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Contents
East Germany: Walking TigHlrope onNew Cabinet Widely Unpopular
Nates
it-tndonasla; Further Economic Deregulation
USSR: Turkmenistan Official Murdered Over Reform Afghanistan-USSR: Incidents involving Westerners
In Brief
Analyses
USSR: Backsliding on Human Righls Iran: After Khomeini
Walking Tightrope on Liberalization
.erlin's recently greater permissiveness In cultural policy and tolerance tor some criticism ot economic perlormance and environmental policy do not slgnlly that the regime Is reconsidering Its strong opposition to fundamental political nnd economic o'
In tho wake ol an unusually open writers congress lasl month, East Berlin has decidedllow publication ot two novels, including one by Stephanrominent writer whose unorthodox, books have been banned torecade. Th* regime has also shown some willingness to acknowledge shortcomings In economic performance anci environmental policy. Politburo member Werner Felte,econt keynote speech to the Communist Party Central Committee,here was extensive damage in East German loresis, even though he omitted mention ol the air and water pollution that has greatly concerned the population. The Communist Party's newspaper has published two unusually sharp articles criticizing housing construction and consumer services In two districts. ,
^VassMpssaaaVho regime apparently hopes limited liberalization will stave oil domestic and Soviet pressure tor more fundamental political and economic reform. Although Easl German leaders may be concerned that Moscow may haveole in removing conservative party leader Gustav Hussk In Czechoslovakia, the/ have made clear their unwillingness lo emulate Mikhail Gorbachev any time soon despite faint praise lor economic restructuring in Ihe USSR. Wary of the link between economic reform and political liberalization. Chairman Honecker and others ere emphasizing the dangers ihey are facina and lhe need Ic continued vigilance. dfJMF
Allhough East Berlin's unusual willingness to air economic grievances does not signal enthusiasm for reform, it does reflect the regime's growing unhapplness with the country's economic performance. Politburo leaders seem to hope that public shaming ol economic managers will Improve productivity and efficiency so that East Berlin can coniinue touccessful economyustification for not embracing Soviet-style reform. Continued dissatisfaction with the economy, however, could lead to serious disagreements In Ihe Politburo, which so tar has not openly criticized the hlghly_centralized lOmlC structure Honecker established Ir.JfJpBfc
Now Cabinet Widely Unpopular
Somali President Sled's announcement fact weekow Cabinet has angered key Somali social and military lections.
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Grumbling probably has notevel to threaten Siad, but he will be watching closely for signs of Increased disaffection In the military. The growing frustration with his favoritism and the government's policy drift are likely to Increase support tor Somali dissidents and may encourage increased meddling by neighboring Ethiopla.VflBHMaasj^^
INDONESIA: Further Economic Deregulation
Jakarta haa taken another email step ki Its piecemeal program to liberalize Indonesian over regulated, stagnant economy, which haa been hit hard by tho soft oil market. The government last weekxportB and
Import tariffsldo range ot goods and simplified export regulations on product* other than those under export quotas, auch as textiles and cohoo4H
[Jakarta has yet to effect large-scale reform ol the
pervasive import monopolies, despite growing domestic criticismfrom Indonesia'! major International creditors. Many olas plastics and steel-are dominated byfamily. Socharto continues to defend Importbut Is under pressurotoderegulation
USSR: Tuikmenistan Official Murdered Over Reform
Earlier Ihlsegional parly official In the Turkmenistan Republic who had been attempting to expose corruption among oblast party leaders was murdered. assSaBBBSaaBaaBaaasBaaBal tha
official was an Instructor In the Chardzhou Administrative Organsparty organization responsible for local oversight of the KGB and the police.pecially appointed group from the interior Ministrypecial prosecutor arrived to Investigate the murder, the Chardzhou first secretary resignedurkmenistan party plenum amid heavyBf|fjBjpt i. -
murder Is Indicative ol deep-rooted resistance to Moscow'a reforms from the police and the party In Central Asia, whore General Secretary Gorbachev has pushed hard for change. By .
. ewiftiy removing tho first secretary and publicizing the corruptionresponsible for the murder, the regime Is putting localnotice that It will not tolerate resistance to reform. In relyingmedia exposes and outside prosecutors, as he hasand Uzbekistan, Gorbachev continues to showofficials can tackle corrupt Ion
AFGHANISTAN-USSR: Incldenla Involving Westerners
[There have been so vera! Incidents In
Afghanistan in receni months Involving foreigners, however. Including the deaths of two US Journalists and the arrests of two Western reporters. Kabul has also announced the captureest German it" and the deathritish journalist elsewhere In Afghanistan.
I/There is no evidence that any US citizens are In Paktia, butaccompany Insurgcnl groups occasionally The Soviets may mtsldentlfy as American anypeakers cr Individuals wearing Western clothing. Moscow undoubtedly will use the presence ol any foreign JournallBt to teod^-cnsdJMltvioJtsclaJms of foreign Interference In Afghanistan Mesa***
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In Brief
new chief debt negotiator Is Fernando Mllllot. until now Central Bankill provide continuity for negotiations but unlikely to alter Brasilia's debto successors amed yet as Finance Minister, Centre! Bank president. aajjjk>
Leadersnstlon Caribbean Community will hold emergency
meeting Monday In Barbados to discuss Haiti's coming general * robably win condemn Haiti's new electoral laws, urge election postponement, but trado sanctions unlikely.assaassar ^
East Asia
Soviets again last week spologlzed for Intruding on Japan's airspace early this monlh, implied pilotromised to demote pilot, adopt ofaventlveoscowat timing ot Incident
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Moscow's Renewed Reliance on Repression
In mid-September, pole* brokelanned demonstration against anll-Semltism and detained participants on routo, Including members ol the Begun family. Irvosllya attacked lite protest organizers for being Zionists.
ctober, authorities detained two edilors of lhe Ofasnosf Journal and confiscated theopies they were carrying, wiping out one of the Journal's editions.
rimean TstarkcfflgjBsjsJinaro arrested as they triad to march to the Crimean Peninsula.
Onoscow police detslned aboutuman rights activists, Including Lev Timofeyev and Sergey Grtgoryants. toemonstration In support ot poUtlcal^prtsoners.
Onovember, authorities In Rigaarch by moreatvian nationalists by mobilizing0 uniformed, plainclothes, and "voluntary"
Grtgoryants and aboutembersroup trying lo demonstrate against official anti-Semitism onovember wore arresled on their way to the planned protest site.
Onerson-strong religious demonstration in the Ukraine was reportedly broken up with the arrest of at leastarticipants.
Onroup of aboutoung Jewish refuseruks demonstrating on behalfamily denied exit permission was beaten and kicked by plainclothes thugs, fined, and held for several days. The plainclotheslso destroyed some of the camera equipment belonging to several Western newsmen covering the event.
Onentecoatailet couple who had been released earlier In the year were beaten up. forced onto an airplane, and sent Into Internal exile near Ihe Czechoslovak border.
Duringott>achev summit. Soviet authoritiesmall group of Soviet Jews demonstrating for the right to emigrate by busing In scores ol plainclothes bullies who were later billed in the official media as the original pro-peaceNN correspondent covering the protest was detained.
Onecember, the anniversary ol the UN-proclaimed Human Rights Day, authorities prevented teveral would-be participants horn attending an unofficial seminar on human rights and arrested four Ukrainian activists en routo to tho meeting on trumped-up drug charges. Subsequently, however, the drug charges were dropped, and as manyeminar participants were snowed to meet in private apartments
hroughecember.
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Special Analysis
Backsliding on Human Rights
Attttr ma/or Improvement earl, this ,ear. Soviet treatment ol dlaaldantt deteriorated this fell. Local authorltlea Hove mora traquantl, ravaried to coercion againat dtealdenta and relutenlkt. General Secretarywith aherp critic lam ol dlaaldent activity Irom hit colleagues-ecomt to hava agreed lonarrower llmlta. asssssaaV
Over tha past yoar, the regime hasumber ot highly visible stops to Improve Moscow's poor Image on human rights. The steps Include the return to Moscow of Andrey Sakharov and tho release ot rooroolitical prisoners. During the spring and summer, arrests ol dissidents virtually stopped. 8ut this trend seemed to stall" In September.
Signs of Backtracking
The release ot prisoners has slowed significantly, and Ihe regime has resorted Increasingly to exBe for the meet obstreperous activists. The courts have sentenced dissidents to short Jafl terms and levied fines with Increasing frequencyaafJJLa^
The regime hasougher line on scltvttlee by prominent former political prfeoners who had eerier appeared Immune from renewed attacks. The authorities have harassed Sergey Qrlgoryants and Lav Timofeyev, who together organized the Qlasnoal Press Club, the Olaanoat |oumal,uman righta seminar In Moscow this month. In September, Novostl Director Falln accused Grtgoryants ot violating libel Isws. and tho KGB has apparently put pressure one 'urn ajH^
eptember,eries of highly visible demonstrations in Moscow, city authorities issued "temporary reguletlons" thst required protesters to get permission seven days In advance and bnrrod an demonstrations in public areas like Red Square. Since lhe regulations came Into effect, local authorities In Moscow have disapproved virtually all applications, and other cities have followed suit. On more lhan one occasion, the regime hasu! ntnrdemonstrations to intimidate protesters. eTJBsaV'
Several human rights activists have reportedly received death threats snd beatings since late August. Religious end nationalist protesters-Baits, Crimean Tatars. Jews, andbeen subjected
continued
A Few Bright Spots
Despite the trend, etozen additional prisoners have been freed from labor camps or psychiatric asylumseptember. Allhough the regime etui detains some dlssldenta In psychiatricoviet press campaign against psychiatric abuse continues. The regime has released some refuser Iks who were wall known In the West, snd the overall emigration picture has continued to Improve virtually each month this year. The rehabilitation of Andrey Sakharov haaoviet Journal published his criticism of Soviet policy ki Afghanistan and his demands for the release of all polilical prisoners. His signature even appeared on an obituaryoviet physicist, along with those of Gorbachev and other Politburo
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Why tha Tougher Stance?
The Soviet leadership, clearly concerned and perhaps surprised by lhe surge In natlonalia: activism and the rsieased prisoners' aggressive use ol opportunities to organize, may believe thatolicy of greater repression can keep dissent within tolerable bounds. Gorbachev's more conservative colleagues. KGB Chief Chebrlkov and "Second" Secretary Ugachev. have been especially vocal In registering their beHef that "anti-Soviet" activists and nationalists are using glesnosl and "democratization" lor their own purposes. flflH
Gorbachev himself may agree It is essential to tighten controls to keep demonstrations In hand because lhe variety of nationalist expression and public demonstrations Unleashed by the loosening of controls Is unprecedented In recent Soviet history, in view of tha increased political weight of conservative leaders, he may believe, moreover, Ihat aiactlcel retreat Is necessary toplit In the
Politburo.
It Is unlikely that the current mix of relaxation and repression is final. The crackdownredicament for Gorbachev because he had hoped that relaxing controls on dissent would give him and the regime greater credibility both abroad and with the Intelligentsia at (lOme. He still seems to be seeking this credibility and may hope that the current dose ol repression will encourage woujd-be_dJ^serrters to exercise greater unilateral restraintbB|m
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Iranian Factionalism
Dospllo divisions on key domestic and loreign policy Issues, the Iranian leadership appears firmly united on the goal of undermining the US role In the Persian Gull. Tehran's ability toampaign of military actions, diplomacy, end terrorism to work against US and Gull state resolve and to reduce Iran's International Isolationtrong degree of cohesfvenes* among the leadership on these Issues. Differences that have appeared have been over the tactics and not th* goal of removing the US from the region. Hostility toward the US hasundamental tenet of the Khomeini regime, and, unlike olher Issues confronting the clerics, Khomeini has Issued clear public guidelines, rejecting compromise with Washington. Tehran almost certainly views the US military builduphreat to the survival of the Islamic republic aa well as lo Iran's goals of victory In the war with Iraq and hegemony In the Gulf.
Analysis
Khomeini
trentltlonew Iranian regime when Ihe Ayatollah Khomeini die* la likely to go smoothly at lint, out, aa rival leaders vie lor power, lha political scene probably mill become volatile. Asaembly Speaker Rataan/anl, the second moat powerful leader In Iran, la likely to emerge at tha headoalition ol key leaders. His ability lo maintain tha support ot tha Revolutionary Guard mill determine whether ha can prevent the regime from unraveling. Iran's war policy and hostility toward tha US are not likely to change rapidly when Khomeini
The publicity surrounding the recent Issuance of Khomeini's newnd the concern aroused by rumors of his Imminent death highlight the Importance of hla leadership lo lhe stability ol the regime. Heey rote establishing policy guidelines on major Issues. arbitrating disputes wiibln Ihe leadership, and rallying popular
With his departure, factionalism among the leadership will probably become the most serious threat to the long-term stability ol the Islamic republic. Radical and consorvailve clerics and their lay allies are deeply divided over the direction Iran should take. They disagree on economic policy, the role of clerKs In governmeni, andhow aggressive Iran should be In exporting fls revolutionary Ideals. sjtstV" -',
Bafsmjanl the Key
The odds appear better than even that Rafsanjani can consolidate hla control after Khomeini dies. He Is an opportunist who has prevailed by maneuvering between the lad ions and by puttingoalition of allies In the cabinet, the Revolutionary Guard, the intelligence services, and the pailiamentedjykfa
Rafsanjsni's success In building this coalition makes It likely that Ihe succession will go smoothly at first. Ayatoilsh Montazeri. Khomeini's designated heir, will assume Khomeini's position as Iran'a supreme religious leader but leeks Khomeini's religious standing, popular appeal, and political skills. He probably will beitular loader. Ratsan|anl supports Montazeri because he believes he can be manipulated and ^ecause he_needs Monlazerl's lormal endorsement for his policies.
Factional disputes, however, are bound to Intensify. Rafsanjani's toughest challenge will probably come from Ihe radicals well entrenched throughout lhe governmeni. Including Ihe cabinet and Iho Revolutionary Guard. Some may regard confrontation with Rafsanjani as necessary In order to reverse what they seerift from the truehe revolution. And they appear powerful enough to force Rafsenianl to support most points on their agenda, including
continued
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centralizing control over (he economy end aggressive export ol tne revolution. Tne radicals, however, have serious divisions within their ranks that Rafsanjani may be able to exploit. eaSBBBsr
afsanjani (aits to take charge after Khomeini dies, the chancesestabilizing all-out power struggle would Increase significantly. Many contenders are likely to bid for control, but no other leader appears to have Rafsanjani's ability to effect compromises. If infighting turns violent, lhe more radical elements In the regime wouldecided edge intruggle because they control the most guns. sMBja
Post-Khomeini Polkjles ^
A poat-Khomelnl regime probably will not make abrupt shifts on major domestic and foreign policy Issues. It will remain committed to the overthrow of the Ba'thist regime In Baghdad: pressure from the radicals would hinder Rafsanjani or any other leader from seeking peace. If popular opposition to the war or crippling economic problems threaten theafsanjani leadership would allow the fighting io subside mirier lhanegollsled seillemenl.aeJSBjej*
There will be Utile chance for esrly Improvement In relations with the US. Most Iranian leaders share Khomeini's view that the US Is the greatest threat to the Iranian revolution and to Islam. The image ot the US as the "great Satan" will be an important symbol of continuity alter Khomeini. Rafsanjani la unlikely to make overtures to the US that would risk jeopardizing radical support, aajsjajt i,
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A fundamental Improvement In Iranian-Soviet relations Is also remote. Hostility toward Communism, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and Moscow's miliiary support for irsq will continue lo weighapprochement. Ne/ertheless. the increased US presence In the Persian Gull has caused Tehran to seek belter relations with Moscow, and this could give the Soviets an sdvantage in the competition for Influence after Khomeini dies. Military clashes between Iran and the US would enhance that advantage.
Original document.
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