Chantages
Rlghtwing
liberal opposition will be ruvtJpresscd torift of voters to tbe National Party in tbe coming pirriUmcniury rdccUonaajaajfjj
meeting lastbetween ANC ceTKials and South African rugby officials highlights Ibe ANO campaign of selective dialogue with Afrirarvrs.
JI
Ai in other aspects of public policy. Soulh Africa'snique context for economic decision m
Secret
ette
TV modes; rxce.oeaic powih upeacd over ihe nrjt lew rears is likely to reinforce the politico! impasse between black potibcal demands and Pretoria's wlUuvgnessfTex only limitod apartheid icEorrr.s. hhh
Chalkncca
Iplersatioftsl Iso4atkc|
slit^ea^
Pretoria has made some recent progress toward iu dual foreign policy goals of^gaining arxepudce and cocpOTtion in the
61
Scope Note
Wiih this edition, ihe Africa Review will begin an occasional series of special issues over ihe next several months, each devoted to an African region or topx of current interest. We beginlose loot: at South Africa and key political, eexxaomic, military, aad djplctnaK issues and ueraas lhat are likely to affect the country and US interests through the. Several articles present prrdlminary findings from research for intdligence araeajincrijs thai arc planned for puhltcaiion later ihisyear. while others iipdaic subjects covered in recent puMicaticns.H
State. Bothaeportedly mild slroke tbb month. Al the time that this issue weni to prats, bis long icirn prognosis and fanes? lo remain in ofike wore not dear, bet we brieve thai ocr anaiyvs of medium-icrm uonds ho'-ls regardless of wbcjter or not Botha steps aside in ihe coming wecki ot mocuht. Crjrnmcrui aod queries oo the articles arc welcome and may bejjucetedhe Chief. Africa Division. Office of African and Latin Americanaattattatettattattat
Blent
Jmnwuvj JSJp
Africa Review Perspective
Prospects for the National
rating National Party (NP) under. Botha bas weathered more lhan Tour yean of iniprrxcrkerited comets ir and nxmabcrol pressure. Although Botha recentlyild slroke and il likely to sup down in tho corning weeks othe National Party probably wQI continue ha cautious poucies. While Sooth African securityoncerns nndcrlie virtually all of the government's Intcnuiuceial, regiceul, and domestic actions. Moreover. Pretoria generally hast acted eccordirtgyngstanding stnixgy Intendedrolong NP dominance, shifting tactics ia response to changing circcmsuncei. Although the strategy appear! capable of ensuring thai ihe NP wiD tnuorfic through at least anciher four yean in power, we believe that over the longer term Pretoria wiUluyvcinaeasir^dlfQcultycruping with buck, economic, regional, and electoralr mm
Replaying Old Themes
Despite toying occasionally with Ideas such as federalism or Swiss-style camoru. the NP in recent years has urayed Utile frem its strategy crafted during. Elements of the strMogyough security posture, rnodcai reforms of social and economicnited black pcn*er-sharing at Ihc local and regionalaiicnal advisory body lo discuss cunsii inuottalih blacks acceptable lo the government, privtujiaiton and deregubiion lo boost economi; perfcamnrec.iilue of coercion and diplomacy In the region. Only in ihe special case of the tripartite agreement oo Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and Nam ibian inbcpcrdcnce has Pretoria departed rigniftcanuy from iu script and committed iuelfow approach ibat limits its flexibility.
a faces fundamentally intccne liabledemandsestive black majority for genuine political poriKipauon andonservative white tninorilyeturn to strict apartheid. In recent years, ihcae two camps have become even more poiaiired and most blacks cow reject as insignificant the same apartheid reform plans that tome whiiei condemn as selling oat white South Africa. Recalling UVt gulf, Pructfia appears unwillingress ahead rapidly on even iu very tirrud reform agenda poorunuonal ailia.ricr.iary election expected later this year.
Prolan has made fewer anempts iccerulyonvince foreign observers that it intends to proceed with far-reaching political change, probably recognizing that such efforts do more to make righiwing whites ai home nervous than to assuage inxmauoral critics. Instead the NP appears ccrnictu to market unabashedly Usoliiicnl structures for blKkj and whites.
South Africa's stagnant economy and rapid black puliation gto-wh win exacerbate racial triors as whilesblacks compete for scarce icsoureca. Whiles are faced with lowered living standards and will be oven muter.ed lo preserve while privilege at (be expense of black pcdiucal and rxceiomic aspirations. Alihough some blacks almost certainly will benefit from growing black unionism, relaxation of black business rtgulaocn. arid govorimcnt scooeconcariic sressiing en black areas, most will face wcracning unemployment
9
and poverty in an economy unable io provide jobs for most ofew black jobseekers each^
Pretoria also facesegionally tnd internationally as it attempt! to reduce its dipIem>Jik andand force the removal of African Neurol Congress (ANC) bases from neighboring states. Pretoria will try to reap auuimum gains from iu agreement to implcjnent UNn Namibian independeoce and iu rapprocfieraeru wiili Mozambique. Intentionally,Pretoria tlmoat certainly expects to forestall additional economic sanctions and. gain at least Ural led access lo financial markets. Dorocsucally, the NP hopes its rxaional policy Eoccessea will impress white voters and prevent defection! to the rightwirg Conwrveiivc Party (CP).
Trends la White Politics
President Botha and other senior. NP leaders have yet to come fully to terms with the splitikancrdom end their new reliance on English-speaking voters to stay in
power. Tri-re are nc English speaking mrjnhru in me cabinet Bocha,egacy as the man who destroyed the "volt" has made repeated calls to conservative whiles to return to tbe NP.as the only workable vision for the future. Nevertheless, the NP continues to pursue lecroingly contradictory policy goals that confuse supporters and prompt ckfecticasslolheCP. Paradoxically, [he NFs ataarapttrHoogh tbe Cxoservstivea havegtven greater credibility so rightwing policies. ^
Mc^^jom i
The elections for whits municipal auihoriuei ia October--which were fought on national political issues -were the first (est of CP strength since It became ihe off* ill opposiucn Ji the waker-irj stewing ia tbe parliamentary electionlthough thecreased Lwir share of the poll sorice/it over7 parliamentary election -NP readers were buoyed by the election results. The Ojnservatives made some inroads In heavily industrialized areas, but their overall performance fell short of CP expiations. The NP retained control of the hotly contested Pretoria councilomfortable srrajcrity of councils in (he predominantly Afrikaner Orange Free Stale. The Conservatives won few seats in Natal and Cape Provinces, likely NP gcrryrnandciing of parliamentary districts price to (he next national election will offer some protection from CP gains in the crucial Transvaal Province. |
Botha probably believes that his party's success in retaining the support of lhe while political center in the municipal elections re fleeted the broad appeal of his blend of tough security, miner apartheid reloraj, and regional detente. The President almost certainly was relieved that ihe CtoservauVcs did not do as well as expected, but ho it probably concerned by the oppositionoods in urban areas and among Afrikaner voters. NP leaders probably calculaio ihai the CP will gradually capitalize on Its electoral gains to attract mora financial support ard build up the party'sf.-nKrjcture. Pretoria almost certainly hasoost from the negative wbiir>-particularly business--reaction to the costly ^imposition of strict apartheid in CP-ecjrarollcd mimicipal areas, and from a
Seofet
recent controversial split within the uliraright Afrikaner Resistance Movement NP concern about growing rigblwing sentiment was reflected in theovembermall rightwing extremist group. |
Botha is probably most satisfied with theerformance against ihe liberal opposition panics. In October lhe NP edged out the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) lo several historically liberal urban councils. ineludingtohannesbu.-g. Although the PFP teamed up with independent candidatesin control of the Durban and Cape Town councils, it fared poorly outside its traditional urban strongholds. Efforts by the three leading liberal parties to unite under one banner to challenge the NP more effectively are likely to founder over Disagreements on leadership, ideology, and
SliaicgyB
Ti gh tening Control
Tightening
The government hits become increasingly dependent on authoritarian government structures and security measures to conirol the black ojxposiiion and calm while fears. Wc believe the impositionationwide suie of emergency6 signaled the government's determination to use every available meant to stop the amiaparlhcid movement. Through extensive powers granted io its security forces, the government has crippled black political organizations sod Iheir ability to stage massive antigovemmenl protests. These measures have closed almost all avenues for peaceful protest and change, and have begun to impinge upon whlio freedoms, but with Utile discernible backlash from the white communit
The Soulh African Government has restricted much of lhe freedom once enjoyed by the press and other media. Pretoria has used censorship, coercion, and manipulation of informaiiononceal effectively evidence of black grievances and protest from domestic and international audiences, and convince while South Africans lhat ihe government has full control Of the situation.!
Dealing With Blacks: Repression andncc the imposition of the state of emergency, tho South African Government hasomprehensive counterrevolutionary strategy aimed at
ending opposition in tbe block townships through tough security actions as well as political and economic co-optation. Pretoria has intensified its crackdown against the opposition, and will not hesitate to ban or restrict organizations or individuals contravening its broad security proscriptions against nongovernment activity. Tbe government will tolerate few challenges to its authority. Pretoria effectively banned at leastpposition organizations8 and severely restricted thend acliviiies of most opposition
Pretoria hopes lolimate in whichblacks can negotiate with the government free of intimidation from black militants. The government is trying to eliminate the current black opposition--which ii views as controlled by Communistsith leaden of its own choosing. Minister of Cxnstitulional Development and Planning Heunis-South Africa's primary constiiutional arc^lect-recently claimed lhat the current security rejlrialors leave ample room for politicalpresslon by blacks as long as they are willing to work within the system. Pretoria also hopes iu tough security measures will keep black expectations low and convince blacks of their inability to force reforms ihrough violence and CtvH disobedience. I
The NP, fiimly^oolla to the concept of groups rights, probably does not believe it can satisfy black demands for political change. To dale, all changes instituted byto broaden democracy to includebeen counterbalanced by an expansion of national executive authority toignificant loss of white power. Its actions are carefully orchestrated to sow disarray in the black opposition and convince moderate while supporters and Ihe imeroaudnal audience of its intention gradually to broaden black political participation.
Confident of its ability to contain black violence find maintain order through draconian measures, Pretoria is actively pursuing political and economic co-optation io an effort to reduce black dissatisfaction. Central to Pretoria's political co-optation plans is the national
council. The council, which would advise ihe Prcsidou aa consult! uonal change, has been loolcd as ihe fim step toward political parjciisation at Use rouicaud leveL Dcapiic alnsost unanimous black rejection of the council.Li clearly intends to proceed wiih the scheme, probably calculating (hat it can always co-opt willing black participants with ofTers of personal financial gain. The government has alsoorisotuuceial arundrneni that would allow the appointment of the first black cabinet minister or deputy
Black municipal elections last Cumber formed an integral part of Pretoria's strategy to convince white voters that it is successfully co-coting blacks with poliinal and rxcoomic inducemenu. Pretoria claimed thai ihe black ua-noul--narginally ftlgher than the las block clecuoasQcmoostraied greater black suppott for its reform program and support for the notional council ^gtm
The lestcrcd kxal ariruiutiraimnt are intended aj provideadre of compliant black local officials with whom ii may discuss iu agenda of limited political change. Although the black municipal authorities lack sufficient political credibility and financial resources lo overcome community opposition, Pretoria has declared that ihey nowandate to negotiate consiiajuorjl change for the black maksrtiy. Tbe newly elected rxfixeaals will select from their own larats nine membersit on ihc national council. Even in the MP. however, few see the councilredible forum for black political participation J|
Outlook
We believe that ihe NP will probably muddle through at leant the neat four years in power, but without achieving any lasting solutions to iu electoral, black, economic, or regional challenges. Although die seriousness ci events or crises facing the government may at times appear--or be portrayed by iu foci to ihe loft and right-as regime threatening. Pretoria probably will be able to at least cope with the challenges. |
Pretoria prtybaMy will aucmptsocknte race ca iu ckymcatic and regional policies as long as il sees benefas io tbe lorn) of dir^oenauc acceptance and
We believe the NP willomfortable parliamentary majority in the coming national election Nevertheless, iu concern over growing CP strengC, will relegate progress on reform to ihc backbumer. even among "vcrligio'-or enlightencd-NP members ai leanuccession crisis probably would further dampen any pressure for significant reform within the NP. The government is likely to delay the national cotartcil and other inkbiive* unul alter ihe dectioo. aod probably will claim it is wailingandate from whiles to move or. reform. Pretoria mayew "mixed" residentialajor issue in the October municipal elections, butnlikely to repeal the Group Areas Act, ihc backbone of residential apartheid. Many white moeka-aies are unhappy with Pretoria's slow pace of reform, but fear of tbe CP. support forecurity stance, and disarray among more Lbcal paruet leave them with few political alternatives to the NP.
Pretoria's security measuresut achieved an impasse wilh the black rnajority. The black opposition lacks [he power to force the government io address its etanaods. but Pretoria bas been unable to impose ia winerwrtthip blacks and tegiuraize racially disrrirr.iruKwy govcr.imcot inst.unions. Dcspito the government's choiocicritauon of ihc black municipal elections as on ckjctoral suarocss.andate (Or iu program of limited reform and black economic de^cjopenent, we believe the election had liulc meaning for rnosi blacks. The process of blackfirmly entrenched since Pretoria icUicd laws goverr ing black migrauon from rural areas to ihe ciUes inhas facilitated political awareness and orgaru'ration among blacks and frusiroicrj Pretoria's Cfforu to root out diucnt.H
A now outbreak ot* serious unrest is probably inevitable, but in our view is unlikely in itself io be regime [hreaicning. Black political frustration will be aggravated by higher unemployment, icGailon, and wcaserunf black living condJuocs. BladeJi tnd irjensified abaruraunn will increase the compeiiuon for scarce resources, and intensify black men tment of white economic privilege. The spark that will light the under of black anger could rangeecurity force action in which many blacks are killed, such at tha Sbarpeville massacreo specific economic provocations, such as the Transvaal renthat escahaaed into nationwide violence startinghe black opposirion, roaeret, at sol unequipped to translate that anger and violence into ccaxcrted actico to challenge the regime. The security forces have cVurnceistraled their wiUingness to use any means to maintain conb^ijjid have significant resources ,
maintainvoilableH
Alternative .Scenarios
Despite Its strategy for the next few years, we believe that even ihe NP accepts the incvirabilHy of fundamental political change in South Africa, Presoria's policies arc aimed at delaying that day al long as possible. The Currentbel*ve* Us security forces can guarantee continued while privilege well into Ihe nut century. NP leaders also believe-probably wiih leuihey can continue to win neededppoi; from the while political
Iarefully orchestrated program of limited reform, lough security measures, and regional detente. While wc believe that the NP probably can weainer at least four more years In power, several events could seriously undermine its control over tbe pace or direction of emits:
A surge in CPtn reaction todramatic increase in black violence targeted againstleadightwing takeover of the gOverrunent. oronstiiutional crisis if the MP refused to give Up centre*.
Widespread black noting cock" erupt if jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela died in prison, or if Pretoria, truscalculadng its ability to control black reaction, released him.
A plummeting gold price or comprehensive and mantlocory UN economic sanctions couldevastating economic depression.
A breakdown of the Angote-Namibea accordsalt or delay of Namibian iridcpcndonce could lead to renewed rostilUics between Soulh Africa and Angola, and probably inviie sironger Cuban and Soviet iruerveiilion.l
6
Electoral Challenges
The RighfwingTnreatl
lhe Dm time in almostews, lhe future of National Party (NT) rule has come into question.oulh AJrica'i rightwing Conservative Partypaaoter of the NP-has surged from the rrintea of while politics to become the official opposition iaTbe Conservatives already aiehilling effect on goverarneni plans to modify apartheid to bring some blacksational advisory body. Opinion polls and recent municipal election results su&test that the Conservativesetter than even chanceapture the Afrikaner heartland- -once the sacetgbold of Nationalist sucton-ia Tnsnsvaal and Orange Free State Provinceseneral election this year, leaving the NPignificantly reduced, leu loyal, andgiith-spcakiog constituency.
Conservative Party Surge
The Conservative Pany is the rising star in white South African politics. It has surged to pnxrunence5 largely because of white anaiety Over sustained, widespread township unrest and the MP's faltering efforts to modify apartheid The CP's promise to return South Africa lo strict SDo/iheid--and eventually parti urn the country--has become increasingly attractive to whiles concerned about their persona! security and the certainty of continued unfettered white control of white affairs. Its promise of tough security measures is attractive to many whiles- -particularly Afrikaners-frustrated by the hip's apparent inability to restore calm lo tho townships andradually intensifying bombing campaign by tbe African National Congress (ANC) in both urban and rural areas. |
Unlike tbe ruling party and Us liberal opponents, Ihe CP is becoming more confident cf its future. Conservative leaden utlk increasingly of when, not whether, ihey will unseat theseneral election. Conservatives point lo7 general ciecthe CP replaced the liberal Progressive Federal Party as official opposition in parliament--and so its strong performance In naaionwidc municipal elections last year as evidence of tbe parly's growing popularity. Election results and surveys of white ccinion iruScate that the CP is gradually gaining strength in Transvaal and Orange Free State Provinces, the traditional base of ibe NP, and that it has even trade gains in oortftern Natal and Cape Provinces. Moreover, the CP appears lo be maiing substantial gains in previously stalwart Nationalist sectort of the white cornmunuy. irrduding bureaucrats, security officials, formers, andesser extent urban industrial worker*!!
SeeS
ibXt. lit*
Nationalists Edgy
Senior NP oOJclals-as well as rank and file party members in the provincial caucuses--are clearly disturbed by tbe threat from tho right. The Conservatives present notolitical challenge to continued NP control of government but alsoeminder of the sigruTicaol split in Afrikaner culture over the inclusion of blacks inariety of reporting indicates that President Botha is seriously disturbed that his policy of limited racial reform has split the Afrikarw-based NP. the highly uifiiienualcrni-secret Afrikaner polilicsjl^uliural ocsaruiatioo--and ihe Dutch Reformedocc talked "Ihc National Party at prayer"!
Toe NP1 concern that iu policies might resulturther toss of support on the right has led to considerable hesitation and backtracking in NP policies. Wc believe concerns about the rightwing threat are in large pan responsible for the ruling party's apparent lacklear road map for reform. In acdiuoo. the NPs increasingly authoritarian approach to dissent and dramatic policy reversal on Angola-Namibia are in pan attributable to Nationalist concerns about CP inroads into NP support.
The Conservatives have made political hay over the NTs vacillation on reform. The CP docs not hcsiiaie to capitalize on racism and fears among whiles of losing jhcdr cultural identity, economic position, and political power if blacks arc brought into government. The Conservatives have used the NPs refusal to state clearly its reform intentions lo stir white anxiety that the government plans to sell out white interests. Similarly, when the NPew change to apartheid legislation, ihc Conservatives effectively criticizo theas cotuuer to white interests. Al fl result, the CP alreadyear veto on the NPs agenca-for out of proportion io its nunwricaily small presence in parliomcriL
Tho NP has considered drastic measures to stop or at least contain rightwing gains incroral election is ecmstiiutionnlly mandated beforeut Botha has tried to defer ii2 by ccsttuiuiional araondrncriL He has run into stiff opposition from the leader of ihc Labor Pauy-the
majority party in the Colored House ofho will only consentonstitutional amendment if the Nationalists Scrap major apartheid legislation Out mandates racial segregation. UnwUling to undcnakeolitically dangerous move Botha now appears set to gerrymander electoral districts to Che best advantage of his party before the general election expected to be called kua (hit year. |
Outlook
In oor judgment, it is almost certain that the NP will retain controlarnent in the ncxi general election, if* Is held User this year, but the Conservatives appear poised for their strongest pwforrtuince to date. Wc believe if an election was held today, ihe CP wouldelter than even chance toajority cf seats in
Transvaal Province and would probably make
subsiiVjal gains in Orange Tree State Province. |suggests lhat the CP is only mnSr age poinis away fromear sweep of these two important regions of traditional Nationalist suppon. Several critical variables will affect ihc she ot the rightwing vote:
perceptions of the domestic teciultyignificant increase in township unrest prior to the election or an intenxificarion of the ANCs bombing campaign would enhance tbe CPs prospects.
^PerctptiomoflriiNP'srtJormpropam. IftheNP snriouitces unexpected changes to apartheid legislation or appears to move too rapidly on previously anrounccd plans, ihe Conservatives will be able to heighten OKtcerns that the NP has lost sight of white interests.
. Status of Jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela. We believe ihe release or Mandela would spark an outcry omong rightwing whiles that would undoubtedly cost Ibc NP substantial support, following Conservative charges ihai the NP had buckled to International pressure and had grown soft on security.
conditions. Whites increasingly are embittered by their slowly declining standard of Uvirgj in the wake of years of slow growth and high
inflation. The CP alreadyde substantial gains among farmers hit hard by years oa* drought and dcrJinirrg governmeni subsidies. If ibe South African economy plungedeccsskxa prioreneral eiectioo. the Conservabvsa would gain acVliooral scappcei fcVom whites who Named NP misrDaaageeneraL
A forrlga policy re renal or mUUaryretoria is emborrassrdignificant torcigo policy reversal such as the collapse of the BraziaviUe Accords on Angola-Namibia otserious military setbackms? border operation against ANC (acuities in the rcgkM. some conservative whites might lose further confidence In NP leadcrst.rp.
Most new N? initiatives on ibe domestic front probably will remain oa hold until after ibe general election. NPprobably reason thai iheir current emphasis on security and slow pace of rtXorm will keep losses on tbe right to an acceptable minimum, wfule act antagonizing the party's new. prorcform sueyorien on the left-eneral cloction. the NP will have another five years to implement its policies without worrying about an Imminent CP
We believe the election results will be critical for the future course of NP policy. The Nationalist! almim certainly will erncrge from the elecuonigrufcantiy reduced. less loyal.aod xcrtaiir.gly EngliuVspeakirg const itueaxy. If the eleciinn yields mixed results, wilhimited loss of parliamentary scats, we believe Nationalist leaden win probably continue oo their current tack, muddling ahead on limited reform and cracking down on all forms of dissent. Ifvauwa, however, make substantial gains-more than doubling iheir presence In parliament toreau--ihe eiectioo could force the NP finally to accept its more reformist, English-speaking constituency on the left and break from lis traditional base in Transvaal and Orange Free State Pioviacea- la the unlikely case of more significant gams that threatened continued Nationalist rule, the NP probably would be forced to move toward the parties on the left, preparingprorelQ/m" coalition]
Blink
Boks Action
-The RightWing in
onservative Party (CP) controlled town near Johannesburg to tighten racial segregation have met with widespread oppcattion.arnaging black consumer boycott of kxal whiir>owaed businencs. la turn, the Consc vsuves have made token elTortiace-saving compromise but are unlikely to capitulate fully on their segregationist agenda for the town. Meanwhile, the National Party (NP>dominaied central government-hopes to score politscal earns for Uaraf-is content to kt the Ccoservauves struggle with the issue, and Pretoria is uenikely to bail them out by repealing laws that allow for strict
Conservatives Take Charge
The CP woo conirolajority of towns in Titntvaal Province in the nationwide elections last October. Ciung an eke (oral mandate from whites to promote segreauuion.CTonkials vowed to use Jrfu control of local municipal govemrnenis toward lhat end. Ica while mining towniles east of Johannesburg, tho CP dominated municipal council moved in November to reirnpose segregated arnenoies in rriuaucspa! buildings, parks, poors, and other facilities, and lo eliminate multiracial business districts Several other towns have followed suit, but (he Boksburg cite hai received the most press play aril notoriety. SSSSSSSJJ
Consumer Boycott
The CP's policies in Bcksturg haveoalition of black and 'colored* buameaao-en, civic sod church leaden, and ethers ciperaring under the banner of die "Save Boksburg Commiitee" toonsumer boycott of local white-owned businesses, which depend on the buying power of adjacent black andownship* Cexurary to Conservative blester that black consumer spending in Boksburg it 'nothing moreyproduct of the whilelack spending Is estimated to constituteore than half of local
mail SOlCS,
arteqiMtewiihave made the boycott easy to sustain j
For its part, Pretoria has given at least tacit approval for the boycott. Although it ia illegal to advocate boycotts under the three-year-old state of emergency. Pretoria has vowed not to take action to break the Boksburg boycott unless Iherc it violence.:
While business groups have argued strongly against stricter segregation io Boksburg, bul have opposed the boyco'jues their businesses. Some have joined with black and "colored" town councilors to lobby Boksburg and national govcmmcni officials to end the reuntrcduction of petty apartheid, aastsssssaj
Multinational companies hnvo also flexed their muscles. One multinational, which has been located in Bolstxjnj for over SO years, appl led to be reaoccd out of the mtjD'Kapaliiy'i jurisdartion because of lhe new rules. Not surprisingly, the company's sppticadon was denied. The managing director, however, promised "moral and financial' support lo any Boksburg group that wished to protest the CPS moves legally, aaaasssa
Seeking as Easy Oat
Pressure from local business, oeclinirig property values, and potential loss of corporaic constituents hive led the Boksburg municipal council to search for an cosy way out. The council has proposed providing funds to upgrade industrial and recreational facilitieseighboring black township in exchange for reserving facilities in Bokslsoeg for whites only. The proposal it unlikely to stop the popular boycott because it does not address tho fundarncntal Issues, ajjaana
m
Sec^t
PFPJ waning eltctool rxospects were eocdirmed by the rcanlts oi* local elections last October, in which its two rlvab hot the libera) vote Gelded few candidaics. The Piofjeativet dad acttneny teats ooeude iheir tradioona: urbannd ihc National Party edged out the Progressives to win control of saver al historically liberal urban councils, including Joharncsborg. Progressive candidates fecrced tacticaliipensof'd bj J< com iisl.'I. panics with mited results. APFP-InoepcadcntPany coalition won control of the Durban council, but the Progressives won no seals on the traditionally ccnservaiive Pretoria ccnrteil, dcspiie teaming up with the National Deroocrtoc Movement B
The Mtrger Option
The three liberal parties recently announced plans to join forces in an effort to broaden their electoral appeal, but will be herd pressed to overcome remanung oosutclcs to an effective merger. The parties have yet to resolve important differenceseader for the new rainy or to daIolicy platform that rcconciki differing views over Southowuiuiional future and relations wiih the black oepcaxton. PFP leader Zach De Beer recently admined ihai the differences arc unlikely to be worked out in time for the new party toeneral election, particularly if it is held early this year, fssaajssj
Electoral Prospects
The three liberal parties are likely to do poorly in the neit general election, pjrtxutuly ir. the absenceerger. PFP leaders eakralate that the party would lose up to one-third of iu seats without an electoral pact. Although surveyi of white opinion Indicate lhatParty commands nearly as much support as thehe IrtJependents have yet toomparable partyesuu: tare aod. in our view, would do well to win one or two scatseneralporutig indicates that ihe National Dcmocraoc^over^ which has alienated
many rvjtcntial supporters by focusing on building Lies lo the black opposition, is likely to retain only one of its three seats in thesaatatatl
Even if the three liberal parties succeed in jratungime to fighj an effective pariiamerrary electionew party it unlikely io moculiie the full poiontJal of ihe liberal vote, or to prevent the National Party from winning some seats now held by ihc Progressives aod tbe National Dcraoaauc Movement The ceenpromises made to achieve anderger would be certain to alienaie portioni of the parties' respective comiltucocics. Moreover, personality clashei and ideological differences will make the facade of liberal unity difficult to mamiain and could ultimatelyew party aliogei
Outlook
While we believe prospects for ihc parliamentary left will rcrran dim over the rest severtl years, the liberal opposition is likely to regain some support lost to ratrapailiamentaryrowing contingent of while liberals and oxuaparliamcnuiry groups have begun to rethink iheir stance en panicipaiicrn in the face of growing rightwing strength and ihc Naiiorial Party's moratorium on reform. Tbe majority of white eppasjaoa organizations favored voting in ihe municipal clrxtions last October,
I numbers in some areas, concerned by the National Party's threats to ^segregate wards that elected PFP candtrJaies. Liberal voters will have more incentive to vole in pari iamentary elections, where the stakes arc higher. In the longer term, if Pretoria tightens restrictions oo white eairapariiamcntary groups.
ircpvhtvpury
"m mm Ji ihc itilli ludiiitrtmiy dumter liniuorot farly-lu.rwwiiivc fooeri;
curtailing their ability to operate, some aciiv'au may become convinced that parliamentetter platform tot pressuring the government.
^verthe'eu.ipea whix lupport for the prorr/orm oppositionctnaae confineda minority for the foreseeable felure. Although while icoety would probably become mere polarized if pmi jre from OSe black ojpoiiuoo and rnuanarional condemnationCJiicJied white afestyles. that process would be more likely to benefit rightwing groups than the white liberal
Black Challenges
Prospects for the Internal Black Opposition
nationwide state of emergency, renewed in8 forthud year, and ibe South Africanffective banning of lhe black Deposit ion's leading crgarjncluding ihr United Drmxnue Frontart February, have made active man protest virtually impossible Moat opposition leaders are jailed or rr^tricted from any political activity More than "vQ.CCO activists have been cktaincd since the state of ernergency was declared, including roost of the UDFs national and regional kadershrp Despite its impressive security mac hi nery. however, the Soulh African Gcrventmenf. in our view, has mil yet defeated the black opposition. Pretoria icmaiiis unable to stop oil acts of passive civil disobedience or to draw blacks into governmentcontrolled negotiating forums. The unpassc in black-white relations it likely to persist in the near term, in our view,asaJyu^cycnt that Oramaiically changes the political dynamic I
anniversary of the Soweto uprising have become almost routine. Furthermore, the ii.it recent actioni have taken place with little evidence of vk>terKegor btirrtideuon of workers by radical youth. I
Black trade unions are likely to remain one of the most important components of the black opposition for Ihe treat several years. Although the largest uadc union federtlioe--ihe Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSas banned from all political activity last February, union activists have blurred lhe distinction between narrow labor issues and political demands. Virtually all labor actions nowolitical dimension. Labor leaders are likely io continue iheir harsh rhetoric against the government and reraaar. committed as pol'rJcal militancy. local labor organ ireo will probablyrucial role in rebuilding community organ iretions and opposition networks.
uliiiiulwy^JtiVKmU liy ll
local grievances such as high rcnu and p
'xndcd
Coping With Kepression The oppciiiiJon has been adept at mounung an incresuingly sophisticated civu discoedience campaign, raarted most noably by boycotts- The oppcautkM continuei to employ work, rent, and school boycotts to press national demands for poliucal rights and protest local grievances such as high rents and poor schools.
crackdown last largely
thwart the group's planned boycott of the brack local elections held innable to hold mass political meetings, blacks gather in homes, in churches, and even on commuterssssaj
Many boycotts and stayaways have taken on lives of their own and require li'.tle organiaalion or coordinauon Tbc Sowcto rent boycott has continued for almost three years, despite the banning of its organizer--jhc Sowcto Civic Association. Massive naiioowide work and student boycotts to commemorate theune
Prominent Mack church leaders have become rnore active poliucallyeauh of the resirxuont againstppariuon groups. Church leaders have achieved new poliucal promiDcncc as they have taken up the causes of banned groups, such as lhe UDF, keeping the opposition flame alive while community orgnniiauons were in disarray. For eaample. several church leaders, including Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Reverend Allan Boesak, flagrantly violated security refutations by calling publiclyoycott of the black local elections in October. They rarobably calculate that their religious positions offer them some protection from government persecution. Religious leadort have been undeterred by President Botha's public attacks against them for serving, ia his words, the irueresti of the African National Corgress (ANC) and Communism. They arc likely to continue organmng protect thaaly veiled as prayer meetings.
Church leaders' activism is noi always shared willtin Ihc church hierarchies or tl Ihe grassroots level, however. Progressives areinoriiy within easeotialli conservative church:
as bee* modest, aod few young activisu are practicing church-goers, Marty local churches have been rductant lo risk security force action against ihern by allowing opposition groups to use ehjich lac iti lies, further abenaiing some activists.
earguard Ax lion Pretoria has attempted to use political and economic coaptation to draw greater black participation in racially baaed government institutions in the buck townships and rtornelaods. The government undoubtedly hopes lhat an expanding black middle classtake in the system will actoderating factor in black politics- The generarnene wants to Improve blatk ctntaasnicbcxh br boosting growth in genera! and by laigetiog blackcommunities for special devekjiKnscrst projects. In addition to upgrading bousing, this effort includes government funding for new sports. Cultural, and church organizatiorn. Pretoria probably recogiiiaes lhal the strategy is coru'raioed by the limited financial resources available for black economic improveroeni, butill help divide blacks and at least delay the day rtfryoEueal reckonin| for whites.
Preiona's political co-optation efforts have been rejected by most blacks The crackdown on opposition groups last year war intended tolimate in which "acceptable" bucks would be able to negouaio with (he government Cree of ktimidaiion by black Btilitanu. The black municipal elections held in October were an integral pan of Pretoria's eiTcru toadre of compliant black local officials withould discuss limited pobucat change. The gewsament almost certainly will entice at least some blacks, particularly discredited black township officials, to join its proposed national council. The council, which would advise tbe President on constitutional change, has been touted as tho first step toward political participation at the national level, but. in our view, il represents Pretoria's efforts to limit blacks to advisory
and largely figurehead roles. Tho majority of blacks will rejeel participation in the council, viewing il as little moreubber stamp tor Die ruling National Party's policlef. B
Look In| lor New Strategies
Araa^matism- torn cot of adappearse emcrgjeg in exposition forces. Tbe heady dayshen marry blacks believed liberation was just around the comer have given way to sullen acceptance that Ibe government will hold the upper band for several more years. The opposition has placed more emphasis on common objectives and less on ideology in an attempt to forge opposition unity. For example, prominent opposition leaders"Including Frank Ckikane, Albctiina Sisulu. Archbishop Tutu, and General Secretary of the National Union of Mire* orkers Cyril Ra/naphcaa-raeeotktatd for the first time in December with the Soweto Town Council to end the nearly rjxrec-ycar-oid rent boycott there. The negotiations tat some irr.pcrinri pawralencr the Council agreed to write offent anr^rs-subjea to approval byauthorities -and accrued some legitimacy in lis administration of Soweto. At tbe some lime, the Council and the government acknowledged the credibility of the antiraparthcid kadership ihai advocated tin boycotts
A process of rebuilding ccposition networks at ibe grassroots level, focusing on local issues andgoals, is underroroinern black journalist has djbbed ihitrocess that emphasizes black development instead of self-defeating attacks again it the whiteew emphasis also hat been placed on seeking bluer: economic gains. Black busincsimen are now considered integral to the struggle instead of collalnestlors. gtSaxaaai
The ANC has played on instrumental role in encouraging cooperation between opposition groups. It has urged the UDF and COSATU loroad opposition coalition including black businessmen, traditional tribal leaders, and liberal white exuapailiamentary groups. Tho ANC in particular has urged unity between COSATU and the National Council of Trade Unions-South Africa's second largest trade
ANC Goals and Objectives
disrupt Pn
The ANCt iho't-fertn ecjtancs an forty clear and its rwO-track miUxary-poUticai strategytaJuaaem that majority rule UWeraidikcfratr. Skxwt-termbjectives imdude: urging South African Mart, to COtutnue OMigc^crnrrxnt acuivilseiroad tomtit*tio* thai would prrgg Pretoria to negotiate, and gelling tntenavUsnal gitpportfor pedicles designed to isolate the South African Government"specifically comprehensive economic sanctions. The ANCs basic short-tem military objectives art designed lo bolster tht internal black opposition, to buttress the ANCt internal credibility, and to disrupt Pretoria's control mechanisms In lhe townships. I
morale and thereby force Pretoria to ncgoaate. The ANC senior leadership probably will allow periodic increases in military activity inside South Africa to placate restive insurgents andplit between lie political and military wings over strategy. Nonetheless, it almostll take steps to rein in tie military wing if it starts operating too independently.
the longer tern, the ANC hopes to force the while govtrnsneni in Pretoria to accept black majority rule, prefer ably with lhe ANC at the helm. The groups military tactics iherrfort. are largely designed to undermine white morale, thereby feeing the government lo lhe negotiating usbie. The ANC vision of pottaparthesdSouth Africa, however, remains somewhat vogue Iu cfficial politicalmosufesse,5 Freedom Charter, tuts moderate socialistoesraciaJ. democratic, unitary Stale-bet l* dcLberauty vague in order io appeal tc and attract asoalition of aruiaparihesdforces as possible. Last year the group released draftotiapariheld constitution designed in part to refine in visionuivt South Africa. The gKlines, however, essentially reinforced the charter'sther than embellished i
-,iihe impressive- bombing campaign last year-aesigncd u> discredit the gcrvernrocors nationwideits internal network is alive and operational, aaajaaaaj
One negative outcome cf litis shift toward greater operational freedom at the local level, however, hai been an increase in controversial attacks on civdon targets. Lastash of incuscrimlw; bcmb.nss
Political Gauls
lhe ANC continues to depend on its allies In the internal blackparticular the United Dcfrccratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU>-io sustain antigovernment opposition activities. In addition to coordinating strategies and protest actions, the ANC kadershrp has tried to mediate rivalries between the two groups to promote opposiuon unity.
In addition to contacts with the black orpcfcUien. ANC leaden hive sought to expand relations wiih Soulh African whiles. The ANC regards its meetings with wWies-particularly Afrikaners-as opportunities lo burnish its professed oCrnocrauc and multiracial credentials, exploit divisions in the white community, and broaden multiracial opposition to the South African Government. Talks but year with tbe leadership of several white eatjaporliamentary groups and with officials from the white Soulh African Rugby Uoion-an Afrikaner instuuticn--represent the ANCs latest efforts to engage South Africa's white community, afeaaakj
The ANC--wiih help from supporters worldwioe--has been able to isolate South Africa iiitantaiionally, Al the same lime, however. President Botha's visits to several African capitals last year suggest that Pretoria tt having some success shfddirig iu pariah status. In fact, there are hints that Pretoria may be able to expand its mtciiuiuonal coruacuesult of successful negotiations on Najnibian irKjependence. EvcnZambian President Kounda has alludedossible meeting. Pretoria's gains ia the mterruuional arena will complicate the ANC's international public relations campaign and undermine lobbying efforts for punitive measures, such as additional economic sanctions, against South Africa. ^
Outlook
The volume and tempo of ANC attacks have steadily increased over the years despite Pretoria's tight internal security.owever, lhe ANC may be forced to curtail its military activities somewhat to adjust to new operational conditions and venues. Trie group probably will increasingly plan the timing of its military operations lo coincide with significant events in the black political cakardar-such as theune anniversary of the Sowcto uprising-or to reinforce entigovemment actions organized by the internal black opposition. Deliberate attacks on civilian targets probably will
ontroversial issue among ANC officials. Despite efforts by the political leadership to restrain military operations against civilians, wc believe such attacks will continue. h
The ANC also will continue to consult with internal opposition groups to coordinate protest activities, but their ability to mount significant aniigovernmcnt protests will continue lo be circumscribed by Pretoria's repressive security measures. The ancs reluctance to propose any policy options without prior approval of the internal opposition suggests that it will not offer any novel political solutions to tbe Soulh African problem any time soon. Moreover, the strength and diversity of lhe internal crpposition probably will continue to reduce the ANCs chances of becoming the sole spokesman for Soulh African blacks in any political initiatives or ncgotiations with'.
Prospects For Mandela's Release
moved feuied African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandelaiitiroum security facility on prison grounds last December in what it hinted was Uic first stephased releaseyear-old Mandela has been accorded more liberal family visiting privileges, bul he it isolated from other prisoners and the govcrnmeni continues to deny diplomatic or media access. The rumott of Mandela's imminent release late last yearlurry of activity by black opposition lend en seeking to capitalize on the release to revitalize tho battered crpposition movement. Rumors lhat Mandela will be freed altogether are likely to Surface periodically during ibe coming year, but wcciorut would release him only under eondiiions andime of iu Own choosing so minimi re white rightwing criticism and the risk of sparking new black activism, bbj
Pretoria's Dilemma
The jailed ANC leaders bout with (ubeaeulosis last year troujjrn home to many South African officials the need to resolve the Mandela problem before he diet in prison. Pretoria apparency hopeshased release wcuud placate micntatronal opinion, avoid heightened black cipceiatioos of dramatic political change, and provide ample coporuinily to delay the process If security ccratcorations so dictate. The government may also hope tohased release lo demythrcue Mandela end to exacerbate ideological splits in lhe black community. Pretoria already has argued thai its main torrccra In moving slowly It for Mandela'slaims militant activists who believe he Is more valuable to the oppoiition jailed or deadartyr than free plan to ossatsinaie Mandela if he it released. aMftassj
Pretoria would probably attempt to use Mandela's release to try to draw moderate blacksovernmentsponsor cd negotiating forum such as the prcrposcd national council. If Mandela is given an uneondiuanal release, thm would ostensiblyajor black precondition to talks with ihe govermect
and might prompt local and homeland black leaden, particularly Zulu lender Dutheleii. to join the council.
Security officials--who oppose Mandela's release under any conditions-undoubtedly have warned ihat he will immediately engage in illegal political activity, forcing bis reimprisor.mcnt and fun ha aggravating racial tensions. Moreover, tbe govcrnrncot It mli smarting from the negative while reactionhe unconditional
/
release of ANC leader Govtn Mbekibeki immediately began political aetiviiy and the governmentwithressictioris cc hai
em mi
Black kadeti hope lhat the release of Mandela would energize the opposition and usherew era of antiaparthcld activity. In response to the widespread release rumors in November, ihey quicklyoorinataog committee to advise Mandcia on policy mora and rxepare for pontic contacts,
I Mandela would beighlightedcderate but far-roac hing reform agenda, and to initiate discirssionside range of South African and international kaders, including the National Party, lie would serveridge to all communities In South Africa. Indudiag business, white moderates, and Buihelczi By taking the cbplcana-uc offensive, oppottitioa kaders hope Mandela could prevent Pretoria froms release to score avaetory. Opposition kaders, however, fear that Mandela's release would reduce international support for cccoomic sanctions aru^jolcmiatic isolation of the South African GovemmcnL H
Deipde the cfTcru of black leaders to prepare for rus rckasc, MaraJcla's own internals are urclcar. Al though he procaMy wouldkcision by the ANCs kwocrship io exile and senior mternal opposition karleri loeace Initiative, Mandela might argue againstourse. He ii probably frustrated by the relative success of Pretoria's regional diplomatic offensive at tbe same time thai it has increased rcprcsssdn raoraesucelly. aad probably does rot believe the government is prxaarcd lo negotiate settously with legitimate block leaders. Mandela almost certainly recognizes that bis release will rtrcrvidc the opposition a
ime opportunity that must be capitalized on qotckly. Ho would bo discredited in the eyes of many blacks if heeace initiative thai failed lo produce early results. Mandela might therefore choose to confront the goverrirnerM directly and provoke his rearrest, therebyowerful symbolo the i
Prospects
Despite wanting to reserve the issue, Pretoria is unlikely to risk alienating conservative whiles by icleasing Mandela priorstcionel parliamentary ekction
e ctlked later ihis year. Even ewer the longer term, Pretoria is unlikely to release Mandela
unless it Is cemvinoed il can contain any resulting black
moves toward political mobilization
The goverr.rnentree Mandela because his actions and impact on the black community would be Lrnccrssibie to predict wnh accuracy. Mandelayducal figure to raillrcos of blacks, particularly to idealistic youth, and his release could prove the catalytic event that wouldew wave of rntlirtnwioe unrest. Mandela undoubtedly nxognizos that he could anger many blacks if he attempts to present himself as the sole spokesman for the black majority or if he appears to be taking tooine with Pretoria. Aiihouga be lithe mot! popular black leader ia South Africa, he represents only one pol ureal faction andean be only one vcace at the negotiating table. Mandelas assassinaDon--by rightwing or radical left wingalmost Le.-taniy would increase black anger and frustration, leading lo widespread violence, perhaps
A Case Study: Ru With the ANC
Talks
Iu longstanding ctTorUsolate white South Africa, (he Afncan National Congress (ANC) has recentlyampaign of selective ckaJogue. For yean the ANC hat sought io isolate white South Africaariety of political rttcasurce, including lending support to theotions campaign, championing cultural boycotts of Southusicians and orusu, and promoting on international sports boycott of South African veams andeeting ktst October io Harare between the ANC and South Afiican rugby officialsase study of tho ANCs new campaign: selective dialogue with Afrikaners. Tho ANC probably hopes us dual strategy of raiting isolation with dialogue win weaken white resolve, foster divisions in the white commiinity, and increase ANC legitimacy. HHP
The Setting
The rugby talks are ine most important caam pie to date of the ANCi campaign of selective dialogue- InNC ofliciali metroup ot SO while South Afiican liberals in Dakarecond, smaller meeting was head in Frankfort last May. The ANC has also met at various times with white business, union, and church
Tht Playtri
South African rugby oOiculs initialed talks with tha ANC in an effort io reenter International competition, preferably before the centenary celebration of the Transvaal Rugby Union this year. The chasmon of she occraoal South Afrtcar. Rugby Boardouis Luyt. met secretly with ANC ofliciali twice to lay the groundwork for tho Harare meeting last October. Luyt then convinced rugby czar Dunie Craven, chairman of the racially cUvided Sooth African Rugby Uriictieeting with the ANC was for the good of South African rugby.
The ANC dearly valued the oppcetuniiy to meet with senior Afrikaner rugby officials. ANC leprcsenuLves at the Harare meeting included Secretary General Alfred Nio. Director of Publicily ThaboMbeki. and Cultural Secretary' H
ANC has adnuued that iu efforts to isolate while South Africa have been counterproductive in scene respects, and ANC cff.cials have hinted lhat they may solum iheir support forcnr old sports boycott. Ideally, ihc ANC would like so beositionerate where the boycott would apply and where it might be relaxed. The officials have suggested that iheir new policy will be to coopctate wish South African sporu and cultural groups that reorganize themselves aloog rtonrocial lines. Tbe ANC probably behoves the Afrileaitera tports-mx-iiaotent lever with which to influence white South African amides. Indeed.rugby, an Africaner passion, has been referred to ai "the soft utxfcrbclly of the Afrikaner psyche.
The Maich
The meeting in Harare opr>aucd quite successful. Luyt and Craven reportedly apccd-subjcct to approval by iheir respective uriions--ioingle, nonraciai mgby onion and promote nonraciai rugby at all levels in exchange for ANC supportifting ofoycou of Sooth African
i the rugby issuc-lhc ANC hadoup by ncgwiaung wiihikancrt |
The BacktrackingHarare meetingtorm ofboth the ANC and South African rugbyThree days after the Harare riseeting,denied thai uSo
rugby rnjrccrneni hed violaicd the international sporu boycott and stressed that the rugby officials must firstingle nonracial rugby union. Tho ANC officials added lhat only when nonracism is firmly rooted in Soma African rugby would they advocate relaxing the boycott They bockirackcd further by suggesting that their preconditions would bodiffteult-if
not impossible"io meet in the ibsence of broader political change, barkening back to their earlier slogan "no normal sport in an abnormal
Meanwhile, South African Government officials fel: backedorner by Conservative Party criticism of the rugby talks just prior to nationwide intiriicipal dections. and lambasted Craven and Luyt publicly for meeting with ANCn response to Eovcrnmeni pressure. Cravenublic statement that his union would not moot again with the ANC. He did win support within the SARU. however, for the goalsingle nonracial rugby union and the elimination of sports apartheid. taai^BBj.
tho rugby offieials had used the ANC for iheir own rMirposes and dumped it when pressed by the South African
ANC President Tambo was personally bluer about the rugby officials' decision lo shun i
Lessons Learned
A key lesson from lhe rugby talks is lha* uogential issues, such as the sports boycott, arc difficult to resolve in Isolation, suggesting that brooder political agendas inc.aably will intrude and frustrate compromise. The white rugby officials justified their talks wiih the ANC by claiming to have won important concessions ftom llKr^CHJpwiihoutjcopardlaingwhltesccurity. Foelti part, -he ANC publiclyiuu-in exchange for minor concessions by Ihe amiapnrihcid opposiiion--ihe agreement would hasten the end of aporihcid- The dynamics of such competing claims probably will be repeated in (mure ANC Afrikaner utiles on tangential
i.
Despite the difficuliy of reaching compromise on tangential issues in the absence of serious negotiations on fundorncrual political questions, the rugby lakes probably were useful. For iu pan, the ANC sees progress whenever it can engage ln dialogue with Afrikaners. The rugby meeting and other ANC-Afrikancr talks provide each side an oru^alunUy to put
I
Economic Challeng
How Is Economic Policy
broad outlines ol the economic policy apparatus in South Africa differ little from many other countries, irxlodiat; the United States.ther aspect! of South African pubic policy, however, theacial probternsnique context for economic decision making. In addition, resident Botha's teehoocralic manage mem style is imprinted on the econorrtic policy proeeii,elatively fluid systembetter ot worse-can react Quicklyomestic political or economic factors, or perceived external
n the South African Context
Frea>ria'l economic policy goals include nearly aarvertal objectives: (aster sustained real growth, lower inflation and uncmptoyrnent rates, and improved national economic sceuriry. South Africa is also concerned over the country's balance of payments and foreign debts. Moreover, in common with many other African governments and the United Kingdom. Picsotia has com mined itself publicly to privau ia'jx and economic deregulation to enhance economic eiricieRcy.
South African ccooocaic pcxacymakart face iiKorncdiscnoation concerns that complicateselection,ome exient-lhese tactonother countries as well. For example, inefforts. Pictorta hascfcstruoxnisrc rjm ilar to thatas civil servants move to protect jobsvested interests. South Africa's rulingalso is by no means unique in worrying aboutrate hikes would affect its electoraldebt-burracned
Pretoria's rears about unchecked black urbanization find close parallels elsewhere, especially in other developing nations.
Despite limilariiies with economic policy Issues in other countries. South Africa's racial problemsnique context for the eccnornic decision making process Economic policy historically bas been used to advance while, and especially Afrikaner, inuseats to the disadvantage of the country's other racal groupt.8hite mierests were entrenched through an increasingly rigid and legally defined caste system.owever. Pretoria has feltnough about ihe economic status of Afrikaners and whites in general -and worried enough about the rigidities of the system and waves Of violent black protest-toradual relaxation of the rcstrie uont on black econctnicascent white backlash to these economic reforms hat guaranteed that economic policy making In South Africa is highly politicized, gxfsttsssj
In addition to domestic political factors, related security considerations add to the unique context of economic decisionmaking. Given South Africa's extensive preparations for Western economic sanctions and rtctwotk of ecranomic ticseighboring states that give it considerable regional leverage, the overlap between eccnotnic and security policy is relatively large,
Key Plovers
The three lop rrtacrexxonoraic fxralieyrna
arcethroe holdpolicy jobs, serve on committees thatof economic policy, and haveprobably enhance their influence.that President Botha onlymatters as necessaryesolvethose with high political cxwicnt.
9
and consumers. Botha probably made the subsequent decision toharp interest rate hike shortly after the election, bbj
Dynamics or Economic Policy Process
Wc believe routine ecoooraic decisions--such as budget
form illation or day-to-day adjustments to money, public
debt, cr exchange rate pohcies-gcnerally arc made and approved by various economic committees, in some cases culminating in cabinet-level review. The budget process, for example, begins with broad multiyear targets set bya te President's Committee on
Nauonal Priori lies. These targets are refined by Public Finance, which then makes specific yearly budgetary rxoposals that are reviewed by various budget coremiuces. leading up to discussion and approval by too cabinet. Other committees guide and monitor actual spending over the courseofthe fiscal year, including over budget spending I
TV rormosruc policy process is relatively fluid,
and tbe patternsraJn^friWr to vary in response to changing circumstances and pcrsonaliu'es. This fluidity undoubtedly tt more proocorxed in lhe case of at) hoc Oeosiorai. such as the rmposiuonmlateral debt moratorium5 or sporadic changes in prime inicj est rates, where lite mitiativcolicy shift can come fiom any of scvcraJ key individuals or committees. Botha's personal emphasis co technical eaperuse hats added to the fluidity, as government economic analysts and outside experts often are lapped to assist or critique decisiorti, according to diplomatic sources.
Assessment
The fluidity of economic decision making infcaource of both strengths and weaknesses, in our view. For bcuer or worse, policy can be adjusted relatively quickly in response to economic crises, domestic political developments, or external threats. So long as cool heads prevail, quick response can be advaniiipeoos.teminl
fiilexample. Finance Diieemr
mcaeTeeeniy -charged orarticular economic decision, the more likely that the chain of economic committees and analyst*lead to tha State Sec miry Council, cabinet, or State President.
l_
Hsuggest* that mtbtar^cxsErslfy^ffcTtain areas of economic policy making-the sixe and compceiixin of lhe deft for an obvious example
ll, nanoxdDy having high-ranking economic policy makers involved In the formulation of aspects of military policy, and by co-opting government and private economic analysts into military decision making cm an ad hoc basis. In addition, diplomatic sources suggest that Botha has his own "kjiehea cabinet* of economic advisers, including de Kock. government consultant Wim de Villicrs. and leading Afrikaner businessman and economist Fred du Ptessis. Tbe widely varying views among these three advisas probably are partly respoeitible for soma recent lurching of economic policy from tide to tide, as different individuals gain Botha's carassttttttjsj
BImnk
Impact of Western Economic Sanctions HM
doubt Lhat even comprehensive Western rxooomic Sanctions no ail impose rsxough etencerue end political costs oa South Alrics to force Pretoria to slier Its racial po'uoct rapidly and funcuxrocntslly. Existing aanctkmt have hadodes! impact cn the ecortorriyegligible effect cn Pretoria's policies- South African exporters have managed to keep acngcul sales from falling by tappingarkets for their goods, using innovative trading practices, and employing subterfuge to continue trading in rxrenibtted markets. Indeed, largelyesult of higher gold prices and more drjrrjestic spending, the Scaath Afiicanasnoderate recovery7
Dark ground to tbe Recent Sanctions Pretorisrg facedancuora irrended to influence in domestic apartheid policies, as well as iu occupation of Namibia.or example,N General Assemblyesolution recomatending extensive economic sarctions.he Arab rncmbenof OPEC impend an cal embargo asajnit South Africa that remains officially in force,andatory arms embargo resolution was passed by the UN General Assembly Ln g
In the period4rxccxcerJenaed black protest against apartheid and resulting harsher government repression led scene world leaders to support economic sanctionseans of showing cusnpproval for Socih African policies. Tbe United States, as well as the European Community, Nordic countries, Japan, and the Commonwealth oaxioni imposed sanciioni on South Africaotives for adopting sanctions undoubtedly varied, but some advocates probably hoped economic pressures that threatened while lifestyles would eventually compel Pretoria to end apartheid andransition to rnajnriiy rule.^
In addition to formal economic sorptions,eriod was characterized by aa miensificaucn of da facto sanctions, uxh as conrumer boycou of South African products. Most important among the Ir.fcnmal sanctions was the withdrawal of many foreign commercial credit lines front South Africa (the so called "financial sanctions') lhat culminatednilateral moraioriura by5 on most foreign debt principal repayments and subsequent agreerrtents67 with major foreign commercial creditorsreschedule the repayments.
Coping with the Sanctions South African industries have been able to blunt roughly half of the Lheoreixal ftnarxaal impact of saracuoos on
exporters have shitted to newtarge uiig China andoften have sold their prcxJucisiscount. In addition. Pretoria has procnoted ahernailve trading schemes, such as bartcr and other forms of countertrade, to attract new buyers.
believe,South
AfricanDrei^ige and
exploited loopholes to preserve sanctions-affected Western markets for their goods. In some cases, businessmen probably have disguised the point of origin of goods and exported them through third countries, or relocated subsidiaries to neighboring
Pretoria had boned mechanisms for subterfuge oade through years of grappling with embargoes on ils purchases of crude oil and arms, and was well equipped to circumvent those few embargoes placed on sales to South Africa- For example, press reports indicate that
20JBA^myiet9
Africa has used Malawiront to evade Dcnrrutrk's toial mdeese rerxiru claim lhat Danish exports of technical instruments to Malawi incrensed io more iimnimes iheir previous level following the irado ban. Sweden's local trade embargo also has been circumvented Swedish firms have
continued to do business with South Africa through foreign subsicbaries. i
Siffii
Secj*^
Impart of thr Sanctions
Economic. Based on the sketchy data available toand on forecasts by South African privMc md governmente believe sanctions, including debt repayments under the accords with foreign creditors, have trimmedercentage point from South Africa's real annual GDP growth potential through the. Sanctions have slowed export growth, especially for nongotd eipons, which have remained essentially itagnante estimate thai in tke absence of sanctions, nongold exports would have grown by tome IS percent per year.
Largelyesult of higher gold pricesecovery ia domestic speeding, the Sooth African economy hat bad two relatively good years78 that have masked the economic impact of lanciioni. Real GDP grewercent each year, up fromercent per year average over the previous five years. Foreign trade increased, with eaports totalingillion7 and anillionomparedillion"
Nonetheless, despite their modest overall impact, tradeFor example, export revenues for the Soulh African coal industry have declinedercent during the last two years, in part because of sanctions, while textile exports fell by moreercent and steel, iron, and aluminum exports declined only sUghtiy.B
denounce the West as dangerous and tinreliable, while othersore moderate line and recognize the long-term costs of estrangement from Ihe West.
Most black orapositidn leaden publicly support sanctions and many have uged additional Western measures since Pretoria's crackdown against the opposition last year. In private, however, tome black leaders have expressed reservations about sanctions.
; data suggestssuvctions,ajority become hesitant when black ureroployment and economic hardships are seen as direct consequences. Despite these misgivings, most black political activists probably still favor international economic pressure against Soulh Afrit
Outlook
Despite renewed calls for sanctions in toeac areas. Western governments appear reluctant to adopt additional economic pressure. In any case, the ability and willingness of western nations to imposeomplete embargo on South Africa's exports kt problematic. Roughly half of South Africa's annual carport revenue comet from materials such as gold, diamonds, and strategic minerals. Their generic physical characteruiics. high value-to-weight ratio, and use in metal alloys needed for defense ty sterna rneke these items difficult to embargo, fj
Economic sanctions have bad minimal impact on Soulh Africa's policies. Even after someears of informal and formal sanctions. Pretoria continues to defy calls for an end to apartheid. We believe the government'soliucal concerns, rsanicularty lis determination lo maintain white power, will continue to dictate its policies.
Most white Soulh Africans regard Western economic sanctions as hypocriticalorm ofanctions undoubtedly haveongstanding sense of isolation that reflects both South Africa's geographic distance from world centers and (he anachronism of apartheid. Government officials are split on how io react to growing isolation. Some
In Our view, sanctions alone are unlikelyorce presdect Botha to undertake rnodincaiicextof the country's racial policies lhat he would riot otherwise make South Africa's extensive and costly preparations for sanctions rnake it improbable thai Pretoria would cave in to foreign economic preasare without first testing its abiloy to withstand comprehensive measures.
Given the likely limits ive sanctions to cripple South African exports. Pretoria almost certainly will coratinue to formulate its pouctcs without substantial regard for such aue/national pressut
Copingettered Economy mm
Soulh African economy ii unlikely lo avenge more ihanercent real growth per year over the neat four. can. given the ceedepay foreign debt and likely slow arowxh of export eazningi. We expect average income per capitaall, black unempkryment rates io rise, and Pretoria to face harsh budgetary choice* between sockieconornic spending and security needs. Tbe modest average economic growth performance Is likely to reinforce lhe existing polwjcal impasse between bktck demands for full politiral participation and Pretexts'* wdlingeess to offer only limited apartheid reforms, pj
Recent Economic Performance The South African economy bat averaged onlyercent real growth annually over the past eight years, down from an averageercent per year in. Growth rates have been whipsawed0 by huge twings in the world ranee of gold- which accounts for saneercent o( export earnings--as well atrop in world demand for other commoditiesrolonged drought in southern Africa, Tha world gold price bit an all-time high of0 per ounce Inat since then has potted yearly averages ranging from0 tourifig the same period. South Africa's annual real economic 'growth* hat variedercentositive SiJ
Policymakers have publicly admitted adding to the economy lurmoi: through etisrs cf judgment, South African officii fundamentally misread domestic economic and world gold price trends by underestimating the strength of tbe domestic recovery and overestimating world demand for gold. Once the policymakers realized the magnitude of the resulting current account deficit, they tried to protect the balance of payments by slowing economiceduce imports Interest rates were pushed upercentage points in less than eight monthshe private banking sector reacted, however, by borrowing overseas
at relatively low rates, rtlhcr than by lending lest. Asa result, tbe current account deficit widened,risis of corJdence soon resnbed oval was exacerbatedising tide of violent political protest in the black townships. Byun on the rand had forced Pretoria tonilateral standstill on most foreign debt repayments and to retighcen other controls on foreign capital repudiation. Pretoria, realizing that as an icwnaiicoal pariah there was no easy recourse lo IMF loans or formal multilateral debtpproached its major commercial bank creditors and worked on two interim debt repayment aaxrds. The more i ot Ihese accords will expire next real
Since the advent of Soulh Africa's debt crisis--more aptlyrieit"auo of debt to GOP waa never excessive by LTtematloaal standards-Pretoria hat sought to rebuild foreign and domestic investor confidence Economic policy makers have credited tough government security meatuses. Including crackdowns on press freedom to report oa black unrest, with making it easier to restore confidence- An oncrrta ji economic recovery begannly to lose steam Mi the face of widespread Western economic sanctions The recovery did not gather sign iflcant momentum again until ihe fourth quarteroreover, even this growth spurt may have been short-lived. BasedIhe sketchy data available, we estimate that the economy did no better8 ihantomatth7 real GDP growth meercent H
Economic Prospects
For the South African economy, growth prospects depend crucially on the amount of export proceeds that are left after meeting ret foreign debt repayment obligation* and other capital outflows. The Reserve Bank it likely to use part of the residual foreign currency earnings to rebuild relatively depleted foreign
OROtm OFRATE
DOMESTIC PRODUCT
USrail RAND
' tnno Data la Eatlmatad
" London avaraga dally fixing prloa
ul ihe rest will be available to ihe economy for ihe purchase of physical capital andlary geech imparls Deeded lex economic expansion
End of iht Mint-Boom. The recent more rapid economic recovery probably hat become uosusiairiable asanssultofsrjgnaniessrxwrareints. InporociJai,ibe gold pnee has tailed to perform as well as was forecast early lost year by some private South African eccti ivmists. who argued publicly that it would0 per ounce by theereflthtxgt Pre toriahas been slow to take stroog corrective measures lo eui growth and imports--probably because of the political costs of higher interest rates prior todr muriieipal electionsober^hctecovery has shown early signs of slowing. I
udgment that wc share, most private and govern mcnt economisis in South Africa have forecastercent real GDP growthTtose projcciicias generally have assumed an average gold pnec of0 perormal rainfall year, and no major tightening of Western economic sincikjrts. Given ihc uncertainuct surrounding these three key assumptions, the confidence level attached to the specific growth rates projected is fairly low. For example,I CO per ounce increase in iheaveuige gold price9 would2 billion, orercent, lo foreign currency earnings.
Longer Tint Economic Prose*tit. I
in Soulh Africa,
t assuin!rr^BfiTinrrwa7Tcrgoid
H wcdOuruvtlrHjSoutb ^xH^TeHTOm^iiuTveiage moreercent real GDP growth per year over the next four years- Our projection of economic growth potential parallels tevenil that have been made by private and government
isis
I Oixrtceeeast; pWa^wi! irtcrease only gradually in realgrulicanily higher real gold price-that is, adjusted for changes in the value of the dollar and major commodities such as crude oil-would relax the balance cfpeytrstaTtsccnwairiiardalkyw far rraxe rapid growth. Oa the other hand, actual growth could be much lessercent per year if South Africa suffers another
drought, gold faibi to perform as well as antidrxated. the world economy slows markedly, or cxamprehensive and rrtandatory UN sanctkyeis are adopted. I
Political Ira pact of Slow Growth Ecc-iceriic pressures are only one set of (actors- -and rarely tbe decisive one-that affect the South African pohtical dynamic. Nevertheless, mediocre economic growth prospects over the next four years are likely to reinforce strongly the existing political impasse between whites and blacks by heightening compel, lion Ibr scarce jobs and economic ressDtnxee. Based on recentncome disiribution and
anercent lealuW^IowlTiTite overoe neat four yean probably would have the following impact on key economic groups:
While civil servants and unionized blacks would tend to make small gains in real wages, or at least break even.
Other white, 'colored" and Indian workers would lose some real intomc. on average-
A growing black army of domestic servants, farm workers, other nonunion;red laborers, and the ttrierorioyed would fall even farther behind
Slow growth will mod to polarize South African society further by accelerating the drift of while voters io tho right, slowing government socioeconomic spending on blacks, thwaniag rapid black rxonrxmac gains, and adding to tensions in ihe black townships. |
AcctUratlngIht Right. Analyses of past votirg trendi suggest that whites who feel axes vulnerable to economic competition from blacks such as white miners, other blue-collar workers and some civila key component of tbe rightwing vote. White elections in Sooth Africa seldom are fought explicitly on ecortcanK Issues, but declining average real incomes for whiter undoubtedly have facilitated rightwing claims thai Pretoria's limited apartheid reforms endanger white living standards. Conservative Party officials privately admit they could do mote to exploit economic issuet for electoral gain and claim thai Ihey increasingly will do so,|
c3
oihsr Brake on Socioeconomic Reform. Pretoria probably would react to rightwing electoral gains and mediocre economic growth prospects with moves designed to insulate white living sttndards-to tbe extent posstDle-csrxsciariy (or key National Party constituents. For example, thepercent pay hike for dvil servants before nationwide municipal ejections last October.orollary to its moves to protect white living standards, the governmentkcly to cut scjcioeconom ic spending programs aimed at the black community. Pretoria already has trimmed planned increases in spending for black education inudget,The government alroisTkeTyTSec^ ie Conservative Party efforts to stem the transfer of fnnds to black townships from white municipalities va the so-called regional services councils.
Slowing Black Economic Gains. Mediocre economic growth and reductions in socioeconomic spending may thwart significant black economic advancement over the next four years.limate of declining whito living standards and growing rightwing opposition. Pretoria is less likely to countenance other black economic gains and may move to limit the growing power of black labor unions. Some segments of the black population probably will continue lo make economic gains even in the face of Untiled growth and efforts to fetter black unionism, but the pool of econom ically dispossessed blacks-the unemployed, domestic workers, hawkers, beggars, and marginal farmers-is likely to increase
faster than the cadre of middle-class and union bedatssssssssssssj
| thatillion more blacks willy lhend that the black unemploymeni rate will rise byercentage points toercent nationwide,
Keeping the To wnsMps Tense. Although the Causal link between economic performance and black poliucal protest is at best tenuous, several major upsurges in domestic political violence have coincided with sharp economic downturns. Indeed.conomically based grievances of the black population-such as high rates of black unernployrnent and the poor quality of black education and housing-are intimarely tied to broader black political demands. Mediocre economic growth and reduced funds for socioeconomic spending do not guarantee massive new upheavals in the black townships, but-in the absence of fundamental political change--they make government provocations more likely toiolent responseignificant new upsurge in violence probably would dampen domestic and intranational investor cordidence. Economic and poliucal uistabilily might feed back into one anotber-as happenedS6-and cause significant turmoil, but probably withouthreat to the regime. ij*^FJ
Regional Challenges
Pursuing Regional Objectives!
Brazzaville Accords co Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola aad amplemenation of UNn Nimibiao rnOeyenocncetrbulr nc fiar period in southern Africa and have complex ramification* for Sooth African regional behavior. On tha one hand. Soulh Africa remains- BV predorninani regional powerradual reduction in Cuban and Soviet involvement may give Pretoria increased latitude to exercise this role. On the other band, unprecedented domestic anreat. increased attacks by the African National Congreiind stronger international pressure have deepened Soulh Africa's isolation and heightened regional tensions. These new regional and in terra licnal dynamics, however, have not altered Pretoria's basic approachegional relations, whichwo-track policy that mixes coercion and diplomacy, ptssjgasjj
Regional Roles
South Africa is, in the words of an official reovemment media commentary, the 'paramount regional power" in southern Africa, possessing the necessary economic, political, and military assets to maintain iu position and serve iu interests. The South Afncaas are proud of iheir military forces, which are not only larger, more effieient and better-trained than those of most neighboring states, but alto,arge extent, arc self-sufficient In terms of basic equipment. South Africa's economicven more soaring Despite caperiencing0 the worst recession inears and subsequent sluggish growth. South Africa retains economic power so great that its neighbors have little prospect over the neat several yeari uf significanily reducing iheir dependence in areas such as trade, transport, and employment for migrant tabor)
In addition to its role as tbe unrivaled regional power, South Africa--because of its racially discruTiiriatory policies-has been cast sinces the regional enemy. Expected Namibian mcependence late this year or next year will mark the culminationrocess of
southern African decotooitauon that has alteredolitical and security realities facing South Africa, making it the final target of lhe black independence struggle Pretoria has long been aware that its political and social policies, almost universally condom noeady target for international criiicisra.1
South Africa'* status as the enemy of iu black-ruled neighbors also has madeurvival utt state Many white South Africans view preservation of white domination at home as necessary not only for their own SurvivalSostile region, but also for the country's self -ascribed role as the guardian of civilised standards and Dorms in Africa. Moreover, the projection of Soviet and Cuban power into neighboring black-ruled states sinceas convinced roost white South Africans that then regionalmportant tc the East-Westonviction that may be reassessed In the wakeuban troop withdrawal from Angola, but will not be easily abandoned as long as arrasnd support for insurgents remain prominent features of Soviet involvement in the region.|
Regional Goals and Priorities Pretoria's objectives in SOxHhern Africa reflect the preeminence of security concents in in pcaieynseking. In order of priority, the goals of South Africa's regional policy are:
* Df/ioiing she Cuimllas. Pretoriainimum has sought its neighbors' cooperation in preventing military operations by antircgime Insurgents of both the ANC and the smaller, less effective Pan-Africanijt Congress. Ideally. Pretoria wants formal. bilateral security agreements thai would compel its neighbors to banish these groups from their territories. Such concessions can sometimes be extracted as pan of broader agreements. For example closure of ANC military camps in Angola was part of the quid pro quo for Pretoria's agreement to independence for Namibia.
Pretoria's Foreign Policy Dogma
Soulh African regional policy Is based on several strong convictions about black Africa and the worid-and the country's place In them-ihat are shared by most South African whites. These views, rooted in deeply held racist and Afrikaner nationalist beliefs and fears, underpin white resolve and have been reinforced continually by official and unofficial commentary on foreign affairs. Because of them. South Afiican leaders have shaped foreign policy dogma primarily to justify the preservation, of white power, privilege,overning system based on the principle of racial discrimination.^^
So'Ul-backed Revolutionary Onslaught '
Many South African officials, at least until recently, haveoviet hand behind virtually everyavored theme of Pretoria's Soviet demonology has long been an alleged -totalommunist-inspired mdilary. political, and economic campaign against South Africa-thai uses surrogate forces directed by Moscow in an attempt lo isolate South Africa and deny Us geostrategic position and resources to the West. For most South Africans, this threat has been confirmed by the presence not only of Cuban troops but of Soviet advisers and equipment in hostile neighboring slates, as well as Soviet backing for aitiapariheid insurgents. Although the removal cf Cuban troops from Angola will reduce the urgency of the perceived threat, years cf official anti-Soviet propaganda ensure lhat most whiles will remain skeptical of Moscow's intentions.
Moreover, in part to explain away domestic black unrest, Pretoria has recast the principal threat to South Africarevolutionaryllegedly spearheaded try the ASC-under ihe direction. In President Botha's words, of "Godless Communism and International terrorism--ihe onslaught justifies both dracordan internal security measures and an aggressive regional policy. Soulh Africans regard the AMC's tactics-sabotage, guerrilla attacks, infiltration cf domestic black groups to foment unrest, and refusal to renounceits close tiesouth African Communist Party as proofevolutionary strategy aimed at installing black majority rule.
"Black Africa Is Dying"
South African leaders delight in cataloging the failures of black-ruled African states-one-party politics, starvation, economic collapse, and civil war-which Pretoria attributes to the absence of what il insists is the ctvHitlng Influence of white. Western democratic values and tke failure of African political systems to accommodate ethnic diversity. Denying that Its views are racist. Pretoria argues that poUiically immature black states are victims of inappropriate foreign constitutions and ideologies-Manism and socialism-thai have left southern Africa in
A captive of its racial and ideological views. Pretoria discounts the possibility that an independent black state can succeed without white help. This attitude underlies Pretoria's seeming obsession wilh events in 7imbabwc, whose relatively good performance and prospects for stability and prosperity since independence0 threaten South African dogma. Pretoria seises every opportunity to highlight negative developments then-especially policy changes inimical to the interests of while 2imbabweans--as whatsthas colled evidence that "the lights of democracy are (being] dimmed in yet another African
Western Shortcomings
White South Africans are ambivalent toward the West. They identify with Western values and culture but resent what they claim is the West's hypocrisy and lack of understanding regarding Soulh African racial and security policies. The Defense Minister has charged that ihe West, "plagued by post-colonial and racists in league
7
Preserving miliary and Economic Dominance. Preterit has tried to maintain military superiority by opposing'superpowerwould, limit South Africa'! ability to protect itselfonventional threat and project its force In the region. In addition. Pretoria has sought to engage its ndghhors in mutually advantageous trade and other econorruc ues and to prevent any reduction in their economic dependence on South Africa.
Obtaining Political Acceptance. Pretoria huaaxkafly has wantedelations with ill Mackneighbors, of which only Malawi has granted tbe regime formal diplomatic recognition. In addition, the South Africans have long sought loormal, regional body of compliant states- such as the "constellation of states' idea first proposed by Prime Minister Vorster5 and refined by now-Picskfcru
Bothainai would serveexus for Pretoria's regional security, economic, and poliucal
policies
Putting Policy Into Practice Although the overwhelming majority of white South Africans agree on these regional goals, difference*ven at the highest levels-over whether and when Pretoria thould tmphasiie persuasive or coercive tactics to achieve them. South Africans who favor cooperation have long worried that bullying tactics risk bardrning regional and intcrnaaioaal attitudes toward South Africa, llardlineri counter that regional conflict is inevitable, that economic and political cooperation only risks strengthening fundamentally hostile regimes, and thai South Africa's power must be used both to he effecove and to ensure that there is no ambiguity about Pretoria'sation, ajjaajgaa
In practice, the Soulh African Oovernment hit empwo- track approach thai often involves the simultaneous use of diplomacy md coercion. The dual approach hai offered Pretoria flexibalty in dealing with its neighbors because il keeps open the rLpIoanttic option, as well at the orapciusniiy to place the onus for conflict oa others. This rlrlicatr balancing act, however, hat failed to resolve the struggle between hardliners and moderates' for control of the country's regional policy.
Competing for Control. The compartmenting of responsibility for the two regional policy tracks hai contributed to the burcaocrsxic bottle. Security bs primarily the domain of Minister of Defense Magnus Molan and the Soulh African Defense Force in
cooperation with the South African Police. The pursuit of regional economic and political goals ia the main task of Foreign Minister Put Botha and the Department of Foreign Affairsften in consultation with olher ministries.
The ccctrasLng background and eipcrter.ee ofleaJ-ng members of the two groups has exacerbated mutual suspicions. For example, international poatings have given DPAroader, more sophisticated understanding of Western perceptions of Soulh Africa and have stimulated them to consider alternative ways of protecting Pretoria's interests. Such attitudes have been viewed with distrust by the more insular South African security catablislirnent, which often has simply
4S
Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Similarl
ow Pretoria should respond io economic
mLtdy^kaaaaei
ItV^riTsSoover omic sanctions.
cabinet ministers, including theot, axe not always informed of the military's sensitive, coven opera Linnai planss foracks--even after ifaey are carried out.igh poterroai for urvJermuiitig DFA's crtd4Nliiy and causae setJoos resrjooal and iateritstarjrial rroctumjocis.
fraideal Botha ana the State Srctirrr? CouacUn iu rivalry with the DFA. tho mUiury has the advantagelose relationship wilh President Botha. Important disputes regarding regional policy^inatcly have been icaolvcd by tbe ausocrauc I
IWhen Botha wi action, he usually has looted to tbe SSC, an utcreasingly important cabinet comrruttee in which sctudr rnilitary oiTcen play key relet in ccntroUing Lhe agenda. In our judgment. US*ggrcssive. hardline attitude toward the region gcnerally-bui notset the lone for SSC ckxisions. Bods* and civiuan roemters of the SSC have Overruled the military on rare bet significant occasions. Such as the decision4 to sign the Nkomati Accord with Mozambtqu
The military'i prcoominance is sometimes underminedack of unuy on important issues. We believe lhat ibe military Leadership spirt over an appropriate military response to Angolan developments7nducing the large-scale Cuban rxsptoymcnu toward the
borderfor
example, military
polltlcully motivated decision to announce-but not immediately totroop withdrawal from southeastern Angolaubsequently, they probably also disagreed among thcmaclres stout the des JiSliiy and feasibiliiypkjmatic rather than mUnary response to Cuban moves and, most recently, over me erjequacy of the termsettlement on
Pushing the Dlptomatle Option.he DFA bas sought, with increasing success, to regain lu influence over regional policy from thehe DFA's prraogeiiWaHcWffliWnntrama'iotitl isolaaoa and the growing appeal of white righlwlng pajties that back the military's hard line, bul senior DFA officials already were preparing to exploit quickly new ooponuniticx to regain influence pj
In our judgment, the DFA's strategyoreign policy corneback has been based oo bul Iding support Ibr aa "Africa first" policy Tbe approach-grounded in foreign Minister Botha's belief that Pretoria meat gain actepancecaap do totheof the world-has consjsaed of proposing economic initiatives toward the region and Kirmpting toopular image of South Africarapcxisible and essential partner ratheroslabillzing force. Sauifactory rraoluiitxi of ihc ulks on Angola and Namibia has boosted this strategy and given DFA new opoonuoities to pursue contacts wilh block African Leaders. The strategy also involves ntending fences with the military, however, byimilarly hard public and private lice on security. This tough line has included oemanding security concessions from ndghboring states, such as Bottwana, in return for other forms of cocexrauun.ltstttstSB
The DFA strategy bas benefiicd irom aggreisivc new leadershipirector43enetal Vanespected by the security establisbrnent. according to Brae-US Embassy, and DFA otTtcers have load our Embassy that in scene cases working level relauoni with the military have improved. In addition, the Embassy has noted belter morale within ihc DFA recently, especially ger officers. The Africa section it now the
The successful negotiations in Brazzaville on fcnplemeoiion of UNnd Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola--as wellenewed rapprochemeni wiih Mozambique-have raised Ihe DFA'a influence cccrslderably for lhe moment, id our judgment. The comparative strengths of Pretoria's coercive and diplomatic regional policy arms, however, will continue to shift back and forth with changes in domestic political realities, the relative effectiveness of toproib'utryanddhrioniat* of neighboring states to South African initiatives, especially once Namibia gains independence H
Over the long haul, the attitudes and policies of Pretcoia, its neighbors, and the ANCecipe for continued regional conflict, and almost guarantee [hat the security
services will, on balance, have the cominant say in South Africa's regional policies. Pretoria's apartheid policies will remain the fundamental obstacle to lasting regional drtenie. So lorhite minor liy continues to dorrtinate the Soulh African Oovenasxnt. we foresee no change in Pretoria's fundarnental regional objective* or in its neighbors' continued defiance Thus, even though the Brazzaville Accords may bolster the irunuence of the DFA and iu Africa first Doticy. the region win continue to experience tension and turbulence as cross-border violence ebbs and flows,
i
The MUitary-The Next Mission I
iigning last year of the Braraaville Accord! thai cail for Cuban troop wiiidrawal from Angola and irdeprascence lor Namibia has caused its professional tolCuert, poltcyrnakert, aad private catiaens lo review the million and capabilities of the Sooth African military. Following "he end of its direct involvement in lhe Angolan civ il war. Havana's deploymemarge and tophisticaad force near the border wiih Namibia exposed tactical vulnerabilities and limaaticrts is Dae South Afrkan Delrnse Force (SADF) that tnilitary planners will mark at priorities lo redress even after Cuban Iroops have completed their phased withdrawal from Angola. Military leaders will also reexamine theirolicynukking andlanning to cry to ensure lhat their influence does not diminish. Soulh Africa's hesitant response to last-moving events revealed Strains and conflicts ln thepparatus. Moreover. Pretoria not only underestimated the throat and poliucal resolve poecd by Cuban fcacca. but alao uadcresu mated the odmestic corrsL-aints imposedack of will needed toai that threatened to escalate white casualties and other costs.
Daunted If Undefeated
Soulh Africa was not defeated on the battlefield, bul for the first time in modem history its leadership was unnerved by the peoapectell armed adversary able to Inflict actions casual ties on South African forces ia conventional warfare In out view, military considerations weighed most heavily in Pretoria't decision to negotiate lhe Brazzaville accords. Al the peak of its wue4vemcni in1 andouth Africa may have commuted moteroops io southern Angola- Pretoria provided aerial and arUtlcry support to TJNITA in addition to crucial logistic aid such as fuel and medical supplies, faj
By March end April of last year Pretoria was faced with the prospect of its troops becoming bogged down in the fighting. In early May, Havana's tactics-involving the movement of0 menanks, and the
construction of several airbases well within range of lhe NamibOQ border-began restricting South Africa's ability to operate in scaiii western Angola. Having caught Pretoria off guard, the Cubans continued moving south, pushing the SADF back Into Namibia in laly and, in oar judgment, causing President Botha and bis aenior advisera to accept reluctantly the idea of negtxiaiing Namibian independence in exchange for Cuban Droop withdrawal, r
i the other hand, the SADF also learned several hard lessons from iu Angolan mtervcreion. The Air Force's inability or ur.willingness toircraft incursions from south western Angola into Namibian airspace, and Cuba's sobering display of air power in striking ihe Calucque Dam. exposed air defenteofti-'i.'i ia's rjtotela igei Other military branches criticized the Air Force for its reluctance to support tome ground combat ceperaiions in Angola. Moreover, the aruerrauicews] arms embargo operationally handicapped the South African Air Force by hampering ha ability to replace lost aircraft or procure sophisticated antiaircraft defense syMmnH
9
Scajth Africa* forces, while well trained, suffered from poor araareks bofli in Angola and hbaroibuL Low morale among South African piho regardde pui d. and their increasing attrition as many opt for private sector jobs, exacerbated the Air Forces
Moreover, i
to maintain battle alertness as fighting alongside UNITA forces around Cuilo Cuanavale miermfied South Africa's rVarfsion in August to withdraw from Angola and proceed wilh ocarotiauoos for Cuban troop withdrawal andndependence compourded morale problems, particularly arnong junior rafnean eager to prove thernselves in combat and srnWor officers who had prorered arokticos cogency plans for attacking and dislocating the Cuban fceccs near theboroex These hawks argued thatlcxnau were giving away Narrobta. and thai consequently the next war would be fought on South Africa'sats-
Losiog the Bank at Home
In addition to low morale among iu uoopt, the SADF for the first fame faced some ambivalence at homo.DF has historically enjoyed almost unqiH^uoncd white public surxport. which translawd into direct political influence and clout for large defense budgets, even during financially troubled limes. Military leaders probably are now eottcrrad that the growth of antiwar -which bau been directed irtairtly at the
tg National Party-ccrua! give wayervasive distrust of the defense forces. The military may also worryc cceu-dence us its abililybe eroded by pcrcr^usn
d lhatDF backed
believed that losses were actually much higher than reported, and no mention was ever made of the numbor wourtded. Li response to growing public apprehension,DF released some details of iu involvement In Angola inn late May, however, persistent rumors that hundreds of while casualties had been concealed from ihe public compelled Defonse Mlrvlster Malan to address the while House of Assembly. Malar, reported on the number of white Southaboutn the last year-arvd tried to laim LVrsequest^.uig the war as. Nonethetkss. contrary to the govertLrrteiu's insissence that the Army had completelyrom southeastern Angola, rurnots spreadncanrc Scuth AXrlcaa corxirraenr had been Barocrrutod ard cut off in Oato Cuaoavale. Also irdxaiivehangingrr.herscf theut voral Erd Ccxascriporxa Campaign began criticiiing the war in Angola th addition to military service in South Africa's black townships; thewas subsequently
The drop in public support at home may have partly accounted for Pretoria's slow reaction to events. Even after Pretoria was clearly aware of Ihe magnitude of Cuban deploymenu. its response was ambivalent and phlegmatic. For example, we believe ihc very limited callup of reserves in June reflected Prttoria's rJulrot toessage to the Cubans yet remain sensitivehite population already feeling burdened by lu time and financial cemmitrneno to serving la tne citizen force. Furthejirtore. while Pretoria must have antacrrxtied retaliation tor Us aggressive patrclling in sojh-efiem Angoia and shelling of Cubant Chtpa in hue June, it was apparently jrprepared for the Cuban <
the seemingly unwirmable war in Angola dragged on. white Soulh African soldiers were being killed in Increasing numbers, even though seasoned black soldiers end most of the fighting. Many durenj
n
Losing Arrows From ibe Quiver
will be the unrivaled regional power once ibe HCubans dcpaiiH
would increase their military capabilities ino protect themselves from South African cross-border attacks, but their armies would remain primarily defensive and lightly armed. <
Although Soulh Africa probably will face no conventional threat in the near future, its withdrawal from Angola and its acceptance of Namibiao indcrxavlcnce present the SADF with several political, strategic, and operational challenges. In Namibia, for example, Mpacha airfield at the Op of the Caprivi strip has coaended the South African Air Force's range well
rntocerrtral Africa. The loss of this airfield and lhe base for the Capririattaitcm-whose members speak the same language widely used in western Zambia-willorward staging base and iruelligence-gathering tool from South Africa's i
By withdrawing from Angola, the relinquished an important training officers. Similarly, lhe increasingly South African arras industry has reputation tor producing equipment under fire ia the field. Furthermore, excitement of actual combat to of flying aging aircraft the already South African pilots may increase.
Ar.gola, gi.
m
Foettack. Pretoria run tried to use iu relationship wilh UNTTA to gain greater pctitical and military acceta to the VV^ Although we believe Sooth Africa will continue to give UNTTA financial asiituncc and hmlicd tcehrucalbian irw]epender>ce will require Prctcvia to ctramatically scale down its program.esult, we believe thai Pretoria's Influence over UN1TA is likely to decrease along with iu Intelligence collection oo Angola, giving South Africa less ability to court the Wear.
Out look-Th* Neat Mission Tho SADP kadership almost certainly teesneat mission as one of (sorting iu slightly dulled influence, prestige and resaliness. Its first baric is likely toorneaoc bureaucratic struggle to preserve as moch of the military bolf.e! ashef eapectadons thai Sooth Atnca wia save up0 million per year in military outlays throigh its withdrawal from Namibia. Military leaders probably will claim that imm inert Namibutn irdeperdence rscentsiUies rapid construct; cn of KtUuations along the Orange River and other frontier positions in South Africa. |
In the longer term, military leaders probably will push hard lor offensive paeatige projecu. both to deter potential aggressors and reassure white South Africans, who. while generally admiring iheir military, may have lost some faith in iu invisibility. CorKerns over air defease will not abate completely with the Cubanhe military Is Ukely to press for
i an advanced jet fighter. Rumors (hat Zimbabwe is shopping for high fxrfceinarsce aircraft, perhaps,he SADFt desue to upgrade Its air
DF probably wQl employ other rrteans of sending iu message of strength to white and black South Africans, netghboring states, and the inicrnaiional community. The miliury. once relociirt to use iu (cares to serve as polKeaieii for Scuih Africa's black
At effort to its
rorvd. campaign-by. the same lirne, the SADF mayounter insurgency program and launel border raids against the African Ntuonal Congress, tenting that the wiled orgaiization will be off balance at it relocates from tniining bases In Angola. Finally, if urtantlcipaied cvenu-sucbeversal of the Cuban troop withdrawal process-force South Africa to (lemonsoatc conclusivelyas sharper arrows remaining In its quiver, Pretoria mayuclear test, which we jedge South Africa could ccnducl anyolitical cccisicci to proceed. I
Irwultiil
i
."a
fighting international isolation!
Africa bar made sortie progress in recent moo!hs toward itt dual foreign policy goals of gaining acccpiancc and cooperation in the region and fighting tnir^tuoria! isolation and economic sanctions. Pretoria has deftly taken advantage of goodwill surrounding its signing of the Braazaville Arxords with Angola and Cuttt-ardssaer Client iu warming relation? with Moravnbique--to convince many foreign and even some domestic critics that it has abandoned iu abrasive, dcsubdinng regional policies toood neighbor Some observers have evenreegional moves presage iirmificant apartteid reforms at home. We believe, however, that ihc fundamentals of South Africa's regional policy remain intact and lhat Pretoria's increasingly authoritarian approach to donsestic opposition and commitmentf govetTanent rernain
unfeol i
Africa First
oothold of acceptance aod legitimacy in Africatepp.ni alone to broader acceptance in tbe international communityornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy. Pretoria uses persuasive and coercive methods- alicmaleiy or al tines sirnultsneousiy--to gam or forceccpciauon, among iu neighl
Pretoria currently it emphasizing diplctrsatic rnlibitives and economic induccraecu ever dctubiliza'Jon tactics ia iu regional policy. South Africantressing "Attica forew label for an old polky-which calls for African solutions to African problems. It is designed to inn.' postin the region, emphasise regional economic inavrk^endenec, and underscore Pretoria's regional
Tha Braizavillt Breakthrough Pretoria's agreement to imraenscn* UNn Nanubian independence was prompted by the mounting costs of military operations in Angola and
Namibia. In the past. President Botha and the miliury steadfastly opposed the UN plan, largely because of tbe security impliwiionsostile ptvernrnent in Windhoek led by the South-West Africa People's Organizationhe augmentation of Cubann southern Angolaomestic backlash against whits South African earsnaliiet led Pretoria toegotiated compromise. Botha apparently calculates thai the accord is in Soulh African Inlcrests and that Pretoria will have adequate miliury and cconornx levers againstWAPO-led Nana.bun gOvemmci
Pretoria has mado the Brazzaville Accords the centerpiecearefully orchestrated effort to improve South Africa's intcmatinnai image and fitrther Icrigitardirigapid scries of visiu hue last year by Botha to several African capitals--as well as West Germany. Switzerland, andhis image in South Africa and fostered hopes that South Africa was moderating iu posture la the region, mm
Diplomatic Offensive
Botha's summit with Morambkan President Chlsaano in September fueled hopesroad regional rapprochement Soulh African propaganda linked warmmg relations with Moramb.chie to devekDC-nicr.tr on Angola-Namibia as evidencetow era Id the region The Botha-CliLssano meeung, however, was the culminationearlong effort by both Pretoria and Maputo so improve relations and the Angola-Namibia talks probably had no significant erteci on the liming of the summit.
Pretoria undouoteoly attributes the current state of relations with Maputo to the ctlcctiveriest of iu policy of com busing military pressures and economic inducements to gain acceptance ia the region. It has increased iu diplomatic and economic leverage over Mozambique without rigiuOcantly limiting iu miliury
options. Despite iis assur one esaputo, wc believe Preorairiues low-level coven assistance toeS RENAMO insurgents. Meanwhile, Sooth Africa can point to regular liaisontaunch member of the Frontline Suites rn its efforts tt> pressure other countries for improved relations. aaaj
A period of relative calm in southernall parties soughtaVlaBnjaaBa|ing progress to Angola and Moaxmbioue- reatcred tbe impression ibat regional lensiOBS were dissolving The PrcoUJoo Satra toced down their rhetoric agaanst Sooth Africa, and Prrxoria. for io part, avoided large-sea^ crowrxader rails against the African National COagres* (ANC) despite an ieleasified ANC borabing campaign inside South Africa. Pretoria continued to conduct operations againct theBotswana. Zambia, Mozambique, and Swaziland-but generally opted for covert operation rather than more visible oven strikes.
Pretoria uxok advantage of decreased tensions to Improve ilea to African countries that already were willingeal with South Africa. Malawkan Presidentonly African leader who maintains formal diplomatic relations with Pre torconsentedummit with Bodu In Scpteraber. endZairian President Mobutu, wbo maintains quiet out close contacts with Present, agreedummit in October. Similarly. Ivorian Pres.den: HcniphcuetBcHgny agreedow-key meeting with Bothais swing throagh Europe Bssttttajj
Hopesundamental change io Sooth African attitudes prompted some African leaders who normally eschew relations with Pretoria to become more conciliatory. Zamblan President Kaurtda, who reportedly considered the Angola-Namibiaare opportunliy to resolve the Angolan conflict and gain Namibion independence has considered .
South African propaganda recently cited growing concern among security officials about what they characterizerowing ANC presence in Zimbabwe, ttx Pretoria crjtstirrucs ui cite Botswanain infiltration poute for the ANC After intense South African pressureroadening of formal ties, Gaborone but month agreed to regular meetings on security issues and working- level exchanges on ANC activities in 'paci|
Repacka gingRtform
Pretoria baa tried to maintain mcunentums diplomatic ofJensive by catting domcatic cventsavorable light. For example. Pretoria boosted hopes that its reform program It alive by delaying legislation that would enforce racial discrimination more harshly. After international calls for leniency. Botha commuted the death sentences of the Sharpcvjlle Si* and hinted that Nelson Mandela may be ret key precondition of many blacks to participation In Pretoria's scheme to negotiate limited black
power-sharing.other, .ess prcrnmcnt prisoners have already been released, but were immediately placed rata severe re unctions thai praveat poatical
1 WW
Outlook
We believe Pretoria's new tooknpeeary shift to more aophisucaud. subtle tactics ratherajor charge io lit loog-tcrm goals, and there are clear limits to iu commitment to this tack Pretoria will not jeopardnze its tong term aecurity interests or take steps to weaken while control of the government, ajttttttttj
Someretoria probably already believe lhe diplomatic offensive has run its course. Pretoria will try to reap maximum gains from its agreement on Naraibian iriclependence and rapprochement with Mozambique, bet it will be unable to prolong the atmosphere of goodwill indefinitely unless ll OtTen its Critics toesu^dang new. Other Africanhatsssttttwhich already are willing toimited basis, may agree to high-level meetings with Pretoria, but racither Zimbabwe nor Botswana is likely lo change us policies toward South Africa in the foreseeable fu
ail iu recent moves. South Africa has limited its flexibility only in the US-brokered talks on Angola-Namibia. Most senior officials probably recognize that intranational eipcctaudns now preclude any move to sabotage tbe settlement, j
South Africa will continue to res pood positively to African slates lhat adopt more conciliatory policies. Nevertheless, Pretoria recognizes that its relations with African states could just as easily deteriorate, particularly if it deckles toarge cross-border operation against ANC facilities in neighboringestructive ANC bombing inside South Africa could lead Pretoria to undertakeaid, even ai the cost ofravcrsing the recent easing of tensions in the region.
Pretoria already has raised expectations in Sic trccrrtaccnal community that the tentative signs of moderation Late last yearenewed commjimea to apartheid reform. In the near terra, the government wiD probably try to forge ahead with its scheme to bring blacksimited power-sharing arrangement and may introduce some minor changes lo apartheid legislation. Over rime. Sowever. Pretoria is unlikely to convince many countries that these changes presage meaningful reform |
Soulh Africa Chronology
Highlights
TUs Chronologyompilation ofdgniftcaM development affecting South Africa and is drawn lordly from <nr.ua sources.
ANC-Foreign. Zimbabwean aulhoriifa arrest ri> whites foUcfwoigcat bootbn ANC crzasii house.
Economic.n rax benefit! for US firms in Sooth Africa to ccvrner recent changes in US on laws.
President Botha aiinoonces plans to privatise sttte-owrted rrrros.
Homelands.loodless coup is thwarted by South African intervention.
PoUtttal The New Republic Parry begins plans for disbanding onarch to align with irtaepernlent Denis WorralL
Pretoria effectively bans ail emposaion aciiviries of IS otxaniiarjoos, and places personal restrictions onpposirjon leaders
Paris, France: ANC representative Dulcie Scpterober is
Foreign. Gaborone, Botswana; Sooth African torccs, claim Big they are striking an ANC lacUity,ouse and kin four residents.
Judicial. The Sharpevule Six. condemned to hang,emporary stay of execution.
Media. The Catholic anraarxtrtheid newspaper. The New Nation, is banned for three rnonths.
FoliiicaL The police reserves fire seven men for refusing to reraaunce theirixe.
Unrest.enwtfal car bomb explosion kills three end injuresagistrates court.
Africa
Unreal-Ralatad Deaths
K^wbt bliasa
source; south africa polios unrest reports
Jan Fa* Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sip Oct Nov Dm
Sfoiarnbique proposes the resumption of the Joint Security Commission
and economic cooperadon established under4 Nkomall Accord.
ftetoria area; police uncover lite largest weapons cache to date, includuig an
tirfacr> to-air missile
Foreign. Delegations from (he United States, South Africa, Angola, and Cubaeries of discussions aimed at resolving the fighting in Angola and agreeing on Namlbian independence
Jadiclal Two white pob'cesnen are sentenced co death for the torture and murderlack youth.
Labor. The final version of the proposed Labor Relations Amendment Is released, limiting orgaoited labor's power, and is approved later in the year.
0 memrien Cif the
Sou* Africa participate Incall for three days of lnrKB-hour protest against the proposed LaborL
Foreign. Zambia blamei Soulh Africa for an explosion thatome in Lusaka.
Gaborone. Botswana security forcesaidmall group oficam, capturing two white aitackers.
PotidcaL The three houses of patfiarrsent (white, colored, and Indian) hold the* first joint assembly, but will continue separate voting by house.
I approves the Ccotueiopmeni fall, rjeovidingouncil lo incl.de blacks
VmrtsL President Botha announces the renews! of the state of emergencyew requirement for registration of members of the press.
A callhree-day peaceful protest by black unions draws black tupport at high asercent in some urban areas.
Labor.oweto municipal workerstrike.
Unrnt.ar bomb explosion kills two whites and injureseopleugby match.
Explosions damage cinemas screening the movie "Cry Freedom" in Alexandra G'cruuustsburg township) and Cape Town. F'retoria bens the movie
liemini, Ictharuwsburg; an explcunoairnpy't Bar restaurant at lunch time kills one white andeople.
ASC Jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandelaape Town hospital for treaim of tuberculosis.
Foreign. South African troops begin their withdrawal from Angola, which it completed onugust
South African, Cuban, and Angolan represcniailvcs sign an Angolan cease-fire, agreement
Labor. National Union of Metalworkers memberstrike that eventuallyOO workers.
PeiitkeL Piaoria bans all End Coracriprion Campaign aciiviiics.
rouphile conscientious objectors publicly declare that they will not serve in the South African Defense Force,
Johannesburg; three prominent black Soulh African political prisoners
escape and take (emporary refuge in the US Consulate.
Botswana; Gaborone claims to have foiled an attempt to rescue two imprisoned South African commandos.
Labor. Durban:XO harbor workers belonging to the South African Railway and Harbor Workers Unionday strike.
Political. Four residential area bills, downgraded from national to 'own affairs" bills when colored and Indian parliamentarians refuse to consider them, are approved by the white House of Assembly
President Botha travels to Zaire,rraany, Switzerland, Portugal,
and the Ivory Coast
Political. Someercent of registered black voters participate in nationwide raurucipal elections. In whhc municipal ejections, the Conservative Party gains in inrJiistrial areas and rural areas of Transvaal while the National Party generally holds its own elsewhere.
Unrest. The UDF callsay of peaceful protest to mark the municipal elections.
Four defendants in the Dclmas trial arc convicted of treason and Eater
sentenced lo jail terms ranging from six toears. Seven defendants are convicted of terrorism.
President Botha overturns the death sentence for the SharpeviDe Six and for four while policemen convicted of mwctering blacks.
Media. Opposition paper. The Weekly Mall, is bannedonth.
Political. Pretoria bans all activitieshite eairemlst splinter gioap. the Blanke Bcvryding Bcwcginghe BBB later is replacedow group, the Blanke Nasjonale Bcwiging.
Pretoria releases jailed Pan- Africantst Congress leader Zeph Mothopeng and ANC member Harry Gwnla.
sb
Unrest Four antiapariheid organize lions are banned.
lackshcoung
Brazzaville. Cottgoc tte protocol outlining implementation of UNeginning9 aod Cuban trocp wiiSdrawal from Angola withinonths is signed. The it suiting BrazaaviBe Acrords are torntally signed oneccrnbcr In New York;
PoOsual. Pretoria releases ihc jailed ediior of The New Nanan, Zwehuche S, itulu. and places heavy restrictions oo hint.
Preuxia announces plans to redraw white elecioral disuici toundar iei within each provinee, which cay mcacate that parliamentary ejections will be delayed unul October or9
Unrest. Boksburg, blacksoycou of while shops following the re introduction of "white only* facilities In ibe town.
Pretoria bans si* antiaperthesd organizations.
Original document.
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