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(Gorbachev's Reform of the State Institutions:arliamentary System?
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM W" RELEASE AS9
IXiwtorale of
Gorbachev's Reform of the State Institutions:arliamentary System?
A Research Paper
This paper wasy' Office of Sorter. Analysis,onlribolioo from SOVA. Comments and qncoes areand may be directedhief.
.SOVA,
sovat-foonx
Gorbachev's Reform of (liea (ions:arliamentary System? I
Duringhc USSR, will begin pulling in place new slate legislative and executive institutions lhat could radically transform ihe Soviei politicalcmber USSR Congress of People's Deputies will be elected by popular vote onarch and is reportedly scheduled io convene in lale April. It will choose from its membership ihe firsl standing parliament in Soviet history and will almost certainly reelect General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev as the nation's president .byhime ihe fust chairman ofnember USSR Supremepost that will carry considerably more executive authority than the old, Urgely ceremonial post of chairman of ihe*OSSR5upreme Soviet Presidium (see figure 1)
Since Stalin's lime the parly has used the slate systemeneer of legitimacy for its policy decisions and lo mobilize mass participation in the political system- Gorbachev bas evidently decided that tbe old stale institutions arc incompatible with his reform campaign. His overhaul of ihe slate system is intended to advance several strategic objectives:1' Gorbachev wants to institutionalize peresiroyka by creating state bodies capable of effectively reviewing the party's policy suggestions and more lightly monitoring the government bureaucracy's administration of them.
also wants to establish constitutional limits on the exercise "of power byystem of "socialist checks and balances" designed to increase the accountability of both elected and appointed officials.
hopes thai new electoral reforms will invigorate and build legitimacy for the political system by increasing popular participation in stale affairs nnd making state representatives more responsive to public opinion
Gorbachev's reform alto serves bis tactical intctcsu$and Jjis clearest personal political gain from the new stale structuretrengthened presidency, which previously was almosteremonial post. He no doubt expects that by upgrading ihe presidency he will enhance his own poweris ihe Politburo,easure of popular legiUmacy, andotential base of power outside the party apparatus. Although the position may not be as strong as he would like. Gorbachev hasost from which he may be able to circumvent the Central Committee and bring popularear on party officials who are thwarting his reform initiatives.
ICOHX
9
Gorbachev hai set limiuis slate reform campaign. Me does not in lend io reduce the party's leading role in guiding policy decisions, and he has no intention of per milling the emergence of opposition parties. Moreover.-he-does not want to empower the new state Institutions or (he Soviet electorateay thai frustrates his own policies or jeopardizes hH political position.
Although Gorbachevajor victory in securing parly approval for new laws designed to meet his goals, there is considerable evidence thatcompromises were made along the way. Many uncertainties remain, moreover, aborjl how the revamped state system will work in practice. Al the national level, orthodox party members and political reformers continue lo struggle over three key issues. Both groups fear lhat Gorbachev's proposab to upgrade ihe presidency could lead again lo one-man rule. Party traditionalists also fear that the creationtreamlined Supreme SovietoveWestern-stylehile reformers are coocerned that tbe new scheme will permit tbe traditional political establishment to dominate state rrpresenuiive institutions.the party orthodox are ar-xehei*srre that electoral reform win terra lea tbor rxwtiom throughout the political lyitexn, while reformers intend lo press their campaign to close legal loopholes tbal permit central and regional party officials to manipulate the process and protect their own imerests.
Tbe current ejection campaignlect deputies to the Congress of People's Deputies bas revealed lhc dilemma facing Gorbachev as he tries io open up ihe system lo input from previously unrepresented croups while also attempting toubstantial erosion of the party's leading role in decisionmaking. Tbe party's effort, to pursue the contradictory goals of trying to control (he election process from above while encouraging democratic participation from belowension over political reform that may well emerge again as the state resisucturing scheme unfolds. On the one hand, traditional heavyhanded orchestra two of the elections has been much in evidence ai the party bas moved to protect Its top national and regional officials from doctoral competition. On the other hand, the current campaign has opened apopportunities for citizen participation. In particular, the relaxation of central control bas been felt most strongly in the Baltic republics, where naticwhsi groupsbeen permiiied to back candidates against many republic officials.
_Storer
structure and procedures of the new bicameral Supreme Soviet am still being worked exit, and Gorbachev has not been clear aboui how far he actually wants to go in reforming the slate institutions. Hismay be tactical: by wailing until the opening! of the party conference last June to announce specific proposals overhauling tbe slate system, Gorbachev gave his potential opponents little time to organize resistance. But he also may be uncertain about the exact role that the new system should play in,counterbalancing the party apparatus and governmeni bureaucracy.
One or the most important uncertainties concerns the role of nationality groups in tbc new representative institutions. Gorbachev and his reform-minded allies hope that the new state machinery will create an effective safety valve for the release of nationalist frustrations and help inonsensus for nationality policy decisions. As inystem, one bouse of the new SupremeSoviet ofbe composed of deputies from national-territorial units, but it is now constitutionally responsible for interenhnic bsues and could assume more significance if tbe state system itself acquires greater authority. Yet Gorbachev cannot afford lo allow the representative bodies to become vehicleshallenge to the center's control over the periphery or to tbc party's bold on poliiical power.
Whether state institutions remain largely ceremonial, rubbcrstamp bodies or become genuine legislative and executive organs will continue to depend, as io the past, on tbc willingness and ability of the political leadership to bring about ihese changes. Previous eltorts at invigorating tbe (late system failed because ihe leadership lacked the political will to carryeform that could have undermined the power of the party and their own positions. As the new system gets organized in the coming months and both proponents and opponents of the reforms try to shape them to serve their interests, wc willeries of opportunities to judge if the new system will have any effective power:
The definition of tbe president's roleis tbc Supreme Sovietwhether the new system will be more independent and democrat-
ic or whether It will be dominated by the chief executive and become just another weapon in Gorbachev's political arsenal.
Tbe duration and nature of sessions of the Supremeit sits continuously for six to eightear, for example, or whether its two houses deliberate independently orhelp determine what institutional weight it will have in the political system. The degree of professionaliiatton of Supreme Soviet deputies andespecially if they become fall-time salariedalso lay the groundwork for how much independence the new representative body will be able to assert.
The responsibilities and composition of the standing commissions and their staffs will start to establish what authority the Supreme Soviet will have in relation to the party apparatus and the government bureaucracy.
The center of decisionmaking is almost certain to remain in the Politburo, and the new slateikely to have only as much power and influence as Gorbachev can bring with him. But, if Gorbachev is able to draw the Supreme Soviet increasingly into the review ofay of putting pressure on ibe Politburo or of bypassing the party apparatus, the state system could in time amass considerable political clout, especially over the government ministries. The new system, at least initially, will not work in the way Western parliamentary systems operate, but it mightucleus fromore pluralistic political system could growignificant redistribution of power at lhc political center could lake place.
Hart
Coiiicnls
'
Old SopremeControl and Bureaucratic Domination
t^irposa
The Party Coofercrice^t forReform
at the
New Slate Structure
Institution)
Standing Parliamentary
Dcmocrstic
and Resistance
Froro tbe RepuMha
Current Election Campaign
live New State lntUtu^ons_Bc
Mnal
Gorbachev* Reform of ih* State Institutions:arliamentary System?
Today we mutt have iht cowaf lo admit If the political lyitem remain/ Immobtlt without change, then we will not cope with tht ta/kt af reilmcturing.
General Secretary Gorbachev
Since Leaio'a lime, the Soviet political system hai allowed bttk OTportaadiy for dureao aod groan* other ihaa the CnmxnniH Party to participate ia political deciiioa taaiicj. Soccemve Soviet COfuUsliUoosocspka lytteai of populsrly elected repre-lenuirre sute institutions thai purported to write the law* of ibe Und. Bat. iany meaningful legislative and eiecalivc cowers were exercisedmall eirefc of men in Ihe leadcnhip bodies of the Commnoiii Party. The slate Institutions wereioeneer of legitimacy for the party's decisions and to mobilize mass participation la the political system. Although efforts were periodically made to invigorate the stale in*ions, the party leadership never bad aay meaningful Intention of giving ihese bodies real decisionmaking authority on matters of political imparlance. Without, willingness to give up some of Its power, ihe party's pledgeperfect socialist democracy" prod need link more thau {osmetic changes ia the poblieal system
General Secretary Mikhailbe first party kader ia Soviet bsstory -ho has tried serSousIy to limit the party's involvement ia Soviet lift la an effort to infuse the political system with vitality andolitical errriroameni conducive to hisrefonna, Gorbachev has launched aprogram of political realnacturing. He haa made ft clear that be will not abandon lhc one parly system or diminish tlte party's "kadingui he does want to redefine Ibe party'slo stale, government, and economic bodies. To kgitimiae bis new system, Gorbachev also wants lo open up ibe political process to panicipatron by group* and ML vsduab previously unrepresented by Ibe party.
A key part of Gorbachev's political restructuringis the effort to breathe life bun Ihe stale institutions and promotelhaneilizen participation ia Ihem. In8 Gorbachevajor victory in this effort whenh party conference wt in motion the most aweepmg reaSruetur-ioE of the stale system since Sulla's lime. FoUowinj CorbacbeVs lead. Ihe conference approved reforms that could transform the Urgely ceremonial state
TheKh Oortwehcv assumed inbong gyvca considerably moreauthority.
Tbe IJOO-member Supreme Soviet, whichmet semiannually for briefeing transformedembcr parliament sitting spring aad fall for sessions of throe lo four mentis.
A newember Congress of Peoples Deputies is replacing ibe Supreme Soviot as the country's tbeoiciically highest sutc authority.
These reforms were enacted into law In December when the USSR Supreme Soviet,onth of public debate,umber of amendments to the USSR Constitution. The Supreme Soviet aboew law oa stale election* designed to increase citizen participation ia eheotinc ibe pool of candidates for the new Congress.
Tbe Supreme Soviet's action* set iha stage forcocrpicte overhaul of the aula systemio tbe officially et*pro*cd tbteubk:
The top stale insuttitioa* wtO be reformed inn March. Soviet voters win elect theof People's Deputies, whichl convene onpril to form the Supreme Soviet aad elect the president. Tbe Supremo Soviet itselfwill begin work, oaay.
In the early fall ihenion republka andutonomous republic* win tied their own congresses and supreme Soviets modeled on the new
suie structure.
Gortracher Inherited
bask willur jut* structureopularlycounciloviet of peoples dtpuilrt. According lo tht USSR Constitutionhr Soviets art Ihc country's political foundation. Overall there are almost SifKO sovlelt. logrtheromplex hierarchy with three main levrh.
USSR Supreme Serial. At the lop of the pyramid I, ihe USSR Supreme Soviei. which consistsO deputies directly elected by popular voir every five yeari and eUv-fed eaually between two houses. Depw-tlei to Ike Soviet of thr Urdcm are rimed from districts based cm eewal number, ofrpwtU, to the Scrrirt tf'Sailonalltus are cJsooea on the basts
publics and auloevenoushouses mat, appear, legislation before ll beettcnes law. As ihe highest body ca"slate authority, iht Supreme Serial Is constitutionally tmpejwertd to deal with issuesthe entire USSR, such as amending theratifying Urrilorial formations and border chantes. approving stale plans and budgets, and enaellng all-union legislation. The Supreme Soviet usually meetsear for brief sessions,lasting two to three days.
Betweentnember Presidium functions OS thr mtdn state legislative and administrative body. The fuB Presidium roestlsudy meets every two mceuhj bul often convenes metre frequently to deed wilh pressing Is rues. The cJudrman ef theIs elected by the Supremeechnically the USSR head cf state, or president. He eurtoenarily prrridet over sessions af ike Supreme Soviet, ilgni Irgislattcn. dispatcheseceives theof foreign ambassadors, and Issues pardons
The Presidium also supervises the workommissions, which fetrmally review andfiliation for the Supreme Soviets consideration. Commissions typically have IS members and meetear, although imaller subcommitteesmore Ireaucnlly.
Republic Supreme Sovieu. Each of ihe li union republics andvtoaomnus republics has asupreme soviet that possesses the legal right to initiate legislation and decide note and govern mental Issue, affecting Us territory, like the USSR Supreme Soviet, repwbiic supreme scrviru meet Infrr-eurnity and have presidiums that handle mast leps latter amd aarrumstrativr work
Local Soviets. At thr base af the state hierarchy are more0 Soviets orgaedied In villages, towns, cities, districts, and regions. Subordinate to thesupreme sovieu and the USSR Supremethey are formally responsible for evpejvlitng the economic plan In their areas, directing agricultural and Industrial development, and en-erscelng th*cf housing, health, educational, and other services, local sovicu eon have between Hand MO deputies, who are elected for Wenonik terms. Since tkey meetto sixear thandling cf day-to-day bwanneu ts done by etpesotnied
Like Supreme Soviet deputies, elected srsrmber, af local tcwiets recetvt no rrrneuurrvtlorn for thrlr work csxes* tor cross associated with eetandlng meeting, and petfesrming their duties.
In che late Tall local soviels throughout lhc Soriel Union will bo elected after tho adoption of newproposed law on local ma na cement andat increasing Iheirio manage local affairs.'
The Old SupremeControl and Bttreancralk Domlnttioo
Created by Stalin6 lo give tbe totalitarian stale an appearance ofepresentative lawmaking body, ihe USSR Supreme Soviet bas functioned for more thanears as little moreabbcrsiamp forf tbe Communist Party. The party regulates the stale system by dominating the election process and ensuring ibe approval of key person nei. Although the party contains lessercent of the USSR's population, its representation in ihe Supreme Soviet has never been less lhanercent of tbe tool membership. ATIf the current full and candidate Politburo members are deputies. On average,ercent of the party's Central Commiiiec is elected to the Supreme Soviet These key members are generally unaffected by ihe high turnover rate In Supremo Sovieipercent of the deputies were elected for the first lime lasoeliable core of supporters for party decisions.top party officials arc strategically placed within the Supreme Soviet's Presidium and as chairmen cf itstanding corn millions.
own kgiitstive and executiveregulation of the economy, public order, foreignand defensecan pass lawsof the Supreme Soviet. When ihey do act jointly, the Supreme Soviet custom wily approves laws without much critical discussion. Becauseheoretically rcsponiibk for prevent, ing ibe passage of aaoorutiiuiional legbtatko, the Preaidium it authorizedcpeal any ministerial decree that violates the constitution. In practice, however, lhc Council or Ministers haa rarely been challenged.'
A major additional obstacle inhibiting tbe Supreme Soviet fromatchdog role over Ihe government is the presence in the membershiparge number of bureaucrats, who arc unlikely to vote against iheir own interests.7 top officials of Ihe USSR Council of Ministers and republic couneib of ministers were elected lo ihe Supreme Soviet. Upward ofercent of the membership of certaia standingomposed of deputies employed to the governmental institutions lhat the Supreme Soviet theoretically supervises.
As part of Gorbachev's political reform campaign, the media has pointedly revealed ihe impoter.ee of the Stale institutions. Aa article In Pravda inB acknowledged widespread public indifference toward the Supreme Soviet's "formalism and ossifiedand detailed many of its shortcomings:
closely monitoring an election process tbal permits only one candidate for each oflectoralie party carefully determines theof tbe Supreme Sovkl's membership and thereby fosters the imageepresentative body of workers and average citkens deciding the highest matters of state. According to official Soviet calculations, of the current deputieserceni arc workers andperceni are collective farmers
The Supremeiu infrequent sessions and small supportalso proved no match for the permanent government bureaucracies. Under theibe USSR Council of Ministers it ihe highest organ of slate administration. II possesses lis
Sessions arc tightlyresidium member admitted that Supreme Soviet deputies examine questions prepared ia advance by the executive apparatus and already decided by toe party or government.
Sessions are too short and conducted too hastily to allow for seriouseputy from tbe Yakutsk ASSR complained that onlypeakers and three hours were allotted for discussion cf (he controversial and complex Law on Cooperatives. Even Ihb exceeded the amount of Supreme Soviet discussion traditionally given to pending legislation.
Frameimlim: The Emsasrmlasten efime Stmt,,
Spoken rarely CTvuejje profotfdra^cii] fa-.iff miaatric* r* lopes ofan 'or prarrcu bcjtesstiag their .
rootl af Iht Current System of Soviets lit Im iht
early Jart af Iht Soviet Gtyvenuvstnt.7 local Soviets sprang up In major Kuala* dile, atcouncil, of worker, andecisive role In hetplnt the Bolsheviks atialn power. Under the famous slogan "All power to the sovietsl" Lenin encouraged them ai the main governmental syslem for the 'dictatorship af Ihehe first Soviet ctsnstltuiteins invested supreme state authority in the Congress ofn unwieldy body made up of representatives elected by local Soviets. To act as Its proxy between sessions, the Congressmaller Central Executive Cornmittee. which also assumed legislative powers. In turn, the work of the Central Executive Catnmitiee was guided by atldium of between IJ andembers.
Originallyultiparty character, hut they eventually came under the cosnpleU control of the Bolsheviks. Unta effectively regulated the sovicu by placing peaty members an their executive ecmnmli-lees. and Stalin eitabltshrd permanens party egfees on every level af the administrative system. By thehe sovieu were firmly yoked to the party's goal of bull'Ing -socialism In one
6 Stalinew constitution thai radically reshaped the state ttrueture and Instituted ihe system currently In place. Al the national level, the Central Executive Committee was abolished and the Indirectly elected Congress of Soviet,lrecily elected Supreme Soviet. At tbe local level, soviet! based on workplaces or bywere replaced by territorial Soviets. In addition. Stalin's constitution Introduced ihe principle of dual subordination- Soviets and their executive committees were made accountable to the state institutions and government bureaucracies above them in the political system.
- Deputies in passive ia nsaertine theirnly teste* in tbe current Supermeinthe depuueaquestion."oonbindinc recommendalion onlaw under ooniid-eretion. allhouth beforequestion"even met. One deptily conlraited the ailuaiioe. io the US Congress, which routinely make*amendment* to billi before ihey are passed.
The facilities hinder debate. Georgian pieaident CllasbviU noted lhal only Russian Is used alSoviet meetings and lhal tbe lack ofprevents speaker, from uilnf their native languages
Voting is public and almost alwaysatvian deputy luted that vexing was ao ritualistic that he; abstent ions were not even noticed She wondered why the system waste* tnooeyurely formal eseroae.
teyrici eatixens ore eairaarcliaaii-
ly cynical abouictioeunf of fomal Soviet
institutions They view eiccsioasbara and regard
their oNigaiory pajllcipaiaon ia tbcra as insulting^
F Jnany in the Soviet elite believe thai this high degree of allien alienation from tbe political process bas negative implicallona for the long-term vitality of Ibe syslem and deprives Ihe tcgime of the Ideas and energynlented people, leading to imUlulictt-ali'.n
, t
When he fust came to power. Gorbachev sceened content io maintain tbe pretense that the canting Supreme Soviet waie^moeralie. lawmaking uucito-tion. and he iheywed no inclination to give ibc state
ny imI power Ai Brerhnev had doneorbachev5owerfulmost of hii powers by maneuvering him inio taking ihe leading Presidium position. Al ihe lime Gorbachev intended tohis position aad promote his programs by relying oa the traditional power base of past GeneralIhe party apparatus
ll became increasingly apparent, however, thailo Gorbachev and his reform agenda was strong within the parly apparatus. Tbe weakness of his support in the Central Committee undoubtedly made the idea of strengthening state institutions attractive Gorbachev's statements and actions over the last two years reflect hb increasing frustration wilh the party bureaucracy. This frustration culminated ta!ull-scale reorganization of the Secretariat and Central Committee departments that substantially reduced ihe party bureaucracy's lis* and funciions. Tbese actions were dearly designed lo supplement Ibe upgrading of lhc stale bodies and make il easier lo use the new represent alive institution* to circumvent ot>orbachev's pobeies.
By strengthening Ihe presidency. Gorbachev hasost thai will enhance his personal poweris the Politburo and the Central Committee. As president be will be formally accountable to the Congress rather ihaa to the Politburo, which over time may come lo provide bun wiih at least marginal ij enhanced protectionolitburo-based move against him.
la addition to these immediate objectives relating to the political straggle over hb effort to consolidate personal power and win approval for hb overall reform program. Gorbachev abo appears to bave several loo get term strategic goals,eries of public statements going back to the7 Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev haalan to rt-'gaaire the entire Sonet polity. Ia what appears lo be his ideal model, he hopes to ralionalire ibe political system by limiting the major elements to clear roles; Ihe party will consider and propose policy, the state iaaiitution* will review and authorize it, and the government bureaucracies will carry ll out. lie intends to align formal power wllh real power and cad
the fiction where by state intlitutiom do noi caccisc in practice the powers tbey possess in theory.he reportedly wants to ostablisb conslituuoaal limits on the caeaoiac of power byystem of "sodiliit cherts andhjaaal totbe acoounubdiiy of both elected andofficiiU and prevent abuses of power.
His declaredot lon the party from poliey formulallofl, but to end its heavy hand In miaoauiugini slate affairs, particularly the ccooc-my. In the economic sphere be abo want* to weaken the government bureaucracy's rose. At Ibe party conference las! June, be blamed lhcsystem of power" aad the "command-orcaaure structure" (or the problems confronting Soviet aocaety. Finally, he wants to make the political system more dynamic by broadening ihe arena of political discussion so lhat concerned group! may have some input Inio policy formulation affecting their interests, and so ihaTe-narrow circle of ofbciab cannot make major decisions without some oversight, asu the case ia the decision to invade Afgbanbiaa.
Gorbachev bopes that electoral reform* thai gcouinc-ty increase popular participaiioa in political life will give Ibe politicalegree of legitimacy that the old system of forma Italic voting aever provided. He also hopes that electoral reform willore professional cuts* of state ofViah. who arc electedthe basis of merit and notjwota tyvtem
The extent to which these strategic goal* arewith Gorbachevs tacticaladear. On ooe hand, Gorbachev aa president can personally lead the reform of statesing Ihe political capital he has accumulated as General Secretary to push for sarong legislative machinery. Ou the other band. Gea^aeheVa dual appolntnaraa as prcaUcat aadSecretary appears lo befie the independence erf tbe state Structurt from the party. Whether thb will handicap the new stale institution* as ihey seek to establish legitimate auihoriiv <wt ihdr own willey issue In tbe future.
Liie-rse. in anemic* GcebaeaeVi strategic goati. it il important loui he bai set cleat lieaM* lo ihc amount of "ckmocraiiaijon- ho wille ooe. not intend for Ini rcaUaenrxinf procraoi to red ace the partya role in guiding ibe isobtaral system Tbeemeodrnenu pawed by tbc Supreme Soviet do not effect clauses dealinc with the party'i leading role in formulating polity. Gorbachev bat pubfidy dceUred on reveal occasions that hit leformi are not meant lo pave the way (or the emergence of iiarties.
Ai vilh hii larjer "ekmocratiintion" campaign, in revitalizing Hate iratilotioni Oorbacbev ii grappling vritk bow to reesmdle the objective of makinf ibc system more open and dynamic wilh lhc goals of maintaining tbe one-party system and enhancing fail own poliiical power. He does not want to empower ibc Soviet populationay that frusiraies his own polidta or jeopardises the abibty of the party lo maintain iu leading political role.
CeeaaetwvCampalga
The decision to Hart the reform of the state lUncturt at the top sets Gorbachev apart from bit predecessors Since Stalin't death, the regime hat period rally declared that the weakaett of the tiate institution* ii harmful to the political tyttem and aa obstacle to
cbange have focused on tbe base of ibc staleIn 1M71 Khrushchev persuaded Ihe parly to endorse measures aimed at strengthening local sovicb. Similar calls were made under nrerhnev and his luceessors. These efforts were uniucocssful, mostly because the leadership lacked the political will lo canyeform that could hive undermined the power of ibe party and its own position
Gorbachev loo begao eJiscusriDg state reform by en-doming eflorts to enhance the power of local sovieu but toon moved inwardider systemic lalrueturing. At ur7 Central Ceatntsit-tee plenum,utched bis program for "da. mocratiatioo- of tbe political system, Gorbachev backed more Oerooaaiic elections so local soviet* and urged the preparationraft Ian on electoral
reform, bat he offered bo specahc proposals regarding Ihe soviet* themselves >ed sinapty sugfesud using Leaua't legacy iaeiopmeai to solve the peobtems of enhancing their powers.'
Tbe Party Ccmfcreace-Btacaetnt fot relhical Reform
ByS. Gorbachev bad evidently decided to uieh paity conference scheduled far June IMS toadical reatructaring of the national state Institutions, although hit public ttateincnuhinted nl the tweeping nature of his plans:
Al the$ plenum he recommended reforming the state system and made hit fieri public call for reconsidering the activity of the Supreme Soviet and making it more effective.
In MatchC
3,hat Anaiobyexperienced former Supreme Soviet official who was then party leerrtary for tectrity and legalwas working wuh Geebacbev on constitutional changes that would eatend tbe peers of the soviet* at all levels, irse Iud mg the Supreme Sorirt
raid-April Gorbachev qaetly lobbied rcapoaal pany otnciab oo what -cold be the most cootrover-liaI of hisparty fir* secretaries at all kveli of the pcJitical system also serve at chairmen of thdr corresponding sovieu.
In May Ihe Central Committee approved andfor public discniBion "Theses" thai expanded on Gorbachev's February call for recomidering ihe work of tho national state imtiuilious. Theyenhandng the power of tbe Supremethe Leninist periododel aadandful of passible ideas for discussion, including increasing tbc duration of Ihe Supreme Soviet's sessions, demarcatiDg the fun.-ii.ioi en* tbe Soviei of tbe Union and tbe Soviet of Nationalities, and permitting public tcgatuxt lions to electHowever, they did not include many of the tpctauc-and mostthat Gorbachev would advance ai the coofcrcacc-
i-rrt-
Chronology of8
Februaryay
I Jultf
1 October
ctober
8 November
ovember
ovember
ovember
ovemberovember
November
ecember
ecember
makes first public call/or reforming the Supreme Soviet.
Thesesh party conference suggest proposals for reforming the Supreme Soviet.
At the party conference Gorbachev proposes radical restructuring of the State system, including strengthening the presidency and transforming the Supreme Soviettanding parliament.
Party conference resolution on political reform endorses most af Gorbachev's proposals.
Central Commlllee plenum sett timetable foe enacting Gorbachevs state reform
Gorbachev assumes presidency with retirement of Andrey Gromyko; Ink 'yanav becomes vice president.
ommission finalises draft laws.
Draft constitutional amendments and law on state elections published for public discussion-Popular fronts of tetania. Latvia, and Ulh uanio jointly call for rejection of draft laws.
Politburo numbers Chebrikov. idedvedev. and Slyun'kov travel to Balticto attempt to head off challenge over draft laws.
Estonian Supreme Soviet rejects draft ctmstUullonal amendments and asserts republic's sovereignty.
Latvian. Uihuantan. Georgian, and Armenian Supreme Soviets criticize draft laws.
Politburo approves revisions In draft laws.
Presidium refects actions of Estonian Supreme Soviet as unconstitutional. Central Committee plenum approves revised draft laws.
USSR Supreme Soviet debates draft laws; constitutional amendment passes.ollhbstentions: law on state elections passes unanimously.
Nominations for9 general election io Congress of People's Deputies begin.
Ooebiche-v'i relative silence concerning iKe Supreme Soviei and (lie presidency was al lean In pert tactical, but may alto indicate that tbe derails or* hit pioposals were itill being worked out. Gorbachev hid briefed top regional party official! in advance because he needed their wpeicei for Utc proposal Ihai first tecre-laiie* alto serve at soviet chairmen Bvi be ewderilly decided to keep many other details secret in ordervert organiicdn the Central Committee However, some evidence indicates "hat Gorbachev had noi yet completed his plans by mid-May and mayhave been making changes on iho eve of tbc conference in txder to picerapt potential critics.
While Gorbachev appartsd; kept parts of hit ptaa to reform the Kate system from the fall Centralbe evidently used articles in the presi to float several ideas as trial baDocu. In the weeks before tbe party conference, Soviet newspapers and journals harshly criticized the Soviets and ihe electoral system, which one writer calledhell which has substituted fee genuinend proposed numerousremedies, including the adoption, of elements of Western parliamentary government The debate opened shortly before the February plenum, when Izvattra published an interview with Borisreformist legal expert at tbe State and Law Institute of ibe Academy ofoffered specific proposals for restructuring the Supremethat were later reflected La Gorbachev's Kbense. It reached its high point in mid-June, whan Uttraiur-nuyo gtr*rf* carried an snide entitled "Oa Soviet Parliament*ritten by prominent political commentator and unofficialGorbacbev adviser Fcdor Butiatskiy. who later said C al hecoau-thored the piece with Gcorglyprominent icformitl tbeotctkian tad GorbachevLuk'ytnov. In the article BurUukiy;
Directly criticized the mcchaniioi whereby theby electing the General Secretary, in effcci eJiooaes the autioatal leader.
Saggested combining the posts of puny lea da and head of ttate by having the General Secretary run for presidentirect nafioowkle secret ballot.
Proposed strengthening the prctrtlenl's powers.
for transforming the Supreme Sovietmall permanent parliament.
Gorbachev iiirpritcdmembers of the Centralbis opening address at the party conference offered detailed proposalsadical rcsiraciuring of the national state iaaiituiions. The these* had anticipated inch pol.ucal reform preapoub as reducing tbe party's rote ia eceetcmait peuicy making, enhancing; Use power of local aovtcss. and tefen-ming the electoral system. Bai manywere caught unawares by Gorbachevall to strengthen Ihe presidency, transform the Supreme Sovietmall indirectlyanding petrtia-niertt. and create an entirely new Congresi of People'a Deputies. Gorbachev's proposal that party fullchair iheir corresponding Soviets was especially atartliag to the majority of detega tea Former Moscow party chief Boris Yd'tsin ccenpumed thai the notion was uneipecied and was applauded when he ailedatron-vac refcrendem on the issue.
Despilc cotisiderable skepticism in the party aboutof tome of these proposals. Gorbachev wassecure approval for almost all of bisby stacking Ibe speakers list withand chairing the commissiondrafting the conference's resolution! onand derntxratizatioa. Gorbachev sufferedwhen tbe political reform resolution didhis protioted list of presidentialulas electoral reform tadabuses ofOelegales cttdorsedreformist proposals, ind tidingand limitations of two coosecatrvc livefor stale officials. During debate oa theGorbachev had toeparate vole onlo have party first secretaries serveelegate* voted agalnsl
thehe had to beatalleparate vote on whether the general lecreiary should be elected president
Although Use party conference cadcartcd aamerouatih foracing the power of local sorters. Gorbachev tubscquonUy focused hit at lent ion cm to-curing kgal enactment of hb plans for miructoring ihe national staleentral Committee
plenum in July adoptedtimetable that calledarty commission on politicalbydraft tbe constitutional and legal chances necessary for restroeturini the national stale system and to publish them for nationwide discussion in October, It abo announcedlenum would meet in November to approve tbe final form of the draft bwa. which would then be submitted for final enactment by tbe Supreme Soviet, '
Rt.ust.nce it the Top?
Gorbachev's efforts to finish the details of bisprobably encountered resistance wiihin ihe lop Soviei leadership andole in tbe shaltcup at the8 plenum. Although tbe Politburo almost certainly had approved at least the broad outline of Gorbachev's plan by mid-April, severalAndrey Gromyko. whose post as president was nowhave had second thoughts as the time for actual Implementation ticared. Some evidence suggests thai Gromyko'*aboui ihe shape of the restructuring may haveole In hb retirement from the Politburo oneptember and from ibe presidencyctober. In bit resignation speech before the Supreme Soviei, Gromyko intimated that hb departure was notvoluntary.
The altitudes of other Politburo members to tbe state restructuring pan aro eUfficolt to dbcern. Mostof the leadership publicly supported the decisions of Ihe June party conference, but tbey made virtually no mention of the proposed sute institutions,perhaps, lhat they bad reservations about the scheme. Ia hb first major speech after tbe party conference, then "Second Secretary" Yegor Ligachcv praised the political restructuring plan in general terms but repeatedly stressed the hrnil* of political reform. In an oblique reference lo Gorbachev'sthai narrowing party fmictions andstale institutions are necessary for tbe success of economic reform, Ligachcv warned lhat "delimiting the functions of the party and Ibe stale does noi mean separating politics fiomOSCOW party leader Lev Zaykov abo made public statementsoui the limits to political reform. He lold Pravda, for eiample, that "somenterpret ihe patty
conference decisions "toovenZaykov did noi address the reform of state institutions directly, however. In ihe late summer then party ideology chief Aleksandr Yakovlevarty meeting in Riga ihai lie favored shifting substantial decisionmaking authority from the Centralio Ihe new Supreme Soviet
The leadership shake up in September improvedchances of ensuring lhai tbe new state institutions would be created and Implemented on bis terms. By assuming the presidencyctober. Gorbachevead bsue of whether the top party leader should be bead of state. As Presidium chairman, be now had the formal authority with which to dominate deliberation of hb proposals within the Supreme Soviet. He further bolstered bb position by promotingwas already serving on the commission drawing up the draftcandidate Politburo membership and moving him from the Secretarial into the Supreme Soviet as vice president. With candidate Politburo member and cadres secretary Georgiystrong Gorbachevchairing the SupremeLegislative Propcili Commission. Gorbachev was now firmly In control of the process of shaping the legislation required for enacting hb proposal;
New Laws
The leadership change* evidently helped Gorbachev overcome the remaining resistance to the majorof his political restructuring scheme. The two draftcontaining constitutionaltheew law on stateGorbachev's commission finalized in mid-October and published for nationwide dbcussioo recapitulatedentirely the proposals that Gorbachev had made in his opening address at the June party conference, including ones that he had not managed lo get endorsed in lhc conference's resolution on political reform. Most notably, ihe draft conititutiortalcontained Gorbaehev'i proposed list ofpowers, although with one significantIn June, Gorbachev had suggested lhat the
1
J
president bave the authority to "decide" key issues of foreign policy. dcrcBte. and national security, but the draft law itipulatcd only that the president "reports" oo tuch matters.
The Bitionwide discussion of the draft lawi lenerated considerable debate over tbe detail) of tbe newpailiculirl) cooceraing the distribution of power between Moacow and the tcpubtka. Evidently au-priied at tho outpouring of enscaion over thii Usee -especially in the Balticagreedumber of chances in the draft laws destined to mollify nationalist critics. However, most of ihese compromises did noi affect the main elements ol his restructuring acbeme, andecembera flee three days of often sharpSupreme Soviet enacted ihem into
bold it until Brezhnev became presidentorbachev's scheme transforms ihe president from being first among equal Presidium members into an executive leader of the full Supreme Soviei with onmihutknal aulboriiy in both donsratic and foreignTheiton now calls Ibe president the highest official of the Soviet stale" and gives bun ibe power lec
Prepare the agenda for seaaiows of Ihe Congress and Supreme Soviet.
Sign legislation
Submit reports on try domestic aad foreign policy questions.
appointees to top-level government jobs, including the posts of premier, protecutor general, and Supreme Court chairman.
Recommend appointments to tbe newOversight Comee.
Chair the Defense Council.
negotiations and sign International
The new office will have some comriiutional rextralots on ii. Gorbachev himself proposed several limitations at ihe party conference, arguing thai safegaards were focessary to cr cum sen be the president's power.the new arrangement, the president is electedive-year lerm by secret ballot by Ihe Congress of People's Deputies. Ha can serve no more lhan two consecutive terms. Ha will be accountable to both the Congress aad the Supreme Soviet, allhough only the Congress can recall him Gorbachev accepted otber limitations In November In an effort to reassure critics lhat he was not latent oa one-man rule Most notably, the Supreme Soviet will have the right to repeal decrees of the president and the Presidium.
New Stale Structure Aa Opgrniew Presidency
dearest personal pditkal gain from has reform of the naie systemtrengthenedUnder the previous cocstitutional arrangement, the president enjoyed no more Legal authority lhan aay olher member of the Presidium The posi was largely ceremonial, and no party chief fell ihe need to
The presidency is not quite as strong asproposed In other ways as wdl. The head ofIhe right to "reportnotof foreign poliey. defense, and security.some evidence indicates that Gorbachevthe presidency io have greater legitimacy
10
hii. ii ihe rrj o' Ibe pan. coa'eree>ce in June. Gorbachevany allies that he wantse perceived(be leader of ibe USSR iad lhalGeneral Secretary he ll really only ibe leader of Ihe 7Qnullioo pony member.
Although al ihe pany conference Gorbachevthat the Coo grew of People's Deputiespresidem. Ilurlaukiy. "trial ballcoo- calledelection by Ihe general relation. Ifreflecting Gorbachev', views. It wouldGorbachevajor concession.dection would have markedly increasedof Ibe prealdency andany coup, since it woulda national recall to remove himno legal requirement that Ihe generalaeevcresident, ao Gorlatchev's removallop pany rpot would not necessarily cosl himdale position, although fi it certainlythe Pobiburo would move to deprive him ofbase aiNo- ibe president can bethe annual Ccngren meeting, or at aaa-aioo, -bach caa be catted ioereart thai Goebachc bad
been forced to ktiiwm the idea of direct dection in order to galaport of regional pan, leaders unwilling lo risk iheir own positions as pan, first secretaries in popular voting for soviet chairmen. Gorbachev apparently could not uncouple Ibefrom the lower levels of ihe slate system
New Representative Institution
Conteiously drawing on ihe Leninist precedent of ihe Congest of Soviets. GorbachcVi scheme createsember USSR Congress of People's Deputies ai the new "supreme organ of slateFigurehe foldoul at the end of ihis paper, compares ibe cad and Ibc new slaten several ways, tbe Congress takes over the form and functions of the current Supreme Soviei. The Congress is elecled once every hvc years,eputies are chosen under Use oldrom electoral districts based cm PopuUtloorom elect oral districtsby national-territorial uniu. The Ccmgress
formally has ihe ultimate authority in stale mailers affecting ihc entire Soviet Union, sack aa amending ihe USSR Coasiitut ion. deciding territorial issues and border changes, and ratifying long-term economic plans
In several Important ways, however, the Congressfrom the old Supreme Soviei.ll bebody and have anby legally recognlred "all-union publicsuch at the pany. Irade unions, andll will meel routinely only once aimponant. il will have retronsibiu'ly forpresidem and the Supreme Soviet and forihe rraoent'i appointments io the
The creation of lhc Congresslow in reformers' hopes for direct popular dection of ihe president and Ibe Supreme Sewtet;ear opinion. rl only added an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy between the voters and the real legalelors ,ad opened Ike door for orncial nunip^aiion of ibe membership of theSewiet. la frvorfyw. Boris Kurasbvili coe-demned the Coagrees as "an anincta!ty conceived organ more ia the natureallyorkingadrey Sakharov trgaed that ibc old system was in theory more densocratk, since there was no indirect election of legislators. In9 Yd'tsin called for direct dection of both tbe Supreme Soviet and ihe president
The absence in the party conference's theses of ihe proposal lo create the Congress may indicate thai Gorbachev subsequently elaborated the ideaoncetsion to party teadert and institutional officials wanting to sit In (he new Supreme Soviet butto submit io direct election. He may alto havo seined on the ideaay of buttressing hispoalilon. B, keeping ihe Congress In theory ns the supreme title authority, Gorbachev could Urea ml roe ihe Supreme Soviei andaintain tlie ideological-
ly important Leninist notion thai slate power ihcaiM
uhimaldy residean inttilution composed oflected workers aod not profeational politi-
Public Ortaxitaiiom Allocate* Deputies im Ike Congress of People's Deputies
Communist Parly of ihr Sarin
Ati-llnion Central Trade Union
too
7S
Cooperattre organisations Collective Parrot Council (fS) Hihtrit.,Callcttlrfi Asiocialion Hi Union of Consumer)
Komsomol
Committee ofSotitt Women
AllUniOn Council of War and tabor Vtteronf 7J
Scientific "otSwj
Academy of1 Academy of Airiculiural) Academy of Medical Sciences flO) Academy of PtdagogUai Science iU) Academy of
Union of Scientific and Enrlnerring
)
Union of larmiers (JJ
Crtetht
Union of) Union af} Union of Cintmeiottophtri UO) Union of) Union of WritrrsilO) Union ofThrotn) Union of Artists UOj Uruoa of Designers <S)
Other public
Voluntary Society for ihr Promotion of tht Army, Amotion, and Nery (VS) Union of Kid Coss/Rrd Crescent)
Znamyt) Soviet Proc, foundation ft)
Society Compaltniny/or Sobrietr I'l
Sporting oroanliotlems ill
Comftne Informaiion on theciies tttitttbuiee io rustic orient lotions *ottlrWe omitawil.
During ibe nationwide debate oo ihe deadalso strongly opposed Ihe notion of pefrnii.public organizations to elect deputies.chained ihai il violated ihe principle ofand universal sufferage, becauselo such organisation* would gel to votelhan onethai because of to many-
memberships beole five difTereni times for deputies to the Congress. Reformers also criticized the apparently arbitrary determination of whichwould be given representation in lhcMembers of informal groups expressed the fear Ihai the paiiy't traditional dominance of tbeallotted deputies would give ibe party tooresence in tbe Congress. Nationalists in non-Russian republics objected to Ibe notion of "all-un'mo" organizations, since ii ruled out formalparticipation by republic-based popular fronts. They also feared thai ihe naiute of nationalare centered mostly inlead to Ihe oveneprese nta lion of Russians io the Congress and ibe Supreme Soviet,
A Standing Parliamentary Body
The transforms lion of lhc curreni Supreme Soviei inio "the standing legislative, adminuuativc. aod monitoring organ of USSR stale power" significantly advances Gorbachev's goal of professionalizing the state system. The new Supreme Soviei will suit have IwoSoviet of the Union and Ibe Soviet of Nationalities-bill each will haveeputies, and Ihe full Supreme Soviet will meel (or sessions of Ihree or four months in spring and fall. Moreover, tbe iwo houses will bave clear areas of competence: the Soviei ol ibe Union will handle such all-union mailers as the economy, legaloreign policy, and national security; the Soviei of Nationalities will be primarily responsible for interethnic issues. Tbe law now lorbids members of the Council of Ministers fiom being deputies ol the soviei Io which they are subordinate.esult, with the exception of lhc Premier, tor go^ernmenl officials are now excluded liOm bcloruiintf io tlie Supreme Soviei and its
U
eooiiHuiians ibe new Supreme Soviei lhc combined formal powers of Ibe old Supreme Soviei and Ihe Presidium, which is reduced largely lo an admioiatratire sums. The new Supreme Soviei will be respoosible for:
Ratifying appoiritmenls lo the Council of Mi nut era.
Appointing lop mililary leaders, including iheCouncil.
Ensuring ihe uniformity of laws throughout the
USSR.
Implementing laws regulating the national economy.
Submitting io the Congress state economic plans and monitoring implementation of Ihe plan and budget.
Supervising national security issues, includingor abrogating treaties, granting foreign aid, mobilizing iroops aad declaring war. and deciding on ihe use of troops outside the USSR.
Repealing orders and decrees of the president and Presidium.
Monitoring resolutions and orders of national aod republic governments
At the party conference Gorbachev tried to preempt the objections of orthodox pony members to Ihe idearofessional legislature by pointing io theprecedent of the Central Executive Commiiiec, but he eventually had to make some concession* lhai could affect ibe professional ization of the Supreme Soviet Deputies will be elected by the Congress for five-year terms. The draft laws published io late October stipulated that up loercent of tbe membership of tbe Supreme Soviet could be "renewed" annually. However, the final version of ibe law stale* flatly lhat there willioover rate but does not specify how ihis will be done. Reformers fear thai Ihe leadership willthe rule* of the annual rotation to removedeputies. Gorbachev had also proposed lhat member* of the Supreme Soviet devote their full attention to stale work. The draft laws stipulated the release of deputies from their other Jobs whilethe Supreme Soviet sessions or working for one of its standing commissions, bul ihe final law said only that the deputies "may beroponentsrofessional legislature believe thai this will retard the
developmentody of deputies with legislative experience and aa institutional identification with ihe state system.
More Democratic Elections
The new law oti state elections introduces numerous reforms designed to open up the process of choosing deputies to ihe Congress of People'a Deputies. Key provisions applauded by reformers:
Liberalize the rules for nominating candidates.
Enhance ihe power of central and district electoral commissions io men it or and publicize elections.
Guarantee public and media representatives access to official proceedings of elections, including tbe counting of ballots.
Permil candidates to publish campaign platforms, provided they do not contradict Soviet laws.
Permil candidates to form campaign committee* of up ioagents."
Gorbachevajor setback in not obtaining provisions requiring multicand idatc ballots, whichand local party officials reportedly fearedhreal to iheir power. Gorbachev had endorsedcompetition at thelenum and introduced much publicizedreforms during elections to local Soviets Int ihe party conference be called for competitive selection of candidates and iheresolution approved the notion of more candidates than scats The draft laws published in October contained even stricter language, saying that ballotsule" are to contain more candidates lhan scats. But Ihe final version of tbe law said only lhat "ballots can cany any number ofhis revision gives Vocal officials considerable leeway io manipulate dections, especially as the center.'isStrong hold on Ihe process
Controleray and Resistance
Although most of tbe public criticism of Gorbachev'! restructuring plan diminished once it was enacted into law, many of the issues raised during the debate over ibe draft laws remain. Element* of Ihe stateplan bave drawn fire from both conservative*
and reformed Pin. uaditionalisU are concerned thateform* threatenpset ihe iradi-liom of Soviet deouonm* king and alsoring back elements of ibetoarteors parliaments riari-ism" thai ihe Bolshevik, had overthrown Ri full It, on ihe other hand, argue thai the reforms do nol go far enough in creating viable democralie insiitutsoos capable of competing wiih Ibe party end government. Some, like Borlt YeTuin and Andre, Sakharov. have openly crillciud what ihey view at anlidemocralic features of Oorbnehev't pun.'
Al Ihe national level, letitlancc lo the restructuring tcheme hat centered on three key uttues:
P'ttiarnilal pewr. Both ortbodo. party mem ben and reformer, fear that Gorbachev, proposals to upgrade the pictldency could lend again to one-man rule. For party traditionalists, thb would violate the tradition of collective leadership etubOtbed in the pott-Stalin day. ll also potentially reduces the abtlityof the tberla thelock or severely cartaflrefermre tarrnlarly concerned that tbe
Sopeerre Soviti They alto argue that, wtiheasl direct election of lhc presidency and tbe Supreme Soviet, neither inaiitatioa eaa be Italy aeoouoiable to the people
Electoral competition. Party coaiervativni are con-eerned thai completely opening up the electoral proeeit will threaten iheir potitioni throughout tbe political lyitem Regional partyanicu-Ur are worried about the fall elections of deputies to local sovicu. especially if Gorbachev holds to bb proposal that party Hut secretaries tUnd forat tovlel chairmen. Reformers are dbmayed by the success lhal trad itu bad In watering down the new election Uw. They applaud the liberalira-tion of the nominating process bul are angry that the procesi of leglitering Candida les^bereby the party has traditionally winnowed tbe held down U> ooenot been freed from official manipulation. Reformen are alto disappointedaerrisioo requiring deputies to reside in their coasutaeeoca was not enacted, because that wejahl htm ended the practice -hereby Mcaccr- eased eencisb are given safe seals all scrota the country.
without enough cheeksut mainly out of fear that tceneone otber than Gorbachev could grab the cftce. la response lo assertion* that the reforms onlyonstitutional basis for pern-ITS Oorbaehev already possesses as GeneralKurashvili wrexe in Itvenlya thatultiparty tyttemrue parDamenl caneal safeguard against an autboriiarian leader.
Syttcm of rtptturtaiton. Traditionalist! fear that the creation of the Supreme Sovietoveystem of -Western-ttylen which group* outside party control will beorum for Iheir viewt. However, reformers (ear that Ihe Iwo-tier tyiicm of election will permit the traditional political estaMUbment to continue to dominate the represehUtive bodies. They arethat guaranteed rcpreseuutlou (or public cuganiraUooi willehicle for easing top offi-
l. lato the Congress, whkh will then actfiller" lo keep radical reformers out of the
Oulcryb* RcamUic.
By tar the most negative reaction lo Gorbachev! plan bas come from the non-Russian republics. Al the party conference Gorbachev connected the rratructur-ing of the political iyitemeccttsldcration of tbe USSR's federalist approach to ceuter-twriphery relations.esult, when lhc draft law. were published in October, there waa great clbsppcteirneni and anger In many republic* especially In thethe proposed constitutional amendments not only did not address ihe lame of federalism, but alto appeared to contain feature* designed to limit republic sovereignly. Both nationalist actMsU and more cautious republic party and government offictab openly expressed their concern that the reforms would centralis power in tbe national lute system aod undercut Mcacow's previously tuicd plant to devolve considerable economic and poliiical power to tbc republics.
it
The lead in opposing ibe drill laws wu Inken by Estonia, where concerned republic officials nndof Ibe newly formed popular front joined forces. Onctober the popular froni called upon Gorbachevemote ihe draft laws from IbeSoviet's agenda andommission to formulate new cotislitationa! changes. On 9arepublic president Ryuytel'. then party ideology chief Toome,opular frontthe Estonian esse in Moscow io Luh'yanov, who was heading iheresponsible for suggesting revisionshe draft laws. The protest culminated onovember, when tbe Estonian Supreme Soviet voted io declare Its power of veto over all-union legislation and to reject the draft laws altogether. Allhough no other republic legislatures were as daring, varying degrees ofwere raised by supreme Soviets in Latvia,Armenia, and Georgia.
Stung by the criticism, Gorbachevcries of conciliatory gestures toemporary truce and secure passage of his state reform program. He publicly admitted lhat tbe draft laws had been hastily composed in parts and offered assurances tbal there had been no intention of infringing on the rights of tho republics. Declaring that restructuring the Supreme Soviet was only the first stage In overhauling the state system. Gorbachev promised that lhc second stage would focus on the rights of tbe union republics and announced that the long-awaited Central Committee plenum on nationalities would be held Inn mJd-November, Politburo members Cbebri-kov. Medvedev, aad Slyunleov personally visited the Baltic republics to reinforce the message. Finally, alecember Supreme SovietGorbacheveries of revisions halo the draft laws that were aimed at mollifying the non-Russian republics. Including increased representation of non-Russian republics in Ihe Soviet ofguaranteed representation on the newOversight Committee,equirement lhat the Presidium would have to consultepublic presidium before declaring martial law in the territory.
lb- Curreul FJeelloa Campsigw
The current campaign to elect deputies to lhcfirst election conducted under the newrevealed the dilemma facing Gorbachev as be tries so open ap the system to input from previouslygroups while he attempts toubstantial erosion of tbe party's leading role ha deexskomaking The party's effort to pursue the contradictory goals of trying lo partly control the election process from above while encouragingparticipation from belowension over pobiical reform that may well emerge again as tbe stale restructuring scheme unfolds.
The party's traditional heavy handed orchestration of Ihe election process was much in evidence during tbe nomination and registration of candidates. Al ibe national level, the leadership protected its topfrom competitionsured the election of key supporters. In January Gorbachev called on theCommittee to nominatecliiburo-endorscd candidates forcats allocated io the party, includingf theull and candidate Politburo members and all the members of tbeThis slate was elected at the IS March plenum, although not unanimously. All the full and candidate Politburo membersumber of negative votes ofallots cast- For example,lenum participants voted against Ugachcv;gainst Yakoviev.gainst Zaykov, andgainst Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov. Gorbachev receivedegative votes.
Top leaders not based in Moscow were assigned to run In safe territorial districts, although not withoutRussian Republic president Vorotnikov was registered into avoid direct competition with Boris Yd'tsin, who is running in Moscow's prestigious national-territorial
the expense of radical ecooooiist Gavriil Popov, who protested that the authorities had unfairly withdrawn his nomination. The registration of Ukrainian party
chief Shchcrbiisiiv lo run unchallenged iesparked protests in Kiev. Al lhc regional and local levels, many party oresniration* followed the center's lead and manipulated ihe rules lo protect their representative* from electoralercent of the territorial electoral districts Dave only one orticially regbtercd candidate Infor eiample. allbkom first secretaries are running unopposed
ihe probability of defeatopular frontwithdrew bis nomination, oiling his group's decision not lo weaken Brazauskasis hb more conservative opponents in the Lithuanian party.
Latvian authoritiesandidate* for thevailable scats. The republic's party leader^pre-mier, and president are all being challenged.
public orgaelialions, Including tbe trade unions, veteran* council, and Academy of Sciences, look iheir cue from the party and nominatedew more eaodidates lhan available seals, lawhom S8 percent are partynominated forcat* set aside for publicandful of organizations, how ewer, including the Komsomol,enuine choice, aad the Soviet Peace Committee look thes:ep of elect iig aMcocowa aaiional state representative.
Nevertheless, having guaranteed Iha election of the lop leadership and secured representation forconstituencies, the party haa allowed andegree of electoral competition and openAccording to official slatbtks.erceni of thehave two candidates,istricts will have three or moreeries of often raucous registration meetings, allistricts in Moscow registered muHlcandldate slates; one ballot will canyames. In Leningradfbtrkts arc being contested
The relaxation of central control hat been fell most strongly la Ibe non-Ruastin republics, especially in the Baltics, where republic authorities are apparently taking the electoral reforms seriously and permitting nstionaltst groups to challenge official candidates;
OSciih in Estonia registeredominees in theit nets The republic'* party leader, premier.KOB chakman ad raceThe local popular front cbims to have fielded candidate* in all ihe districts.
In Lithuania thereandidate* foreats, and ihe popularacklog candidates in at least half thearly chief Brazauskas faced
Could Ihe New Slate Institutions Be Ef ecllv.7
There are still maay uncertainties about the powers and procedure* of the new stale institution*.and Luk'yanov appear io be la charge of working out Ibe detaib, bulot clear how much control Ihey ultimately have and whal iheir intentions are. Nothingvailable yetumber of crucial issues thai win indicate whether the Supreme Soviet win be given iha wherewithal to serveenuiner whether it will be relegated againeremonial status, dominated by tbe party or perhaps manipulatedtrong president
Gorbaehev'i public silence is reminiscent of the sr.ua -lion before ihe party conference. He may be planning lo seize the Initiative al the Congress's first convocation byomplete package of procedural rules and organizational regulations and allowing little room for discussion, much as he did at Ihe party conference. The lack of mformailon may abo Indicate that many details remain to be worked oar.
program for political reform and that manybeen crafted ad hoc Soviet ceYxiab haveseeking infarmatvo from the Unitedand West Germany on how legislativeoperate In bte January
lotcC - hat emniratknal work was under way on the Supreme Soviet's permanentreview proposed legislation, question ministerial officials, and prepare Uws for ihe deputies' consideration- -bul thai major issues ofsize, and function have yet to be decided
r
j
Whether state Isatilutioos remain largely ceremonial, robbers tamp bodies or become genuine legislative and executive organs depends not on tbe USSRbut on the willingness and ability of the political leadership to bring about these changes. As tbe new state institution! get organized in tbe coming months, there -ill be opportunities for both proponents and opponents of tbc reforms to try to shape them to serve their interests. The fleshing out of particular issues willong way toward determining bow the new system works:
The roU of ihe president. It is still unclear whether Gorbachev wants to workore democratic state system or whetherttempting merely to acquire another weapon in hb prfitioa: arsenal. The new lawstrong executive presidency but do not clarify the office's roleis tbe Supreme Soviet over.which he formally presides. Although tbe Supremeow empowered to repeal hb orders,o formal arrangement for holding the rxeatcent accountable. He could be recalled by tbe Congress at anyat iu annual meeting or at an extraordinary session, which the Supreme Soviet canthere are no other built-in checks on presidential powers.may sot be willing to waitumbersome and perhaps critical legislative process to enact hb
proposBls. The possessionersonal staff wii(
giveeal advantage in preparing reports and position papers aod could permit him to dominate ihe Supreme Soviet's work. Gorbachev may abo prefer lo avert potential challenges by using hb authority to issue executive orders to circumvent tbe Supreme Soviet's review of suggested laws.
The the of the legfllaiure. The streamlining of the Supreme Sovietembers marks progress toward reformers' goals oftanding parliament capable of meanbgful deliberation of pending laws. This ability will be enhanced if the two houses sit and debate indcrxrrdentty and not jointly,ow often the case.
Tie* composition of the lerlstature. For ato be effective, iu members must be free to challengeisb!Jon. Yet two factors may inhibit the Supreme Soviet from exercisingeview function.arge percentage of Its members will continue to belong to the party; overercent of the nominees to Ihe Congress arc partygreater percentage of party members than In the old Supreme Soviet, Although some outspoken reformers like Boris Yel'isin and nationalists from theer cent of whom also belong to tholikely to enter the Congress and Supreme Soviet, the nsajor-iiy of party deputies may not be willing to violate the rules of democratic ceolralbm and publicly challenge party-approved proposals. Second, tbe electoral rules governing Supreme Sovietare open to manipulation and could be used to screen out or remove troublesome deputies. Most notably, there are no criteria for identifying which Supreme Soviet deputies must give up their scats to comply with tbe rule recurring an annual turnover ofercent in Supreme Soviet ntembersbjp.
Permanent functioning. For the Supreme Soviet lo develop an Institutional weight within the rciBtical system, it musiermanent presence at the center.ajor battle could be fought
over defining ibe lengih sod ailaic of Supreme Sonet scaaiom Reformer* will -in: tke newinre to sitot Ihe three-our-monthn spring end fnU stipulated in Ihe newVey am likely to push for deputies to be in Moaeow full-time lo putnic iheirrihodoa parly members- particularly regional of-hdala worried aboui Iheir ration* back borne, bul also (luliluuonal leaders unwilling to aerve aslikely lo move to have ibe Supreme Soviei nvcei only periodically during iu session and lo leave substantive woik to the staff of its standing commissions.
full lime poliiiciani. To be effective, stale repre-icniailvca must abo concentrate on theirajor teat ofommitmentore professional legislature win come over the decision to release Supreme Soviet deputies from their other jobs and to pay them adequate sabries lo live in Moscow and devote iheir attention to stalelb initial prcpoeal thai deputies be freed from other posts was watered down io the final Uw. which now says only lhai deputies may be released. If moat deputies optetain their previous ocenpa-lion* andarge percentage of their uex lo ether nutters, iha Supreme Soviet will be hard pressed lo buildody of legUUlrve experts commilled to asserting Ibe itates interest* inaffairs
Reformers are abo calling lorions lo supervise thr KGB. MVD. and Defense Minbiry. Since lop covernmcnl bureaucruU are now excluded from Ihe Supreme Soviet, nopal ie* may be able loore aggressive rote in supervising Ihe ministries' activities.
Tht formationuft-ort naff If the Supremeo actenuine legislature, it mustupport apparatus capable of providing deputies wtlh independent research and position papers. In lhc old slate system. Handingoflen had only two or Ihree permaneni siaff members, bul evidence Indicates lhai in lhc new Supreme Soviet each commission may have as many asull-lime suffers. However, several reformer* have expressed concern thai iheeing reduced ia sb. under Gorbachev's rccrgaaitatioawill simply reconstitute it-sclf in the Supreme Soviei apparatus and inhibit the developmentuff concerned for the sUU"a
Ltptiotivr in/Uatitt. To aane parliament, the Supreme Soviet win have to be able to propose legislation without waiting for taatrucuons from the puny or government Karuamli has estimated that under Ibe newcm deputies win propose half of all fawn.
Handing commUiions. Tbe respOBsibil-llica and operation of the aUnding commissions will provide ihe framework for ihe substantive work of tho deputlo.'nnd help determine their degree of Involvement'In formulating legislation aad monitor -ing iu implementation, lo the old Supreme Soviet Ibe standing commissions met onlyear and reviewed already prepared legislation. Reformers want to extend the reach of the Supreme Soviet by creating new commissions or broadening the scope of those already In place and empowering them to meet regularly for substantive discussions. Avaibble evidence indicates thai several new commissi ons may be formed lo take on the governmentInc lading new commissions on emigration, rdigion, iaicmtional affairs, security and defense, energy, youth, women, and the environment.
Outlook
Gorbachev appears commilled lo givingenuine measure of power and tbe Soviet population some degree of influence iniheir official represenulives, bul be wants lo achieve these objective* within the frameworkingle-pony system In which much power remains concentrated In ibe handsmall group of top officials. Hb politicalwill be severely tested as he seeks lo implement reform while averting both an unmanageable increase In grassroots ci liren activism
l*
chatknges ibe party's leading role and efforts by reealdir.nl parly ollidab lo sabotage iheHe will face ticnlfkant obstacles alone 'be way:
resistance. The Polilbu.ro and (he Central Committee are almost certain lo oppose ihe liansfer of iu 'jstaniitl power lo (he state institutions. Nol only would lhal markedly increase Gorbachev'! personal power and undermine iheir ability lopolicy, but it would also threaten the party's position as the dominant force within the poliiical system. For the foreseeable future, Gorbachev will have to fight and win liis policy batiles within the Politburo. Although he may use the Supreme Soviet to put pressure on pany officials opposed io his reform programs. Gorbachev will have to be sure of his position within the party. C
J toldinoruary thai
Gorbachev is likelyany "secondvacant post since GorbachevLigachev out of It lastthe presidency takes up too much of his lime.
resistance. The government will be highly resistant to giving up iu powers lo the newly activated state bodies. With iu lop bureaucrats exduoed from the Supreme Soviei and held ac-
1 countable to die stale at leasiear, the
Council of Ministers is likely lo resent efforts by Ihe standing canunbilons lo rein in iu authority and more rigorously supervise its work. YePC
3 confided C
J that Ibey will welcome the new system, provided that it succeeds in removing (he pany from direct economic manneement.
within the state. Although Gorbidiev obtained the slate structure that he proposed at the party conference, he may find in the course of activating it that he cannot manaie tbe new"as easily as he would like. Goibaehev is unlikely to have any challenee '0 his election as president, although there is no requirement that Ihe Congress consider only Ihe General Secretary in choosing Ihe chairman uf ihe Supreme Soviei. If he is too heavyhanded In managing the process or decline the Supreme Soviei or is perceived as intent on creating another rubbcrttatnp
io Ihe Interests ofwill increase cynicism about the sincerity of his reform program. After his election to the presidency lasi fall. Sover-skaya kult'uraeader's letter asking why Gorbachev had not submittedwl.(candidate baHM. Out if the Congress docs nol act as areformersSupreme Soviei may contain deputies who wilt mount dialiengcs to his proposals. On several occasionseputies openly challenged party-approved legislation.Ihe activation of republic supreme sovieu8 shows bow quickly popular initiative canlegblative aelivbm. The new Supremethe Soviet ofwdl contain kgislnlors wiih even more radical reform agendas than Gorbachev is likely to accept. Both Boris Yd'uin and Baltic natknalbu have announced plans to form their own political interest groups if elected to the Congiess and Supreme Soviet. Although Gorbachev will have plenty of supporters in the new Supreme Soviet, he mayifficult time restraining legislative activism by deputies who lake hb rhetoric about empowering stale Insillulions seriously.
Sonet political culture. Gorbachev will find it easkr to change ihe form of slate Institutions than to alter several generations of Soviet altitudesthe poliiical system. If he truly intends for the Supreme Soviet toeaningful role inpolicy, he will have to overcome deep ideological suspidons within the parly aboutfjistaturcs thai allow diverse political tendencies to articulate their demands. The leadership seemstosocialbt pluralism'" lo emergene-party syslem, and Gorbachev wants to open Up the political process to previously unrepresented groups. Bul he will also have io overcome historic Russian (endencieo that have stymied previous al-(empu at establishing national democratic insiitu-lions. Oo the popular level, Gorbachev mustapathy toward politics among some groups whileay io control (he enthusiasm of citircn organizations ih.il aie pushing for anof democracy and refr-rm beyond lhal which he it willing to allow
(Jorbachev'* success in transforming ihe political system will have to be measured over many yean. In ihe ibort term, however, he may be able lo use lhc revamped slate institutional slruclurc lo fur-ibcr consolklate his own power and advance bis policy agenda. Indeed, there are signs thai Gorbachev plant to give the new Supreme Soviet and iueavy legislative calendar. In early9 Luk'yanov publicly declaredaw on local government andkey dement in the campaign to reform Ibe localbe considered at tbe first Supreme Soviet session. In late January the reform-minded economist Leonidwill enter (he Cocgresr as one of theannouncedeweconomic reform plan should be completed soon and considered as one of Ihe first acts of the new Suprcrne Soviet. Lasttall member at the Foreign Affairs Ministry doubted whether Gorbachev would make any important weapon systemsuntil the new legislative mechanism was In place.
Gorbachev is unlikdy to gel everything he wanu as the new stateet up. bul he needs to make sumclent progress to maintain ihe momentum of hb political restructuring program. The new laws giveonstitutional framework upon which to build, but Gorbachev's opponents realizel
stake and arc likdy to fight bard to prevent the full empowerment of ihe sute system. If Gorbachev holds true to form, be will pusb hard for substantive changes to hb liking, accept vxac compromises, aod then come back for more.*
Over the long term, whatever Gorbachev's ownabout the desired limits of reform,etting inrocess of invigorating the new slate institutions that may leadadical change in how political business is transacted in the USSR. The new system at least initially will not work in Ihe way Western parliamentary systems operate, but il coulducleus fromore pluralistic political system can growignificantof power at the political center take place. As momentum for change increases, lhc ability of the top leadership to control change will decrease, and al some point ptrtstroyka in Ibis area as in others could become irreversible
adooal Stale Statftm
Hifheii ortaa of tiate power Eteveryan Meetir
mem USSR Supreae Soywi byot
ElMiiof USSRoviet by Mad
Approve* rtete pktt and budget
ttaiftct tmft-xUl1 fonMioru aod boricr clatatej
Head of ifafe (prtiJdcat)Kaad4 Dcr-me Coooci)
srotla to. Cocava i> aod
Soprcot SovietllOQJ
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Pornrj Defcatc Council
Mute* hi^Ji-iooi miilujy aopenntraerrti
Mooilizc*od dtclaret war
Can repeal PreddJuir. coerce* aod orfm of
Adooti Uwi orient with lime of Cooxrcu
flc-atr
Headed gy Chainoao of USSR Siijwme SoWel
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Accountable to USSR Supreme Soviet
Cooiiiu ofxberi of die
USSR Supreme Soviet and republic lupreroe fotfctl platttodioj cot.vnmioc.1
decreet
New
Oiant*
* New power aod fufKilo-ni erf juie i
Original document.
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