CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9
Soviet Policy Toward the West The Gorbachev Challenge
National Intelligence Estimate
This Estimatefw* of the Director of Central Intelligent with the advice and assistance ot ti US Intelligence Community.
-Serren
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Soviet Policy Toward the West: The Gorbachev Challenge
Information available as of9 was used in the preparation ofihis Estimate.
The foUowing inteAygenco organizations ponicioated
in Ihe proparaiKXi of irus Estimate:
The CentralAgency
The Dcfonse Intelligence Agency
Thc Nalional Security Agoncy
The Bureau ol Intelligence and Reseated.
Deportment ot State
ThcDivision.
Federal Bureau ol kivesipgai-xi
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Stall (or intethgence.
Departninnt of the Army
The Orector of Naval IntclVgcvice.
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief ol Stafl. IntrHrlQcnce.
Oepanmont ol the Air Force
The Director of Intenigoncn.
HeadQuavters. Marine Corps
stimate was approver! lorpubocation by the NaitonalForeign Inte^gence Board.
Key Judgments
Dramatic changes jn approach lo lhe West, under Soviet leader Gorbachev are driven by economic and social decay aiidening technological gap with the West,rowing realism about trends in thc outside world. For lhe foreseeable future, the USSR will remain the West's principal adversary. But the process Gorbachev has set in motion is likely to change the nature of the Soviet challenge over the nexl five years or so:
New Soviet policies will threaten thc security consensus developed in thc West to combat Soviet expansionism.
The Soviets are likely lo succeedegree in undercutting support abroad for defense programs and in reducing poliiical barriers to Western participation in their economic development.
Al the same time new policies will make Moscow more flexible on regional issues and human rights and pave the wayotentially significant reduction of the miliury threal.
Alliance cohesion will decline faster in the Warsaw Paci lhan in NATO, giving the Easi Europeans much greater scope for change.
We believe Moscow wants to shift competition wiih thc Westargely political and economic plane In order lo prepare the ground forhift. Soviet leaders arc making major policy changes androad reassessment of the West.
These new policies serve domestic as well as foreign policy needs:
They aim lo create an international environment more conducive lo domestic reform and to undermine thc rationale for high defense budgets and repressive poliiical cool rots.
They are seen as more erTeciive than past policies in advancing Soviet foreign interests.
There arc limits on how far the new Soviel leadership wants lo go iness confrontational East-West relationship;
Vigorous c'lorts to protect and advance Soviet geopolitical interests and selective support for Communist regimes and revolutionary movements will continue.
Moscow will continue to employ acltve measures and covert efforts to advance us objectives. Foreign intelligence activity is likely to increase.
i
Given lhe turmoil unleashed by the reform process, wc cannoi predici policy (rends during (he period of ihe Estimaic wiih high confidence Nevertheless, we believe that Gorbachev is likely lo Slay in power and that (he reform effort is more likely lhan noi to continue. If so. we believe the following developments are probable:
Miliiary power While increasing so far under Gorbachev. Soviet defense spending will decline significantly in real terms. Moscow will maintain vigorous force modernization programsffort in key areas, but production and procurement of many major weapons will decline. Gorbachev is likelyake further concessions loTART agreement, show flexibility on chemical weapons, and take further steps to trim and redeploy Soviet conventional forces-moving unilaterally if necessary.
The Weslern Alliance. Moscow will attempt lo translate its more benign image into expanded credits, trade, and technology sales and reduced support for defense spending and force modernizaiion in Weslern Europe. While trying lo reduce US influence and military presence Moscow does not see an abrupt unraveling of current Allianceas serving Soviet interests.
Third World competition. The Sovicls will seek to expand Ihcir influence and continue support to leftist causes deemed lo have some future. But Ihey will be more careful lo consider how such moves affect broader Soviet interests, including relations with the Weal. They will encourage their clients to make economic and poliiical reforms and seek Weslern aid II is highly unlikely that Moscow will become dirccily involved in military support to anoiher leftist seizure of power in lhe Third Worldid in.
Alternative Scenarios
Weumber of developmentsunlikcly-coutd disrum current (rends and push Gorbachevifferent course:
A widespread crackdown on unrest al home o. in Easiern Europe would probablyeescalation of East-West tensions, causing Gorbachev lo lackonservativehift of Ihis son would limit Gorbachev's freedom of maneuver in ncgoiialions and his ability to transfer resources away from defense.
Were nationality unrcsl lo Ihrcaicn central Conlrol Or the territorial integrity of Ihc couniry. weisk that thc leadership would revert to more hoslilc rhetoric and policieshe West in an aitcmpl lo icunify ilie country.
IV
Gorbachev'sbut nni lo beignificant impaci:
A more orthodox regime would slow (he pace of change, be more supportive of military interests and leftist allies abroad, and eschew unilateral arms control concessions.
see little chanceuccessor leadership would completely roll back Gorbachev's policies or revertajor military buildup and aggressive policies in the Third World.
Disagreements
There is general agreement in the Intelligence Community over thc outlook for thc next five to seven years, but differing views over thc longer term piOTpccts for fundamental and enduring change toward less competitive Soviet behavior:
analysts see current policy changes as largely tactical, driven by the need for breathing space from the competition. They believe the ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism and iu hostility toward capitalist countries are enduring. They point to previous failures of reform and ihe transient nature of pasthey judge that thereerious risk of Moscow returning to traditionally combative behavior when thc hoped for gains in economic performance are achieved.
Olher analysts believe Gorbachev's policiesundamentalof national interests and ideology as well as more tactical considerations. They argue that ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism such as class conflict and capitalist-socialist enmity arc being revised. They consider thc withdrawal from Afghanistan and ihc shift toward tolerance of power sharing in Eastern Europe io be historic shifts in thc Soviet definition of national interest. They judge that Gorbachev's changes arc likely to have sufficient momentum to produce lasting shifts in Soviet behavior.
Indicators
01PMgTOS 0vcr lhc nexlward
fulfilling ihc promise of more responsible behavior, wc will be watching for:
Soviet acceptance of real liberalization in Easicrn Europe
f-ull implementation of announced force reductions.
A subsiantial conversion in the defense industry to production for lhc civilian economy.
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The Soviel World View ia Flux
From lhe days of Unin, Soviet policy toward lhe West has been shapedody of ideological dogma centered around negative images of the West and thc necessityong-term struggle by the "socialist camp" against the West. Thesetenets hove pictured lhe West as in an inevitable state of decline and forced relentlessly toward militarization lo shore up its position. They have depicted East-West relations as based on uniemitting class struggle, leaving Utile or no common ground for cooperation.
Tensions in Moscow over how far to go in seeking accommodation with Ihe West have been reflected in disputes over how much change is called for in this traditional world view:
Gorbachev and his reform-minded allies believe that significant revisions are required toong-term basisess confliciual relationship with theshift ihey believe Is essential lo their efforts lo modernize the country. They argue that capitalism remainsobust stale of health, that il is noi inherently miliiarisiic. and thai lhe West can risearrow class-based approach lo relations wiih the Communist Bloc. While reaffirming lhe continuing relevance of class analysis, ihey are seeking to diminish lhe cemrallly of class conflict to East-West relations and assert the overriding importance of "universal human values."
MOre orthodox leaders, such as senior party secretary Ugachev. accept the need for reduced tensions wiih ihe West and for some ideological adjustments. But ihey are skeptical aboul theofundamentally less conflictual relationship andore limited accommodation will suffice. They believe the reformers are going too far in tampering wiih fundamental tenets of socialism and are resisting the effort to revise traditional notions about class struggle, capitalism and ihe threat it poses and the nature ofthe East-West relationship
Wc believe thai, over (tie longer term, ihc mosi reliable guarantees of enduring change will be in thc instiiuiionalizarionore open society and relationshiphc outside world:
Thc establishmentore pluralistic and open decisionmaking process on foreign policy and defense issues.
Progresshe rule of lawignificant relaxation of barriers to free travel and emigralion.
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Contents
Judgments
nder Gorbachev
Moscow Views Its Current Predicament
Strategy Toward thc Wat
1'ov.ei ,md Arms Conlrol
6
Toward the Western Alliance
in ihc Third World
for Gainsov.r.
for Western Policy
of Enduring Change
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Discussion
ObJecti.es Under Goffaacho
The dramatic changes in approach to (he West under General Secretary Gorbachev are driven bydomestic and foreign objectives:
Domestically. Soviet leaders appreciate that, for decades if not generations, the main goal will be reforming and modernizing the Soviet political and economic system. They want to create an era of reduced tensions and expanded relations with the Western powers that will facilitate this task.
Equally important, these changes are viewed as essential in (heir own right for strengthening Moscow's international position, advancing its claimlobal superpower role,-reviving the credibility of socialismodel of development.
Traditional objectives continue to influence Soviet policy toward the West. Moscow remains committed
to:
NATO cohesion and US influence inEurope.
ndermining support for the US military presence overseas
Selectively backing Communist and other leftwing causes around the globe.
But under Gorbachev, more clearly than before, Soviet leaders recognize that in pursuing such(hey have often done more harm lhan good for broader Soviet interests by antagonizing adversaries and drawing them closer together, by encouraging military buildup, and, in some respects, by reducing Soviel security. Moreover, (hc Sovicls appreciate ihat. in ihc current situation, maintaining good relations wiih the Wesl assumes an even higher priority
tensions will promote (rends abroad lhal diminish Western defense efforts and reduce the cohesion of opposing alliances.
Formal or informal limitations on the armswill enable Moscow to maintain an acceptable miliury balance while reducing defense spending and diverting resources to the civilian economy.
Expanded trade and economic tics, in Ihe long run at least, will be important to the success of economic revival.
We believe thereroad consensus in thc Sovjet leadership in support of these objectives that will persist through thc time frame of this Estimate. Nevertheless, thc relaxed constraints on politicalunder Gorbachev have revealed even more clearly than before tbe sharp divisions and wide-ranging debate thai persist over tbe extent ol the accommodation wiih ihe West that Moscow should seek:
Al one end of tbe spectrum, re/or men appear to believe (hatecisive break with thementality of the pastuch more extensive engagement on arms conlrol. economics, and global poliiical issues will aver! impending crisis and ensure the renewed competitiveness ol the countiy.
Al thc olher end, many oilhodox members of thc elite agree thai the USSR needs "breathing space" but believeore limiicd and tactical acconv modation would suflice- These oflicialsoalition ol Russian nationalists, old-line Marxist-Leninist internationalists, and conservative bureau-craU alarmed by Gorbachev's (ejection ofprinciples
The extent to which Moscow shifts toward anwith the West will depend in part on how ibis debate is resolved. Nevertheless, most analysis believe Ihat the process Gorbachev has set in motion if itlikely lo lead lo lasting changes in Soviet international behavior whether or not that is lhe current leadership's intention.
Is Gorbachevs "Detente"Different*
This Is noi Ihe first limeoviet leader has attempted to introduce libcraliiing reforms at home or move toward detente abroad. Thc limited impact of these previous attempts at reform and the strong cultural barriers to change in the USSR suggest caution in predicting success for theround at reforms. But we believe Gorbachev's efforts arc far more comprehensive than those attempted by Khrushchev or Brezhnev. At the same time, lhe domestic and international factors compelling the process forward are mow more substantial;
ended mass terror, exposed Stalin's excesses, and periodically reorganized the Soviet bureaucracy. But- -with ihe economy growing at ihe fastest rate in Sovietsaw no need to alter the fundamentals of the command economy or the polilical system. Gorbachev and hiswitk domesticthe Ideology and institutions of the Sta-linisl system itself and groping toward something radically dufrrent to replace them.
made some dramatic Initiatives in foreign and defense policy (agreeingeace treaty with Austria and slashing Soviet ground forces byillion men) and modified traditional doctrine in some areas (discarding Stalinist dogma on lhe inevitability oful wiih optimism on the rise about the USSR's ability to overtake the Uniied States and the advance of Communism in the Third World, lhe
pressures for change were limited. Khrushchevew competitiveness In East-West relations and directly challenged US security interests in West Berlin and Cuba. Gorbachev's ideologicalquestioning tradition' al notions aboul the West's Inherentlynature and the cenirality of class struggle to East-Westwell beyond those of Khrushchev.
to reform Ihe economy under Brethnev were more shallow end narrower im scope,tn particular any serious effort to address necessary political and social reforms. In. Brethnev sew detente asore assertive thrust in the Third World while eating pressure for fundamental domesticGorbachev, on the other hand, seekstensionsacilitate thoroughgoing and probably wrenching changes at home.
faces very different pressures from Soviel society than hisbelter educated, more demanding, and more knowledgeable about the outside world. Globalinformation and technologicalalso impelling the leadership toward change more strongly now than in. Gorbachev's reforms have accentuated these trends by reducing the barriers that have inhibited political expression and sealed Soviet society off from Western influence.
Moscowurrent Predicament
Moscow's willingnessnder lake potentially wrenching changes derivesrowing appeccia lion lhat thc USSRooming syilcmic crisisthc prospeel of falling further behind the major Western powers economically and irxhnologically:
Gorbachev humell has consistently underscored the gravity of ihc problem ihe USSR faces and used ilustify his incicasingly radical reforms^*
orbachev asserted that ihe USSftnceded peresiroyka simply tosurvis-r tf it failed, the USSR wouldhird-rate power and lhe cause of socialism would be
imperiled
Economic stagnation has frayed the social fabric at hoenc and undermined Moscow'* claims toStaiu* abroad
1
Figuie 1
Soviel Economic Performance Under Gorbachev and His Predecesion
Average tumulgnuwa 12
-6 S-70
Lticlinill.'f
The Sovicl leadership is increasingly doubtful about the military's ability over the long run to keep pace with Western lecfcrsological advances, in particular tbe long term impact that thc US SOI program and iU Spinoffs could have on Sovicl miliury strategy
The technological dilemma also inhibits thc USSR's ability tolobal economic playerime whea use Soviet Bloc is less able lo uuiain itself with iu own resources and Soviet industry is finding it increasingly difficuli to provide goods in sufficient quantities and of competitive quality.
.
approaches io itic West aie also fueled by international factors quite independeot of tbe USSR's internal weakness:
Recognition of Moscow's responsibilitycries of foreign policy failuresrowing realism about tiends in thc outside world.
The irrelevance of traditional Marxist dogma to curtenl global trends.
Thc continuing vitality of Ihe Western economies, lhe hollow ring of Moscow's former talk aboul the "growing crisis ofnd the needorrow from the Western experience.
China's growing lieshe capitalist world and increased use of market principles in iu economy.
The burden of empire, states that have emulated tbe Sovicl model (Cuba, Vietnam, fiasl Europeanare expensive to support and suffer from endemic economic malaise similar lo thc USSR.
Thc declining appeal of Communist ideology in the West as well as Ihc Third World.
Changing Siralcgy Toward Ihe Weil
Thc USSR's growing domestic and foreign troubles have served to discredit Ihe lingering legacy ofand autarky and have led lo major changes in foreign and national security strategy. Reformers whouch broader-based engagement of the West is necessary to turn things around have been given authority to reshape the Soviet approach:
Gorbachev and his allies have concluded thaiignificant shift away from past thinking about East-West relations and toward less confrontational inicinational behavior will produce lhe decisive improvement in relations with the West that ihey nerd
Sovicl leaders havejde-rangingof Ihc West and the prospects for improving East-West relations:
are redefining the USSR's national security calculus, linking security with long-lermof lhc Soviet industrial base and playing down thc perceived miliury threat from the West.
have substituted new doctrinal precepts to govern Soviet foreign and defense policy,the centralily of class conflict to East-West relations, abjuring the notion that Moscow coulduclear war. and challenging the high-priority claim (hat the miliiary has had on resources.
order to justify such an approach to the domestic audience, reformers in the foreign policyhaveystematic atuck in (he Soviet media on stereotypical thinking tha( has exaggerated the miliury threat, ignored (hed,mcisions of national security, and obscured Sovicl backwardness by minimizing economic and social pi ogress in Ihe West.
Although Ibis shift in strategy toward the West is borne in large measure out of weakness, it also has en
offensive inient:
It is seen in Moscow as an effective means lo eliminate tbc USSR's "enemy image" thai has cemented Western unity, fueled support for defense programs, and sustained resistance to expanded cooperation with the East.
Given the likelihood lhal solving the USSR's domestic problems will uke decades if notSoviet leaders appreciate thai they can score gains far more quickly on (he foreign policy front. In effect, new strategics toward the Westeans for Moscow to improve Its competitive position in the sboil run through political means while waiting foi domestic reforms to lake effect,
Attitude Toward Internationalnidations Moscow's new international strategy has led it to attach growing political importance to the United Nations and other international organizations beyond the traditional emphasis on propaganda andcollection:
lhe Sovicls haveote businesslike, less polemical stance toward participation in UN bodies; for eaample. accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in implementing international human rights agreements.
Moscow hashilosophy toward tbeNations that places more emphasis ooproposab. Where il fonneily sought lo keep the Uniled Nations at arm's length on serious questions, Moscow Is now advocating an increased role for thc world body io resolving regional conflicts andinternational agreements.
Soviel leaders calculate that,oreUN role, they can expand their globaland constrain US unilateral actions, thus compensating in part for inherent political and economic weaknesses that continue to limit their ability tolobal superpower role.
International Economic Strategy The far-reaching campaign to reorganize thc foreign irade and financial sectors and increase lbc USSR's role in world economic affairs it an integral pari of Moscow's changing globalorbachev sees this campaign as important lo thc success otperes-iroyka over Ihc longer term. Nonetheless, he is aware of the risks of ovcrindcbtcdrjcsi and exposing tue Soviet economy to the vagaries of tbc international market. Hc remains determined to find indigenous solutions to Moscow's problems:
expect Moscow to continue taking incremental stepsreate conditions for more extensivein the global economy and lo open tbe Soviet economy to some foreign partkipa lion and competition.
uller KfJlmcni of Soviel cataorn* urapecit. seeJ-SS. Cwfew&rv'i Ero*ww Profmixl Ik* CMUnreiIVSR
believe Soviet leaders want eventually to make lhe ruble convertible with Western currencies and are beginning lo lake some steps in Ihis direction. They see full convertibility as the culmination ofthe reform process, however, and are unlikely tothe process until at least thc
Soviet interest in international organizations such as thc General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Pund (IMF) signals Moscow's hope to become fully involved in theeconomic and financial community:
is probably most interested inarty to GATT roles and negotiations at part,of its long-term effortxpand foreign trade and reduce barriers to Ihe export of Soviet products.
Discussions with thc IMF and the World Bank will remain more exploratory in nature.
Ce-Kinoing Traditional Behavior
Soviet leaders want to move away from strategies ihat led to and fueled the Cold War. But there arc limits on how far Soviet policy is likely to evolveess confrontational relationship. Even the reformers in thc leadership continue lo see the East-West relationship as adversarial:
tbc changes in Soviet thinking, ideological and geopolitical differences willajor obstacle lo improved East-West relations. Moscow remains commit led to supporting Communist and "socialist-oriented" regimes, still actively seeks to enhance its involvement in Europe, Asia, and lhe Third Wortd. and continues to back selectedmovements-Moscow still employs unsavory practicesdvance its objectives. Active measures campaigns againsi US inlerests continue. There is no evidence lhal even ihe reformers in the leadership would reject (hesealtogether, although the Gorbachev leadership is likely to take steps to constrain excesses and will be more responsiveestern pressure on ihese issues:
has during the last year reduced Ihe amount of blatant disinformation in its own press
hat begunarticipate in bilateral talks in winch US complaints about disinformation are conveyed directly to Soviel polilical leaders.stories accusing thc United States ofethnic weapons, inventing thc AIDS virus, and trafficking in body organs have continued overseas via covert presse have seen no evidence lhal Moscow is prepared to exert influence on ill allies and clientsin (he Thirdcurtail such activities.
In an effort lo bring iu network of front groups-led by lhe World Peaceline with new policies, Moscow has replaced individuals in senior leadership positions and pushed for measures lhat would allow diverse opinions to be voiced. While Sovicl leaders are giving less priority to front groups, they and ibeir Bloc allies continue to finance an agenda of front activities designed to promote Soviet positions on key issues such as arms control and human rights
Inielligence operations againsi lhe West areSome key areas, such as illegalof technology, arc receiving increased emphasis. Inielligence activities arc likely to increase further as Ihc Soviet piesence abroad grows
Military Power and Arms Control
Moscow's strategic reassessment extends to the core of iu nalional securilyway il calculates its miliury requirementsis the West and the Optimum sire and configuration of iu armed forces. In the past, Moscow worked hard to build offensively oriented strategic and conventional forces thai would givereponderance of power. The Soviet Union now aitpears to believe such efforts wcrcoflen loo MSlly. politically counterproductive, and miliurily ineffective -and (hai Soviet national securily can be Hisuicd with smaller, less threatening military forces.
Changes in this sphere arc drivenaricly of factors
Growing concern about ihc costs of maintaining, equipping, andarge standing army and the needivert scarce resources to rebuild lhc civilian economy
A recognition lhal the military buildup in tlie past was excessive and enhanced NATO cohesion,abuildup, increased tensions on Soviet borders, and in some respects eroded Soviet securily.
A growing awareness of lhc rote of economic power and international diplomacy in nalional security calculations.
Evidence that the leadership is serious aboul taking steps io act on this reassessment and reduce resources ievoted lo defense has been accumulating steadily:
Gorbachev's pronouncement of "reasonableas Ihc guiding concept for (he future size and structure of Soviet forces haside-ranging debate over miliury policy. While still ill defined, ihc concept has been used by reform spokesmen lo argue that more modest force levels than Moscow has maintained in the past arefor Sovicl securily. Tbc unilateral cuts in conventional forces Gorbachev announced ai ihe United Nations in8 suggest that the reformers' arguments have prevailed.
Since last summer polilical and miliury leaders have begun io speak with increasing frankness about Moscow's determination lo base futurein miliury capabilily on qualiiative rather than quantitative factors, lo prepare for an era in which ground aad naval forces will be receiving less arms and equipment, androwingof defense industry productionivilian needs.
The political leadership has taken slept to reassert iu control of decisionmaking on national securily issues in order io implementinking."has challenged tbe privileged status enjoyed by tlte miliiary under Brerhncv. Competing centers of defense and securily analysis and more civilian involvement are being encouraged The foreignand the Central Committee apparatus arcore assertive role.
Not all Soviet otlkiab share the new national security calculus onGorbachev's initiatives are based. Most military leaders probably support prrtstroyka in
-fie-wot-
Figure 2
Soviel Defense
Billion? wblei
140
Yntmitmrii
u
I .
bul many are iroubtcd by Gorbachev's dramatic unilateral restuies and shifts ia rsecotiatiag poslure and probably question his more benignof ihc Western threat We have hi tic direct evidence, but we believe tome political leaden shire concerns aboul whai they see as Gorbachev'sconciliatory pollute These concerns are likely
toole if Gorbachev's criiics everolilical challenge We believe, however, thaiis likely to retain the initiative on national securily issues for the foreseeable future.
Arms Control
Toropitious political climate for such reduciions in defense spending. Gorbachev is taking steps to ensure lhal Western arms programs are similarly constrained, making arms control central to his policy and agenda.
Arms control has been vital to thc Soviets' efforts to shape the arms competition in their favor since the
, but we believe itore important role in Gorbachev's national security calculus:
Gorbachev's innovations in doctrine and ideology, and his willingness to open lhe USSR to intrusive on-site inspections, remove key barriers that have traditionally limited Moscow's flexibility. At the sameooming domestic crisis givesar stronger economic incentive than his predecessors.
Like other Soviet leaders before him. Gorbachev sees arms controleans of limiting Western arms programs, but to achieve that objective he is willing to negotiate reductions in Soviet forces Ihat go far beyond what bis predecessors were prepared to contemplate.
Unilateral reductions arcign of Gorbachev's determination not to have his program held hostage by the negotiation processay of pressuring thc West to be more forthcoming. Unilateral initiativesariety of areas are likelyeans to undermine suppon in the West for defense programs, "kick-start" arms conlrol negotiations, and save resources at home. We believe Moscow prefers to achieve reduc-tioris primarily through negotiated agreements or reciprocal measures that maintain atough parily with lhe West.
The Soviel approach lo arms conlrol also retains propagandistic elements. Many Gorbachev proposals are obviously seir-se.ving or quixotic (nuclcar-wcaponsfrce zones, reductions in naval exercises, withdrawal from foreign bases, abolition of nuclearevertheless, Moscow is more willing lhan in the pasi to translate vague arms control concepts into specific negotiating proposals.
Oulloofc
There is agreement in thc Intelligence Community that this reassessment of military requirements is only now beginning jo have an cffcci on So^ici forces.
The Soviet Defense Modernization Program
Despite changes in military doctrine underand the promise of significant reductions in the Soviet defense effort, the USSR has continued to field andotentforce:
he Soviet Union has begun to deploy:
Two improved variants of silo-based ICBMs.
A rail-mobile ICBM.
The Blackjack supersonic strategic bomber.
Soviets also continue to deploy;
Road-mobile ICBMs.
Two new classes of submarines carrying ballistic missiles.
More modern air defense weapons.
production levels8 reached their highest level in the postwar period.
The Soviets will;
Probablytealth bomber by the
Extensively modernize Iheir strategicforces so that by Ihebout half of their ICBMs will be mobile.
ariety of new high-technology convenlional weapons.
Modernization has proceeded apace underand new bighs in spending ons well as on hardware have been reached in his first four years. Our preliminary estimates suggest lhal the value of military procurement grew in real terms byerceni per year during this period. Bui. despite these initial irends. we believe-on the basis of private and public commcnis and the regime's recentthat the leadership now intends to lake steps over the next several years ihat will affect virtually all areas of ihe Soviet defense effort.
Gorbachev't tuccesi in consolidating power inshakcup bit fall and the reduction in East-West tensions have improved his ability to move ahead forcefully with his defense agenda. Given lbc current ferment and flux in Soviet policy, wc cannot predict thc future with high confidence. But. ifpolicy trends in Moscowin our view, they ate likely to for at least thc nexl fewbelieve the following developments aie likely.
Defease Spemiimg. In light of Gorbachev's recent actions and thc public commitment of tbc defense industriestep up drastically ihcir support for consumer programs, we now judge it likelyramatic escalation of East-WestSoviet defense spending in real terms will decline over lhe nexl couple of years, while efforts lo reduce the defense burden will continue duringive-Year Plan:
unilateral reductions Gorbachev announced at the Uniled Nations in December, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and lhe elimination of missiles aad equipment under the INF Treaty could yield annual savings equivalent toercent of estimated Soviet defense spendingS billion rubles)
recent assertion that detente spending will be trimmed2 percent over the nexthat further cuts beyond those already announced are io lhe offing.
1 To implement Ihis pledge, wc believe lhc Soviets are likely to reduce procurement in mostay also be reduced, bul we believe they are likely toffort in the areas of space- and ground-based strategic defense systems, dirccted-energy and radiofrequency weapons, and advanced conventional munitions.
To implement Gorbachev's companion promise to cut procurement5 percent, ihe Soviets are likely to stretch out procuremenl tales, phase out older weapons more rapidly, cancel some programs, and use greater selectivity in choosing weapon
programs lo develop. We believe this will especially affect tank and miliiary aircraft production, where the potential savings are substantial and thcreadily convertible lo civilian needs.1
Strategic Ariru. Achieving reductions in strategicmiliury and poliiical more than economicremain high oo lhc Gorbachev regime'sompleting workTART agreement and constraining SDI will be lop prioritiese believe ihc Sovieis are likely to show further flexibility:
They will continue lo insistimultaneous reaffiimalion of Ihe ABM Treaty, but will settle, for language thaiess explicit linkTART reductions than does their current position.
They may agree to defer the sea-launched cruise missile issue orimple declaratory state- em of limits.
Gorbachev will dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar if necessary toTART agreement.
Thc Soviets will not let verification become an obstacle.
Should negotiations stall. Gorbachev may takesome of the prospective START agreement'tgeneratepressure on US negotiators and capture the economic savings in the near lerm.
Follow-on strategic arms talks will raise additional complications, such as the need to factor other nations' forces into lhe eoualion Moscow may well
'A Minilil fil-emon ot rcwurets from the Often*leihr civilian economy could Oo much tovorker incentive! ind caw inflationary cemrev thereby ptWni lhe ny tor the eventualof key economicleetingiver uoa. biwoci.o uiy task ftvea ike laiBkkiicictiit* Som
1 The ouiloo* (or Scviei vriiefie (occeireiiein NIF. i S ftrSsf Font, mi Cnaabiliiinlor Sooiriie rVvefeo' Confliii Through ihi loir IMOi. Occcmbfr
-Sot;roU
I
further reductions in strategic systems, but will insist on maintaining atough parity wiih the West. Dcspilc Gorbachev's call for lhe elimination of nuclear weapons by thc end of Ihc century, thc SovieU will want to retain sufficient strategic forces for deterrent purposes and lo buttressand wc do not believe theyoul ban on nuclear weaponsealistic objective.
Conreational Arms- Thc impact of new thinking on conventional forces is likely to be greater thin on strategic arms:*
Conventional forces are large and expensive io maintain and inoderniic. Without cuU here, the increased allocation of resources toward civilian use lhat Gorbachev wanu would be impossible.
Initiatives to reduce Ihc USSR's conventional force preponderance have Ihc creates! potential losupport in NATO for increases in defense spending and weapon modernization programs.
Thc reductions Gorbachev announced al Ihc Uniied Nations in Decemberwill cul substantially into Soviet force structure in Central Europe and will significantly reduce the prospect ofa shorl warning theater offensive. Moscow will retain the capabilily toajor offensive inlo NATO territoryeriod of rtsotnliution. As Moscow implements these cuts over ibe next two years, it seems likely thai Ihe Sovicis will argue the ball is now in NATO's court Any new unilateral iniiiaiives in thc lime frame of this Esiimaie may be addressed io other defense sector elements.
Over (he longer terra, we believe lhc leadership's recent sUtemenU and ihe ongoing ferment in miliury doctrine indicate Moscow will go much further.
A majority of analysis believe lhat. over the next few years, Moscow will uke additional steps to addiess remaining asymmetries lhal favor lhc
' The omtootwi comtoiiMalio Seminie ii-issv. rvrWif. Fcbxwt Its*
Warsaw Pact and restructure and redeploy iu forcesore defensive poslure. Moscow will prefer lhal any steps oo this scale be pari of negotiated arrangements wiih lhe West lhal also limit perceived Western advanuges in air and naval forces. Hut. given the prospecu for protracted negotiations, the potential for further unilateral initiatives remains high.
Dy pointing approvingly to Khrushchev's announced demobilizationillion tioops inome Soviet officials are clearly arguing for substantial cuu beyond what Gorbachev promised si thc Uniied Nations.
There has been some discussion at lower levels in the USSR of truly radical initiatives, including an abolition of universal servicehiftuch smaller professional army manned by volunteers and supportedarge territorial reserve army structure.orce could reduce Ihe costs associatedarge standing force and allow diversion of significant resources to the civilian economy and lo high-technology conventionalThis discussion has provoked sharp rejoinders from senior miliury officials We believe initiatives on this scale are unlikely during the lime frame of this Estimate but we do not rule ihem out.
Chemical Weapons. Thc Soviet leadership willigh priority during this period lo reaching some kind of global CW convention that would slop thc United States fiom modernizing iu CW sicekpue. How far lo go in pulling lhe Soviet arsenal on tbe negotiating table has probablyubject of some controversy within the senior military and political leadership:
On the one hand, Soviet Foreign Ministerhas spoken out forcefully agaiast chemical weapons io Soviet audiences, arguing thaiconsiderations make chemicaluch greater threat to ihc USSR than to NATO; that Sovicl CW stockpiles are "barbaitc" and harm thc USSR's reputation abroad: and that theya colossal waste of resources.
-Socrot-
(he other hind, on (he basis of out ownwe believe orttoial Soviel suternenls coniinuebscure Ihe scope of Moscow'a CW stockpile
President Bush's strong suieinents of bis own interesthemical accord probably add to Moscow's interest in exploring the prospects, despite the difficult verification issues remaining. Further initiatives from Moscow are certain,theegotiatedsteps are likely. We believe Moscow will probably:
to undercut Western skepticism about Soviet sincerity by agreeing to intrusive on-tile monitoring of some Soviet facilities, putting pressure on lhc United Stales to reciprocate.
Clarify its willingness to go beyond the destruction of old CW stockpiles and address the issues cf research and development of new CW agents and of CW proliferation in the developing countries.
Despite the changes in site and posture we believe are possible over lhe nexl five years or so. Soviel miliiary forces will remain large, diverse, and increasingly modern, and will continue toormidable threat to the West. Moscow will retain forces sufficient to launch large-scale offensive operalions should war occur, The specific dimensions ofthe military threat that Soviet forces will present to the West over lime remaine determined and arc beyond tbe scope of .this Estimate'
Policy Toward ihe Weslern Alliance
Moscow is giving greater priority lhan in thc pail to relations with Western Europe. Moscow's increased interest in thc icgion reflects domestic at well as foreign policy considerations:
The Soviets eapect that Western Europe's global clout will (row and thai non-US members of NATO will acquire cieater influence within Ihe Alliance.
laaM tuuet (if doe.ued aa NIEIEta. aad Ifcr twilnwa Nil" II Dtl.inwff'J 'ii
Oorbachev protege Alektaadr Yakoviev. now in charge of tht Central Committee Foreign Policy Commission, has underscored these trends in his writings and public remarks and argued thaishould take tbc potentially divergent interests of Ihe Uniled States and Western Europe inio account as ll pursues Its national security agenda in the region
does noi want lo be left out as theCommunity (EC) heads toward closer economic integration and growing ecocomic power.
Europeritical source of the foreign technology, ir.vestment, and trade that over the long run will be important to the success of pt'tsuoyka. The West Europeans are teen in Moscow as more willing and reliable suppliers than Ihe United Siaies.
A series of new initiatives aimed at the Westhave shifted from heavyhanded militarytoward more sophisticated political approaches. Gorbachev is scheduled lo visit the key Westcapitals in the first half
Soviet leaden acknowledge that past policies toward theas the deployment ofnd withdrawal from lhe INF talks in Decembertriggered counterproductive Western responses
After yean of criticizing Ihe EC. Ihe Soviets have decided that the potential benefits ofsymbolized by ihe signing of aa EC-CEMAagreement in Juneany risks to Warsaw Pad cohesion.
Moscow's emphasis on the themecommon European borne" symbolizes iu shift from the slick to tlie carrol as il seeks to expand ils influence while limiting thai of lhc United Slates
Moscow's credentials in Weslern Europe will be enhanced by its willingness to give ill Eastallies substantial new room for maneuver. The Soviets will allow the Easi European! wide latitude
fc* expanded economic lies loropc sborl of leaving lhc CEMA framework or liking steps lhat leave them excessively vulnerable to Western leverage.
While Gorbachev has spokennited Europe free of alliances and divisions and wants to reduce US presence and influence on Ihe Continent. Moscow almost certainly accepts current alignmentseality for the (orenable future. Allhough concerned aboul NATO's military capabilities, the Sovietsees NATO as providing certain benefits: helping lo preserve European stability, managing (he German Question, inhibiting the development of an independent European military organization, andand even restraining the United Slates. Taking steps lo end thc political division of Europe for ihe foreseeable future would also run serious risks in Easiern Europe. Soviet accounts of an important foreign ministry conference in Moscow lasl summeronsensus view thai attemptingecouple thc United States from Western Europe would al least for now be counterproductive.
Outlook
White Moscow's ultimate goalestern Europe closer to the USSR, and more distant from the Uniied
Slates, we believe that, for Ihe lime frame of this Estimate and indeed well beyond, Soviet objectives
arc more modest;
* Moscow will attempt to translate ils more benign image under Gorbachev into tangibleeconomic lies and lechnology sales, slowing owdernizaiion of NATO's conventional forces, and undercutting support for defense spending inmore generally into an expansion of Soviet influence on the Continent
Blocking modernization of NATO's short-rangeweapons willop priority. Gorbachev is likely io announce some unilaieral reductions in Moscow's arsenal of short-range nuclear forces as caily as this year as NATOecision on modernization of lhe Lance missile.
Moscow's inlcrcsi in mainlaining siabilily on ihr Coniincni will limit ils initiatives on West Germany and Berlin The Soviels hope that West German
Thc Sovieu. ncvcrlhclcss. continue lo see Ihc Thirdegion of rivalry wiih lhe West:
They conlinuc attempt* io reduce US influence and especially lhe US miliury presence. Moscowthai iu initiative! toess threatening and more cooperative image will create anatmosphere less tolerantajor US military presence.
Moscow continues io back Communis! allies and lo selectively support client stales and somemovemenu (noiably lhe African Nationalthe South-West African People'sand the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador).
Under Gorbachev, Moscow isuch more imporunt role in carrying out iu strategy in lhe Third World to international organizations, and particularly to ihe Uniled Nations. Moscow is probing for ways io exploit UN peace keeping mechanismseans to constrain unilateral US initiatives and enlarge its own role.
Looking Ahead
Moscow will conlinuc low-profile support whento leftist insurgencies and groups that arc deemed to have some future, mainly those lhal will not require massive Soviet assistance The SovieU will press their allies and clicnue sensitive to broader Soviet interests and to eschew behavior that could excessive-.ly antagonize ihe Western powers:
Soviel clients in the Third World will also be encouragedndertake economic and political reforms and to accept and even seek Western economic assisuncc.
Soviet economic and military assistance io Thiid World clicnu wiU in many cases be scaled back as agreements arc renegotiated. Even allies of special importance (Cuba, Vietnam. Angola. Ethiopia. South Yemen, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan) arc likely to feel the pinch, although ihey will continue lo receive substantial aid.
Given Moscow's limited economic capacities, lhc Soviets will continue to push arms sales for barter or
hard currency Miliiary assistance will remain lhc
primary feature of Soviel relations with many Third World countries and may be offered al favorable terms in orderelp expand Soviet influence in countries of special importance to Moscow.
ll is highly unlikely that Moscow will become directly involved in miliiary supporteftist Seizure of power ia tbe Third Worldid in.
Moscow will give greater priority lo relations with lhe newly industrializing countries and traditionally pro-Western sutes.
Soviet miliiary forces (primarily naval and naval air) will rcmair. deployed to several Third Worldparticularly thc eastern Mediterranean Sea. We believe thereood chance, however, thai Moscow may draw dowa iu forces in some areas We see some chance that Soviet naval forces will withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay during the time frame of this Estimate. Although thc Sovieu may in some cases seek to expand existing miliury access arrangements, we believe ihey ate unlikely lo seek any new foreign basing arrangements
Moscow will be more supportive than in the past of negotiated scillemenu in regional conflicts, although its behavior will depend on the potential impact on relations with thc West or other key regional powers, and also on the economic cost to Moscowonflict:
In the Middle East, the policy of "neither peace nor war" no longer suiu Soviet interests The potential threatonflict pose* to Soviet security and to relations wiih Ihe Western powers ensures that Moscow willeace process in which ilole, while leaning on iu Arab clients and the PLO lo be more cooperative in the process.
In Central America. Moscow will counselPresident Onega to lake advantage ofpeace initiatives, limit support for regional lefiisi insurgencies, move toward more pragmaticpolicies, and seek economic ridariety of
1.1
-Seere*-
Flgure 4
Sotiel Arras Deliveries lo Minis! and Communlsl CIIcbIs,
While encouraging iQiernal reforms, lhe Soviets -ill woik io keepninisi stale.
Moscow ices ihe Horn of Africa as another polen-lial arena lor joint US-Soviei efforls loolilical seiilemenl.
lhc fundamental mistrust lhat has sustainedin the Wesi and most of lhe Third World to expansion of Soviet political, economic, and miliiary influence. If current trendswe believe theyis likely to make substantial progress toward lhe objectives ihacdrive this change in approach:
fur Gains and Losses
These changes in Soviet approach have alreadysome imporiant successes for Moscow.ubstantial degree. Gorbachev has already undercut
Building on the gains he has already made,will succeed in creating an extended respite from East-West tensionsore stableenvironment conducive io undertakinginternal reform!
pressure* within (Se Weslern Alliance lo stew the pace of defense rnoderniaiion. reduce Handing military forces, and limit defense spending will be furtheror without arms conlrolfacilitating Moscow's ef-fort to reduce the defense burden, make additional troop cuts, and concentrate on rebuilding ihc Soviel economy.
Western inter est in broadening trade, technology sales, and financial and other economic tics to thc USSR *ill increaseesultore lenient poliiical attitude toward mvolvemenl iaperes-troyka (Serious economic constraints, such as lhc difficulty of repatriating profits and Moscow's lack of hard currency, will remain.)
But Moscow is playingeak hand as it attempts to Iranslate an improving image abroad into tangible, lasting benefits. Iu use of military powerever of influence is likely to decline further, while it will face persisting economic and political weaknesses lhal ptrrtuoyka will do little to alleviate in ihe time frame of ihis Estimate. In particular, even ifreforms begin to Uke hold, lhe USSR is not likely toajor global economic player until well into Ihe nexl century, if then:
Weuem Alliance. New incentives will befor individual Alliance membersursueagendas with Moscow. Changing attitude* tc-ard Ihe USSR in Western Europe will compli. eate Alliance management. Alliance unity on some key security issues will be seriously tested, but West European supportS military presence on the Continent will not.nincantly eroded
Third World Many Third World countries will welcome the USSR's new international respcctabil-ily as an opportunity to improve tics to Moscow-aiming lo advance their own regional agendas and to gain some leverage on the Uniled States. Moscow is likely lo be ableapitalize byarger role oniddle East peaceit has long been odd man ML Local opponents of US nuhury facilities in the Thudl be emboldened io press (heir case as perceptionsoviet threat decline Soviet activity and1 increase, affording
'I
conservatives and membersof the military and security elites have criticized specifle decisions such as the unilateral nuclear testing moratorium, thc acceptance of asymmetrical reductions in the INF Treaty, and unilateral force reductions.
Scenarios Under Corbacber
Nevertheless. Gorbachev has continued to oulmaneu-ver his critics andmprove his abilityarry out his foreign policy and defense agenda. Weontinuation and consolidation of current trends is the most likely scenario in the next few years*
It is widely recognized in Moscow thai iheforeign policy has contributedramatic improvement in lhe USSR's iniernational image and to its security.
Gorbachev will continueove cautiously io prepare the groundwork for potentially controversial initiatives.
He will coniinue to gradually remove defenders of thc old order. Wiih his downgrading of leading conservative crilic Ligachev lasl fall, he put nay-saycrs on notice ihai they willrice for rcsisting his program.
is shaking up lhe entire foreign policy and national securily apparatus so thai il will better serve his agenda. Thc foreign ministry and party foreign policy apparatus have already undergone substantial reorganization and the miliury,and security services reportedly will soon do so as well.
Potentially Disruplire Developments Gorbachev's reform agenda has so far producedeconomic disruption and polilical turmoil, with few positive results to show for it. The situation is likely to get worse before it gets belter. Short of ihe
- Our ludemeiuiorbachev's siayiej power are based onit witliatucts to tack with the pctilieal windsnd the suecras he has already achieved in eutlUnt)nE coflMnaiirc appone-iis in Ihe pany. Thesee discussedhc (cibec-iimtrospwifiu
arjfi,fairn 4tenl0 Owr1 tout YrOr,
overthrow of Gorbachev, wc believe the newstrategy toward lhe West is relativelyto such bad news on the home from.
Upoint, (he prospect of continuingis likely lo reinforce sentiment in favorfrom East-West tensions. Continuedcould push Moscow to move more quicklyiradc barriers and elicit assisunce fromespecially on the consumer front.on the otherif itlead Moscow on aio reimposc constraints on conUctscitizens and the West, limit travelresume some jamming of Western radios,the constraints on
Serious insubility in Eastern Europe would probably pose the greatest risk to Gorbachev's approachhe Wesi. Moscow is tolerating snd even encouraging significant steps in the Bloc toward greaterin domestic and foreign policy. Moscow'shas fueled new and rapidly growing pressures for change in lhe region, especially in Poland andPrecipitous sieps toward grcaier indepeodence by an East European regime-^aisuig the prospect ofa loss of party dominancehallenge io the integrity of thcraise alarms in Moscow and strengthen semimcnt in favorrackdown in the region and the reimposition of lighter controls on Easl-West contacts.
A rescalation ofrackdown at home or in Eastern Europe-could also throw Gorbachev's sirategy off irack. There is already some sentiment io thclhat Gorbachev has moved too quickly in his drive lo improve relations with the Western powers and given away loohift in Washingtonarshly anii-Soviel policy could reinforce Ihese concerns and (cad Gorbachev to tackonservative direction.
This development would probably not lead lheto roll back initiatives already uken, but it would almost certainly strengthen those arguing that
Moscow should "pause" in iu effortsorge beiler ties to (he Uniied Stales and place rnorc priority on cultivating (he West Europeans. It could also limil Gorbachev's freedom on maneuver in negotiations and his ability to transfer additional resources from defense lo the civilian economy.
Scenarios Without Gorbachev
How Soviet policy would change without Gorbachev would depend on tbe liming and lhe circumstances surrounding his departure. Wc do noteturn IO ihc cotifrontauonal policies of the past Ls likely. Bul there could be some significant retrenchment from Gorbachev's more forthcoming approach to the Westesulting increase in East-West tensions:
If Gorbachev were lo die in office, we believe his policies would survive him ai least in the short run. Gorbachev would most likely be replacedoderate reformer or by one of several allies on lhe Politburo who seem as radical or more so than he is. Eiihcr would attempt to maintain lhe current course, although thc removal of Gorbachev'spersonality and political skills would be bound to slow thc pace of change. Because Gorbachevwill coniinue to remove opponents of his policies from the Politburo, over time tbe probability that Gorbachev's course would persist is likely to
If Gorbachev were to be ousted from nfl.ee in the next few years, he most likely would be replacedore orthodox figuicistinctly more cautious course on domestic and foreign policy.eadership would probably voice support lor pereuroyka in general, while in practice moving lo gut some of Gorbachev's most controversiallo liberalize lhe political system and introduce market elements into the economy. It would be difficult for any regime to Improve Soviel economic performance without constraining defense spending,ore orthodox leadership would almostbe more supportive of military and defense industry interests. It would probably eschewunilateral arms control concessions or force cuts, be more supportive of leftist allies abroad, andore conservative approach lo theofthc miliiary and security services Such a
regime would not necessarily pursue morepolicies, bul ils harder lineange of foreign and domestic Issues would pcobably lead lo an increase in East-West tensions.
We see little chance (hat any alternative regime would find il in the Soviet interest to revert to an openly confrontational strategy toward lhe West that wouldajor new military buildup or actreasive policies in lhe Third World. Polilical instability serious enough lo threaten centralunlikely in ourincrease the chancesenophobic leadership advocatingourse could come to power.
1 We see even less chanceeadership coming to power thai attempts toore radical effort than Gorbachev to engage the Wcsi and integrate the USSR into the international community
Implications for Western Policy
Under almost any scenario, lhc USSR will remain the West's principal miliiary and polilical adversary. I'" -eitroyka.hanging Ihe nature of the Soviet challenge. Sovicl policies lhal mute Cold War rhetoric and reduce the West's perception of hostilily and danger threaten to undermine the philosophical and institutional framework thc West has developed over the lastears for containing and combating Soviet and Communist expansionism. It will become increasingly difficult for the West to approach Easi-West reUiioas from lhe same perspective, rhetoric, and policies as in the past. Western policies will have io sellore challenging market where Ihe perception of threat is significantly reduced while competition remains strong.
At the same lime, the processes Gorbachev has set in motion create new opportunities lo realize objectives Western policy has longhese processes will conunue to:
Erode the xenophobia and Iwc-camp mentality lhat have traditionally driven Soviet hegemonic ambitions
There is general agreement in the Iniellitemct Community over the outlook for the next five to seven yean, but differing views over the longer lerm prospects for fundamental and enduring change toward less competitive Soviet behavior:
Some analysts stress Gorbachevs political vulnerability, the opposition lo real change In Ihe party, military, and security elites, and lhe unpredictable consequences of lhe turmoil he has fostered in the system. They pointistory of failed attempts to reform the Soviet system and are reluctant to make long-range predictions about ihe future. In any event, they see Gorbachev's changes as largely latli-cal. driven by the needespite from the competition. They suspect that lesspolicies may last only as long asto achieve the expected gains in economicinto the nextanderious risketurn toassertive behavior when thai lime arrives.
Other analysts stress Gorbachev's political strength and cunning and the strong forces-societal pressures and global trends- behind the reform process. They view ihe current effort at reform as far deeper and more comprehensive lhan past attempts and see current changes as drivenundamental rethinking af national interests ond ideology as well as by more tactical considerations. They see temporary retrenchments as possible and even likely, bui believe Gorbachev's changes will more likely than not havemomentum to endure, producing lasting shifts in Moscowore open society, more cooperative behavior in the Third World,ignificantly reduced emphasis on military competition
Pave ihe way for Ihe significant reduction of for-waid based Soviet military power ia Europe
Weaken Soviet hegemony and expand individual liberties in Eastern Europe
Undercut support for radical leftists in (he Third World.
Further weaken the claims of lhe miliiary on the Soviet budget.
Facilitate movement toward institutionalfor individual liberties in the USSR.
There are limits on the West's ability to influence this process;
Gorbachev and his colleagues have made clear ihat they plan to proceed in current directions whether or noi the West
Weslern assistance can affect Soviet economiconly al the margins.
In lhe long run. Gorbachev's fortunes and lbc fate of his policies will rest more on domesticthe ability to conlrol domestic disorder aad lo improve economicon foreign policy successes.
Nevertheless. Western influence over Soviet foreign, defense, and domestic policies is probably greater lhan ever before:
While Gorbachev has tbc initiative and thc ability to make foreign policy irinovations more quickly than the Western democracies, the USSR'stroubles give him tbc weaker hand and lhe greaier needess confrontational relationship.
Gorbachev recognizes that successes abroad help bolster his position at home. Hb ability to claim success will be dependent oo how (he West responds to his initiatives.
Gorbachev will not endanger Soviet security or give in to what be perceives as bbcbnail. but be has already shown that hc is prepared to force through dramatic changes in past Sovietai some risk to his politicalorder to addressWestern concerns
Sun rot-
Socrstf-
Origins Of "New Thinking"
formation and growing prominence in the pottwar yearsumber of foreign policy think tanks under the auspices of the Academy of Sciencesey role in the dissemination af new thinking. Most of the well-known proponents of new thinking have iheir origins In or still workandful of these Institutes.
Most of Ihe ideas lhat Gorbachev has touted under the rubric of new thinking in fact have their origins in the West. Well before new thinking. Western concept! such atalance of interests, and mutual security were appearing in Soviet academic Journals and unofficial remarks
Gorbachev has sought to institutionalize new thinking by promoting its proponenil at every opportunity to positions of prominence in lhe party apparatus and ihe media. New thinkers areprominent in the major academic Institutes and lhe foreign ministry. Were lhe politicalin Moscow to shift, however, proponents of more orthodox approaches to International affairs could again assume more influential positions.
"New thinking" hat comeandumber of theoreticaldtemphasis on military struggle and class warfare to "reasonabletn defenseeatsestmenl of the costs and benefits of Third WorldGorbachev has set forth as guiding principles of his foreign policy.
While Gorbachev has brought these new concepts to the fore, many of themong history.
Some got their Start under Khrushchev, in the
thaw thai followed Stalin's death:
Although he never used the term. Khrushchevumber of basic theoreticalStalin's dogma on the inevitability of war and resurrecting peaceful coexistence
Many current "new thinkers."Includingbegan thetr political and academic careers during the Khrushchev years.
The Brethnev years were markedore conservative political lone. But the regimea broadening discussion in academic circles of many of ihe components of newas the risks of regional conflicts, the changing naiuie of capitalist societies, and the meager protpects for Communist gains in the Third World.
of Enduring Chance
As evidence of Moscow's progress over the next two to three years toward fulfilling the promise of more responsible behavior, we will be watching for:
Soviet acceptance of real liberalization ir. Eastern Eu rape.
full implementation of announced force teduciions.
ubstantial con version in thc defense industry production for the civilian economy.
Over the longer term, we believe the most reliable indications of progress towardretrogressionchange in the USSR will not be in any specific list of policy changes bat in evidenceore open society and relationship with the outside world
Iruiilultonal changes thatoredecisionmaking process on national security issues, such as establishing an effeclive mechanism for oversight of foreign policy and defense issues by ihe USSR Supreme Soviet (legislature).
The f glasnoil io Ihc national security >ejlm, providing for release of significant data about the Soviet defense budget anda vigorous debate about foreign and defense policy options
esponsible, nonconfronlational role on transnational Issues (such as terrorism, narcotics, and the environment) and in international bodies such as the United Nations.
Significant steps toward greater interdependence with thc global economy, making (he ruble acuirency (not tikely in (hc period of this Estimate) and exposing the Soviet economy tocompetition.
Progress toward the rule of law, including sharp curtailment of (hergans" extralegal
activities.
A significant relaxation of the barriers to free travel and emigration.
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