Near East and South Asia Review
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Near East and
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Implication* olI'nd co Ih. Iran-Iraq W
end to ihc hostilities will force the two belligerents, key Arab slates, and Israel to search foi new way* io protect their vital interestsore tincerlain cnvironmcni. Over the medium and long term, we believe Ihe risk of another Arab-Israeli war ts increased.I
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Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Jordan's Iliiengigenie-nt From Ihr West Bank ffM
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For King Husseins gambii to pay drvidencSTor the peace process;we behove ibe PLO would ban io respondramatichat would break down barriers io peace talks. PLO leader Arafat is unlikely to makeove ualcas hetrong pccsibilityhange io the US or Israeli position toward PLO participation inWn,
The Saudu have worked lo contain the impact of the Iranianhe region and loossible spillover of ihe Iran-Iraq war. Although Riyadh cautiously welcomes the cease-fire in the Persian Oull. il remains suspicious ofntentions
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The resurgence of Islam in Egyptorce both for instability and in Wny Presideni Mubarak's policy mia ofirmness loward the revival has so far achieved modest success stlrf he prospect of Islamic inspired revolution appears remote
Ubanoa: MUballah at ibe Crottioadf reutla>l
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llirbsllah's c'owthind of violent tcaVK) locompici movement with aspirations lo represent Lebanon's Shiai may be diluting Hin ihc Lebanese polilical cioiionmcrit appeale mvnl 'he niceeassessment of ih< froup's (series. ^B1
Kabul has been pushing polilical. economic, and propaganda programs in Qandaliai designed to expand the regime's base and undermine icsistance support in the region. The effort has largely failed, however, and we believe Qondahar is likely to be the first major city to fall once the Soviet withdiawal is complete ij-flK
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Near Easl and South Asia Review
Articles
egotiated
End to the Iran-Iraq WarJ
believe an end to hostilities between Iran and Iraq will force Ihe two belligerents, key Arab states, and Israel io search for new ways to protect their vim) political and security inlerestsore uncertain and fluid environment Baghdad and Tehran will be likely Tor some time to focus their energies on securing economic and military aid. mainly from ihc West, expanding political influence in thc Gulf, and preserving ooW peace with each other. Gulf Arab states will try to balance (heir relations between Iraq and Iran, giving reconstruction aid to both. Israel and Syria willerious military threat (rom Iraq's powerful armed forces and will face eapanded Iraqi and possibly Iranian involvement In thc Arab-Israeli arena TheTmpael of peace between Iran and Iraq on she Arab-Israeli conflict may be the biggesl question
mark
our view. Increases the risk of another Arab-Israeli war over the medium and long ierm[ol
Iraq and Iran: Capitalizing on Peace
Evenomprehensive peace agreement is reached, Iraq and Iran almost certainly expect lo be lockedold war for the foreseeable future We believe -aw- Baghdad and Tehran will work to prevent the outbreak of hostilities for several years, batand most of iheirwill assume arreihcr war will break out before the turn of the century became of deeply rooted Arab-Persian differences, strong competition for political dominance in the Gulf, and Ihe ideological clash between Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and secularism in Iraq. Neither state, in ouiill be nislied with the outcome of the eight-year war
frag. Irao, clearly see* itselT as victorious in ihc war and is likely to tout iieeir as ihc dominantd poliiical power in the region. Indced.-wc believe Iraq will use victorypringboa rd Vgaf*"lILilsmony in thc Gulf, and President Saddam Herseyn.will espect thc Gulf Arabs to line up txhincT^SgSoaa's political lead. Iraq docs not sec itself indebted to the Gulf Arab' SUIM(orraaierTal nodin the war. On the corUrary. Baghdad consideri,lbc Gulf Arabs indebted to Iraq for preventing the upon of the Iranian revolution to (heir soil. Iraq hastcnilon of repaying thc more than SJ5 billion in aid it received from the Gulf
Iraq will icck regular demonstrations of continued Gulf Arab suppori.tart. It probably will ask for
Pushing lor formal securiij andwiih--perhaps even fullGulf Cooperation Council to giveover Gulf Arab defense andv_
Strengtheningihc Gulfarning to Golf Arab leaderseed Baghdad's directives. Iraq will try to make suit however, ihai these efforts lo weaken ihc Gulf States do not benefit pro-Iranian dissidents.
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An effort to acquire Kuwait's Bubiyun nnd Warbuh Islands, strategically located at ihc moulh of (he Shall al-Acab. and olher disptucd territory alone ihc Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, as partostwar muscle-(leu rig strategy Such efforts arr likeU to succeed only II Iraq uses militarysV
Further afield. Iraq almost certainly will meiie^to settle scores with Syria. which has steadfastly suopOrled Iran ia the war Once peace is secured or Iraq's eastern front, we believeajor effort to dcstaoilJic ibe Assad regime. Iraq may even try to sabotage some strategic Syrian facilities or provoke military tcnviom along the Syrian-Iraqi border, with an eyeutting new pressures on Syria's already stiained economy. The Iraqis probably are conlldcnl thai the Syrians would avoid any response that might leadajor-conflict.
a*cid any response i
Baghdad probably will try to challengeIn the Levant by givins financial andto Palestine Liberation Organizationand his I'nlah group and lo foes ofas theanese Forces militiaIraq will also try to reduce Syria's role-tate with Israel.
Baghdad may evenoderate stance,terms Tor Arab-Israeli negotiations and peace inic engineer in anti-Syrian diplomaticup of Iraq. Egypt. Jordan, aad thc PLObow ever, we believe Iraq'snquestions will become more hard line Werelation between Egypt aad Iraq toaa tbcy jockey for politicaltaaV-Arab
Meanwhile. Baghdad is likely to tuikc at the rebellion) tsurdiengeance alio thc war. Tbc Kurdish rebellion Is likely to collapse and go backuisance status within weeksease-Air. as it did afteftian witlidtew iti support foe Ihe KurdsS as paneal with Saddam ^gas*
- Iraq's post-si stiitMx.piobably will put heavy emphasis on economic reconstruction and expanding commercial and polilical ties to lhe West, including
ihe United States. Wc believe Baghdad will see good relations with Washingtonalance to its close lies id Moscoway to keep the Uniied States from drifting too closely toward Iran. Iraqi leaders probably also liope tint good ties to tbc United Stales will prompt US business investment in Iraq after thc war. particularly in lhe oil exploration and development fields.!
Iran. Iran's postwar strategy is certain to beby internal polilical developments.Speaker Rafsanjani maintainsTehran is likely to seekwith Gulf Arab statesfrom Iraq's polilical coat tails. Gainingaid and reestablishing imir.cj-llinks with Gulf stales will be
Still, Iran probably will provide clandestine Itairrmg and support to dissident Gulf Arab groups and to encourage Shts activists throughout the Gulf to engage in antiresimc activities. The overthrow of Sunn! monarchies in the Gulf willong-term polilical objective of the Iranians. In ihe event Rafsanjani weic pushed aside and more radicalpower,Tehran probably would focus more heavily on spreading Us revolution by sponsoring sabotage snd other subversive operations against Gulf Arab states.
Iran is unlikely to cut back its heavy Involvement in Lebanon and may provide more fundsizballah to increase ils polilical and miliiary options. Although Tehran may be less sensitive lo Syrian objections to ihil support after the war with Iraq is over, Iran will slill need good relations wiih Damascus to ensure thc flow of aims, mateifcl. and personnel to Lebanon
An end to ihe war will noi. by itself, assaucjjfec release of the Western hostages in Lebanon over whom^ran exerts some control Their release depends primarily on Tehran's interest in improving its relations with Washington and olher Western capitals, and Onillingness to give up the hostage card.
SeVrel
There ml* be some increase in Iranian meddling in Alghanisian. bui it will mainlyateriel support to Shis iniuVgeni groups. Tehran could send some Revolutionary Guards to Afghanistan toattlefield for its mofe zealous membeii and. at the same lime, move potential troublemakers out of liaa. but Ihis it much leu likely hajj-JJ-a,
Iranian istctesi in improving relations with the United-Siaies after the war will depend largely on intrrnsTpolitical developments, and the coming io power of radical elements could leadoie hoitilc Iranian policy toward the United Stnici Nonetheless, an endhe war willayor obstaclemproved relations, and wc believe tome Iranian leaders may ice less hostility toward Wsthmglon in Iran's poliiical and economic inicreits Tehran
relations with Washington would help slow further improvement in US-Iraqi relations, which ihey almost certainly want io
Some improvement in Iranian-Soviet relations is likely after the war. but longstanding Iranian suspicion about Moscow's Intentions in southwest Asia as well as deeplyil-Communist sentiment among the Iranian people wet sharp upturn Tehran might offer Moscow scene tJCtsWauic Opportunities in Iran'* reconiiruction program to gain Soviet interest In ibe event ibe West proved unwilling to provide Iran wiih economic and military assistance. Tehran probablyttract an eipsndcd Soviet role (hjffjbj
Tbe Calf Stales:egional iiof Power Gulf Arab states have made tremendous strides over the past eight years in bolstering their militaries and cooperating on security issues. They arc likely to continue lo pursue, evenhese stiatcgici after the war's end |
We believe all Gulf Arab leaders arc deeply suspicious of the long-term regional aims of both Iraq and Iran and sec balanced relations between the two in their best interests. The Gulf slates probably are willing to contribute icveral billion dollarsostwSTfefonffruction fund for both Iran and Iraq, although the amount probably will fall far short of Tehran's and Baghdad'sajor Gulf
Arab financial commiimcniseconstruction fund would greatly reduce ihcir willingness and ability to provide aidther Arab states Still, ihe Gulf stales will provide tome financial assistance lo other Aral capiialtaintain goodHaV
Saudi Arabia, which will continue lo be lhe leader of Gulf Arsb intercut aflcr hostilities end, will almost certainly attempt toath of poliiical balance lween liaO g|
closely witajsracl's main benefactor^Nonethelesi, Ihe Golf Arabs will seek to maintain fundamental security link* to ihe United Stale* afier thc war. both a* insurance in ihe event of icncwed fighting and as a. reminder to Iran and Iraq that Washingtontrong stake in Gulf politica
The Oil Issue: Downward Pressure on Prices An end to the war almost certainly will put downward pressure on oil prices. Psychological factors, particularly market ci pec tat ions lhal both Iraq and Iran will increase production io assist in reconstruction, willey role in price movements. The stability of the market will depend on how OPEC accommodates the demand by both countrics lo increase eaports.jMsl'l
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Of lhe two belligerents. Iraq is mere likely lo increase lis oil production subitantially- Wp.oel;cvc Baghdad willixutductiarffli nfiec'i ji possible without disrupting the oilould easily miscalculate, however, leading to increased production by other OPEC members and mote pressure on prices Oil prices, incenario, could fall to lest thaner bai - tfjf j
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ater deterioration ot dan's oil sectO! duiinc lhc war limits iii ability to inciease production dramaticallyime Tchrait-araJiiiorulKuih foi OPCC production restraints lo remIraq end" shore up pekcv Moreover, ihc promiseultibillion dollar reconstruction fund -ill encourage oil policy moderation by lian so as noi io antagonize Gulf benef. janaa.
Tbc Arab-Israeli Arena: Israel end Syria See Problems
Israel and Syriaainly arc alarmed about lhc potential consequences of an end to lhe Itjnlraq war In addition to Iraq's large,quipped, and ball Ic-hardened standing army, its long-range ballistic missile aad &ghur bomber capabilitiei arc viewed by both Tel Aviv and Damascus as security threatsemporary modus Vivendi between lian and Iraq tbat Treed Up some Iraqi military assets, in our view, would be disconcerting to the Iwielis and ibe Syrians. There almost certainly will be less Israeli aad Syrian consternation about Iran's postwar agenda, although Tehran's iroublcmaking capabilities in Lebanon and.esser client, among Palestinian* will be
A.riii. Despite the Iraqi menace. Ibe Syrians arclo try to mend femes with Baghdad iRTnfc aC near termneither contritionharp revessaiolicy is in keeping with President Assad's personal style To countei any Baghdad-mounted subversive cirort. Damascus will crack down harder on its
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iai foe* and increase ppon Ulraqitfccm ioibvetsivc campaign agiihtiayn't, regime. Aivad wouldai of subvcmon urd urtofiim iomiluary eoofrontaiion j
Aildeisceral disdain for Saddam. Atsud will Mill tee poliiical and economic benefit in ctoic relations with Iran la particular. Damascus will tec good iclaiiom with Iran at insurancehowdown in Lebanon bclween Syria and HirbalUh. which would undermine Syrian efforts io engineer Lebanon't political reconstruction Thc Syrians probably also believe thai an improvement In Iran's post-war economy will kadradual increase in economic assistance from Tehran Dcspilc Its economic hardihips dunng the war. Iran provided Syria with gratis andssionatt oil shipment! io keep Damascus in Iran's
ImpBcaliotrs foe US Interests
An end to Ihe war will have several positive near-term benefils for US interests indle Ea.il. In addition to reducing the iok to US naval forces and commercial shipping in lhe Persian Gulf, it willihe free flow of oil from ihe Persian the West.
Reduce military threats io Gulf Arab stales.
ayor obstacle to improvement in US-Iranian relatioai. ^_
Reduce ihe threat, at least temporarily, o' ihe eiport from Iranilitant brand of Islamic fundamental! tm thati US focui
But aa end io the war will aboumber^ftvonal developments and trends thai ma> pose itsk* To US interests over the medium and longIn
addition io ther ho* an end to lhe
fcet Iran's internal politics and foieign polio.
tome* major trouble spoil ihat we sec on then
include
likely pursuit of poliiical and military hegemony in ihe Persian Gulf and beyond. Gulf Arab states.eventually look io the Unned Slates (or pioieclion Ironi Baghdad
rricuoa beiwcen Irao and Syria, which could developayor poliiical and military stugfot between two Arab heavyweight*.
Eirumekd Iraqi involve me Bi in Arab-Israeli itsae*.hieh probably will complicate ArabelTorts tonited posilion on terms for peace lalkt as Syna, Egypt, aad Iraq purine differ eaind
Hem pes by Iran to increase its influence with Afghan. Lebanese, and Palestinian group*ay io keep alive its long-term aim ofMimic revolution io other state* in-ibejcg-.ori
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The Arab-Israeli Peace Process;ement From ihe Wrti Bank
Jordan's discngacement Trom Palestinian affairs has given the Arab-Israeli peace process its most serious jolt in many years. King Hussein wants" to put aside, at least temporarily, the "Jordanian option" albatross and secure his political base in thc East Bank. One factor in the liming of tbe announcement probablyesire to give tbe neat US administration time to developnew game plan feu getting peace talks under way. For Hussein's gambitay dividends for lhe peace process, we believe the Palestine Liberation Organiialion (PLO) must respond with its own dramaticexample, acknowledging it needs Jordanegotiating partner, accepting UN, or even recognising Israel's right towill break down immediate batrieis to peace talks. Caution is PLO Chairman Aiafat's hallmaik. however, and he is unlikely toofd course unless he detects the strong pcosibiliiyhange in either lhc US or thc Israeli position toward PLO participation in negotiations.
The nine-month-old Palestinian uprising, King Hussein's recent decision to disengage, and coming elections In Israel and the United Stales have made Arab sPaXaMMVPhardliners even leu willing to make concessions on peace process issues, and meat players see the
Israeli and Arab players, particularly the PLO. need timejp son out the impact of Jordan's withdrawal from Palestinian affairs snd find ways to keep the security situation in the occupied territories from deter lorn ring in tbe coming months. I
Strategies and Concerns ef Key Play. Jordan King Hui_jCinjMi adopted an "Easi Bank first"'"j-*nii lo protect Initial meal base at home and prevent the Palestinian uprising Irom spilling cner to Jordanian territory
The disengage mem. in our view,actical move designed, in pan, to force thc PLOake ils own
initiatives for incslmcai in peace talks The King has dearly signaled thai it rt theesromibility to ^wtoctteslmiae rmerrns in the territories during
ibe uprising and ihai Amman is notlame for
unfulfilled Palestinian political and economic
opcctatioeu
Thc King is not optmg oat of the peace process. He almost certainly believes Arafal will fail to consolidate his influence in thc West Bank and Can Strip, forcing the PLOTb turn back eventually toward Jocdan for cooper st*tiin Me believes he has dumped thc onus foroward negotiations squarely in the laps of ihc PLO. Israel, and live Uniied States.
Despite hu pullback Irom lhe Wen Bank, we believe Huiaetn'* banc peace proccu foaK remain unchanged;
An intf rnaiional conference, leading lo direci aegotialioos bclween Israel and Aiab panics
A react seillemeni Ihai satisfies minimum Palestinian demands foe lelf-deicrmmaiion but prevents the ernctgenceilitant. rrredeoiiV Palesiinian stale
Wc believe Hussein is now willing to entertain any formula lor Palestinian repr escalation ia negotiation-lhal would preclude the participation of radical clement* hostile to Jordan He almost cenainly is confident that Israeli objections would wexk to ihis end.
Tke PLO.JJv-tPLO undoubtedly is more eonterredwith howoingake up the Jordanian gauntlet in the territories thin with bioadc* peacecllions Arafat's firs) priority iscquire funds to icplace the terminaied Joidanian expenditures and gain broad Palestinian support.olitical response io Hussein's action ai ibe scheduled meeting o' the Palestine National Council will be another major challenge.
Arafat's piopentity to avoid ntky moves that might thrraicn his leadership weighsiamalie initiative ai the meciing. Bui he may decide loses ap alhe certain insiabihiy of'mvitJ the likelihood of even greater PI Oa wayegilimitc his own standing in ihc West Bui enhance thc Pl.O's internalredibiliiy. and strengthen thease foeeace lalhs
pparent I
Although Joidan's disengagement has eclipsedithin the PLO over lhe'concilia to*ilalcment on Paleitmian ictatsoav with Isiact drafted bylieutenant Abu Sharif th* P
Foreign Minister Percy's Labor Pariy has beenevere Wow by Hussein's disengage men I. at il undermines the "Jordanian option" that has served as the foundation stone of Labor's peace process pisiform. Unless the PLO'and Jordan reconcile their differences or the King dtamatically reasserts his lesponiibility for the West Bank. Labor probably will have lo go tack lo the drawing board next yeai and Iry to patchew strategy.
Syria. Syrian President Assad almosl certainly sect Hussein's new tack as favorable lo Syria's posilion. as it weighs heavily against separate peace talks between Israel and Jordan- Moreover, ihc success of Syrian-supported PLO dissidents in pushing Arafat's forces out of Beirut earlier this year has encouraged Syria to continue ils strategy of trying to gain .control ol the PLO by weakening Arafat's base of opetatirms. Damascus probably also will encourage its Palestinian surrogate* to ilei up their activities in (he West Bank aad Cau lo try lo counter thc Influence of Arafat's Fatah group.
A major feature of Assad's peace process strategy Is his insistence that Arab* be representednified delegation at an international peace conference.ng'as the PLO Is not subservient to Syria, Assadlikely to continue to Insist onelegationay to preserve some Syrian Influenceesolution of the Palestinian problem.
We believe Syria retain*
fnegotiating
processes that do not fully lake into account Syrian
interest* or attempt to circumvent Damascus. Syria probably will also Iry to work more closely with Jordan on Arab-Israeli issues to fuel Arafat's suspicions of Jordaniancollusion in an ami-PLO campaign.
The So*kt Reaction
Moscow has not, a* yet,tand on King Hussein's decision to renounce Jordan's responsibilities for the West
Jonelheless,
Moscow probably is concerned ihat"lhe PLO may eventually be discredited, as It fails to live up to the porrtfcsl and economic expectations of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
In any event, wc believe ihe Soviet* will remain committediheir minimum demand that peace negotiations lake place under the framework of on international conference. In the waning days of the current US Administration, the Soviets are unlikely lyjlcaiaie from longstanding positions and probably will wait lo see how Hussein* gambit plays out before making any adjustments to their peace process strategy.
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Krwtr P'wl
Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Iran Policy 4
initially minimizing ihe potential threat of ihc Iranian Revolution, ihc Saudi, csrefull) workedoniain in Impact in ihe region and. laler. ioossible spillover of lhe Iran-Iraq war. They gained aeai regional unanimity on policy toward lhc war. provided financial and logistic supportaghdad's war efforts, and helped to convince the Westxpandnaval presence in the Tetsjan Quit to plot eg ncuttal shipp-ngaaflaasaHHMMBManl aaatna^Slgaj*. audi Arabia largely avoided military clashes with lian. primarily by limiting its naval presence in the Gulf, shunning cc* front at tonal situations, and imposing restrictive rules of engagement on Ihc Saudi Air Force and Navy. Allhough thc Saudis cautiously welcome thein the Gulf, they remain suspicious of Iranian intentions and will move slowly to reestablish tics
Initial Saudi Reaction In Ihe Iranian Re.olutlon The mleries of events that toppled the Shah look ibe Saudis by surprise. Ing Riyadh " "'" unsuccessfully gambled lhat the Shah could withstand spreading unrest and. to boost his stature among the Iranians, publicly stressed Saudi Support
DV V lhe Shah fled Iran in earlylhen Crown Prince Fabd openly portrayed the Shahe lender of Islam Riyadh's inula) concerns about llie relativcl) unknown Ayatollah Khomeini were eased by thc appointment of tbc provisional government under moderate Prime Minister9
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Despite the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran and the fall of the Baurgan regime inhe Saudis remained optimistic that ihc Iranian Revolution would evcniualfy evolveore moderate direction.
"cover, Riyadh calculated lhat Iran under
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Khomeini would help io stem the spread of Communism In the Middle Fast and that, in any event, Khomeini was the only viable alternativeower grab by the pro-Soviei Tudeh Party asPtskss
The Saudis also miscalculated lhe intensity and impact of lian's revolutionary teal, thinking thai Khomeini's fierce rhetoric was laricB for internal consumption9fcned to ignore Khomeini's barbxand Tehran's publk calls for Saudi Sbias in the Eastern Province to revolt. In0 Crown Prince Fabd publicly slated thaU skat were "no aaablcms" with Iraa, and in February of the same year the Saudisoken level of iclief aidictims of Hooding in Iran's Kliuiestan ^ both ccasions the Saudis had hoped soiheir desire for an improvement inions, but the Iranians did noi reapond in fr
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I: The vVarBefjnav ^
rally lookow-key. noncommillal stance
I the Iran-Iraq war _
J^beylear-cut victory by
either side would make Ibe winner tbe* '
NevertheleHrthe war did leadapid-shift in ibe Saudi position regardingtccuriry. Riyadh, which had esehewed lhe Shah's proposalsotlcciivc security pact, became thc main proponent of the formation of ihe six-nation Gulf Cooperaiion
Council inhe Saudii viewed the groupinga mechanism iT* laohtatc greater cooperation on internal securityore vilified foreigrrVolicy In Ihe face of Iranian JBKteision.
I Mi Apprehension Sett In An uiHuoceraful coup ailempi in Bahrain in1 by pro-Iranian Shias ended Riyadh's general eomploeency about Iranian intentions toward ihe Gulf states. The Saudi strongly suspected ihat Tehran was responsible for ihc plot
'--disalio began io increase
eoonom.ca.el to some less wealihy Gulf stiles to slave on Possible Iranian inroads and bolster friendly
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JTie Saudis were deeply .roublcd when Iranian troops cr^eWbJraq, .erriioey fa, ,he fi.-ai time in July
ecided io siep up support
rother" Arab countrytrong bufferwecMhe Arabian Peninsula and Iran
lOga: Tbe War
The Saudi response to attacks by Iran on neutral Gulfbegan in4 in retaliation foracks on Iranianlo seek diplomatic coadtmnaiion"of Tehtan. In part due to Saadi lobbying, the Arab league in May isiued an appeal to Iran to cease ils atucks againsi "Arab deals' In the Gull. The following month a
* Ila In Ontmt piailn i. a>
mis lim.m
ministerial level meeiing of lhe Gulf Cooperation Coaacilommunique condemn! nf, Irani activities. Althouih neither statement altccd Iran's policies, they did provide Riyadheasure of political tupcCTi^Htj
Tbc prcapects of an Iranian-Saudi conflictin4 after Saudi Idown ann Saudi airspace.sought to limit tbe impact of thedid not even publicly praise the violence ofAir i
InSn bier Saud visitedfirst high-ranking Saudi official to visitcame toprogress was mproving
iyadh Begins To Reassess Its Strategy eyl9H5 thender no illusion that ihe Cooperai^olmcil or ihird-Mriy efforts to reduce tensions would
ByWlowing Iraq's loss of the Al-FawSaudis had be^omtMnviodedontinuation of the wa, would directly threaten their national interest flMBMSBtfa'ajMgAH^^u
Riyadh concluded lhe war was
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to weaken Iraq militarily and economically,ntually Baghdad would noiiabjc buffe between Ion and ihe Arab Gulf:
tougher stand toward Tehran gradually look shape
Apparently at s" result of ihit reassessment, the Saudis organ to more directly aid the liaqi war elfori. In6 Iraqi aiicisft that had attacked Iranian oil facilities st Laiak Island refueled ai Dhahran Air Base on their iciurn
e use of ihc t
Iraqis the Saudis hadequest Irons Ihem for contingency assistance. Riyadh increased economic aid to Baghdad as -ell
Thc Saudis alsoore active US mijiiary commitment in the legion. Tbcy enthusiastically welcomed the arrival of US warships in thc northern Persian Gulf inome Saudi officials initially were concerned thai the leilagging of Kuwaiti tankers in7 would espand the war.
, successfully moved to limit the presence Iranians ai this yen's Majj In March, the Organization of the Islamic Conferenced -suggested resoluiion lhal asserted Riyadh's right io take the necessary measures to prevent^ icpeti'.ion of7 violence. Thendocied the rsiabliihmeniuota of pile rims from each country; the Saudis argued lhal sT^ limitation on lhe number of peoplenecessary ecause con sit net ion ia Mecca limited ibe availableuota of *SPQ0 Iranian pilgrims was sabsequcrity announced by the Organization,"but Tehran eventually boycotted lhc Hai).claiming Iranian pilgrims were being prohibited rrom attending Mgft
baaipcrated by Iran's behavior, thc Saudis severed diplomatic relationspril Tbc Saudis saiddeaiaierr-was-basedori Iran's role in7 Mecca riots, the sacking of iheir embassy in Tehran, and Iranian obstruction of freedomhc
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Riyadh has publicly welcomed ban's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution S
ihc Saudis will
Evenease-fire is success'ul cojitinuc to regard IranIn security]
Over the near term, scveial faciors are Jikely to influence tbc pace and cxu.nl of any possibleledge by Tchrannot lo disrupt next year's Hajj or to abide by ils quota wouldtrong signal-to Riyadh of Tehran's.desue for be!
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lbc etiremi
Al Jihad (Holy Wart iv among hit command good Muslims toilitary cell of ihc groupI. Similarly inspired
Mr ike at lhe gc killed Presiden assassination aformer Ini known for shai
Itlam influence* Egypt't puiilSct ia tappcr-ite direct>oni On the one hand. Ihe Utamit resurgence in ill imlitam form breeds politiCdli ihicatent leaden* lives, undermine) governmcni legitimacy, focuses duseni. and provide, chanrek for external subversion On ihe other hand. Warnemontiiated capacity to promote liability Egyptian Islam -ch at unifier, ccuintelor of patience, and safetyforditronieni
ifidaniruialitt*advan the6 police itou by-direcuni:ganut nightclub* and ban
More broadly, the Islamic resurgence it doiabilirirg in lhal Itlam't tenet*eaiunng Kick by
Prendeni Hotni Mubarak* policy mil of accommodation and firm run* toward the revival hat ihui far achieved modcn success Quality Islamic social serviceseneficial supplement to government efforii. and the limned inclusion of Islamic activists i> ih* political proeci* hat helped isolate themat* While Islamac revival it indeed changing the face of Egypt,crspeei of aItlamM inicredtaw appears
gyplS Islaauk Play*.*
Islam promitc* piospe'ilv to ihc failhlul individual and community Poverty among the dc.out and the breakdown of family lysiemi canbe blamed on an un-lslarmc lysicm
Discrepancies between code-rooted civil law and Islamic law conflict with the belief ihat government's ultimate purpose is io promote Allah'* plan af justice.
Iilam picitcs ugamvl perceived social evils luch a* alcohol, dancing. puWit affection, and non-Islamic drei*.
Foreign policies are von-jlobal Islam Egypt's relation* wiihthui tu leiioon with the
Egypt's Ifesurgence it far fromirfTiWto eruemrer-rhe legitimacy of thefundimenuliti oueti (or pure failh and practice v*> only one of many Islamic trends impactingand public affair* Other active trendsmynical oidctt and lhe governmcni -
Fundamentalist themielvci may agree on thc goal of an Islamic oidei. bui Ihey differ on lactiet. and slialrgy The Muilim Diotheihood. Egypt's oldest and largest lundamcntalisi society, now advocate* patient development of an Islamic society that in torn will gradually pictt lot Itlamic government Bymilitant groups generally advocate theforceful installation of Islamic governmeni. which can thenure Itlamic order J
Aspect*
Egypt's Tsfltltk fcsurgcrcc "toila* tortured group* ihai
The Islamic resurgence can also challenge political stability by servingallying point To. dissent originatingariety of sources. Striking respamise chords throughout Egyptian society. Islam hasrimary ijecjogical challenge to the Mubarak tr, *
Amidst the icsurgencc, Islamic institutions thai prewide duality social services thc gwernmew esnrsot or "ill oat provide arcarallel order ihat we believe weakens public confidence in. and reliance on. the state Such effective "pmpagsnda byorries many observers who* re-volution byhese critioj fear the Egyptian Governmeni may tailor policies to appease Islamic pressure to the point of
A further shiftore orthodoi Islamic society may desubiliie matteis by alarming Ihe Coptic Christian community. Urbanjeeiaiian violenceemonstrated thrcil
Finally, Islamic institulions can be disruptive by providing channels of support for nations and groups seeking to alter or weaken the Egyptian state. The Muslim Brotherhood maintains extensive contacts throughout the Arab world, and oil money from Persian Gulf states provides significant support for Islamic ventures in
The Cositiie Side
I dam's serviceoderating force in Egypt stems in pan from its positive attitude toward government. The Koran's counsel to "obey those in authority over >cnj" isradition of labeling disobedience sinful mm
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White legitimate aulhceity is supposed to serve Allah.
1 gsptun Islam has long given Ihe bene fit of ihc doubt to tie ruler, given ihc perceived alternative of anarchy. Islamic militancy thus ironically tcgitimirei eiisling structures by making the stale appear as thc dike agaiast
Egypt's pervasive, state-con trolled (cligioui institutionseliable support for thTsntem Official Islam has been mobilitcd to compete
of si ale-directed preaching has improved, and *debates wiih radicals eshibiimuscles on ihc pan of theAbAzhar. the establishment'sand center of Islamic learning, stands Outcontinued counsel of patience. As thcforemost religions university. Al Atrial is
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Wg believe Egypt's growing Sufi orders are another force forystical Islamic tradition well rooted in Egypt. Sunfrom outward deceptions fosteis toleration for lhe earthly statin quo Yet Sufi quietism can emerge in pious action This duality is apparent in Sufi determinationp;-vie and undercut violent fanatics with worldly good works. Sulis quietly operaf thc .Islamic service eiplosron,*
Tb* Coin's Ldgc: Whithrr tgypl? Mubarsk's two-lfack strategy toward the Itlarrvc resurgence accrxnrnodates oadcrl) Islamists and cracks down firmly againsi firebrands The Muslim Oroihrrhuod is lacilly allowed io participate In politics, partly lo keep members above ground and partly in cipcciation of their cooperation against the militants Mubarak probably also anticipates that public airing of tbe Islamists" specific agenda will expose ihe inadequacies and diminish the appeal of their programs With orderimeorkmooth reconciliation
Potentialey question isIslamistsrediblesjgasfr . ifcraise lhe suspicion of "wolves in
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Time may also work against Mubarak. If the Islamic resurgence* is largely driven by economic and social frustration, then ihc delay of economic reforms in order io prevent Islamic-generaled protest may. in ihc long run. be self-dcicaiin
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19
*y
Wi,4om aft "MuMM" Rtipentr.of Islamic,oilolippery slope lownid an ultimate"indecisive^ middle cc-flseand all-out suppression seemstoday ai'shrewdrgj
Time and public eiposerc bare yielded greater soul-(carchini among citizens abooi ihe proposed radical Islamic altenvativci. Mais weariness of loud, c'licmisi behavior is evident in increased lolerance of constricted civil liberties and In willingness to slate securiiy agencies of radical activity1 ^sWsasssgakgfasiaar'a lively public debate lhat reflects the comtiitudcs of ibe polilical culture toward religion's role in Egypt. Emotioni run strong, bul unintimniated debate is reducing aairety iMBI
While Islam is aa increasingly try component ia ihe definuion ol the Egyptian political culture, it is not lhe only component. The Pharaonic legacy, for eiample, still commands apathetic salutes to ihe ruler and his coltoris. islamic appeals are rsot likely to supersede such historic stabilizing strengths as a
largely homogeneous society, pervasive bureaucracy, and omnipresent, well-equipped security lorces Stated differently, citizen attachment is more to the Egyptian nation than lo thc greater Islam.
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Wc believe Egyptians may very well adapt ihc Islamic resurgence into some thirst recogniiably "EgyptianEgypt's dominant natiorsal instinct continues to comprehend that the quest for perfect punly is unattainable An increased Islamic ianpaint on Egyptian society does not Inherently make il less stable. Ratherword spelling doom, (be Islamic revival mayey Egyptian span over present troubled waters JflHat.
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i
i
Hizballah al (he Crossroads -MM',
*"Tk(3)
rowthand of violcnl zealotsomplex movement with sspirationi to represent Lebanon's-Sbia* may be diluting 'if otrcmi.nl Ai Ihe same lime, changes In lhe Lebanese political environment are selling lhe stageccsamination of Ihe group's poliiical tactics, particularly (cirocitm Hiiballah has not abandoned or disavowed its self-proclaimed goal of establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon, bui the implementation ofine remains distant. Although wchat no iubsiiniial change will be discernible in lhe short term, we suspect that changes may occui in thc group's relations with Syria and position on participation in the Lebanese political reform process that could mean il is reassessing ils tactics jBHp- -
Hiiballah during Ihc past year hasdisorienting developments that(he fundamental is Is* need to takeThe growth of its military arm asmounted increasinglyagainsi pro-Israeli militias in
kidnaping by ils miliiiamcn of an American mllllsty oflker assigned lo Uniicd Nations duty in souiherf Lebanon in February
erious military and political setback in ihc southApril as Amal. the pro-Syrianl Shia miliiia. forced Hiiballah miliiiamcn lo lay down ihcir arms after weeks of ihaip fighting
A stunning turnabout in the southernol BeirutMay when Hirballah lighter* trurjJ. defeated Amal.
A spectacular aiihoer hijackingin Mayihatithout tbe hijacker* being punished for their actions but no nearer lo realinng thei- giul*
' The entry of Syrian peacekeeping force* in early June intotronghold In Beirut" southern luburb*.
defeat in July of an important ally, (he pro-Arafatinlani. Inipt of Wen Beirut b> ihe pro-Syrian Palestinian forces of Abu Muta
Hiiballah's Itlaatic RepublicLAn EfoiKit no good blueprint for conniuciing aIran, lhe only existing cxarmple ofoor model for Hispallari lo follow
It ishal the political upheaval that preceded and followed tbc fall of the Shah can be replica led in Lebanon Tbe Lebanese poliiical sy*(cm i* Isccd wiih instability, bui the condition* thai enabled Iran's Shiasverlhrow lhe sysicm simply do not etisi in Lebanon. Iran is almosier eeoi Shut bui Lebanon Shia*lci percentage of (he population.
There nir lubstantial theological differences bclween Hiiballah cleric* and Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of Iran's Islamic Mite Tbc difference* arc rooted indivergent threads of modern Shia theology: an avowedly activist school represented by Khomeini and ihc "Line af ihe Imam"rcmitt school represented by Lebanese clerk Shaykh Muhammad Husaynguiding spirit afhi*raqi Ayotallah* Hikim Kho> and Bakr-Sadr
The Iranianitte comaUM4|emenli of Iranian nationalism lhal are not applicable lo Lebanon"*For example, ihe suppression of religiousas thein Iran is not
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IB
rcpeatablc in Lebanon with ils diverstis of powerful Islamic arid Christian religious seel* Similar!', cultural I'adttons like thc iTcoxtlriaa fesln-al of No Ru.bicb are powerful espuVstion- of Iranian nationalism aad historical unity, are absent from Lebanon
w
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Lebanon is occupied by its neighbors.of the country) and Israel HO per cents,an
public statements and scholarly works.conclude lhat Fadlallah recognizes lhal Lebanese power politics, militia-stylc means ihe establishment of an Islamic republic requires far more than ils mere proclamation (flflKl
conclude that henecessity ofay to mamiain Lebanondiversity within an IslamicFadlallah apparently considers Lebanoncreation of Furopesn imperialism, he hasitAbolitioaolilical entity Hefor an cad to the "sectarianed for majority rule -wh-shSb^as substantial political power Belihc implementation el Islamic law. andto convince Lebanon's Christians that anwould noi be hostileheiro their miliiias, he has smd lutlc .ibout theof
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We speculate that FadlalUh's long-term progratts for establishing on Islamic republicour pafl-strategy. Thc views he expressed in his book.jfjra'ri ontf iht Conctfl of Power, indicate he seestep toward an Islamic republic as the creation of an Islamic political,cortsciousncssjoiong the country's Shia masses. Thc second <ugc is ihc for matior-
Band fc-3
The diifercnccs between an Islamic ti.nr as conceived by Fadlallah and Khomeini's Iran, nevertheless, strongly suggest lhal I'adlallah's polilical philosophyess extreme and siill heavily influenced by his Iraqi memo" Lialikc Khomeini. fadlallalTar thai he ewes not tbiak that Shia clerics should head the liaal say ewer political aaiough he clrarlytate based on Islamicnidenee. he does not appear to favor the notion lhat Khomeini, as thc alleied representative of the vanished llth Imam, shouldigher authority than other polilical aciois.,
modify it or to disband the oisiing replace it wjili an Islamic republic.
li.ing With Syria
We believe Fadlallah *ecs Hizballah's relationship wuh Syria as increasingly central to ihe movement's coeuaued arowib le ihe put. Hiiballah has irhed emtrategic ties to Damascusayor element in managing ils own rclaliortihip with the Syrians Wc speculate ihai Hizballah will begin to rely less on Iran as an Intermedials following lhc cease-fire in lhei and have more frequent and higher level contacts with Syrian olticuV In ouretter relationship with Dimjuui could banelii Hizballah b> reducing^ Ihc likelihoodonlronialion with Damascus and bv offering pMcnliJt polilKal leverage agjiim Amal. The willingness of Fadlallah ioimned Syrian nrcKne- in tlirbullah's Beirut stronghold and
1
Shaykk Muhammad Husayn fadlallah
k ebejuioanon anepublic Wt told that Man, carrifi within it iht Idta at got'nmtnt. a< dnei any nonrtligious ideolovor thi, thinking to bt transformedolitical rralinas of liftosition of power rrgulrts" mart than fust slogans Iven local political slips art net snff-crnt ttethtr. it lakes mans factors, among which Is to kevr tht motoriiy further lki< idea, net mtrth adhere tois insympetk, wuk 'fRfc
kink ihat the idea of an Islamic rtfiublle, like lhe idra of Marxism, does not enfoyan overwhelming majority in lis favor within the Lt^ane'te artna. Not tven the majority of Muslims supports an Islamic banvtn internal situation, the existence of different efWtmuniiits. thr complexity of lhe Ijrbanesr problem as well as the regional and imernaiionol situation, where decisions rtsnternlnt Lebanon are mode, all neither allow not out in ihe irantformetion of tht Idea of an Momre republic into
Shaikh Muhammad Husayn
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meeting wiih Stuart Pre*ldeni Assad in Damascus lasl month suggest* thai Fadiallah't ftnii.inwrtiil.it ideology is no hindrance to living with the realiiies of power in Feb- unfff* 1
The Syrian public account of Assad'* meetirg with FadUUah imniioily rccognitcd If iiballah/sstature io Lebanese politic* Stria- coaxcrnthe jfoientially turbulent political environment before Lebanon'* comini prcaxJential election ma, havead to ran* the issue of Hizballah's political rote in Lebanon Given hi* pan bchavtor. Fadlallah probably wouldarger political role for himself, if it were oucrcd. but would implicitlyeal with Syria, Fadlallah'* emphasis on his religious role is intended to hide Ins
Hiiballah'* Crossroad
Fadlaiiahmeeting with Assadikmirsa ihe faasdarncnulms mvrsi confrorai as ibeyio implement tVir visionew Lebanon, should <hc> work wuhm the entimg political system' To do *o. Ihc status ouo rishs undcrcuiting the group's Islamic rredcnitali and make* It possible for others to blame
of Hizballaha purcl) leriurist otganiiationwi coniiiwiag calls (or ihc releaser> on humanitarian ground* may help dntancc hrnljom some ol Hizballah's less lavoty activities.
Outlook
Iii our view. Hizballah Is (tearing decisions on how to proceed lo establish an Islamic republic and th* cucni io which ihe Shia fundamentalist! should engage in ihe cuireni politicaley indicator of Huballah's pragmatism will be the group's willingness io participateolitical reform process in Lebanon afier the per^iekraial eleciioai-Alilsw.il> Fsdlillah his claimed that the system itselfis the cause of Lebanon't problems, we suspectegard talks aimed si restructuring lhe system as worthy of his participation, particularly if be can position Htrballah as the reT*rcscntaliv* of Lebanon's Shiai. Wc believe ihai fiewlll conclude Ihai It'-tiStd be unwise for Hiiballah io itlow Amal io portray itself as (he only spokesmaa for Lebanon's Shiat
ove by Hizballah would abo please Syria. Svrwa-Hizballah frict-owi arc crttaia to continue hotrpanagedwell by Assad
Hizballah for the shortcoming! of the politicalparticipating ruta ll harder fori>nircv
W< relieve thai Hizballah, although reluctanturilcipalc In the Lebanese political syucm, it unwilling lo forgo future participation To participate, however, il alraoH certainly mail distance itacK flora hi terroriit put. Although Hizballahubstantial bate ofnvolvement in terrorismajor obstacle to beoadening Its mf ueoce. particularly amongstove lOulhcrnShlai. many of whom arc doggedly loyal lo
Hl/ballahn traniition betweeni(ar) political buicaiacracy and positioning itself as the representative of Lebanon's Shias. in our view The Inira-Shla fighting thii spring in southernwhere Amal badly bloodied Hiiballah -and in WestHiiballah out overdemonstrated thai the fundamentalists, although ihcv have created an impressive militia, have not yd suppliaicd Amal. The miacd results alio suggest that Hilbullab's ptogress, although significant, may have
as much WJo with Amai's poliiical shortcomingsfr* Stillbound'
with HitbatliM appeal In any case. Hirballlb it not and radlallahclose lo supplanting lhe more mod era le Amal on ihe national poliiical scene
hristianc suspect that if Hiiballah decides toole representing Lebanon's Shiai ia the pottiicalihc movemeni may well parallel Ihc course lhe Chfistian Lebanese Foices militia bat taken. Thai group bat remowd much of lb* stigma of its alleged involvement in terrorism and ils lies to Israel by alliances with some Arab slates and circumspect behavior. Fadtallah's meetings wiih Assad could be harbingers otXbangc so Hiiballah't sometimeiwith Syria, ihe mosi important Arab player in Lebanon.ubli iiatccttnt ihai bostages in Lebanon iho,ld not be puniahed foi Ibe showdown of Iran Air Rightby the US Navy may also help alter perceptions
We would nui cipeei Hirbvllah to abandon ihe venerable Lebanese political practice of holding ben'agci NeveriyclcM. if llir-alijy proceeds along ii* protnt course suspect ihcpolitical liability of holding Western hostages will gradually conic IP be seen at Outweitl nig lhe benefits oblami'd ^jjj '
Neiihcr wouldballah to complciely or rapidly ahundon ils use of tcirorism. V'c believe airline hijackings are possible at long as key Hiiballah oAeials seek to free relatives held earrtkru in Kuwait W*owever, that the gioup'i reliance on icrrnnsm ssiTl decline if il makes peotrcUC towardegitimate political iaoi
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II Hizballah'she Lebaneseglows, it could precipitate splits inRadicals such at Nasrallah otMujhniyalj might quit the organization. InHizballah to far hai been lurpnsmgly freefactionalism,ove lowaidm the political ivilem couldihit hive lain dormirt There areand regional loyalties among Hiiballahit tome point could develop into important(3)
We suspect that under the surface of agreement on policy issues, there are differing views on tbe ox of terrorism and on the importance of ties with Iran and Syria that could split the group. HirbalUh lerrmiiii could break away ham lhesuspect that some may already have done so Western and Arab observeri of Lebanese affairs have speculatedbout competing pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian tendencies in thc organization If Iran substantially reduces its support for Hizballah, there could be more serious internal differences over how the group should weighi its relations with distant, although sympathetic. Iran versus close and powerful Syria
a*.
Afghanistan: Limits of kabut'i Influence
^
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We believe the Kabul regimes poliiical.ecoawra-i. and propaganda programs inAfghanistan's second largest city before Ihe warbeen designedxpand Ihe regime's base ,md undermine resistance suppon in ihe region. Octe-ie ils effort i. however, ihc cny hasenter of opposition Kabul's head on the region has grown increasingly tenuous since Sovici forces wiihdic-from ibe city in early Augustj
Qandahar. the caprial of Qandahar Province. Isbe Ihe firsi major city lo fall to ihe resistanceSoviet withdrawn! is complete Thehas faced in us poliiical andin Qandahar are Symptomatic ofthroughout Afghanistan Thc failureptogiams, along with tbc intenseIhe ruling People's Democratic Parlyhas convinced us that thealmost certainly will fall within tii toa Tier ihe completion of
if
'"Gatewayhe South"
Before tbe Soviet invasion, Qandahar City hadnhabitantsCuireni population stands0 according to presiwas southern Afghanistan's main center of commerce and agriculture, providingercent of lbc cmuMry's dried fruit and servingransit po-ni foi much of its foreign trade. Qandahar Province was thc humc of several Pasblun tribes, including ibe Durrani, lhe ruling tube until1 Comma ml coup, and lhe rival Ghilui t'ibe to which many founders ol ihe People's Democratic Party ol Afghanistan belonged.
Since lhe Soviet invasionhc Qandahar region has been ihc site of almost coniinuouo fighting. Reeeni estimates in the regime press indicate thaiet cent of ihe boosing in Qandahar cny hat been desuoyed. Qandiharrt contend the desiruction it
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he roads in Qandahar have lias been damaged. Moreover, many villages throUGhoui Ihe province have been rayed and half ihe schools deslroycdstimates lhalillion Afghans have fled Qandahar Province during ihc war.
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In Search of Friends and Influence Kabul's chief goal in Qandahar.n mince- popular support for the resistance. To do tbb. lhe regime has employed various tactics.ooing local leaders wiih gifts and influence, canning tribal lies bclween leadeis of the ruling party and lite locals,tautgjnjliury
Economic Incentives
In hopes of increasing popular support for the regime. Kabul pubhcly claims io have channeled several
4?
dollais into Qandahar Province for the rccor.stiuciionof roads, schools, hospitals, nnd houses.
evelopment proprcts etiimated to totalillion,carried out in Qandahar Provincend the regime plans tn maintain this levelridges have hern built this year andkilometer road from Qandaharhe a'poet pavedoncreteand several generatorsset up and begin production earlierv le' specialists have assisted in building an asphalt plant, electrifying one of the oity's districts, and repairing roads Several stores and stands arc said to be selling goods from tbc Soviet Union
In line with iu national reconciliation policy, lhe regime hasommission in Qandahar through which it claimi to have provided assistance to someillages in the region.oreons, of fertiiizer_werc provided to Qxndaharh for
Thc regime, in an ultcmnl to gum cooperation from or al Icjsi neutralize thc tubes in Qandahar Pruvincr has done nothing io counter the booming narcc* it trade there la fact rcpa:sir
indicate lhat Kabul, with Soviet financial support, has encouraged opium production by selling seed malting cash paymenls tn advance of ibe harvest, and actinguyer and transporter for lhe etop, but these repels have not been confiresed Although Oassdaht' isayor drug producer,n importaui transit point for narcotics destined for Pakistan and Iran
In other provinces, tbe Soviets ate trying io expand their influence ia Oandahar theough direct
delegation ol Qandahar tradersagreementlllssm with the USSR's Kazakh Republic for lhe import of foodstuffs, cement, and bicycles to lhcrie Qindaharia wilt supply the Su**ei llmon wiih ramns. lea. ctah. and other fruit. Moreover, plans were completed recently fewwatc supply project foi tlic Spin Duldak district, estimated in housand Reconst rue lionelephone eichangeines is scheduled to be completed by thc cad of the sear I'fauWj
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Other attempts to manipulate In bat politics similarly backfired. Kabul's introduction of bruitl JcQvrjani commandos to Qandnhar inxeanniplc. appears io have increased local opposition io the regime alier lhe comm.indos committed many atrotitic* again it civilians.f
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Sec^
Qandahar shopkeepers have worsened ihe regime's tight food situation by refuting lo swell food Items to governroops who dp not nan families living in ihe area. bj[3)
Seif-DrfeitioK Strategies
We believe Kabul Judges ils political overtures of secondary importance lo military operations in
resistancesections of
thc provincial capital were bulldozed to improve internal security at the same lime that regime officials were trying to buy Qandahar! support. In mid-June, the Soviets, before their pulloul, destroyed fruit trees that had lined the road westeny this cover lo the i
i In our judgment, roads that the government bas built or paved around Qandahar have been to bolster the city's defense perimeter rather than to gain support from the local population. aaassVMHi'sjX
Wc believe the destruction by Soviet and regime forces of much of the region's infrastructure and masttveJani-bing! of local settlements have alienated most Qandabaris to thc point where relations cannot be repaired by bribes or promises. Kabul's lack of military control also limits its appeal even to those Qsndabaria who might be susceptible to regime overtures. In Our view. Continued targeting of regime supporters In Qandahar by resistance forces has convinced us that thc regime has little ability to
protect its adherents in the pix.'nces In our view. Roti local leaders who might be susceptible tondiihmenu arc restrained by fears of resistance
,n
Prospects
We believe continued fighting and mining of roads and fields have pi evented any significant recordon work in the Qandahar aiea. Sending party reconstruction teams to the province isymbolicteams are mote likely to functionefense force. Moreovet, falling government levenues coupled with increased etpcndilurcs on the military probably willabul's development
In our judgment, none or the political or econorrj*jT_ prog rims the regime has tried in lhe region have had more than minimal success. No program has helped Kabul gain the suppori of moreandful of the local population Even thoseas offers of local development programs and bribes to localhzt traditionally been effective In Afghanistan were undermined by Kabul's inability to maintain control of the area without constant military operations. In our view, this failure will lead, soon afier the completion of the Soviet withdrawal, lo tbeJail of Qia^smaf'to-fhc rahiancV. We further believe that thc failure of similar regime programs elsewhere in Afghanistan has SO Isolaied lhe regime that it.
cannoi long survive the Soviet pultout lustssssV "j
)
Sri Lanka: Muslim Role in Ethnic Polities'
uslim minority is takingore important role in the island's com pin ethnic politics as thc government continues efforts to iiaplcmcni the Inoe-Sri Lankan peace accord and pieparei lor nalional elections. The Muslims generally oppose Ihe accord's provision for the merger of lhc Tamil-dominatedan province with tbc Eastern Province where thc Muslims have significant demographic weight, bul have miicd views on how to press their position. They arc becoming increasingly discouraged bygahaj President Jayewardene's inability to resolve tbc communal conflict between the Hindu Tamils and (he Buddhist Sinhalese majority, and many are moving closer to thc major opposition parly. Widespread disenchantment among Set
n Muslims 'will likely encourage radicalism among Muslim youth who are incicasingly coming under the influence of Islamic stales sueh as lian if'
)
Caught Up In the Ethnic Conflictecently, the Muslims have been generally quiescent, but they iacresungty hare found themselves caught up in Ihc Tamil-Sinhalese conflict. The year-old peace accord between India and Sri Lanka is intensifying Muslim fears of losing out to the other two ethnic group* because of ihc provision for the merger, subjectear later, of the Eastern and Northern Provinces The Muslims arc concerned about the potential loss of political poweroining of thc two provinces would represent for their community. Muslims in Ihc cast would comprise onlyciceni of lhe populallonnified province, at compared with theirercent in ihc present Eastern Province, and would lose their relative strength in the elected council that would govern the combinedgj
Concern overf influence thc mergering is making theore cohesive
nili
dilTcrences ihai have oitted between Muslims living in the west and those in the east have begun to narrow because of mutual opposition to the cnergei. Increased violence against Muslims alto is drawing them closer together. Muslims in Ihe east have been frcqucnl targets of att .cks from Tamil Tiger insurgents, who (be Muslims believe are trying to force them to leave the province. Eastern Muslims also resent Ihe presence of the Indian miliiary and-accuse them of showing partiality to the Tamils and rajsireating Maslim women To prevent farths-r1 MsMrm hostility toward the Indians, Sri Lankan forces Abad to escort Indian troops through some Muslim areas, to the press. An increasing number of dashes also have occurred between Muslim and Sinhalese groups in Colombo, brought on by whal the Muslims perceive as growing Sinhalese chauvinism.uslims in Colombo believe thc K3 Sinhalese -bashed the TamilsJ and the Muslims could bera*>|
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Muslims generally oppose thc provincialwe believe they remain divided on bow strongly to press iheir views on Colombo Muslims in the east haveeparatist movement and gradually are winning limited support from their western cousins. At earlyuslim leaders petitioned the government so carveuslim province in the east that would remain separate from any merger of Ihe north and east, according lo lhe US Embassy. Last year the five Muslim members of Parliament affiliated with the ruling United Nalional Parly (UN Pi voted io favor of the peace accord.ts mercer provii
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-afcc-
Profile of 'he Muslim Community
Muillmsignificant ruylititat ond economic forte as Srihird large si ttknn group, although ihey lomprtsr only percent af ihe population. They migrated to the island over several cenlurtet from India ihe Prrs'anCulf. and Southeast Asia Moil Sri Ionian Muslim', arr SunrHs. All speak Tamil, but in recent years ihey haved moved ia distinguish iktmstlvtsisiinet ethnic group by building more moseues adopting Islamic drets. and imluding Arabic on signs in many of iheir shops
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he *me'gcnce"Of tr
Muilim youth group benl on confronting lhencases the likelihood of more communal tirife in
Courliag the Vuilim Swing Vote Jayewardene't UNP aad tbe oeatet-kft Srieedom Patty (SLFPl will vie for (he Muslim vote as they pecpaie lor presidential and parliamentary -Muslim poliiical and culiural rxganiia lions taut in Sri Lanka, in ihe past the country'* Muslims have *orked through ihe UNP ando achieve iheirome Muslims arc calling for the formationuslim poliiical party, and the Muslim UntiedFront formed earlier tbn year mayedging cITort to establish un independent party.
)
Eveneparate Muslim party is cvci.iutHy formalized, we believe rrtoti Muslims will continue lo look ioo national parlies became theyikely can deliver political benefits Sinceational elections, mosi Muslims have lupporurd Preudentarty because its open economic policies have served Ihcir commercial
The Muslims arr geographically divided wiih two-thirds livtmg along the western coast and one-third living in ihc cast Western Muslims, concentrated in Colombo where they account for approximately Ii percent of ihe populaMon. ore somewhat better off
financially than many Sri Lankons because Ihey dominate ihr lucrative gem Industry, construction, transportation, trade ond thr Itrriet testae. Muslims in Sn Lanka's Lettrm Province comprise SI percent of the population, wtth the resi of tke province tquollr divided between Tamils and Slnkalrte
Eastrrn Muslims are not OS wall off o' lho.trhe
well because1 ihey generally work
afrUulture and coastal fishing.their coenparaii.<rl) good
eeon^itTstiindtng. Muslims generally art
undtrrtprtstnird in Sri Lanka'siem
ond professional ond civil service positions
b
Muslim group*lied view* over ho*with the Tamils They generally have inedwith (he Tamils to itrenglhen Iheif the Norihern and Eastern Province*When lhe accord wat signed lastpoiylfion* looked lo moderaterategy (hat would satisfy
agreed tip support the Tamil dcmandlor merging ihr provinces in exchange for Tamil assurance* thai Muslim rights would be preservedombined
MutHm Mi titcres ting
Younger Uuiltmt loin Innko appear to be Increasingly drawn ic radicalism to express thri' Islamic minornterests. Some mav have concluded from Tamil imsurgens activity thai "olence gets the government's attention more than moderation Oiheei air succumbing to the Influence ofam Islamic states such as Iran and Ubya.
Prospects
Wc believe Jayewardene will continue to try to appease thc Muslims to maintain their support, but noi at ihc expense ol his policies to bring about an end to lhe Tamil conltlct. Jayewaidenc and other UNP leaders svill try lo address Muslim concerns over losing political clout probably by promising them participation in the government of the new combined province and increased entry into civil set
Is taking steps to deal wiih lheaf outside extremist states. Itt pet led Tehran's charge in April and appears tomonitoring the activities ofkaorganism it reluctant to lake stronger measures
Otainit Tehran, henurverjor economic and polti'cal reasonsthis tear prodded some emergency relief ttemi'lo displaced Muslims who fled the can due to communal violence. Iran also was Sri Ijsnka'l major oil supplier heftwe the Persian Out] unxr. and Colombo mas hope to resume thit economic arrangement In 'Ar/u'b'f HMl.
SSI
interests belter than IS* more socialist policies the SLIT hu aoVjcated Over ihe pan iwn years, htf-cver. Muslims have grown increasingly ulsenchantede war dene's inability to resolvernmunal eonflkt and lie lb-owing iheir supporthe SLfjjP. Allhough lhe Muslims generally haveihe SLIP as more chauvinistic ihan ihe UNP,
Tithey appear to be
to set aside their concern because ihe 5LFP Opposes the pi
If Jayewardene decides to meet Tamil demands and mtige the north and cast to hold provincial elections, he will rely on UNP-aHlliated Muslim leaders to convince Muslim constituents the move it needed to
may believe he can agreeemporary merger ol the north and can because Muilim and Sinhalese voters in ihc cast will voleermanent meiger In Ihe refciendum to beear later
Weailure of the ge-ernment to consider the Muslims' grievances -ill cause them toore militant altitude and probably io become more receptive to offers of assistance from radical Islamicstates such as Iran andoreover, if Muslims in eastern Sri Lanka believe Colombo is unwilling to consider their demands, more may become willing io eooprrjie with Tamil insurgentustain disorder on the eland Radical Muslims may even consider assisting the Sinhalese oiicmist group known as the Janalha Vimukihi Peramuna which aims in overthrow the goveinmcrit JaaajpVo3}
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Original document.
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