f INTELLIGENCE
ebruary IS89
The Nan-Communist Factions in Cam) The Challenges Ahead
Summary
Although many issues, including power-snaring arrangements, arc
unresolved ir. Cambodia, the frameworkolitical settlement is
emerging This development is raising new concerns about "he
the non-Communist Sihanoulnst National Army (ANSJ and Khmer People's
National Liberation Front (KPNIF) resistance (actions to cope with what*
wouldew era in Camood'a in our view, it is. not too earlyegin
assessing the strengths and weakness ol each faction and speculating
about the challenges they may face In the difficult transition that is on the horizon
international credibility and domestic popularity that flow from Probablv the bost flrospect lor the Ron-Communists is an accommodation with the sironyer People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) ^nd possibly elements of the Khmer Rouge, along with international Guarantees,
By mosi measures. Prince Sihanouk's National Army has clear political and military advantages over the often self-destructive-KPNLF. Nevertheless, both organizations are fragile, in our view, and no matchprobably not pojitir.aUy"for the Communist Khmer Rouge
The non-Communists' Survival most rtfcely will depend on political acumen scarce
A Perspective on the Process
broad outlineso predici whore all the panief nion ^os.-stance factions ihe Peop
bo II Pr
are taking shapp4 and it is difficult
s reached, the dynamics arether ASEAN countries, the three
What is clear Is that Cambodia will be highly unstablehe aftermatholitical settlement and fraught with risks and uncertainties 'orthe Khmer factions especially the non-Communists If the diplomatic process continues on its present course, even an internationally sanctioned agreement will not guaranteeontinuingovernment. Negotiators are haggling over ihe formularovisional entity, but so far have not focused onrocess for 1N2 transitionermanent government or crafted any ground rules to shape the result The various settlement proposals make only vague refeicnceventual elections, fo wh.cn there are no strong traditions or established institutions in Cambodia
The Non-Communists* Balance Sheet: Assets .
Tht primary strength of the non-Communists is their political credib*iity. Unlike their Communist Khmer Rouge counterparts and Vietnam's client People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime, the non-Communists art not tainted by past excesses or collaborationated enemy. Memories of the Khmer Rouge's reign of terror in therobably ere the most serious impediment to that group's Quest lor sole power In Cambodia. For its pan, the PRK's decadelong drive to win favor with the Cambodian populace has been stunted by its imageietnamese puppet The non-Communist factions, on the other hand, have international political legitimacy thai accords the resistance movement stature It otherwise would not have. We believe iheir relatively stronger public image would Improve their chances .or generating appeal mside Cambodia when theyow government (here
of the non-Commui highly popular Prince Sihanouk, the consensus among all parties solution and futureihanouk's own oroua. thushnom Penh
nves from their association with hSitrO;i in nur vii
Because of the non-Commun<sis' residual popularity, political credibility, and to Sihanouk, we believe the PRK will see utility in keeping them on boardettlement. The PRK has already showed interest In joining forces with them to strengthen military and political defenses against the Khmersecurity threat officials in Phnom Penh acknowledge will remain indefinitely. They also probably calculate that the prospects for substantial international assistance wilt be best if Slhanpuk returns to Phnom Penh and the non-Communists participateew government
The Khmer Rouge has reasons of its own to cooperate politically with theat feast for now. The organization has sought refuge under the non-Communists' political umbrella and probably will try to do soettlement, oast early on
he Khmer Hougc reconciliation with Prince Sihanouk late last year and endorsement of his peace plan, which required Chmer Rouge to drop opposition to international peacekeeping forces, probably weie tteps tn that direction, fl
Iheir military fore
The two non-Communist factions are also making some headway in
^rr/rynmuAnCT on/a
have taken advantage of the increased manpower ana support tOTTOp upsitJe Cambodia, though mostfy in areas near the Thai-Cambodian bortfCf^JJJp
and Liabilities
The KPNLf has been nearly paralyzed for several years by chronic mfignjng andmorale ihat render it the weaker of the non-Communisi factions. Many Front officials routinely sacrifice the organisation's interests torown. and we believe they will continue to do soettlement. They have already squandered much of the domestic political-capital and international appeal derived from their cause
Taken together, the two non-Communisi factions have no; bcncMcd 'rem cooperation
Shared concerns andy improve iPanHvO'k scmowhai as ;hc [wo c'Oups try to COpO with the problems and uncertaintiesnsilrOn ahead
/s
Longer Run Challenges
an advantage in its dealings with the non-Communists; although PRK government structures are embryonic, the regime is strengthening its presence throughout most of the country, in the international arena, the PRK is gaining stature by shedding its close association with Vietnam and by advertising its role as primary opponent of the outcast Khmer Rouge Moreover, any value the PRK places on cooperation with the non-Communists probably is related more to Phnom Penh's desire to stack the political deck against the Khmer Rouge thanaving the non-Communists as anti-Khmer Rouge allies on the battlefield The PRK's use for the non-Communists probably would decline if Sihanouk dies. Any perceived lessening of the Khmer Rouge threat also would reduce the value of cooperating with the non-Communists
tne non-Comrnunists inside Cambodia because of the large there, the numerous caches of combat materiel at its dispo
. _the runnier
Rouge guerrillas of<en resort to harassment, intimidation, and armed auacks against the non-Communists despite the acknowledged need for partnership with them. Thisheavyhanded approach contradicts the organization's claims to rehabilitation.
Original document.
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