THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Created: 8/1/1988

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Director of

Central

Intelligence

Prospects for Change in Sino-Soviet Relations] |

National Intelligence Eitimate

This Estimate- reprosaeits the views of the Director of Central Intelligenco with tha advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.

"Secret.

bI'jia

Cm

o* of Central

The Prospects for Chang in Sino-Soviet Relations

3 was usedhe oreporwws fs,

SAstwvfo/Bf)c$ onjervaoofis periKoateo

the preparation of ints Estimate:

The Central IriMtgtflCJ Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency

Tre National Secure Agency

The tVeau of ^te-oerce end Re^earcn.

l Swe

The Office o' Intelligence Support.

Oeotriment of ire Treaswy

atsoparocpating

Trio Deoov Chiel of Stafl lor Intelligence.

Oeoenmem of ihe Army

Director of Naval InteCgence.

l>rj*-tfnen:of Ihe Navy

The Ataistani Oof of Stafl. tniethgence.

Deoanment ol tho Air Force

This Estimate was approved for puDheatxxr try the Hanenel Foreign lnte*geeve BoanJ.

Key Judgments

We believe there ishigh probability of UgrUncaBl improvement in Sinc-Soviei relaiions in the next six months or so that will ultimately leadino-Soviet summit within the two- tu three-year lime frame covered by this Estimate. While Sino-Sc-iet relations have been improving, since the early IGeneral Secretary GwbecSevs ascendancy aad hb snbsc Cjueni reorientation of Soviet policies have added significant impetus io the process. In particular, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the warming of US-Soviet relations, and progress on the Cambodian issue have changed China's attitudes and increased its Ihuibility in dealing with tbe USSR

Sino-Soviet relationship could even advance to the point where there isino-Soviet border agreement, resumption of party-io-partytatement of rmncipie* on relations, aod perhaps the beginning of talks to reduce forces along ihc border.

Relations, however, are not likeiy lo progress to the point where China movesruly equidistant position in the Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationshipps competing with the USSR in many regions of the world. Althoughexpect miliury contacts to develop, we do not believe they will extend u> major arms sales, advanced lechmtogy trawler, or genuine miliuryPast disputes, lingering distrust, geopolitical rivalry, and conflicting national ambitions will continue to bound the reconciliation and promote disagreements.

The pace and extern of improvement will depend in large pan on whetherBoth sideseformist coarse at home and coniinuc to sec a

more peaceful international environment as essential to the pursuit of

domestic reforms.

The Soviet-US and Sino-USain essentially oe trgek-

There it continued progress toward resolution of ihc Cambodian conflict.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is interrupted.

The Chinese malniain their positive assessment of Gorbachev and his staying power.

Improved Si no-Soviet relations will increase Chinese and Soviet leverage in relations with the United Suies and add to Gorbachev's imageeacemaker. The already minimal potential for Siiio-Sovict military conflict will recede even further. This will increase pressure in the United States to articulate its policiesore challenging political vironmeni.

In acWition, ibe more rapid ihc pace of inTDtorcinenii in Sino Soviet relations, the more pronounced will be iheir impact on US freedom of maDCUver In East Asia. For example, in an atmosphere of Irianiolar delente. Japan probably will be under greater pressure to improve its reUtWos with the Soever Union. Moreover, if the image ot* the Soviet miliury threat tn East Asia ts diminished. US allies may see leu needpend money on defense or permit US military access.

Nonetaeless, the imptcreerrsenis in Sine-Sovici relations envisioned in this Estimate aril) not. in our view, furnJaroenially threaten US interests in the nest iw> io three yean:

contacts will make it easier for the iwo sides to coordinatewhere their interests coincide, bul Ihey will tenia in competitors punning their on very different feceolitical agendas.

- We do not believe thai any Chinese or Soviet forces withdrawn from the border regionesull of diminished miliury competition will be redeployed io measurably augment the threat to NATO or to L'S allies in the Pacific.

Althoughl try lo take advanuge of increased Si no-Soviet economic interaction to tryet more Western technology. China will aaimit such gains lesi il jeopardise its own accessuch technology.

If Slno-Sovict relations improve sufficiently io be perceived asAsian countries may seek greater US support.

rfc* information

Contents

Judgment* Discussion

ovietTies

PrOficsi u> Date

Factors Likely To Affect Sino-Soviet Relation, hi the Next Two io Three Years

1

5

Internal

iniernaiRolen?

Influences on Sino-Soviet Rebuinn.

<c

US Factor

|

Over Cambodia

Impact of the Afghan Settlement

Norih

16

Other Actors

7

for Sino-Soviet Relations Over the Next Two to Three Years

for the United

Discussion

aad Smart Gee* toetter Ties '

The coming toof reform-minded leoderthios in bolh China aod the USSR haa already signiheainly cruaged eacherception- of ihc other and tpwrred tabstaeUal improvement ca* Stoo-Sotoct rrta-itoes. We bctevc tht retoitrattittp is destined for farther advanccaesull of recent evenu in US-Soviet relations, ihc Sovici decision to withdraw from AfilunisuiB. and the efTorts ibe Soviets are makingettlement of ihe Cambodian problem. The Chinese attribute these changes to General Secretary Gorbachev personally, -ant to reinforce Sit new direction* to foreign policy, and seem on the vergeecisionmi elevate polilical contacts wiih the USSR. We believe the ultimate outcome of ihese contacts willlne-Soviei summit, at which tbe norma lira lion of Sioo-Soviet reiaticcri nuj beWe aho beLeve ikes cowld occur well before tbe end of ike iwr> in ihree->ear ume frame of this Eaiirnata.| |

For China, ihe objectives of its changed policies toward the USSR are ice

Diminish the Sonet threai to Chinese security ind free ap more resources for ccceromic tkvesopcncai ai home.

Improve Beijing's kvcriie in Washingtonime oi increased US-Soviet cooperation

Buttress Gorbachev's iniernal potitioe.

Gain political concessions from the USSR.

Secure economic sad scieniihc and techrtcaogical benefiis from the USSR aod Eastern Europe.

Fananoi and New Delhi about Soviet reliability. | |

For tbe USSR, belter si no-Son^ relations are de-tiined to:

the leverace it bclictes ihc United States enjoys in the triangular retotionship.

Permit some reduction of rnrJitary forces along ihe Sieo-Sovtot border.

Proencacupanded Sovietsia

Provide additional moment ome* thinking" in foreign policy and helpore favorable image of the Sovici Union and ils leader, Gorba-

V'e judge, however, thai the geopolitical imtaiions of the two sides will remain fundamentally antithetical,that historical disputes and fears will tihirnately verve to preclude broad cooperation in thearena. China aims eventually to hecrane tbepower to Asia wiih major influence on the world stage; the USSR hopes to prevent the Clunesc from achieving this real, earns to carvearger role for uteJf in Ana. and would like to move Ctktoainimumotition of Iruc equidistance between ibe United States and the USSR.[ |

Presets to Date

Much progress hat been made in Si no-Soviet rcUtiom since ihc Chinese chanicd tactics and became more receptive to Soviet overtures for better rrtatiora in ihe, but ihe process bas gathered snorettocc Gorbachev toe* over in(see inset.Firsts to Sine-Soviet RdaiiortO. Thesidet arc beginnini lo seriouslyrob-lemt beiween them. The Soviets have already moved part wayatisfy Chine's demands on ihc three "nkeHlSll"

ErTont to reserve iheosew arc under way, andeve credit Soviel pressure oa Vietnam for Vietnam's recent show of kiibilily.

About hair the Soviet rrocau la Afthanluan as ofay have returned home, and the remainder arc opeetcd to be gone by ecu February.

Recent Finn inReitriani Uielfgt

Sino-Smiettalic forecade, begins to increaseides return*and sporti exihcngts. impended since.

2

sidei resume political, talks at deputygn minister level, suspended since invasion of Afghanistan,

September IW

7Vo sides begin lecond series af poliileal talks on international t'sues. alio at deputy foreign miais-ler level.

4

Two countries' foreign ministers meet at L'mted Nations for first time line* China's admission

First Deputy Premier Arkklpov visits Belling and initials series of agreements tafaciliiaie expanding economic ties, highest ranting visitor sinceKosygin

5

Gorbachev receives Poliiburo member and fleeeng al Chernenko's funeral, first Chinese official receivedoviet general seere-tary since Premier Zhou Enlai

China calls USSR "socialist" for first time

Chinese National Peoples Congress sends first parliamentary delegation to USSR inears

Firsi Soviet brtefimi uf Chinese on theirneeutiaiiims( mted States.

S

Politburo member and tic* Premier )'ot> illinkhipov vfcil. Signs firsttrade agreement inearseparate accord on technical cooperation.

Soviets publish first favorable media comment on Chinese reforms.

Atguu IMS

Soviet trade union delegation visits China for first time inears.

S

Supreme Soviel delegationChina for first time Inears.

Sasiet Friendship Society delegation visits China fi>efirst time inears.

5

Chinese Firsx Deputy Premier Song Ping stopsoscow en route home from Eastern Europe and sees Gosplan Chairman and candidatemember Taly;in.

6

Two sides sign agreement permitting resumption of cross-border trade, which had been hailed in the

.

/continued)

2

mmwtmtm

Inaugural. .t/ Iaw Comminlom.

JurlW

ett /on* his

jt>i/ more IO-

*ardf1 demmmds om the three

First pre-USGA consultation]6

Candidate Politburo member Talyzim. fimvisitor totf simct Kosygfnimalite* ageeemtmi amecmomie peokrert io be undertaken by Soviets in Chum.

Polish General Srerelorj JanKeiski becmnesive dorest East Eumpeoa allies of USSR lo itstt Chin, ami reestablish pany-to-porty tin; the oiher four Sow European general tecrrtaries sub-irouenily fellow in his path

h

Two si Jet etimhliih first committer to o> true jeim detelopmem af boundary rnees.

6

Sovieis end clandestine radiobroadcasU ia Chima.7

Sino-Sovlet border tttH, suspended sinceesume.

JmmelU?

.itr.Ri Generml Set Mary Zhao Ziyang tuwj ft>

Germany, Czechoslovakia. Hungary, and Balemna. tkus tomp/rrmg mormatlzmimm of rekmm -uk USSKi.kuessollUt.

ml Ckimrtr tomul-Cultural

7

Sonet tomsuUue im Shanghai ate In Lemmrrod closed Horn, reoprn.

First policy planning talks since. AwtmszlW

Soviet Defense Uimuer Yaztrr sends -himne eommterpmt. Zhmng Atgtmg. for PLAvenaryfoe the Am time imean, alrhomgh Chima fmli ia ottmtm ledge il.

T

Fim CPSU congratulatory menage to CCPsince

Fim Chimese delegmiom to Soviet ammrenmry fmmiies0

Chimne pabliihnteniewmret general secretaryrradrs.

Soviets publish collection of Deng

speeches.

Unclassified

84

Two tides hold Foreign btirmur,atin America.

Sutirl troopa hart Irjlini there may alto hat been iNhcr rrmmrtioms in Sanrtaalks oa ihr no udci loaaaonding border dnpssicprogressedht petalhere the Sonetstcd tooint aerial servey of tbaorder. When completed nest month, ihtt-dl tba* that mm to nlaad*oppositechi ef Khabavorosi mom at Senct nmicinoi slnld belong to the Chinese. Soviel refuse! to acknowledge tha in the real hai blocked settlement of tbe mrrme border diirmicj

Potitttal eotuoxtl are eicundiaa. although theeaca other oa many (omen

policy iuoes- Moscow and Beijing have :Uo own) amy from tbe ideological ngidit) of ihe put and found common (round is the thacviMioa of their reipectirc reform effort*.-

Tke tm sideshold their mm jo-ai seminar oo economicecember.

i- mrii-.Li ind academics in each country are pub-bciy apcJaadiflg the other'i reform efforts ia orderarther advance the caesc of thru own leader-thipt' reform efforts. Soviet reformers, for eumple. recoinuc the limitations of the USSR's ecoaornic reform effort andlike io tee the USSR emulate some of China's agricultural and industrial reforms, whereas Chinese rsKcDecreals are

ate King Soviet political reforms io providefor polilical reform in China. I

These contact! ore taking placeariety of levels, including:

Aaeeil wnnrt of ibe lorrsew rrucmers st the United Nations and of deputy premiers lo dttcun economic reunion*

Talks at ihe deputy foreign mirttiter level onaad internaiiorul issuese three obstacles I. as well as Ihc bonier dispeie (see idsci. Theorder Dtsrxitt'i

Discussions between lower level foreign miniiiry ofrtciali on an ea pending ranee of issues such, as UN affairs, tbe Middle cast, Latin America, and arras cooirol.

parliamentary, academic, icieniific. and cultural eschtngct.J

roeorasr froai. ihc changes have been more

Both sates arc now -'i r( io admit that trade OH faobtaie jrr^eacwibmf nl of ihewrtortk.

1 WO andiridead rs plederybawl iSce rigare il

Ten> lafks arc estcc agaii irsrasea; lorn term tradebarter- and probubtv

ill meet the i'ol ol laving j trade iu moverillion by ihe cad of the oi'.cru nvc-yaret nestO.

Cross-borclcr trade ithat S, trade thai is negotiaied by local otncials in the border regions asrade nrsjutuied by central mmiur.es ia Moscow aad Beijingi has rcstrrncd and grown rarntUy. Tbe two udct arebe mfrsnmctarr tihai n. budding new rail lines. opaadiBg riverine port capacity, establish.ne joint ventures, and to forthi that will support an even greater etpansion.

The two sides have also accestfuu)cw icnes of blanket economic aceords under ibe terms of whkh Moscow ultimately bones to tend several hundred technicians to Cbioa totdred* of factories bwh dttrtng tbe be>da> ofcol La bent ion and prorrde credits and personnel for lbc construction of seven new ones.

Sonet mrrcnant and nsning three are bemgin Otincsc harbors.

1 The two sides havemore than JO groups of cccnoenic tpecislrsts and agreed in principle io undertake other cooperative rsrotecu ia agriculture, fisheries, ncteorology. nonferrous mcijUurgj.inaehtnc building, oil and natural gas. and railways.

UVira**fi the Btttrrore .vaSTprjvatcdeach vale bi arrayed ijunu ibec oaoderrit/vd ataf. arearwMc 'tun they -erec-"Recent Mlkur) OevrSopmenrvThe-'iriiowever.been one of ihc factor* ccubtuifCMMimake -aulo refectbt redoctiorn ibr> have nude vo farIsrael)bulK. thesest*each ttue't ihrrai percepruc forhat CM <he viie ofated forcci bt overmen Moscow hatone of iben had preevotsi) ua tamed iacdacrd ibe

number of truupabeburner.ilu agreed todrstro) (hearorvcii'n ui.'i ihis -as done reirrunl) lo vec-rcagreement aub ihc L'niiedev itehappyocket Ihc

anther siaV edawfi If aad ihr Chtmrie rtcinetr 4rmj ii. ihat po/nital. eiuaoraw. omul milt-lory, a. i . pmMianital "aoratu-Ii:oiiom"of irlo'lons. Siate-io-itate relaiioni arc better and more ef, rumic lhan it in> lime uocc ibe. Each tide jtjttgcs thai the jctmt) of ibeeu ihrcjteo.niecade agaP

Despite tha improve me tu. ibe tvdatrorttfiip is still rnore adversarial than it ta .ooperatn-c. Chtrta tidl aaa Ihc obtUcSei to mod able tac pace of improve-meet in lira io ihe USSR, lo dcmoritirjieonccrn cntr Soviet acticari ihat alTrciecurity/ and abo to prevent Siru-So- ici relations from adversely afYeciing iu rcLiuona with Ihc United States.an of ihas itraiejj. Chins lhas far bas stalled on Sonet aiteaspu lotSSSSPtfc. erchaage nsits bel-ecn lorOco mimuers aed premierv or resume pnny-io-party tier- (Sec inset. "Sino-Sonetinsvr)

' In tea rwein. China'i awheh

ana theaact laa LaMedkealaaiiasa^.riba^SiirW'raaliM IVUt at**

isaeaifOvat ia* aaa a*w isea

Sjmp-'i iM.ii athaave

aaertelaS'tavl

Factarv Liaer, Ta .UTen Sate So. In aataetten kt rhatan

Heat Ual Vau-Smxt rctituaas the acvtm three von -iU depctd oa iBiarnal Joiioi-n" in bolh Chi as and the USSR,SuaHl clTorts hs mane soepursduag Chinoc iranruceius vjirdsda/es b> ihc tbroc Caiascn rVvibUa>brvejubim' CS rctjiasatt bush aauHnev aed theot other coaainei caer ahachhave bul limned iflrhieace.|

Seatrt latrraal Scree- IW Rear el Car*arho

Gorbachev bu already ctctm-BUraied anodil> loaf-held Soviet pnaattjaa cJK-faJC it theaad he also iprcars so be menrag us ihu direct unrs China;

peechtd not we: ut, Gorbachev tirvr tieajard bas uneaiaaa to improve nuiwu. cacagctolt. sed deal -ith China't obvueks. tSee itaet.Suirsncnis oa Asia ")

GorbuKhcv hu rcpliced moat of hit predecetacev"ii, -No acre more micretted in axr-iag ptopas^acbt poiau sgautM the Chinese thin us improvingaiih otorc -Vxibac Wu jr. -ho have jckno-lcdrcd posl Soviel mouses in dealieg wiih China and rrcognired ibe need to make real coaiceuiont lo hah China's drift to the West.'

See inters (or background ongists sad China's KremliooacgiHii

As noted above. Gorbachev has moved at kau pan way to resolve China's demands on ihc three obstacles.

The rtaaha of the sooa-to-be-ewnjected tent} of ihc Siao-Sovict border coekt rxonde Gorbacrcva facc-tavieg way to show farther fltsibuity oa Ihe border drtfioiel

Smwt Saulntiin and Chmexlite Itea Amen-

an coaairrraru.u tjit uacaran o* vicai aad ihnavaa brtaviai of ihrir aaVerwiet. In larae forttraphv atuiare drwnbini niuili fall rante elim Hew (roar* tot enl) lie vie- ihate taamae iteamoaa et tfatrnutcrv j )

"Stft-at

The Sina-Satiet Bordrr Dispute

Chimes* had long resented Russiam ifntenel aggrandnemrnt at their expense tnb centu-ry. but li was not until after the tweets tif ike Chtneie Rrvalution anal the downturn inclot on,* lhalerious issue In relationsoscow and BfiJInM. Th*e greally alarmed b. Chines* lerrttarsal claims, which thr, sawundamrmul threat la th* security of the Sarin Foe Hail. Chinese claimajor factor prrcpuailng ih* Some! military buildup oma.au*

hen China's claims Ant surfacrdChina was demmndlmg that Moscow mtkmamt. edit thai it hadcquired some IJ million war* kilometers of territory in Central Asia and th* Amur River Basin imk century. China sought tk*0 sauurr kilomnert in ihe Pamirs,slands in the Amur and Utsmrt Rivers, and severaliraeis of html in the Sino-Savtei-AlamsyJimn iribordtr area ihai China claimed the USSR had acquired ta excess afh-ceniury treaties

The first round uf lalks was held shortly before Khruthehevs ousttrul then China em barked an the Cultural Revolution and tbtrr were no more lalks until after iht Stno-Sovitl border clashes9H. the border talks serred as ihe ami, direct channel af communication -apart frtmt ambaisadonalthe two sides.4K. Moscow, fearing that China war only pee-stmttng its first Tntron the ternioriat question.

steadfastly refuted la aekmrwttdge ihe allegedly unequal" nuiur* idh-cenlury ireattes. Al Ihe first roundb* Soviets agreed in principle io use the ihaewrg main mrvsgntum chammrh pnntipl*dw* ih* rtvmn* horde*ut they irted ta rrmmslandsl* Khabarovsk by mmmnimng thai in* mustn mar, ear,oa channels id the erven Rowed umlh and west id ike idands insitad id norih and east as ihey in fail do Chinattinquisk its claim U. tk* Pamir area but later withdrew ike utrrf

The cttertat tresesegotimtiims resumed in7 afltr Gorbachev went public with the thalwegnd ih, plant for Savirl

withdrawals from Mongolia were anmrumrtd In Ik*hat have taken place since then.

the Chinese have mn raised the unrqual treaties if Ihe last trntury. and ihe twogreed one, again to focus first on trytng to rrudrvents on ihe riverine burdfr. Despite trotboehrv's tptrth. iher* tj still sum* uncertainly regardingnternums am ihe island, utnumteIhe Soviets may rvrnlually h* willing lo acknowledge Chines* irwnrrship in' thos* islands, bul will peabmhl, withholdomvessmn umd China seems moreake cinmprumiies in return, such as abandoning Us claim to ihr Pamir rrgion Th*ill al,i, peobobtr be careful to claim lhal ihe naturalhe mm has changed Ike border in order la avoidrecedent for other disputed terrtltwtes along ihr USSRt borders^

are nowoviet trnapt 'about IS division) facing onmllion Ckt-nese troop* 'aboutivisions) along th, Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia."

integratingthem into the group armtei and modernizing their armor and artilleryit will lake rears far China tt. acquire all the advancedto ensure thete MM CMull-scale Soviet asiault

Gorbachev look freer in IW, ihe Soviett hare eoatlmtrd lo madimiit ihe equipment af ihe forces Ikej hare stationed there and Haveo mobilization divutoat to acme ua-nl, albeit at low rtodinest level* Soviethough substantially leu numerous than tnaienf Ihe Chinese,onsiderable edge In mobtlit, and firepower We estimate iht, are eapal.te afhinese attack into tke USSR and ofuiek counteraiiark. Tkty ore alto capable ofimned oBrmtve moChina- To lake ami bold all af newtkeauerm China, however, would require thr doubling of the farce or the use af nuclear ueaptuu We Mm ihai ihe Soviets would be highly reluctant ta initiate the use of nuclear weapons against China far limited obwaives because of the dangeretaliatory

Bailing, wktckfor yean planned to defend China by luring the Soviels in deep, now plans laoviet Invasion from ihefirii defensible terrain. Accordingly, since ihes. China hei been reorganizing end rrequipping its farcesore conventional combined-arms defense. Since IW. some IS Chinese maneuver armirs have been reorganised intoore powerful combined-arms formations called "groupnd China bat strengthened itsorder defeme divisions by

The St/vleis want to reduce the militarywilh tke Chinese before China complete* modernltatian of its forces. Toward thai end, tkey have repeatedly proposed agreementi on nanuie id force, mitiiary confidence-buildingnd/or farce reduction talks China has repeatedlt refected these proposals Since Gorbachev look aver, ibe USSR has taken additional umlateral meaiurtt. such as Ihe withdrawalivision from Mongolia and ike planned destruction <d_ niorte in Asia. I

ealidttj 'qf Mitutterefense Ya-

1 rrc/'t claims that ihe,also 'rJ-ieJ their forces along ihe Sino-Sonei border.}

/ Chine

thai none af these actions has as ret substantial reduced the Soviet military thr rat and thus far at least has continued to refect Sonet proposals on military confidence-building measures and/or force reduction talks. China could agreeialogue, however, if thereino-Sovlei border treaty or if it came to believe lhal there would be no iignificani east in terms of Us relaiiuns with the

urdikeit ia ihe time Crime ol ihii Etiimau. bothnd ihe ChinesehM Gorbachev* oevur would diminish ihe prcanccii fat cent maia ihs Seeo-Sovwl relations Bothhe Chinese also believe that, if Gee bat bo rt re-ssoved. be abnoai eeruinlt would be replaced tryleader mote actions shoot dorncux reform sad rest fable, on forcnpi pofie>hange, moree-er.cause ihe Chinese lo review their iiwument

about ihe direction of Soviet policy sad perhaps mmhcanil) dampen iheir iiKlinalMa toh tbe

<fciaese InternalW Rate at Drts]

Whde Chinese leader Dcet Xraornng has beta aa iraporuaiore rapidine-Soviet ties. Mrne Chinese are new taring thai he

n Canal

The growth in political and economy contacts looks impttiiivt "hen comparedhe absence id tUek contacts throughout the second half ofnd. It looks considerably lets so when compared to the relationship the two sides en/oped with each other tnr the ties each country now has to ihe West. For example:

The last Simo-Sovtet summit took place when Khrushchev visited Chinalthough Premier Kosygsnomed triphina in9 when Sino-Sonet tensions along the harder wereeak. Since that time, there hate heen I2 Soviet-US summits andlout Si no-US summits, not touch brooder US dialogue with both countries at lower levels and in Ihe people-to-people arena.

The United States has already trained more teholori from each country than either has trained of the other.here wereovietshinese students in theSlates, but the USSft and China exchangedtudents.

he USSH accounted for more than half at China's foreign trade and China aciounted far one-fjih of Soviet foreign trade;he Soviets accounted furercent idrade and the Chinese forercent of Soviet trade.

Some of theolanned Simo-Sovtetcooperation protects will not be completed because ihe Chinese plant monoge't -ere free to purthaie Western equipment and did. Even if the Chimer* had other factories to replace them. Soviet protects in Chima will be dwarfed bp the averuch project! China has comraaed foe with the West.

potential for eominued growth tn Stno-Soviet economic ties is limiied by both tides' desire to export their better goods to the West for hard currency and by China's concernive the USSR the leverage it once enjoyed am Ihe Chinese economy]

.date

Gorbmckevi t

At Vladivostok inlant lo broaden Us overall economic and polilical role In Asia and nakedalm/or more Soviel tmolvement in Asian security issues. But his main message was for ihe Chinese. Gorbachev indicated that.

The Sonets were prepared ta accept ihe<the main mwrlgattom channel) principle to resolve Iheir riverine border dispose, thereby suggesting for ihe first time in public thai Moscow would pre up possession ofislands opposite Khabarovsk lhal had blocked agreement in the past.

Announced thai ihe USSR wouldmall number of troops from Afghanistan and was engaged in talks with the Mongolians about withdrawing iroops from that country

Although ihe Soviel withdrawal fromurnsham, and the Mongolian withdrawal came onlyubstamial strengthening In the Mongolian armed forces, it was the first time any Soviet leader hodhow of responding to China'son any of the three obstacles.

Gorbachev, however, failed to address the issue thai most concerned the Chinese: Soviel

In an interview wiih the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka on the first anniversary of ihespeech, the Soviet leader announcedillingness to Include Asian-basedS-Sovltt INF agreement, thus preparing the way for additional reductions opposite China. I

; ftblkao wiih the USSR,c-uY aot cipcct beiiing uteaesedy cqaaliaux,scei on-ecii ihc United Sum and tbehtngc the prevailing Chineae vie* lhal Moteow potei Ihc greatest tent-term threat to China aAny likely lucceuocoreover, will tee the open door to the Weilseful counterbalance to Moscow and at Ihe main touice forology needed (or economic and military modermratio and Ihui -ould coatiBue to protect Chma't Western ties from too much improvement in relations with Mot-

i oe Saaa-Seilet

Although nolmportant at theompel-stent driving each title, other countriei bate had aad will continue to have tome influence, on tbe evolving bilateral relationship. The United Sutes is the mew imporiani of these playert.umber of oiher coumrtes on China's periphery also loom large.

The IS Factor. Improvingretailors may limit US Nrverage in ibe irtaageUr relationshrp. bet US influence dependt more cat US tMUienl rcUuom with ihe USSR aad China than on icUtiont bet>ecn Moteow and Beijing (tee irttct. The Evolving US Relationship With ihe USSR andiven China's more esiensive tics to the West, ibe United States has had and will continue to have somewhat mme influence on Chineie policy lhan on Sovici

P-kky-cz)

Until recently. China's fear lhal developing too cosywith Moscow too fast trotddavtrtisace for iis rnoderniratwe effort ledIcaoersaupraw oet ibe normalizationrelations with the USSR and downplay itsNow ihsi US-Sovici relations haveihc Chinese teem iu feetisadvantagetriangular relationship and are moving io righiby trying lo upgrade their ownIhe USSR. The Chinese are still concernedpotential adverse reaction in Wathingion andcarefully, but ihey probably catenatewig accept even significantSuva-Sovici reiaiiont beeaaae of Ibe recentof US-Soviet relations.'

Thr Ewaerimi VS Hetaiieasnip WM ihebM

The ISm, China ami'he ISSH hat missed through ihree disiimi phases:

I mil ihe Sino-Sattei sfivi emercrJ ta ihe open, ihe Sonets were im ihe sieontysi nuii- ion beeause ihe L'mied Stales hadrlu-llonship milk the Chlaete.

Then ihe advantage shifted to the L'mied Siaies. became. Inuetepling iherectiit- id theStdll ami acting la tmprinewith Beijing, ihe (ruled Slates was being courted by both sidesas ihe ISSH Ihat nan- had lo prepare for iheii-uodrom war.

.Vow lhal Slmo-Smiet relations areas become more dx&cwlt lor anr one of the three camntrset to fiat the other Iwa agmrai each other'

Cenfltci Orer Cambodia. China has long muck tha iuec ihe number-one obstacleetter Sino-Soviet relations sad ibe litmus test of Soviet mtcntiom. Afterecade of corJUci. rtowever. ihe poti-liom of ill panies in the dnouie appear to be in lias and Ihe prospceUolitical settlement have improved:

The USSR is encouraging ain order to improve relations wilh China and other Lati Asian countries as -ell as lo reduce ihc burden of aiding Vietnam. Moscow appears ready lo run more nut of IrKtion with Vietnam io accomplish these goals. Moscow, moreover, probably could live with ameat that :lWs real power sharingewegime.

Cbou. which wants to avoid appearing obairuc*has cahibited rnore nsnubility. alihougb it ccet-unees toull withdrawal of Vietnamese irtrope and the ditvalauan of ihc Vietnamese puppet regime in Cambodia.

V'thovgh the ocnlaeic* iociilcmcni are vt.ll fornweUble. the Chinese appear to have rcdciincd the Csmboduntetaaescse nsneta-ble lo sutkdra- all force* before ibe end9 wouldincse demands fur prcsrrcu andiao-Su*ici .ummit mce-irtg

The Impact of ibt Afghan Settlement. Aff haunt anarwasi the least irnnurtjoi of the three obstacles fromervtscciive. Nonetheless, ihc beginning of Suvki -ithdrawah fjrotably helped convince the Chineve thai the SovkIs were, as they claimed, really pressing Vietnam to resolve the Cambodianomoletion of ihe Sonet withdrawal may encourage China to further upgrade ihc Sino-Sovlci political dialogue, r

.Vert* rXerrw The Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in P'song'ing cuts bothOn the one hand. Mown* and Bcipiagommon desire to moderaic North Korean behavsot. are both uncnihusustw about North Koreanl-*ongs phns to have brs son succeed mm. are developing trad* and other tees to the South, and -ill go to tbe Seoul OKmpro ,m

yang could be ihc vestec for ihe hujhesa-level -if largelymeeting Laecadesresidcni Gromyko iraveh there for North Korea* tOth anniversaryesi month and mccit wiih bn Chinese eounierpari. Yang Shangkun

: i

On ihc other hand. China resents how Moscow, in the coarse of ihc Ian few yean, has exploitedconcerns about China's growing ties io ihe L'niied States to enhance its infhience in Pyongyang at Chinese rtpenw. Chinaalto dislurbcd bysuccess ia gaining ovcrllight rights from North Korea that enhances iit intelligence capabilities agaiaru Chinese forces in lbc region at the apparent quid pro quo for providing sophisticated military hardware lo Fyoniysag. China will try lo keep iu concerns below the tlairrrnint. however, leu the North

r

mce Unbar into ihe Soviel camp. Should ihc Soviet-North Korean military reJauceuhinugmncanily clover -an unhkciy event, iaorth Korea couldcnrth Chinese obstacle.

military force to preserve Communui tule.ikel> to till even morel the United Slates. | |

the Sovicu and the Chi neve uili continue to vvjetpetc forrsfrrn tmrvam ThuJ H'ueU. there n> no oneiktt) ta have the wmc kind of impact ue Smc-Sovkiihc countrvcv mentioned ibo*c| )

IVm peers for Susa-Scniet Rtbtlcen Oter ihc Neat Tuo larte Vtan

Tne USSR and China have almost al-ayt been rivals aid vometimo icvcrvanexwhen tbey aneosibiyfrurada. ThereUiiueniup of tbethe rnatoneal esccpooa. nut Ihe rale. Il caakc into csrastneeetell of Charasand ui fears thai the Lnited Sum >oeld icck to overturn ihc Chinese revolution. Now that these fears have disappeared andtronger and no longer isolated, lbc Intelligence Community ludgcs ihai there it no chanceeturn to the kind of superior/ subordinate relationship that prevailed inen Soviet cJrkials sdrrul tha. Developmentess hotlilc. nsorc -normal" relationship,iriual certa^ty The rttue during ihe um* frame of this Estimate is ho* far and ho- fast tbe too sides arc likely to i

-jj

IAl Stnc-SuvKi l' o' ,ny Slme-lmliam eenrlkl

uould lead both Mchcov.

ickratiem by theirallie. into eWtll ihis issue from BvXahlaga nr'a Suc^Soviet relations.

V Ml

Until recently. lbc Chinese respuo* io Gorbachev hasairly cautious one. Wc believe, bo-ever, ihat Chinese altitude toward the USSR arc changing and thaiabout Gorbachev'i internal pcstltion. ericnuraged by the Soviet aciioni to satisfy China's demands on the three obstacles, and anxious tosnceived imbalance in thers on tbe verge of or may have recently

ui^ of pcOgrtJt oill nv.la.ic lilt

mietted Sto-So-wi diycavnuaa on Cambodia, ibtmoling oftaatne.

m inlit'll Nations, andbet-ten the Soviet! and Iht Chinese alanniversary fettrvuies in Pingtheretitcr-thae-cvea chancei all thevt nscctingi.icei adl agreeforward -ith tht long-p pooed exchange",ii: i. vltiu the) agreedn principleand ihen noer Khtdultd. Tht fitti utchootid ootnt(all. bat prababi) not untilUS Preudtntul eirci-onowsnber.

Whether the Chinee then decide to esehangetbt two vvumrieV premier* or opt cbrecily forprobabl) "ill depend to urtnof iht probable reactionGreen iht fact thai Gorbachev ha.with INeticknt Reagan four times, however,it more likely than noi that theillforeign miantttV visiti to begin by

A Sino-Sovict lummii would bt uied by the iwo sides to make further rrfogra* toward reserving tht three obujcles and ibe IwrJtr dispiiit. Whetherf thevt nates w'll go Bsaggjesultumrrui it much less clear.iito-Soviei summitould end with the Issuanceocument that would acknowledge tbe improv-meni in relations ihai has taken place1 ant, effectively coen-

iW.jl msubttshrntni of partyio-party lies, sthai would make ii easier for ihe two sides to exchange party as well as government delegations, although we ihiek this less likelyirst rrttetiBg. The Chinese would be concernedossible etgatrrc reaction ia the United States and might opt lo reserve thb concessionoier meeiing/

By ihe end of the period of this Esiirnaic. the two side, could agree to open talks to redact forces aioag Ihe border.lso some chance thai they win reach agreement on their border

fcvra aedcr the teabrt-ric iha:rrurwei arc nor hkeiy to prugreva lo the point -here China move,ruly cuuiduiant pumht inlaicral rttnwanhip and vtura competing actively withitin Iht world. Pastgei tr. doirmUrivalry, and euarWiing aaiuaali continue id boend the reconciliation and promote di*a| |

There are suave place, ia ihc aurldere the puaatwan. of the Sotacu and iht Chanoc are vlcatr to eachhanre to tht United Slates. In tome of ibe* catev if-eurjitccv arc mitkading Chinailkctoocal rwiroei. oat Nicaragua aod the debt ataetnoa are aimed maudyhird World

pohcy-umber of UN oaves and arms control out.iions, however.inoct to tee tomt increase in couperjiion in multilateral (orantt asa now.

[Bar

C hiaa hat alrcad) purchaicd limited amountt of voroc dual-useas patstnger aircraft, heli-copten. ttiecommurKauont eo>aipmtnt. andfrom Moteow and its Eau European albes. And we cipeci Sioo-Sovwi rmhury cotwacu to develop p* patalklarith the espanded political dialogac--/

do not beiieve that the military contact. aitlarmsdvanced icthitcaogy tramfcr.mc rruhury ccoptraiMtt. The Chinese hopeselectively purchasing US mililary equipmentihey will be able lo catch up withdevttt-jrnem. W< think, therefore,lag would be rdactaet lo risk its -ascentlo the United State, by engaging inpurchase, from the USSR. And Mcecow,pan. while deilrous of slowing the developingmililary relationship, probably would btprcaide ibt kind of higMechaoiog, cjo,centalwould likely

fee il* luird Stasia

Continued improve meni in Suio-Soviei reutioer. -ill imnciM Satici jnd Chioesc leverage in reuirorn wiih ihe United States and add tomageeacemaker. The already mimmai potential (ormil ii in coadia -ill recede even further. Thii -ill iiwrejM ib* prcuert on the United Stales to in .vulue in policiesncre challenging rwtaiical environment. In additvn. -ve more rapid the pace ofin Sisw-S. rclataao, the moreoaetrdii be iheir i- a LS freedomtr in East .Iho. roe cueapee. ia ia atmu-iptKre ef inaagvJir detente, Japan reobuBr. -ill be iiader greater prcuare to .rnpeose .ta rclaiMoa -ith ihc Sovset Law*.if ihc-mage of the Sonet rmliiarv ihreil in Eaucbrrwuvhetl. LS alhes may ace Uia needpend money oa defenvc or permit LS military access.! I

The irnprcntmcntj in Sino-Sovret relations errviHOned in thia Estirnaie will aot. in our view, fyndanieniall) ihreaien LS inieresiiover ihe next wo to three years;

Espdndinga summit and/or resumption of party-to-partymake il easi-tr forides to coordinate act torn where their inieresii coincide But ihey will remain competitors pursemg their own .cry different geopolitical imercsis.

ion afrder dar-sic and mm mov ofrms control dialogueduuibic foe theand tbe Chinese to draworces alonv

I her common border. We believe, however, thai those forces would rut be redeployed to meavurably augment the ihreil to NATO or lo LS allies in thehe Sotacucast.e ev pee tedse any rediKtwm to press the Leiicd Slates andimilar .i.

improved rrlaiioea are perceived ars irsraierurag. Kuan .waninc. may veekrwri.

o-Soawt rcooornac and vocMihc and tecltaoaopcal laicrchaDec -ill iBcrcne the chance, thatmay cam acccu to Weaiern iccbaol-ugy aow denied it Became China does not -ant tous primary adversary or ieopardirt rts own access to such technology, it will act to limn Soviciny techacaogy leakage from China will be Ins significant than that taking place die-where in the -ortd. nanieulartv in Western Europe and the noa-Cummunisi countries of East Asia.

Original document.

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