NOTE TO DOUG MACEACHIN LARRY GERSHWIN RE SPEECH ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET U

Created: 6/14/1988

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Ihc Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (WdmffW.DC JOSE

DATS: 7

8

NOTE TO: Doug MacEachin Larry Gershwin

I ampeech on developments ln the Soviet Union and implications for US strategy at the Naval War College Thursday. m using ray old itandby Soviet speechave added something more to it on arma control and strategic developments. ave drawn this primarilyecent SOVA paper on how the Soviets might look at START.

I would appreciate your looking at these three pages and giving me any corrections or suggestions you might have. ould appreciate hearing back aome time this afternoon.

Robert M. Gates

in this connection,elieve we can anticipate further significant soviet initiatives for arms controlsome of them ambitious and unrealistic, but virtually all with enormous global political appeal. gorbachev is prepared to exploreand,hink, reachsignificant reductions in weapons, but past soviet practice suggests he will seek agreements that protect existing soviet advantages, leave open alternative avenues of weapons development, offer commensurate political gain/ or take advantage of us unilateral restraint or constraints (such as our unwillingness inoermitted limited abm).

in my judgment, the benefits of arms control for gorbachev, particularly with respect to strategic weapons, are strategic and political, not economic. while he seeks to avoid new, unanticipated costs that developments such as sdi might require, strategic offensive weapons account for only aboutercent of the soviet budget, and few of the production or resource capabilities are transferable to civilian purposes. only through significant conventional force reductions could gorbachev begin to realize any kind of economic benefit and,ery great extent, this would be years in the future.

the political benefits of arms control for gorbachev are evident. as the centerpieceetentist policy,oted

EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKESAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.

ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELLAS LONG AS ANY AGREEMENT PERMITS CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS, DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMS- PREVENTS THE UNITED STATES IN DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPACE DEFENSE, AND PLACES CONSTRAINTS ON AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE CONSTRAINTS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE RAPID GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES.

ABSENT SIGNIFICANT LIMITS ON US FORCE MODERNIZATION, THE SOVIETS WOULD FACE IN THE FUTURE SEVERAL NEW US CAPABILITIES WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO DESTROY SOVIET ICBM SILOSTHELBM, THE RAIL MOBILE MX, AND MIDGETMAN. THE US COULD HAVEALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS CAPABLE OF DESTROYING HARDENED TARGETS BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, AND IN

ould have up0 strategic warheads. tart agreement that protected soviet bottom-line positions and cut the usarheads would in their view leave the us with insufficient capability to implement the current us strike plan as they appear to understand it, however,tart treaty that encompasses current soviet positions, the ussr's ability to attack targets in north america and eurasia would not be signficantly different with orew agreement on strategic arms.

arms control and other new initiatives also are intended to break soviet foreign policy out of longstanding tactical deadends and to make the sovietore effective, flexible and vigorous player throughout the world. the result is likely tooviet political challenge to the us abroad that could pose greater problems for our international position, alliances and relationships in the future than the heretofore one dimensional soviet military challenge. we must be prepared for greater soviet flexibilitya new and disconcerting willingness to say yes to some old and not well examined us and western proposals. considerable new thinking, flexibility and political agility will be needed on our own part to anticipate and counter soviet initiatives and to avoid being outmaneuvered and placed consistently on the defensive.

in this connection,elieve we can anticipate further significant soviet initiatives for arms controlsome of them ambitious and unrealistic, but virtually all with enormous global political appeal. gorbachev is prepared to exploreand,hink- reachsignificant reductions in weapons- but past soviet practice suggests he will seek agreements that protect existing soviet advantages, leave open alternative avenues of weapons development, offer commensurate political gain, or take advantage of us unilateral restraint or constraints (such as our unwillingness inoermitted limited abm).

in my judgment. the benefits of arms control for gorbachev-particularly with respect to strategic weapons, are strategic and political, not economic. while he seeks to avoid new, unanticipated costs that developments such as sdi might require, strategic offensive weapons account for only aboutercent of the soviet budget, and few of the production or resource capabilities are transferable to civilian purposes. only through significant conventional force reductions could gorbachev begin to realize any kind of economic benefit and,ery great extent, this would be years in the future.

the political benefits of arms control for gorbachev are evident. as the centerpieceetentist policy,oted

EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKESAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER IN POLITICAL. CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.

ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELLS LONG AS ANY AGREEMENT PERMITS CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS. DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMS. PREVENTS THE UNITED STATES IN DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPACE DEFENSE. AND PLACES CONSTRAINTS ON AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE- DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE CONSTRAINTS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE RAPID GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES.

ABSENT SIGNIFICANT LIMITS ON US FORCE MODERNIZATION, THE SOVIETS WOULD FACE IN THE FUTURE SEVERAL NEW US CAPABILITIES WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO DESTROY SOVIET ICBM SILOSHELBM, THE RAIL MOBILE MX, AND MIDGETMAN. THE US COULD HAVEALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS CAPABLE OF DESTROYING HARDENED TARGETS BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, AND IN

ould have up0 strategic warheads. tart agreement that protected soviet bottom-line positions and cut the usarheads would in their view leave the us with insufficient capability to implement the current us strike plan as they appear to understand it. however,tart treaty that encompasses current soviet positions, the ussr's ability to attack targets in north america and eurasia would not be signficantly different with orew agreement on strategic arms.

arms control and other new initiatives also are intended to break soviet foreign policy out of longstanding tactical deadends and to make the sovietore effective, flexible and vigorous player throughout the world. the result is likely tooviet political challenge to the us abroad that could pose greater problems for our international position, alliances and relationships in the future than the heretofore one dimensional soviet military challenge. we must be prepared for greater soviet flexibilitya new and disconcerting willingness to say yes to some old and not well examined us and western proposals. considerable new thinking, flexibility and political agility will be needed on our own part to anticipate and counter soviet initiatives and to avoid being outmaneuvered and placed consistently on the defensive.

in thiselieve we can anticipate further significant soviet initiatives for arms controlsome of them ambitious and unrealistic, but virtually all with enormous global political appeal. gorbachev is prepared tohink, reachsignificant reductions in weapons- but past soviet practice suggests he will seek agreements that protect existing soviet advantages. leave open alternative avenues of weapons development, offer commensurate political gain- or take advantage of us unilateral restraint or constraints (such as our unwillingness inoermitted limited abm).

in my judgment, the benefits of arms control for gorbachev, particularly with respect to strategic weapons, are strategic and political, not economic. while he seeks to avoid new, unanticipated costs that developments such as sdi might require, strategic offensive weapons account for only aboutercent of the soviet budget, and few of the production or resource capabilities are transferable to civilian purposes. Only through significant conventional force reductions could gorbachev begin to realize any kind of economic benefit and,ery great extent, this would be years in the future.

the political benefits of arms control for gorbachev are evident. as the centerpieceetentist policy,oted

earlier, it has the potential to bring downward pressure on western defense budgets, slow western military modernization, weaken resolve to counter soviet advances in the third world, and open to the ussr new opportunities for western technology and economic relations. arms control gives credence to soviet claims of their benign intentions and makesar more attractive partner in political, cultural, and economic arenas.

arms control is an attractive proposition from gorbachev's point of view for its strategic impact as wellas long as any agreement permits continued modernization of heavy icbms, deployment of mobile icbms, prevents the united states in deploying an effective space defense, and places constraints on air and sea launched cruise missiles. from the soviet perspective, deep cuts in strategic offensive arms, with these constraints, offer the means to limit the rapid growth in the number of hard-target weapons in the us arsenal and to constrain us progress in the development of advanced strategic defenses.

absent significant limits on us force modernization, the soviets would face in the future several new us capabilities with sufficient accuracy to destroy soviet icbm silosthelbm, the rail mobile mx, and midgetman. the us could haveallistic missile warheads capable of destroying hardened targets by the turn of the century, and in

ould have up0 strategic warheads. tart agreement that protected soviet bottom-line positions and cut the usarheads would in their view leave the us with insufficient capability to implement the current us strike plan as they appear to understand it. however,tart treaty that encompasses current soviet positions- the ussr's ability to attack targets in north america and eurasia would not be signficantly different with orew agreement on strategic arms.

arms control and other new initiatives also are intended to break soviet foreign policy out of longstanding tactical deadends and to make the sovietore effective, flexible and vigorous player throughout the world. the result is likely tooviet political challenge to the us abroad that could pose greater problems for our international position, alliances and relationships in the future than the heretofore one dimensional soviet military challenge. we must be prepared for greater soviet flexibilitya new and disconcerting willingness to say yes to some old and not well examined us and western proposals. considerable new thinking-flexibility and political agility will be needed on our own part to anticipate and counter soviet initiatives and to avoid being outmaneuvered and placed consistently on the defensive.

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