Trends in Soviet Policy in the Third World Under Gorbachev
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Trends in Soviet Policy in the Third World Under Gorbachev
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policy in (he Third World under Gorbachev has shifted(ism and away from tbe ideological strictures of the past.shift* will occur is not yei dear. However, the mooientumalready evident and the extent or Soviet discuss ion ofconcepts of international relations and national security makeunlikely dial this or any other Soviet regime can simplythe clock" and reium to Ute attitudes and policies of the
behavior has. in our view, been shaped by two overarchingprimacy of domestic reconsiruction and reform has led Moscowa more benign and stable external environment that wouldsecurityower cost) making it easier to focus on problemsThis has led to Soviet efforts to improve relations with the Westreduce the burden ofetwork of Third Worldobtain increased trade, investment, and technology from the
The second priority is Moscow's intention lo expand iu rolelobala role that is the basis of its claim to superpower status.Soviets have tried to avoid being seen as retreating from thein the face of US pressure, revitalized their diplomacy in keyregions, and tried to expand ties to slates the USSR had
Under Gorbachev, the SovieU have widened tbe range of policyused to promote their interests. Moscow's most effective new tools have been its emphasis on cooperation with all statesore polished team of players to iniplecnent policy. The Soviets also haveore dynamic approach to international organizations such as the United Nations. At the same time, ihe USSR remains the leading supplier of arms to developing countries and continues to relyariety of active measuresof which have been refined in line with Gorbachev's more sophisticated politicalsupport its policies and discredit those of Ihe West.
Moscow's approach to regional conflicts has changed substantially. Soviel leaders haveialogue with Washington on these disputes, supported seitlemeni processes in several regions, withdrawn fromand urged client slates such as Angola. Cambodia, and Ethiopia to
SOVSVIOOliXS*
move toward negotiated settlements o( disputes and conflicts. The Soviets liavc cootinued to supply anna to their allies, however, suggesting that, although they want political resolutions, ihey are not forcing iheir clients to accept "peace al any price."
In two regions of high priority io theAsia and the MiddleUSSR has succeeded in reasserting itselfentral player, increasing iu credibility with former adversaries like China, South Korea. Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere bt the Third World most nations have responded with interest to Moscow's new pdilical tone and desire for economic relations. The pace of these gains, however, his been constrained by Moscow's unwillingness toinancial price to improve relations, the relative unattractiveness of Soviet goods, and the USSR's desire to avoid olfending existing allies like Syria and North Koica
Economic issues have dottiinaled Moscow's recent rclaiions withallies. In our judgment, the Soviets, although nottheir Third World clients, are trying to moveew typethat stresses mutual economic benefit and politicalnoi ideology and military aid. which may well dediae ai progresson ending regional conflicts. This has led to tensions wilh many
clients
The Gorbachev leadership haswo-irack policy towardin Ihe Third World. On the one hand, it has sustained military support (ot selected icvoluiionnry groups such as the African National Congrcs and maintained quiet conlacl with other organtralions. On the other hand. Moscow has urged local Communist parties to participaie in the political process as the way to tjromote change. The military side of the two-uack policy enables the USSR to retain its credibility in situations where it now has few other assets, while the political track expands itt options for influencing future developments
Moscow's new approach will make it more difficult for Washington lo "sell" Third World leaders' on the need to contain an expansionist USSR and may complicate US effotts to maintain military access in some regions. The United Stales will have to deal with the USSR's improving ability lo scire the International Initiative on issues of inictcsl to developing nations and will have lo respond lo Soviet appeals for increasedeconomic and humanitarian problems in the Third World
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I Im paper examines Soviei policy in ibe Thiid Worid under Gorbachev'obal oerspexiivt, with (be objocii.fi of assessine bread treads and patterns, hichliehling areas of continuity and change, and cvalualioo; iheiiL.ui for US inlcccsu. For (ho purposes of ihis paper, the term "Third WorM" refers to the countries of Alia (caciudinche Mietdk East, Africa. Latin America, and (XeaniiAustralia and New Zealand)
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The paper'i condutJoru are intended to coniptcrncnt paper* issued by Ihe Ofllce of Soviet Analysis that cover Soviet strategy and activity in particular countries and regions of tbe Third World. Tbe paper also comfvlernents two other studies recently puMUbed by thM>iT.ce.of_&jvie:
Trends la Soiic< Policy in the Tbifd World Under Uorbachet
mod loitniiixnti ofPolicy in Ibe Third
World
Coif Priorities,
Sovietin ibc developing world underhave been shaped, in car view, by two cncrarcai-iruc priori (ics Tbe first ot ibeae bai been atitcd eiplic'ily by Gorbacbev and other Soviet leaden; the need for dornestk reconstruction aad reform.wrote7 that "pftii-oyka is an urges: necessityrom tbe profounddcrcl-ccment in our society. Any delay in beginning perri-troyko could have led to an exaggerated internalhich would have been fraughterious social, economic, and politicalhe overriding priority of domestic change hasel of shoel- lo mediuni-term foreign policydifferent from those of tbe Brezhnev era
In general, the Soviets appear comtnitted ioore beeuga citcraal environment ibat woaddigher degree of secwrilyower eeat and ihoi make it alio for thorn to focus oa eVennes'je ecoosnie priorities and political problems inch as resurgent minority nationalism. Soviel representatives 7 meeting of Soviet Bloc party secretaries responsible for ideology andolicy issues that the USSReaceful Interna-lional situation ia order lo provide the proper conlcit for "radical reform" in the Soviet Union. Among the specific foreign policy objectives that ariie from Ibis general goal arc improved relation! with the United Sutes. Western Europe, and China, inclading eflom to resolve conflict! in tbe Thiid WorW that heighten the risks of coofrontalioo between ihe superpowers, and Internalrraaweassaau- bilateral andenhance
Anothergeneral obiective springing from the core goal of dotneafic rebuilding hat been ihc need to improve the terms of Soviel economic interaction with the outside world. In the Third World thii hat meant, firit and foicmott. sue moling In reduce the mounting
economic burden of supporting tbe USSR's network of allies. Gorbacbev and Foreign Minister Shevard-nadre told the Soviel foreign policy establishment in6 that the USSR would have to reevaluate worldwide commit menu that drain mjcsouicei anileen,ss.-t
j. Ala. uSe Soviet Uant has aoturni grate, retain! from trade, iavcttaacst. and teetuwtogicml exchange with the deveaoptag world. This hasrcdc*ttini at toeme io tbe writings ce" Soviet academic experts, aad ShevsreUacbe told the foreign policy csiabiishraeal lhat the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must pay more attention toccMomic mailers in formulating itt policy plant
The second coreai hu shaped So.lel policy in the lltiid World under Gorbachev is Moscow'slo capand iu rolelobalole thairitical part of iu claim to superpower itatm Although this concent is not staled asas the imperative of domestic refona. our analysis of Soviet behavior in ibe tseveioping world indicates ibat th* USSR coanin-es toattacfa substantial impoe-tance to pUyiag aa active pan ia Third World affairs, especially in the Middle East and East Asia, areas of high potitKi! and economic interest wtacre ibe USSR has notiedomiruot actor (see fotdout on Ill
One of the tpccific policy objectives deriving from Ibis second coic concern is ibc Sovietntention not lo yield in eitiling positions in tbe Third World in the face ofe!teres toar-reaching US* press campaign, the So* icu coined ihe term "neog total ism" to describetheyat Washington's policy of suing iu military, ceaanomac. and politicalttack and. .fMoscow'! Third World allies. InT C
J laid that Ihe USSR would not bow to ivch
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incisure, and.8 <ulicit, Ycvgeniyeading academician andustified Soviet defense of the USSR's exisi-tag allies in tbe Third World.
In addition, the USSR has sought to extendand inftBerice in regions that it hadneglected or from which it had been deluded,most of Centra! and .Sooth America, and the * aid is7 that
the USSR wanted to expand relations with slates it bad previously ignored or treated solely in the contest cf their relations with the United States, C
hange fromregimes, however, tbe Uorbachev leadershiptpotligbt Monbm-Leninism as an effectivefor expanding Soviei influence in the Thirdreportedly told WarsawT that capon of revolution isand too*
A Broader Range of Instruments
Under Gorbachev, the Soviets have revltaliiedthe rwiige of policy instruments usedtheir ioWrests in the Third World, (nyears the USSR relied heavily on armsthe basis of its presence and Influence inSoviei policy also suffered from anand ineffective diplcirnatlc apparatus.that revamping the tools cf policy wasif Ibe USSR were to change Its Image In theand implement its new foreign policy
The most effective tool of Moscow's new approach is its chanted polllieal The Soviets have shaken up their foreign policy apparatus and brought in more competent diplomats better able to engage ingive and take with Third World ealicials (see inset on policymakinglto, Moscow has moderated the tone of its political pronouncements. Whereas Ihe Soviets used lo sharply criticize the nations of ASexample, as obedient objects ofoviet broadcast praised ASEANorce for peace and stability in Asia. In approaching nonsocialist stales. Soviet officials have emphasized areas of agreement and the USSR's desire for eooperaiion with all states regardless of political orientation
Moscow has also Insensijied In economicout the prospect of increased tradeactivity to developing slates andinterest io joint ventures and barter deals thairequire large outlays of bard currency n7 Indicates thaia lengthy list of proposals to thenew ventures in ihe energy, mining,and ship repair sectors, and the USSRa variety of offers to Bruril, Argentina,for cspanded commercial relations,tc Creviewed1proposals indicates that tbey focus onthe USSR expects to be profitable anddirect developrnent aid or concessionary -j.
The Gorbachev leadership hasore dynamic approach to International political and economic oe-tanliailom. notably the United Nations. Over the past few years, the Soviets have increased their financial contributions io the UN. calledreater UN role in solving regional contacts, and putroposalCoropreheniivo System ofSecurity" that, among other things, seeks to address Third World concerns about doeloptnent and security issues. On the economic side, Ihe USSR has tried io expand its contacts with global economic inilituiions aucb as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and with regional economic and devulop-ment bodies. For example. It has signaled Its later est in joining Asian economic organisations by sending observers to sesiioos of the Asian Development Bank and Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
In addition to these new dimensions of Soviet policy, ihe USSR continues to make extensive use of arms trantfirt. Total Soviei military ddivcriesbe Third World have remained constant overeriod In the range of9 billion per year, making the USSR ihe leading supplier of weapons lo developing stales. The bulk of Soviet shipments has gone to cticnls fighting insurgencies and to longtime customers such at India and Iran, but Moscow has also uted arms offers to court new objects of inicrest.
Cktrgleg Ihe Apparatst
Theoreign policymaking apparatus has undergone two major rtorganljaitonse believe thai ihese changes were Intended to enhance Ihe ability of Gorbachev and his allies to makeonitor Soviel foreign policy and to allow ihem to bring It Into line with the USSR's domestic needs.
The first shakeup was aimed primarily at replacing Bresknev-era holdovers In key positions. This phase saw the appolmmenl of Eduard Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister and Anatolly DobryrHn-previously Ambassador to the Unitedchief of the Communist Partyt ImesTuttlonal Department:obrymn met with little success In his efforts to transform the IDtronghold of ideological orthodoxyore effective player capable of supervising the overall conception andiff foreign polity. Inhttried again. As portarger partyall of the Central Committee dtpartmenis with responslblllly for foreignInternational. Blot Relations, and Cadres Abroadwere combined and put under the amhorllyanpolicy ammltslon" headedey Gorbachev ally, Politburo member Aleksandr Yakov-lev. This consolidation could result In more effective policy eoordlnailon. although the relationshipthe new ID and the commission, members of which have Indicated varying degrees of 'enihwdarm for "newould prove probtemaitt
The leadership has enjoyed far greater success alof Foreign Affairshich hasits role slgn/lcantly. Shevardnadieajor rejuvenation of the MFA,the regional ministries, creatingfor functional concerns such asand human rights, and bringing to thebetter educated officials. He has alsotethntQues In support of policyexample. First Deputy Foreign MinisterBessmertnykh toldfast yearopinion polling was ustajor me first timewith the decision lo withdraw
Changes In the legislative apparatus promise to expand the role of tht Supreme Sorlet In foreign policy decbiormahlng and to turnargely ceremonial post Into aexecutive position, furtherening his hand In foreign affairs. Gorbachev also appears to be moving toward changes designed to secure Input from outside the bureaucracy In the shaping of foreign policy. Although the forms of thisart not yet clear,assible that theSupreme Soviet will become more active In debating foreign policy Issues, perhaps even holding hearings In the manner of tht US Congress
D-uveas [om ef Sonet Policy
Major Moid oa Regfonil Conflicts One of the root! significant area* of change in Soviet policy under Gorbachev hai been ibe USSR'slo regionalovietand diplomats have proclaimed iheir Interest In finding political solutionsrmed conflicts in Ihe Third World, and over theeveral years the
USSR has iteaday intensified iu rhetorical andsupport for several regional settlementForeign Minister Shevardnadze summarized the baste positions of the new Soviet approach to solving regional conflicts in bis1 Speech to tho Foreign Ministry, stating that dialogue between the partiesonflict, international cooperation to
nd ruii.iiui icconiilUliiM with inter nilre the main neps loarard
I1 ag-teioentl
Moscow's new approach icftceis. tn pan. iuers Of limiting potential poinu ol conflict wiih Ihe Weil and of reasserting itselfredible actor in regional affairs In our judgment, ihetc riot its underlie the Soviet Utwoft'i renewed dynamism In the Middle East, -here Soviet intcraeiioa with the key regional players hit beenat ntoniofiaig iatcranitonal peace conference that wouldoviet role ia the Arab-luaeii peace protxat- Stttular goals,esire to fend off US activism in the Third World, also appear to bare ahaped the So*ieu* drpaomatic actrvitr duiing the lail rnonthi of the Inn-Iraq war, when tbey sought to rally regional backing for reducing the US military pretence in tbe Persian Gulf while keeping open their political options with both Tehran and Baghdad
Tableits i
Tbe Cost of So-let Military and Kcoooanic lorolreoKnt In Cfirot Stales lighting
mosta tic shift in Soviei policies, however, has come on another sel of conflicts, the wan(he USSR's Marxist-Leninist clients; Afghani-Stan. Angola. Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. In our view, an additional central motive driving (he USSR's support for political solutions in these cases has been iu intention lo reduce ihe economic burden of supporting lis clients.7 Gorbachev toldc foreign minister* that attempts to "export revolution" bad drained thereserves of socialism.
'_l> (see table I) In addition, Motcow watby the problems thai lis involvement inconflict* posed for its pursuit of high-priority foreift policy goals, both in Ihe Third World and al the East-West level. According C
Sphere was growing dtssalisfaction among Soviei officials in7 wiih the problems thai ihe USSR's intervention in Afghanistan caui"'rig policy in the Middle Bail and elsewhere
In contrast io ihe purtuii by previous regime of military solutions Jo these conflicts, the Gorbachev leadership staled its interest in negotiated settlements, called foi ihe United Nations lo mediate nnd monitor agrecmer.it. and urged ihe United State*y
constructive role by curtailing its backing of iruut* gents nnd joining with ihe USSR io guarantee agree* menls ending the disputes. The Soviets themselves participated in (he Afghanistan negotiations and agreed to withdraw their forces under the termsN-brokered agreement, and they were helpful,to US diplomatic statements, in the US-mediated talks on Angola
In addition, (be USSR has cmpbasitcdts allies the desirability of political settlements (seeihe citent of Soviei willingnessxploit clients' military dependence to pressure (hem on this issue is unclear, numerous rcporu indicate ibat the Kremlin has driven ibe message homeFor example, Gorbachev has (old EthiopianMengistu twice within the pall yearEritrcan war should be "solved peacefullv
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Its backing for political solutions to ihese conflicts and iu Own withdrawal from Afghanistanihe USSR has not insisted Ihal iu other clients negotiateosition of military weakness.
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arms shipmeauthiopia vrfieo separatist rebelseries of banks innd Moscow aad iu DVoe allies have ensuredmilitary
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In addition, with the rscrptionecent shift on the quotron of arms seppUei to Afghanistan, Moscow has repeatedly rejected proposals ihat eaU for theof miliiary aid to iu dun is as pan of aclaiming thatof rcaaticaea
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oal of establishing itselfentral actor in regional aflaii* ii reflected in its new activism In two legions of blgbest priority to iheAsia and the Middlepolicy bad itagnat-ed under breihnev. Ir. both areas, the Gorbachev leadership his puteries of tecur it?Ibat east the USSRJilomaalike "above Ibe batik"o help promote regional security through oegceialsoa. It has stressed iu desire for improved relations with all countries, including former adversaries such aa South Korea and Israel The Sovieu also have tried to improve economic relationsicglonal states, especially with thoset Asia, which Soviet economic experts haveai it vital source of trade and investment for pc'tiirowla In the USSR, especially development of the Soviet Far East.
Gorbachev lis madelo China leading to improved legations, made ovale res to South Korea, and stepped up Soviet courtship of otheritales such as Thailand and thee bai also made two major speeches layingroad set of proposals for Earl Asia, Including removal of foreign mi .ii.ii} basei and troops, establitbment of nuclear-flee rones, talks on naval armi reduction,lelsinli-iypc conference on regional security
between sovereign states andubject forFor example, peril reports indicate that inS Gorbachevequest by Costa Rscnn President Arias Ihal the USSR hall its armsin Nicaragua
Moscow's policies suggest Ihal. although it supports compromise between iu clienu and their adversaries, ll is not demanding that they lurrendei to Opposition forcesid for "pence at anyhis probably
In Ihe Middle Bail, tbe Sovieu reactivated iheir call for an international conference on tbe Arab-Israeli conflict,preparatory conference" of the UN Security Councils pcnniDcnt members to build discern lie mccnentiim. risked Arab disclosure byialogue with Israel, and carvedipJoenaiic role ia the settlement ol the Persian GolfMoscow haa reinforced these initiatives with diplomatic, propaganda, and economic activity,vitit* by Foreign Miniur* Shevardnadze and other topull calendar of bilateral and
multilateraliehaato. red itiMfuI uie of ihc regional media to eoaunnnicaic Soviet poutioni
Soviet progressesult of tbeae tcitiituri sou been steady ralhei lhan tpociaculai. The substance of policy hai changed more slowly lhan hu ihe siyfe on ceitaia hey nines, inelvdiegcontinuedfe* ill Vteteameae. Syrian, and Palcaliritn afliri and in pertinent attempts to diminith Wealern rnili tary pretence and influence through iu security pro pouhv ThU divergence hu en tendered UcpOdim on the pan of some rciional acton atheltimate intentions nnd ledlhein to react cautiously to Soviet initiatives. For example.
haracter ired Gorbachev's once mt'i'l lo give up ibe Soviel bite al Camin Virtuam if tbe United States abandonsfacilities in the Philippinesnterfere in (IS negotiations withIu
Nevertheless, Ibc Gorbachev regime's activism has lod to improved relation* with many counlnci in both regions. For
reported7 that the USSR's actrviimrta image and heightened le^onesianIncipantlcd tiide, and the atmosphericsdimensions of Soviet Lgyptian relationsh/i'" under Gorbachev,In particular, ihc trend
toward improved relations -iih China. South Korea. Unci aad Saodi Arabia bat increased Sovtet political ftciibilitT These pussal have, in our judgment,tbe credibility of the USSR in both areai. significantly reduced the pouibility that ihe USSR can be "curtof regional affairs, and ki tbe stage foi wider and more intensive future involvement in L'att Asia anil lite Middle lUn
OtwnUag* ta Ihr *- Wo. 10
Soviet pu'ttiit ol gocxl relation)capitalist and pre-Wealern Thud Woild itatest Seen limited to tbe Mxldle Fjit and Fjii Asia Since beower. Gorbachev hai greatly increased the scope of thil activity acrosi Ilie enure Third World, using-ider laage of potter lootsourtcovntrin "or adwidepohciei haresome early dividends, as proWcstcin and moderate nMtaligncd sutes have responded with interest to the USSR's new political tone and to iu desire for
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lite objects of Moscow'i attention fall into four overlapping categories:
Regional Actors Relation! with itates such ai Iran. Thailand. Zimbabwe, and South Africa are citenlial to the credibility of Sc'iet regional diple maey and to tbe USSR's atteopu to portray itselfonventional superpower,evolutionary threat.
political and economic links toTltlrd World tialea such at DrarJI.Uruguay, and South Korea representfor Ibc USSR to expand trade aad obti
"Missinghe SovieU bivc sought to round oat ibetl presence ia tbe Middle East and Africa by establishing dialogue and. il possible, diplomatic relations wiih the handful of ttatea in these region! whose ties to tbe USSR were moci bund or nooeirttea! Oer ibc past four years. Moaeow bu opened diplomatic relations witii Oman, ihe United Arab limintet, Qaitr. and Ivory Coast.
- Stainetai olio-ei Interest Through Ihe, the Sovieu hid virtually no presence in the South Pacificen limited poaitioa in Central America Mcvn- probably icta its new dialogue with pao-Wetitin Central Americano and calabtiihmcnt of diplomatic relations withcountries in tbe South Pacific alill superpower credentials and improving in potitioa lo deny the "rat eadusne influence over Ihe long letm
As an the nasi, the Sovkii arder> fcaic continently tried lo ciptoii opcnmei Cm led hi Waal-em. especially US, difficulties for mitnnce C J
3 icpoited7 thai Soviet entreaties lothc Pacific IsUnd slates sought to like advantage of iheir dissatisfaction wiih Western policies. The Sovieu also hive attempted to cipaoit otspotcities presented by US differences in irceai yean wiih (he Phil leaner. Panama, and Saadi Arabia. Al Ibe same lime, Moscow has raoriraycd iiade with Ihe USSR as an alternative for developing countries facing Western import restrictions.
Several factors constrain the pace at whichmake further advances, ll has not been willing,with lu focus on domestic economic concerns.muchinancial price to back up itsIndeed, in the South Pacific ihe Soviets klagrccancet withfocalttXUKX)In terms, according ]Soviei profession, ur uractex mhave run well ahead of Ihe USSR's abilityihiough with attractive deals (sec tableibe need io tread carefully on Iheciisiing allies has slrnosi certainly slowedof Soviet relations wiih proI or instance, we behrve Ihal Moscow's drsiic.
to maintain iu position in list) and North Korea lias affected Ihe pace of development of Soviet relaimniIran and Soulh Korea, respectively.
Relationships With Key Allies: Change and Conttnuley
Th* Mar lis!Slates RedefiningGorbachev.economic concerns hat beenisswes indataonf with nsal'.io in ihe Thud World Sovietpir ihese sUici on notice Ihalre finite and Ihal they can no longer eipcffor cample, tithinorbachev did noi repealpledge, of Sc-irt aid thai Or.-il iihe elieniee..out,bt Soviets icm>iedl>
ilseii ii.iiii'ii and forugn v'jl<r* iions in iclline CoMii 1'm.drni Osirocould not increase nul levelt in Hn<iinn
The Soviets have stressed lo Viernsm, Cuba,Korea ihe aceessiiy of reducingof Soviei ccnasoenie aid.Wling debtto Ihe Sonet Bloc, and oftheii rnoribued economies through reformsto reduce central control and increase
Vieinamese General Secretary Linlt described ameeting with Soviet officials in Moscowbecause the Soviets demandedaits debt to the USSR,astro. Gorbachev insisted, umtscoeufuUy.lavaru adopt tbe principlesiaed
Sovieth have conveyed similar mcasageadirnu such as Angola.Nicaragui, all of whkh have absorbedof Soviet aid bul have made littleFoe ei ample. Soviei envoys haveth* Nicariguans for allowing food aid loon the hack market aad have insisted thaitighten their economicubta.'
paper prcaeatod By Sovset economic advisers an Sc.5 recommended ihat Ethiopia allow Urge scale private farming and private investment in light industry, eiemplilying ihe USSR's iniistence that economic prcduClion. not Ideological orthodoty, mlc Pill priority
Moscow hat suggested that iuCOmmuniat andclicnis sees, greatti tide and investmentountries, almost Certainly in recognition thai only the Wealn-de ihe levels of ecoiwr.ic aid ihese rovntric*it.?
3 sari thai the USSR -ai pushing Prei-Ject dot Santos to widen contacts wiih iht "'eat in order toobiam financial ainiaioncc. according
I reports nut Soviet officialsrslschon*Kiih move* nude by Vieinam to unblock rein ton* -ith the Waal, which they eapecieeoncniH: benchor Hanoi
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Soviet Military DeUreriesKey Nonsocinlist Allies In Ihe Thirdhat anchor their presence sod influence ia IheEast, Souib Asia, sad Sou lb America will kad lb cm lo conlinue using Uric-scale arms transfers lo keep relaiions with ibese couotriescald fooling.
Moscow almost certainly will eiperience ditlicultiea over Ihe neat several yean in iu relations with its non Marxist aUica Ihese countries will reaist encroich-menU oa tberr political prerogatives, and all have gainedlaying East againtl West in teekang adraneedand favorable termsertheleaa. we believe ibai the So-kIs need (en hard currency, iheir desire lo maintain their share of ihe world arms market, and their aim ol preserving ties
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Caotkia Inii.i; Reflation
Undei Gorbachev, tbe Soviets havewo-track policy toward revolution in tbe Tblid World. On ibe one Band, ibe Gorbachev leadership, like its predecessors, prcodes support for selected revolution ary move menu. On the other band, the Soviets have shifted from backing armed struggle at the main route to toppling urge! regimes towardletsmore politically oriented approach to promoting change
Krldroce of Support
The Sovieu continue lo be the primary military benefaeton of the African National Congress and Southwest African Peoples OrganiMUon (SWACO).
c
^cUirrsed inI Ihnl kvels of Soviet aid to the ANC have not dropped under Gorbachev. Moreover
3 said ia6 thai the PCCh reives oa the Sovieu for financial backini and SpeCialited military training, aocordim C
od sute-
esenu bi
suggest that Ibe USSR is providing financial and possibly military support lo theMarti Liberation Front (FM1 N
] la addition, in view of their stated intentionuee the Colli of foreign involvement, the Soviets undoubtedly do not want to assume ihe burden of supporting new revolutionary itatcs that would depend on them for military and financial help. They probably also want to avoid provoking regional crises that would belch ten tensions with the United States and Western Europe.
The military side of the two-uncl policy enables Moscow to maintain its credibility as an actor In (he situations ia South Africa and Chile, where lisfor the ANC. SWaPO. and tho PCCb atill represent its main entree. Tbe USSR's new political approach, meanwhile, allows il lo cipand iu options for influencing futarc ocveac**acalsanner consilientbjectives of oocrrolling coats and avoiding muff on tit km in the Third World
In view of these ob)octivcs, wc believe thai for lite lotcsccaUe future ihe Soviets will be wary of military intervention In ibe Third World, lnoimer International Department Chief Dobryntn ic-portcdlyeeting of Comrnuciii party officials ia Ilaiana that Revolutionary ferrees" should not casual oa drawing the USSR into local conflicts This cautionary line does not. however, rule out the use of arms and security assistance io gain influenceegimeountry of particular regional Importxnec For an asteaiincni of Soviet capabiliiei for projecting, power In the Third World, see appendii
Assessment aad Outlook Progress to Dale
The most oorablc luceesi of recent Soviei policy in the Third WorM hai been, an our view, the effort to improve lb*mage an the developing world and to leeaublish ihe USSRegitimate actor in regional affairs Third World leaden and publicsore fjvorablc view of Gorbachev, tho USSR, and Soviet intentions, accordingeat menu from US cnibassica iiound lite globe This opens ponttbtliltcs
a:ioniariety ol nates amiorganisations and gives ihti. higher degreeof rfiplomaiiccredibility and llestbln, than they enjoyed under Brezhnev.'
oviet sundpoini, ibe problem of regional conflict.', almost certainly appears lesi acute Hun it Cid in IMShe 'bleeding wound" of Afghanistan has been stanched, albeit not healed. Ihe US-mediated agreement on Angola promises loStmlh African pressure on the Luanda tegime: the rebel threat to ibe Sandinista government hu diminished; aod the Cambodian settlement process no longerajor obstacle lo Sino-Sovieltxhcment. Nevertheless. Ihe Soviets still face sonic difficulties, as insurgencies against their allies persist in iltliiopia and Mozambique, andespect them to continue to press these regimes to move toward political selllements.
Moscow has noi yci enjoyed much luccess on Hie economic front. Allhoogh peogress toward settlement of regional conflicts promises lo ease ihc Soviet j' economic load, the costs of backing Iheir Communis: ind socialisi-orienled allies remain high, and ihese stales have made little headway toward economic viability. The slow growth of trade wilh Ihe Third World is almost certainly disappointing lo the Soviets, and ibe piospectsapid increase are poor unlit domestic economic reform lakes wider hold
New Challeoges for (be United Stales We believe lhat Moscow still regards the Third World as an important arena for Soviet interests and ilia: th: United Sutes will have to deaf with continuing Seivir: elloru to expand ihe USSR's presence nnd inll-jenee there, However, the new dimensions of Meoeoi.'i policy in the Third World, notably its downgrading of ideology and its emphasis on good iclalionsnil Hales, are likely to pose ne* cueslions lor US policy
The USSR's new approach lo thee.cl oping itates, its changing relations with thd its success in improving its outside imare pia-Hucake il more difiVcult for Washington toThird WorM leaders on Ihc need lo contain an cip.-iiisiomst.revolutionary Soviet Union and its allies.
Thujic ii hmder for the Umlcd Statesmuin hi military access io some areas. Also.uch better position lo Hy to take the initiative or. issues of inteeesl lo the Third World, at Uorb.ichev aid whtj his piopcoals to the UN on dcbl iclie' last December, and we eapcel Ihc Sovieis to continue lo oiler effectively pscTcaged proposals on lecunty and economic problems. In general, as Ihe. ell leform thei: patp.ii.iMs andd eiplouiau give way to more polished envoys, the West can no longer count on Smiei diplomacy lo experience thewounds" thatleagued it in the past.
jIvj will hive ioithabilily lo use surprise effectively as aOver the past four years, he has made adramatic foieign policy rrieves, including ibeof theissile force, acceptance ofinspection for arms control rerificjiion,from AfghsnisUD. aod tnilatcral cutsconventional forces. Regional issuesmay see the need for one of bisbold strokes include?
Allan seeurily. Tbe Soviets couldnilateral withdrawal from iheir base In Cam Ranh iuy in Vietnam as part of on effort to influence ihe debate in ihs Philippines about US bases and exacerbate questions in the region about ibe needS military presence.
wilh Israel, Moscow could restorewilh Tel Aviv wilhoul wailing for Israeli -icceplar.ee of an iniernaliona! peace conference. Tlie SovieU might consider this Slop, in spile of the reaction of iheir Arab allies, in order to reassert their role in ihc peace process should they perceive "he United Stales to beosition toamp David-style agreement or Otherwise inoiwpo-IIW the settlement process.
presence In Cuba. An offer to withdraw the Sov.tt brigade in Cuba either unilaterally orS departure from its naval base at Ciuiiiiinamo might be seen by Ihc Sovietsay to icraove an irriUnl in US-Soviet relations, make
Mini rtin bis detente needs are ciaggcrat-ed. and encrgire Moscow* prapiK.il'. (oe iheof overseas miliury bases and fences. Saidi an offer would not affect ihe USSR's important Inteltig - collection capabilities In Cuba or lis air and naval access, and would leave in placeoadvuert and technicians of the Soviei Military Advisory Group.
Tbe United Stales will also face ibe question of bow to respond to the Soviets' appeal for increased Fast-West cooperation. Soviei officials have already called for joint actionange of economic, ecological, and humanitarian problems in the Third World, although lltey have been slaw to offer specifics on concrete programs. Over the next few years Moscow may revive ibe ideaode of conduct forrelations in tbe developing world. Soviet acade miciarvs have been eiptorrng theraised by Soviet leaders in the earlya way to regulate East-West competition4 ankle, Gorbachev adviser Yergeniy Prima lewloose general "rules of thencluding rcaunciaiioa by tbe superpowers of unilateralIn regional crises and mutual reduction of arms supplies to Third World states. Ii ii not yet clear bow far Soviet leaders would bo willing lo push ibe Unitededify Ibese ideas in bilateral
Coniianlty Not CiBaranteed
As long as doo>estk reform remains the ovcrridieg priority of Soviet leaders, prtaiaatioaiabk international environment, the expansion of ccoaornic relations, and controlling tbe costs of Soviet contra rt-ments will remain central objectives of the USSR's regional policy. At the same time, Gorbachev andl.ii- -iI alliea probably will not be indincd tueasily caiiunf Soviet petitions in the Third World. To do so would, at tbe very least, provM* ammunition for their domestic opponents
These potirisa will be subnet, however,umber jf factors ibat could lead to signifcam change, including
Palilscal rtmslrp. The iptciucs of Third World policy do aot lecaa toone of contention anaong Soviet leaders. Ul debates8 about the rrne of 'class struggle" la Soviet foreign pedicy suggest that such Issues could become pawnsolitical battle, potentially affecting ihe course of Soviet behavior in areas inch as support formovernenis
Leadership change. If Gorbachev were ousted.regional policies would undoubtedly beew regime that came toon the basis of opposition to Gorbachev's doutcstic initiatives, for ciamplc, might be inclined toorekss cooperative line on Third World issues
economic uindi. Aa economic downturn could put even more pressure oa military and foreign assistance budgets and lead Moscow to pull back sharply from its clients in distant rttinna inch as southern Africa and Latin America,
Ii is possible that Soviei perceptionsuture swing in US policy toward isolation could lead Moscow to behave more asserfjvdy in the Third World. There are signs, however, ibai tbia traditional Leninistofwhen the "mainis active, advance when llsiicieed- Soviet academic observers have argued that this is Use operational codeeak country and thai the USSR, having attained tupcrpowcr states, no longer needs to regard every shift in the-jTlTird World scenezcro-ium perspeeiive.
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Appendix
Soviel Power-Projection Capabilities
Sovietrained, equipped, indprimarilyar in Central Europe. While9 Invasion of Afghanistan and Ihe recent deployment of troops to (he Caucasus regiontbe USSR's capability to deploy military forces and equipment lo its periphery, Soviel capabilities for longer range projection of forces are more limited. Nevertheless, the steady increase in size, capability, range of Operations, and scope of activity of Soviet forces over the lastears has improved somewhat Moscow's capability for distant military operations.
The Soviet Ground Forces maintain seven airborne divisions that could be quickly deployed to other areas. These divisions are kept almost fully manned and, once mobilized, could begin to move within hours. Becaase of the limits lions of the Soviet airlift capabilily. however, il would probably take several days to move one entire division. The airborne forces' lack of heavy armor, moreover, limits their firepower and ibe length of time they could sustain military operations without Ihe in trod act ion of more heavily equipped regular ground forces. The Soviets maintainegular ground force divisions, buthird oflocated in Eastern Europe and the western USSR or oppositeare considered "ready" units, manned with over SO percent of their ambled wartime strength and almost all of their combat equipment. Even most of these "ready" units would require utensive mobilira-lion to deploy. Moreover, the equipment of the regular groundot easily dcployabtc by air.
The Soviet Navy regularly deploys lo disUni areas to promote and defend the USSR's Interestsprotecting the maritime and fishing fleets, asserting Soviet richts in international waters, collectingand monitoring Western naval forces, and. through port visits, displaying military might and clemonsllatinc Moscow's support of Third WorldDeployment of large forces to distant areas is not one of tbe Soviel Navy's traditional strengths,
however. With ihe exception of Cam Ranh Bay, ihe Soviets do not maintain the large miliury bases overseas that are required io support such forces. Moreover, the Soviets lack advanced cargo transfer aod adequate numbers of supply ships and tenders, relying instead on merchant vessels that function as naval auxiliaries when needed- These "auxiliaries" in turn depend on supply faciuiies In foreign ports. Because of the Soviets' concern that they might suddenly be denied access to foreign-owned facilities, they have tended to employ mostly movable orassets such as Horning piers, tenders and repair ships, and floating dry decks to support their overseas military presence. Despite their loss of access io several naval facilities ia, the Soviets in ibc fast decade have expanded their access to otheras those at Dnhlafc Island. Ethiopia; Aden, South Yemen* Luanda. Angola: and Cam Ranb Bay.7 agreement with the Syrians also granted Soviel naval ships greater use of port facilities ai Tanas. Nonetheless, rase of these pons has decreased In tbe past few years as the Soviet Navy's number of out-of-arca ship days has declined.
The relatively small site of Soviet amphibious forces, divided among four fleets, would limit the scope ofliii'-oui operation in distant waters. Soviet naval infantry consists of0 troops, compared with tbe US Marineroops. Soviet amphibious capabilities have increased over the past decade, however, with ihe introduction of largeof air-cushion vehicles and amphibious ships with greaterand endurance The Soviets cootinne to procure Ropoc hi-classa amphibious war-fore ship that can accommodateedium tank* or up toheeled vehiclesroops. The Soviets began8 io procure Ivan Rogov-elaM aen-phibi-Ous assaultfirst type equipped with a
tieltOtipier deck. .This ship Is capable ol sustained long distance operations and filled wiihcommand mid communications suite Ibai enhances iu cagiabrliiUaommand vessel I'i procure mewl suggested that :h* SovitU were about lo lubsunliall) cipsed theirwarfare (a'i>tbili(ia. although ihe consirut-(ion of only two ships of this dill (biu far may iodicslc ibat this goalow priority. "
Because Ihe Soviets hare doc cmphatiicd theof an aiictafl earner Reel, they would alsohortage of tactical airpoweristant foreign intervention. The inability of the vast majority of their land based tactical aircraft to conduct aerial refolding ciaccrbaics this shornjc They have, however,upgraded iheir ability to project lacticnl ail' power with the Kiev-classcarrier, the fourth and final unit of which should be operaiional this year. The Soviets are currently fitting out the lead ship of the new Tbilisi-clasi aircraft canier. which will support conventional-takeolT-arid-landing aircraft as well as bciiceplen.
In the past decade tbe Sovieu haveumber of improveis to their military Uaiisportatlonthat would serve them well in an attempt lo project forces abroad. The Sovieu are replacing the agingub aircraft withandid, ugruficantly Improving their ability to move troops and equipment over long distances. Thentroducedivals ihealaty In site aad ixilcirtnancc and, if deployed In significant trans bets, could also greatly expand Soviet airlift capability, although iu unpressurircd cabin suggesu that it will be used primarily for transporting equlp-menl.
Despite sect ieaprrneosents, the Sonets would be hard pressed to rapidly deploy or sustain military forces in diitant operaUons, and might find It Impossible if opposed by modern alt or naval power. Almost all of
the military equipment needed foronsto be brought forward because the Soviets maintain Wile pac-pasiiiowed duipaaent abroad.forces would not hare aufficicnt protection,ol their limited air defenses and antisubmarine warfaresuabilities. Alibome forces deploybroad would require metilighi clearances, as well as staging rights at foreign airfields alcag ihe way to lompcnsaie for their inability to refuel en route. These (arm would also lad. adequate air defenses and tactical air support to protect them en roulc or an ihe scene.
Although the Sonets under Gorbachev have tbaas far continued to gradually increase the sire andof Iheir forces, Mcnoow's drive for greaterin the military apparently hat restrained lome-wbat the growth of Soviet power-ptcjectioa cjpa bdi ties I'coocmJc considers lions apparently are the peine reason (or the decrease ia Soviet naval cperalkxii outside home walen. Moreover, most Soviet rural escrcisci in recent years have been shorter in duration, although more intense, and have stressed defense of tbe honselaed ticca within Scrvjet home "tiers. These changes ban decreasedadi ocas toower-project ion mission.
In the fotarc wc expect Soviet capabilities for distant mslitaiy elation* lo improve gradually throughodotnjatioa andimitedin access lo maintenance and resopply facilities abroad Nevertheless, the Soviets' caor direct military intervention will remain limited, andespect them to ooatinuc io rely priourily on political maneuvering and on other indirect means of projecting influence, such at arms sales, miliury and economic aid. and covert action
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