PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

Created: 6/15/1988

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Pakistan: Implication! ol tha Dissolution oi tha Civilian Ocrvvnmant

Summary

PrwWanr Zia haspartamaniary slsctions by the end of Auoust. but we believe heposipono them una9 lo facilitate his effort to split theeague and co-opt tu more psatSe members. 2ia lired Prima Minister Junoio and dissolved the National Assemblyelieved thoy threatened tothereum-nom position In Pakistan. jfrHFf

The ouster of the Junoro ooverrtment cats Wo Question Zla's basici.7 coup. Zia'a acoons now are sokwy tohe Army. Crvfllan resentment of the Army's how ia Ekary io &row andwhoaipune could beg* io erode asmore

polWclMd.

Theof crvOan govearment svencrhen* Pakistan's "fl^ws to Ignore Soviet pressure too me Afghan resistance. Islamabad also wll move more foreohdy to Installpro-Pelostenlabul, probably led by fundamen-taftsl distance leader QuIboooVi hfkmstyar. Zla wffl notto alter relations whn

tates, but ousting Junejo and attempting loufcuddinin Afghanistantress ties. Restrictions on democratic Inalflvtlona are Beefy to heighten ami-American sentiments in Pakistan as the United States Is irwreaaarigly identified

PrassrJent ZLt's nrlng ol Pnrne Minister Jurasjo and rjtasoMrva of the National Assembfy onay ended an experiment in power sharing that he began with nonparty parliamentary electionsm Justified his aotlons by effing Artietel the Pakistani Constitution, which perrrits the President to act when he Judges that parliament cannot copereakdown of public order. He accused Ihe Junnki government of rampant corruption, obstructing Islamiiation, and permitting the economy to stagnate. Me promised toarotakar government and to hold elections withinays. Ms failure to renew his commitment to eerty elections in hisay nationalhowever, promoted pubic speculation that ho would postpone ejectionspf

9 June, Zla ertnounced an Interim Cabinet cc*nposed largely of rrarwters (torn Junejo's Cabinet and the Pakistan MusCm Leagueost are personaly loyal to Zla, and some served undarartial law admtnistralion. Zla did notrime Minister but did appoint Aslam Khattak as Senior Minister. Khaitak, who wll also head Ihe Convrvjnicailons pcrtfobo and aerve as Chairman of the Provincial Coordination Committee, will proOably act as de facto Prime Minster. Zie did notate for elections. Onune the Cabinet recommended the elections be heldarty basis. Wo be*eve Zla wet rx>ncur. JC^eT

la Act?

We believe thai Zie fired Juneio end dissolved ihe Nationalof hia and the Army's discontent over crvtlan attacks onIrxlopenoortce:

9 ww'*-oowarful booy wnosa marrams wars not know fordaoandanca Junto's PaUetan MuMmvoo-iouVuat* In uva Nattonai Ai.arr**

h*seyeeWC list

In forming an hMtvVn oovwnmtAt. Z* has surrounded himself with wed and true loyalists many of whom wipoaklnda and disagree. but who wffl accept' Zla's decision as the last word. His advisers so lar have been drawnool ol his colleagues whoao assocJalion with him predates his coming to power. iP-rrKj

Mo/larrvmec' As/amarUor MinisterInterimtoni Minister -An BO-year-okl lawyer, who ha* wo.-Vjc jjSapl nntmnnt otMwnrrwsr aince 1

Shanaoxaoa YaquO Knew,reiffn Mtruiiv Longtime associate and trustedormerrchiiecl of Pakistan's forolgn peficy until forced out by then Prime Minister Junejo in

Fails Hag, Miavlm CW aaWstav. North West Frtyitku- Pmrtnc*

Former Gcvemor and Martial Law AdmWstraior lor thethnic Pushtoo: staunch supporter ol the Afghan rescstanco andble mbt ol soldier, admln-oirator. and pokUclan. according to USne ol last Pakistanise trained at Ornish Indian Army School at Dehra Dun.

.YOUAKE THE BLAME?

aI dlSO,!lof in Sind bad'oocrtions. me- aod Warr^zation stymied were probably only secondary

egreeoir at -

- . ,and ineffective Chief Mlnls-

eftadlisted asrecedent for Ns possible removal.

is.'emiC rogisiaiion broadening

he was witling to respect the majority sentiment In

There is ItUe chance that electionsbo hi useless, we believe thatwitf hold elect*

. by the end cf august as Zia had promlsod. Never-

lacUoruvfized parliament erd uon by presidential fiat.l

a

jgaiation it passes will have more credibility than leglsia-

Mcxeover, on* readingthe Pakistani Constitution would require Zia lotate ofency or to Impose mental law tftte were lo cancel elections, risking serious popular unrest. In our judgment. The Army could contain the unrest, but the necessity of having lo do so would probably erode Army support for Zla. Nevertheless, we believe Zia would nullify the results and raimpose martial law Ifajority and threatened to use thai majority to force Zla's resignationf)

Undermining the Muslim Lsaguo

Wo believe Zia Intends to divido and discredit the Pakistan Muslim League, which, unchecked could be his strongest pariiamentary Ice. Many PML politicians have told US diplomats that they are confident they can win reelection if elections aro held inays. These politicians concede, however,rolonged wail will seriously jeopardize their chances and promote the likoEhoodragmentedfT

Zia probably calculatesunejo-who has vowed lo fight his dismissal at thee-nowod pariiamentary majority he could demand Zla's resignation or try to curtail his authority to the lairty narrow powers given the president under Pakistan's Constitution. At the very least, Zia would be laced with the prospecjjhatnatoil PML would refuse lo reelect him President when his term expires In March'

Zia haa already begun to undercut Ihe PML. Ho has accused the dismissed parliamentarians of misusing development funds In their districts andorruption probe. US diplomatsthat two PML membors of the former Punjab Provincial Assembly have already been arrested. The probe will grve Zia ammunition to either discredit or coerce PML candidates. Zia'9 cBssolutlon ol the provincial assombl'es also undercuts the PML at the provincial level

tn the North West Frontier Provinceia named martial law era Governor Fazio Haq asCJwfMnteter^socuring an allyun the NWFP while excluding the PML leadership ift^VBaV

Haq has siready reassembled most of his martial law era

team and adds lhat Governor FidaML loyalist, may soon resign. Zia has not yet named interim governments In SintJ and Baluchistan Provinces. Zia's decision to name two SMdhfs

'unov paustan'i constitution, thahoton By an ofcctoral comco cemposmaand tha provfcieiat aisombmi. (u)

and one Bakich who wore cool to Junejo lo the Federal Cabinet suggesta'pursulng the same atratagy there, JSXIT

Impact on Foreign PoOcy

We De&eve thatuster wilt moat slg/iificenuy impact cn Pakistan's Afghanistan pcfcy and as relaticns wan the Soviet Union and incfta. Pressure lor ocnceasicns on Afghanistan had come from tho dismissed cfvfflans who fearod that Soviet relation cr cnlavs in re )'uCoe3 could damage their election

President Zia:anission

and permanent protector ol his country, |He probably sees ihe political staoaty ol the nation "as Fnitment to preserve and protect the nationtrong ^Pakjstenlradition, but Zia apparently hasn as his personal mission.

The Army and islam are the primary sources of Zia's coreeeply rongious man. he often sees responsibilities as moral obagstions and believes that Aaah hashim to lead his country. Heuty to preserve Pakistan's Islamic Idenlity. Zla's support for the Afghan resistance emanatespecial responsibility ho feels to the resistance end the relugees as fulfilling his religious duty lo his Islamic brethren. Histo political parties stems from his belie' that thoy are un-lslamic. 1SJ#V

A products*taryeieves in the virtues of OBSdpftne and order.y was the backbone of his martial lawand contfeues to be the base of his poitical Support. Zia wil continue to depend cn and draw from the Army to fulfill his vision cf Pakistani national integrity and Islamic punty. iC-NTf

Short-TermIn the Saddla

we balsva that Zia has regainod the initiative ande able to contrci the liming and tr*tho sections. The businessnvjuccoasfuima^-Twampleased by the cissokrtion of tho National "

rafly to Junejo. The Jemaatakistan's atrcngest ratgisW"SSani In" parsL ment. condemned Zfa's action arc has put out feelers io the Pakistan People's Partyut

the Jemaat sees the PML rather than Zla as Its main foe. Jamaat leaders are in basic agreomom wtth Zla on Afghanistan and istamUatlon. The Jamaat and Zie were tacit aWga in tha.era. snd we bejiave'

Oviricial and^tjonal Assembly members win hedge their bets by

mougn manyc running asM3)

that tig tear the country apart. Zte's actions now are solely to protect himself and the Army. PubSc cynicism, already running high, would be accentuated 4are delayed or are viewed as having been manipulated toarta-merit that Zla can easily dominate.

The ouste/ ol the Junejo government calls into question Zla's basic commitment to democracy. In our Judgment, the fundamental sin the Junejo government committed was not incompetence or venality, but crossing tho unwritten boundary by challenging the primacy of Zla and the Army We befteve Hie Implications lor democracy in Pakistan are even mom ftmjgousihan Zla's original coup

against former Prime Minister Bhuttoia acted then because"

ing between civilians over disputed elections threatened to

uster does not bodo well lor parliamentary independence regardless of whether the now elections areartyonparty basis. We boSeve the perception was growing prior to Junejo'a ouster that Zia and the Army were prepared toML victory in0 elections and to continue to relinquish their influence over the civilian government they had created If this perception is replaced with the belief that Zia stifled Pakistan's latest democratic experiment bo-cause it was working too well, the successor parliament is ikety to havo groat difficulty boflding creo.bilrty. We doubt that the next parliament will risk the same fate as the Junejo rjovernrnem by challenging Zia. In any event, the Army is iftoty to tolerate little or no probing Into its activities or questioning of Its share of the national budget, which we believe could run as high as

thai

iplicallona for the United States

CMIian resentment of the Army's hokJ is likely to grow and fesler. We do not bolievo that thewffl beo overturn the Army's hold for the foreseeable future. In our Judgmenl. Armyb strong, end junior officer, loyalty to the Armyf command nmhnr-tho Army wlB remain loyal to Ziar

in the short run. Sa unlftety to alter relations with the United States- Ho has told the USthat he wants more vigorous narcotics interdiction and has Named the ousted civilians for

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