South Africa's African National Congress: Weathering Challenges
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African National Congress:
Weatherinz Challenges am
African NaUonal Congress (ANC) has met the challenges posed by
im/onmiumevents In Sooth Africa over the last few years by maintaining its
cohesion, retaining its dominant position in tbe antiapar-
tiiciG mervement, and broadening iu contacts with the West. Pretoria's virtual binning of tbe bUck oc^itiost ia February probably trill load lo new challenges and opportunities for the ANC, particubuiy In its relations with groupsth Africa
The leadership component ofieniber Nation!Commitrigorously adhered to coosensas deeiskc making to reconcile ideological, generational, and ethnic differences. Tbe organiza-tion also has avoided fractious debate by focusing on itsoverthrow of white rule inskirting controversial issues such as the characterostaparthcid South Africa. |
The ANC's ability to forge consensus bas enabled it to adjust its political and railitary policies to address tbe changing realities of South Africa, The increased radical tag tion aad poiiiidation of blacks during tbe last several years and the emergence of strong antigovernmect domestic org am rat ions, such as tbe United Democratic Front, have posed new challenges to theANCi policies and to its ability to affect devclopmeBti in the black community. Tbe ANC has responded by relaxing restrict ions on targets for its insurgents and establishing alliances with internal groups, including the increasingly powerful black Labor movement, toorapeUlion for black Loyalties and to secure rrscogurjoo of its own preeminent role. To widen itserode support for Soulh African State President Botha'sANC has also intensified its campaign to woo South African whites. |
Tbe ANC has taken advantage of the unparalleled interest in South Africa on the part of fcsteign gcverrur.cnts to attempt to increase international pressure OO Pretoria and to seek political and financial backers. ANC officials reportedly consider Westernin the form ofinWrMtiooal isolation crucial to breakingill. Pretoria's recent crackdown on internal opponents probably will give new impetus to the ANCs carnpaign for stiffer economic sanctions against Sooth Africa. Overtures to the West have not substituted for kmgstandina lies to the Soviet Union, however; the organization has simply widened the range of its international contacts. H
believe that Ihe ANC's successful response lo recent chslknfee indiesles (hat it will continue to maialain organi rational unity and policy relevance under probable conditions over the Dear term. We doubt that tbe oriaoiratWo wiO make any dramatic policy change* In the neat two to three yean, but the question of kiUiag South African whites willontroversial topic. We believe that ANC leaden will be reluctant toholesale campaign directed at white civilians, but operationalrv.it .nun will probably preclude tight control over more milium ANC members. In addition, militantradicalized by the latest wire of gcrwrunenlmay call for an increase in atttck* on civilian targets.esult, weontinued slow increase In while casualties.
The ANCs reliance oo cooseosus decUicmniSJtinj also makes it less likely that tbe roup will adopt any bold initiatives. We believe that ANC leetlers wiU ccfltinwc to find it easier to agree internally oo respooses toactions than on new strategies of their own. Moreover, unity concerns, which preclude debate of cootcntious issues, and the continued need for Soviet sudthat lb* gtrcng Ccarununisl influence will sot diminish.!
umikxly to occur over tbe near term, dnveloprncnU Ihat would threaten ANC ccibcaioo include leadershipss the result of the rrJease of Nelsonan increase in black ethnic tensions. Mcawer, we believe that, should the ANC come to power, tbe organizationsfcnenikHksi, and ethnic differences would significantly worsen and threaten tbe group's cohesion. If Pretoriaincreased violent internal repression and If the ANC wereby more rmhtant groups thatadical rruliury policy directed at whiles, in our new, the ANC couldiolent campaign against white dvuians. On tbe other band, if Pretoria agreed to crediblexiations with imrsortant opposition groups represenliflg significant numbers of blacks, the ANC might decide to abandon ibt preconditions for negotialions in order not to be excludedolitical settlement
Co tit eats
Cnallecgcs; MaiDtaining Cohesion
Challenges: Dealingadicalized Cojuoitocncy
of Mili tary Policy
to tbe Internal
Pressures: Reaching Out to the International Community 8
Western Contacts g
Potential for ANC Disunity
Dramatic Shifts in ANC Policy
Tbe National Executive Ccarirnitice
Scopepaper assesses Ihe continued viability of the exiled African National
Congress (ANC) as tbe leader of tbe antiapartheid struggle io tbe wake of developments in Sooth Africat goes beyond two previous studies1 in discussing how the organization copes wiih internal tensions and responds to challenges to its leadership posed by black opposition groups inside Soulh Africa and by intense international scrutiny. mM
African National Congress:
Withering Challenges Imm
Unrest erupted anew in South Africa4evised CocstitutioQ gave limited national political representation lo Colored* and Indians but continued to deny the same rights to blacks. The extent and intensity ot black reaction produced government countermeasnres that ranged from half-heartedal political reform to the declarationationwide state of emergency innd, more recently, the virtual banning ofppositiongroupsrade union federation. The period4 also bas seen the eawrgcace of black political organization* and leaders inside Soulhrowth in mailancy among black youth, and mash-rooming taternauooal pressure on Pretoria to make meaningful political changes. These new realities haverofound impact not only on the white regime En Pretoria but also on its principal opponent, theNational Congress (ANC).
Thu Research Paper examine* theesponse to unprecedented organizational and policy challengesiscusses prospects for continued ANC cohesion and leadership of tbe antiapartheid struggle over the near term, and examines policy implications for Ibe United States, ll also explores alternative developments that mightplit in the organization or cause dramatic shifts In ANC poli-
Organlxndotud ChaUenges: Maintaining Cohesion
Tbe African National Congress has contended with ideological, generational, and ethnic factionalism since it was foundedensions among groups have varied in intercity and scope, regularlychanges in policy and tactic* and on rare occasions causing open splits in ihe organization. Profound differ cocci over strategy during UseNelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and other leading lights In the ANC Youth League to seize
control of the parent organization.and ethnic disagreements led dissident* to form the spiinier Pan-Africanisl Congress. InterNC differecxes have also been responsible for thepurging of individual officials and of small cliques lhat refused to assent to the majority view.lethora of new internal and external pressures thai have ihiensLhcd in recent years, the ANC bas survived intact largely because thedisparate groups have subordinated their individual agendas in pursuit of their commonthe overthrow of the while regime. |
Idtelotital Differencet. Ideological frictionsrevolve around Ihe inclusion of Coramunbis in ihe ANC and have long been the most serious leadership and organizational problem facing the ANC. The political views of members of the National Executive Committeehe primary leadership component of the ANC, range from moderate socialist loMar
The National Extent it* Committee
As ihe policymaking arm of the ANC, tkt NBC effectively runs iht ANC through its committees, whose everyday responsibilities Includeand foreign, political, and military affairs. Theembers of tht NBC represent, althoughtht ideological, age. and ethnic groups that the ANC comprises and also embody the deep differences In views that characterise those i
Generattonalty,EC members belong to tht group that began associating with Iht ANC before it was outlawed0 and turned to violence. Tht youngest members of this group are In their early fifties. Eight NBC members belong to the next generation, which encompasses those who became octree In the ANC during the decade following0 massacre af black protesters at SharptviUt. Representatives from this generation are in their mldthirties to late forties. Younger, more militant generations are not yet represented on the NEC.
< Ethnically, tht NEC haslacks from fivetribes, two Indians, two Coloreds, and one white.
ideological and generational affiliations af the NEC Inadequately reflect the makeup of tht ANC Itself. Our analysis of intelligence reporting leads us to conclude that the percentage of Communists on the NBC Is considerably higher than the overalltn the ANC for example, and the median age af the NBC It probably aboutears older than that of organization membershole. On the other hand, we believe the NEC's ethnic eompastttonmirrors ihe black majority in the ANC and Xhosa preeminence among black groups, abj
See atpendUBsor deteits retnrtins ihe aglUatttmsEC
Although ideological differences pose the greatest potential threat to ANC unity, both non-Communists and Communists have deliberately subordinated long-term partisan goals in recognition of the mutual benefits of working together to achieve their coniinoa short-term objective. The publidB enu nf SACP members, ave taken their directions from Moscow, suggest that tbe party believes that tbe promotion of ANC unity is the best way to maintain SACP influence over tbe course of event* lending to eventual black rule in South Africa.
Moreover, partnership probably appears more atlrac-dve lo the SACP thao oompelilion because (he party has organizational problems thai minor the idecuOsu-caJ, generational, and ethnic differences of the ANC
solution to South Africa's problem* (probably fostered by Moscow's realization that the "revolution" is nots well as Soviet ackrsowledgmcnt of the ANC's primacy in the antiaparthcid struggle, also encourages SACP cooperation with nOc-Communisu and helps toideological tensions between them, at least for the snort term, i
Nor.-Communisi* in the ANC are equally anxious to keep Idwlogjcal frictionsinimum. To preserve unity, Tambo txadttionally has responded to SACP complaint* about anti-Communist machinations by curbing the party's anUgorustS.1
g*atr*iio*al ttuioiu. Generational difiercnces in the ANCong history bul have particularly plagued the organization mice the outbreak of6 Soweto riots, whichassive influx of mutant young recruit* into ANC ranks Tee hurt few years have seen tbe emergence inside South Africacw group of commit led aad even more radical ized black yoath, who have karacd ANC militant* in arging aa intensified military campaign.
These demands have placed increasing (trains on the orgs nixatioij. Middle-aged snd older members still dominate tbefill almost all senior
all NECyounger cadre*.
file is the ANC itself and Iu snflltary wing. The key issue has boon their divergent approach to violence and military tactics. The younger members not only support these means but slto tend to be djctcof whiteaandjeas committed to particular ecc^onv le
In tbe last couple of years, the ANC leadership has adjusted iu policies both in response to the demands of its younger generation and because even more senior ANC officials became convinced of the need to modify their military tactics. The election of several relatively junior officials to NEC seatslso pleased tbe militants. The public statements of these new NECthey are ia their forties and therefore do not belong to the same generation as thethat theymore closely with the aspirations of young cadre* than the more senior leaders,
finer aad ethnicity.he least fractious and meet often exaggerated of the differences thatthe NEC, in our view, bat this issue causes greater tension below top leadershipew black NEC members resent tbe nonblacka on the committee because of their disprryportionate influence
Ethnic differences among blacks have been mare divisive for (he organization over tbe last few years than those among racial groups. Although several black ethnic groups are represented on the NBC, the Xhosas, wbo live primarily In tbe eastern part of South Africa's Cape Province and are more than five million strong, have dominated the ANC for almostears and have formed the backbone of the military wing since its creation. All ANC leaders publicly deny I
The ANC has tried to deal with racialalbeit with questionable success at the rank-and-fileemphasizing the "Afrieanncas" of South Africa's whites and by repeatedly declaring that itsot with whites per se but with aa"apartheid governmenL" Ethnic factionalism has been handled by emphasizing lo new recruits Ihe. ANCs commitment to ethnic diversity and,ore substantive way, by broadening the leadership to include more representatives from non-Xhosa ethnic groups- For example, three of the six blacks who joined the NBC3 are non-Xhoia.|
Mechanic of unity
The ANC bas also maintained unity by making consensus the centerpiece of its decisionmaking ;
An examiuation of ANC decisions revcab thai the consensu* tool has some drawbacks, affecting both the pace and quality of itsrocess often delays' evelootDeots- For example, the ANC's fa Dure to respond6 British Commonwealth offer to facilitate negotiations wiih Pretoriagave ihe government extra time to change its mind about the initiative and later to blame the ANC for Its failure. Moreover, the necessity for consensus has blunted the ANCs ability to adopt boldrimarily because it has been easier to agreeon responses to Pretoria's moves than on new strategies of Us own.esult, ANC policies generally are reactive rather than innovative |
Despite these drawbacks, the consensus system bas worked remarkably well for the ANC, in our view. Byecisionmaking style that facilitatesamong divisive groups, the ANC ha* been able to deal successfully with unprecedented domestic and intentional pressures in recent years lhat. if unmet, might have compromised its position as tbe preeminent representative of South Africa'soreover, ihe policymsking process ha* permitted the ANC to deal confidently with issues and aevelop-menli oa which it has reached agreement and also has given it some immunity from attempts io exploit its divisions.
Domestic Challenges: Dealingadicalized Constituency
The dramatic changes thai have occurred4 have significantly altered the way the ANC operates and relates to its constituency inside South Africa.
Caught oflguard by tbe widespread unrest ud hdehtcncd politicaJ awareness of blacks, it haaand revised iu lactic* to suit newhese changes have ranged from adjusting military tactic* to aublithing sound relations with newblack groups lo courUng South African whites.
targets, inch as shopping malls and supermarkets, that are often tbe work of township militants or poorly cusdplined members, even though such attacks are not approved operations |
Tbe new military policy is, in our view, still ambigu-ous, and the organ! ration remains reluctant toremeditated campaign against white civilians. ANC rhetoric generally remains mote radical than itt
Tie. to tn* Internal Opposition Relations Wilh Political Coups. Tbe expansion of domestic opposition groups over the past few years has tasked the ANC's ability to affect development* in South Africa's black community. Although Pretoria claims that internal black groups are merely front organizations for the ANC, we believe thebetween the ANC and internalspecifically the multiracial United Democratic Frontfar more roanptexJ
or example, although the range oftarget* now includes white fanners who monitor ANC infiltrations on behalf of the government, ud even urban white males comjdercd eligible forservice, available evidence does notarked increase in attacks against them. In fact, landmines placed oa rural roads and bombings in urban areas have resulted in far greater nan white casualties. ANC pcupagsnda still contains provocative calls to "bring the struggle into whileut official prar*ounc*menU appear to be carefullyto avoid arousing white concerns.^pB|
eoly accepted teat iney could not compete with the access these groups had to blacks, the ANC appeared reluctant to let internal leaders make independent decisions on strategy. At the same time, the ANC appeared to have no qualms about using the ready-made grassroou network of an organization like the UDF to mobilize protests and possibly even to recruit for its mUrtary wing. These poUcset, however, have had the unintended effect of reinforcing Pretoria'a stereotype of the UDF as an ANC stalking horse and have risked alienating some elemcau of the black opposition. Pretoria cited ANC sUternenU supporting antUpartbeid groups as evidence of complicitythe internal black opposition and the insurgent group lo justify the restriction in8 of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) oflack opposition groups, including tbe UDF.
Over lime the ANC bu chimed iu polkie* andore cooperative attitude that reflects both iu growing, respect for the capabilities of the internal opposition and iu nndersUnding of tbender which it operates.esult, we believe that the ANC and the internal opposition todayore equal coalition of forces, although numerous US Embassy reports indicate thathallenge the ANC's singular popular appeal. I
. campaign to
improve ties to internal black organizations, the ANC has also courted the black laborember Congress of Sooth African Trade Unions. Since iu establishmentS.eservoir of political power has presented the ANC with new.
. cooperative arrangement, indicating that they recognize thatof iu ability to deliver on bread-and-butterfar more direct influence over South Africa's black work force. SACTU appears to haveiche in servingiaison capacity.
ANC leader* today continue to meet with their UDF counterpart* outside South Africa to discuss general goals and strategics, but the exiled group no longer iasitU that internal activities be coordinated in detail. The ANC reportedly offers advice to the internal groups on tbe kinds of protests that would be mutually beneficial, but it aim wii guidance from groups inside South Afr
ANC, SACTU, and COSATU leaders meet regularly to discuss sua ten' and policies and to coordinate activities.'
.COSATU, in torn,'
^NC goals. Tne ou tcome of COSational cocferecce underscored the group's commit moot to the ANC. The labor federation vowed tobe forefront of political activity in South Africa, cencially adopted the ANC's agenda aaia the Precdom Charter, and. like tbe ANC, called for comprehensive economic sanctions and
Despite tbe strong link* and frequent coniacutbe ANC and COSATU, tbeir reUtidoahip ptobably will rernaio complicated. COSATU is wor-ried about ANC encroachment, and we believeetermined toafe distance between Uself and the ANC, regardless of Its support for ANC positions. Relation, with the ANC also have caused friction within COSATU between those mem-ben who favor greater political activism and those wbo argue that the federation should devote its time to labor Issues and industrial problems.
Tbeto recogrdzein the black labor movement has not stopped the ANC from secldng Independent contacts with brack workers, another tactic that could sour relations between the two groups. Tbe ANC continues to try to cultivate relations with the leaders of individual COSATU affillat
In addition to pursuing contacts with the internal I
black opposition, the ANC also bas sought to impj
its relations with South African whites. In responseovertures, groups of whites ignored SouthGovernment warnings and traveled to Lusakaleaders i
Despite the ANCl interest in attracting whitethe leadership apparently is reluctant to embrace some of the moderate policies advanced by white
groups, particularly the renunciation ofprobably out of concern thatove might erode black support for tbe organization. The leadership has, however,pecial effort in iu sUlcmcoU and actions to allay misgivings about the ANC aad its campaign to end minority rule. In officialfor example, the ANC consistently sutes that whites have an important role to play in posupanbeid South Africa and that the ANC is fighting the "apartheidot whites.
Although ANC overtures havemall but growing number of well-known whites who arewith the Botha governmeat, they have not convinced tbe average white Soulhprimary concern isthe government should talk to the ANC Poib indicate lhat even whites considered liberal by whiu South African standardsistinctly more coiuervative line when the ANC is the issue. This while altitude came through clearly in the7 election when whites voted overwhelmingly for candidates wbo called for action againstlthough ANC leaders were sobered by the election results, we believe they continue to view improved relations with whites as an important part of their overall political strategy aimed alroad. rrudtirariaUe^tioo that would pressure Pretoria to negotiate.
had eajoyed good relations with several Noidk countries, its official contacts wilh other Westetn govemmcnu had been limited.
Since embarking oa iu carnpalgn lo the West, the ANC baa solicited financial aid from non-Commi sources- bet its primaryhas been more than "tin-cupities human rights issues and drarsccratsc pn.ocip.ea. the ANC has pressed Western
further bnhue Pretoria. ANC leaders have increased the frtooeacy and derauon of their visit, to the West Tambo has been panicaiarry active, lalklnt with the Minjannof NewZeaknd. AiutrsJui.and sta weD as the US Socreiary of State and tbe IK Foreign Minister, over the lest two year
Receotly. however, tbe ANC has suffered some diplo-malic disappointments. At tbe Commonwealthinritish Prime Minister Thatcher rejected further economic sanctions against South Africa and rleacribed the ANCarrorletMoreover, several other Western| including those of the United Stater aad Australia-have been pressing tbe ANC to clarify iu poetapar-tfaeid agenda and to denoeoce acta of wokoce. The ANC reseats these demaada aad ewblicly accuses Westers laden of setting higher aUederds for its ccesdect than for Pretoria's Despite rhesoric sad recent setbacks, the ANC has so far itcfraincd from
We expect tbe ANCi campaign for suffer sanctions to mteosify in tbe next year in response io Pretoria's February crackdown enpponents.
Mainlaiakss Old Ilea
In our view, the ANCe courting of tbe West haa not dirsuruahed the importance of iu lira to the Soviet Uiuon. Moscow, in fact, ha* backed ANC overtures to the West in conjunction with its current supportolitical solution to the South African problem. Sovietfor ANC dtplcrnatic initiatives Is probably contingent on the West gaining no significantover the dkectioo of ANC policy and not undermining the ANC/SACP alliance. Tho Soviets aho have accepted ANC solicitation of Western humanitarian and economic assistance and have urged the ANC to use iU Western contacU tothe "liberation" struggle.
In Africa, ANC leaders nave sought to improve accesi to the Frontline States' so as to improve their military effectiveness, but to date they have had little success. Most southern African leaders are politically committed to the ANCs goals but stop short of aiding and abetting its military activities because of the threat of South African military retaliation. Inno country border ing South Africa permiu ANC military bases on its territory. Frontline leaders are generally supportive of the ANCs attempt to improve relations with the West snd share the ANCs conviction that Western diplomatic and economic pressure on South Africa needs to be intensified.
Outlook and tin plications
We believe that the ANC will maintain iu position as leader ef the antiapantxid snaggle over the next several years. Iu experience whn consensusand iu successful accommodation of various
1isbia. Zimbabwe, Angola. Taoxaraa, aadANCo miliuiy
ideological, generational, and ethnic strains willit to handle organizational pressures, in oar view. The preservation of unity, however, will probably necessitate further broackniog of tbe leadership to quiet organiratiODal rivalries. SACP influence will remain strong, in our judgment, not only because of the need for Soviet aid but also because (he ANC and SACP realize tbey need each ether to attain their mutual goal of black majority rule in South Africa.
Tbe ANC will continue to adjust its rwlidc* to changing circumstance* in South Africa, but we do notramatic shift in tactics. Tbe ANC is likely to maintain close relations with tbe internal black cpposilion and labor unions. The newprobably wQ] prompt internal groups to seek ANC advice on eperating underground in order to continue opposition activities. The ANC wOl also continue to court whites, but wc do not believe that It will make acccnunodations, such as rencnincinghat would endanger tbe support of blacks.
The question of killing white civilians will remain tbe most controversial topic on the ANC policy agenda. Pretoria's recent action* probably have discredited black leaders who attempted to rein in militant youth and have reinforced perceptions that whites will never
voluntarily give up power. These realizations may prompt many black you tha to leave ibe country lo join tbe ANC* military wing in exile. These potential now recruits, wbo have received their rxolitjcal baptism of fireiolent rrivinwunent, probably will urge the ANC to carry out more attacks against whiteWc believe ANC leaders will remain reluctant to endorseampaign. Wc cannot rule out, however, that the ANC leadership may respond to even greater government repression by granting the military wing more latiuide in choosing targets.operational coosiramta-^mmunkatkias and logistic problenis-*ai preclude tight control of ANC members and townshipoontiDocd slow increase in white civilian casualtiesesult.
The ANC Is likely to continue to pursue hs two-track policy of maintaining dose ties to Bloc countries while expanding contacts in the West. It will do this because it needs Bloc aid, on the one hand, and becauseonvinced that Western pressure is critical toPretoria's will, on the other. The Soviet focus on political, rather than only military, meansay to change the governing system almost certainly will encourage the ANC to continue its WesternHowever, the ANCs courting of the West inevitably will stop short of action that would threaten organizationalasignificant, number ofthat would erode its position as the premier representative of the blackas unilaterally forrwearing violence-
to press for change* in Nicies or altitudes. Indeed, the ANCs concern that other rssrties may try to divide the group will probably harden its commitment to cohesion aodoreover, the characteristic cautiousness of tbe ANC also suggests that the organization will not propose novel solutions to Ihc Soulh African problem and that its response Ume to faat-rareaking events, roduding political uiitiatives that may be launched by Washinn-lon or Pretoria, will remain agocuxlngly slow.
Tbe West's relations with Ihe ANC probably will abo remain difficult because of the group's penchant for fiery rhetoric and ill-considered statements. Despite iheir focus on international mailers in recent years, ANC leaders still are not expert diplomats. Inthe ANC believes that the West bears pert of ibe blame for the continuation of the apartheid system, and it is unUkely to abandon criticism of Western governments. H
The Potential for Dbunlly Despite the ANC's remarkable cohesion to dale, extraordinary events could exacerbate underlyingand bring the ores mta tionreaking point.
Tht Release ofNelson Mandela. From Prison. The possibilityower struggle exists if the ANC does not affordeadership post consistent with his ambition and his domestic and international standing. Public opinion polls show thaibe country's most popular and influential black
blacks- occasioned, for example,ecision by Chief Buthelexi and bis Zulu supporters to negotiate wilh the itFvernmeot. Persistent, violent clashesrival black ethnicas ihe Xhosas and thelead lo splits among black that could reverberate in the ANC.
The Collapu oj tke Whin Government Probably the greatest ibraat to ANC unity wcadd ben its goal of overthrowing the whiteraas-fer of power in Sown Africa to the ANC wcedd severely teat the organication's cohesion because ibe ANCs various factions have conflicting plans for ibe pceupaithcld era. ANC Communbu sndcould be at oddi, for example, ovor Ihe direction of foreign policy and the creationew ecoooniie order. Tensions between them, coupled with black ethak rivalries, would createstrains in the crpmralion. Tambo, perhapsthe likelihood ef serious disagreement* down Ihc road, haa publicly said that the SACP would have to fend for itselfajority-ruled South Africa.
Possible Dramatic Shifts in ANC Policy Although marked shifts in ANC policy are highly unlikely, we believe that they could occur in response to dramatic developments during the next two to three years:
without subtlantially changing iu military tactics, wc do not believe the group wouldadical rntlitary policy solely in response to government repreasioo. Extreme internal repression coupled with internal or external threats lo ANC prestige, however, could lead tbe group to advocate aa tntiwhilc terrorist campaign- For example, if the ANCs leadership of tbe antiapertheid movement were challengedadical black groupwholesale attacks against whites, ihe ANC rnigbt try to regain its predominant position byllilani antiwhite policy.
Tht ANC agrees to abandon previous preconditions and tratn fare mgattattoea veith tht Soulh Africa* Oewaweewest. We do not envisionolicy change union the ANCs position ta theleader of the antiapartbesd movement were to be significantly undercut by internaluch a* the UDF and COSATU, and unless tbcae groups subsequently entered intopower-sbaring negotiation* with Pretoria onoaus African hacks. The ANC, fearing that it would be left outew politicalmight then decide to oompromiaa byiu proconditiccs for negotiations. Even then, however,ove would be hotly debated in ANC councils, and some militants would continuergue againat any compromise.
ANC and Soulh African blacksllilani anliwhite ideology and advocate terrorist attacks on all while civilians. Including children. Because the ANC has reacted to mowingrepression and biack casualties in recent yearsOriginal document.