ifiaoand Eflt'cli ol War ol Ihe Citieo
Iraq's mlsalla and air elfeeA* -gainst Iranian olllei taint, fliohdad'i deilre lor revenge and mayemporary sobering allaet on Iran. Although Iranian laattara have made no concession io gain Iha cease-fire lhat appear! fo nave gone Into effect yeaierder. tha, prooabl, racognlia that Iraq's attaeki end frert'a rtraalad waaknaiaaa hava /owared Iranian merala and ralaad turthar quaatlont about Iha ettactltinata ol tha cla/leal rmgtma. Moth countries will tr, lo aequlra mora waapona to attack or defend cfltaa. bail Iraq's longranga mlialiai ana largo Air Force -III continue to giro ll that advantage In tha near larm.
from attache o- shipping in February.
probably began rta mfasas barrage ega-a: raolar ones to'sorn is Faoruary. The Ifrtertarty of Ifte unprecedented icnc^range missfla attacks-Iraq has fired SB mss'lss toesigned to demoralise Iranians end weaken their support for the cnKlcal rag.me. Bagnosd also mayoped to goad Iran tooorly prepared ground ottentrve that Iraq couk) defeat and offset the poor
responded with missile attache on Baghdad and Mosul and limited air and artillery strikes on otherargets. At the sameamancrniuul halt to the -macks. procaDly In recognition ol their comparative disadvantage in the war of the dties
Effects on Tehran
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Ifar'smlle strikes and air and arlrllery attacks In 1r* past two weeks probably haveasualties in Iraq, but they anlflcanlly sHecled Iraqiell iheranian missilesghded hit rghtly populated areas southesst of the city. Tehran may have tried to strike economic and military targets (hare so It could claim thai, unlike Iraq, Iran was not targeting civilians^attacks caused no pubfie panic, erTdrWIffogW eraq netc evacuation exercises In February, no significant number ol people nave left Eajr.coirpj
The success of Iraq's attacks probably has surprised end heartened Iraqi loaders, who are now mora likeJy to attack Iranian cities In ihe future. They also may feel more secure In attacking economic targets, beiievaig that Iranian retaliation would be limited. Such attacks might backfire on Baghdad, however, if Iranian anger stimulates enough enlistments to enable Iran tootential decisivec. rsBsjjjjj
Tehran probably Is worried thai more Iraqi attacks will erode support for the clerical regime by demonstrating II cannot defend Iranian cities or retaliate effectively. Iran is ftkety lo try harder to acquire more missiles and aircraft to improve its ability to retaliate. Although Iran Is unl fcely toajor offensive In response lo Iraqi attacks on eiies. Tehran may consideri/nd attack to show its OctCTninaiiOr lo cor! rteorf lie! POriginal document.