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Supporting Allies Under Insurgent Challenge: The Soviet Experience in Africa
A Research Paper
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Supporting Allies Under Insurgent Challenge: The Soviet Experience in Africa
/ VcnarlM Bratltbtt
wi miiJ Id rlli upon
USSR'* assistance to ils key African client, facing majorElhiopia, andfaitcd to diminate the guerriUa tbreaU but has succeeded in keeping the regime* in power. The Scmeu have not sought quick victory. They teem to expect that, in the long run. cxmsolidaiion of the client Male's power and authority, expansion of thephysically controlled by the slate, elimination of alternative pohlieal forces, and pcrrislenl military pressure on and erosion of outside support for the insurgents will ensure (he insurgents* defeat t
General Secretary Gorbachev, like his predecc-sson, can be patient in pursuing these objectives because the USSR does not face substantial domestic cwosilion to ils involvement In Africa, and thedate an estimatedillion in miliury aidan object of concern, are tolerable. Moreover. Soviet economic aid has been paltry compared with Ihe needs of the African clients. Indeed, Western economic aid to these states5 has been about three limes ihat of the Soviet Bloc
review of Sovici political,gicat, and military writings indicates the Soviets have not formulated, amiliury doctrine of eoonterinsur-gency warfare. In our judgment, this is probably because the persistence of these insurgeiKics raises sensitive Ideological qualions. which Soviet theorists may prefer to avoid, about ihc Soviet role in suppressing movements with large popular followlngs. Moreover, the miliuryfocus on NATO and China may make it difficult for advocates of small-unit concepts applicable to Third World counterguemlU operations toearing
Soviet u'lcralure on these African situations indicates that the Soviets exiend no legitimacy io the insurgents and their demands and claim that Ihe rebel* exist only because of foreignew recent articles, however, suggest there mayoveore realistic picture of the insurgency problem, perhaps reflecting Gorbachevs call for "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. We did not. however, find parallels to Western theory for counterinsurgency warfare
AUhough the reporting is often sketchy, our research revealed common patterns in Moscow's assistance to its African clients facing insurgencies The Soviets stress:
Building up the client state's administrative, security, political, and economic apparatus.
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Large-scale material and advisory support for ihc ally's military forces aimed ai the creation of large convcniional forces lo be used to secure Ihc capital, key cities, and vital rxonoinic reeioni and to expand the areas controlled by Ibe stale by gradually pushing the insurgents back.
Consistent support for the client state in the international arena in order to secure broad recognition of it and to deleglllmizc ihe claims of the in-sui gents.
Although administrative, economic, and political factors play an important role in Moscow's advice to its African clients, the Soviets concentrate the bulk of their assistance on the military. Nonetheless, Ihe USSR does not appear to believe thai it must help its clients achieve decisive military defeat of the insurgents in the near term. Contrary to Ihc West's penchant foT quick solutions to such problems, (he Soviets seem to emphasize gradually helping their clients consolidate power. They expect their clients, to assume most of ibe burden of carrying out the "proper" methods with coaching from Moscow
The Soviet military presence is signifies nl in each country and,, had grown todvisers ionthat have since remainedadvisers have performed vital functions in organizing, training,the armed forces. They aie altacbcd lo staffs, sometimesthe battalion level, and are deeply involved in planning andoperations. Soviet logisiicians keep close track ofand transportbysuppliescountry to support combat operations. The Soviets also stressof intelligence
technicians
repair sophisticated equipment such at aircraft and missile launchers, and Soviel instructors (each al military academics. The Soviet politicalsystem has been setup in all of the military services lo oversee iheir political reliability
advisers nre,ule, noi
permitted to participate directly in combal. Advisers bave occasionally laken part in combal, bul apparently only when ihe hosl government's military capacity to cany out the mission on its own is deemed inadequate. Mosi of these episodic cvenis involve flight operniions
The Soviets also attempt toelatively low profile and tely, to the citcnt possible, on surrogates to minimize negative regional perceptions of Soviet intervention and dampen die impact of Moscow's countcrinsur-gency efforts on East- Wcsi relations Cuba, in particular, plays an
importanl role in furthering Sovielor example, Cuban iroops in Angola and Elhiopia (rec governmcnl Hoops for combalnd Cuban adviicney iolc in basic training for new recruiu. East German advisers are also key players, particularly in selling up and directing the srxurily and intelligence services
TJie Soviets have trained and equipped their allies* forces according lo the Soviel model loonventional, not an insurgent. Ihreat. This rellecis Moscow's view of ihe predominant challenge facing each country: in Ethiopia, (he quiescenl threat of another Somali invasion; in Angola and Mozambique, Ihe danger of South Africa
Our limited picture of ihe substance of Soviet military advice to African clients in combating the insurgents indicates lhal,road scale, it reficcts the conservatism of Soviet military concepts. Ii emphasizes ihe creation of secure enclaves around.viial elements of ibe client state's polilical and adminisirattve base; major campaigns aimed al searching out and destroying insurgcnl groups, disrupting their base areas, and hindering their rcsupply; and ihe need for adequale preparation at all levels priorajotin (he areas of logislics. command and control, reconnaissance, and intelligence on enemy forces. We see few signs lhal the African commanders have developed disiincl operational and tactical approaches of their own
have complained aboul Ihe absence of Soviel
training suited for counr.erinsurf.cncy operations and have noled that the Cubans are more knowledgeable and helpful in thi* area. Recent evidence, however, sug-esls ihe Sovietsow beginningay more attention lo specialized training. Details are sketchy, but the Soviets apparently are increasing naming for forces such as airborne troops
The Soviets seemave said litilc to tlicit African clients about the social andAlthough Soviel adviser* can be found in some Cases down lo the battalion level and must be aware of the impact of combat on local conditions, (hcie are no indications lhal they have advised iheir clients lo insuiuie, any twtwrams designedwin the hearts and minds' of the local population
*
The Soviets have been most elTeciive in helping ilicir clients build mechanisms of political control. Theseervasive internal security apparatus, press and propaganda programs, massnd intensive polilical indoclrinaiion In the military arena, (he buildup of large, well-cquippcd conventional armies has helped to secure viial urban and economic areas, but ihc conlinucd emphasis on military campaigns
bciier suited: for engaging enemy forces in setpicee baiilcs on the European plainsactical rigidity that is nol well suited to (be fluid nature of guerrilla wars. Thispkd with the absenceormal doctrine for dealing with the varied aspects of insurgertcies, will continue to hamper counterinsurgency efforts.
We believe Moscow's approach to helping its African clients and iu position in those countriesumber of vulnerabilities. These include its allies' failures to decisively defeat the insurgents, the African regimes' lack of political legitimacy and poor economic performance, and the relatively weak popular appeal of Marxtsra-Leninism. NtWKtbdess. wc believe the USSR is fairly satisfied with the results of its policies. They promote what wc believe are the Soviets' basic interest* and objectives io these countries: Increasing their poUtical role in southern Africa andorn,ilitary presence, gaining access to air and naval fadlities, and promoting leftist change in key regions. Also, while tbe Soviets do not control the internal politics of these states, they have amassed significant levels of political influence
Wc believe that neither tbe Soviets nor the Cubans are planning to increase their involvement beyond the level necessary to sustain tbeir cCenta' military rjosition. Nonetheless, Sovici writings and leadership statement* under Gorbachev indicate that Moscow Is wmmitted to defending its gains ofgainst insurgency and "imperialistnd. in the faceear and present threat to the governments of Angola or Ethiopia, the Soviets probably would respond, in the short term, with increased arms deliveries, aod the Cubans with more troops or advisers. The Soviet commitment to supportinghowever, is less clear. There are growing signs (lint Moscow is disenchanted with Mapulo's weak ideological commitment and with its active search for Western military and economic aid, The Soviets might disengage rather than mount the costly effort needed toerious turn of events there.
In the eventapid dcterioiaiion in the political and military situation of one of its African dients. we believe Moscow would press the African state to negotiate with the insurgents raiher than escalate significantly Soviet involvement. Moscow would probably posh, however, for aihat eicludcd any opposition lenders that it viewed as too petwerful or popular
Contents
Pare
Civic Action in War Zona
SumiDiiy Background
Organs of Defense and Security
Counterinsutgency: Eait and West
The Vanguard Workers' Party
The Soviet Approach: Consolidating tbe Client State
Foreign Policy Support
Or sum of Political Mobitiintion and Control
Socialist Fcooornk Development
Soviet Military Involvement
Eapanrico and Structure of African rorea
MilitaryJ3
logistics and Maintenance _
Paying for Soviet Military
Soviet Military
Tbe National
Tbe Operational
The Tactical Level
22
Participation In
Tlie Bole of Soviet2)
Otherand Outlook
Results ni of laie
AppmdU
Soviet Writings on Insurgency ind Count cnnstirfceocy
Suppottiiig Allies Under Insurgent Challenge: Trie Soviet Experience In Africa
During thehe Sovici Unionrowing icnie of optimism aboul the pioapcctt for ^onvting favoeable change aad expanding Soviet influence in Ihe Third Worlderger.ee ofnumber of new otvort unities in Afrka. on which ibe Soviets were quick lo cuDiUl-irc la Angola. Moscowelfprods iavdailt regime attain powerent* colonial civil wai and subscejuently backed ibe re gimc's clToru lo consolidate iu rule. In Moiamb'ique and Hlhlopla. Mcncow moved to stipport radicalalicadf in poorer and anil led their efforts to build Mar silt-Leninist societies
These opt-Mtunities, however, also led lo aa unforc-aeen deep fovolvcenem in combating insurgencies Since inking power, each of these government! hai been faced with armed resistance from group*for various reasons and lo various degrees, ibeir claimxmopolv of state power (ice figure I) The Serrieti have been the primary source ornd military aid for tbeee Martin-leninisi icgimrs, but In spile of extensive Soviet backing, none if ihr three has been able to defeat Iu Iriturgency.
Moscow! involvement In countcriniurgcncy erarfaie in Africa led u> to oiamine whether such activities arc guided Ii) an identifiable political and miliuryand whether the Sov.cu bavc emulated Western approaches to liach warfare. We en mined ibeirin Angola. Ethiopia, and MoumbiqiK in search of eovnmoc ttemeats in their approach We also studied Ibe influence of factces ssscfa al the ecceaarttic aitaatioei, icgional politicalnd Gail/Went issinally.evaluated Ibe effective neat of Soviet counict insurgency efforts and (he vxilnetabili-tics thai may have emerged in Moscow'i position in Africn aaresult of these corn mi tiro nil
CoupireUsjiteocy: East aad West
A comprebcosire search of twoalf decades of Soviet political, ideological, and miliury writings at ihe USSR apparently has not yetistinct doctrine of "socialist" counter* insurgency (sec appendix on Soviethere is no discussion of counicrinsurgencyolilical-irtilltary problemnique Marxistdeterreapceisc. Tlicsc wrilings dothat Inc Soviets extend no legitimacy to the insurgent* and their claims and thai ihey blame the persistence of these insurgencies on outsideA growing number of military articles0 -clearly oriented toward Afghanistan--focus on Ucticnl problem* related to tooling giserrilla* but do not address toe broader problems of ocninleruuur-gency warfare
Soviet military advice often includes tome of Ihe elements tried in Western cxHinterinsurgency(tee inset outlining Westernul Moscow'* overall miliury and political approachconsiderably from Western theory andFor example, Western counteriraurtencyemphasize* poliikal action ia rebel-conicsted areasey to winning "hearts and mindi" al tbe local level. They contrast, apparently have placed little emphasis on the need for political action in the war xono. On the military tide, Soviet advisers have consistently advocated targe combined-arms sweepof batde plans forof the small-unit tacticsby Western theory
Clvk Action lo War Zooea
An important element of Western views regarding combating insurgencies are cfforti designed to win the support of the population. Judging by Ihe paucity of
Coantetinsurtincy Strategy
la-depth analysts Of H'tslern cotmtrrlnturtemcyreveali that these programs traditionally com. bine lacilci Intended lo promote metalol title actiononJ reform, end economicaffentWi militaryincluding ibe uie of highly mobile forces and local defense until, Hecornitlnt lhal virtually all
factor.tirtmurgtncy prof am ultimately
Influence popular support foe the gOvtenmenl. West-era tlraltry strives lo blend intense persuasion and precise coercion techniques Foe example, government efforts toillage's education or sanitation syslenu may be employed In tandem with highly controlled, specific military operations lo weed out guerrillas In tht Immediate area. On the basil of Stilish. French, American, and otherpe-rltneu In combating Insurgencies, e'peli generally egret that certain Identifiable factors have beenivlueettgfkd Western count ettnsurgency stretegiet They Include:
0atio ofeni troopi. Il Is commonly perceived thatalio allowtfor unit patrolling and tltiwlng rural ucurlly. as well oi maintaining llatle difemn
Employing unconventional tactics andparticularly tmall-unli toe tics that diimphatlte
ihe contentr titan td7forces enj and em-
phailse tonstanl patrolling by mom email, lightly armed units ixipporttd by latere backup for en. TMi Includes Ihe use of air operation!upport role to provide careful and controlled fire support as well as reconnaissance, supply, transport, and medical evacuation
professional troop behavior ami disc-phne. In order to ensure tht octtre support of the populate, ihe military It trained1 to respect and assist the local population when pomble
a popular militia. The government usuallyhen Itopular mslllla lo atsitl regular forces In malnlolnlng security and to keep iht populace engaged In tht
effort.
- Promoting ihe governmenll efforts through ptytho-logital operations. There at usually three main targets of these operations-the public. Including the international public; the tovernmeni'i combat forces, and the Insiirgenli.
quality Intelligence on guerrillamodus operandi, and locations. In addition to insurgent order of battle. Such an effort requiresophisticated Intelligence apparalut
andtltulionet rivalries that tett'lcl
the flow cf Ir/oemailon.
Developing police operations. The police forcesountry can ploy an Important role In rnalnlainlngnd order,overnmentIn ihc tour-.trytlde. and Implementingand rtiourte-eonlrol programs.
nified management for coumertn-surgeney. The government mull be capable afoherent counierinsvrgency campaign, which tequtea establishing an ortenltallonalthat maintains tommond and control ami
blends cinllen authority and military goals.
turpi admlnitlrellon and trnircmmrnS.
This iir'udet government iff or It lo implement pnj-grems and reformtry to gain popular aiqui eieence and maintain lis legitimacy
open mice discussionon
topic, the Soviets apparently nave nan nov io say lo (hcii African die nut about Ibe soc-iel and poli ileal atpocli of counter insurgency oj'talioru in Ffbcl-conlioiledxample, f
*hof Ibe treatment of em!anttones, paa'>catjce of insurgent-held ai ru.rioos other formt or civic and political action.refcrcncci haveadmo-
nition* from Soviet adviser* to Alrkan commanders to avoid unareatary brutality in ibe treatmeni of insu rgent prisoners, airxc this only make* Ibe enemy Fighl harder, Soviet pilots have flown transport plane* in tupport of Ethiopia't reacttlemenl prof ram that moved peasant* from northern, Ins urgent thee* lewd area* to the south of the country. However. lam program appears to have been an Ethiopian initiative, and we have no indication thai Ihc Soviet* are advocating similar elTorts elsewhere
The teeming lack of Soviet attention ta tbe political and social *ade of counter insurgency warfare In Ibe field probably has several explanations. Although Soviet adviser* are present al times even downhe battalien level, the dearth of information from Ibem on ihc Impact of combat on the countryside or cos local cooditiooi suggests ibis type of activity falls outside their purview. Alto, the Soviets may have found it difficult to advise local military conimandert on ihe treatment of insurgent* and civilians in the bm tie fie Id area, given the probable insistence of the comma nders that Ihey are more familiar with the situation and better Qualified to deal with the local population. Finally, Ihe Sovici advisers may simply not see the political situation in Ibe war acneecisive collide ration io fighting tbe war. emphasizing instead ihc balance of military forces
The So-let Approach: Caewa baa tint ibe Client State
We believe thai Ihe Soviets view the consolidation of the clienl state as Ihe long-ierra key to defeating the insurgents and that Moscow's military involvement on behalf of il* allies must be seen in ihc eooteii of ibcsc broader state-building efforts (toe insctl
ol Drfmu md The firii priority of (be USSR in assisting "socialistlatci hu been support of their military and locurltr apparales The Soviets praurnably believe (Jul ear eeherf (be leftist tranaforvtaiioa of those countries will be irioiitcey unless the couetrwa are protected front outiide attach, or inlernal lobtc nicest.
Tke Aimed Forc/i. Sovieto andwjih the armed forces inh"and Mozambique hai been ciiciuive. reflecting bolh tbe advantage the USSR boa in mini military aid ai optxned to other policy instruments, and theke Soviet! miaeb to the fiinctiorti the armed force* peiform on behalf of soda! ill-orien led regimes (see figure J| Tbe military cefeods the country it!trot external threat and prolexa the nevrains! internal challenges andn tome cedes, il bat thr capabilny toaei as abase for the devcidpmr.nidministrative stiucturc wheie no lueb ilraOarc hai previously existed
S" Soviethave noted ihii. while ihc aimed (orcci perform several fniiciiooi caacniiat to iht lajft ml of ibe client state, (her ennnot serve assolid Ions trim base for the development of Marus: Lcntnin insliii (ions. Consequently, the Soviets havetoeialttl-orienled rcgimci dominated or the armeduch as thai of Chairmanni Men-tutu in Ethiopia, notegloci (he (asks pfenning broader adminst/alivc and political
x-rll* Ogaaa. The pcrsiitcnce and scale of tbt cftciTt oflie USSR and its Cuban and Cast Bur ope nn allies In aiding and advising the security oigins ol allien it clients are indicationi of IheHie Sovtels attach to this sector:
- Scmel and taildviser!ays* ioi> u> ihe tieetiort of Angola'sand iotc!li lence forest.
Soneit.
Cubans, and I'm Germans have trained, equipped, noil idvlud the Mornmbicao locuiilysince Hie
|VM, the Bibiopiao Miniitry of National and Public Se^my(MPNS) received training and techrticil usitunec from the USSR. ilulgaiii, Baal Germany, and Crecbenlcniloa. The Ml'NS accent) toguarded its institutional independence era re luiii siut limited lutaianiive cooperation withe rr. fRoc semce*
I astern Bloc and Cuban assistance has lutauouitl, tiuproed ihe carelilies of the African services to diieoei and suppress domestic opcosilica and room-toi tlx KIi'iIm* ofnly Angola haiito Alvcs
ilinivuesilully pot down
(JrtiM' ol I'ollllcil MoblUullon andi iOn Ihe basis of coverage in theidn and ipeciil ra' few mala.believe Mvsto* hu the building of "massa1 pail af ibe process of coo solide lint "sociitUt me Hided iiaiea (see Ivgurcovici tilcrnlwre abcwliit faveenble reference* to inilitntioaa such alrtuxns"nd jouM. tOuih. women's, and various prolesiional ii'giniiA-otii These iruiilutioos perform severalior the new ManJiiLcniniiirhey
echiniiin fot penetration and roniiol of vjiivui nviil and piofntsiunil seclors
Co-op! (he po'iiical activity of villous groups,ihoic thai may raven change bui noton. and direct it intochannels
Foster national ettoataMtncastribalism,and other forms of local identity.
Itvloctiinale participants in (he virtues of theand Mart iinv leninism
Identify and rociuit cadre*
Actase for tbe tubsequeriiof Cominunicl pad tea.
LtTWafc of direct Soviet and Bloc participation in theid operation of these ocgaairauorrs in Ango-U. lirhiepia. nod Moutnbicruc vary In Angela. Ihe Soviet Bloc directly aided the Popular Movement for (he Liberation or Angola in the creation of iu national youth and worket'iclhiopia. however, apprari to bave developed its men institution!ating the yean before large-scale Sonrl an-votremmt. althou(lt European-educated Marml id vitrts to the ruling Military Council may have helper! shape tuch institutions during the early yean of military rule tividence oa Mozambique Is sketchy, but ibe eagerness of the Maestri regime ia theOi so mof Moumbiquci ul society suggests that it was receptive to BVoc asliilkr.ee in the Cicnlion of its man iiisttlulioni La itemtea haveajor purt in
laming trade union officials in all three eta lea, and the mass organizations of all three lake pan in Scniel-sponsored international forums tad cacbtogea
Piiii aad aTdararfnaafhe Soviets bave long teen the creation of ceoually controlled press and educational intUtullons aa an eatcntiat pan of the devtt-Kmunt of any socialist atate Such institutions help pcornofc idenufxalicn with the retimes and Man ism-Leninism, the "cceicct" understanding of internal andvents, and the deieloprneni of the lechnical nnd rrfofessona. slilii required by ibe new itate
In all three of tbe African count/vrs this longitandini
emphaiis is reflected in the eaicruive Soviet Bloc Involvement in their press trad educational sect on (see Tgurcoviets. Past Europeans, and Cubans Ualn journalists nnd provide iotcrnttiooaj "ram services'" for tbeir dram, til of abeenosed, eettlrally cc-ntroilrd press In (be rducatioral area, Bloc slain run ii wideof programs providing academic Kholmhipt for extended study lo the USSR and LaitemcuLized lechnical and professions! t avariety of fteUi. education In Cuba for stmncUry kNjoI stocenu, and tntUuctors foe poiilioni tn local universities
These efforts have not always had the desired results.
For
Sonet Woe edacaisonal pnajraaai have bad niter limited iucccsi in ideological Indoctrination and thai Soviel technical training isoflci rjonsldered inferior to
thai mailable in the West, Ho-ocr. all these rcfin.es
hat* the press and educational system solidly under State corriroi Whatever their loag-tcrna tacccaa ia promoting genuine belie/in Maraatm-leruabm. these iuililuiiont are not likely to icrvtource of noliiicjl challenge
The Soviets believe lhal correct istvelorirrieni of ihe VWP end its apparatus should injululionaliieand Soviet influence byIhe bases of -hai have been narrow, personally domlnaicd regime* Mosoaw'a object It to make ibe Soviet position less vulnerable to personal andrivalries oe leadership changes. Ideally, ihe VWP ultimately will become Ihe sole source ot "legi-timale'" polilical po-ec in the stale of socialisttransition lhal Soviel theorists acknowledge willong time
The Vanguard Workers' Parly
During, several Soviet alinmpts to build influence in the Third World by cultivating leaders apparently commilled to "socialism" ended in diiap-pcrinunenl or outrighl failure. One conclusion that Soviet theorists drew over Ihe neat decade was thai reliance on the revolutionary commitment ofleaders was an inadequate base foranist-Leninisl. proSovicl version of socialism ewer the longtronger political-inwas needed io lead thethrough the diflicullies it would inevitably encounter
Self-proclaimed Maralst-Uninltl parties in all throe AfricanPopular Movement for theof Angola-Workers' PartyRHLIMO (Front fot the Liberation of Moumbiquc) in Mozambique, and the Workers' Parly ofin theory at Veast. tbe Soviel definitionWP. The USSR has provided Iraining. financial support, and "appioved" italui lo all of these gioups and appears to see ihcni as movingositive direction over the long term. Nonetheless, the Soviets have devoted considerable attention to the problems these parties have in carrying out tbe Iranution to socialism. Moscow'i persistent criticism, which has al times provoked lescntmenl from (be Africans,the Soviets believe ihat the leaders of Angola, Fshiopia, and especially Mozambique stillong way to go in establishing whal the Soviets would considei to be reliable Manist-Leninist institution*.
concept of the 'Vanguard workers' patty" (VWP) was developed in theo deal with the problem of what this framework, could be in countries that almost invariably had noclass of any size or poliiiralbe VWP. which should Operate according to Ihe principles of "democratics intended to guide Ibe development of the state and economic apparatus, mobilize popular cncigics for the revolution, and ensure that the Stateprogressive" and pio-Soviel foreign policy line
'ooel iticoKiKal. lielrdfiiiid -whirl" parti"i'iind -II* HillpielrUtianird ro'lr" Th*tw, diKiiha lull.fl.djo*anrti as lhal el il- Se-iowSde ihr VWP if Iris id in. kom.ni thai mini bt teemedite arm netarm
Socialist Economic De>elopmeos Economic Stratcty. There is no aulhoritalivc Soviet formula for dealing -iih ihRcomplcs. problems of economic dcvelopmeni in very poor African states. Nonethelew. there are wide areas of Agreement in Soviet irxciolired literature on the general lines thai tbe economic development of these slates should take. The essenliali of ihc Soviel economic prescriptionigh Icvrl of stale involvement in the economy, state-sponsored agrarian reform, toleration of some private capitalist activity in "traditions!"as retail trade and localimprovement of key government provided socialservices, orientation ofeatcrnal trade toward Ihe
Wuiorn Venus Soviet Bloc BcooocaJc Aid DUbartaocol* Co Angola. EibJopla, and5
eountiira, and ihe iclifictran ol Wciteenio-hI aaivrlT. The USSR"!ic'ii:- iparw econeaiiic gate. Ethiopia, aad MoramlxQoc lut lainmili bcrn ia ihe In,ol projeci-oncnied financial aid nndii|iroii for ihe ttaic iccioi
lo rectal yean, ihc So.I'll hator.i>
i.mlliicaa alliea. including oil-iipoi ting Angola The Stnicli have coniiitenily blamed then alliea' nrohlcim on ihcaeli-aidneiJ. poor infia-uiutlm uihjliim. hetap>iiliil dc-miuud.ctoacn-ichich itiey aia eM-taed CKci Ih* nan fc- jean,Soviet aMirihave alio niucijcd
ihey lea ai ciccuki, radical, nnd inappropriate policies oo ihe1 of Africani ird (he need to maleiv ol both demieaijc and ve.
iou ital Menem teeteetdformanoe nihcr thanmind li ihc hey ci
pohci
Ha-iti Aid mi Urmia Inrrilme'l iclt lil'C
ameri ofKi
Thudo mifitac pan rle>ade aaaJladMaiani-Lcmnitti laihnaeimiifall' fir
ihrxi of llietrdi(iet figure fc|ie Kicinliti hit ivlirir it Cleat onwriMiii
uWdoe* not carry -iih it aa automatic claim to Ihc wealth of Ihc Scroti Bloc and ihat Third World Manual- Uaioiat tuica -ill hat io depend Arat and fcectnrat on their own resources Th.ii probably reflect, abelief that ecorwmic aidover political payor! Hun djoe* rrriuttry aiaiiuncc and Soviet perception* of tbe Broiii to Moscow'* own corarromrc resource*.
Both Angola and Mozambique hare turned to Ihe Weat forrxonornk aid. and Ethiopia has accepted massive Western economic and famine aid. Varioui aourcea ind in. ic lhal Motcow does not object to moat Western Uvcatmcoli and. at limes, encourage* iu aUlca to look for aid where the, can id tl. The Sovieu. however, ate wary of Western aid being iraniUted Into political iriflutncc and warn their dienU about Wealern motives
Koralf. Policy Scrpport
lioltilmg ihtey dement ofolitical appecach to the problcens of Its African allies li the useariety of foreign policy instruments, including <xxnentic*nlpro.-agindi. activi-ly in internalionalnd activeo try lo isolate tbe inaurgenu from outride rnaterid and diploenslic cuppen (tec laictl The Sovieu have pla.ed on the eaubrbbed proposition of many Third World countries fricanto be wary of Western "aoxoioeuUii- intcr-fe.eaee moa of group, righting (or change in existlogrrangement, or .ute bcairidariea. Theand their Bloc .Hie* have coniistecl, sought to portray group* fighting the regime* in Angda.and Ethirapia as the creation, of ouU.de power. Interfering in the internal affair, of then addition, the/ have nought to exploitThird World and Western opjxuilion to South African apartheid to otlradM UNNotional Union for Ihe Total Independence of Angola) ond HiMoumbican National Rcsiilancc) for their connection, wilh Pretoria. The USSR probably etpecU that, over the long run. thi. persistentwill help reduce the willingness of various counlrle* lo champion ihe cause of ihe insurgenu and to supply them with material aid
Tht Smitti aad Wrgnflarinai. The So-id altitude towardnvolving their African allies, thend. In aotrtc utaationi. third parties ha. been eouiroeal. la the Pihiopiaa cbm. tbe Soviet* have .appealed and in aecnu caies even tporisorrd meeting, between reprcaenuiivaa of Ihe Mcngttiu regime and the insurgents. On occasion. Soviet otTi-dal. have indicaied theirto diicuss louih-ern African Utuca with ihe Unitedn the other band, tbe Scried have conaiatcntly opprasednegotiuioru on Namibia and on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola talks that dealt indi-reeily with ibt future of UNITA and theegime Moscow hat also "arned Angola and Moram-biouc of Ihc futility of trying to obtain rdlef from the insurgencies by culling deals with South Africa, as both did.
The two key variable* thai .hare Mcecow'a attitudes toward any given negotiating proceti are. a. might be etpeaed. the decree lo which the USSR isin the process and the potential tbe ne tenia liom bare for increasing the influence of other pan in at Soviet eipense la the Erhlopian case, tbe Soviets had elirocl or indirect oatmretiena to Ibe rebdt that enabled thcen toentral rote In facilitating thehile the Weti did not hoc enoughny with Adda. AbtbtDow it toediating role. By centrist, apparently neither Laanda nor Maputoibe Soneu prior la signing separate pacts with Pretoria, aad the So-net* read th* US-backed regional negotiaiion.irect atttrriptut them outegional settlement
Soriet Military fa-dmnrnl
Miliury aid is key lo Soviet influence-building in the Third World. Mixcow'. involvement wilh the armed forces of it. three African elknu has been ealcnsive lite Soviets haveecisive role In structuring, equipping, training, and advising them. We believe
Soviet Mrasurei To Disrupt Zaire's Support io ihe Angolan Insurgents
Soviets have aggresilvely attempted in increase iheir lafiueiiee In Zaire--with diplomacy, active mea-turet, peels ptruyaganda. and ecoetomlc propoiali. Their primary goali have been lo ease real orpreiHire from Zaire on the Angolan regime, foetttall Zaire's luppot/or UNIT A. Increase Soviet Involvement In Zaire, and weaken Zaire'i longmnd-Ing ties to the United Stales. This campaignthe USSR's efforts to capitoilicollilcala cooling ofesire by President Mobutu Sese Sekoonollgtied Image -In an effort to build Influence and to temper Zairlan support for the Angolan Insurgents
We believe Moscow. In pursuing Iheirsariety of covert Influence operation!
forgedfrom the US Amhaiia dor to Congo to the US Ambassador to Zaire delivered In late7 to the Zai'lanto Congo. The forgery drier-bed altegrc US meddling In Zaire's domestic politics and tut tested US involvement with ihe oppositior-'
3 Pail
peaetlce suggriu ItGB plant Intended to embarrass the United Stales.
andbafjy wereumor campaign In Zaire warning thai "dangerom" US Zairlan military exerclie activity threatenedoring states, especially Angola. The Sovieii ant Angolans augmentedp opposition prenure on Mobutu to reduce USpress and radio charges thai ihe United States Is turning Zaireenter lur subversion. Including using the countereil lee AIDS virus for biological weaponi.
The7 edition of the NigerianAfrican Concordtory about at alleged US plol to use Zairlan alrbatei as a
tprlngboard for dcliabttlSatlon aclMllts In louih-ern Africa. The report guoted extensively from an alleged memorandum of the Zairlan notional Intel-lite net service thatbelieve could have been forged bp the Soviets. Similar charges of US maehlsxaslont have appeared in Angola and elie-wheie In Ihe region
We believe ihe Soviets will try to Increase such optttilons. Given the Kinshasa media's positiveof Soviet views. Motctyw may step up efforts lo
bribe or recruit local Journalllts. In Febeuary. foe example, the etiy's largest dottyilth, five-page Interview with Supreme Soviet President Tolkueuyv. whichS-authored Item on arms control Isiues. The SoM-ets may alto be selling tht stage for additional covert operations designed to embarrass Mobutu beyond Zaire's borders. For example, the US Emboli, U. Sraitavllle ins peel' theay haveioey Ir7 in Congo alleging thai Mobv.la latertted tc vse the CIA to assassinate President Saito- Plgvesio
Jo ptriuode Mobutuithdraw support for UNIT A. Moscow would have to convince him that UNITA'i operationshreat to Zaire'sexample, in the border areas- and that Mi support for UNITwtih litJeopard!itl hit ability toalisical and eeoveomlc role In the >er!an We have doubtt that Moscow ever truly has tht reivureei in the region to be successful In these tfforti. More-sr-ee. in targeting Mobutu, ihe Scrtietiajor risk, ihoerid the Soviet effoeis be too heavyhondedransparent (luch as disinformationhat are exptiied as Sovietotcow could peo-uohe- set it if.', .'ovi leaaer to Ignore the USSR's diplomatic and economic overtures or even tncreoie luppori to UNIT A
MtVtW
ilitary Advisory Groups (MAGs) are iu key instrumeni in countriesrge Soviet rriili-tary presence. Ihc MAOs in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are each headedeneral, and theyariety of functions. Tbey:
Structure nnd Irain the host country' armed forces.
Help each couniry plan and direct militaryi
Coordinate Soviet Bloc and Cuban military assistance.
Perform maintenance on sophisticalcd military
equipment
of Adiisory Croups
th Main Directorate of the Soviet General Staff in Moscow is responsible for administering Soviet military relationships wilh all Third World
Tumi _
Soviet miliury pertonriel ire found Ibrougboul lb* miliuiv structure of the boil country. They mainuin1 in ibe national,nd local levels In ibn naiiooal capital, Soviet admen arc locatednicmry of defense headquarters The advisers are also presenlmayor militaryand combat uniti normally down to brigade kvel, but tome timet aUo at tbe battalion level. Cmany asoviet advticti arc attached to an army brigade. Miliury advisers are assigned to unit romiPirdin and leehm cal adviien are assigned to specialisies ranch as locis ties, tccbnosog-y, cflgiocertnf. and com munica lions, ai well at to moioriied infantry, commando, tank, and air defensea lions. In addition, interpret en and dociori aie attached to most brigades
1 ipentloe aad Strwctwr* of African Forces Eipeasine Tbe armed forces of Angola andave capanded dramatically since Soviet advisersmved Ethiopia's forces have grown fromroops before the revolutionroops today.orces now oumberroops and. in Mozambiquermy has grownt independence lo0 today
Despite ibe overall eipanded sine of these aimed forces, none of them enjoy*decisive numerical advantage over theestern lulc of
hat government forces need updvantage over tbe giicrrillas. Ethiopia, with the largest aimy,dvantage; Angola and Mozambique both possess1 superiority in numbers. Each, however,igninennt advan-lage in quantity aod quality of military equipment.
Military Strmrtmre. Sovici military adviser* have been instrumental in tincturing local military forces along Sovietn Angola and Moaambicrue, this was reli lively easy to acoumpJuh. These eounlnes did notoherent military arm is place "ben the Scrvieti arrived on the acesnc- Moscow helped form ihc preindepcodenoe guerrilla forces into convcnlioriilhe Soviet orientation toward largo-scalein Central Darope Is visible in the esipfaaala on combined arms forma (ioos capable cf coordinated use of arrnor,lnjllery. and motorized tafia try to defeat enemybe oinlaicaaoccelatively large standing army basedrofessional officer corps and draftees also reflect* Soviet conccpls. In bothoviet id vise it are heavily involved in efforts in recruit soldiers for the army
o-
t>ia drf no*ystem for tnarsdatory nalicoal null tin servicel. Itwo-year tour of military duty, as doe* ibe Soviet system
Tki PolnUml Committoritaldement thai tbe Soviets have unpriniod on the irrned form of AnjoU. Dhiopii, and Mesaimbwaac is ihc political commissii ayaiccn. The Sovieis helped set upystem in all of Ihe military aervice* lo oversee iheir political reliability, deter coup plotting, and reinforce Marxist-Leninist ideology Tho Soviets and Fast Germans have provided poliivcal training both locni'v and ia Essrapc foe virtoally all politicalhis effort has been Important because the armed loror* have served as an essential part of ihe power base of ihc new Maraisl-Lcninist leaden
the politi-
cali-n- hai also bad several negative toeiseceeivcci few rndwnry morale and pcr'armiwoc la
Pm mm ?m
KtMopia. lot eanmptc. cerrrpctitionunit,and senior politicalhampered raiib-ury effecthrr rvcu during aad alter tlx Oiede- War- AlthoughUem hit caaed in receci yeanthe restoration of the power of the com-oiancUnehere continue* to be coniiderabrc resentment of tbe political com miliar lyilcm in all of these African state* In both the officer corps and enliitedbe Imposition of political training rerjuiieroctiu and the emphasis on polilical credentialsasis for promotion suggests thai there may be some ptice paid in tbe overall UaaeUrdi of crflker competence In spite of tbcae difficulties, boaever. tbe coca miliar system ha* been succtiiful in thai no Krioes challenge hat emerged from the eruriiary to cither the political leaders or tbe primacy of Marxist-Leninist
Military Fqulpalrot
The quantity aad type of military equipment sent by Moscow reflect not only tbe Soviet General Staff's doctrinal emphasis on large conventional forces, bet also its pert* pi too of the primary military ihteat fedng these regimes. The iinmcdiate challenge con fronting Ethiopia7 was Ihe invasion of the Ogaden by Somali cxxiventioaalndsupplied aimi In this period that were designed to improve the capability of Ethiop-.en fotcca to deal with this coov-eolioeial threat. Since the Ogadenecurity focus has shifted lo tbe northern insurgencies, though building forces capable of dele: ring any future Somali military moves has also been nn important objective. The mis of Soviet equipment deliveries has remained generally conslilenl over the years
In Angola and Morarnbiquc tbe Soviet* from the beginning vwwrd the possibilityouth African invasion with grave concern.c* of lystcms delivered to all thier ecu nines gradually iini.iv.od from essentially pott-World War II combatin tbe beginning to, more recently, mote modern MIGnd aurface-to-air missiles, along with large numbers of armored personnelrucks, and awooort vehicle* (sec figurend table! HgeaajMfC
3lOmc recent eqitipmtnr deliver tea. par lieularly to Mozambique, conlinuc toWorld War ll-viningc models
Since independenceJ and partjculaityie, ihe threat posed to ihe Angolan regime by Jonas Savirnbt's UNITA has grown cornrderably. Noneibelesi. ibe Soviet! apparently continue toSouth Africa a* ihe primary threat tolthough tbe Sovieii are attempting lo upgradeability to figbl tbe insurgents, Mcncow'tinvestment in improving Angola's air defensea thing ii* southern border reftect* an overridingwilh the South African threat.
Moiambiquc did not have to worry about onthreat when it became independentince the, bow ever, it has been faced wilh Ihe faateai growing insurgency In Africa. Soviel arms deliveries immediately following independence and rcoenl deliveries of nil defense equipment have been designed to helponventional force to meet Ihe South Africani.cries to Mctramcaqve have been far fewer than the levels ptovided to Ftktopsa and Angola, particularly sincehen 'doner President Satmora Machcl signed the Nkorniti accord with South Africa
Moscow seems unwilling lo finance the man ire effort iieeeasary to cverccene RENAMO and is skeptical aboui the Morambican Armed Forces' ability to Ctpkit eiparaded arms deliveries. Moscow und-wibterj-ly sees Moranbaju. as less important than eaibrr Angola or Ethiopia, which have better economic prospects, irtiportanl regional roles, and more lirmlv established Maraisl-lenlniatoscow, however, seems willing lo continue lo supply arms- ivri to maintain the FRELIMO regime, to check Western laiucracc in Moanmbique, nnd to ensure continued access lo Morarnbkaa port*
S3 Ihe USSR also appear* willing to support Zimbabwean and Tanranian forces oiKruiin* in Moiambtque against ibe insuigctiti
Logistics and Maintenance
The Soviets baveeading role in establish' lug and directing logistic operations in sopron of ihe counter insurgency efforts. They have provided the ihree beleagucied African states with an abundance
i 1
Jicciet-
MI-ISthip
Although moil Of the equipment delivered thus for to Angola. Ethiopia, and Motambloue It primarily lulled for conventional warfare, the ScMen have delivered one system that Is useful foriiack helicopter. The Soviets have told iheir clienii ihat ihe MI-IS can be used in practically any situation involving confrontation with small units. The Soviets' high evaluation of the MI-IS may be based on lit successful employmeni under similar conditions In Afghanistan. Not alt Iheir etientt agree, howevee. The Ethiopians have found thensulledfor many vital eountertnsurgtncy missions, especially in the mountainous terrain of Eritrea They claim ihehen fully laden with fuel and ordnance, has limited vertical lift capability and Is unable to hover and direct fire. These ptoblemt frequently render it useless In support of Ethiopian untls pursuing rebtlt tn thelto CZ
3 more lhanelicoptces. mclud.ng several Mt-2Ss. have been lost in Angola. We expect the Sovieis wilt improve the capability of thtn Africa, especially though the inttrrporalitut of systems to to-.nter ihauldcrfired SAMs and Improvement of Its ttconnoliioncr fpnt'ilities
tilthut appears unwilling lo make ngmlicirt eNorgci In In overall syatem of maintenance and
lUp|>Kl
rrnkeioc
Sewvet Bloc miliiary naming for Third Wortd clients' peikawincJ lakei place priniai.lv in the USSRtiein km ope. with tome of the tiniplei Iraining taking plaec within the hcul country. Soviet efare ceeaccairaiect prxeuoly on alOtT training tor iciwoeand on more sophisticated and technical ditciolincs iucIi at flight and air detente training
the tut!
enaceatraled on tbe aaene Ceaircaivanai lombincd.aimi operational concept! laughl lo Soviet
See ret
Upon returning from (he USSR, their, snnioi officers assume Iho best assignmcnu nnd commands, including Ibe kadrrthip of *Onve elite units thst actpalace gunrds" foe Ibe pro-Soviet heads of ititc.
Sonel Dloc miningmpbaiis on political ioaliuclioa. Soviet political cornnauti aie aiuched to boat coualry core bit brigades and admin-ulef warning programs foe political radio ia Russian
in German advisers stress political training for border gunidi because (her consider it more impoi-tant than military training
Tke Soviets apparently now are providing somecuuntcrinsurgcncy trainini for thenAngolan off.
cars who leturncdwo-yearHalt cmuse in the USSR* werecounieigwcrisHa tactics. While ihe spnribc typeand urtia is not kne-^n. at tea it onewas reponedly act upnuntrifiproi^ially in mind. In Morambit)tie,Soviet advlscts
have begun to undertake speeiBllvd onuiileigurntll. training.
The Cubans, meanwhile, apparently t'CIbe bulk of basic irainini for rumor omcerspersonnel Most of Ihn Iraiairg lakesSometraiaiag tnhea place mid focuses on aicas inch as ermineand the study of enemyaccording >t
Also. Angolan. Moiambican. and Elbiopianof the eiireme rigidity of ihe Soviel education* al system and bad operiencca with Soviet racial prejudice have pi educed resentment among live Alri cani udents tbal may pose someroblems for Ihc USSR.
Paying for Soviet Miliury Aid
The Soviets hate provided miliury equipment toon favorable repayment terms and. ineccordinr; tcno
COSI. We estimate lhal up tooercent of ihe military aid is providedrant basis. Nonetheless, the Soviet] etpeel that the credit Ihey provide will eventually be repaid
Mnrambique currently dons not have ihc resources lo pay for Soviet military equipment, but ihc Soviets continue to provide some aid on eononsioiiary icims Although ihc SovicU sometime* cancel thodebts, they have also held ap arms deliveries pending paymeal or compensnlion in etport products rhe SemrU receive fish and liih products from Mo rimcaqae al bargain prices at partial payment for their rrilitaiv traioaag aad arms, acnortlutg trt_
eio the USSR mounted to overJiloabiihc midlvtOiC
lhal the Soviets
U-uthcd asidr [tbitq-ar concern about Ihe debt and encouraged AOdii Ababa lo buy nwc equipment, and tariatya other icrorti have indicaiPd lhal the Soviets haveii.'ipii ealcAikni on the delii sevcial iinm
reported Soviet focusining high-ianking caTrcers hai cauaed some friction between Mutv and its clients la Moram:or estmfit fT
soma in*-cdWiah were displeased with ibr larkaitcniioo green in training middle nndtrcionsctuScm Mnbet
was displeased enough to ioqucsi Tanftniaii and othci outside help, mucii to Moscow'i innoyirur
o the USSR also lis* increased rapnllv Iron, aba-fcllrc, j. cUilline i-- ihr National Haiti- o' fi -tpok: The drama lie fill inil pi itei0 made it hanlcr lot Luanda lo
i ii*nailn I .
defer red fuiOicr payment* on principal Owedite
USSR
3 Many of
We So-ici promise* of nonmilitary aid have vanished,mooi all of ibeir assistance li In (be lona of military equipment or advisers.
Financial problems rottritnstandiag. tbe Sovietsbeen creica. to supply large qualities of miliury oquiptoenl when iheac counlrict bare been facedeteriorating eruliiary ritoation. Major military alrlifli hare given tbe linpicsskHioviet policy that calU for tending the anni qu icily and worrying about tbe rcpaym-ril details later
Although the USSR coatinues to pressure Angola. Ethiopia, and Mozambique to pay ol tbeir oblige-lioru, ilprobably cooticac to defer repayment for tte foreseeable future oa tbe buii offollowing considerations:
The Sovieti probably realise thai the gravelilualion In theseHihio-pia andligftihcanlvirtually impossible al Ibe moment- I'lrssuie for repayment Uitdcr thesedrcomstsnees would almost certainly leadajor conf tooulion. -Ueh the Soviets would prefervoid.
Mow- probably caJcsnales thai the pceiiicil bene -fits of baring relatively loyal Maraisi allies in the Horn and southern Africa are worth the cents.
ebt inuc reinforces (he allies' already deep military dependence on the Sovieti, and may enable Moscow lo extract future political or military
concr.nloni
Soviet Militaryce
Evidence on Ihc lubitance of Soviet military advice to African oli-ru on coo-.batina inanr(eneiea in fiermo-
J Nonetheless, when the limited infee mation it combinedose ciaminstvao ol military rievdopmenis. some general patient are apparent
The National Let el
'egafa Mowov lias born dl rectioliiicalaiill-tary itralcgy apparently intendedlo defeat tbe iiuurienlsrotracted coetftrct. Tbe strategy has been aimed al examinees; UNnd keeping Ike rebels ocT balance vrWne beirig cnrefnl not to provohc South Africa-ennet-style convon-uonsl cnmpelj-o. berwever. has bcess for the roost part unsuccessful. Despite the current military stalemate, tbe Soviets have counseled latanda agaimt any politi-caj accommodation with UNkTA that would btlni lonai Sivimbluling coalition. They amu'cutly believechsrlsmalic SavimbTi political alcilla and popularwould five biro, an edgeoabiloo lovanment
Mlofim. The lilenUon Ineerscerbat dsf-fceeni in that most of (be insarrcol spoeps there arc not altentptlni lo overthrow the rccianr orhare of power In the central govemmcar. buti foi autonomy or itdepcodenee. Aa In Angola, Sovici military advice has called for large sweep campaigns supported byalrpowcr. Tliese campaigns, however, have been largdy utuuccessful Id dealing with the luturgr i
There hasuality in the Soviet approach over the past several years to tbe Ethiopian strategytbe northern insurgencies.a.
orteide/alkvnolitical solution lo Uc Co Sid on the basis of scene form of limited auteerorny for the northern provinces. On the other band, Ihc Soviets appear lo havethat applying pressure on Menglstu toolitical sclltenicnt could backfire by arouiing hit rationalist seniintents, which could override bis arlini-ty for Communism and dependence on the USSR. We have no lodienlion thai the USSR has tried to apply its major source of leverage onis need for Soviet militarymsh himolitical setilenacsst
espite tbe grim security situation in Morambiqwc. tbe Soviets appear to believe ihat ihc basic goalenerally pro-Soviet "so-cislill' regime insccuie foi at lean ihe
neat term. Moscow continues to counsel Maputo lo defend key cities against the insurgents nnd issome military nasistnncc. but has not made the major commitf aid Ihat would bo needed to defeat RENAMO.
The Soviets reportedly consider Moumbican forces useless. Tbe Soviets probably were spared having to consider seriously increasing Iheir commitment to Maputo when Zimbabwe introduced troops to fight the rebels In Mozambique. These forces reportedly are operating independent of Soviet advice and appar cnlly do rot even notify Soviet advisers In Moram-tnquc of their plans. Moscow, however, apparently il content to lei Zimbabwe and.esser client, Tnnianla shoulder much of the burden. At the lame lime, Mcocow reportedly will underwrite at least some of the costs for these outside forces lighting the guerrillas
The Operational Level
road scale, tbe Soviets' operational advice to their clients reflects their basic militarycentraiirrd control, massive troop strength, heavy concentrations of armor and firepower, and operations designed to achieve victoryelatively short period against Urge.oooveoiaooil forces. Their rigidand lackormal counter-insurgencyreflect (heir focus on Europe, where the forces and terrain bear little resemblance lo conditions in Africa.
Although reporting on the substance of Soviet opera-iidvice is tkctchy, general patterns areThe advice appears to focus on;
The creation of secure enclaves around Ihc vital elements of the client state's polilical andcapital, other major cilies, key economic areas, and main lit.es of communication.
Tbe use of major campaigns aimed at sealehing out and destroying Insurgent groups, dbrupting insur-tent base areas, and hindering rcsupply of insurgent groups.
Large-scale multombined arms assaults on rebel-held areas nnd sweep operations intended to open major roadways.
The need for adequate preparation at all levels priorajor campaign. Although the liming ofoffensives isost government decision, on at least one occasion io* Soviet adviscrc in Ethiopia successfully persuaded Mcngistu toarge-scale campaignthey believed Ethiopian forces were not ready to lake on the Insurgents.
Tbe catcnt to which client operations directly reflect Soviet advice is unclear. The bulk of the evidence, however, suggests (be Soviets are deeply Involved in planning major
i Soviel advisers in Angola have Ihc final say in
determining tbe planning of major combat operaijons. Moreover, we have no indications that Ethiopian. Angolan, or Moiambican commanders havealternative approaches of their own
Government forces have had some lucccss in using large-scale eombuved-arms attacks on rebel-held towns wben their advantage In numbers has been substantial, as occurred in both Ethiopia and Angoland have been able to open up key roads for daytime travel by heavily armed convoys. However, they have rarely been oUe to destroy major insurgent concent mt loos or control large areas of the Count ly-side
Whatever tbe substance of tbeir recommendations. Soviet adviiers frequently have difficulty gellingfield commanders to act oa their advice. For example fj"
^Sovietften heededmall but influential group of senior Ethiopian officers at defense headquarters a( Addis Ababa, but that most senior field commanders aic opposed lo Soviet recom-memillions. In
J.iiUtary commanders now tend to look more toward Zimbabwe for advice because ihey believe Iheir Soviet advisers are serving no useful
pilCXB!
--Scerfr"
Tbe Tactical Level
Information on Soviet taeiieal advice ii alio '
advisees a< ietc regional commana oiviiion andleveli closely monitor combat operation! and suggest coo (in of action. TJ^'l iggest* their tactical ndviee bat included trie following poinu:
Tbe need for careful punning before an alUck. especially in the areas of hsgiitics, command and control, reconnaissance, and intelligence on enemy forces.
ovcrnmcnt-lo-rcbel manpower ratio, which was teen at the minimum for encaeemeni ol tbe insurgents in Ethiopia, tccoidini C
Conduct of heavy and encoded preliminary aerial and artillery bombardment of rebel rations,by mass ground assault on those positions and preparation foe rebel counterattack.
The extensive use of airoviel advisers have reportedly pressed commandersake more use ofdicopter gunshlps to ilrike insurgent concc ntra lions.
Althoughthe ad vim i
have concentrated oo urging olleiui'c activity/^
3'be Soviets also have advised unitsmprove (belt defensive preparations lor insurgent attacks byigher standard of combal readiness and increasing reconnaissance activity
Il is difficult lo ascertain the degree lo which the comrturiders in any of the three count lies haveSoviet tactical advice in executinE combat opera lions. Soviet advisers apparently do not have the authority to issue orders lo military commander- f_
^Jlbe advisers' credibilitymatters it. in some cases, unite low.some
Ethiopian senior held commanders, field grade offi cert, and junior officers ore firmly opposed to the type of advice they arc getting from the Soviets, whom
Military. oa Tmeilei
There haserceptible chant*0 In ihe number, detail, and orientation a/ Sou/el unclaulfied aritttet about particular tactical problem! related to1 Coverage haiftr combat, mountain war/are. ambushet, and Jungle warfare. Then articles hare been expanded over earlierwire few andInclude more detalli and analyilt. Thtphange In the perception of certain toetlti.ore balanced vine af the role of hetleopteri In mountain and Jungle condition! at well at praise for certain tatliei that had been attributed lo theforemost amonghe use andof lu'p-ise. Humcroui article! discuss the need to trie scouting ponies, the problems of landing helicopters, and the difficulty In Judgtmt larrtit and pasliiorJrtf lofirt In mountains. In general, they tfvt more attention so the conditions under which such operations should be carried out. by whom, and for what puf>ote. They also stress ike need for reliable communications as well as the use of local residents lo discover etYuntetrevolutlonary hideouts
Tht Inueated attention In Sorltl writingsounter-Insurgency optratlons luggeits ihe Soviets are In the process of reevaluating iht requirements for ihls demanding mission Many of these articles have used Ihe VS txperlettct In Vietnamolm of'departure, but It Is clear that iht vast ntajortly of them relate dlrtctly io the Afghan iltuailon. Although many also hovt potential applications to tht situations InEthiopia, end Afotamblque. we have seen no articles tpectfically applrlng the concepts developed In rfcr'i Afghan-oriented literature to African counter-Insurgency operations
they consider to be Insensitive to Ethiopian casualties and out of touch with battlefield conditions. Indeed C
3
Elhic-pian officers routinely itnotr Soviel advice on all bui narrow technical issues
r
1 _J
Tactical IntelUsow,
Moscow to introduce Cuban Hoops without Ihe negative repercussions (hat undoubtedly would accompany the intervention of Soviet Bloc troops.
tIoo la Combil
Soviet
adviser, are. urule, rvoc pcrmitieaartitipiie directly in rambat. Moscow apparently wants to avoid casualties and the political consequencesdirect, nortdenisble involvement in what are essentially civil
oviet advisers bavc, at limes, participated io combat
3 the Sen-set combat rote bat usually been limited to flit hi operations and has taken place only when the Soviets have considered the host go terntnent's military capacity inadequate to carry out the misisoo. II
Soviet adviscis, onhave iceomNnied African army units into mound combat
Tbe Rote of SovietawCnbaeo
The Soviets icly licatily on Cuban support toM. and Morambsquc (seci Caban iroop* were vital in eau Wishing and censceiciting [iro-Sovki Ma ulst-Leninist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. Indeed, the introduction of Cuban troops was probably the determining factor in deciding the outcome in these two countries daring the early stages or Soviet Bloc involvement These pint Soviet-Cuban interventions irantftnrned Cuba from an essentially passive recipient of military largess into an active and valuable military ally of the Soviet Union Havana's nonaligned credentials arc particulate valuable.
Angola. Following Angolan independenceS, Cuba gradually increased its longstanding low level of involvement with Ihc Mf*LA by leading advisers and military sacoort rcsoonei to assist tbr Mirmt Leninisl croup. This group of Cubans has steadilyoord log (cl
*aboutiliury personnel Of these,0 are combat lionp* assigned to air, air defense, and ground combat units, while ihcOJ Cubans are specialists,nd advisers assisting the Angolan armed forces
I* addition to tbeir military presvnacc, in Angolahave anivilian id vise,medical and economic assistance work farU ol ,hf
Angolan Governmcnl. performing both advisory and functional tasks. Cuban civilians abo serve as teach-en.onitiuctiongricultural ei-perls, and economic advisers
Ethlv/tla. The relationship between Cuba and Filio-pia its (led to develop inhen Mengiuu became chairman of Ihc Military Councilloody power struggle The firstuban- arrived thai year, and, following Somalia'si on Ethiopiabe number grew lo00 This included Cuban troops whoor ginned iauiocoesrbal bei*orlei andey role in defeating ihe Somabi
Since the Ogaden War endedhe Cuban military presence has steadily declined. The Cubans have not been wilting to get saved red iagainst Ihe insuigcnts. probably because Fidel Catiro was unwilling io luin on the Ef means, whom Cuba had (rained and supported before Mengisiu't rise 10
Transferring lie Lesions of AfghanittaaT
more than seven years of experience Infighting the Mujahedln In Afghanistan, the Soviets have made somepolitical andtheir approach to the Insurgencylose scrutiny of Soviet activity, however, suggests their experience In Afghanistan has not lednique approach to eounterlnsurgency warfare thai they might use In support of their Afri< sn allies.
Soviet troops are gaining valuable experience fighting In Afghanistan and, aceordi.-j; lo
Defense Minister
Sokotov commented jrtflf ke hoped allIn she Soviet military would gain combatthere. Morealf million Soviet soldiers have served In Afghanistan,umber of senior officers. Including Sokolov. have been closely assocl-aied with the war. Thzr; have
ome of these Sovietveterans liave visited the three African clients facing major Insurgencies.
In fighting the Mujahedln. the Soviets have increased their use of special-purpose forces and air assauli units. Improved their Intelligence, and deployedttd security unlit. The bulk of their forces, however, remain traditional mechanised Infantry whose main responsibility Is protecting fixedand guarding lines of communication. Soviet guidance to their African clienls about structuring their armed forces appears to follow these pat term. More recent.he Soviets are now paying some attention to training and advice which are tailored to counierlnsurgency
In Afghanistan, the Soviets hove employed some of their mast advanced equipment and have modified older equipmentesult of comboi experience
The Soviets have provided iheir Afghan and African clients with some of the same types of equipment, but not the latestbecause the clients cannot afford them and would have difficultythem.6 the Sovieti significantly Increased the number ef heavy artillery pieces, automaticand helicopters assigned to their own troops In Afghanlitan. Recently, the Afghan military received more advanced artillery and Infantry fightingAngola alsoignificant number af artillery and mortar piecese expect more helicopters, artillery, and armored vehicles will be sent ta Moscow's African clienls who are fighting insurgents
The Sovlett and the Afghan Government have hod little success Implementing economic, political, or social programs to win the allegiance of ihc populace, prirf rily because of Iheir lack of control outside at Kabul end othee major cities. Indeed, ihe bluer hostility of almost the entire population lo the Soviet presence has made It Impossible fot Soviet-run effortsin acceptance. The Soviets have encoueaged ihe regime to establish politico! orgaiiliotlons to coopi local leaders and tribal groups. These suggestions have sometimes been accompanied by economicThese effoeit have had limited and usually only temporary suceest. Widespread efforts hove been made to win over insurgent groups, local leaders, and refugees during the "nailonalthat began Inut most regime overtures have been rejtcied. Similar Soviet efforts to win the Support of ihe populace ore not evident In the African countrtei
.
' una. Military Presence In Angola. Ethiopia, and Mouoiliiqu'
1 oit reliccricc, und reduced (earlomali invasion, arc the likely reasons behind Ihc reduction of Cuban force* lo. About hall of this total are military ad risen and half are eonibaihe adviser* provide technical assistance, but do not have ibe etieiuivt- operational role* that they do in Angola and Mozambique- The combat Irocers provide an ostensible deterrentomalibui have played no role in combating theimurgeney. In addition, there are someO civilian advisers and technicians in Ethiopia
Mozambiaut. Cuba moved quickly lo establishrelations with Maputo shortly alter Moram-bique gained independence from I'oelugalS.
Cuba initiated economic rebtions wilh Maputo7 and sent civilian advisers to rebuild Moranveteriorating sugar industry. There are cur-renilvsvilUn (eclwieiaits In Morambique.
7 Cuba began sending military advisers loand organize Mozambique's Army.ubao military advisers and techniciansin Mozambique are attached to someprincipally motorized infantry andai battalion level and above.the Cuban advUers are rnore
-Se-uel-'
aggressive and eicpcriciKcd in counierir.surgeneyttan Iheir Eastern Sloe counterparts and are more fortbocntiieg Aidwding lo
(he Cubans* primary (unction ia ounc training lot newhe Cubansey role in running Ihc securityote liaison cassis between tbe ScrricU and Cubans in coordinating their military activities, with the Soviets acting at the higher level*.
Other Surrogate*
Other Soviet Bloc countries, particularly East Gerrna-ny, andesser extent Bulgaria, alsoey rote in assisting Soviet efforts. The East German presence is primarily evident in the internal tccurily and intelligence appantuscs in these countries. Eastadvisers permeate tbe intelligence structure and reportedly cvrn carry out their own intelligence col-lectiOQnperaUon* against the insurgents, Vietnamese instroclon noted for their expertise in guerrillabasic military skills such atjungle combat, and ambush tactics.
Assesittwt nod Orrtlook
Although we did notnified Soviel doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare in Ihe Third World or parallels to Western theory in the Soviet approach. Our research hasattern in Moscow's aid to its African client* facing im urgencies
however, we believe we have identified the main elements of tbe overall Soviet approach:
Large-scale materiel and advisory support for the African ally's military forces aimed at the creation of large conventional forces.
Use of these force* to secure the client's carntaI, key cities, and vital economic regions againstand insurgent threats and to expand the areas controlled by the state by gradually pushing the
insurgents back.
support for the Marxist- Leninist dient slate in the international arena in order to secure broad recognition of il and lo ddegitimize Ihe daims of Ibe insurgents.
The Soviet* seem to expect that. In the long run. consolidation of the state* power and authority, expansion of the domain physically controlled by the stale, elimination of alternative political forces, and withering of the insurgencyesult of peas'*tent military pressure and erosion of outside support will ensure the defeat of the insurgent challenge.
The important role administrative, economic, and political factors play in Moscow's advice to It* African client* doe* not mean the Sovietsow priority to the military dimension of theirndeed, (hey concentrate the bulk of their assistance in this area.oscow does not appear to believe that it must belp lis clients achieve decisive military defeat of tbe Insurgent* in the near term. It seems to treat the Insurgency threaterybut still subordinate, part of tbe long-term challenge of beloing iu Margist-Leninisl alliespower
A strong emphasis on building up tbe diem state's administrative, security, political, and economicto establish its power and ensure compliance in areas under it* control.'
ResuIu as of7
Moscow has enjoyed mixed result* in Implementing its overall approach lo biiitding these African state* and helping them deal with insurgency
Il sBouM be ruard lhal Ihia DxewiriWi ia wot uiain in nam ton'rontiatVim-all, alltrritlint Martin*train 1st rrtlmra ibatil ti-il Write butite So*IIIHill vulnerablerite'reroluiirr
Bait Jiit ikt Siticihe suitebtrvcl]':miiturc of leeror and intimidation directed at cppoaxou and rewards (or supportcra. Coalman Mensas createdSoviet Woealate itrueturt reaponilveiieasonably loyal mUicary.ecurity rnechanitrn capable of maintaining riant polillcal control. Ethiopia's eeoavornic perforrrtartcc hai been poor by any standard, bet this bas dm kd lo mennias-fcl political opposition
Tbe regime In Angola has bad moderate sueoraa In devrlopinf tbe itatc Structure,in those areas of tbe country that foem the main ethnic base of the MP LA. It baa had dltrVewltics coctsobdatietg iu bold In other regions The armed forces still require citcnsire Soviet and Ctsben advisory support, and the secnrily of the regime itself would be doublfnl without0 Cuban combat ucops and miliuryAngolan ecortomk performance has beenandve nuts have some-hit otTsct tbe poor performance of other industrial and agrscol-tnrnl sectors
The govcrnmeni in Mozambique has hadiable lute apparatus, and theof iu armed forces bas beenirseornpetetvee and ethnic and tribal differ rocesconseepseoce. the iraurvcots bate gained inTbe economy is in disami. with little ,i
Combtulag ihtespite the lack ol succcas in defeating the insurgencies, the militaiy situation in these three countries, fromong-term perspective,oes not appear lo be irretrievable or. ia the Ethiopian case, particaiiarly terrain The Ethiopian insurgents base been effective ly confined lo tbeg ions and do notuni ihtcal lo Addis Ababa. In Angola. 1INITA enjoys wider geographical scope than the rthiopiii rebeb, but. in ihe wake of government offensive operations since IMS. is notosition in threaten the capiul or ihe reeirnc'i main source of (evenue. the
'iclds. Finally, wblk the Sovieisregard the miliury situation io Mounsbique asdo
dmNAMUhreat to Maputo in theerm. Moreover. Zimbabwean military interveniion on FRBLIMO's behalf has slowed insurgentand relieved the Sovieti of having to deal withhreai over the near term.
raagwerd Wmktn'The Workers' Party of EUuopia.oviet standpoint, appearse tke moat developed of the African Vanguard Workers' Parties. The party, however, It nil! heavily dominated by Menglstu and his miliury supportersat from the dviliaBr-coniraUcd party the Soviets have advocated. Soviet assessments of the Angolan MPLA-PT note that ll bas made some progress towardational party of reliableto MaraisnvLcnlaism. However, tbeT has not been able to transcend ethnic and racial barriers and has been prone to facSJonallsm.fRELIMO is inspect In Sovici eyes il has been ineffective in carrying out virtually any of use usii of the 'national democratic revolutionand in recent yean iu leaden have been less vocal in tneir commit menl both to "scientific socistam" and Soviet foreign policy positioot. Ihe problems these parties have had ia these aad other autes of "socialist orientation- have faded an ongoing debate in Soviet academic and policy wilting! on tbe "correct'" rote of the VWP in Third World countries
OunlJt Support. None of the insurgent groups bas obtained meaningful eternal diplomatic recognition, though Ihis Is primarily due lo regional political ci-cs,instances ruber than to Soviet dirJomaoy. nelrve meaiarrs. or propaganda In particular, Afiieinto I ttempts to redraw enislingand UNITA and RENAMO association with
Seem -'
Africa bare been inhibiting fact on. Moscow probablyowever, that persistent campaien. ing on these themes and championing of its clientause* in ibe international arena serve to reinforce ihe Third World diplomatic consensus against the insurgents, to build political support toe the three gmernments, and to complicate Western efforts to aid the insurgents
The Soviets have not had much impact on thematerial support. Blhiopia's northernhave consistently obuinedorxy. and supplies from the Arab world and front group* throughout Europe. RENAMO probably Still receive, tnodest support from South Africa, and UNITA gets South African and US military aid. In all three cases, Iheiave also shown themselves capable ofenptortng arms and supplies from government forces and would be able to sustain themselves, albeit at reduced levels, even if outside support were cut off.
Moscow will probably continue willingness to discuss tootberrj Africa with Ihe United States in bilateral exchanges on regional issues and may amplify its presently vague proposals for an internationalon tbe area. The Soviets are probably more interested, how eve.^jog these talk*eans of oblaining intenrtiiaiion on US policy and inienlions than tbey are In establishing any kind of meaningful negotiating forum
Cent* to rne USSR. We estimate the total cost of Moscow's economic and miliury support for ilsclienls since Ihe* to be aboutllion (sec. The Kremlin did noi anticipate this largeburden when it first moved lo support its African alUes. andhat frequently slressed that its aid Is notariety of open source writings and recent Soviet efforts to tighten the terms or client military debt payments suggest Ihe USSR intends to keep ihc costs or its involvement with these Maoist allies under lighter control.
Nonetheless. Moscow's expenditures on its African Clientsmall part of overall Soviet military and economic outlays. We do not believe cost
considera lions will significantly affocieommiinienl to its African allies. Al prcseoi. ihe Sovieis probably sec live political and military bcnclits as outweighing ihe economic burden
In spite of Ihe various problems the Soviets have experienced in helping their African clienls- deal with ihe insurgencies and consolidaie power, ihey are probably fairly satisfied with Ihe results of their appioach. First, it has lerved lo promote whai wC believe are their bask interests and objectives in these
-Hetrt
countries: increasing their political role In southern Afrka and the Horn, esiabiisblncmilitary presence, gaining access to air and naval facilities, and rnxmot-ing leftist change in key regions. Also, while ihc Sovieis do not control the internal politics of these siatea, they have amassed slgniScnnt levels of political influence. The Kremlin can afford to be patient in pursuing these policies, since it docs not facedomesticu involvement in Africa, and thean object of
VuWabUltles
Although Mcacow's approach to the Insurgencies against iu African clients has, for the most part, served iu intercsu ande believe thai iu approach and iu position ih these codntrics have several vulnerabilities that could hamper lis crTcctive-tscss in ihe long run. Moscow appearse aware of and lo have devised res pomes to sorne of these vulnerabilities, while others raise questions Ihatunanswered
fsuargenr Peniittnct. At the very least, prolonged insurgent DMlifary acaioo means thai launda.and Acldis Abnbi must devote substantiallo large military forces, which obstructs the process of eeooornic and political consolidation More serious from tbe regimes* sundpoint, insurgent persis-lence contributes to public passivity, and in some cases, outright opposition as the futility of (be govern-ment's military efTotU beeoenes increasingly evident. Finally, If icnernment fewee* are weak enough, as in Mozambique, the ihsurgenu may make military gains sufficient to threaten key cities, vlul economic Ur-geu. and. potentially, the regime itself
All this increases the eosu lo Ihe Sovieu of suppoMing their allies, retributes to friction between African miliury leaden and their Soviet advisers, and. at limes,lient's political leadenhiponsider alternativeseavy reliance on Ihc USSR and Marxism-Leninism. Moscow has usually respondedliese problems by increasing arms shipmcnu and irying to improve iu cllcnu' military performance. The absence of viable alternative sources of political and military support has SO far contained Ihe political fallout from ihe clients' poor military performartce. In
the aWeoceoie successful approachhe insurgencies, however. Ihe Sonets will continue to esnerienee tension and difficulties in their reUtiooi with these states
/nsrnWfiry oftnklr. The Soviet position in all three African tutcs remains vulnerable to sudden leadenhip change through assassination or coup. None of ihc rating parties has created afor leadership change,eader or faction less coromiiied to Marsisrr^ Leninism and the USSR could emerge suddenly. Ethiopia appears the least suscseptibkoup because of Mengittu'g political Iron grip. The Angolan leadership also appears fairly secure, at least by African standards, ekspilc ethnic and racial tensions witbin Ihe top leadership. Mozam-bique has the least stabic political equation,olitical move by miliury leaders willing loeal wilb the RENAMO insurgents cannot be ruled out.
The SovieU are preauronbty sensitive lo thesebaring previously lost political ground in Africa following coops In Ghana, Mali, and Guinea, and they have several instruments they can use to protect ibeir pcrsiiion in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Their extensive advisorybe adnimistratire. miliury. security, and political insthuUons allows litem to monitor political deveiopmenu and. possibly, loiry toreemptive coup or counter coup by party or miliury elements more loyal to the USSR. Also, wc assumehe Soviet and East eurorscan serrices have cullivaied independent networks of sources and unilaterally penetrated host countryoperations. The presence of Cuban combat troops in Angola end Ethiopia might alto dltcourage ptot-icn. Finally,oup occur, tbe Soviets would probablyair degree of leverage over the successor regime by virtue of iu dependence on Soviet aims and, in Angola. Cuban troops. While none of these factors guaranteesoup hostile to Soviet interest will not take place, they provide some degree Of "insurance" against potentially harmful intubility.
-Keceel
Poor Economic PteftH-mance. All Hire* of Moscow's African clictiu have experienced serious economic CifFiCutiiei and nonek-ch,iaginj ocorvrmiic outlook, although Angola's situation win improve If oil prices
"lit leastTicials in Mapuio and Luanda niie corne so see aspects ofrxitl- Laniais: rxooomk model as pan of their problem, and all three countries have expressed ditsaliafaction with whal they see at Inadequate Service economic aid. These dlflKulties have already led Moumbaajue and.ore limitedgoli SO tuna to tbe West for economic aid
The Sovlcti have not been opposed in principlet African clients' obtaining Western aid, but
0ears the lion" in Angola, Mozambique, way to leaders who did not eitber colonial rule or the period in which
rsl reports and various Soviet writings indicateoscow is concerned about the possibility of increased Western influence. Moscow willlients' military deperdcrsce tond influence. In view ofs well as iheirhey will (ubsiamially
Sonet iml.Uiy aad polilical backing helped the re giants centtcdidtic power and defeat castside chxl-lengts. Their world view may be more directlyd liy the post revolutionary experiences of ceurromic decline, pen Lit cm ina urgency, and dependenceoreign power. They may be less inclined to accept miliury ecuuiiccu to (bearxism Leninism.or rdose rcUtioris with Moscow gs necessary national policies, and more openolilical and econotulc pragmatism at borne and genuinerood.
The Soviets appear to tec tbe devtloprntai of tho Vanguard Workers' Party as (be main answer lo Ihe problem of generational change. They believe that an insUtutiottalired Manbl-Leaiinist VWP shouldbecome the primary and, ultimately, (be only posit Mr arena of leadership competition andIwould guarantee that future leadetslup change would take placearxist-i it inititutiona! framework and that future leaden will remain loyal at least SO the forms of Marxism-Lcmaism Moscow has had extensive experience otth sell professed Mar tin parties lhal broke away from Sovki approed policies and presumably hope* to ensure Ihc loyally of tbe African VWPs by edaentiori and guidance in (be "ctarrect" methods of building the pan,
Appendix
Writings on libiugcncy aod CoBnlerUtWiency
In (be pan. Seme- military eVxtrioe nndheory have held Ihatra and military ccaiflicli in (he Third World arc an outgrowth of Western imperialism and iulo national liberation inryvcrnenu in the Third World. Sonet thcoritta bate long described the "nattoral liberaijoo proccu"ositive and hlttor ically ordained (rend and one in which Ihe Soviel role lahampiony colonial or foreiin-dctronalrd "iwoeolonier ic-gitnes Over the yean, the SovteU hue rained mod) ciprrtite In dealingariety ol ontaxnOnitl guerrilla and insurgent rntneraenU by rarovamrojmaterid. nnd adritory and polilical etatstaneench force) In Africa. Alia, and Latin America
Today, however. Soviet ideo!oflau and strategist! ore faced whh tbe problem of defining, analysing, and pteacribing rcaponaca for littialiona Id which antigen-rri iruurgendc* con front friendly Marxist-Leninistornptehcrtiivc review of (woalf decades of Sennet pc^tkal.and military writiagt indicates that Ihe Soviets have not yetinirtct decttine of tceiniur-geney.o diwussioo of cuuntcrinsurgtiseynique pobtienl military problemnique response from the Soviet state, la Our judg-mcnt. there are aeverat reaiooi for (his somewhat surprising omission:
Tbe persistence of Ibete insurgencies raises tentative ideeaogkal quetlioos (hoi Soviet ttsooristsvoid. Mortoow't dient regime* ostensibly rule in the interest of ibe "worker nnd peasantcknowledging that substantial opposition to Miriisl-Leniniit govern me nil penisu among these group* could call imo question critical esernenu ea* theseaima to legitimacy and undercut Soviel explanations of the "national liberation" process.
Theof miliury doctrine and ibe military eitabliihioeat't focus on mauive combined opera-lion*ATO aad China may make It diBi-cult for advocates of Beaiblc. tnull-unit owvcrpti applicable io the Third World toearing.
' The Sovku may not view these Third Worlda* tuflidcotly common or threatening to Ibdr security interestsequire the formulationeparate military doctrine
If the Sovieti have secretly developed or area doctrine applicable to countcnni urgency, It is not evident In (heir writings orhe Soviel literature does, however, provide somei cht into Soviet thinking on the question of anti-Marxistin ihe Third Woria
Soviel rtbterrers have long noted that during the revolutionaryariety of clement* may riteppoaition. Including countetrcvolutloaary das* forces aad groups and individuals seeking personal gain. According to tbe Soviets. aa-Jgoveriirnen! rebels in ihe AJrican eases are eoade up of two denseals 'internal reactionaries" and "bandits" (see. Sovielxplains ihe ability of these dementsurvive over several yean almost cxdulvelyesult of crutude support from the "onperialist" world, not because they attract significant internal support Indeed. Soviel aocusations regarding intensifiedand equipping of the countctrcvolutiooaries by the Unilrxl Stair* and other nations fame increased statically since the Invasion of AfghaniaUn
Rt^alaalkei
rve-ilwon.here may betowardncee realistic pictureeproblem li-rtillya polillcal oejierverovm noted in6ariety of faetori. ineiudmi economic buckwiidncJi. the strength of tradition and religion, and tbe error* of revolutionary leader*ntered countrrrevejutioo againtl scant-nl-oricnted Third World Ultra and pushed laerteandostensible bcnericiaries of revolutionarythe camp of the oppou lion An article in the7 edition of Moscow's Military Hlitory Journal discusting the Mmliin rebellion in Soviet Central Asis during oflen cited in Soviet wrilingt alluding lotuggcsti the Soviet* arcore real ink view of iha insurgency rvoblcin In (be run. the auer-ilfii in thanbaime-tki -rie portrayedes> bands supported by
lor*ign imperialists and engaged toleJy in banditrybnsary article, however, adrtut* that the bni nucbi bad certain legitimate grievances a* -til a* tuppurt from the local population The appearance of Iheac article* in auch autboritaiivc publicationt aug gaii (here it high-level interest in the USSR inore balanced look at ih* insurgencies Mint Sovieton 'he labycct, however, coniinuca to strea* the role of citernal meddling in sustaining the lebelt
Original document.
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