild Ihe country and promote ethnic reconciluuion has been continuously undermined by reminders ofdte genocide.
For two yean following the genocide, international assistance went toward supporting more than two million Rwandan Hutu refugees in neighboring Zaire and Tanzania rather lhan rebuilding Rwandan society. Moreover, the former regime's armyaw-level insurgencywanda from within the refugee camps.
With Ihe return of the refugees inhe insurgency gained momentum, further distracting the government from its program of reconciliation and reform ^
Although Ihe Hutu insurgency does not threaten the regime in Kigaliepeal of the genocide is unlikely, lerroeul-style guerrilla attacks are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. I
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Many of the same forces that drove Ibc genocide in Rwandautsi and modcraie Hutu were killed in lessays from April torelevant today Several key differences exist, however, which contribute to our judgment that systematic ethnic massacres of live scale witnessed4 are unlikely to he repeated in the foreseeable future. I
Prelude In (it-nockle ^
The Rwandan genocideroducl of several political, social, and economic factors. |
Rwandan Patriotic Front Challenges Hutu Regime.orce of several thousand Rwandan exiles Invaded northern Rwanda from Uganda. The force, the Rwandan Patriotic Armyevolvedore ot Rwandan Tutsi that had served in Ugandan President Museveni'* National Resistance Movementhe rebel force thatational army upon sweeping Museveni to powerespite having lived most of their lives in Uganda and havingital rule in Museveni's victory, the Rwandans were regarded as outsiders by most Ugandans and found themselves becoming increasingly marginalized.hey formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, dedicated to securing the nghl of Rwandan refugees io return home. The rebels decided ii was lime to act inhen two influential Rwandans- one of them current President Pasteurapproached the leadership of the RPA's political wing, the Rwandan Palriotic Frontaying thai Ihe Hutu-dominated regime of President Juvenal Habyanmana in Kigali was on the verge of tolLtpv
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Battle-hardened RPA fighters expected to quickly overpower lhe Rwandan Aimed Forcesortion of northern Rwanda, andower-sha/inp agreement with Habyanmanaosition of power Despite dramatic initial gains, ihe RPA ol tensive qusckiy hogged down By month's end, governmentsupported by French and Zairianforced the RPA back into Uganda, killing hundreds. Including several rebel leaders, and causing raindrctb. more to desert.
After Paul Kagame took over leadership of the RPA in late October, the force spent several months regrouping in the volcano region of southwestern Uganda, and resumed operations in1ne-day occupauon of Ruhengeri town, where RPA fighters released several hundred political prisoners, some of whom joined their movemcni. The RPA spent the nexl three yearsuerrilla war in Byumba Prefect die and gradually captured enough territory to bargainower sharing agreement |
Domestic Opposition Challenges Habyarimana Regime from Wuhin. Under intense pressure Irom foreign donors and the international community, Habyarimana agreed in1 to open Rwandan politics to mull ipartism.ear,o/en opposition parties had lorrncd. the iwo most significant being ihe Democratic Republic an Movement <MDR> and the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR)
The MDR presented the greatest challenge tu Habyanmana's National Revolutionary Movement for Developmentbe MDRore moderate Hutu party that exploited Ihe regional divisions within tbe Hutu political scene and included many former Habyarimana allies who bad fallen out of favor. The MDR led the effort to pressure Habyanmana for greater political inclusivcness
The CDRadical offshoot of the MRND ihat criticized the government for not being aggressive enough in fighting theThe Hjij extremists of the CDR extended their violent opposition of the RPF to include the Tutsi populace in general and the moderate Hutu opposition, whose calls for greater democratization were seen as distracting (he government and, consequently, aiding the rebels. I
Economic Decline.6 world prices forprincipal source of foreignsharply. In previous years, tin exports bad been able lo cover ihe gap left by decreases in coffee earnings, but the cullapsc of tin prices46 had resulted in the demise of Rwanda's tin mining industry
: The MKislKMrreJia none in July IWI lo IhcvolutionaryMovement la Development -nil Democracy, lu refleil in newfound poliixal liberalism
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The com of chc war further depleted Rwanda's scarce hard currency,cramble ensued for conirol of scarce resources.
Habyaiimana's clique became more determined to maintain control of the government and their access to the countryimned resources.
Once the genocide began, many Hutu peasants willingly killed Tutsi neighbors with the expectation encouraged by the extremist leaders that they would inherit their victims' property and belongings. |
laying the Foundation of Ethnic Divisions. After9 Hutuwhich the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown- Huru political leaden used the feareturn to Tutsi domination lo control tbe Hutu population The precise evolution of the Hutu and Tutu groups, and the manner by which the Tutsi came to dominate, is unclear. Many scholars believe, however, thatears ago Tutsi cattle-herders migrated in successive waves from the horn of Africa lo the deal Lakes region, where theyargely symbiotic relationship with the Hutu, who were primarily farmers. There was significant intermarriage and social mobility between the iwo groups, and theyommon language and culture Nevertheless,ociety in whichn the absence ofwealth. Tutsi generally were more wealthy and over time came to dominate the political scene. European colonizers sharpened and exploited ethnic distinctions by enacting preferential policies in education and employment.
The preexisting structure and efficiency of the Tutsi kingdoms lit well with German, and later Belgian, policies of indirect rule.
Tutsi rule also conformed to racist colonial theories. Tutsi, with their lighter skin and more angular facial features were seen as superior lo
Mnal Solution Impli-iiK-nli'd |
The starting gun for ihe genocide soundedhen President Haoyarimana's jet was shot down on approach to Kigali's Kanombc airport. Although never proven, the ihootdown is widely believed to have been the work of Hutulikely within Habyarimanu's own Presidentialto negotiations with ihe RPf.
extremists believed Habyarimana had given the rebels and tlie Hutu opposition too much in peace talks, and they feared their time in power was drawinglose
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Although details are sketchy, eyewitness accounts surest that ihc President's plane was hit by one or more shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, launched from just outside the airport perimeter or from near HabyarimanVs palace, both areas controlled by government forces.
Within hours, the Presidential Guard constructed roadblocks throughout Kigali and began assassinating opposition politicians. journalists, and influential or outspoken chocs of the regime. |
Several additional factors suggest that the genocidealculated strategy, carefully planned by key trtembers of the Habyahmana government.
Much of the killing was carried out by MRND-traincd militia, the Inierahamwc. supported by the Army
Rwandan media, particularly the extremist radio station Radio Television Libre des Millcs Collines. preached ethnic hatred and encouraged mass participation in the killings but was unhindered hy ihe government. Hutu extremists dehumanized the Tutsi, calling them cockroaches and convincing many among the uneducated masses that Ihe RPA fighters were demons with glowing eyes and pointed tails who would slaughterulu if ihey weren't killed first. ||
Numerous unconfirmed reports claim lhai lists of initialrc circulated among extremists The rapid, efficient, and systematic nature of the political assassinations in Kigali during the first days of the genocide supports the existence of such lists.
Local government officials who worked to contain the violence were quickly replaced by extremists. Numerous survivors and unwilling participants have testified that government officials often gave speeches encouraging the population to kill and occasionally took pan themselves in the killings. In areas where the Hutu population was reluctant to take pan in the kilting. Inieiahamwe from other areas were bused in lo spur on Ihe locals.
In4 the commander of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda informed UN headquarters thai one of his sources had provided detailed information on government training and equipping of ihe militias to conduct large-scale massacres of Tutsi and opposition Hum politicians. The source corroborated claims of "death lists", live report was disregarded at the time, but its credibility is bolstered by subsequent events, ajaaj
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In ihe weeks following Habyarimana's death, violence spread throughout Rwanda. Although the scale of the killing varied from prefecture to prefecture, no area was free of massacres
Byumba witnessed ihe least amount of killing because the RPA alreadyortion of the prefecture at the start of the genocide and overran most of the rest toon after resuming its offensive. Ironically, in Ruhengeriiser.yheartland of Hutumassacres took place during the genocide, mow of ihe region's Tutsi bad been killed or driven out prior
Cyangugu and Kibuyc saw ihe most thorough killing;ercent of the Tutsi population in Cyangugu was killed and as much asercent in Kibuye. accordinguman rights organization.
At Ihe start of die genocide.by the only Tutsi Prefet in Rwanda -remained free of large-scale killing and attracted Tutsi refugees from the rest of the country. Onpril, however, ihe Prefet wassubscn.ucr.llyIhe large gatherings of Tulsi refugees soon became the victims of some of ihe largcsl massacres of the genocide.
Soldiers and Inicrahamwe militiamen did most of the killing, but ordinary Rwandan peasants also took part in the genocide. Many killed to settle old grudges, to gain neighbors' possessions, or because they embraced anti-Tutsi senlimeni The government once again resunecied fearseturn to Tutsi domination Moreover, intimidaiion and Rwandan respect forfactors llularge role in the later refugeeto mass participation
Many Rwandans look part in the genocide because theyif ihey did not take pari, they would be seen as Tutsi sympathizers and would be targeted themselves
Rwandan society, much like Germany in, was highly slructured and held obedience to authority in high regard, even io the extent of following orders to kill neighbors
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i,. of War and RPA Victory
Two days after ihe killings began, ihe RPA resumed its offensive. RPA forces crossed the demilitanzed rone in theas part of the Arusha Peace Accord, signed in its final version in3 tod rapidly advanced on Kigali. The RPA battalion in thetationed there in accordance with theits attempt to break ihe FAR encirclement of its barracks. By late April, the RPAured all of Byumba.f Kibungo, andf Ruhengeri prefectures By ihe end of May, it had captured Kigali airport and the adjoining Kanonibe military base and was closing in on the new seat of the Hutu government, Gitarama, which it captured in mid-June. As Ihe RPA pushed across Rwanda, hundreds of thousands of Hutusome feanng Tutsi rem bun on. others believing government propaganda dernoturiog thebefore the advance
efugees flooded into Tanzania in early May, and more than double thai number fled to government-control led areas in western Rwanda. |
In lale lunc. the UN Security Council appioved the deployment of French troops tosecure humanitarian zone" in southwest Rwanda. Operation Turquoise, as it was named, was extremelyarticularly among RPA leaders, who questioned French mouves. Many suspected Prance, which hadlose ally of Habyarimana's regime and hadritical role in Mopping (he RPA offensise inas trying losave the vesnges of the Hutu government and Army.
Although the French presence probably prevented some massacres, it did not stop ihe killings. even within Zone Turquoise.
Hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees and the remainder of the FAR passed through the French zone safe from pursuit by the RPA. which further heightened suspicions about French motivation
After nearly ihrre months of heavy fighting, the RPA captured the capitaluly and quickly consolidated Us control of Kigali, liutare, Gjlarama, and Ruhcngcn prefectures In lale July, the RPFew government,nilateral cease-fire, and declared the war o. c: H
The Refugee Crisis and Attempt* to Rebuild
When tbe civil war and genocide ended, ihe RPA rebels- who had been fighting ioower sharing arrangement on Habyanmana's regime- found themselves in charge and faced the daunting task of rebuilding Rwanda's devastated society. Much tif Rwanda's population had fledeighboring countries and many of those Ihiil
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remained looked upon lhe RPA as an occupation force and upon ihc 1'utsi-dominated RPI ('ovcmmcm as foreigners flnl
A Society in Shambles. In lhe course of (ourmonihs. Rwanda's population was nearly halved. In addition lo the roughly ItOO.OOO Tutsi and moderate Hutu killed, moreillion Hutu tied Rwanda and gathered in refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire during and immediately alter the genocide. The traumatized remains of Rwandan society were soon augmented by the reiurn ofutsi exiles from Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi, many of whom had spentnottheir lives outside Rwanda. H
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Already one of the world's mmi impoverished nations. Rwanda's economy groundalt. Most of the country's educated elite and professionals were killed or took part in the killings. There remained few doctors to care for the hundreds of thousands of physically and psychologically wounded survivors, teachersducate the moreillion Rwandan minors, which includes upwardsrphans, or lawyers and judges to deal with the tens of thousands of jailed genocide suspects, which now number. Thousands of rape victims found themselves struggling to deal with the physical and psychological uauma as well as ihe social isolation and ostracism that followed tnc crime Thousands of women became pregnantape, and many were infected with AIDS approximatelyercent of Rwnndans now HIV-positive, according to one survey, m
The FAR. defeated but largely intact in the refugee camps of Zaire, vowed lo one day launch an invasion to return the Hutu to power. In the meantime, they regrouped, recruited, trained, and conducted guerrilla attacks against civilian and military targets in western Rwanda |H
Vasi sums of international assistance flowed into the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania -especiallyholera epidemic swept the Goma, Zaire camps in late July und earlyless aid lor Ihe new regime in Kigali. Internationalon by France,'i; oncd mil io
Kigali on the RPF making Ihc new government more inclusive and reigning in RPA
abuses.
oalition government was formed roughly on lhe basis of the Arushareferred to in the plural as the Arushawhich established the number of ministerial and National Assembly positions each partyhe positions set aside for the MRND. however, were assumed by the RPF. and the new position of vice president was created tor Kagame Several donors, particularly Belgium. cntKi/ed the new government for excluding the MRND even though earlier efforts to co opt MRND moderates were rebuffed
Widely respected for us discipline and pcofessaonaJisn) throughout most of Rwanda's four-year civil war. the RPA deteriorated significantly in the last months ol the war and the aftermath of its victory.ight-knit antl experienced force, the RPA had swollen0 men by0 by June,0 by September. Most of these new recruits lacked the experience of fighting for Museveni's NRM and underwent an extremely abbreviated training program, if any at all. Many of those who jomcd during or after the genocide were motivatedesire for revenge. These factors led to an increase in RPA abuses. Moreover, live new regime lacked the resources to pay its troops, resulting in more looting, shakedowns, and armed robberies
In the Shadow of the ex-FAR/l. During the next two years, Rwanda made small gains in rebuilding the counliy. Althoughraction of its pie war level. GDP grew by nearlyercenlndhe education and judicial sectors slowly resumed operation. Most significantly, an uneasy peace was restored througtiout rnosi of Rwanda, occasionally broken by former Rwandan Armed Forces and Interahamwe (ex-FAR/l) raids launched from tbe refugee camps. |
The threat ol renewed war coniinucd to hang over the RPF-led government, however, and theaids became an increasing frustration. Moreover, ihe continued refusal of more than one tenth of Rwanda's population to return from their self -imposed exile undercut the coalition government's claim io kegitirnacy. When Zainan Tutsi in (he provinces of North and South Kivu. Zaire began to suffer persecution at ihe hands of the Hutu refugees and local non-Tutsi Zairians, Kigali saw an opportunity io address several concerns simultaneously. In laie September, iheTutsi from SouthRwandan assistance,ilitary offensive aimed ai ihe rctueee camps and UV ZainanrcesZ) The corrupt and inept FAZ mounted little resistance to the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaires the rebel group became known, and the rebels quickly overran much ol*eastern Zaire, including ihe refugee camps.utu refugees returned to Rwanda rrom Zaire inheywerconth later by another half million from iheanzania I
With the closure of thethe subsequent fall of Kinshasa to the rebel* -Kigali hoped ihe ex-FAR threat had been destroyed The massive refugee return had been so large and so rapid, however, thai the RPA had been unable io screen the returnees.ighters, mixed in with ihe returnees, inliltralcd back into Rwanda and supported by fighters who had remained in the insurgents1 rear bases in ravtcm Congoguerrillahe Army and Tutsi civilians in northwestern Rwanda. M
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Renewed Genocide Unlikely...
We Judge that several of lhe conditions lhai allowed lhe genocideccur4 are not present in the current situation. Most significantly, the RPF-ledstark contrast to itsnot attemptingxploit racism and instead appears to be genuinely commillcd to promoting reconciliation andnon-ethnic" society. In addition, the many Hutu were traumatized by the genocide and arc unlikely to engage in such large-scale killing again, especially without ihe assistance and support of the government and confidence that they would not be punished for their crimes. |
Ihe insurgentsase of popular support in the northwest but have been unable to muster support in other areas of the country.
Northern Hutu from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures traditionally have competed with southernin Gitaramapolitical control of Rwanda. Rwanda's first President, Kayibanda, was from Gitarama and favored his fellow southern Hutu. After Habyarimana look powerouphe center of power shifted to the north, and now southern Hutu are generally apprehensive about supporting an insurgency that aims to put northerners back in power.
The insurgents have not disclosed any political platform, apart from continued genocide and return to Hulu rule.
Theby the RPA during the civil war and again during the ADFI.'s RPA-supportcd march acrossnot tared well against the army, and Hulu civilians are hesitant to sideorce that controls no terriiory, lacks the resources to provide for large numbers ot people, and appears to have little chance of militarily defeating the regime.
The rebels have grown increasingly brutal wiih the Hutu population. Insurgents frequently murder Hutu they accuse of collaborating with the government, and in late May, according to press reporting, the rebels attacked civilians who had recently abanclortcd them, killing.
Prior to the current conflict in Congo, theppeared to lack ready access to fresh stocks of arms and ammunition.
Moreover Jsss||Mli^Hli^Muntil recently, the
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arely utilized heavy weapons,
Typically, less lhan half an attacking insutgeni force carriesthe remainder use "traditional" weapons- and those armed with rifles carry little
willingness to support then retaliation for Rwandan involvement in the current Congo conflict is likely to result in increased access to ammunition andheavythe Hutu rebels. |
ut Low-level Insurgency Will Continue to Hinder Reconciliation |
Insuigcni activity, which spiked in early7 and again in. appears to have tapered off since. The insurgents remain particularly active in several communes of Giscnyi and Ruhengen Prefectures, but ihey have also conducted raids and ambushes in Gitarama. Kibuye, and Byumba Prefectures. Although ihe insurgency is not regime threatening, it hinders government reconciliation efforts and political, economic, and justice reform.
Continuing ethnic killings reinforce distrust and suspicion between Tutsi survivors and their Hutu neighbors. The insurgency, combinedack of progress in punishing the principal perpetrators of the genocide, has created an environment in which violence has become an accepted means of resolving even relatively minor disputes.
The governmcni has made little progress on political reforms, including plans to conduct local elections and prepare for elections of National Assemblyappointed by their panics, per the Arusha Accord.
The Rwandan economy has yet to reach its pre-war levels. Insecurity in northweMctn Rwanda, the traditional breadbasket for the country, has created large food shortages
Although authorities have released several thousand genocide suspects fromthe sick, old. very young, and those against whom there is littlereleases are unlikely as long as the risk persists that those released will join the insurgency. I
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The RPA's deployment of several thousand troops to Congo has probably left its forces at home overextended, but the insurgents have been unable to take advantage. The heavy pace of RPA countcrinsurgcncy efforts since June and the subsequent casualties inflicted on the rebels appear to have impaired insurgent capabilities.
Ai least three senior insurgent commanders were killed in separate RPA operations in Gisenyi Prefcciure from mid-July to early August.
Nevertheless, continuing support among family members and extremist civilians in the northwest, and the rebels' ability to perpetrate guerrilla and terror-style attacks wiih minimal sophisticated weaponry make it unlikely the RPA will eliminate the insurgency. Intense pressure from RPA countcrinsurgcncy operations in northwestern Rwanda probably will force the insurgents to shift operations to other areas, increasing the number of attacks in previously stable areas such as Kibuye and Byumba Prefectures. Insurgent activity will probably increase in the near-term because of support from Congo, but the intensity and frequency of insurgent attacks will again decline as the insurgents continue to take heavy casualties, draw down theirstillof ammunition and arms, and alienate the Hutu population. Low-kvel insurgency will continue to drain scarce goverruneni resources and hinder reconciliation and reform for the foreseeable future. I
Major Events in thr Rwandan Conflict J
9 Ethnic fighting results in hundreds of Tutsi deaths, tens of thousands
flee into exile in Burundi. Uganda, andJulygains independence from Belgium
3 Tutsi exiles invade from Burundi but are quickly defeated;0 Tutsi are massacred in reprisals In the following two months
Gen. Juvenal Habyanmana takes powerloodlessRwandese Alliance for National Unityredecessor to the
RPF. forms in Uganda lo promote exiles' "right RANU becomes RPF; it advocates right of return by force0 RPF invades Rwanda3 Arusha Accord signed, to be implementedations, Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) deploys to
monitor cease-fire
Habyarima/ia's plane is shot down on approach to Kigali;
killings begin in the capital withinAprilresumes offensive
withdrawal of Belgian contingent. UN Security Council
reduces UNAMIR from us heightroopsutu refugees enterore in
following months
Operation TurquoiseJulyseizes Kigali
ulu refugees enlct North KJvu. Zaire
ulyannounces new government
4 Moreutu refugees, including remnants of the FAR. cross into South Kivu, Zaiie from Zone Turquoise
6 Banyamulenge revoltouth Kivu
6 Mugunga refugee camp in Zaireulu refugees begin return to Rwanda
6 utu refugees begin returning from Tanzanian camps
'ITic Arusha Accord, which forms the basis for the current Rwandan government,cries of six documents negotiated between ihe RPF and the Habyarimana regime between2 andhe first, the N'sele Cease Tire
Agreement, was signed in1 and amended in1 and July
eries ot Protocols of Agreement followed:
The Rule of law.
Power-shanng within the frameworkroad-Based Transition Governmentmended.
Repacmtum of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons.
The Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties
Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions
Basic Principles. The agreements establish the Accord and the Constitution of1 as the "Fundamental Law" of Rwanda. The Accord lists the articles of the Constitution supplanted by provisions of the Accord and declares dim. where unforeseen conflicts between the two documents arise, the Accord lakes priority. The Accord calls for equality for all citizens without discrirnination based on ethnicity, religion, sex. orthinly veiled reference lo ilabyarimana's patronage of Ihe northwest *lhc Accord specifically calls for the deletion of reference to ethnicity in government documents, including identitywere toritical role in targeting Tutsi for elimination during the genocide
The Accord declares the right of return of Rwandese refugees abroad to be inalienable and gives returnees who were gone less thanears (he right lo reclaim any property assumed by others in their absence. The Accord alsorovision calling for the government to encourage people to settle in villages to lactlitatc ihe provision ofas schooling, health care, andto "break with ihe tradilional scattered
The Accord callsransition period ofonths before national elections, beginning with the formation of the government and with one possible extension to be dclcrmincd by the National Assembly "if warranted by cxccpiional circumstances
impeding ihe normalocal elections were to begin wilhin six months of the formation of lhe transitional government. In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPFive-year transition would be necessary to prepare for elections, although local elections could start sooner. Following the return of the refugeeshe RPF again extended the transition, stating that the five-year clock restarted with the massive migration. Initial planning for local elections has
little progress has been made, in pan due lo the
insurgency and in part due to unresolved procedural questions. |
Creation of Communions and Government Institutions. The Accord calls for the new government to establish National Commissions on: Human Rights, Unity and Reconciliation. Legal and Constitutional Issues, and Elections. The Human Rights Commission was established in7 The government is in the process of setting up the Constuutional and Reconciliation Commissions.|
The principal issue addressed by the Arusha Accord is the structure of the new transitional coalition government, and the dismbution of positions among the RPF. the MRND, and the opposition panics. The Accord provides for four main government institutions: the Presidency, the Broad Based Transition Government, the Transitional National Assembly, and the Judiciary. J
The Presidency. The interim President was lo be Habyarimana. so the president's powers are limited. He represents the government at official ceremonies and in meetings abroad. Otherwise, he serves as little moreubber stamp for affirming Cabinet and National Assembly decisions On any issue where the President can make decisions, the decisions do not become binding until authorized by lhe Cabinet or the National Assembly. |
The Broad-Based Transitional Governmenthe Accord cstahlislied the BBTG as the most powerful government institution. The Primefirst of whom. MDR leader Faust in Twaginmungu. was specifically named in theheads the government. The Cabinet, in which all of the major panics were lo be represented, is to reach decisions by consensuswo-thirds majority if consensus cannrx be reached. This is one reason the Rwandan government is often slow, but unified, in passing legislation ot making controversial decisions. The distribution of ministries within the BBTG is spelledc RPF was to receive five ministnes, most significantly the Ministries of Interior and of Rehabilitation and Socialiwo most likelyeal with refugee issues. Additionally, one of the RPF ministers was to hold the title of Deputy Prime Minister. The MRND was to hold five ministries, including Defense. The MDR received three ministries beyond the Prime Ministry, most significantly Foreign Affairs. The Social Democrai Puny (PSD) was to hold three portfolios, including Finance; the Liberal Pariy (PL) ihtee portfolios, including Justice; and Ihc Christian Democrat Pany (PDC) one minor ministry.
PoUowing ihe genocide, ihe MRND was outlawed and its ministries assumed by the RPF. much to the outrage of the other coalition partners, because the Accord calls for (he ministries of any defaulting party to be divided equally among the remainingJ
The National Assembly. The National Assembly holds three ihree-monih sessions annually. National Assembly deputies vote as individuals rather than strictly along party lines. The distribution of seats within the National Assembly is also spelled out in the Accord: MRND. RPF. MDR, PSD, and PL were to receiveeats each, and PDC was to receive four. One seat was set aside for each remaining party* With the backlash against ihe RPF following its seizure of the MRND's ministries, that party's seats in the Assembly were divided among the remaining parties, per the Arusha Accord. |
Integration of the Army. Another major issue addressed in the Arusha Accord is the integration of the RPA and the FAR. The Accord callsman, standing force to be achieved through significant demobilization by both armies. RPA fighters were to holdercent of the enlisted billets andercent of the officer billets; RPA and FAR officers were to receive an equal number of command positions. Moreover, the two forces were to divide the lop two positions in any unit, that is, an RPA commander wouldAR deputyAR commander would have an RPA deputy. The Accord also called for one RPA battalion to be deployed to Kigali to protect RPF officials prior to implementation of the remainder of the Accord.
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particularly the creation of the BBTG.
Observing (he Spirit, If Not the Letter, of the Agreement ^
With the exceptions noted above, the RPF-led government has attempted to maintain the spirit of the Arusha Accord.
The Cabinet has undergone several reshuffles, bui the general distribution of seats among the parties has been maintained.
When Prime Minister Twagirimungu departednother MDR politician, Pierre Celestin Rwigima, replaced him.
' The Accord alio makes tx> mentioniceoiniwi cteaied by ihe RPF following Die genocide, anil assumed by Kagame. The Accord established ihe Speaker of (he National Assembly as interim successor io Ihe Presidency, pending an Assembly rate io chewandtdatc*forth by dV former Prewdcni's pany
*Ttai* bin provision provided Habyarimana the opportumiy he soughtelay implcmcniBiion of (hee and his clique encouraged the multitude of minor rulremia parlies lo argue (hai iney were emittedcat in (he Naitonal Assembly The shbaf ion whs further complicated by Ihe splii in most parties he:*een moderate and CJlrcmia Tower" factions, wiih eachiphl lo ihe seats and minislnet reserved (til the pally. H
Confidential
The Army currently fields0ver0 figure established by lheFAR soldiers compose less thanercent of that total. AtAR soldiers have been integrated into the military, however, including several senior officers. One of only four generals in Rwanda is reintegrated FAR.
Gendarrnarie Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Gaisinzi.
Original document.
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