Iraq's National Security
Iraq's National Security Coals HI)
Judgments
lilarmaito* ttt,labli
to bolster Iraq's defenses againsi Iran will head Baghdad's list of national security goals during the next decade. Iraqi policymakerslmost all their country's national security goals with an eye to their impact on ihe Iran-Iraq balance of power. Baghdad's perception of that balance will heavily influence how cooperative the Iraqis are with the moderate Arabs and the Uniledf)
Baghdad probably will concentrate onN Security Couneil-guarantced comprehensive peace settlement wiih Iran before resuming full-lime pursuit of its international leadership ambitions Baghdadbelieves that Iran is more likely to observeettlement and that, ^ms violated. Iraq can use it to seek international sanctions against Iran.
Baghdad's emergence from the Iran-Iraq warosition of strength will give impetus to President Saddam Husayn's aspirations to leadership of the Arab world and the Nonaligned Movement. Iraq has thc largest and best equipped armed forces in thc Arab world, and its victory effectively removes Iranegional counterbalance for the nest few years. Despite substantial foreign debt. Iraq's oilonly to Saudi Arabia among the noncommunistSaddam enormous economic leverage in pursuit of his policyf
Saddam probably will try to promote his leadership goals through less radical means lhan Baghdad has employed in the past. He has softened Iraq's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and supports the mainstream elements of the PLO He probably will largely eschew efforts to undermine conservaiive Arab regimes
Nonetheless. Iraq is likely to remain more radical thin iu Arab allies and collide on occasion with regional rivals. Baghdad probably will remain among Israel's most hostile enemies, but war-weary Iraq probably will not undertake significant military adventures in the near to medium lerm The Iraqis will continue to sponsor Ba'th parties in other Arab states to advance Iraqi interests and to foster opportunities to establish pro-Iraqi regimes. Baghdad is not likely io abandon ihe use of terrorism againsi its opponents, both foreign and domestic.
Iraq will inientify iu efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other advanced military technologyeter Iranian aggression. Its successful use of chemical weapons, missiles, and high-performance Western and Soviet aircraft has whetted its appetite for advanced technology.ounter against improvements in Iranian chemical warfare capabilities. Baghdad probably hasigh priority onuclear weapons capability,
Baghdad will seek to prevent the United States and the USSR from favoring Iran so much that Iraqi interests are threatened. Iraq believes that thc superpowers regard Iran to be of greater importance in the region and will try to enhance Iraq's political and economic appeal, particularly to the United States. Baghdad will stress tbe importance of its oil reserves andthe continued growth of bilateral trade with the United States. The United States became Iraq's largest supplier of civilian goods? with exports0 million, mostly agricultural products. The Iraqis probably hope strong LS-Iraqi economic ties will work against major improvements in US-Iranian relations.
The Iraqis appear less concerned over the possible development of close Iranian-Soviet ties because of Tehran's traditional wariness of its neighbor. Moreover, Baghdad probably believes that, as the largest purchaser of arms in thc Third World, it will maintain its appeal to Moscow by continuing to make Urge military *nd commercial purchases ggJwTT
Al the same lime. Iraq will seek to reduce its miliary dependence on the Sovieu. Baghdad is strengthening iu fledgling indigenous weaponscapability and purchasing more weapons from Western Europe, China, and Third World suppliers. Diversification willlow process The Sovieu and iheir East European allies supplyercent of Iraq's principal weapon systems andercent of overall miliury deliveries.
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Despite the need to maintain harmonious relations with Ihc Gutrtrategic considerations are likely io lead to severe tensions with Kuwait over disputed territoryeace settlement with Iran is signed Baghdad will probably try to gain control over Kuwait's Bubiyan and Warbah islands to increase its narrow access to the Gulf The vulnerability of the Shatt al Arab to closure and the need to develop alternative naval aadport facilities have increased thc strategic importance of the twoKuwait probably would turn to its allies in thc Gulf Coordination Council, the United Slates, and the USSR for political and miliury assisunce if Iraq threatened to take the islands by force.
In retaliation for Syrian support for Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq will work to weaken or overthrow the Assad regime. Baghdad ii likely to focus on increased financial and military support to anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon because its assets inside Syria are limited.eaceeached with Iran, Iraq may supplement this policy by saber rattling along the Syrian-Iraqi border to divert Syrian troops from Lebanon.
Iraq's need to finance rearmament, reconstruction of war damage, and economic and social development to fulfill thc expectations of its populace will lead it to seek maximum oil revenues. Iraqi efforts toarger share of any increase in demand for OPEC oil probably will worsen present frictions with other OPEC exporters, especially Iran, ^fprf)
lank
Contents
Judgments
Note
Threat Fromixation
Iraq
Weapons: Thc Shori-Ttrm Fix
Weapons: The Long-Term Deterrent
Military Technology
Seir-Sufficiency
Iran's Appeal to the Superpowers
Carrots
Soviets
Old Scores To Settle,lank To Protect
Crowding at the Trough
Persian Gulf: Vital Interests
Suspicious Allies
Arabia 9
and Third World Ambitions 8
8
Race
Moderation
Iranian Factor
Policy
u
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tiooa
Iraq's Natj Coal
Threat From Iran: A
Despite few visible signs of war in Baghdjd. the nearly eight-year conflict with Iran na. permanency scarred Iraq and heavily influenced iu nationalgoals Wc estimate that Iraq hasCOpercent of the totalthe equivalentillionopulation lhef
UnitedL^HHHIL^HHHDrelative of nearly every Iraqi family has died or Men wounded in thc war. Thc war has disrupted the education and careers of hundreds of thousands of menhave served in the military. Il has virtually depleted Iraq's foreign exchange reserves, which we estimate were SJ5 billionnd put the country moreillion in debt to non-Arab and noncommercial lenders Iranian shelling has displaced thousands of civilians in cities along the border, including Al Basrah, thc country's secondiargesi city.
I.Rnidtmi at Alwit ^ft
easily destroyed Baghdad's offshore oil export he war and la(er seized most of.isilometers of Gulf shoreline. In contrast. Iran stretches along the entire length of the Gulf, i
sense of vulnerability to Iran, long regarded by Iraq as iu greatest military threat, looms all the larger after years of Sghung. In our view. Baghdad has concluded that, eveneace settlement rs reachedore moderate regime replaces the clerics in Tehran. Iraq will have to remain onains: renewed hostilities. This means'kilometer borderostile neighbor that is three times more populous than Iraq More than half of Iraq's population, including us two largestandof thc border Iraqi air and land defenses, despite their superiority in equipment, would have little time to respondurprise attack Moreover. Iran's prospective oil earnings willo rearm and perhaps eventually challenge Iraqi military^fM
The war denied Iraq direct access to the Persian Gulf, hignlighting its vulnerability, need for diversified Oil export routes, and secure access to Gulf waters, (ran
Fortress Iraq
Wc judge that Iraq's primary national security goal during the next decade will be io enhance its military supenomjran We believe that Baghdad rely on advanced miliiary technology, which has proved essential in countering Iran's advantage in manpower and morale during tbc last four years of the war HP
Chemical Weapons: Tbe Short-Term Fix
Ir. our jucgmeni. the Iraqis highly value the effective-nets of chemical weapons against massed(he hallmark of Iranian opcanons during the war
^ccre?
45^
Western Military Technology Iraq's war experience has led it to value Western weapon systems, especially high-performance aircraft and missiles, which were used to damage Iranian civilian morale and reduce Tehran's oil eapons and financial ability to buy weapons. The Iraqis regard some Western equipment as superior to corresponding Soviet hardware. Such equipment servesritical complement to the Soviet weaponry that makes up the bulk of Iraq's military inventory. The Iraqis depended largely on French-btiilt Mirage aircraft and missiles to attack Iranian shipping in the Persian Gulf and economic target) on the mainland. Iraq particularly values weapons with accuracy and standoffto reduce the risks of losing aircraft and pilots. We believe these concerns will lead Iraq to pursue Western air technology after (he wir as well
Greater Setf-Sufficiency
Tbc uncertainties Iraq faced during tbe war inarms from the Soviets and the West have led it to attempt to reduce iu miliury dependence onDespite efforts to diversify arms sources, thc Sovieu and their East European allies continue to supplyercent of Iraq's principal weapon systems, andercent of overall miliury deliveries. France, which provides high-performance be-ccme Iraq's seeond-IirgeK
The need for an indigenous weapons manufacturing capabilityspelled out tn (be report of the ninth Ba'tb Party congress in
TV establishment of such la national miliiary) industry is necessary for the strengthening of national independenceree national will. If it is not possible to produce all our armed
forces' requirements, then it is possible and necessary to produce the ma/or pan of them
through national production wtth emphasis on
certain items.
Count eractiag Iran'* Appeal to la* Superpower*
The war has demonstratedaghdad thai the superpower* regard Iran to be of greater importance
understand! that the superpowers* relations with Irac arereat extent determined by thc wish Tor unproved ties to Iran Thc Soviets temporarily halted arms shipments to Iraq at the outset of the Iran-Iraq war in an unsuccessful effort to woo Iran. In our judgment, Baghdad has concluded that MoscowIran more than Iraq because of Iran's greater sue. lengthy border with the USSR, and strategic location. Similarly. the Iraqis believe that Washington values Des to Iran more than its links to Baghdad and seeks io restore relationsriendly regime in Tehran over the long term, if only to compete with Moscow for political influence in Iran. In Iraq's view. US covert arms ules to Iran confirmed US priorities
We believe (hat Iraq seeks to prevent thc superpowers from favoring Iran so intensely that Iraqi interests are threatened, particularly during wartime. Baghdad accepts lhat US and Soviet relations with Iran are likely to improve after tbe war. To discourage either superpower from aligning too doscly with Iran. Iraq appears to be trying to enhance Iraq's attractiveness to the USSR and particularly to thc United States.
Economic Carrots
Baghdad is attempting to highlight for Westernthe importance of its oil reserves io thc West's long-term energy needs. Iraq boasts that its proved oU reservesillion barrels are second only to Saudi Arabia's. Iran's proved oil reserves, in contrast, are only about half of Iraq's. Moreover. Iraq's oil eiport capacity will increase toollow-ing the completion of phase two of ihe Iraqi oil pipeline through Saudi Arabiaestoration of the offshore oil export facilities closed by Iran early in the war would give the Iraqis an additional export potential. We estimate that Iraq's present Oil production capacity is. about half that of Saudi Arabia. This compares with Iran's oil production capacily ofHW
Besides oil sales. Baghdad is dangling ihc prospect of substantial trade wiih ihc United Stales The Untied States became Iraq's largest supplier of civilian goods7 with exports0 million, mostlyproducts. Thc Iraqis highly regard US oil technology and equipment and have soughtof US firms in oil exploration in Iraq. Baghdad initiated sweeping economic reforms last year, in pan toarger role for the private sector. These reforms include thc sale of many stateeduction in government regulations, and theof more autonomy for managers of state organiu-lions. We believe these developments will further promote Iraqi trade with the United Statesin high
Although Iraq's interest in US products and services largely reflects Baghdad's high regard for USleadership, we believe lhc Iraqis also hope to increase thc US economic stake in Iraq. Tbe Iraqis, particularly former Ambassador to ihe Uniied Slates and present Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Nizar Hamdoon. appear to have concluded that courting US businesses is an effective way to gain polilicalin Washington. Hamdoon actively wooed US businessmen while he served in the Uniied States,ecent symposium on Iraq in thc United States for US firms drew two senior Iraqi officials, including Hamdoon and Minister of OU Chalabi. Indicative of Iraqi thinking. Foreign Minister Tanq AzizS interviewer4 that in the United States, unlike iningle company can influence foreign policy Wc doubt that the Iraqis are prepared for direct US investment in Iraq, but they probably view their actionsay of promoting voices in thc Uniied States thai would seek to protect growing US interests in" "
Israel
BEST GCW AVftiUBlE
In recent yean Iraq's policy toward line! has mc> clover to the Arab rnoderates and the Uaatad Stat) and away from ihc Arab radicals. Semcr Iraqi cials. Including Saddam, repeatedly jive dftt assurance!raq's ore mature in Hi .'or:ign policyartyf the revoluiion The Iraqis say they nor
ilitary solution to the Arab-Iirierind insteadegotiatedemer*inisteras repeatedly said tha: Iraq will suppon whateverajority cf Paiest-mass .ind acceptable. Although it has not rtsrtuxsd its criticism of Egypt's peacesrael.cad .las restored dipiomatic tics to Cairoscitai leacan ia> tne> l-addam is. a fa riser rroderation on the Arab-Israeli issue
It aur judgment, the tempering ot" Iraqi hcsaliiy toward Israel stems partly frcm practical :cnsiccr-anons dictated by the Iran-Iraq *ar and lacegotiatiora with Irantunc:rt bl lint with these of pi. Jordan, and iaudi Arabia, its principal Arab supporters. Theceen cultivating US suspon for sffaus to IfliiasVftcajai UN Security Council.lls for an end to thc Iran-Iraq war. and ', position in the peace talks We bci-eve. ho-^er t'.at the Iraqis remain deepi. opposedsrael,egardestigetsteni colonialism in emoamsnneatll Arab naticnilists.
fts
Iraq nusirusu Sc*ic: bttrsticm ic the resrns saiaraqi- iumc ofin order tciran. andties toSyria in-.le t'.cscs; jicclehas reservedtrie >iu;ia*ed
raq and ze'-it- rhevejivsmes:outhtan Nonetheless.icaJic alter nafecnt..iLed -elianc: ia tzetu Bala gnu iuppiier Onlyi-csgrtntn oan luppi; Iraqtot Iran at balMst) tszzzt! r.E seven years of lisr East
btilicarms to Iraq. Tat Iraqu appear uttsried::is simplicity arteperation :i' BESgyytttas, :nciud:a{ tasks, ntffitry. iniCircraeeqjipeiag irjq'ir;si with *wen .Ttiiiury equipment'-*ouic be
ppealhe iind 'hia: iht Soviet L'-ion itataq.aq las been theargest hire Wor.'dheirarnings In accmcc. the
inc.
I rhe Iraqis may vote more independentlythenar bat will remain sensitive io Soviet preuurc^lPr
Syria: Old Scores Tolank To
Syrian suppon Tor Iran total thc Iran-Iraq war has intensified the long rivalry bet-cen Damascus and Baghdad. Iraq's current resentment of Syria dates to the ouster of civilian Bathisu from po-er by the Syrian party's miliury wing6 Despite efforts to unite the two suitsg, Saddam accused Synaa President Hafir al-Assad of trying tohimelations deteriorated further2 when Syria closed the oil pipeline between the two countries and began political and miliury support for Iran and Iraqi dissident groups^gtfft
In our judgment. Baghdad will make the removal ofigh priority after the war with Iran ends. Saddamely known to hate Assad, an emotion probably shared in varying degrees by most Iraqis because of Asud's perceived treachery in backing Iran. Moreover, the Iraqisegime on their western flank that will be at least neutral if conflict with Iran recurs. Finally, senior Iraqi officials haveresentment that Syria has gainedpolitical influence in thc Arab worid because of the troubles in Lebanon and the temporary polmcal eclipse of Iraq and Egypt. Baghdad probably believes ihatan help to restore Iraq-srightfoJ influence by cutting Syria down to ritaJptfT
Efforts to make trouble ror Assad probably willin Ubanon. where Iraq will find readyfinancial and military support among
m Iraq has provided
arms this year to the Lebanese Forces. Ubanese Presidentoyalist Phalange militia, and the
Lebanese armed forces. Baghdad rs also backing thc more moderate factions of the PLO in Ubanon
Iraq was
supporting Syrian Muslim Brotherhood exiles in Iraq5 and directing Baghdad-based Palestinian terrorist groups against Syrian urgeu. These groups have limited asscu in Syria, however, and we believe Iraq will find it more efficient to focus their anti-Syrian activities on factions in Lebanon. Baghdad may supplement this policy by saber rattling along the Syrian border to divert Syrian troops from Lebanon, to weaken Damascus's ability to counter anil-Syrian elements there, and to place additional strains on Syria's weak economy
Water Crowding at tbe Trough
The war has icmporarily eclipsed serious Iraqiover Syrian and Turkish claims on water from thc Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which originate inwc^ouriiriesan^rovjde Iraq with most oforried about Turkey's massive Southeast Anatoliaetwork ofydroelectric and irrigation systems on thesethe project and Syrian consumpuon could reduce ihc annual Euphrates flow into Iraq fromillion cubic meters (bem) tocm. Iraq estimates that iu minimum requirement iscm. Syrian development efforu also concern Iraq. Iraq claimsillion Iraqi farmers were harmed when Syna reducedlow of ihc Euphrates to fill the reservoir behind thc Euphrates DamS. Tbe introduction ofand other poUuunu aad increasing levels ofhe two rivers raise additional problems
Tbe lack of an agreement oo water snaring creates periodic tensions among Iraq. Syna. and Turkey.
I
Syria cui ihc waierftow to Iraq) Although the threeet try to bold an Dual technical meetings
wner poJ.cics for ihttivcn.differences remain, <3
Iraq, do* rut ream from Turkey and Syria, iitrategic disadvantage and finds its options limited. Baghdad hai embarked on an intensive program of dam construction on both rivers to protect itself against unusual drawdowns of water Moreover, Iraq may hope to exploit the electrical generation from the bydruelectrical installations at these dams to increase iisleverage-ith_Turkey <laBBBBBBBBaBBBBBBaaBBiBBBBBBBBU
raq provides Turkey *ithercent of us annual eiectncal consumption, and this rate may riseercent when Iraq's hydroelectric projects are compleied^gHirT
The Persian Culf: Viul Interests
The Persian Culf is critically important to the Iraqis because ii is the principal route for Iraqi imports and
and because of the vital financialsupport the Gulf Arabs have providedwar effort. Thc closure of Iraq's oilin the Gulf early in the warvulnerability of its southern oil route,moreilometers of IranianDespite existing oil pipelines through TurkeyArabia and the scheduled completion ofoil pipeline through Saudi Arabia byore than compensate for tbc loss of thethese pipelines, bke the Syrian oil pipeline,to interruption, giving Iraq strongfor restoring access to thc Gulf
Weak, Suspicious Allies
Ba'thisi Iraq regards tbc smaller Gulf monarchies as anachronisms, thai cannot forever resist progressive forces In Baghdad's view, the vulnerability of these regimes lo Iranian intimidation and Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalism make them -eak allies. These same failings, however, make them suscepiiblc to Iraqi pressure and potential candidates for Iraq's brand of Ba'thism^pf?
In our view. Iraq is restrained in its dealings with the Gulf states because efforts to exploit their weaknesses would probably drive ihem closer to Iran. The Gulf stales are extremely wary of Iraq, which many of them regardreater longer term threat than Iran. Iran's war with Iraq, its support for Shia subversive elements in thc Gulf, and iu miliiary attacks againsi Gulf shipping have only temporarily eclipsed Gulf fears of thc miliiary and subversive threat posed by-Iraq. Thc Gulf states recall Baghdad's support for Gulf subversive groups innd tbc kidnaping* and assassinations of Iraqi opponenu in the Gulf states by Iraqi intelligence operatives.
Kuwail
Iraq's desire for greater access to lhe Gulf is likely to lead to severe tensions with Kuwait over disputed territory after the war. Iran's temporary seizure of the Al Paw Peninsula as well as thc cloture of the Shatt al Arab, the port of A) Basrah, and Iraq's offshore oil terminals increased the strategic importance toof the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Pes session of the islands would permit Iraq to move its oil terminals abouty from Iran, provide better protection for the naval port of Lmm Qasr. and possibly allow me constructionaval pori on thc islands Iraq's expansion of Umm Qasr port and its claims to be considering thc diversion of ihe Shan al Arab to Khawr Abd 'Allah would funher enhance the islands' importanceraq fttfJ*-
Baghdad is likely to press Kuwait hard io obtain control of the islands after the conflict endsr
; Iraq primely acknowledges Kuwait'sover lhe islands bul insists on permission lo build an Iraqi port on Bubiyanrice for formally settling the borderespite Kuwaiti financial and logistic support, thc Iraqis testily rejectedefforts to resolve the dispute during the war In
ii'iwe
lie TmrtaHicnu*liNwe* ItiejcJ-i'wxrcifiM wihnnin border.
he Irionmaliof Kuwaiti wrhat) iwj'otOiuVH
0*
contrast. Baghdad largely settled outstanding border issues with oiher neighboring allies-Jordan andihe same period. Given lhe islands' strategic importance io Iraq. we doubi ihai il will be satisfied wiih lessong-term lease of the two islands and minor land adjustments near Umm Qair.
Saudi Arabia
We believe thai Iraq will seek to Iimu Saodi Arabia'she Gulf and ihe Saudi-dominated Gulf Cooperation Councilhe Gulf sutes rejected Iraq's bid to Join the GCC1 on the grounds that this would require admitting Iran and ihat Iraq's socialist form of government differed greatly from the co five rvalue monarchies of the Gulf. We doubt that the Gulf states will admit Iraq to the GCC. but Iraq maystatus that gives some economic gainsirect say in political or miliiary matters Despite such limited status. Iraqi pressures on other GCC members may reduce Saudi influence over decisions of the organization and thc effectiveness of thc GCCorum for discussion of political and miliury issues of concern to the Gulf states. The Iraqis and Saudis are also likely to quarrel if Iraq presses Kuwait strongly on the border issue and Iraq challenges the Saudis for leadership among the Arab states.
Similarly. Baghdadeadership role in the Third World Before the war Iraq loaned hundreds of millions of dollars to Third World regimes to win thc chairmanship of the Norta.'igned Movement and the nomination as host to the Nonalignedhe war prevented IraQ fromtbe chairmanship and serving as bos; The regime, however, has not lost its desire to head the movement.
Iraq's leadership aspirations will both help andiu progress toward iu national security goals. To the extent Iraq achieves influence in the Arab worid. Baghdad can better rally efforts to weaken Iranian and Syrun influence in the regionreater leadership role in the Nonaligned Movement almost certainly will give Iraq greater influence in the United Nations. Iraqi gains in the Arab arena, ho*are likely to revive the fears of weaker Arab states and generate envy among rivals, who may work together to counter Iraq This, in particular, will complicate Iraq's efforts to dominate the OCC^jjgafl
and Third World Ambitions
Baghdad's aspirations for leadership io the Arab world and tbe Nonaligned Movement are strong The Iraqis believe their cultural heritage, physical size and location, relatively large population, oil wealth, and accomplishments have earnedeading role in the Arab world. Iraq's education system and media inculcate in Iraqis the sense ol' Iraqi superiority from
'Cull* Cooper *uoa Co*"ol.iiKfvdfitur. ihr Ihtee *raP Ewwi andiinportM to lhainilia from Inn ind I'Mbolic military proticlionlie form
tm. Tk*>k*witn lun-iid
Implications
particularly given Iraq's missile and chemical
As Baghdad seeks to realize iu national security goals, it will do soubstantial power base. Iraq is emerging from iu war with Iran as thc foremost Arab power. Besides its oil resources, it possesses the largest, most experienced, and best equipped armed forces in tbc Arab world After partialIraq will probably keep hundreds of thousands of men under arms and retain an air force ofircraft. Even if Iran's miliury actseasonable counterweight. Iraq's armed forces will tend to intimi-date neighboring Gulf states i
Seeuriiy Coal-Setting Process
a meruitihtMM-^chMCajr
Slace assuming the presidencyaddam Husayn has increasingly concentratedautho'ity in his office and government ministries at the expense of the Ba th Party apparatus, which brought him to power The consolidation of his position on the Revolutionary Command Council iRCCl. the most important decisionmaking body in Iraq, permits him to make decisions with Utile need to consider ihr views ifothcr Council membersf^^fk
rSaddam mot Foreign Ministert the architect of Iraqi foreign policy
Saddam has transformed the presidential officemall unit designed to handle the President's daily affairsarge structure, organized to match the government ministries it monitors and includingfor agriculture, finance, industry, and security. These advisers are often transferred to ministerial posts after serving on the presidential
Despite the growing powers of the presidential office, members of the RCC play important roles in helping Saddam formulate policy, particularly the setting of broader security goals. Tariq Aziz, Minister ofAffairs, and Sa dun Hammadi. Speaker af the Sational Assembly endredecessor, appear to carry considerable weight with Saddam in foreign affairs Similarly. Defense Minister Adnan Khayral-loh.ousin and brother-in-law. almost certainly influences at least some military decisions. First Depun Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan isconomic czar, bul he probably helps develop policy toward the Arabs and the VSSR and its East European atlies^jgfH
Saddam also appears lo give considerable weight to advice from selected government officials Minuter af Culture and Information Laitf Susayyif Jasim often accompanies Saddam Saddam similarly appearseigh heavily the advice of his son-in-law Husayn Kamit al-Mapd. head of the Military Industries Organization The President appointed him Minuter of Industry and Miliiary Industrialization in May^-jf-
iews prevail. He often overrulesmade by RCC members I
Saddam's interference in ihe
Iraqi military's conduct of the Iran-Iraq war is common knowledge. '
I
Arms Race
Iraq's intent to acquire nuclear weaponserious threat to regional stability. This will almost certainly lead other nations in the region, particularly Iran, to accelerate efforts to obtain such weapons.
lieutenants have found that many of their earlier revolutionary aims have not served the regime'ssecurity objectives The use of terrorism and subversion againsi their foes isolated Iraq andefforuain international respect and access to sophisticated Western technology. Tbe Iraqis, therefore, are likely to practice rtlanvt moderation in their foreign policy, giving less emphasis to efforu to subvert moderate Arab states. We believe thaiwill find lhat iu inieresu arc closer to those of the Arab moderates than Arab radicals like Libya and Syria. "
Still. Iraq's Ba'ihiit revolutionary heritage andaspirations in the Arab world may lead it toto the left and pull radicals to theiu efforts to represent both camps.ihc Iraqis have lost none of iheirwill employ terrorism against Iraqi dissidentsstate thai uses terrorism against Iraq.will be less reluctant than many countriesto use of chemical agents,
Tbe Iranian Factor
Baghdad's actions after (he war will be largelyby the perception of iu strength relative to that of Iran. Iranian weakness or Iraq's clear military dominance will, in our view, lead tbc Iraqis to eipcct totrongegional affairs, particularly in thc Gulf Iraq will depict itself as ihe savior of thc Arabs from tbe Persian onslaught and justify its claim to leadership by pointing io its military and economic strength and to Iraqi blood spilled in the Arabs' defense,
If Iraq's miliiary advantage erodes significantly, we believe the Iraqis will seek closer ties lo theparticularly the United States. Iranian strength would alto lead Iraq to cultivate iu moderate stance loward iu present Arabthe Gulf States, andtread more carefully inio unseat Syrian President Assad. The Iraqis would more willingly share leadership in the Arab world with its allies.
11
Iraq's relation! with (he superpowers will be heavily influenced oat only by Baghdad's perception of ibe miliiary balance with Iran but also by ils military independence from lhe superpowers Over lhe longer term, significant progress toward military(he acquisitionuclearprobably accelerate tbc trend in Iraqi foreign policy to take stands Ihai challenge lhe interests of the superpowers For instance.mayrewar initiative aimed atforeign miliiary bases on Arab soil that could be used against US mibtary relations with the Culf Arabs or Soviet tics io Syria or South Yemen. The development of close ties to Iran by either superpower, however, would tend to promote improved Iraqiwith tbe otber superpower.
Oil Policy
Iraq's ambitious goals must compete for scarcerevenues. The Iraqis will want to modernize their armed forces andarge standing army They also will want toajor civilian reconstruction effort after thc war Baghdad must provide sufficient economic development to fulfill the
populace's expectations of postwar improvement, while simultaneously repaying interest and principal on its UO billion foreign debt.'
We believe lhal Iraq's heavy agenda of national security concerns and domestic economicwill lead il to pursue an increasingly aggressive oil policy To meet its postwar financial requirements. Iraq probably will utilize much of its expanding oil export capacity Iraqi officials are no doubt aware that increased exports would depress prices. Iraq will use its increasing capacity to increase iu bargaining leverage within OPEC toigher production quota. In addition, Iraq is likely to try to augment its influence within OPEC, putting it at odds with Saudi Arabu.
1 Ihe SJO billiondttn don noid 10
ji.on noi lattnC- io reaoi iMirhtth il "iH rceaid jiihtGuir iu in*toi ill
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