NICARAGUA: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS

Created: 2/1/1988

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Nicaragua: Domestic and Foreign Policy Trends (u)

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NICARAGUA: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS (u)

IntonntfiOfl ataiLblrwd

in ihr cat Daraiton of Ihu Strmo'^nJum. luumvn) for pubtica'ifln on thai date bv Ihr Chitamm a* Ihr

KlUOnd Fctcitn tnwtWtK* Council.

key judgments

Nicaragua's Sandinteta leaden are beleaguered by ihe moat acute problems (hey have faced to date, but recent developments have enhanced their chances of consolidating power.

With extensive support, the anti-Sandinista armed opposition has become an effective military force and has waged an increasingly successful and widespread campaign of attacks, ambushes, andMoreover, the impact of the war combined with the Sandinistas' internal mismanagement kept the economyare survival footing but year. Despite continued massive Soviet Bloc economic assistance equivalent to one-fourth the country's gross domestic product, per capita CDP fell by moreercenteal income lossesthe averageurchasing power to less than half7 level, and Inflation soared0 percent in the last quarter.

The cutoff of US military assistance, however, has dealt theerious blow. Its continued viability hinges on thesupport of Honduras- Even assuming continued Honduranwithout renewed lethal deliveries, we estimate the number of effective combatants inside Nicaragua would drop ton the next several months. Operations would become more defensive and more geographically limited. The southern and Atlantic fronts would probably cease to exist Renewed humanitarian assistance would affect the pace, but probably not the ultimate level of decline.

For their part, the Sand In LSI as will step up efforts to destroy orthe insurgents and to interdict overland resuppry. The Sandinistas are constrained to some extent by their continuing fearS invasion and hindered by morale, discipline, and desertion problems.small-scale Sandinlsta cross-border operations will probablyalthough tbey most likely wilt stop short of major actions unless the Resistance masses men and supplies so as to offer more lucrative and accessible targets than in the past.

At the same time, while some elements of the domestic opposition may continue to look for opportunities to test the limits of regime tolerance, there is little likelihood that opponents can generate large-scale demonstrations or force the regime to implement political reforms beyond those required toontinued shutoff of US lethal aid. The Sandinistas control the National Assembly, and their effective

security apparatus neutralizes and intimidates dissidents. Thus,elements will be more inclined lo creeping accommodation with the government, especially if the insurgency no longer challenges the Sandinistas militarily. Managua is eager to appear in full compliance with the Peace Accord and will rely on informalsemiofficial mobs and actions against low-echelon oppositionto maintain its grip.

On tbe diplomatic front, we see little shift in Sandinista near-term strategy. The Sandinistas will pursue cease-fire negotiations while holding to demands that will put the insurgentstrongand continue to push for bilateral talks with Washington. The four Central Americanof which face growing ckwnestic difficulties in complying with the Peaceunlikely, however, tonified strategy to put the Sandinistas on the defensive. If the United States extends humanitarian aid the Sandinistas would see it as an effort to continue the insurgency, and they might suspend talks with the insurgents bul not roll back internal political reforms.

DISCUSSION

t. We believe thai, although Nicaragua')are beleaguered bv the most acuteand ecooooiic orotlcm* thev hive facedpowerevelopment inhave coniiiltribiy enhanced the/It chancesTheir improved

prospects result aot only from tbe recent denial of coaUawed US miliury assistance to the antigovern-men! lAiuntnti but abo from theit mc^-vi in 'I ill fully pursuing mare Be-Obir policies In dealingi aoBltoUc proposition, tbe leaden of the other Central American nations, and international pressure* and optnlom|^

2 Since tbe Presidents of Nicaragua, ElGuatemala, and Cofta Bin met Inloir August, the Nicaraguan GovernmentMveral symbolic and conditional concenMnato appearompliance with the regionalimpetus al tbat tana. Thay

rotracted Kate of emergency, suspended the prison term* of hundreds of tbeirllowed the muoi uopmition newspaper La fntnm to begin publishing again, abousbed the feared revolutionary tribunals,repeated delan andinto direct tails with rcpreten la rives of tha- Iniurgency] |

lthough none of these or other movaa tbe Sandinistas hove taken since thehe summit tn San lose. Cotta Rica, in* reduced lhe government'i mooonJy vlhey have lest credibilityrowingperception thatilling to make important concessions cooduclve to internal pluialum and amicable cosibKeoce with its neighbors Wchowever, that President Daniel Ortega; hb brother, Defense Minuter Hurnberto Ortega; Minister of Interior Tomai Borge; and other top Irade ti continue toervid commitment to Mar iht IxninUt doctrines and goals In their domestic and foreign pohcies. [

or the moment, the Sandinistas' untiedand other domestic opponents have beenbv recent developments. In particular, doubts about the long-term viabdity ol the insurgents will almost certainly Increase, and result lo (educed popular support for thetr cause, as well as substantial erosion In the site end effectiveness of their forces. In addition, leaders of already fractious civilian oppoal lion parties andsomewhatby the greater freedom of assembly andthey have been allowed in recentremain pessimssOc 'about theu prospects. Most no doubt fear that, if the insurgency collapses, tbe Sandi-nisras will be invulnerable to other sources of domestic pressures. | ||

e believe, funherrnore. lhat other Central American leader) and demon's ticIn Honduras and Elalso been made more vulnerable because of recentDoubts about tha reliability of US policy and commitments have mounted, especially In Honduras, and leaders and elites throughout Central America are probably reevaluating (hair own priorities. In addition, the respond peace proceaa has given inspenas tn greater politicalin Elradical opposition leaders and forces have become more directly involved in overt political actjwlyjj

6 Guerrillas and radicals In Centralin CIlong bees theof ctandestlnt SandlnUla support, andfrom various source) luggesti tbat. despitepledge to terminate aid. it continues inWe believe that, despite commitmentsmade in the regional Peace Accords, ibeleaders remain united In their king-termto revolutionary internatumabsm, and that infuture they will be unlikely toassistance to and coflaboratkaa withinsurgents and

he Azcona govrrnmrnt and military com maud -tn la Honduras will abo be confronted by loughthe neat several weeks Leaders In Tegucigalpa have long considered their support for the Nicaraguanotentially grave liability, and Ihey will now have to decide how to balance the commitments they have made in tbe

peace process with their antipathy toward theand Iheir morey*ar-old commitment to providing sanctuary and other crucial backing lo the insurgents

s Over the ihott term, (he following key variables will be important deteimlnanti of how US interests ate

US tnitiatives and capabilitiesrovideto (he Nicaraguan insurgents

Honduraa wuttngnct* to continue to provide lanctuary and support lo (he insurgent!

Sandinlsta performance in dealing withsevere economic problemv and the moteand better ortumtcd fxpeentora ol oppoa-tiou to (he government | |

The Insuroeney

9 With ntennve support, tbe airti-Sandintsia armed opposition has become an effective military force and has waged an increasingly successful and widespread campaign of attacks, ambushes,o-tage. although it Is ml) not operating in tbe core Pacificn their principal arms of operation in northern and central Nicaragua, the insurgent* In tbe last yearaneave maintained the tactical Initiative Then improved performance has Increased the regime's casualties and economic cow* and clearly stretched the capabilities of tit armed fortes. Combat action loot year increased* Although the moiority of iDwrgnK-IniHated actions has focused on relatively small, lightly defended objectives, recent operation) have clrarly deowutraled an increased Insuraenl capabJtty to conduct occasional targe-irate operations against mili-tanly impoitanl targets)

oncerted Sandinlsta psychological warfare effort. Insurgent morale and coheaiveness remained soundew cooabatantj have accepted amnesty from Ihe government, and there currently are no indications of large numbett of bghtcri abandoning the struggle. The insurgentsto enjov coarriderabSa popular mpport ia central and northern Nicaragua They have begun giving lira tet emphasis to small-tc air civic action, and there are increasing reports thot ihey are able trfcount on al lea" tome of the rural population for active assistance in the form of food, medical rapport, and intelligence on Sandinpta Hoop movements. |

espite these gains, Insurgent tecruKmenis have only managed to keep pace with kisses, and the insurgency remains confined largelyural areas of the country. The insurgents apparentlyie nipt my to establish Internal front cells outside (heir normal areas of Operation, but they have been largelyIn thr face of thetrong counter-measures 11

he iraurgcats remain highly drpendent on citernal iogiwic support and in iitcreasingly tenuous aerial resupply lystcra. Sandtnrstaefensearerowing threat to the latter and are adversely affecting insurgent capabihtles Ofcraltons security by inMrgent ground forces In preparation for rcsupply drops also remains inadequate andactor in the January shoot down of an Insurgentircraft in southern Nicaragua] |

itbout aerial resupply. the imurgenii will have to tdytill embryonic overland network end caches Inside Nicaragua They probably have ade-Qkiate ammumtioa toeduced level ofin tbe coming months, but access lo food stock) in country is fat Ins certain The insurgents' viability will largely depend onillingness to allow them to eipand their logistic infrastructure alone 'he border and to return to Honduras, at least periodically, to refit aad replenish supphctfj

n; ii Irr Favorable local conditions, bulenewal of lethal aid from the United Stain, the Insurgents will be forced toore defensive ttrategy. This will permit the Sandinistas to regain the lad leal initiative and operate with gi eater impunity against iuurgent unit* Logistic and associated sreutty functions will tie downhird or more of the intuigent force and will decisively leaven its offensive capability Transporting supplies to units in centralthe uuurgenU etvjov iheir greaiestba eitmoely difficult and mayullback of (hot* forces to shorten supply Una Doubts about the iruuraency't long-term viability will almost certainly increase and result in Im popular support. The ability to recruit will be diminished both by more limited anas of operation and popular perceptions, resultingradual erosion of strength even under favorable local conditions [

ttacks on government tapper depots would help alleviate shortfalls, but will be more difficult to

tv- hc-vaw. lileleia

at least ihr mil ievrr.il months. hwyntithe key to maintainingr.ut efecrn* &sh)>nt (orr* ii hcwdwa* o'esupply use. then thenijncr can probably maimilnabsent any further

ere lo danvll lancluary and support lo it* tvtawaace. thrruurgrnc, -ould almost certainlv rolupar. although tone irnaimjbunting in remote areas

sine*tfe.ua.,landing,

ibt ifcodu.in co^rernrnent haa .acuaued it mnaly demanded ihat lha retjstanc* attempt lo go it alone without try uwlaodsaran temtory more reeently.

tsere would be further cooc-hIko in etchangenal elly ja-o/ continued uswil aadespomhdity

simply put, ibe bottom line for honduras ii to avoid beam kit holding the bag aa

tw last ads comment ptiw ihal end. in failure leaving it isolated dlpfornatkaltv and poatkalltnr a

the primary urge*esurgent saodlrujt* goverrunerrl that, freed from lu wncentratron oo lhe iiuDsency would use its military power ind sebwrstve network to undermine the am administration

anctuary for an insurer nmisotmed refugee bow that could number in tbe uru ol thousand* tfcor-srlmrajl gfgav lary. and ecooornic teseureet. resulting ntrr mendoui domestic backuih agatnflivilun and military leaders

the hondurans ire based in by their past pchevhus, despite periodic brmu of unease andh us policies ihat hat* ltd to on*.aazatast lhe urmia ore and the demand* oftegucigalpa's self.malnlain the he-nstaneeuffer aialnst mirtagua and avoid the chat. ihat might result from hi rapid diuokeem-ha,

the margin (or honduran areeptanor of anybowever. hat- grown reset thin. umhave now brrnry naked out posstuia* oppos-dhonduran involvement inlrsreec* froa ihn pomt-ihwctuickaad depend onof lhe 6ruicaragua andfl**rd-of lheindsother farteei intuceon.n using .tnkationeffective preaure and whether the otherel sajesdor.n

of ihe nicaraguan itounatnts

iuwawm nanus* no and control.

unity, and discipline will be sorely tested aacompete lor scarce resources in theheavy oubtary pressure if csauakws mountis no prospect of renew cd aid, untieabandon tbe

vubout renewed lethal deliveries, insurgent strength almost certainly will erode, with the pace ejected moat substantially by action on hurnanttarlan aid and the stance of the hondurans the urges* insurgent faction, the nkuaguan resistance army-north,otal strength uf0 of whom reportedly are insidea review of delivery rates, however, badicates that the number of its efieetiwproperty outfitted and armed and able to operateontinuouslower, perhaps averagingver theonths. without renewed lethal assistance, we etpect this number will drop tover tbe nert several monthi reseeting both tbe insurgents' tactical need to conserve resources as well as its hardcore supporters.

it. moreover, we see little prwpect that the north-ern group will be able to contlrroe to supply the srnauer. less ehcctrve guerrilla factions in southern nicaragua and along the indigenous areas of tag atlantic coast. without such support, we eipect ihe, southern group ofen to cease to fti tsrag. the coastal indian

of lhe Indian leaders from lhe coastentative cease-fire agreement with the governmentew small bands are likely to survive from its present effective strength off

IS. In the absence of lethal or humanitarian aid ibc decline-an force level Inwould be more rapid. Should Tegucigalpa at the same lime effectively pressure Ibe insurgents to end their use of Honduran territory, then force levels would probably dwindleffective combatants within three months Even under this adverse scenario, insurgent numbers might run as. and the drawdown might eitend over sU months if thehave cached large amount* of materiel Inside Nicaragua, an unlikely- circumstance, but one which we have insufficient data to

aintaining unity willormidablefor the Nicaraguan Resistance, which wasia7 as the preeminent political body of ihe insurgent movement. The eiparsded Resistance Directorate has been more cohesive and representative than its predecessor orgaalration. and its members have avoided open splits over major issues Thev have espanded tie* to regional leaders and internalfigures, although they have yet to attract broad grassroots backing inside Nicaragua J

lie cutoff of aid threatens tha cohrslvrnrsidirectorate, which will be readeasurend long-term viability of the enhreIn planning their strategy forethe Sandinistas, tbe more moderate directorslikely to push for increasing accommodationNicaraguan Coverrrment as funds begin ro drythey may now even consider returning toAllrxw Hobelo, who withdrew from theIn January, has been quoted

eturn to Nicaragua, and Aritttdrs San-chri recently broached (he possibility of completely abandoning ihe armed struggle Bora use two keyAdoHo Calero and Alfiedodistinct viewpoints, arguments la negotiating strategy are llkery to Intensify and could thrcaren ibe balance of the directorate. Wehe directors will work toward maintaining unity in the srvort term, but tha pressuies promoting disunity will gradually intensify. Defections at this level will not ipso facto result in massive troop desertiom. but wouldontributing factor in prompting commartders tutheir allegiance,

Compounding Economic Problem*

he impact of lhewiih lhe SartdinBIas*are survival fooling last year, and ihc apparently accelerating downturn wilt continue to

defyerr mi oy moreercenteducing, overall econornlc activity to more than one-third below prerevolulionarv levels. Combined wiih real income loues in earlier years, lhe average Nicaraguan's purchasing power Is now less than half7 level. Inflation skyrocketed in the Anal monthsanna, lo an annual rate0 percent during Ihe quarter ending in8 Inflation drove real wages (or salaried employees ioercent of0 level byorcing the vast majority of NKaraguans to trade in the Mack market for bask goods The war abo forced the regime to curtail politically hetwucul doeloprnent ptoiectv and lo redirect virtually all public invest rami toward the mililary infrastruciure

hortages of raw materials and other prciuccr inputs intensifiedn particular, critical fuel shortages In recentprtmarilyarge increase In militaryInrced fi clones to close and hampered the harvesting and processing of this year's ospott crops Tlie US Embassy reportsack of pesticides and fertiliicrt has dramatically reduced many cropower crisis caused by fuel oil shortages, drought, and disabled equipment added to production problems ||

Tha Sondwuitot

n May. the Stvndlniitai began rifling some controls on the distribution of consumer goods in an eflort to ease ihortasjes. Producer pri.es were petvcdi-cally increased throughout lhe year and someOB farmers and ma nuiacturtTa were rasedmany private producers still comptain publicly thatnornpoty on eroriornic decision nuking According so the USseveral privatetaxtorthat Ihe regime hadivide-arid-conquerdown lucrative offers by the trpvern-ment to reestablish private cotton larmxl I

nhc regime instituted its most sweeping economic reforms In several yean in an eBort lo slow inflation and rtnlote some of thelost purchasing power. The reforms Included lbe issuanceew currency, creationingle eschsjtg* talc for all Importsorts, and aOroorvioiiorrt

Sendlnuuitration Paitv

Membership estimatedW0 tn

Ptetrtjuisite for pritVcnlialJn.nsj. government serviees.

Membership confers economic pel. iwgis

Hoitb HI ttols In Xsiioturi Assembly

Sendintitd Orient* Commuter.*

Organized roiinnwide.

NYlghborhund blockm-vMed oi Cuban Committees for Defense iJ live (lesiilullon

Used to Survelt.nd nu.hiUfr pnpulalion.

Sondtnuia Votst/ft

Membership composedarty ocliiist* in terns, twenties, and thlrtiev

Hardcore source of supportn jum-

lor progovernment demons! rations

Ctinfediiatlon of Saiufimim Worken

Main tiHtrnmrm ofn* ml jial innhiti. mum

Membership unknown, hulllm plaicesl at many prlisie-ieclor wortert.

rissocUIlM of Niteragnen Women

Regime front, ostensibly noupoliiia-il

President Lea Cuidoarty Mlivua jhiIer of Borge faction.

CoonhiutoraJ Nicaragua*lnuctailoni-Heroei and

ilembenhlp0nniud ij OVM goiennnent professional and univenilv cmpiovecs

Not officially an organ of lbe rulinglront;ndependent" activity advocacy uf higher professional salaries and eiemiMnei from offictal wage scales.

fold increase in average wages The government tt> talns nearly all its controls over ihe econom,.and did not take actions to reduce the defk-ii. the key to controlling Inflation. According to press rrpnrts. black tnarltels sprang up almost immediately ufler the latest reforms were decreed, and dollars victc selling atimes the official iatc.| |

DBterioioling Foreign Sector

reliminary dau suggest that hard currency esport earning! probably declined last year Rapidly expending trade tier, lo lhe Sovietlast year absorbedercent of Nicaragua'sthe Sandinistas' increasing tendency to finance imports bv preseiling exports are responsible for reduced cash earnings. Soviet Bloc countries, instead of paying cash, have been applying Nicaraguan exports as partial

f

nent for their economic assistance to Managua. 1

Foreign Economic Assiitgnee

Mr liny

he economy depends on substantialBloc assistance. Preliminary figures indicateaid from the Soviet Bloc declinedyear, but still exceeded Nicaraguan exportand aid from all other sources combined.undoubtedly was disappointed that the USSRincrease aidnan economic assistance package towith at least MOO million per year Intbe.

has grown

ly impatient wim aaivalmsta economicand is demanding more accountability

conomic assistance from Western sources has remained fairly stagnant with increasing aid from the Scandinavian countries offsetting decliningfrom others. Sweden. Norway, and Finland increased aid last year and now account for mote than half of all bilateral assistance from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OFCD) Press reports indicate that severalWest Germany andconsideringaid programs with the Sandinistas, pending ihe outcome of the Central American peace talks.

Impact of the US Embargo

ver the past year, the US trade embargo lias taken an increasing toll on Nicaragua's capitalIts electricitytrade losses bave declined slightly. Embargo-induced trade losses fell toillion7 because the regime has become Increasingly successful at finding new markets and circumventing the sane-

snraaa VSt

Nicaragua: Direct Costs of US Sanctions

T

[.nun

l.fin

irnKlimKuls

Inl*ne> ihmsmI tn bromine;

May IMS; i

lions. Most of the country's largely US-madealready rundownack of investment and misuse, is teeteringhortage of spare parts. Electrical generators ate failing increasingly andesult are causing blackouts, rationing, widespread factory closures, andet|

No Solution in Prespact

he recent reforms, at best, will havehort-term Impact. Tbe Nicaraguan economy almost certainly will continue to decline fot the nextthe rest of the year, even if the Sandinistas take the unlikely step of trying to implementeconomic reforms. Deteriorated infrastructure and years of regime mismanagement have devastated the country's capacity to produce. Lack of publicin the recent reforms and Managua's failure to address the root causes of. the country's economic problems willelatively quick return to very high levels of inflation. Worsening consumer shortages will fuel public discontent and could lead to more support for opposition groups. Including the

The Nkoroxjuon Pohheol Scene Iht SoneSniltGrl

he Ssndiriuta Directorate has remainedcohesive despite the stress caused bv (he war and (he economic disaster. Thr Oitesta btolhen and theing of lhe parly associated uith them have incrementally asserted thetr dominance over Ihe "hardline" elaments grouped around Interior Minister Tom as Borgr For example, the Jaime Whee-lock (action has Last independence and inBueoce

he rivalry between the Barge "hardliners* and the Ortega pragmatists" probably reflects personal ambition more than rtiroJogieal or strategicThe hardliners are generally less concerned with the image projected abroad and therefore are more willing to use repressive measuresdomes tk dnarrrt, and they associate tricmsclvei more openly with the Soviet Bloc. Daniel Ortega hat no sympathy for real political pluralism, but has recentlyore sophisticated sens* at timing and publicand is (bus more inclined lo make tactical concessions that will help achieve strategic olsjeclives.

here are signs that the concessions made at Esquiputa*particular the decision to meet with the.have aggravated these chronic differ-encea Even if there were no oultight divergence over policy. Borge may well try to esploit Ortega's seeming "softness" toward tha insurgents anderitseans of Enforcing his waning strength in the party If Ortega's moves do not resultontinued shutnff of lethal US aid, hardliners like Tom Si Borge could argue persuasively that he yielded too much to the regional peace process and pushougher internal line Parao^ilcalry. an opening of political space to the opposition might enhance the role and clout of Borge' Interior Ministry Befdom as the principal arm of internal control We doubt, however, that Ortega will push the opening to the point of precipitating an intraparty crisis |

n the absence of credible polls or elections, there is no reliable means of gauging popular supplier for the government or membership In rhe Sandrganization It is clear nonetheless that the regime has the supportubstantial hardcore of ideologically commuteds well as of others whoseis based mainly oo self-mterest The lack of distinction between party and gpvxrnment give* the Sandintsta organiialion. with its Iront groupi and massower and influence beyond merestrength. The Sandinistas have nearly two-thirds of the sears in the National Assembly, allowing i) to control the legislative process wlihoul the assistance of^jhw leftist parties and collaborationist members.

he regime's internal security forces abostrong, and Sandinista leader* reportedly arehat the Ministry of Interior apparatus will remain capable of neutralizing any effort by cither the insurgents or th* political cCDOSilion to develop cefc or strong party structure* in key urban areas Ministry operative* cool,no* to report arrests of alleged internal front members and have used physical andcoercion to eitract confession) from luipccts to discourage would be dissidents from actively insurgent efforts The Sandinistas continue to expand their prison system In lhe last year. 6ve of the seven penitentiaries have undergone map* expansion Three more stale security prisons, which houseprisoners, have been added lo the six exiting [rot nut tons, so the total number ofoworced relocation* of the rural popuUrion and the development of armed agricultural cooperative* are part ol the regime's ongoing itrategy to deny the opponents the opportunity toignificant social base in the countryside

Tha Opposition

lthough opoosltion to tha Sandinistas might const Itopular majority, its inability to make common cause continues to cripple its efiecttveaeas and reiider it vulnerable lo Sandinista intimidation and co-optation. Bitter personal rivalries havethe buses'Coniervatives. Social Christndhave prevented any leader fiom ernerglagpokesmannited opposition.

he major vehicle for concerted action among tbe rionnolent opposition, the Democratic Cooerfina-toi. has been undermined by disagreements among its memberi. its generally weak leadership, and the dispa-rale alma of its members. The businessmen!COSEP. hasimited degree ofability and ha* articulated pn.ate-sector interests, but it frequently has been at odds with Coordinator-member political parties and share* few interests wilh the labor components. Sincehe Democratic Coordinate* hasrgarui-ing oppositionand. In January, several of Its leaders traveled to Guatemala for an unpreoedrnled

Opposition Groups it Nicoroouo

The main impositionDemocratic Coordinating Boardcomoosed largely of moderate and conservative political parlies lhai boycottedH general election Several artti-Sandintsta business and labor maaniuiions abo are board members New opposition croups outside the scope of tbe CDN have appeared tn recent months The so-called legal opposition is dominated bv kdeolcglctfiy tell -of center patties but abo includes several leftwing ettiemtst groupi

Coordinatms Board Social CArtitsan Parlv(PSCl

Most prominent internal opposition party. Parry rocked by interna! divisions, presidency claimed by two contenders On* party leader recently went Into eaile. Under heavy pressure from regime, localinducted Into Army. Has ties to Christian Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America.

Democratic Cotuertjaltot Party of Nicaragua (PCNl

Waspposition party under former dictator Somou. Highly (acrionallrrd. poses little threat ro the regime Bicsiawsv faction under banner of Democratic Corsservstise Party (PCD) works with regime and is represented in Saisdlnista-dorru'isated National Assembly. Social Democratic PaitvtPSD)

Party beginning to deteriorate Former leader recently went Into esile. Has little support outsido Managua.

Qjnstifunotjnlur Liberal Pang (PLC)

Least inlurntial party in CDN. Untested source says party has agreed ro coopeiare with anti-tegutir faction olPCN.

Liberal Porta/PALI)

Created last year by former businessman. Trying to gain allies amorg CDN members, particularly faction

Superior Council of Prltatt Enterprise fCOSCP)

A privale-sector umbrella group formedroke with FSLN0 and il now opposition voice of middle- and upow-income members of the CDN. Mm mguan Worken Central (CT.V) Split into two factions Largely inactive Con/eclVdfvjn for Labor Unification (CVS)

Considersajor target of Sandinistas Solidly structured andAffllliied witheaders spend little time In Nicaragua.

The Caihalie Church

Not formally part of Interna) oppositkia. but leadership generally critical ot Sandinistas and supportive ofand eiternal opposition

Offcer Anfi-Sandinii'o Opposition Cronpi

Central Amertcan Unlonlsr ParlafPVCAl

Very small: inactive, cooperates with CDN. burember

othtrt of PolUUal PrUonm

Recently formed human rights group. Participated in antiregunr demonsristsons earlier this year. Sandinistas has* Increased pressure on group.

Oopoeililla Pj.fi'ea in Iht National AtsemUv

Democroilc Contemattoe Parigssembly)

Breakaway from main conservative party. Cetterally supports regime but highly erstf conHHulional process Has small anti-FSLN faction,

independent Libera/

eats in Assembly)

Leadership increasingly critical ot Sandinistas butpiDtegime faction.

Popular Social Cflrotian Partv{PPSC)

cots in Assembly)

Broadly suirportive of regime in past. Patty leaders may be taking more independent course.

Nlcarat*an SpcMrui PdrfgffSN,

eats ia Assembly) Moscow-line Communist inrty.

Iparty

constantly fluctuates between pro-Ssndinitraandinista poatlont

CommunUlf Nicaragua iPCdN)

tats In Assembly) Small, ultrahtftist patty

Popular Action vfILt*MAP-MfJ-

eats la Assembly)

Ultralrlttst party critical of nrgiroe fot nvaving slowly toward Consoumlsm

rsiNr-^ti

mp MLii' OH FSLN Amman Kar> fUn.

atn'.i

dialogue with the Resistance The Coordinator haa abo coopetaled with other opposition elements inargerwhich Include* radical leftist par-tie* that consider the Sandinistasor constitutionsJ reform!

he independent labor unions, especially the Confederation for Labor Unificauon, have become somewhat more agnressive since the Esquipulas II meeting, and haveoalition in hopes of benefiting from the Central American Peace Accord. Unions haveew tentative effort* at strikes and have made some modest gains, but their overall attitude-is still one of caution.

he regime's virtual monopoly of the media has at least temporarily ended following rhe reopening of La P'enru -the prestigious independentRadio Caaoikav Both remain heanry dependent on external financial support and are vulnerableariety of government pressures, including outright censorship La Prtrua. although it has boostedhas lost some of its credibility by printing inaccurate, itorlea and indiscriminate attacks on the Sandinistas, andnclear to what extent It can expand its Influence beyond its present following. The Sandinkstas still refuse to license any competing televi-Bonespite theu implied commitment to do so in the Esq ui pole* II accord, and coMtissse toradiomore important thaa printin resKtang tha general population

he Catholicenerally regarded as tha government's most formidable opponent, andMiguelravo is widely acknowledged a* the da facto leader of the opposition The church has not assumed aa overtly political role, however, and its primary support for thes lending rt mora! authority Moreover, past conions with the regime have demonstrated its vulnerability to Sandinistand some bishops and ciergy not directly subject to the Archbiihop's authority svmpa-thite In varying degree* with the reglmej |

Obando's room to maneuver ha* also been limited bv hn acceptance of the raedlato' rosethe 'Sandinistas and tbe insurgents Me continues to consult wiih the latter and with internal opposition forces, and lately ha* become mora assertive In putting forward hb own proposals But tba Cardinal uby the need to avoid an overtly pro-ins urgent stance In the diaJogua.p |

Although the internal opposition plans to Hep up protest activity,essimistic about how long the opportunity will last. Tbe US rejection of lethal aid to tha insurgents may wellurther psychological blow to the opposition, lending added subslance to its fears of having to face the triumphant Sandinistas alone Th* practical result is likely to b* creeping accommodation aad setf-reatrauM Most ooposuirm leaden have rtever believed tbev could overturn the Ssndimiias. and they are unlikely to become more assertive if they interpret the US posture as tending towardof Sandinista control [

Sondini.la Straletjiei IKs Political Front

mmet to apprer in fullth Ihe Peace Accord toenewal of lethal aid Al home, (he regime ii likely lo make further political recessions forksnal consumption while cir-conisctibinn the opposition by lest direct methods The Sandinistas, fur eiample, may ir lease more political prisoners andate for municipal elections In tbe face of international pressure, the regime may even agree lo Implement some of the reforms the opposition alliance hasasuman richtshopes of luring, some opposition parlies back Into the national

he Sandinistas want tu deny the United States any pretest! to resume military assistance, and they also want to build pressure for on site verificaiioa of insurgent bases ia Hranduras and for limiird bornam-tarian aid to the insurgents The Sandtn atlas probably recogniie they cannot afford to renege on their formal commitment) in Ihe short term and are unlikely to move against thoseat La Prenta or lheindividuals whose symbolic stature nukes them readily visible to foreign scrutiny. They may be lest fastidious about going alter lower echelon or provincial opposition figures who attract lessThey may abo rely more on the informala ratolled mobs and neuihborhoodofficial actions would be ember raising. To protect their international image, the Sandinistas probably will continue toin cessse-fire talks, consider additionalreforms, and solicit sympalbetic countries to verify tbeir compliance The resrime continues to ererctse tight control through elisting public security laws. Opposition marches, for example. Mill require police approval Managua also has balked at discussingpolitical reforms with dissidents andhas dismissed insurgents' demands to eipand cease-fire talks to include politicaloreover, the regime continue* to aid regional leftist groups whileow profile to avoid detectionwe believe tbe Sandinistas will continue to resist making significant, irreversible political concession) In dialogues with cither the internal or armed opposition the Sandinbtas havehree-pronged siralegy that seeks to wear down lhe insurgentseir resupply ope rations, and reduce the prospect* for active popular support With noin place and insurgent forces in decline, efforts in all three areas, aad especially in the first two, will now accelerate. Y_

Sondlrktlo Ground Fore* Structure

Conventional Defenseankan* battalion*

ipfaotryantrv brigades

WtUiioas

6 infantry hatlalions

bilstide

I group.ocketroups. IM- mm howessens! artillery neaps

6 msfcti* tWsgadet

orces,

aitare baitaliom

brigades

h hunter battalions

ermanent territorial com ponies

lluiiXHtbras

etecve/asilriUi brigades

oviet and Cuban military assistance lo the regime has rem*tried high over the past year and has continued since the peace process beganIhe Soviet* appear to have kept direct deSvene* of irsasor weapon systemsinimum since last August, presumably to avoid stimulating US support to the iniurgents These military drritcriet have provided lhe Sandinbtas with the wherewithal to withstand the insurgent threat while concurrently developing their conventional and reserve fore* struct are. Although units in the field continue to complain of spotof fuel andhe military establishment is generally well equipped and continue* to enjoy firepower superiority over lhe Insurgents-P

The AAititary Front

avorable cease-fire arrangement, we expect the Sandinistas will try to step up their efforts to destroy or expel the insurgents. Over the past year.

orced conscript loo and mobilustioro ofand militia elements give thearge military manpower pool super tor to that of the The rrtpme. however, haa not been able lo develop an adequate force ratio relative lo the iniur-genu lo deleat ihem The regime continue! toS invasioneluctant to draw down itsforce structure in order to support lhe counter-liuurgency effort. Faced wiih more sophisticated and successful attacks, the Sandinistas ate attempting to draw rrsoren the larar urban population on the western coast to meet their eipending manpower needs However, they are having lo tely more on oppressive tactics lo meet their mobr lira'.ton goals and are encountering increasing resentment and resistance from ihe population Morale, desertion, and discipline problems persist throughout ihc mililary and are dvecsetv. but not decisively, affecting opeTatitsrts.

:

n the field, Sandinlsta force* have continued to rely on large mult iha Italian sweeps to keep lhe insur-gcni* on lhe move and to force (hem io espend supples. However, even the Army's best counterunits are Itscreaungjy reluctant to close with theor pursue them without committed artillery or close altumbal losses of helicopters have nceeded deliveries over the past year and have caused the Au Force to become more cautious. The Soviets are attempting lo Increase helicopter survivability by providing new center measures equipment and may be advising pilots on smpeoved tactics The regime also has attempted to compensate by usingrans-poillittlea bombing role Despite these efforts, theobusty aad combat air support capabilities have declined and in recent tnonlbs have slowed the pace of offensive counterinsurgency operations Nevertheless, the Army remains capable of dispatching reinforcements to be-selged areas in sufficient time to prevent the intur-genli from holding their objective* for eslended perl-

cquisition and deploymeni of addiilonal radar sysiems and new air defense weapons are Improving the ttsibtary's shinty tond react to insurgent aerialrratlon* The trnurtient destruction of lhe radar facUittes at Siunaembcrecreased lhe regimes "verLappusg coverage bul did not decisive It impair lis overall capabilnies The Air Force hasasic groussd-eonttrJlcdcapability and has used this to vector armed tr*inputs in pursuit of insurgent resapply Bights. The movement of allf the regime's radatdliected air defense guru to northern Nicaragua has forced lhe insurgents lo (orego use of their forward drop rones in theail ol Nicaragua and may have contributededuction in lbe intensity of insurgent opcf at jots in that area Count enruurgency forces, possibly equipped with the latest Soviet shoulder-fired missile, thegia. shot down an insurgentn the south in famaarv. and similar teams are now deployed in increased numbers near the (rrsurgents' principal drop area in tbe northern part of Nicaragua Insurgent pilots continue lo Bv but are reporting growing numbers of neat misses from Sandimstaand ground fire. ^

e eapeet the Army will twrcaae lis effort lo push iru-jrgrnt forces In the north further up the Rao Bocay valley and will seek to interdict potential overland resiipply route* to insurgent units in central Nicaragua. The Sandinistas also will undertakepsyi bmogical operations lo weaken insurgentand undercut their popular support.ease-fire be established, we believe the military will attempt to place its forces to monitor and control Insurgent resupply and lo be in position to run me offensiveons, should developments run counter to the regime* intetestsJT I

rospects will grow for icscretiirdand small-scale, crosi-borderThe military has continued luch tacticalcollect InteUtgesve and to position mistake teamsiniutgent aircraft. The poce of thesehas declined since November when themoved the majority of iheir forward baseand personnel turn tbe Las Vegas salient loremoteWith Insurgent

forcea beginning to reek refuge in lhe salient area again, we eipect tbe number ol these reconnaissance operations will increase

1

here are currently no indications the regime Is planning lo resume large-scale operation* intoLast August, ihr military did move artillery elements forward toward the borderanner thai presaged previous incursions, but these forces were withdrawn after the insurgents abandoned lhe salient area. We eipect the Sandinistas will want to avoid actions that would risk provoking Washington or Tegucigalpa to lake action favorable to the insurgents. Chancesrge-scale operation would grow,should the tninitems receive new funding or succeed in establishing support base* and overland supply routes in the border area Chances would be great ml if the Insurgenti set up such liases in an area like Ihe aallgnl. where the road network on the Nicaraguan aide of lha border facilitates thebility to move and logistical h- sustain its forces. | ||

The Regional DrptotnatK Front The View From

1- Managua probably calculates that increased pressure (or on-site ver location renuifed by theAmerican Peace Accord uill further undermine Honduran support for the Nicaraguan insurgents and force it toilateral accommodation at "ell as deflect attention from its own area* nf noncompliance. The Sandinistas probably will intensity aitemptl io include Canada and sympathetic West European countries on inspection teams operating under the auspices of an inlernalional mganiulion. President Ortega, who lound only guarded European interest in such participationive nation lour in late January, isecond innEmmie in April.

Vi The regime probably will pursue ceasefire riegotiarioni while holding to demands that essentially require the Insurgents to surrender. In order to convey rleiibtlitv. Managua -ill continue to tie lurtheras an Invitation lor insurgent leaden to Join Ihe national dialogue to discuss politicalthe successful conclusionease-fire Theprobably hope the insurgents will grow frustrated and renounce lhe talha.|

he Sandinistas are also likely to ronrinuefot bilateral talks with the foiled Stales, although ihey probably have lets Interest in such discussions now lhat lethal aid to the insurgents has been cut off Aside from drrnoostraling its -illingness to regotiate. the regime probably would pursue direct negotiallons with Washington in hopes of ending lhe Iradeand obfaiiung economic assistance.^ |

Managua would see renewal of humanitarian assistance that was not specifically aimed at bringing insurgent combatants out of Nicaragua and winding down ihe warhinly veiled decision bvlo continue to support the insurgency, even if there are restrictions on the deliver an of lethal assistance The Sandinistas might suspend talks with theand ihey are likely to Irs to Increase efforts ta use the Peace Accord to force Honduras to end its suispun for ihe Resistance Dornesiicallv. we believe Ihe Sandinistas would be unlikely to grant additional ccneraiortshe opposition, but they probably would hesitate to use the aidretettol!back ot all political reforms In our view, internal policy debates over how to reactumanitarian aid package would esjcetbaleressauons within the Sard,rnti

. nd From th* Vegjon

he lour Central American drmorracics- Ii ir is. El Salvador. Guatemala, ami GalaInlear andell-orchestrated diplomatic initialise*in Incus inlrtnali'inal altmiinn on Nicaragua's failure tn ilemrcraliie Indeed, the Sandinistas conc'irrobably have beets more successful in placing lltrM iteiglibon on Ihe defensive The Presidenli nf :L, lour democratic nations have even ataUtsM Irdwil tint'lear pIctutT of how lherocess vwnild evolve when they iLgnrd the agreemeni last August because it providedeneral frameworkinal settlesnentfj fl

57 The disomy among the democracies hasheightened by domeHlc tensions arisingeir own efforts to comply with lhe PeaceThe Hondwara. for eumple. areih iheinsurgent presence, whichajorand fcl Salvador believes it cannoi givebacking to lhe arsn-Sandinistai without ursderiuir inn Us position relative lo ils own Insurgency Cuatrinala clearly does not want lo leopardlie lhe tains ni Iwa yean of 'activeerrutls ut-cteased inter national prestige and promises of KssViajaw an nml MeiK'anharshly criticlnnK Nicaragua. Costa Rlcan President Arias is the la-ast .iiWraruv arnong the democratic, insurgent military pretturo on Nicaragua and tvllrnt thai Managua should be given reasonable tirm- to democrat ur j

e see little likelihood that ihr democracies will be able to set aside the domestic problems pmed by the Peace Accord any time soon Their wiihrsgn-ts In Hep up pressure on Nicaragua at the Januari summit in Son Jose, for example, probablythe influence of US dlrslomacy. pressure (rum their own mihranes. and outrage at lhe biased rrprnlhe International Verification and Kollowup fominixinin rather than any coherent strategy The Presidi'iils cJrrnanded immediate and total compliance -ith can-mitrnents to democrat nation in language thaiclearly aimedanagua but set no follow-oai ilt-ad-linev. They abo directed that the CentralForeign Ministers assume principalt verification, In effect abolishing the InternationalandCommluions Altruivth tlie democracies Inoked on the US Congressional catsr to Cut off aid lo the anti-Sandlnlstas as depni Ingof an excuse for noncompliance,id nut lake advantage of the Central American Foreignmeeting in mid-February' torauma

II

In outhr lack of coordination will also be felt as lhe democracies wori iooint position on verification and arms control. Allitoitsh llserdetetmincd initially io main coni,ol of ihc verification process. Ihey have been rcluclanl lolemn Nicaragua's attempt to circumvent the summit agreement by organizing unilaieral iniernallonalRecently. Iheresren signs some of Ihc democracies may be more accommalaiing toverification ptoposals The democracies also are ill prepared fot discussion* on securityihe ContwlWa countries willtheirproposals did not reouire any N'icarapun diiar-ma merit. 1

ook ol the Regional Peace Talks

will rroiieil cutoffi lo irregular forces lo lake place inays: permlli atd fnrat rrlvilni

Covrrrunents old regualefrain from rccrl-ing aid

Governments reHerale pledgesrevent iheir territory from bring lord by intutsKntt and lo

relimn Irom giving or permuting niliUn loglilic

uipporl foro try to drstaodiie" lhe Central American

place Inara

- InuirgeMi mint release iheir prunneri limul-taneouilv

NationalCoenn.isi.oe.

To br (censed nittlBian Irom Mgnalurr

Purposeo verify fulfillment ol pledgesuni y. ceate-Hrr. democratization und elee-Iksns

fompuiilinn one member and one alternate fromrSorrti nponaatmm parties, and lead-trtgrtilrras arnetnrnerst chooses eWcti and ggpg-utWinUI ihey provide

Deon

Takes place inays,

"Brain. lernocraiK and ekmlr* isaiuwi ha* nght tn chome-l system withoutinirrfrrent*

Complete liberty fie irfeviaton. radio, and press, no prior censorship, all ideological groups may own and noerare> media, full aceew to media foe peAtiral groupi

Al ratsWiral organ-tar mn* have nghtneaanuc and hold public demnnel' al loo*.

Iii Kate of srlge/rmcf genoy.

Free Elections

"Once lhe condilHins thailrnuKiacs liave beenhe cnvr-rnmrnlt muit establish free elections.

American Parliament electul> It-Mi OAS. UN, andihud slates

legnlatiie. and ptesadential elections to br overseen by Internabservers; schedule accordance with current const ilu'.ion*.

Arsm Control Talk*

andtgirremti In he iwsnei atedith Contadora nsedaatWa- talks tn leelude mr.-tirn to disarm intuigere*

date foe termination ofefugee*

pledge lo prelect and aid: faeihiatc rrtulriaticc.

Develapiweat

pledge lo reach accordsedite development, iolm nessullBllons lor intertf

lalernattaul Verification

Purpose is to verify and follow up on (tr-iwniocsinsent. including reconciliation

Nfertrbership OAS and UN Secretary General; Central American. Contadora. and support group loreign ministers

ttJl arslia- prcagres*ays

Central Arnertran preudenti to meet mithin IM day*

Other

a presidential agreemeru.reaty.

prm tne lort.&calra

pen emlrd

No sanctions forgree

Key Retuto of the Son Jot* Summit.8

rrmlmiti oVmj'ulwl irtjl t'impnjiar oilli

Im-nlt loui drill jmna-Ui. anil ilriOJUrjIinnmsi iliihulr

ih" h'ling of any statr of'l litvdnmn* pn*liiiuliuii. iinl ihr tkoninlirnB nl ipei'ialin- final iiimrniiniuue ihiiiuem.mr'i to fiimliiinii toinpluiKrie lerifiril rinf of I'S jlil to ihr uuiiiwntc

Aid to lhe Inmrgrnfi Hofiilniiaolilptjlliin tiirtnl .Ul to tlie uiitl-MliiiliiiHij iihnteriat* i> implicit in deituntl for foiljo- annmilmcnts. ImiI in ni.rii >ci<*nbri impotiancr. Tla-tr ii no rrilii'ninS jiil In the Nicjisiiun itiirtriUii ur ^'irilI" thr United States to impeil thi* aern-nti'iil.

Vril/ico'lon-mrnVjii Kmi-iim Minutrn willthetin-Internationalml"iiin jiml replace llir commissiimHit prirtttilalfoi verification Nouili- (inunter-mnriilnrlnii ftirce. hut vinmiit poriieipinti aercc to rnrunt oulHih' inimical help lor the Foreian Miniiten

Central American Parlwu-ni. Iinportawi*he parliamenti n" timetable announced fit rli-ctii-w.

iVerl Summit Meetlntt. No date* an* icivrn (nr mien* of enmpfianer mtaj uiinm'i eommiimentt.

Chronology of Nkaroguan Ceose-Fire ondProposals7

Nicaragua mesents detailed proposal few creation of political and securityat lhe mreling in Managua of lhe International Veribcution Commission.

7

The Nicaraguan Governmentroop ptilfbaclt from certain zones to permit cease-fires with local Bucrrilfa commanders YVjihin three weeks, the govern-merit sets upocal and regional peace committees to encourage guerrillas to accept amnesty. Meanwhile, the Sandinistas maintain iheir opposition to meeting with the insurgent leadership.

57

On the day of the deadline for complying with the democratization androvisions of (he peace agreement. Prnidcnt Ortega announces he will agree to indirect cease-fire talks with ihe insurgents ihrough an Iniermedlary.

7

Nicaragua annouiKespolnt ceuse-fare plan The Sandinistas offer to suspend orTenaive operations for iwo weeks lo permit lhe insurgents to assemble in three ronesecember. The insurgents would surrender Iheir arms8 upon interriatlonal ven6caiion of government compliance with peace commitments. The Insurgents would be permitted humanitarian aid if delivered by an international agency.

7

Tbe anti-Sandlnista insurgentsease-fireanuary Al the outset, the government would be required to lift the state ol emergency,ull amnesty, take measures to democratise, and dissolve Sandinlsta rielghboihood committees and paramilitary security groups

7

After conducting separate talks with the government and insurgeivts in Sanlo Domingo. Cardinal Obando calls for two short cease-fires toeligious holiday and Christmas and lor the government lo make democratic reforms. The insurgents accept Obandos rtroposal in principle, but the Sandinistas say all US and Honduran aid to Ihe insurgents must cease before they could accept.

7

A second round of Indirect talks in Santo Domingo is suspended when the insurgents refuse the Sandinlsta demand that tbe insurgents meet with the government's foreign advisers. The guerrillas agree to do so only if government representatives abo participate. Obando publicly endorses direct talks before the nvcetirsg

7 Both sideshristmas truce and accuse lhe other of violating it.

President Ortega announce* j< lhe ouveltiButi oflhe Central .Artscrsvan summit rwill immediately lift the Hale of rmersjencv ami cnttduct direct latin will, ihenil jmrsesly will her trtridttsannease-Are agreement

6

N>caragua publrcire* diplomitK 'hat Cotstadora reManagua imamtary lo vend steps taken in complr with the sum mil aarrernrnl

President Ortega visits Spam. Ilaly. Norway, and Sweden lo request their patticlpa-lion in verification of Nicaraguan comnlunce with peace commitments

8

The Nlcaraguaii Covemmcni and insurgent Mtikito Indian leader Brooklyn Riveraommunique inihet invite Canada, Costa Rica. Cuba. Denmark. Finland, Holland.nd Sw ilirrland to be witnesses lo iheir agreement ami lo lend moral and materialto uWlnpmeril on the Ailantic coast.

8

At the Brst round of direct talks between the Sandinistas and insurgenis in San lose the insurgents endorse the Nicaragua* intetnal ogipotitlon's rsropusal foe IT cncistilu-liOnal amendmenti and propose ihal the nptarsstnon participate in the talk* The iraurrents propose that the netsotiaisoo* be concluded withinart, durissg which lime both side* would not acqvsre additional military supplies.

A new Sandinrat* plan would permit the insurgents to keep iheir armsbort period untilerification of Nicaraguan compliance It also proposes creation of an additional verification mechanumof the Conradora countries and inWnsllonal politicalguarsntee political tights to insurgents accepting amnesty.

8

At lhe second round ol fare-to face talks between the insurgents and theCardinal Obando suspends negotiations when the government leum does not immediately endorse hi* ceasefire proposal The Cardinal proposes thateneral amnesty, allow full freedom of expression, and reconsider forced military conscription In ctchangedas truce Insurgent negotiators accept the proposal in principle President Ortega lactll) endorses (he plan, although he says thai the Sandinistas would only grant amneiti and lower recruitment levelsease-fjre was Implerrsented Both sides lav ihey are willing lo reconvene at any lime

NicoroQuon Complorsce Wilh the Centred American Peace Plon

of Noncompliance

Democfalijalioi

!>talr of

lifted lhe Male ol citiriftrnn on

.

failed tn lift .dl Hit ical restrictionsie dale specified in llir Peace Accord.rnember. The .SundtriiWa parts iK-wsmwr accused the opvoallion of Jj ning the political spuce"he peaceagreement In addition in his statement,ir..nt> nnecemher.Ortega indicated that the Tfillliaiililnot cede effective pniHiral power even if thes -err drfrulcdrrr etrction

activities

The opposition Ii permitted to rnecloutdoor marches and rallies are per* milted with prior government approval

The reqiUrcment that llie oppnsimn see* permission In li-Jd marches and ralliesnurs in advance violates reainiialilr USns-(IjtiU for freedom of avsembls

government permitted lhe opposition newspaperPffn.ie to reopen aridh without censorship.

government has warned La Ptenia nn Kveral recentgainst publishtng slalrments ol imurgentractice that contrasts with the abtllty of lhe guerrillasalvador ami Guatemala to DulJuh guefnlla communiQue* in lheW Sandinistas have abo attempted ro intimidate La Preuse bv accsnang tbe newspaper of promoting violent rjogastationLa Prrnu employees acre br.eflv rietained bylKe aassl one reporter -as beaten and warned against antireglme rrttsaflttat in Octobrr

The Sandinistas permitted the churchstation to reopenalong wiih sis nthr*broadca.sl newswithoul censorship. On '6 January, the government annnunced it wnaM broaden press freedom, allowing several other statKHis tn broadcast news

Onega onnotinced onWmher ihal Ik' nnulri not upprnvr Ihe request ol private liusincssmen toelevision stalton-arftitiirg ihat many West Europeanie*onopoly.

government has invited all edles tn return The National Assembly repealed legislation allowing the seirure of property of those who have Wt the country for over sis months

The government has refusedestoresllrs return or reverse politically motivated confiscations

procedures

abolished the anli-Somocbta Popular Tribunals onanuary.

continue lo be held incommunicadointhat do not meet international standards, including recent aivuta-lions ol torture The government press has boasted thai the erul .if Ihe special tribunals will have little effect on processingaccused nf counterrevolutionary activities. Moreover.upreme Court resigned to proles! governmentwith judicial orders.

savs it refuses to consider th- *'

K1oroiucr ending the subordination of ie Nicaraguan Army to the Sandinlsta party.

elections

says It will discuss with the oppositionate for municipal elections Nicaragua ratified the treatyentral American Parliament and will accept International observers to monitor lhe election of delegates

National reconciliation

Electoral tribunal is Sandinisla dominated.

was the Gist Central American country to lorm its National Reconciliation Commission. It also established local peace commissions in late September as part of its strategy toartial cease-Sre. split the insurgents, and co-opt local church leaders. The governmentational dialogue with opposition poliiieal parliesctober.

national dialogue talks exclude major opposii.on bini-ness and labor groups. Fourteen of thepposition isniili.-ul parties walked out ol the talks7 toW Sandinlsta refusal to forwaid their Joint proposal for constinrmdments lo the National Assembly. The Sandintitaelay the implenyeniatlon of amendment! until alvprobablythey must be approves] inonsecutive regulative sessions.

Nicaragua proonoed ani nwfjre pbno* ember. anditemsmmterprepnulmem-ber Cease-fire lalki under the mediation of Cardinal Obando lone place in Santondecember Both tides agreedhristmasand accuted ihr other of violating-hird round oftalks look place ISrbn;^r>jtrii.ab

Peace Plan doe* Ml detail theV

SaiiPK noi, lhat nanef ri-nrrfi mml 'i J|

chate cease-nres pern-lied hy tl.ni nali< MM, The PreudeMs af lhe Central Imrrhranppeared U> treat thr Sandiarrtai pretmnitttI tails with Ihr inturgrntt at n> - .

anuary, Ihe Sandinistas proposed lhat an international commission guarantee political riahiiease-fire.

unilateral invitations lo Conladma -nd Wert Ri'mpnin countries lo verily !wnd inula compliance circiimirnlt an avriv ment at (Itc January uimmil lhat (lie Cenlral American rWiitn Ministers would have pnncipal responsibility In mil vrrinciilliin malic"!.

Amneil.

releaied MS political pmonm onovember The government1 it will restate allNationala cease-hre. In ihe abamceease-ore. -ill releaie prisoners lo fuetgn

unlike Ihe denwrecies. hai not released all political pf owners bv the dale Specified in the Peace Accord Tlte Sumlimniu alio hate not permilled internailonal human right* groupi aver*.dale lecuntt prisons Democratic leaden have ileno>incnlbint proposal, laying the concept of etile no-npuiilaYlull amnesty

External aid lo miurgrnti

and hai madr

Nicaragua continueshe Sah-adoran no move* to persuade tbem to git* up armed

International verification

U disposed io accept interna-lional verification nf ell atpecti of lhe peace agreement and hai allempied to accelerate creation nf an Impeciion

Sandinistas unilaterally have attempted to arrangeverification of their compliance, violating an agreement al the January summit lhat tlie Cenlral American Foreign Ministers have principal responsibility for verification.

control

American andadepre-sentalivei met in Caracas onecember and agreed to meet again in Panama in February

Defense Minister Ortega onecember confirmed Sandinista plansassive arms buildup,MX0UM. man Army Although President Ortega bier mkI lhe buildup mmroposal contingent on IS actions. CoUa rliein PrewVot .Arias is quoted in the press as saying it it not "in ihe ipirir" of the Peace Accord

ondinisra Support for Subversion

CenVol Airvoxa

Drsptte Mjrjdiii uvntWrn io ihr sources of varying reliability saiggrst thai Nrcarastuaii support (or radical leftist and insurgent groom In thr region continues. The Central American Pease I'lan requires Nicaragua to end such aid bul the SaruliiuMa*

ihe OtherRica. El Selvatkir.

Guatemala, aridnot ht ablr i

tha

idji

Efarabundo Marli National Liberation Front remains the chief beneficiary of Sanditiirta support. Sandinista leader Tomas Bora* has csHillisiHtJ to provide tbe Salvadoran rebels with weapons arttl other support-

>blv

cLrililie

weir planning lo transfer lii and lll.lMHl .Iditi'inal rifles to the insurgents as early jv Onvmliir

i'is:

|the Saltiadtearimaintain com mimical ioiu faitlitir*.Mnreni-er. lhe Sandinistas prmiiledtraining late last Slimmer and missile*.

althouam thcstegspnl wnxi .amu

li weapons to lhe rebeb Nicaragua also lias imIm Saliailotan ittsuraerjjilu

Managua provided similar, albeit mure limited, support to Cua'rmsicn and Honduran Hnvis

The Sandinistas were training Guatemalaneaders as late as7 byie ihi-ni -insurgency' bai la linns, r

B-l

Nicaraguan Support for Guerrillas and Radical Leftists in Central America.8

trainir*

'Null-.

McniBunirJlHi'K Littles

immimiilcn

inhllfalR.

<tPnn

nippurr

uipmt

lire-

also cent losses tn ship weuii-ihe rebeb. j

The Sandinistas continue to provide fundsariety of Honduran leftist group*hem to reside In Nicaragua

Divisions ssiihin lhe Cotia Kicon radical hit have cuiivni Nicaragua lo diminish its support in recent sears Past Sandinista support has included training,ash and logistic* through the Nsra'.gsun Fmtusiy in San lose |

Strife the Peace Plan was signed in Augustliasumbct olmask iu support and demonstratewiih the areerd Last autumn, forthe Sandintstu declined torqsarslguerillasOOssaultocket launchets to avoid possibleinn,

Similarly.vianag-ua oritVreil all

SaNa-iuean rebel factions last September to cngtalirrm mimical ionsingle lacditv under Sin.li-ntsta Liinirol to male it difficult lor the United State* lo claim lhat Nicaragua was violating the Pease flan

in Decernihator an ifresence in Nicaragua Sidonly Im propaganda Dii/posei and ihalwould be allowed lo rrluin in lhecontinue Ifw-ir ope*aliotM as before

E he where in totar no

Nicaragua, working In landem with Cuba, haiey source of (raining and support for leftists elsewhere in the lwm:iphere Cuemlta*from Afgenflnai. CAdr. CoaeWae th-RtpniJirnadot Mexico, and Unmuawmililary (raining in NtoB rag ua.hai ah> prmwiVd OJom.

Inai jiii) Prrirjlan relirU wfctJi MBfjargaj uu!lupport.In

addition Nicaragua lacililales contact! arn-tngleftists.

36

Original document.

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