Directorate of Intelligence
Where is the USSR Headed'
Gorbachev has unleashed an earthquake in the Soviet system that has already gone far toward destroying tht old ideological institutions ha inherited from Brezhnev and Stalin.
o His policy of democratization^ has critically weakened the party at all levels while strengthening tho authority of independent institutions.
o Glasnost has permitted exposes of the crimes ol the Stalin and Brezhnev
eras and discredited old methods of totalitarian rule.
Gorbachev seems to have Initiated this shakeup of the system In order to prepare the groundworkew, leas centralized, more humane society. We see littleherelueprint, however, and evidence suggests that his tactics result from ad hoc challenges and opportunities Thus tar his reforms have produced more turmoil thanaccomplishments
o The upsurge of nationalism unleashed by Gorbechev now poses fundamental challenges to the leadership in the Baltic republics, thererowingchallenge to the legitimacy and integrity of the USSR.
o Deteriorating economic conditions spawned partially by the reforms have produced Widespread coHiUffiemTssatisfaction and growing labor unrest.this summer. Uvflfll nUHflfad thousand coal miners conducted astrike. JgWWW
Currantaccompanying leadershipIt difficult to predict lust where the Soviet Union is headed but some significant revisions to the current course seem increasingly likely.
Reformers appear to be soaking to exploit popular impatience with the pace of change to accelerate their radical agenda and move more vigorouslyore pTuramtic ponttcai systemr*ot-onantefl economy
Moderate and traditionalists members of the leadership will continue to try to restrict reform by insisting on greater party control pf the economy
In any event, the leadership seems to realize that il must move to calm unrest The appointment of KGB Chairman Kryuchkov to the Poiitburo_under-Imed GQ'OacrUvl policy to crack OQWn on crim# ana socintai disorder It
may also presage atoward nationalists in the
Approved tor Reiem.u
SECRET NOBfJRN
CONFIDENTIAL Nt/FORN
espec
Soviet officials haveumber of measures to stem the growing Soviet drug problem:
oealer organization operating nationwide was smashed.
o Over the pest three years, Soviet customs officlsls have confiscated tons ot Afghan hashish being trans-shipped through Moscow to Western European and North American markets.
o Attempts to eradicate the cultivation of marijuana and opium tn Soviet Central Asia have bean stepped up.
o The Soviet media.have bean increasingly used in en
the drug problern. emphasizing criminal panertres for dealers and encourai rehabilltation--with no criminalusers
Such measures, however, have had onlylimited effect:
o KGB Chairmen Kryuchkov and other officials have argued that existing countemarcoticg measures are Inadequate, claiming that more drugs are entering the USSR.
o Soviet sectJtity forces era still short of personnel, training, and equipment todrug
o Rehebllrtatlon efforts are namparadpara( aguipment.
CONFIDENTIAL NOPORN
CONFI
SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Among Us msny byproducts, giasnost has revealed the monumental environmental problems facing the Soviet Union Examples:
o Half of all Soviet municipal water supplies have pollutiontate
o No large Soviet Industrial city meets World Health Organization standards for mammum perrrussable concentration of pollutants in thy
The Soviets haveumber of steps to reduce environmental hazards:
o The draft State Ecological Program Is designed to end discharges of untreated effluents into the water by the0 and to helve discharges ol pollutants into the atmosphere by thehla program Is expected to cost upwardsillion rubles.
o Safety Improvements have been scheduled for most older Soviet nuclear power plants, although they will still be unsafe bytann>rris. fSkwm
A number of factors, however, complicate Moscow's efforts to enhance environmental protection. These include:
o The cost of environmental safeguardsime when the country Is trying to restructure Its economy is almost prohibitive.
o Government organs responsible for protection of the environment lack the clout necessary to force polluting Industries to adhere to stricter codes.
o Environmental protection technology and equipment la lacking.
In light of the Moscow's Inebllrty or unwillingness to act local citizens' groupsIncreasing pressure on local government
o Polluting factories in numerous cities were forced to adhere to stricter pollution codes after citizens petitioned local leaders for help.
o Public pressure forced the closure of the Armenian nuclear nowar station and the postponomnnt In tho construction or expansion of at loastthers.
o Activists In the Baltic republics have made protection of theey platform in their can for greater autonomy from Moscow.
o In9 elections to the Congress of Peoplesumber of -candidates were elected on the strength of sn environmental program. Futureregional, andprobably see an Increasing number of candidates with an environmental agenda.
IFIT^NTIAL NO/6rN
CONFINE-ftORN
RIME
Organized crime had existed In the USSR for decades before lhe Gorbachev era. Mafia-type networks first surfaced under Khrushchev. Crime has expended considerably, however, jn the last few years Although Its full scope cannot be measured precisely, an interior Ministry official has claimedillion rubles' worth of valuables and cash were confiscated from criminal bosses68 Much of this results from the growing cooperative (private) business sector.
o Gangs view cooperatives as tempting targets because many of them generate large amounts oi cash ana because Focal authorities, already ambivalent about the cooperative movement or sometimes in cahoots with local crime bosses, have been reluctant to step In.
o Difficulties in getting supplies and raw materials often drive coops to illegalthem vulnerable to threats and violence. Many have been TiTcTTtTbut of business for refusing to pay protection money.
o Local "mafias" also are infiltrating legitimate cooperatives. Criminal bosses reportedly lend coops money, charging hinh rates ot interest and demand seats on their ruling boards and anares of the profits. Many ofthese cfloas ere used to launder money from the genus' Illegal activities. | |
A Soviet Investigator has said that the mafia is strongest In the Ufcraine and Moldavia. and that It has penetrated into Moscow. Leningrad, and central Russian cities like Tambov. Penza, and Perm. Corruption also has been partlculsriy strong in Centralas evidenced by the scandala In Uzbekistan where fraudulent cotton yields have produced millions of rubles of profits. MXXmmm
-tr
The Soviet underworld is reportedly establishing wider international links', especially in drug trafficking endntiques and icons. This probably helps explain Moscow's qTSWIWq ITOrast in Joining Interpol.
To deal with the problem, the regime so far has emphasized Increased law enforcement end hinted et stricter lews.
o Although the KGB Is being used to beef up the militia (regular policeto set up special law enforcements units to fight organized crime /beenend poorly'
o The militia claims that it Is outgunned by weapons in private hands procured on the black market, snd militiamen complain about rules requiring thum to give warning shots while pursuing criminals.
Another major obstacle has been the militia's susceptibility to corruption. The Procurator's Office has estimated that two-thirds of the underworld's loot goes to bribe officials,ecent Soviet article claims that mafias are able to offer bribes rangingillion rubles. I
CONFIO/NTIAL NOTORN
CONFIDENTIAL NOyFORN
HUMAN RIGHTS/LEGAL REFORM
Under Gorbachev human rights performance has madeSoviet standards,Among Moscow's achievements:
o The publication ot Incressingly daring articles that address fundamental criticisms of the Soviet systemurgeoning unofficial prors
remendous growth in unofficial groups and demonstrations
o The release ofolitical prisoners since the beginning
o Efforts to reduce political abuse In the psychiatric system.
o The highest emigration levelsecade.
ore tolerant artnuo'i' toward religiousan end toprohibition on charitable wort bv religious organisationsconcessions toward Jews and
At the same time, the leadership has made clearntends to retain Its authority to judge the proper limits for Individual actionand some local officials have resorted to repression.
o Authorities In Moscow and other cities have raided the premises of human rights activists, unauthorized publishers, and unofficial groups.
o The regime has responded arbitrarily to attempts by informal groups to
register and meet. Members or groups that challenge the party's predominant role are frequently harassed by the police and attacked In the'media.
o Unauthorized demonstrators are sometimes sentancefl tondays Of administrative detention (Le_ without ball).
o Improper commitments to psychiatricet the behest of corrupt local perty officials--still occur.
o Despite rumorshange Is Impending, the Ukrainian Catholic Church-banned sinceireojl. and the reoime's relaxation toward The practice of Islam has been limited.
Progress toward Institutionalizing greater human lights can be measured bya number of laws that the Supreme Soviet la scheduledat Its present session These include laws on the press and on glasnost
criminals. Other positive the constitutionality of laws and to oversee the
Dinar Bavariiiimm Biiiciarr
Continued progress depends on the political viability of Gorbachev and his allies and the reform program generally. If Gorbachev fudges that destabilizing aspects of the reforms have become too threatening, he himself may decide to relmpose greeter restraints on human rights. I
CONFIDENTIAL NCUTORN
CONFIDENTIAL NofoflN EMIGRATION
The Soviets have permitted record numhprt ntajftjlfl from the USSR, with the total for the three groups climbing from70 last year. If present trends continue,o over imi
Despite the regime's concessions, the opening of culturalnd pjnrnitting trie instruction ofear of rising popular anti-Semitism seems to bearge number of Jewish applicants. Many Soviets want to leave to improve their economic lot and are applying now rather thaneversal of emigration policy in the future.
Sinceong-time refuseniks whose cases were supported by the Department of State were released prior to major US-Soviet meetings. There are still anefuseniks. primarily those whom the Soviets claim previously had
Moscow seems on the verge ofew law that would clear up mervy administrative ninorances to fee effligflTIBn "ino leadership was ready to issuo tho law last rviay. but Qecidod to sjiOraii it to the Supreme Soviet. If enacted, the law will ease several emigration restrictions.
O Invitations frnm ahrnart will hatrnmt.rr]m-
*nd will no longer have to^come onlylrat-deoree relative. One report cfaims mat applicants may not even need an invitation, but will'ba able to leave upon showing Soviet authorities their entry permitoreign country.
o The emigration .ban for those engaged in classified work will expire five years
o At present refuseniks called "poor relatives' cannot emigrate if therefrom family members either on flrwsnclal or other grounds. will no longer apply to adults whose parents or spouses doanyms. ana
resolve disputes based on financial obligations. |
Despite great increases In the overall number of exit permits, the process by which Individuals receive permission still operates capriciously. Many refuseniks are unaware of the appeals process (the Supreme Soviet Citizenship Commission) and cannot opt concrete IIUoHTi^rgl'j'on their status
A recent law eiiowlng citizens toourt complaint agalnat unlawful actions by officials allows suits only against individual officials end not 'collegia!his exemption has prevented unsuccessful applicants from suing the emigration office for denying them exit vises ibssflaW
The Soviets nave made occasional attacks In their media on some Western immigration practices that haveparked by the much larger flow of Soviet emigres. Moscow has criticl/od Washington for hrino too touch in liming Soviet citizens enter bul too generous in granting 'refugee* status to them
CONFIDENTIAL NOj6rN
Status of the Soviet Leadership
The leadership balance of power was shifted dramatically In Gorbachev's favor ateptember Cenirei Committee plenum, where he was able to cflsmlss fhree fullrtburo members who were not enthusiastic supporters of his radical retorm program The changes sharply reduce the threat from traditionalist opponents and bolster his ability to move forward with political and legal reforms.
O The sacking of party legal and security Secretary Chflbrikov( the Politburo's most outspoken critic a) perestroyka and democratization, was Gorbachev's strongest blow to me party's orthodox wing.F)
Tho promotion of KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov to Politburo fullskipped cangioate*lend increased clout to the regime's expressedo ensure lew and order
areer intelligence officer, he appears toilling ally of Gorbachev's. Iforvent supportor of radical reform. He has bubllcly supported legislative oversight of the KGB and has personally leo 4he campaign to Improve the security agency's tarnished reputatlon.fi
The promotions also strengthened the authority o'upreme Soviet, which Gor^acriev :hairs as President
Promoting Yevoeniv Primakov rhairman of thn Council of the Unionupporter of radical reform, to Politburo candidate membership raises the number of Supreme Soviet officials In the Politburo to three.
Vice President Anatoliytrong supporter of pefreatroyfca who has been acquamWfl WITH (jOrTJICIW since they were In law school Inlreadyolitburo candidate member. He hasapable stand-in for Gorbachev in the Supreme Soviet chairing sessions when the President Is otherwise occupied.
Gorbachev still does notree hand In the Politburo, and his troubles are far
o The personnel changes advanced leading moderates in the leadership while passing over reformera seemingly well-placed for promotions, suggesting that Gorbachev's victoryesultompromise.
o While Gorbachev has further consolidated his position In the leadership, he must stillay to remedy seemingly Intractable social and economican intensifying nationalities crisis.TsIng crime rafe. critical shortages, inflation, and* labor unrest
o To solve these problems, Gorbachev mustelicate balancing act. If heora moderate line on some Issues, he "risks "oslng his mo're radical supporter? On the other hand,aster pace of reform would llkoly exacorbato leadership tensions and fuel societal titfTsTonTTB"**
Original document.
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