NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FOR 20 OCTOBER 1988

Created: 10/20/1988

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Mirobevic Sol Back at Plenum

Ic.ic/nr Slobodan klllosevlche parly Central Committee plenum lhal ended yesterday; In Ihe coming weeks, he probably_ win moderate hit tecllca bul retain

Milosevic failed to achieve his main goal al Ihe plenum, the

wholesale ouSlei ot his many opponents onmember Presidium

emuor Central Commilloe Although the psenurn accepted

tho resignations already ollcrod by lour Presidium

art) Miloseviconly Presidium member who failed tn

ote of conlldence was Milosevic's Serbian ally Ousan

Me resigned, bul final action will not be taken until3

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The only Central Committee member removedosnian caughtinancial scandal, despite demands by Milosevic-and others iDi^tas--the ouster ol up lo one-third of its-members urKtcrthe rubric ol party renewal. Some plenum speakers had oven urgct-Hhtilho also hold governmeni jobs be removed. The plenum sidestepped most other controversial queslions. It deterredludy commission Milosevic's calls lor Ihe ouster ol several ethnic Albanian ofllcials from Kosovo Province. The plenum, however, supported Serbia In :heor responsibility lor disturbances In Its VojvodinaajM",

Media reports suggest the plenumban Serb ocmonslrationa

as aomesuch

demonstration in Kosovo is scheduled tor today. On Ihe other hand.

the massive gathering planned lor Saturday in Belgrade was

postponed. One Slovene leader caulioned Milosevic against

MtnnMM Notional and regional loadnra hovelear signal Ihey i&

will noi tolerate Milosevic's use of Seibian nationalism lo undermine

the political system They probably hope lhal their show ol relative

unity will prompt him lo moderate his nationalemands. These

leaders now may bo even more inclined lo use lederal security lorces

and the Army to quell new waves ol Serb demonstrations, especially II ,

they become vi 1')

Milosevic probably will rein In his aclrvliy at least lomporaiily. HeInderal pressures in the past, noweyer. and Ihe pleiium-rfnin&i pur him lo now provrxat>

second plenum is addressing Slovene and Croatian objections to several economic and political constitutional amendments. It eltorls al compromise lail and Ihe (intendments are noi passed by the end ol next month, the governmeni will bo unable tolmplement market-orionled economic i

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of Votontsov's Posting

Moscow's unusual appointment ot First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov as Ambassador to Kabul last week suggestsas decided to push herdolitical compromise in Afghanistan belore the IS February deadline tor withdrawal ol Us troops.

end Moscow Rave not yet made the major announcementforeign journalists were invited io Afghanistan lastCentral

plenum trial war. lo precede the announcemeni was heldflawing been postponed forrjetrbecauseinfighting and disorganiiallon. Only mrm*

changes were announced. 1

timing of VororitsoVs appointment, shortly afleMto

line and that Moscowerson of Vorontsov's dool is needed. It Is not clear whether |heplaiujflrjanpr>uncOTcni included President Nahbullan's resignation In favor of ridn-POPA Prime Minister Sliarq. as was widely rumored in Kabuf. Once In Kabul, however. Vorontsov may nave decided more time was needed to prepare for major changes: he may have agreed toonevejnllul plenum to quash rumors of ihe parly's disarray "

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Vorontsov's appointment as Ambassador apparently is-emotion. In addillon toirst deputy foreign minister, he seems not to hove been in poetical trouble in Moscow, and the brcodlh of responsibilities he has held indlcatesjie.isone at President Gorbachev's top troubles hooters.

KrasTtoyarsk Moratorium Likely To Continue!

Soviets probably will not resume construction at the Krasnoyarsk radar facility when their moratorium ends this week.

Recent Soviet statements about the radar hove not referred lo tfftr

status ol Ihe moratorium. General Secretary Gorbachev last month

proposed lhat Ihe laellilyenter for international spacer.

research. Lasl week kn Paris. Foreigir-Mlnisler

V-i. suggestcdth^UNESCO organize an InternatiorraHbody lo stallammay

r> Siberian winter.

i Soviets are noi likely to resume construction at Krasnoyarsk Ihis year. Moscow probably calculates lhal restarting construction now would undermine Ils recent efforts to remove the radar compliance issue from Ihe US-Soviet arms conlrot agenda and would strain lis relations vrrlh the next US administration. In nny event, construedjop.now would be hampered bv lhe approaching

Struct

is unclear now Moscow intends to handle expiration of lhe moratorium. Although Ihe Soviets have extended olher moratoriums wiUi prominent public announcements, Moscow may prefer Instead to acknowledge that further construct(orrtias been delorrcd. even though its moratorium has olllcialry expired. It may characterize such decisionood laiih gesture, hoping to create an atmosphere iduclve io progress toward resolution ol the issue'

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Mob con Define* Police Powers of Internal Tioops

The) Ministry of Internal Attain tstVDI hat recently explained the decree tha Soviet Presidium Issued In July defining the authority ot the Internal Troops to use tlrtarmt againsi demonstrators and emphasizing Moscow's direct control ol those troops In dealing ith i aHMk

decree grves tne internal Trooos uthority to make arrests, scare* horricni without warrants, perform spotchecks, and cordon oft areaa o' unrest Tney cano doicnd sensitive laoineipt.ress civil disorders, but onlyasl resort and only under circumstances in which

innornnls would not BO htii'

sometimes collaborated with rioters i

The decree prohibits the subordroti on of internal Troops to local Republic authorities dining periods of civtt unrest. MVO authorities maintain Moscow needs direct control because Ipcarauth perl res have'*' Vj a

?rs from thoir own communities

The decre*not change the rota or mlaalon ol lhe Internaloos. however, for the first lime since Ihe Internal Troops wore formedears ago, legally spoil out thoir authority. Tne Soviets indicatedrecise definition of ihe troops' role was needed to ensure thai their aclMf lea would bo consistent with the principles of

Although lha decree was Issued In July, lhe Soviets have only recently given It much publicity. News of *stno Itraarmshas_ recently appeared in ihe Western press

Sonets ara cVetlino theirjnesaJg*estern They have :'ao>isonaay txen reHictant to aejmlt that the USSR neeo* an Interne) army and may bebouthe age Ol glasnost.

The continued attentionaw passed more than two months ago indicates II rs politically sensitive The law mayompromise between strictly controlling newty enacted rightsublic demonstration and putling 'anils on arbitrary, abusive power. Besides preventing complicity by focal authorities In civileeping supervisory power in Moscow may be aimed at preventing authorities from using undue violence in read ma. to demon sira concern President Gorbachev recently voiced.ewly defined powers will, in most cases, formally belong to (lie Minister of Internal Affairs, lha appointmentew ministern ovon more political significance.)

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'i*ing New Producllon Agreement

OPEC'S price end long-term strategy committees are meeting Jointly In Madrid to hammerroposalow Crude oil production ngreement, which mey hlnjseona plan by Its Persian Guitncrease Quotas. flUfflraf^W-

Ino Persian GullArabia. Kuwait. Ihc UAE,avor Increasing OPECs celling by as much as

illion barrels per day. aflsssflsssMk

. They view such an increase ai ve most realistic approach lo unifying ihe cartel, gaining consensus onroducllon quotas lor Iran and Iraq, and Increasing market share rather than supporting

Kuwaili Oil Minisler indicated the sharp decline in oil

resull ot higher Saudi and Kuwaiti oilinduce bollix,

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Iran and Iraq lo compromise on quolajcvcls. SaudiA/abia and Kuwait have indicated Ihey Inland to conlinuolcH*roduco wellheir quotas uniil such an agreement can be reached. Saudi Arabia's production recently rose toillionhigher thanKuwaili output is running ai. morebove Its quota.

(Oil prices hove fallen by morearrel since mid-August loer barrel ejWMaa*

If OPEC agreesigher producllon celling. It is oenuousi aq^TBely*|rj Incrcase-fts "oilbyy opening new cutlets in lhe Persian Gulfprobably oxpand exports to increase revenues forUnless lhe UAEubstantial Increase inAbu Dhabi may break ranks and significantly*

production'

A production ceiling of5robably would keep average world oil priceaer barrel next year. Qui the cartel has exceeded even this level lor mosl8 and has nol been able to muster enough discipline lo conlrol Its output. OPEC alsoechanism to adjust production seasonally, and prices are likely- io remain volatile

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on Western Sahara al Risk

Algeria's Introductionratt UN General Assembly resolution on Western Sahara calling lor direct negotiations between representatives ot Morocco end the Algerian-backed Pollsarlo Front may set back the nascent economic and polilical relationsc two countries amammamama,

Algeria hasosponsors lor Us taxi, which goes beyond lhc UN Secretary General's peace plan by calling lor direct public talks. Algerian military olllclals said recently (hat Algiers lirmly supports the Poheario and will not compromise on direct negotiations, i

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mounting an Intense campaign in thc UN to thwerTAlgerlannd have asked friendly countries ioesolution In lavor ol me Secretary Generals peace Inilialhre. Thc Moroccans are hinting lhal they may link progress on cooperaiion wllh Algiers to progress on Weslern Sahara.i

irior polilical commitment thaiautonomy and is insisting on direct negotiations toInolficlala apparently

believe that Morocco has more lo loseestern Seharen stalemate and that Rabal will not jeopardize relations by refusing to compromise. President Bendjedid probably has accepted the hardline position ol some ol his key advisers as Ihe politically expedient course, parlicularh/ in the al(ormalh-rif ihe recent violence In Algeriathough many Algerians resent the diversionscarce resources to the Polisar

Morocco so lar has been unwilling to grant de facto reecx i

>nt by mooting openly wiih its rcprejcnliilives.

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ncand privaie. make II clear that Moroccos King Hassan may be willing to put on hold bilateral relations with Algeria and the."Grand Maghreb" scheme to develop regional unity ralher than make dorfiestlcallv unpopular concessions on Western Sahara.

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Rebels nt-iurn to Offensive

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Kayaia. and Ikofo

The Sudanese military It under Increasing pressure Irom southern Insurgents; the rebels arc likely to make additional gains before the dry season begins next month.1

ver the past

government garrisons at Kallre.

ebel activity early In the rainy season,probably was overly optlmlsllc aboul holding ground Inuntil thenppirtrot'y have

overcome logistic and leadership difficulties that probably kept ther tchlng an offensive sooner.I

support to the southern garrisons is at on allilmo low Because Of rain, rebel ambushes and mining dInd the shorlage ol transport aircraft on which southern garrisons are critically dependent. Supply problems will undermine governmeni morale and further decrease the Army's ability lo withstand rebel oiiacks

PANAMA: Regime Rethinking Election

Thee held In May

Defense Chiof Noriega, apparently in on effortpen, is considering canceling the presidential el.

has not mado op his mind aboutand Is examining stivoral ailernatlvos.rivate potlssess his prospect; as a candidate Is another sign ofncertainly Theno attractive candidates so far. and postponing ormay appeal lo the Defense Cnlelay to maintainquo The regime ia stropped lor cash and can atillion on an election. Some oppoBltiorTparues alsotavof Ihe clecllon. foarlng that Noriega would manipulate

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A Thumbnailolknr

"lurKitlonalerm coined Inymen Present Sukarno toalien ol groups representing five proton owns, trades, military, and religious and organ Iin tions. In recent years. President Soohano has refurbished Golkar; Itnational olecilons, using palronage and coercion to mobilize support, andmatseat parliament

Oespfie the reQlrne;s. eflorts. however. Gokkar does not nave an ircfcpervOwrrMclerillly or so*dm societypubOcolkar as a

creature of the Soehano regime, tne poliltcai'ocog-iitn ftath to power andvVw Itnd

in an etlort to bolld support, Golkar this year lor the first time isbottom up" approach In whlcn district and provincial congresses select local party leaders and delegates tonornbOf National Congress, Proviounly. Golkar held its National Congress first andiclod local leaders, Indoneolnn andogroooeharto atll mokos all majorconootningTJoikaTr'

INDONESIA: Rulmo Pnrly's NaUonal Congress Opons

Tfoe opening today In Jakarta ot the National Congress ol Golkar, (he government's poMtkal party, is another round In tho power struggle between Indonesia's two moil powerful institutionsthemliiiary and the oviiin the personal rivalry between Defense Minster Murdarvl and Vice President Sudharmono. Golkar's current

General Chair mar positions in Golka key role In the an' Socharto has dec an old Army colkti

nurticd to the Ad

neuvering lor leadership se tne partyprobably play the :lal succession. President ed Lieutenant Goner aleneral assBssBBsV Sudharmono. however, may be

military, with Murdani's encouragement. Is usingto promote Its domlnanl role In Indonesian politiceemdwhat It considers antim.lllary Influence fromterm as Gofkare (inner al Cna-man ends IN? year

Sudharmono moves to tho Advisory Council, however, ha wooil retain considerable Influence and might prewM Walvono. In that case, tho rift between Socharto and lhe rrUMary.became apperont earlier this year when Sooniched Sudharfvono as Vico President. Is littery to widen

J^pocial Analysis

a Middle East Bailie-ground

ihe wake ol ihe Iron-Iraq cease-lire, politically Iragmenled Lebanon la again emerging as Ihe primary arena ot conflict lor rog.onalIraq andlo settle old scores. Direct military hostilities between foreign powers In Lebanon ere not likely In the near term, but growing foreign support lor Lebanon's warring militias risks miscalculationider i

rtv-aJry between Iraq and Syria poses lhe most recont-cxl. threat lo stability In Lebanon. Iraqi President Saddem Husayn. Ihirsting lor revenge against Syrian President Assad lor suppocQng ran in the war. sees the current polilical Impasse In Lebanon as an ideal opportunlly to undermine Syrian Influence in Ihcubstantially Increased lis financial and rWtrtaQtjsupport lor the^ militant Christian Lebanese Forces, despite tfla militia's longslandmo ties to Israel and the PLO. The aid Is designed to thwart Syrian eilorts toew govcrr.monl and to Increase the cost ol Syria's involvement

Syria's response has been restrained so far. and Assad may choose to keep rt thai way lor now to give the Christian government in Beirut eveiy opportunity to disintegrate Irom wllhin. Although Syria isebanon. Damascus probably and mat it can afford toaiting game.

Syria probably is counling on Increased support from Iran Tehran's hatred of Baghdad gives It strong incentive lo cooperate with Syria 'ngainsl Iraq, Increase support lor Ifi-tballahTand seek greater cooperation between Hiiballah and Amal. the Iwo principal Shia militias. Hizballah has become concerned about the decline in aid from Tehran since Ihe Iran-Iraq cease-lire. Tehran noriotholess is likely lotrong commilment lo Hizballah because Lebanon oilers Ihe best opportunity lor exporting the Iranian revolutionn la attempting lo improve relations wllh olher Arab states.

Other Aeloca

.nt

Qaghdad's growing role in Lebanon has raised new concerns omong moderaio Arabs about Iraqi aggressiveness. Bul Ihoy also wanl lo undercut Syria, and many are at least tacitly supporting the Iraqi crusade aoainst Damascus.)

Saudis ate reviewing options lor Joint Arab action lo headinalt hough

they almost certainly expicT Che'US to lead any such eilort. Meanwfifle. Riyadh is keeping channels open to Damascus and Baghdad while making clear to both sides that it Is unwilling to venture directly Into the Lebanese political thicker

For the time being. Israeli concerns remain focused onand Hi2ballah threats to Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon. Tel Aviv Is not witling to undertake another Lebanonas Indirectly threatened, and it probably will restrict ils support for anti-Syrian Christian forces to money, materiel, ardlacr-intelligence. An all-out Syrian mWtery move ageinst tho Christians, however, would force Israel lo consideraa -moving more troops Into southern Lebanon.

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appears to be little chance (or direct military conllict between Iraq and Syria In Lebanon in thc near term; both prefer to maneuver through proxies. Toof miscalculation, nonetheless could be substantial. Syria almost ceria'nV reauzes" (hat ItS'surrogatcs cannoi defeat the Christians militarily, and It might take direct military action against ihe Lebanese Forces il Ihat mllltla continues to flaunt Its Iraqi aupport.ove would test both Iraqi resolve in Lebanon and

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The other Arab states da*JasVMarVlli resist deeper Involvement but might still be sucked into Ihe Lebanese morass il Syrian-Iraqi tensions Increase markedly or if one side or the other gains significant advantage.inimum, continued foreign meddling by all parties will help prolong the Lebanese political crisis, contribute to delaying elections Indefinitely, and increase the risk ol permanently dividing the country Into Muslim and Christian mlnlsletes."

Students on lhe Frontlinea

Studentsich history ol involverncnt In Burmese politics. Tha country's llrsl twoAung Sanu. got their political starts as leaders ol student groups tBurma's Independence with massive strikes and student protests againstIn. Student riots3 over restrictions ontudent leader byary and Ihe cMstrinytHW. ol the student onionwhich moretudent activist*

Students ioined local demonstrators1 to protest rice shortagesdecline. Last year,tudents look to the streets to protestthat, though aimed at bankrupting black markeieers and Insurgents,most Burmese. Thistreet fight between several students and aIn Rangoon tookie of Its own as the growing crowd of studentsturned their mutual wrathrotest against the government and setOl Often .

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Special Analysis

Lead Civil Unrest

is the seconderies ol S, in Ihe unrest alfecilng Buima.

have traditionally been the catalyst tor changeperiodically Inciting mass demonstrations to ventwith rigid, autocratic governments. Theyunprecedented political gains this year attarby upillion citizens In three months otforcing three consecutive governments tooneptember by Detense Minister Sawledarsh crackdown on protesters, endhot since waned. With schools ordered to closegroups badly tragmented, students probably ere not a Uthree! ia the-J

Although students will continue to push lor Change, thefavor continued peaceful resistance. Most studentslo remain in iho background ond support majorsuch as former General Aung Gyi and formerTin Oa, In their efforts to oust the military

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An increasing number of sludents. however, arc turning to violence as thc only option to force the government lo become more democratic. Burma's largest student-erowpof Its leaders resigned, probablyeaull of Ihe growing militancy ot several factions.H^BBslssBss*'The militants are trying to nrmes snc* are seckliij support (mm insurgent groups Such as the Burma Communist Party and thc Karen National Union. An armed student Insurgency would almost certainly provoke further violent .ion by Ihe Army and could delay promised elections

students align win insurgents, they may alsoedge between themselves and the populace. People have accepted their agitation for change in part because Burmese society accords them high status. Education is the chtnf means tor entry into mldlevel and senior government positions and other professions and is one of the few avenues for achieving success. Communities will often pool resources totudent's exponas* because of the prestige and status ol education. This attitude has perslstectdespiie the facTThrt** most university graduates am unemployed or accept menial jobs with little ic'xrvance to their education

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