The Changing Role of Civilian Advisers in Shapingational Security Policy
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The Changing Role of Civilian Advisers in Shaping Soviet National Security Policy
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Tbc Changing Role of Civilian Advisers in Shaping Soviet National Security Poficy
Judgments
Imformnleet arallaple mieti) Oetrmker IW
uml In effort.
President Gorbachev's8 speech to Ibe UN announc-ing major unilateral troop cuts over the next two years is themostof his willingness toew approach in national security and military policy advocated by civilian academic experts and, in the process, to challenge basic assumptions of tbe past. As be forges new directions he has turned increasingly lo civilian experts for advice and ideas, allowing Ihem to engage Ihe military in an unprecedented and wide-ranging debate on issues prevjoosly dominated by the military.
During the Brezhnev era, civilian involvement in national security policy was highly personalized arid informal, with accesshe lopconfinedandful of senior advisers who headed academic thinkof Sciences'who depended primarily on their personal links to leaders. Gorbachev, however, has sanctioned several actions that have begun to institutionalize input from civilian specialists. He has created units dealing wiih national security issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Commit lee apparatus, the Academy of Sciences, and tbe Supreme Soviet.
Gorbachev has encouraged civilian experts to speak out on nationalsecurity issues for several interrelated reason.-:
Byore open discussion among people with various pcrcpectives and iMUtuiional biases, Gorbachevider range of policy options from which to choose.
Allowing civilian views io actounterweight to traditional military assess menu strengthens both Gorbachev's personal role as arbiter on defense issues and the party's control over tbe miliiary.
Positions advocated by the most vocal civilian experts helpore " benign image of ihe Soviei Union to the West and burnish Gorbachev's domestic imagerxaccmaker"ime when his internal programs arc producing few tangible result* for tbe Soviet public.Most important, Gorbachev looks to his civilian advisers for the doctrinal rationalization for shifting resources to the domesticeasure he regards as essential to lhc long-term strength and survival of the Soviet system.
By invoking Gorbachev's principles of "new thinking" to challenge the Soviet miliiary on the field of doctrine, lhc civilian specialists have shifted the center of debate from the narrow miliiary calculus traditionally favored
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by the miliury leadershiproader coiieepiion of national security requirements. In doing to, they arc trying to move discussion to the politicalthey holdetailed technical debate of military structures, systems, orthe military's expertise is greater. Tbe civilian specialists have argued that the suicidal consequence*ajor East-West conflict reduce the chances of an attack from lhc West and make any concept of "victory" meaningless. They have advanced inlerpreiationt of "reasonable suiBcka-cy" and Mde-fensive defense" that challenge several tenets of traditional Soviet miliury doctrine,educed commitment to military spending, and argue axainst offensive ranitioning of Soviet forces. Civilian advisers have been the ones to advocate making unilateral cuts rather than holding oui for mutual negotiated reductions. In making his announcement of unilateralif implemented, would virtually eliminate any Soviettohort-warning attack againstaligned himself with the arguments of the most radical civilian adviser*
The Oeneral Staff ha* been attcmptlnc to broaden the expertise of tomeoflicers to enable themddress the Issues raised by thelitis more effectively,more frequently sending
officers to outside meetings to keep an eye on these specialists and protect General Staff equities. While getting in step rhetorically with Gorbachev's policies, however, lop military leaders have consistently reasserted many of the longstanding notions of Soviet miliiaryas tbc need for partly with tbc West in both quality and quantity ofhave implied lhal the civilian experts lack the competence to meddle in miliiary mailer*
Tbe military's approach of giving liptcrvice to basic rethinking of miliury doctrine while rotating much of the old line was viable only as long as Gorbachev and the Politburo remained uncommilled. The changes made at Ihe September Central Commillce plenum, however, significantly tlrenglhened Gorbachev's position In the Politburo and apparently enabled him to pushinal decision on lhc unilateral cuts be announced at the UN. Tbe retirement of General Staff Chief Sergey Akhromeycv nnd rumors thai Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov might be replaced make it clear that the miliiary hasajor defeat in its effort lo reconcile "new thinking" wi'h traditional military priorities
Gorbachev may include more civilian experts in Ihe process of Soviei national security decisionmaking and push lhc conleni of ihatfurther in the direction of their views. Changes In Ihe process of decisionmaking may become evident over lime In such things as:
access of ihc Institutes to sensitive miliury information and the institutes' publication of sophisticated miliury studies in which tbe daU are derived from Soviet rather than Western sources.
more prominent or more formal role for civilian specialists In advising lhc Politburo and Defense Council on national security affairs.
Changes in the conleni of Soviet security policy in line wiih advice of civilian experts may be reflected in such possible mores as:
in Soviet defense spending along with lhc troop reduction* already announced.
pressure on the defense industry to support Gc^bacbev'i civil industrial modernization and consumer programs.
greater flexibility in both the conventional and strategic nuclear arms controltbc possibilities of addilional unilateral moves and further deep cuts in negotiations
Such changes are Hill politically contentious and highly dependent upon the overall nature of East-Wesl relations. But the civilians are pushing tbe debate in the direction of these changes, and the politicalbyincreasingly receptive to their arguments
Contents
Blunt
The Changing Role of Civilian Advisers in Shaping Soilel National Sccurily Policy
by Gorbachev'* advocacy of "new politicalivilian spccialbu have encaeed the mili-Uiy in an unprecedented and wide-ranging debate over national security policy; While the process of developing civilian expertise on military issues began under Brezhnev and expanded under Andropov, civil. Ian experts seem to haveignificant impact on security policy only under Gorbachev. They have been allowed far greater leeway to challenge previous assumptions underlying thb policy, andaxing steps to institutionalize the input of civilian experts in national security decisionmaking
Gorbachev and his closest supporters in the leadership have both implicitly and explicitly called for civilian experts to speak out on issues previously dominated by the military. There are several interrelated reasons for this:
Byore open discussion among people with various perspectives and institutional biases. Gorbachev and hb Politburo colleaguesider range of policy options from which to choose.
Allowing civilian experts to emerge as ato the military on defense issues helps fortify fab role as key arbiter and reinforces party control of the military, which eroded somewhat duringhut years-
Giving civilian experts an opportunity toore benign image of Soviet military doctrine andhelps Improve the West's view of the USSR. In turn, thb contributeseduced foreign threat and helps burnish Gorbachev'sime when hb internal programs are producing few tangible resulu for the Soviet public.
Most important, by allowing civilians to argue that the externalower than that posited by the miliury. that the definition of national security should not focus primarily on military factors, and that military procurement requirements should not
reasonable sufficiency" of weaponry, he canigher priority for the civilian economy in resource allocation.
Aleksandr Yakovlev, head of the new party commit-sion oo intranational policy, and Foreign Minuter lid used Shevardnadze have specifically urged civilian party officials to help flesh out the implications of "new thinking" for national security policy.himself basethinking of many long-held tenet* of Soviet miliury doctrine:
has directly challenged tbe wisdomng miliury buildup in the name of
SovieU' longstanding commitment to match orWestern military enhancements withresources of their own. As early aspeech to the Supreme Soviet, be said the United Sutes and tbe Soviet Union "will have toommon undemanding of what level of weapons on each side could be considered relatively sufficient from the point of view of its reliable defense" and argued that "thb level of sufficiency is much lower than tbal which tbe USSR and tbe US in fact possess at thb moment."
6 he atUcked miliury theorist* who argued tbal ibe USSR needed sufficient miliury forces to establish parity with an likely opposing coalitions. At the Trade Union Congresse argued lhat Soviei miliury forcei should be determined independently of Western forces: "Let us notautomatically. withoutimperialism is seeking to impose on us In the arms race."
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He hai broadened the concept of "detenu" to include political negotiation. Ath Pany Congress he said that "the nature of today'sleaves no Mate any hope of defending, itself wiih miliiary-technical meant alone" and argued thai "ensuring iceuriiy It more and more taking the formolitical task" that "can only be solved by political means."
Gorbachev's statements provide guidelines for the Civilian specialists andramework for the debate. Gorbachev, however, needs the specialists to flesh oat Ibe implications of his ideas and to float specific proposals and innovations thai can be tested through discussion nod debate before the leadership decides whether to endorse specific options. Thus, while the argument* advanced by tbe ctvibanreflect broad leadership preferences, they can also influence leadership thinking on particular points, nnd in many cases Ihey probably go beyond ibecurrent thinking on otber points.
avillan Advisers and Institutes
For this task. Gorbachev has turnedumber of civilian advisers. Most bave been associated with tbc Academy of Sciences, and three have beaded the academy "think tanks" most closely connected with foreign affairs and arms control (seeince Gorbachev became Genera!since about6 when he began to talk tnoro frequently of applying "newoseen ri tymanda te ofhstilutesexpanded inlo fields traditionally reserved for the professional military, iueh as strategy, operations, and tho proper structure of armed forces.
Yevgenly Primakov, director of the Insiilute for World Economy and International Rdationsas recently named ioewly created Academy of Science* Department of Social, and Economic Studies of International Relations, while retaining bis IMEMO po*iiion.C
- Jja Primakov's new responsibilities will enable him to supervise tho activities of all Ibe foreign affairs Insiilules and to put his stamp on .their work. IMEMO has traditionally focused on global economic
Tie Academy ofnstitutes
Before. Soviet politicallhanfrequently traveled or lived abroad and were generally reasonably well Informed about European affairs. They often depended on iheir own expertise for guidance In policy matters aad kept abreast of current developments through theirwith Western Communistthe Comintern, and its succetior the Cominform.
With the collapse af tha Comintern and Cominform links In the, the death of Stalinnd the continuing deaths of leaders with experience In the West. Soviet leaders Inncreasingly saw the needadre of academic experts art foreign affairs. Several Institutes were created within the Academy of Sciences to meet this need. Among them were Ike Institute of Worldand Inierrtatlonalhe Institute ofhe Instllutt of Latinhe Institute of the Farnd ihe Instllute of ihe USA andhese Institutesajor center of foreign areaIn the Soviet Union and. under <rorbachev, have been given an Increasingly larger role to play In advising the political leadership In foreign affairs.
problems but recently has increased iu emphasis on miliiary policy and national security. Moat of the work on miliury affairs al IMEMO is done in Ihe arms control dcosrtment, which, r^ t
0 people, includingesearchers. The department xs headed by Aleksey G. Arbatov, who is also chiefection on space and strategic arms. Nikolay Kithilovection on conventional and uctical nuclear weapons, and Alck-sandr Knlyadinection on blernationalBoth Primakov and Arbaiov have participated in Ihe debate on military doctrine, and both havesharp responses from the military.
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ihead of Ihe Institute of Ihe USA aad Canada (IUSAO-and father of Akksera full member of the Central Committee with long cipcrkacc as an adviser lo the top political leadership. Although his political fcctaaes have fluc-luated through the years, be still appears to be oae of the tnoai irnporuat erriiian adviserse Gorbachev leadership. IUSAC ants created1 io develop expertise and advise tne leadership oo US* tbe institate has expanded iu charter within the Add of national security policy and has employed such spccialbu as Viuliy Zhurkin and Audrey Kokoshio. who have been among lhc most aggressive In slaking oui civilian notions of military doctrine. For example. Zhurkin and Iwo coauthors, Sergey Karaganov aad Audrey Kortnnov. have uken highly controversial stands on the naisre of the threat posed by the West, and Kokoshin has used) battle of Kursk tooncept of 'defensive defense" thai provoked sharprom ihe mili. ttry.
Jtoal'Jntil recently bead of ibeInstliutcas been at all of lhcmeetings between Gorbachev and Presidecn iftlLZ.
.
probably will continue lo be one of Gorbachev's moat important arms control advisers C
Jhe has obtained finalto establish an armshink unk ofen-time people under the Academy of Science*of Soviet ScieoibU for Peace and Agalnit tbe Nuclear Threat. Thb think unk may be an expansionroup established at IKI3 In response to Ihe US Strategic Defense Initiative, although it it unclear what il will do or bow it will III in with other element! of the Soviet national security and arms control bureaucracy. While IKI has traditionally con centra ted oa technical probierm of space research, Sagdeyev has encoarsged IKI personnelhe debate on military doctrine aad national securityspecially in the area of advanced military technologies. IKI personnel have participated with IUSAC and IMEMO ia some iMcrinsiiiuic studies and have provided technical advice andto lhc other civilian Insiilutes. IKI hai not laken a
leading role in Ibe debate, but Ihe technicalil hai lent to the debate has consider* Uy enhanced Ibe credibility of the institute atudies and bas enabled the civilian* to successfully chslleoge lhc mditaryi espcrtbe in some areas, especially strategic arm* control
Thr Commliltt of Soviet oVtrrrrtru lor Prattihe NuclearambreUaof ihe Academy ofbecome afor civilian advice and expertise onand miliury affairs. Having begun altransparent propaganda forumnder Gorbachev it has begun to playpivotal role. Ii reportedly proposed themoratorium adopted by Gorbachev Inand continued for IS months, despiteel wet* ace. Headed by Sagdeyev and drasringfrom the Academy of SciencesIUSAC, IMEMO. aadbas produced several reports onncluding one7 which argued thaiSoviet strategic forces could be cut by ap towithout harming military or political U
addedetired gencrab and admirabhe Com-mitlec sUff and therefore will have much more
C
liUry expertise id draw upon for future studies. Jibeb now functioning "almostovietto tbe tuft of the US National SecurityWhile Una self-serving claim for the wide-ranging influence of the Committee appears exaggerated.auicrneau indicate be does lootthe Commiiiec for counsel on national security miners.peech Ine commentedon work door by the Commit
Academy of Sciences' Vice President levgentyandidate member of the Central Committee, has participated in several of Gorbachev's summit meetings, including all four with President Reagan.
Aimember of the new Central Committee commit-lion on international policy, he will continue to actn important conduit of infonnation from theof Science*be top political leadership
tnnag c* la the National Securitytoeeae
Under previous general seemtriea. Ihe procet* of civibaa involvement ineeurily policy tu hiahly rer.ooah.ed and informal, with access to the top occitiotuuakert confinedandful of teaser ecMsers. The heads of IMEMO aad IUSAC for etampte. earned influence more because cf their
influence of Ihe institute tpccialttlt. They dearly have gained more access to too policymakers and have beenandate toroad range of national securityspecially miliiary doctrine. C
3 since Gorbachev becameihey have had more access loand more opportunity to prewidedirectly to policy ma kera. This centrumtheir claims of influence in the Brezhnevihey .tressed the indirect nam re of theirtheir claims of influence arefact ihai.pcoalou have often
predicted accurately Ibc future direction ot iovvet forcgn polky lends lo corroborate their,
leg the Brerfmev era. Oeorxry Art*tor would task Ihem IO writehich he would then read and use ai tbe ban. of hi* personal comment* to Brezhnev. Tbe miliury, however, maintained control of the most important instituiionnl channel, of inrormaiion and acted at ibc gatekeeper for ihe Politburo's dcfenic lubcommitlee, tbe Defense Council
During the Dreihncv years, ihe Soviei Geaeral Sulf functioned as the mercurial to ihe Detente Council. It set tba order in which agenda items would be considered, drafted resolutions for Defense Council consideration, and prepared briefings and background papers ooletues. This secretariat function ha* given lhc General Suff unparalleled access to and influence with (ha top potiltcal eVeisiMrnakera Sorer-al reports Indicate last during ha briefncrease crvibaa sateen for the Defense Council andody comparable to Ibc staff of Iht US National Security Counrii, but there is no evidence tbii thb plan ever got off the ground.
Under Gorbachev, the General Staff apparentlytinue* to function at the Defense Council secretarial and so remainsosition io influence all decisions aiTeeilng national Mcurily policy. Currently, however, thl* Influence It diluted by greater input from civilian bodle* (toon addition to ibe personal access and Influence of the InitiiJte directors, there Isthat the poliiical leadership has enhanced the
of Ibc articles oa miliiary policy writtenpolky specialist* have appeared in-here publication would requiresupport. Tbc most unking example ofan ankle by Zhurkin. Karaganov. andin the porty'i theoretical journalthe editors of Kommunlit
took the initiative lo contact the authorsimilar ankle by (he tame three coauthors appeared in the Soviet magazine New Times.f^
j the institute* arc becoming more political-ly imporuni under Gorbachev
- Jthe
foreign policy institutes hadajor rde in formulating Soviet arms control policy
A broader mandate and higb-levd politicalthe institutes and Ibe information they provideevident ia ibe recealbe
hat been namedewly created arms control institute within (be Academy of Sekoces. perhaps attachedUSAC. Zhurkin has reportedly left bl* position at deputy director of IUSAC toew intlltuie on European affairs. Although it it unclear wheiber ihe new Institutes willreater role in
i
Ike formulaiton of Sovirt policy than their predcces-k*he creation of new institute* and (he promotion off the meal radical spokesmen inch as Zawkin sad Kokoabin suggest high-level support
ome rviaeaot that under Gorbachev ibe process of providiaf iafcrmatioa to the lee pobiicatvolvinfore formalized system. Aleksaodr Yakovlcv. ooe of Gorbaehev'i strongest aapportcn in the Politburo and head of the new Central Committee coanmbsion oa foreign affairs, may serveiddleman bet wren the Institutes and Gorbachev. He previously Mrvcd as director of MEMO. and several Insliiuie ipccialbis havehimonduit to Gorbachev. The membership of Yakovlev's commission ai announced in November, moreover. suggesti lhat the commission will be well situated lo serveonduit from (he institutes to the lop leadership. Iu memben include IUSAC chief Arbatov, IMEMO chief Primakov, and Academy of Sciences Vice President Velikhov. Other coenmission members who may be inclined to support thearf ameau include the new bead of tbe party's International Deportment. Valentin Faliu; KGB chief VUdinar KryacsuW-.and Deputy Foreian Minister V. M. NMforov. Sergey AkJuomeyev. chief of theStall until hb retirement was announced durinz Gorbachev's December visit lo Newhe oaly 'military'* member of ibe com mission There arc abo indications that Ihe chairman will be able to name Otber civilian referents lo support the commbaloe'i work.
thc new Supreme Soviet would have severalincluding one lhat would considerand national security affairs. Such aup tbe same sort of expertise ascommission Primakov, Georgiy Arbatov.for ex* mote, are all current "wmbers of
now under way lolueprint for committee composition and suiting in time for the9 election. Current Ideas call for assigning one or more deputiesbe committee and providing Ihem wilh experi sulfa to debate major issue* nnd,he case of
defcnie. lo review those major programsdeoiiom. The committee could thai playrole in debating key securitykguUtkon. ratifying armsew ing the military budget andprocesswho were
developing the committee structure had asked him to brief them oa bow tbe US Congress organized iu committees. Thb interest in US Congressionalsuggests thai the Supreme Soviet committees are intended lo function at least formallyimilar manner, bul. because Gorbachev serves as chairman of Ihe Supremea US prcaidcai. who does not bead Conglegislative com mill ee* would actaallyery different role Ihaa US Congressional corztmiucrs. Rather than actingheck oo hb power as General Secretary orource of policy options that compete with iboae he favors, the committee structure would providewiih an additional lever to shape poiky and legislation
Gorbachev and hb advbera have already created at kaat Iwo formal channels for bringing the work of the civilian initilutc* to the policymakers. In the Central Committee International Departmentolitical-miliury sect too beaded by former L; Gen. Viktor Surodabov ha* been created to deal with annaquestwns Unlike Central Committee cxpcrU la some other sabauativc areas, neither Staiudubov nor his inbordiaatet in the ID haverominent eabtic role in the debate on military policy, However. p
theowinfluential nonmiliury organization condullDefcnie Councilexperts
on security attain seeking to mazimlzc tbeb Influence have jncreaaiagly focused their effort* on winning the ear of ID oflieiab. The new ID chief. Valentin Falin, has recently Uken positions in line with civilian -xperU on some key bancs such as -reasonable auffi-cseney.'
la the Soviet Ministry of roreign Affair*he sovieu have created an Arms Cooirol and Disarm*-memunder Viktor Karpovesearch
coordination center under VTadimir Shustov. anon ar mi contrul Issues. L
Ihe research ceeeoination center servo primarilyaintain lies between the MFA and the foreign policy institute* and universities aad lo solicit input from civilians on foreign policy Questions.peech to tbe MFA Conference inoreign Minister Shevardnadze stressed the Importance of soliciting tho views of outside experts P
Jjthe MFA bid recentlypectae group of younger scholars from the institutes to act as consultants. As in tbc case of tbe ID. the members of these new MFA components have cotisible role in the debate on miliury policy, but they ere providing comments to Ihe political leadership behind tbe scenes and havehannel for the foreign policy institutes to pass their views to the top political leaden
Tbe Civilian Experts' Challenge to the Advice of Ihc Military
There is evidence that tbe civilian specialists already have had an effect on several policy decisions C
month nuclear test moratorium wgs suggested by tbe civilians and that Gorbachev accepted the proposal despite objections from tbe military. Likewise. H
j current .foriet efforts to come upetailed accounting of Soviet defense spendingesult cf civilian criticism of miliury spending and miliury sccrctivenest. The clearest indication of the civilians' influence, however, it probably tbetroop cuts announced by Gorbachev in December. Unilateral cuts have been consistently opposed by Soviet miliury leaders, as well as some of thecivilian special ins. In making his announccmeni, Gorbachev allied himself with tome of Ihe mosi radical civilian advisers
The Nonspecimlisti' Debate
In addition lo civilian academic experts, Sovietand writers have joined in the debate on miliiary policy. Most of ihem have tended to support ike arguments of the Institute specialists. Well-known Irvesiiya correspondent Aleksandr Bervln. forhas questioned Ihe military rationale for the originaleployment decision and has critl-Ciztd traditional Soviet miliiary notions of parity. TASS military observer Vladimir Chernyshev,has argued that parity with the West should be imerpeeted moee broadlyalculus af rxclu-lively miliiary capabilities. Some writers, however, haveore traditional approach. Conservative writer Aleksey Prokhanov has argued that military affairs should be left to Ihe military and hasthose utho "demand the Immediate dismantling af the world military structure wiihoui theof those who created It. who know how It is organized.'
Aside from Ihe propaganda role revisionist writers are playing Inore benign Image af the Soviet Union lo the West, It Is unclear what effect. If any. these publicists have had on the potttlealor the course of the debate. The dissemination of their vtews In major publications does suggest high-level support for Iheir participation In the debate on military policy and Indicates that the poliiicalhas extended the policy of glasnott even to the previously closed area of national security policy. Al the least, ihe wide-ranging public debate oversecurity policy seems to suggest that the Politburo has decided that the military trill no longerearly exclusive monopoly on providing advice to the leadership on military and national security affairs.
blues Raised by tbe drill ins The civilian experts' greatest input hat come in the public debate over doctrine. The Sovicusociopolitical"
aspect mote neatly akin to Wcsiern concepts of national security policy as wdlmiliury. technical" aspect roughly analogous to Western ideas of military doctrine and strategy. Doctrinal changes thus have profound coojcquenccs affecting the entire agenda of miliury decisions, indoding militaryprocurement, troop levels, and force structure. Doctrinal issued, moreover, are the easiest for tho civilian specialists lo address because In doing so ihey can move Ihe discussionoliticalwhere Ihey boldetailed technical debate of military structures, systems, or tactics, where the military's expertise is greater.
Tbe Soviet debate on military doctrine hat involved several issues but has centered on "reasonable"defensivend the impossibility of victory evenonventional war. The lines of ihc debate do not break cleanly between civilianand professional military leaders, bul on mosi of the imporunl issues tbe participants line up In Ihose general groups.
Like Gorbachev, the insiitutc spcdalisu hatelhal maintaining security isoliiical task and thsi poliiical considerations should beabove miliury ones in assessing the nature of Ihe threat faced by tbe Soviet Union. For esample, Viuliy Zhurkin. Sergey Karaganov. and Andrey Kor-ttmov have vrritteo ihat "ihe problem of defending slates' security has outgrown ihe traditionalof purdy militaryecurity derivesompleg of political, military, economic. idecJogieaU and other factors, Ihey wrote, and "tbe predominant rote in this compterlayed by politics.'
The institute specialists alsolo what has long been held by Soviet miliuryvictory it impossiblear between theeven if tbe war it fought exclusively withweapons. Pointing io Ihe Chernobyl* disaster, the civilians stress thai poieniial urgets in awar would include nuclear power reactors throughout both Europe and ihe Soviet Union, lhal modern conventional weapons arc reaching thecapability of nudearnd thai in any military conflict between Easi and West ihe destruction would be so great lhal anr concept of "victory" would be meaningless
In arguing thai victory ia war is Impossible and that poliiical consxleraDcms musi lake priority overones, the institute specialists attack several tenets of uadilionat Soviet miliiary doctrine. First, they argue that Ibe military's traditional definition of "parity" was too narrow and allowed the West lo dicUU Soviet military poliey by committing theto match or exceed Western miliiaryregardless of whether such outlays werelo provide adequately for national security. Writing In New Times Inne Soviet civilian specialist died former Secretary of Defease Robert McNamara lo claim that "parity existed inven when the United Stateso-l" advantage In strategic weapons. Hethat -partly" should be "understood as the capability of the United States and ibe Soviet Union lo cause unacceptable damage to one another."be argued that ihe USSR bad "no need io take part in ihe amis raceooting of purity."
Institute trsedalitts also argue Ihat Soviei miliury forces can be reorganized toore defensive orientation.andmark article in /Communis! published inS. Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov slated flatly thai the Soviet Union fnced no threat of deliberate miliury aggression from Ihe West. They argued that Soviet miliury forces should therefore be restructured toore defensive character. Similarly, in an article on3 battle of Kursk. Kokoshln and coauthor V. V. Lnriooov argued that defensive operatioro are tbe mostand that Soviet forces should be restructured to emphasize defensive rather than offensive
Finally, some institute specialists argue thai, although mutually negotiated cuts In military forces are tbe most desirable way to lower the overall levels of both Soviet and Western forces, ihe Soviet Union could benefit by making unilateral cuts. Zhurkin.and Kortunov have argued eaplidily ihat "reasonablenvolves unilateral measures as well as bilateral arms control agreements and have died the conventional troop cuts made under
Khrushchevseful measure thai successfully diverted human and material reaouicea to theeconomy without harming Soviei security.
The Quality of Ih*eek
Available evidence suggeirs (hat the institutes have
had mixed success in producing sophisticated studies
that can effectively challenge prevailing miliury
views:
In tbe broad areas of US-Sonet strategic stability and strategic aims conirol, the institutes haveenough cipenisc lo ohalscegc traditionalmQitary tenets. In doing so, the institutecan rely on voluminous Western academic and apecialisi literature lhai covers Soviei as well as US systems and concepts. Moreover, on tome of the technological issue* loch ai verification or weapons based on new technologies, some of ihe academics and scientists may, in fact, have more expertise than their military counterparts.
In the eomplei Acids of conventional militaryand requirements for conventional force site, structure, and war-fighting capabilities, however. Ibe institutes have less eiperuse andaccca* to infonaauca thai would enable them io credibly challenge the assessments made by ihe General Staff
When the iastituie ipecialists have written about or discussed conventional militarythe concept of "defensiveusually have done so only in general termt. and Iheir work has scorned unsophisticated L_
One reason for thequality of ihe institutes'lhat the Soviet military still retains controlinlormation. Studies by IMEMOStill relynotderived from open Western sources. In latea study by IMEMO oo
parametersATO-Warsiw Pact militaryhad lo exclude chemical weaponscould not get sufficient data on cither USarsenals. In Mayon
Soviet conventional forces were still largelyoutside the military.
j the General Staff has tried loaway fromwho
have criticized tbe military.
If leadership attention to the work of Ihe institutes persists, however, over time tbey will be able to chip away at the military's domination of information and lo buildadre of experienced military analysts capable of competing wiih General Staff researchers. Both IMEMO and IUSAC already havea few retired military officers on their staffs. In Ihe future, tbe institute, may be able io draw other officers frora ibe KGB and ihe mililary who are experienced in mill-lary-polilical issues. Col. Gen. V. Arapov, first deputy chief of lhc Main Personnel Directorate, C*
adetters concerning officer assignments and tbe effects of lhc INF Treaty on officer retention. Many of the leliers requested early tjioviel press reports have indicated lhai, since Ihe INF Treaty was signed, many officers in tbe units affected by the treaty arencouraged" to resign. Others are being reassigned to lowerrequentlya demotion. Wilh the additional reductions In manpower announced by Gorbachev in December, even more experierwed military officer* will befor new Jobs. An offer from one of lhc Moscow institutes probably would be attractive to many of those officers; the institutes probably could choose from among the beat io develop lhc military expertise tbey still need. As the Institute specialists learn more
about defense Issues and defense spending, sod ss long ss they retain Politburo backing in their clfons. theii influence is likely to grow, i
Th* Miliury'*
Addretslog Gorbachev's Cooeem*
soviet miliury officials apparently bad concluded that the best way to parry the institute specialisu* challenge was to uke up the rhetoric of Gorbachev's "newnd move it in tbe direction they thought best They assertedJhat tbey were responsive in principle to tne political leadership's demands to reconsider important aspects of Soviet miliury doctrine:
In his first ineeting with Secretary of Defense Csrlucei. Defense Minister Dmitriy Yarov said that -at first" the Soviet miliury had not uken seriously the political requirement toefensive"but now weazov said that tbe Sovieu were in the process of revising their manuals and that the changes In doctrine would become evident in Soviet exercises.
Former Chief of the General Suff Aldtromeyev said daring his8 tour of the United Sutes thai tbe new doctrine bad been worked out in the Defense Council, and he repealed Yazov's claim that changes were now being implemented and would become evident ht Soviet exercise*.
Jtbe SovieU are now in the process of revising their doctrine to implement tbe teneU of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense."
wilh pans of Gorbachev's agenda. Some aspecu of this miliury rethinking of doctrine probably have been racked up by the institute specialists and political leadership and form the bastsivilian-miliury agreement on tbe need to reconsider some traditional notions of Soviet military policy.
Gorbachev, with
tne support of other Politburo leaden, basthe General Staff lo consider theihe Impossibility of victoryuclear war andrecommendations in this light, both in termsprocurement, force size, structure, andaod in learnstrategy for theto follow,
while the military is centrally involved io the process of redefining Soviet doctrine, much of tbe conceptual work Is now being done on an interagency basis in conjunction wilh the MFA and ihe academic.
The military hierarchy, however, bu clearlythat the threat to iu priorities posed by tbe civilian expertsortal one that cannot be evaded or glossed over, but must be met on the plane of political debau. Thus, tbe General Staff has been attempting to broaden Ihe expertise of some of Iu officers to enable them to better address the issues raised by the institute spcdalisU. It is alsof_ ending its officers more frequently to meetings held at tbe MFA lo keep an eye on the civilian experts and guard GencrslSuff eouilies.Tu^
^Scmet
miliury officers are increasingly being assigned to tbe MFA. Wesiern academics have reported that tbey have noted more willingness of General Suff oflken to meet with them lo discus* Soviet arms control and defense policy. L_
miliury writing* in the Ust few yean,bave given increasing attention to the possibilityar betwccu East and West mighl be fought exclusively with conventional weapons, and in aof their exercises the SovieU Lave paid greater attention to the problems of defewive operalions. Thi* indicates lhat lhc General Staff was independently considering some important changes in militarythat predate but nevertheless broadly coincide
Holding Ibr Mar on Doctrine
White seemingly gelling in step with Gorbachev by supporting his inns control program ond agreeingeappraisal of doctrine and tactics is warranted, the mililary has nevertheless" been loath to relinquish many cherished principles of military doctrine orhare tbe job of determining tbe content of doctrine with civilian specialists. Mililary leaders haveio bristle at whal Ihey view as civilian meddling in military affairs and to assert many of the tradition-al notions of Soviet military thinking even while often finding il cipedient to advance their arguments in the language of "new thinking."
The military's currentut to that of somethe West continues toerious military threat to the Soviet Union and that ibe only appropriate Soviet response is toilitary parity with ihe West asboth quantity and quality of forces- and vigorous offensive or "counteroffensive" capabilities:
the party conference inS. Yatpv nndunder increasing pressure fromgrudgingly begun defining parity more in qualitative than quantitative terms. Before that time, tbey both bad repeatedly staled that the level of Soviet forces was determined by the level of Western forces and bad spoken forcefully against making any unilateral cuts. In an article appearing tbe day before Gorbachev's unilateral troop cut announcement, Akhromeyev reiterated his concerns.
Defense Commander In Chief Ivan Tret'yak.onfidant of Defense Minister Yazov. has been particularly forceful in rejecting anyof purely "defensive defense" or unilateral force cats. In an interview published ine said that, while Soviet military operations would be "mostlyefense wu not enough "to smash tbe enemy. So the iroops have also to be well versed in tbe arl ofe aaid tbe troop cuts made underby tbe instituteoodterrible blow" to the USSR's defense capability, one tbe miliury was still feeling, and
argued strongly that, in spite of the "lureny change* in the miliury should be consideredhousand times."
Dcrwty Ca-ef of the Gonenl Stafl" Makhawa* Gar-eyev. formerly chief of the Milrtary Scienceaad now the deputy probably charged with oversight of doctrinal issues, echoed Tret yak'srecently inpamphlet on Soviei miliury science. Garcyev argued that, contrary to theof the instiiuie ipccialbu, the threal of war from ihe Wealeal danger to the Soviet Union and suicd thatnadmissible when article* published In oui pceu voice iudgmcnuon the desirability of our unilateral disarmament."
the ideas of ihe institute specialist* regarding "reasonablenilateral cuts,e argwed instead for mainUiniag parity wiih lhc Weal and Mid thai future Soviet defensive operations would not be "passive- but would include the capabihty to carry out otTciune ope ratiom
One of ihe meet comprehensive rebutub of ihe civilian specialists' view* appeared in Ihe5 bsue of Koomufilii. Tbe authors of thedepuiy Maj Gen. Yuriy Ubedev and Candidate of llbtoricof Science* Alekseydown the usefulness of unilateral CUU in Soviet force* androadside against the civilians. While acknowledging thai miUury-ixconi-cal ton iH'rations alone are insufficient to determine force kevels and that political coruudeiaiions domsaau purely miliury rues, ibe artlcfe argued lhat tbe West remainssig ru(scant military ihreal to the Soviet Union and thai the curreni mil'sry pirity between East and West must be mainuined until overall force level* can be redaecdutual basb. The aathon explicitly criticised the Inatilut* spccialbu for their "rash" proposals and. In extraordinarily harsh aad insulting languageoviet journal, pointed lo
"ihe inadequate training of political scientists in questions of miliury doctrine" and the "lack oftating thai "some of the people drawn into the disciadery vague notion of the subject under discussion."
specialists had been malting with regard to arms control and such questions as ihreal perception.
Groand In Controlling Information
Despite their animosity toward the dvilians. mililary leaders have nude some limited moves toward sharing information wiih the civilian institutes:
Both IUSAC and IMEMO have retired mililary officer* on Iheir staffs, and in early*
Ihe institutes were participating in some war games.
Even after the information is made available toibe General Staff retains considerableover bow thatsed, thusthe civilians' abilityet iheir
_3
the future the institutes arc likely to have more access to information on the military. Several Soviet otlicinb, including Gorbachev, have said that ihe SovieU are now working toublicof Soviet defense expenditures ths'i can reasonably be compared with Western spending levels. Some officials, including Gircyev, have also indicated that Ibe Soviet Union intends to make available more informaiion on thospedflcs about Ihe number of personnel and ihe strength of uniu. Much of thb information could becometo Ibe institutes if Ibe United Sulci and the Soviet Union exchange daU on conventional forces as part of the arms control process.
The institutes, nevertheless, remain hampered for now by the miliury's control of sensitive information aod willingness to use Ihb lever to limil the civilians" abiliiy to challenge miliury nssessmenu L
^recently accused the General Suffofinformation from the institutes becausewith the proposal:
Although there probably have been few formal changes in Soviet national security decision making or in tbe inilitaiional process of formulating nuliUry doctrine, there hasrama lie change io the pobcy. Moreover, the political reform process now under way is helping provide an institutional frame-work for civilian involvement oa defense binesikely that cither tbe Supreme Soviet commiiiec on national security issues or the Central Committee commission on internaolicy will draw civilbn cxperU inio Iheir suffs, or tarn to Ihe Institutes for support in generating policy options. FormerAnatoliy Dobeynin. hb deputy at the ID Vadim Zagladin. and Akhromeyev have reportedly become advisers to Gorbachev in bb new capadty asof the Supreme Stwict Presidium. They could serve as an additional conduit for advice In national security decision mi king
Because the General Staff retains control of most sensitive military information and has most of the eipertbe on miliury affairs, the miliury leadership still has mine room to maneuver. But the military's
approach of living lipscrvice to (be need for basic rethinking of doctrine and national security policy while restating much of the old line is no longer viable. With Oorbacbcv's strengthened politicalafter the September plenum, bb endorsement of some of the most radical civilian ideas at theUN speech, the resignation of Akhromeyev. and rumors that Yazov might also be replaced, it seems likely that Gorbachev is well positioned to continue bb push for changes in (he process of national security decisionmaking and that the content of thatwill increasingly reflect the ideas of the civilian specialists.
Changes in (he proof is may become evident over time in such things as:
access of tho institutes to sensitive military In formation and the institutes' publication ofmilitary studies in which the data arefrom Soviet rather than Western sources.
more prominent or more formal role of civilian speciatbts ia advising the Politburo and Defense Council on national security affairs.
Changes in tbe content of Soviet security policy in line with civilian advice may be reflected in such possible moves as:
Cuts in Soviet defense spending along with tbe unilateral troop cuts already announced.
Stepped-up pressure on the defense industry to support Gorbachev's civil Industrial mcderniiation and consumer programs.
Significantly greater flexibility and initiative ia both the conventional and strategic nuclear arms centredthe possibilities ofunilateral moves and further deep cuts in negotiations.
Such changes are Still politically contentious and highly dependent upon the overall nature of Past-West relations. The dvBians are nevertheless pushing tbe debate In the direction of these changes, and the politicalbyreceptive to the dvitians' arguments
BLANK PAGE
Appendix A
and IMEMO: Organization and Key Personnel
1 ns liI. ef tbe USA aad Canada (IUSAC)
Director:
rbato*
Deputy Director!
Radomir G. Botdano* Viktor A. Krcascayuk Vasiliy F. Ponomarev Gcotgly Ye. Skorov Sergey M. Piekhanov AnntoliyA. Porolthovskly-Viktor It Spandar'yan
Execs live Secretary. Foreign Relations: Konstantin K. Sbuminskiy
Scientific Secretary, Foreign Relations. Vladimir N. Kretl'yaao*
Scientific Secretary. Doeoeslk Affairerlenko*
Chief, Canada Department: Leon A. Bagrarnov
Chief, Economics Department: Lev N. Karpov
Chief. Foreign Policy Department: Gcnrikfa A. Tronrnenko
Chief. DonsestK Poetical Department: Unknown
Chief. International Economic Relations Department Mikhail I. Zjkhmato*
Chief, Political Military Deparlment: Atektey A. Vailfyev
Chief, library;
Irina M. lUptswa
Chairman, Party Comnutiee; Alekaandr K. Kislo.
Chairman. Komsomol Committee: Andrcy V. NiWorov
CfUef Editors
Valentin M. Bcrcrbkcw and Nikolay D. Toikaleako
u
Chief. Coo fuel Resolution Department: Unknown
Instil uie of World Economy aod International Retallona (IMEMO)
Director:
. Primako*
Deputy Directors: Oleg N. Bykov Igor Ye. Gur"yev Vladlen A. Martynov Vladimir I. Strigachcv
Scientific Secretary:
Vladimir ft Yakubm-skiy
Chief, Economics and Polities of Dcvesorsing Couniriea Depanment:irskiy
Chief. Foreign Feonornic Rdttiont of Capitalist Countrlcii i' :i:
Margarita M. Maktimca
Social and Ideological Problems Department: Yuriy A. Zamoshkin
if. General Problem* of Imperialism andf Bourgeois Fxonomie Theories Depnrimeni: Abram B. Mileykcvskiy
Chief. Prospecis of Developmenl and Competition Deparlmeni: Unknown
Industrial-Agrarian Complexes Depanmeni: Unknown
ef. Industrial Economies Deportment: Yuriy V. Kurenkov
ef. Information Depanment; Mikhail A- Portnoy
nf. Inicrnatlonal Relations Depart menu Oleg N. Bykov
ief, Japan Department: Georgiy Knaziy
ief. Management Problems Department: Unknown
ief. Mathematics Department: Unknown
lief, Miliiary Deportment: Aleksey D. Nikooov
lief. Modeling and Forecasting Department: Lev M. Grcenov
Sief. Peace Research Department: Georgiyorotov
ocialist Problems of Capitalist Stales Department: Unknown
Cbief. Technical Economic Research Department: Vladimir I. Strigaehev
Chief. USA Economy Deportment: Andiey V. Anikhin
Chief. West European Economies Depanmeni: Oleg V. Salaovskiy
Chief. World Oceans Depanmeni: Lev l_ Lyubiroov
Chairman. Komsomol Committee: Sunijlav V. Kibirskiy
Chief of Publications: V. T. Kskuoov
I
Original document.
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