LEBANON: THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE PALESTINIANS (DELETED)

Created: 12/1/1987

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

550

Warning Page

Lebanon: The Growing Strength of the Palestinians^ 3

Am laicUletncc Autumn!

I ubanon: The Growi of lhe Palcsdnii

" b3

Judgments

tttmbtr lig?-i'lM'All 'tpon.

Palestinians kg rapidly rebuilding their power base in Lebanon, furlhei complicating cfforu lo achieve Lebanese national reconciliation and stability along Israel's northern border. The Palestinianovernude greal strides toward rebuilding: their miliury. intelligence, and political infrastructure. They areoothold in the south and are accelerating their attacks on Israeli forces and (he Israeli-backed Army of South lebanon in ihc security- I

Tbe crowing strength of the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon isby iheir dc facto takeover in6 of Sidon. thc country's third-Largest city. The presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in tbe Sidon area, in tbe midst of several contending militias, is leading to increased Palestinian entanglement in Lebanese militiahe PLO'sactic of playing off rival militias adds to lhe differences anions Lebanon's

fighters are returning to Lebanon by sea. primarily through Srdon, but also through the Druze-held port of Khaldah and ibe Christian port of Juniyah. The PLO infiltration has been assisted by tactical alliances with Lebanese factions, including the pro-Iranian ShiaHizballah and the Palestinians' traditional Christian enemies. Most of Lebanon's militias are aiding the return of the Palestinians in return for cash and other ir

1 Throughout (his paper PLO is used to refer to Palestinianthat accept (he leadership of PLO Chairman Yssir Arafat.opposed to thc pro-Syrian groups belonging to ihe Palestine National Salvation Front |H fo_3

13

Damascus is bent on controlling Palestinian activities" in Lebanon, but il is unlikely to accomplish iu goal. Syria's unwillingness lo project direct military force in South Lebanon, for fear of provoking Israel, is aiding the reemergence of Arafat's power base there. The unreliabilily of Syria's Lebanese allies in opposing ihc PLO may force Damascus to confront Arafat more directly in the Beirut area and Sidon. Open conflict with the PLO. however, would be opposed by the Soviet Union, by Iran andclosestby moderate Gulf stales such as Saudi Arabiaw;ii iB H

In the eventyrian-PLOfollowing Syrian President Assad's death or in the unlikely event he decides to embraceprospects for the PLO in Lebanon would dramatically improve. Arafat would undoubtedly gainextensivelv from the reopening ofweaponyupply line through fj j)

The brightest prospect for further PLO conquests is around Sidon. The prospects for an expansion of Palestinian power in the south will depend greatly on lhe Syrian and Israeli reaction. For different reasons, neither country wants the PLO to become dominant in lbc south, but each willaggressive initiatives by the other. Thc possibilityalestinian resurgence in Beirutore distant prospect. Palestinian fighters in the Lebanese capital are surrounded by Syrian forces and Amal milkmen, and they have little chance of opcratine outside the t? J

ration, at least

mm 43

Increased Hizballah ties toAbuprobably contribute to an increase in coordinated atucks against Israel's northern border. It could also lead to cooperation In terrorism againsi Western interests in Europe, although PLO-Hizballah cooperation vat leas in the near term,probably remain localized in Lebanon

US efforts to mediate the Lebanese conflict and lo promotepeace in lhe Middle liasl arc further complicated by Ihcof an armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The resurrectioninfluence in Lebanon adds to the country's thorny socialproblems and willtcgoiiated settlement in LebanonMoreover, escalation of hostilities, particularly in the south, runs risk of triggering open conflict between Israel andS>

i.

t I

i

i

Contents

Key Judgment!

In Sidon

Motives

of Return and Infiltration Routes

Acquisition

Ties to Lebanese Factions

to tbe Chriilians

to the Druze

to Sunni Moderates

3

to Further Palestinian Growth

b$

Difficulties

Camps War Strategy

Scenario

for the United States

The PLO in Lebanon

Major Treaties Governint the PLO Presence in Lebanon

Figure 1

J

Lebanon: The Growingf (he Palosriniansfl fj }

Palestinian guerrillas neve been makingmajor comeback in Lebanon since their vtpoUwn by Israel; and by Syriabe rise o* Palestinianided by the continuing decline of the authority of the Lebanese Government. Israeli-Syrian hostility, and Ihe ability of tbe Palestinians to success, fully align ihcrtuervcawith Lebanese sectarian and ideological fsctionsflj H j

The Palcaiinians have been reorganizing andtheir polilical and military organizationalLebanone judge that the numbercivilians in Lebanon totalsAlthough several thousand Palestinianwere cupelled by Israel and by Syria,never left Ibe country. Hundreds ofloyalists went underground in Beirutand pro-Syrian Palestinians gathered inBiqa' (Bekaa Valley) under Damascus* auspicesthe Palestine National Salvation Front.emergedey challenger to theOrganization (PLO) under Arafat'sin letunon after3

The PLO's revival has been opposed by Syria and its moai important ally inShia Muslim Amal mililia.4 Amal and the Palestinians have engaged in sporadic fig hithe camps war becausetraggle for control of the refugee camps. SomejjSOOsokiiers and cmlians have died in these battle* I3

Rerival In Side*

Fatah and other pro-Arafat Palestinian factions haw; succeeded ia taking control of Sidon, Lebanon's third -largest city, and areas around it with the help of the Lebanese Sunn! militia of Mustafa Sa'd. Pro-Arafat groups control several hills adjacent to the refugee camp* of 'Ayn al Hul-th. and Al Mtyah wa Miyafcv herealestinian live. The success of thc PLO fighters in wresting control of thc strategic coastal town of Maghdushah from Amal militiamen

Croups Within the Palestine Liberation Organization

Leaser

tayUim

Ara(.l

LiboiueaiaI.F1

for lhe Uberaiinsef

Abba* (Abu AbMU

Yaa-b

|

i( fothcUberaikw Uswainvih

Of I'iC.-lnr

lOFLP)

1

lionOsors*

lheof Hnbb.it> Pi PFLP)

1

Communji

Prnr tPCPi

layman

Niistb

1

Nulo-itFnMH

|

Commind

rPfLP-GCj

Jab.il

1

al<Qadl

1

Simiile

From IPSO

1

i kui |

for iho Uber.tk.ef

Ghuurn

j

rets*.

Muiiiba

(Abu Mum)

mi wui 1

1

Convcin. Mo-crnoM

Abu

1

AsmIbobiiht PiKsun. liberation FfcatlPLFl Al she And mceUne of ihe Palestine Nuionil Council, en. ike Abu Abbas ltd TVlal Yaevb facUons ot lhe FLPio toldrcuriafteition conferenceUne mow hi, but none his

OOOOTcg.

Copyrighted material from the

has been removed from

This Material may be viewed in the CIA Reading Room or requested directly from the copyright holder.

Tbe Palestinians and ihetr Lebanese Sunni alliesitieinptintccupyfirlink il lo the Sidon area. Jazzin is lhe(own in lhe south and is controlled byArmy of South Lebanon althoughoutside Israels security zone intring of former Christianfrom the hilts northeast of Sidon toof Jazzin, andngaged in almostand smajl-arms skirmishes with lhe ArmyLebanon. Th; presence oF the Army ofin Janin and thesolation fromsecurity rone makeempting target foeHizballah. Palestinian, and Lebanese

Thc Palestinians ar

building additional bases elsewhere in Lebanon. pro-Syrian Palestinians and other neutral groups like lhe Popular From for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLPL the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Commandbuand the Democratic Front for ihe Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) have bases north of Asb Shuf (Shuf)

'Alyab, id Syrian-control led arcaa in the Bekaa Valky. and in northern Lebanon near Tripoli. Tbe 'Alyah bates hare been used to shell Amal positions around the besieged Palestinian camps in West Beirut and are ereditcd by Amal officials with presenting Amal from gaining Ihe upper hand in lhe camps war there. The Palestinian bases in the Bekaa and in northern Lebanontraining andacilities for Palestinians and their allies

Arafat* Modtes

Thc shattering of ibe PLO presence in Ubanon by Israel inby Syria's attack on the PLO in lateihe organization militarily impotent and politically demoralized. The loss of Lebanon robbed the Palestinian guerrillas of their most important base for operations against Israel.

Palestinian fighters who bad been accustomed to operating freely inside Lebanon found themselves severely constrained by their new hosts In Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan. Libya, North Yemen. South Yemen, and Iraq,eturn lo Lebanon

Otber factors have contributed io tbe return of an organ bed Palestinian movement to Lebanon:

The massacre of anihe Sabra and Shatila refugee camps iny the Isradi'SupportedForces militia added urgency io thclo return its lighters to Lebanon. Theof Palestinian civilians were subjected tofrom rival Lebanese militias and

4

We believe that most of the Palestinian fighters whoorth Yemen, Iraq, and other Arabin tbe wake of the Israeli invasion have returned to Lebanonl

Siront familal tsea jUeoeiTenedihefigl^

deaths of several thoiisandPaleatirilan^52 and the eontinuinaand harassment of several hundred thousand Palestinian civilians in Lebanon reinforced in (he minds of thc fighters thc need to avenge the suffer-ine of* their people.

The outbreak of the camps war in the spring5 between Syrian-backed Lebanese Shia Amaland Palestinian guerrillas and the subse-Quenl Israeli attack on ihc PLO headquarters lo Tunis in5 encouraged thc Palestinians io speed up efforts to end their exile from Lebanon.

Pro-Arafat loyalists constitute the largest number of recent Palestinian infiltrators into Lebanon!

-Rale of Return and Infiltration Routes

The PLO is slowly rebuilding Us strength but has not yet reached iunvasion level00 fighters.2 il controlled virtually all of South Lebanon, much of West Beirut, and the refugee camps around Tripoli in (he .ior^ 3

^petff'

Tke Mushrooming of Abu Nidal

Abu Hldal. iht leader of lhe Faloh Revolutionary Council, itajor effort to gain strength in Lebanon

relatively few tto

Fatah, we believe that the Abu ntdal oegantzatlonorce to be reckoned with because Its radical image attracts young, disillusioned Palestinians. TheIsull-fledged political entity

in:y ^

We believe that the Abu Nidal organization Isa credible force In Lebanon despite the closure of iu offices In Damascus. Abu Nidal Is actively recruiting disaffected Patesttnlani In Syian-conlrollcd areas and appeari to be gaining itrenph and momentum at the expense of other Palestinian

fo 3

Despite these purchases, we believe that the PLO has not recovered from the loss of large quantities of heavy weapons captured by the Israelis during2 invasion. For example, the Palestinians have not replenished their supplies of tanks and armoredcarriers, which numbered someostly obsolescent4 tanks and about SO armored personnel carriers. The Palestinians* main source of heavy weapons has been Syria, but, since the breakdown of Syrian-PLOhe Palestinians have been unable to acquirens from Damascus!

nuances

We believe that the PLO's ability to purchaseand buy Influence among the Lebanese militias is aided by thc sound financial standing of the organization In Ubanon, although the effort isa heavy financial drain on the PLO worldwide. We estimate thatoercent of the PLO't bvdfsi is Spent in Ubanon, which amounts to aboutillion annually. The PLO made severalinvest menu io the Lebanese economy duringnd continues to draw income from these investments to supplement declining financial support from Arab sources. Arab rsatrons including Libya are another source of money I

I

s**fel

Ifor the camp* in Lebanon, which include trusts fo: families of dencledical arcdsocial services, and land and housing purchases^BI- _5

We judge thai the PLO Is spending large sums of money (perhapa asjnuch0 million to far lhe camps *

ExampltsReceni PLO Involvement in Lebanese Fighting

ke Momntain. PaUmmlan fightws Join Druse fighters In bitter fighting against the Christian Lebanese Farcei militia. Alliance leadi to expulsion of Christian inhabitants from the northern andShuf areas, especially In thr Iqlim al Kharrub region. Palestimaafiehitrs have remained in the lattm ever r

ihe brief Islamic)

I9tt Wee af Tripoli. PLO fighters* Islamic fundemintelists of the Islamic Unification Movement against lhe pro-Syrian Arab Democratic Parly, the Syrian-bached Palestine National Salvation Front, and splinter groups belonging to the Lebanese Com svmntst Party and the Syrian Social National Party. Clashes lead to expulsion of pro-Arafat loyalists from Tripoli and an end to the brief Islamicenclave in the

riniesi TWs lo Lebanese Factions -

Wa believe thai Arafal is developsog lies tofactions as leverage againsi Syria andeDy. Amal Declining financiallocally and regionally are forcinglheturn (ofor help PLO lies lo Lebanese factionsto be fragile in thc pan. however, becausebeen based oa short-term political andrather than on common ideology. WcArafat insist continue to nurture these lies If becceed^con*

TW. io the ChritrUm

Lebaneac Christian animosity toward Syria and Amal I* lengthening Christien-PLO ties- The Chrittiirtt view the Palestinian presence In Lebanonever aatinst Svri

ar afthe Flag- Palestinian fighters in Beirul Join fortes wllh Iht Druze against Amalid to drive Amal from IU turf in West Beirut. Clashes resulttandoff. Syria Interferes to end the clashes by pulling heavy pressure on Druie chieftain .

Wai id Juntdaii tovtt to the fsh

ar of ihe. union fighters Join the Druse and other leftist fortes In West Beirul In the snoss retool bid lo destroy the Amal stronghold there The Palestinian-Druse alliance had come close to achieving Us stated objective when Syrian troops entered West Beirut on Arjttsl't behalf on 22

|

Secret"

ey player In lhe Lebanese Forcea-PLO rapprochement. The Christ Uns are aligning them-telvca with Iraq, one of Arafat's major backers and Syria's fo

[Dany

imoun, ton of deceased former Pros idem Camille Chamoun, was instrumental Inl lion arms shipment lo tbe LcbaneseJ last winterly

eond da Tie* lo lhe Druze

Thc Druze mi in tain cordial relations with thc PLO despite Increasing rneasurc fiom Syria to'end this

their careerssraeli invasion1

HiibalUb leaders it aiiliunts before the

.jfnuV

Israeli forces suffered theic heaviest casual lie* since Iheirin1lashyrian Palestinian guerrillas onll Israeli soldiers were killed byPFLP-GC commando whoang glider lo enter ssorihern Israel. On7 three Israeli totdkrs were killed and several woundedlash with pro-Syrian and Lebanese guerrillas who were attempting to infiltrate into Israel through the security tone. Thc infiltration attempt caase onlyays after an Israeli raid on Palestinian targets ia Sidon thai resulted in nunvttnul deaths and

Ties lo SunaJ Moderates Palestinian tics have always been strongest io the Sanni Muslims. The strongest link bclween Ihcaad lhe Sunrsii si sn Sidon ucder (be auspice* of Mustafa Sa'd. leader of lhe Popular Nasirilc Organisation. Sa'd islind eye to the growing influence and strength of Arafat loyalists in his city In return for monetary and political rewards.

ifighters are ihe backbone of Sa'd'* poliiicalbackingis bid io become Sidon's undisputed Lebanese warlor

We believe that Israeli air and ground atucks on the Palestinian camps around Sidon are cementingbetween the PLO and Sa'd'* militia and are likely to lead to more joint operations against the Israeli-backed Army of Soulh Lebanon, at least in the Janin area. PLO-Popular Nasiriie forces are already dug in ai Kafrown onlyilometers west

Secrft

of Jatzin. and ate locked inio anisarm ihc Palestinians. The PLO retains

dud wiih lhe Army of Soulh Lebanon. The PLOwith iheni mil ilia in

thc Popular Nasirilcs improved the coordinationB Lactivliies around Sidon

the town

Wc judge thai lhe rapid decline ofnfluence ehewhere in Lebanon2 is forcing Sunni politicians to strengthen iheir lieshe PLO reduce their vulnerabilityival sectarian groups. The PLO has established ties io several traditional Sunni leaders sndbe Sunni militias mainly to counter Shia influence in Lebanon. The highest rank ing Sunni religious leader, lhe Grand Mufti Hassan Khaled, has repeatedly rejected Amal and Syrian

fighters and field commanders resume Ihcir hostilities Ghul was killed onuone another bi panontinuing power urol ihc Pafettiauan camp* In Lebanon.

mfMkM All Shahin was shot

mm

Despite the rivalries, the camps war generally forces the Palestinians io pool iheir resources against Syria and Amal.

Nowhere have these rivalries been more bitterthanoa. The rivalriesbecome caircrnely intense ai pro-Syrian andPalestinians have set oot lo liquidate

against the Palestinians isajor riftthe Assad regime and ils allies within the

Arafat'* newlv appointed Forceommander in ihc Sidon area. Katun Taybah. waa killed by anii-Arafat Palestinians in7 and replaced by . Raslm el-Chul Forces Fatah'* intelligence and operations Dim.

A pro-Syrian Ba'ih Party member. Hutcm Kawaih, was killed in June. Kuwathalestinian working for Syrian intelligence. Rasim al-Ghul was implicated by Damascus in Ihc assassination

I)

Palestine National Salvation Front. The rift has already led to the defection of iu major members, tbe PFLP and OFLP. to Arafat's side following lhe meeting of lhe Palestine National Council in Algiers

aaaps War Strategy

We judge lhal Syrian Presidente to mined to control lbc PLO and use il to advance Syrian interests. He appears confident thai the prospects for complete PLO reunification under Arafat followingPalestine National Council meeting in Algiers are waning and probably believes thai intra-Palestinian conflicts will block PLO reunification. Syria's domi-naiion of lbc remaining Damascus-based Palestinian groups will alrncnl certainly prevent completeIts intimidation of those radicals who rejoined ihe PLO has made them lean live about submittingrafat's IcadenKip'^HllJ^k^ ^

Several Syrian- and Iranian-sponsored cease-(ires have been im luted over Use last two years, onlye brokenew hours. Potentially lb* arsoncaasc-arc agreement between lheandoneptemberlastedew hours. Syria for ihe fin! lime agreed alky* Fatah Into tbe talks 'caninghe eease-flre-

_ none of Ihe

ey substantive issues were raised in Ihe agreement, let alone resolved. Amai's original demand that lhe Palestinians reduce their armed presence In lhe south aad withdrawhe camps was noi seriouslynor was Palestinian insistence thai Amal lift lhe nine-month siege of the camps in Beirut and Tyre to alto- the

We believe ihatetermined to containaetlvilica and bring lhe Palestinian movement in LebanonucesftSyria views the abrogation of the Cairo agreement last May by the Lebanese parliamentymbolic victory. The agreement, negotiated between the Lebanese Government and lhe PLOanctioned the PLO presence inand ihc orgsnixalion's rightttack Israel from Lebanon Damascus coupled its cceyositionbe Cairo agreement with its ctpoasiiion toJ agreement bet-err. Lebanoe and Israel, which Syria contended gaveretestemand ecftial

In Lebanon. Despite Christian support (or the Syrian move against the PLO. deep opposition to Syria's overall, strategy for Lebanon remains strong among most Lebanese Christian members of pariia-

The canceTUiion of lbc Cairo agrecmeni has reduced Dimsscoi't influence with lis Palestinian surrogates. The vote dre* severe criticism from several Pasestin-ian allies, including the PHP aad Ihc PopularFront, The PFLP and the Popsslar Struggle Froet say ihai lhe Lebanese parliament's decision was irrel-cvam and that all Palestinian Fighters in Lebanon would disregard it. The leader of ihe Popular Struggledose Syrianparticularlyby the cancellation of lhe accord, saying that lhe Palestinians have the tight to attack Israel fromj 3

Syria appears determined lo continue its suppori for Amal leader Nabih Barri. bui there are deep and fundamental difference* bclween Amal andregarding the management of thc Palestinian problem in Lebanon. Barri's refusal to support thc Palestine National Salvation Front almost certainly stems from his belief that the pro-Syrian Palestinians could gain strength at the expense of Amal. Barri undoubtedly reasons ihai ihe return of theeven ai Damascus'sbe followedeturn of Arafat loyalists, which in lhe long run would strengthen ihe poliiical and military strength of both.

15

In addition. Barri apparcnily views the grovring Sunni-Palestinian rapprochemenihreat to lhe Lebanese Shia movement. He believes that tbcmilitary power of Ihc PLO in Lebanon is likely ic revive thr Lebanese Sur.rnbase

Wc believe lhal lhc splintering of ibe Amal leadership and major Amal mililia de feci tens lo Hizballahihc Syrian massacre of Hizballah fighters at Basta in West Beirut last February have weakened Amal. Several of Barri'i former aides such as Hassan Hasbcmand Mustafa Dirani are openly siding wiih ihe Palestinians againn both Amal and Syria. Ha-shem^controls three villages adjacent lo Maghdushab.

Damascus has soughtally other Lebanese groups to iu anti-Fatah campaign, bul wiih little success. It has engineered several anil-Arafat agreemenU. mosi notably lhe Damascus agreement in6 and ine establishment of lhc Unity and Liberal Km Front ioJslylatter involvingebanese and Palestinian animosities between ihe signatories make such virtually meaningless, except as^ Syria's inabilityontrol us allies in LebanorBB

illl> and Liberation Front will have 3

tie Siegethe camps was lifted temporarily during Assad's visit lo Moscow onpril, which also coincided with the Palestine, Nalional Council meeting in Algiers]

We believe lhat the camps war has enhanced lhc influence and prestige of Iran and Hizballah ai ibe expense of Syria and Amal. Tehran has negotiated several temporary cease-fires between Amal and lhc Palestinians5 and hastoced itself between Syria and the Palestinians J| 0|

HaBaaaflLnVaaaaaaaaaaaHH '^lo

be the only winner in the camps war. since in long-lerm goal it to weaken both Syria and Amal In Lebanon Iran's increasing involve mem in the camps war stems from iu need io ensure thai lhealestinian fighting does not degeneraieales-linian-Shia conon. which could undermine iu plan io strengthen lhc increasingly radicalized Shias in Lebanon. Some Hizballaljoined AmnI in isolated skirmishes against the Palestinians around Maghduihah inut quickly withdrew under

Syria'sally. Libya, is aHo ccennlicaiing Damat-evs's ability to win the camps war by proxy. Libyaaunch PLO supporter ami views ihe warunni-Shia confrontation Libyan leader Qadhan called on the Lebanese Sunnis and iheir Palestinian allies rise againsi Barti's "Shis canton."]

17

Wc bcilevc ihai. although the Palcstinbru atebetter organized and more aiseriWc in Lebanon, tbcy will face increasing difficulties in expanding Iheir HfOnehold. We expect Israeli counter measures and Palestinian ivcoccupjtson with Ihc camps war to frustrate PLO efforts to raise the strength of ils fighters and its icriiiorial control lo the

We believe lhat ihc brightest prospects for new PLO conquests arc around Sidon. but the pros peer for an eipontlon of Palestinian power there or elsewhere in lhe south will depend greatly on Syrian and Israeli actions. For different reasons, neither side wants PLO to become dominant in Ihe south, but each will| resist any aggressive initiative by thc

war there, however, is chinning away at Amal's miliiary and organizational strength. The weaker AmnI becomes, the greater becomes the Influence of thc radical Hizballah among Lebanese Shias]

control Arafat. Syria must coniinue lo rely on Amal. Syria hu so far nutajor movement of its troop" southwardldon. primarily for fear of antagonizing Israel. If Syria decidednter Sidon. il would have to drnw down its forces in Wcsimove ihai would almost certainly jeopardize its sccu-riiy plan in the Lebanese capital. Thc 'ingcring camps

Thc prospectsalestinian resurgence in Wen Beirut are poor. Palestinian fighters there arcby Syrian iroops, Although Amal isand weak in West Beirut, wc believe lhat

A mil and Syria could gain Ihc upper hand in lhc Sabra and Shatila camp* ihould Damascus decide to norm them, althoughove would be costly for Ibe Syrians because of Soviet. Saudi, Libyan, and Iranian support for the PLO. The largest aitJ besi armed Palestinian camp of Burj al Barajmab In Westnlikely to come under cither Amal or Syrian control, since It is one of i main gates to Hizballah'l most Important stronghold in lhc southern suburbs. The storming of Bur] al Berajinaa by Syrian troops would undoubtedly leadactical alliance between Hiiballah and Palestinian defenders of (be camp.ove probably would result in high Syrian casusonsideration that has prevented Damascus from embarking on tha coarse. Syria's aaost attractive remaining option will be to continue ihe siege of tbc camps in West Beirut to keep lhc PLO's forces lied up inJ

Alternative Scenario

In thc eventeconciliation-Arafat's or Assad's death or becauseto change course snJcm bracefor tbc PLO presence In Lebanondramatically. An Aaaad-Arafalb unlikely to take place caoepi underand would require major politicalfrom both men. Assad would have toai the major spokesman of theArafal would probably haveote meaningful saythe day-today affairs of the}

Thc establishment of warmer rdaticeu between Assad and Arafat P'obnbly would bring Ibe camp* warai

Implications for the United States

Lebanon hat become tbe principal battlefield for lhe Palestinians in particular and Ihe Arab-IsraeliIn general. In the last decade most of the casualties produced by Arab and Israeli lighting have

occurred in Lebanon. More Syrians and Israelis died in Iheir clashesn Lebanon than on the Golan Heightsrid more Palestinian'sebanon than in

Of tnggertog

US efforts to mediate the Lebanese conflict and to promote moveoward peace in the Middle East are intimately bound up with Ihe reemergence of an armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon Theof Palestinian influence In Lebanon adds to lhe country's thorny social and political problems and enhance* thc PLO's ability loild card in Lebaneac politics. The motrodaction of thefactor in Lebanon has contributed to theof political attitude* irnong Lebanon's facuceu and has further complicated efforts at genuinereform. Escalation of hostilities, especially it. ihe south, ran* thc risk of triggering open.conflictIsrael and Syri

The threat to US interests posed by terrorism spawned in Lebanon appears to be increasing.against the Palestinian resurgence in Lebanon will increase PLO frustration, and wc believe some Palestinianparticularly Fatah and Abuaccelerate their cooperation with Hizballah and lhc Iranian Revolutionary Guard. We would expect thb to lead lo increased terrorism, bojh within Lebanon and

in Asia and

We believe that cooperation between Hizballah and Abu Nidal would pose the greatest threat lo Israeli and USbu Nidalell-developed support network in Western Europe lhat could be made available to Hiiballah operatives. We believe thai closer Abu Nidal lies to the Revolutionary Guard in South Lebanon would translate Into coordinated operations against US targets both in Europe, whereell maintained, and else wherefrica, whereenerally lax

Kivt'tl

Append'* A

Tbe PLO in Lebanon

emergence of ihc Paksiinians upoliiical forcebanon occurred after7 Arab-Israeli war. The defeat of lhe1 and ihe Ion of significant territorysrael paved lhe way for lhe rapid radseab ration of (hc Palestinians andaicd (heir coopersi>oa with Lebanese nationalist and kfiitt groups, (he original champions of lhecaue In Lebanon. The Wt tat-Palestinian alliance (tew under Draw leaderanbiattutelage aadhristian hegemony. Junblau shielded (he Palcstiaiani from harassment by Lebanese internal security officials, and they gamed substantial political autonomy inside

The emergencealestinian armed presence in Lebanonas met massive Israeli attacks on suspected Palestinian bases in South Leba-non. Israel's policy of harsh retaliation forced tbc migration of thousands of Lebanese Shia andinhabitants northward toward Beirut. Theof displaced and mainly unakillcd migrants who settled in camps and poverty-ridden makeshift shinty-towns on Beirut's outskirts added to the social and economic dislocations already present and reujfoeeed demands foa political and economic reform

The Lebanese Government's inability to respondto Palealinian and Shia demands for political aad econotnk reform or to protect Soulh Lebanon from increased Israels attacks led to bloody dashes between government troops and Ihc Palestinianshe clashes culminated In the signing of the Cairo agree-meat between the PLO and (be Lebanese Government inhe agreement, which allowed ibe Palestinians to launch attacks against Israel"sborder and to protect the Palestinian camps, established the PLOtatetale, tipped lhe political balance in Lebanon in favor of the Muslims, and paved ihe way for the outbreak of dvil warLO fighters and iheir Lebanese allies paraded in major towns and cities wearing miliiary uniforms and carried arms in open defiance of the

Christian -dominated Lebanese Government They slopped civilian and military vehkles al arbitrary checkpoints and harassed "heir occupants, alhal crystal ired Christian fearkeover ofcouniry by the Palestinians and Muslim

The Sbla-Palestinian alliance was csosest during ibe lint two years of lhe Lebanese civil war. Shia Amal fighters joined forces wiih lhe Palesiiniani andMuslim and leflbi militiasghl bluer baitlei against the Christiana. Thc honeymoon between Amai's founder, Musi al-Sadr. and lhe Palesiiniani began to sour, however, over Palestinian activities In South Lebanon, which were becoming increasingly rnirdepsoene on the Shia community there MM

poliiical deprivation of both lhe Palestinians and lhe Shiasataral alliance between ihem ai firsi. As Ihe cycle of Palestinian incursions into Israel aad In ad's reprisals into southern Lebanon brought greater suffering to Mtnahia constituency, il became harder for him to sustain pre-Palestinian polkks. Although thc Shias sympathised with ihe Palestinians, they grew unwilling to tolerate Palesiin-iaa actions lhal eaaoacdtheShia community to additionalH 3

n^ur^jce^in^jhe

Tbc rise of ihe Palestinians io Lebanon was aided by the arrival0 of thousands of additionalfighters and refugees from Jordan following lhe defeat of lhe PLO by the Jordanian Army. After "Black See*ember" In Jordan, Lebanon became lbc lasl haven for lhe displaced Palesiiniani confrontingactor thatrofound impact on the evolution of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Thc acquisition of heavy weapons fromPalestinian influence and addedhe emergence of lbc PLO as the undiiputed political and milUary force in jhe couniry during much of:

21

Some Palestinians struggled -unsuccessfully--lo avoid direct involvemeni in Lebanese affairs so lone as ihe Government of Lebanon continued lo abide by the Cairo agreement. Yasir Arafal was particularly busy building bridges lo all Lebanese factions, indud-inf Ihe Christians, despite tbc initial clashes wiih the Christian militia ia the early pawiet of the civil war. He was ucaiagcd by thc arsor* militant wins; of the PLO led by George Habbaah of tbe PopuUr Front forLibers lion of Palestine, Ahmad Jabril of the Popular Front for (be Libera lien of Pakatine-General Command, and Nayif hawainsah of the Democratic Front for (he Liberation of Palestine. These leaders not only expressed solidariiy with the Lebanese leftist and socialistdidalsocalled for thc overthrow of the Lebanesebyevelopment thai polarized the Palestinian movernent and heightened Christian fears of Palestinian heEemonytHB

The Syrian entry into Lebanon6 on behalf of the Christians angered thc Palestinians and their leftist Lebanese allies and draw (hem closer together. Syria and thc Palestinians had (heir own agendas and capabilities to act independently kn Lebanon, which resulted in several Syrian-Palestinianbcnd Syria drew doser together, however, la the wake of the Egyptian peace initiative lo Israel ia7be aftermath of theof Symetrcops from Lebanon's Christian areasi

Tbe increasing political fragility of ihc Lebanese Govc-nment aided tbe establishmentquasi-Palcstntian state"he refugee camps became armed fortresses complete with tanks and other heavy equipment, snd the south came to be

Appendix B

Major Treaties Governing (he PLO Presence in Lebanon

Cairo Agreement, ThU agreement wu signed by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafal and Commander of ihe Lebanese Army Gen. EmJIe Busunyhe agreement (ranted ihe PLO the right to operate freely in the sooth and to protect Palestinian refugee camps throughout Lebanon. Major provisions included PLO rights to:

- Work, reside, and move freely in Lebanon.

Set op local committees in the camps to look after the interests of the Palestinians "ho were living there, within Ihe framework of Lebanese sovereignty.

alestinian armed presence in the camps to protect thc camps against Israeli and local atuck*.

Carry out police and Other civilian administrative duties inside the camps.

Obtain right-of-way faeffltics to the camps and lo the south.

Travel lafely to the border areas from various Lebanese localities.

Setecurity and intelligence liaison with thc Lebanese Army.

Palestinians.!

recurrent also called for thc Lebanese Army to cease hostilities against the Palestinian armedthroughout Lebanon snd to provide the Palestin-ian guerrillas with mcdicaL hygienic, and otberlies as deemed necessary to carry out their mission against Israel. The Lebanese Army waselease all Palestinian detainees and cease harassing

fcT

The Damascus Agreement. Thisigned on5 under Syrian auspices by several pro-Syrian Lebanese and Palestinian groups following several months of bitter fighting between Shia Amal militiamen and Palestinian fighters. The goal of the agreement was to cement Syria's hold on Iu allies in

Lebanon and to isolate Arafat by denyingole in Palestinian activities there. Tbc basic provisions called for:

Fighting between Amal and be hailed immediately

Thc Palestine Nalional Salvation Front to be ibe legitimate Palestinian group in refugee camps. The PLO considers this provision lo be most offensive since ilirect challenge to the Cairo agreement, which recognizes the PLO as thc sole rcpresenUlive of the Palestinian people in Lebanon.

Heavy weapons in the camps to be collected and stored under Syrian and Palestine NationalFront supervision.

a^lesUnian fighters lo

The Unification and Liberation Front Accord. This front was established by Damascus on7 and included several Lebanese and Palestinian groups, among ihem traditional PLO supportersDruie chieftain Walid JunbUtt, Sunni mililia leader Musufa Sa'd. and Lebaneac Communist Party leader George Hawi. The principal provisions of this accord stipulate lhat:

reUtions should beo thc basis of tbc Damascus agreement.

The Palestine Nalional Salvation Front is ibePalestinian force In Lebanon.

Arafat should not be allowed to rebuild his power base in Lebanon.

21

*

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA