CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9
Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through
National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments and Executive Summary
These Key Judgments and Executive Summary represent tho views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance ofthe
US Intelligence Community.
Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through
Information available as9 was used in ihe preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.
The following inicJf>gence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Cslimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Inference and Research.
Department ol State
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
Departmeni of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence.
Department ol lhe Navy
The Assistant Chiel of Stalf. Inielligence.
Department of the Air Force
This Estimate was approved lor pub&cenon by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
We judge ihat (he Soviei leadership's security policies will produce, during the period of this Estate, the rnost significant changes in Soviet general purpose forces since Khrushchev's drastic force redactions. Wc further assess these policies are designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership revitalize the Soviet economy by shifting resources from defense to civilian sectors. We also believe decisions already undertakenharp divergence from existing force development trends, and they havea dramatic alteration in our forecast of future Soviet general Durcose forces.'
When Gorbachev came to powereechnologically backward economy that hadecade of slowing growth characterized by industrial bottlenecks, labor and energy shortages, low and declining labor productivity, and decreasing efficiency of capital investment. Almost immediately after becoming General Secretary, he began to establish thc poliiical and ideological foundation for imposing his own priorities for resource allocations, clearlyore intense competition between civilian and military needs. In doing so, he:
Reaffirmed thc traditional party authority for formula ting military doctrine, which thc Brezhnev regime had allowed lo become dominated by thc professional military hierarchy.
ebate carried out in doctrinal terms over "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensiveui whichore fundamental examination of "How much isor defense.
Attempted to dampen demand for defense spending by using arms control forums and foreign policy initiatives to reduce external threats
Broadened the Soviet concept of national security as part of ihe "new thinking" policy to give greater weight to its economic and political components.
Embraced vigorously the position adopted by previous Soviet leaders that thc impossibility of victory in nuclear war is basic io the political dimension of Soviet military doctrine, and that the pursuit of capabilities associated wiih achieving victory is too elusive and costly.
GorbachcvVinilial "ground-laying" objectives were largely achievedhis first few years in office. The regime did not order cutbacks in military programs immediately, however, preferring instead to reduce thc
See Director. Defense IntelligenceslurMd've key
burdenrupting to increase the efficiency of the defense sector. Despite these efforts to alleviate what Soviet officials describen the economy, after four years Gorbachev has failed to bring about ain ecortornic growth. Determined to succeed in his revitaliration campaign and recognizing that thc defense industrial sector offers an important source of additional help for his modernization program, Gorbachev,ecided to take stronger action lo invest more in consumer-oriented projects. He evidently decided to act at that point because, in addition io thc obvious lack of progress on economic programs and thc rise in consumer dissatisfaction, thc regime was faced wiih some key deadlines in thc preparation ofive-Year Plan. The results have become most vividly evident with announced policy initiatives designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership rcinvigoratc the economy by shifting resources from defense io the civil sector:
Unilateral reductions and restructuring of Soviel general purpose forces that willersonnel from peacetime forces byersonnel from Soviet forces west of the Urals0 personnel from those in Central Europe. Forces remaining opposite NATO will be convertedclearly defensive" structure.
Cuts in overall defense spending2 percent and defense production levels5 perceni over the nexl iwo years ibal clearly reflect planseduced force structure and reductions in rales of equipment modernization.
Increases in the defense industry's direct contribution to production of consumer and civilian investment goods that will cut significantly into defense output.
Despite these dramatic actions and their apparent far-reachingthere remains considerable uncertainty about the durability and consequences of Gorbachev's it-it iatives on military matters. The amount of progress thai is achieved on economic revival will largely determine Gorbachev's ability to sustain his reforms, his willingness to undertake additional initiatives, his standing with the party leadership, Ihe support he receives in pursuing related programs, and his ability to control the impact of external factors that could impinge on his objectives.
Nevertheless, we believe it is highly likely thai further decisionseduce planned defense spending and to shift investment from defense to lhe civil sector will become apparent during theh Five-Year. We reaffirm thc recent assessment8orbachev's Economic Programs- The Challenges Ahead,
thm Gorbachev will divert additional resources from thc defense sector to thc civil sector. Over the longer term. Gorbachev probably will continue to impose cor. mi.tints on the defense budget, and wc judge that Soviet defense spending will continue to declineortion of GNP through the turn of the century.
Wc believe Ihat thc doctrinal concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive sufficiency" have been articulated primarily to strengthen Gorbachev's conlrol over defense resource decisions lo support economic revival. We also believe that, by lhe turn of lhe cenlury, these concepts probably will have become lasting features of Soviel national security policy, helping ensure continued party control over defense policy and defense spending.
Decisions by the USSR and ils Warsaw pact allies to reduce their general purpose forces and cut defense spending over the next Iwo years would reverse the long-term trend of continuing growth in size and offensive capabilities of Ihese forces.onsequence of Ihc planned cuts, the offensive capabilities of Warsaw Paa theater forces will decline through the first half of.
Wc judge that Ihe USSR will maintain large general purpose forces in the AtUnnc-to-ihe-Urals zone to reinforce its statusuperpower, to deter aggression,arry out wartime missions, and lo underwrite its political objectives in the region. Within emerging economic constraints, we also believe thc Soviets will modernize their still formidable general purpose forces. Furthermore, thc Sovieis will want to minimize the erosion of their relative military posilion due lo both Warsaw Pad force reductions and continuing improvements in NATO military capabilities.ar-reaching convenlional arms control agreement, thc Soviets will maintain (hc capability io conduct large-scale offensive operations deep into NATO (crrilory but only after general mobilization. For ihe period of this Estimate, Warsaw Pact forces, led by lhe USSR, will renuin the largest aggregation of military power in thc world, and the Sovieis will remain committed lo ihc offensive as Ihc preferred form of operations in wartime.
Even with reductions in defense spending and procurement, the Soviets will continue lo maintain the world's highest level of weapons production through the lurn of the century. Although Soviet weapons projected throughill involve mostly evolutionary improvements over presentteady stream of betier military technology will be available io Soviet force developers throughout this period Indeed, the military expects perfSlroyka to yield significantly improved military technologies
In addition to reductions in procurement funds, the significantly increased unit costs of high-technology weapon systems will further reducehigh Soviet procurement rates. The increased effectiveness of these weapons, however, will reduce the number of such systems required to maintain the combat capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces, These factors will almost certainly leadesseplacement rate for more advanced Soviet weapon systems over thc course of this Estimate.onsequence, we expect toontinuation in thc recent trends of declining production rales and deployment patterns for high-technology equipment.
Since thc, thc Soviets have improved their capabilities to conduct longer and more intensive conventional operations against NATO, including increased training for defensive operations against attacking NATO forces. The Soviets assess NATO toougher military opponent on the conventional battlefield today than in past decades. Furthermore, they believe improvements in NATO doclrine and projected forcewill make NATO an even more formidable conventional opponent over the course of this Estimate.
Soviet pessimism regarding the utility of nuclear war and NATO's increased conventional capabilities have caused the Soviets to prepare for the possibilityATO-Pact war might remainut they believe they must also prepare for nuclear war both to deter it and to wage it if it happens. Indeed, wc judge that the Soviets stillATO-Pact war is likely to escalate to thc nuclear level due to NATO's doctrine of flexible response. Therefore, wc expect the Soviets to maintain sizable nuclear forces subject lo limitations imposed by current and future arms control agreements. Furthermore, wc believe that, should anwith NATO governing quantities and modernization of short-range nuclear forces not materialize, the Soviets will continue lo expand and modernize their tactical nuclear missile force by lhe.
peacetime readiness posture of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces opposite NATO during the period or this Estimate will be designed to accommodate the following:
Primary emphasis will be placed on the ability to mobilize and deploy large reinforcements before hostilities, not on the ability of forward forces touick, unreinforccd atlack.
- In line with the Warsaw Pact's recent decisions to reduce and restructure its theater forces, these forces will be maintained at sufficient readiness to defendudden attack and actefensive shield to allow for thc full mobilization and deployment of Pact forces.
Wc consider Pact initiation of hostilities without mobilization to be extremely unlikely. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the Pact might initiate hostilitiesondition of partial mobilization if it perceives an opportunity to achieve decisive results against NATO, orneed to forestall NATO from achieving decisive results against the Pact.
Our judgments regarding Warsaw Pact sustainabilityuture war with NATO differ substantially from those made several years ago.5 we stated unconditionally lhat the Warsaw Pact logistic structure in Central Europe could supportoays of theater offensive operations against NATO. We now judge that overall Pact sustainabilityunction of the resilience of NATO's forward defenses. If NATO's forward defenses were to collapse wiibin three days of intensive operations, ammunition stocks in the Western Theater of Miliury Operations (TMO) would be sufficient to support thc Pact's Theater Strategic Operation for upays. If. on the other hand, Pact forces were to require at least two weeks of high-intensity operations toecisive breakthrough, thc Pact would not have enough ammunition in the Western TMO loheater strategic operationotal of aboutoays. If confronted with the prospect of some shortfall in ammunition supply, the Pact would rrwve additional ammunilion stocks from elsewhere lo thc Western TMO, or adjust war plans to avoid or at least minimize any udversc impact on combat operations.
Soviet general purpose forces are fielding new weapons of virtually every type, and we believe this trend will coniinue through thc end of lhe century. Motivated by the need to counter NATO's deep-attack, high-technology conventional weapons and extended-battlefield concepts, for example, the SovieU have been able to match or exceed NATO'sin nearly every major ground forces' weapons category. Rates of equipment modernizaiion probably will decrease through Ihe end of the century as the Soviets reduce defense productionree resources for thc civil sector. However, we expect that the Soviets will resist cutting substantially research, development, testing, and evaluation in an effort lo close thc military technology gap with ihc West. As in the past. Soviet forces in thc Western TMO will likely be thc first lo receive new
The Ground Forces are the largest element of ihc Soviet armed forces, and their development determines ihe overall direction of Soviet theater forces development. We see no evidence thai this will change. We now judge, based on the plans for reductions in force levels, defense spending and miliiary procurement,year period of Soviet Ground Forces growth has ended, and the decline in iheir overall size could go beyond that already announced. Wc further judgeesumption of growth in thc Ground Forces is highly unlikely before the turn of the century.
In order to meet the targets for reductions set by Gorbachev foroviet Ground Forces will be considerably restructured over thc next two years, but we cannot confidently predict their final form. Before Gorbachev's cuts, the SovieU had begun to move toward combined-arms formations. Allhough the final balance of tanks and mechanized infantry is still in flux, wc believe that combined-arms doctrine will guide Soviel force restructuring through.
Despite cuts in defense spending and procurement, wc judge the Soviets will continue to modernize their Air Forces, albeii .more slowly than in thc past. Beginning in thend continuing through the turn of the century, the Soviets are expected to introduce light, medium, and Stealth bombers, Steallh and non-Stealth fighter-bombers, and at least one new fighter. Thc announced reductionombat aircraft from the Air Forces, however,ignificant change in the pattern of force
expansion of the past two decades. Wc now judge thai the Soviet Air Forces will remain at their post-reduciion levels until after lhe end of the
Soviet naval general purpose forces coniinue to have thc major missions of protecting the Sovicl missile-launching submarine force and defending the USSR against NATO strategic and theater forces Allhough the Navy can be expected tohare of spending reductions, major emphasis will be placed on improving antisubmarine and antisurface combatant operations, gradually modernizing Soviet naval avialion, and increasing theof sea-based airpower as larger aircraft carriers enter service during. Support for land TMOsrimary wartime task of naval theater forces, and welow continuation of several organizational and weapon trends that should provide land (heater commanders with more capable naval forces for combined-arms operations
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact defense industries have been expanding andarger share of the NSWP military tnvcniory. But announced defense spending cuts and the weakened stale of NSWP eeonornics will cause miliiary production in Ihe NSWP countries to decline during lhc period of this Estimate. Wc also judgeSWP forces will fall further
behind Soviel foices in technology and organization during this same period. Thc relative conlribution of thc NSWP armies to overall Warsaw Pact military capability is also likely to decline somewhat over the next few years.
A major objective of the Soviet leadership's current foreign policy is to reduce political support in the NATO countries for increased defense spending to support NATO's force modernization program. Gorbachev will continue to negotiate for conventional arms control agreements to slow Western military modernization and facilitate his own defense program. In addition, Warsaw Pact foreign policy over the period of this Estimate will seek lo weaken thc position of the United States and Canada within the North Atlantic Alliance.
Alternative Key Judgment. The Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, while recognizing the significance of the ongoing changes in tbe Soviet Union, believes the likelihood of large unilateral reductions in military expenditures beyond those already proclaimed by Soviet leaders is not as high as implied by the majority view in ihc Estimate, particularly for thc longer term. Noi withstanding the potential importance of newin Soviet miliiary policies discussed in ihis Estimate, the Director. DIA. believes present evidence and future uncertainties make the elements of continuity in Soviel military policy as important as the changes for US national security and defense planning.
Time. In Sotieto Forces and Policy
Wc judge thai tbc Soviet leadership's current security policies will produce during lbc period of this Esti-mate Ihc most significant changes in Soviel gcneial purpose forces since Khrushchev's drastic forceWe further assess that these policies areprimarily lo help the Soviel leadershipihe Soviet economy by shifting icsources from defense to civil sectors. We also believe decisions already undertakenharp divergence from existing force development trends, and they haveramatic alteration in our forecast of future Soviet general purpose forces.'
When Gorbachev came to powercechnologically backward economy that hada decade of slowing growth characterized by industrial bottlenecks, labor and energy shortages, low and declining labor productivity, and decreasing efficiency of capital investment. Almost immediately after becoming General Secretary, be began tothe political and ideological foundation forhis own priorities for resource allocations, clearlyore intense competition between civilian and military needs. In doing so, hc:
Reaffirmed thc traditional party authority formiliiary doctrine, which theregime had allowed to become dominated by lbc professional military hierarchy.
ebate cairicd out in doctrinal terms over "reasonable sufljoeoey" and "defensive suffiut thatore fundamentalof "How much isor defense.
Attempted to dampen demand (or defense spending by using arms control forums and foreign policy initiatives lo reduce external Ihreats.
Broadened the Soviet concept of nationalart of the "new thinking" policy io give greater weight to iis economic and poliiical components
Embraced vigorously the position adopted by previ ous Soviet leaders that lbc impossibility ot* victory ii nuclear war is baric to ihe political dimension of Soviel military doctrine, and that the pursuit of capabilities associated with achieving victory is too elusive and costly.
Gorbachev's initial "ground-laying" objectives were largely achieved during his first few years in office. The regime did not order cutbacks in militaryimmediately, however, preferring instead to reduce lhe burden by increasing the efficiency of the defense sector. Despite these efforts to alleviate what Soviet officials describecrisis" in the economy, after four years Gorbachev has failed to bringlebound in economic growth. Determined io succeed in his rcvi ia lira lion campaign and recognizing ihat ihc defense industrial sector offers an important source of additional help for his modernizationGorbachev,ecided lo lake stronger actionnvest more in consumer -oriented projects Hc evidently decided to act at that point because, in addition to tbe obvious lack of progress oo economic programs and lhe rise in consumer dissatisfaction, the regime was faced with some key deadlines in the preparation ofh Five-Year. The results have become most vividly evident wiih announced policy initiatives designed primarily lo help thc Soviet leadership rcinvigorate the economy by shifting resources from defense lo ihe civilian sector:
Unilateral reduction and restructuring of Soviet general purpose forces that willl from peacetime lorces by0 personnel from Soviet forces west of lhe
or.In/ellittner Agr*ty. Blitrmutt on put* II.
Urals0 personnel from those in Central Europe. Forces remaining opposite NATO will be convertedclearly defensive" structure.
- Cuts in overall defense spending2 percent and defense production levels5 percent ewer thc next two years that dearly reflect planseduced force structure and reductions in rates of equipment modernization.
Increases in defense industry's direct contribution to production of consumer and civilian investment goods that will cut significantly into defense Output.
Despite these dramatic actions and their apparent far-reaching implications, there remains considerableaboul thc durability and consequences of Gorbachev's initiatives on military maiters. Thc amount of progress that is achieved on economic revival will largely determine Gorbachevs ability lo sustain his reforms,hngness to undertakeinitiatives, his standing with the partythe support be receives in pursuing related programs, and his ability lo control the impact of external (actors thai could impinge on his objectives.
Gorbachev and his allies moved quickly lo reaffirm party control over military issues, in particular its authority for formulaling miliury doctrise. Although most attention has focused oa the defense spending implications of Gorbachev's programs, it has become clear thai he is abo using pertstroykaool lo lighten tbe party's grip on thc military's political accountability. Theh Party Conference and subsequent remarks by Foreign Ministercalling for oversight of the Soviet miliiary by nationwide elected bodies provide strongof thc leadership's determination to broaden and intensify review of national security matters,defense spending.
Reasonable end Defensive Sufficiency. The concept of "reasonable sufficiency" is emergingajor announced theme of Soviel security policy, and it is being linked closely lo Gorbachev's new formulations of military requirements. Sufficiency has beendefined by Gorbachev and other party omcurtsevel of miliury power adequaterepdbut insufficient to conduct ceTeasivcbe concept remains under discussion in the Soviet Union, and Lhe debate has largely focused on three central issues:
wc believe il is highly likely lhatlo reduce planned defense spending andinvestment from defense IO the civil sectorapparent during lhehPlan. We reaffirm Ibe recent assessmentorba-
chev't Economic Programs: The Challenges Ahead, lhat Gorbachev will divert additional resources from Ihe defense secior to ihe civil sector. Over thc ronger lerm. Gorbachev probably will continue lo impose constraints on lhe defense budget, and we judec lhat Soviet defense spending will continue lo declineortion of GNP through the turn of tbe century.
Gorbacbe. and lhe Formitlalion of Defense Policy Gorbachev's decision lo include the military as one target of hisampaign has broughl into sharp relief his atlcmpts to lighten parly control over tlte Soviet armed forces. Soon aflei taking office as General Secietary in
A contest over resources as Gorbachevoctrinal basis for strengthening his control over defense resource decisions.
The need lo influence Western audiencesirection favorable to Soviel defense and economic policy objectives
Thc belief by al least some leaders thai Soviet national security can be better ensured if both sides reduce their military forces.
We judge that in presenting this concept theleadership is attempting toew basis for determining "How much isor defense, li has been linked io iwo other announced policy outlooks: thai overall defense posture should be judged by "qualitative" as well as quantiuiiveand, that further increases over enisling force
do not necessarily resull in greater security. By advocating these concepts. Gorbachev seeks to pro-motc policies (hat will benefit his economy bythe burden of military spending, mitigate the effects of reduced spending by attempting to manage the future military threat through aggressive arms control policies, and reap poliiical beriefils Ihat would contribute lo his goals by reducing the Western perception of tbc Soviet threat. We believe lhal Ihe concept's long-term implications arc inextricably linked to thc faic of Gorbachev's reform progiams. We further judge that, as long as leadership backing within ihe party for his emphasis on industrialholds up. and. barring an unforeseenin US-USSR relations, Gorbachev's concept of sufficiency will provide lbc basis for Soviet security policy.
Over the last few years. Ihc principle of reasonable sufficiency has also been linked to lhe term "defensive sufficiency" (abo translateddefensiven this context it has been proposed by Gorbachev1 and other high-ranking Soviel officialsasis for determining (he organisation, size, disposition, and strategy of I'act and NATO forces in Europe. Not surprisingly, even many Soviet miliury sources have beca particularly skeptical about defensive doctrine, and several high-ranking officers have asserted that, while defense can prevent tie enemy from defeating the USSR, it does not defeat thc enemy.
Although usually placed by Soviet spokesmen in Ihe context of its mutual applicability io both alliances. Gorbachev linked his8 unilateral troopand reorganization announcement lo Soviet forcesclearly defensive" structure.eadership's championing of reasonable and defensive sufficiency derives much of iu impetus from economic requiremenu. and we believe iu success ultimately will be determined by tbe policy agenda and poliiical power of the party leadership rather lhanoctrinal discourse bclween miliiary and civilian writers We further assess, nevertheless, that, by ihc turn of ihc century, these concepts probably will haveastiPi feature of Soviet aaikutal security policy, helping ensure continued" party conlrol ovei defense policy and defense spending.
Alieimatiwhe Director. Defense tmelli-gence Agency, believes lhal Soviet objectives in pro-rr.uUraimg lbc concept of reasonable sufficiency are designed noi only to avoid Ihc cosis of an unabatedf the arms race, but are primarily to establish Ihe basis for arms reduction proposals, to raise Western expectation regarding tlie prospects for substantial force reductions, and to undermine support for NATO modernmuon. Iu long-termwill depend primarily on how the West responds io Soviel initiatives and the progress made in the arms conlrol arena. Should Gorbachev fail to achieve his minimum goals by (be, the Sovieu most likely would, despiie the extremely high costs, revert io Iheir traditional resource-intensive approach to develop the nexl generation of weapons and modernize iheir forces.
In parallel with lhe doctrinal changes involving sufn-cieocy Gorbachev has advocated "new thinking" on foreign policy. This "new thinking" emphasizes lhe poliiical and economic dimensions of national security and thc limits of military power. An importantof this "new thinking" has been an aggressive public pursuit of convent to nil arms conlrol sincehe Warsaw Pact's efforts at cemveniional arms conlrol haveumber of proposals by Gorbachev, by the Warsaw Pact's PoliticalCommittee, and, in addition, hundreds of stale-menu and press articles by lower-ranking officials, all stressing the Soviet Union's desireonventional arms reduction agreement.
We judge that thc Soviets and their alliesumber of interrelated military, political, andreasons to engage the West in conventional
To improve the correlation of forces and reduce what ihey perceive as NATO's capability tourprise attack.
To impede NATO's force modernization plans and prevent or impede NATO's deployment ofweapons, thus reducing the
strong opposition which would coalesce within ibe defense establishment and among its allies in lhc political leadership. This opposition could be largely neutralized, however, if Gorbachev could demonstrate lhal NATO's military forces were also being reduced unilaterally.
Soiiet Doctrine oa Theater War Against NATO Nature af Future War. We believe that Soviet views on ihe nature and resultsheater war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact have changed in recent years. Soviel planning through ibeas basedelief thai NATO's conventionalwere relatively weak and the alliance was almost certain to initiate nuclear warfare earlyonflict in an erTort to avoid conventional defeat.
The Sovicis oow perceive that NATO's conventional forces have become substantially more difficult to defeat. Consamently. NATO has become moreof delaying and perhaps averting the collapse of its conventional defenses, and ihc necessity for NATO IO resort to early use of nuclear weapons has decreased. Thc Soviets may also believe that (he USSR's abilityt least match NATO's nuclear strength at the tactical, theater, and strategic levels has reduced NATO's incentive lo initiate nuclear use early. Nevertheless, we judge thai, even underconditions, ihe Soviets generallyATO-Pa:', war as likely to escalate io ihe nuclear level, and they coniinue to believe that escalation to general nod ear war is likely to be the outcome of tbc use of any nuclear weapons in the thealer.
The Soviets may also have come to believe, however,ATO-Pad war mighl terminate before the use of nuclear weapons* f
urrjcncy on (lie part of ibe Soviet Union to iiuich or belter NATO's high-technology mcekrnizaiioo programs.
To make il politically easier lo allocate oconornic resources within lhe Soviet Union from ihc defense sector io thc civilian sector lo carry oul perrstroyka.
To appeal to public opinion at home and abroadeneralized way. while adding to Moscow's overall arms control posture and enhancing Ihc USSR's imagerustworthy and rational player in the inter nalional arena.
In caiiyorbachev announcedunilateral cuts in Soviet miliury manpower and equipment to occur during the ncxl twoonth later he announced major reductions in defense spending and defense production (see lhchile we believeixture of economic polilical. and miliury considerations went imo these decisions, in our judgment, economicresources and manpower to the civilianwere lhe primary faeior. Had ihc cuts been designed solely for political or ptocugandittic erTcct. we believe the withdrawal of the sii lank divisions from Central Europe would have been sufficient. Politically, thc reductions are designed to put pressure on NATO to move toward conventional arms control negotiations lhat would involve multilateral force reductions. Thc unilateral cuts are also intended io influence NATO electorates to withdraw support for new weapons procurement programs and expanding militaryIndeed, over the long icrm. the poteniial for slowing NATO's modernization itore important factor in Moscow's calculations than lhe direct savings expected from tbc unilateral force cuts. Slowing or reversing NATO's modernization reduces ihe pressure to develop matching programs andthe Soviet leadership to concentrate on ilsproblems.
Depending on thc West's response. Gorbachev might advance other initiatives, especially in thc conlcxi of the conventual arms rcduciion lalks. designed lo keep polilical pressure on (he West while holding down ,he defense burden at home. We believe further major umlncial force reductions would gencraie
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though our evidence indicates lhal tbe SovieU would neiihctATO-Pact conventional war for limited goals not conduct initial operations wiih limit-ed goals in mind, they may be willing to accept partial achievement of ibeir objectives ratberet ease the risk ol nuclear escalation.
Nuclear Doctrine. There is no indication that the Sovicls have ever been sanguine about tbcthey would expect to sufferuclear war. Moreover, evidence fromndicates the Sovieu doubt ihey could prevail in any traditionally meaningful rniliiary-polilieal sense because of ihe expected high levels of damage both sides would sustain from nuclear attacks. Since the. Soviet leaders have explicitly renounced Iheot* achieving vicioryeneral nuclear conflict. Wc judge thai the "no victory in nuclear war"endorsed by Gorbachev andinh Party Congressbasic to the poliiical dimension ot* Sonet miliury doctrine.'
The Soviet leaders' public portrayal of ibeir nuclear policy dcaily serves their political inieresu and it does noieemphasis of Soviet nucleardevelopment. The Soviets continue to recognize that Circumstances might compel Ihem louclearof whether iheyiadmonal viciory can beihey iniend
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raiion ol Ihe couniry ind ihr armed lortei (or irnellirnmethod! of undue lingt failed on ihe piiMtiiieimilitary wiener Bad haidemenu: loeulpcJiltcalIke hen euabUtaca thr erawaMe* and lit: cmin in "Sue*oerars. aad in lenattl nol ihcpoliticalecondplan inand condvtl ol com tut oprralioni. ami tuprimarily theol ihr Sonet Crnrril Slafft* focaopaMaril taawawoa.
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lo achieve thc best possible outcome If il ever happens. At the same time, the Soviet leadership believes the best possible nuctear-mrcapabilily willlhe best possible nuclear deterrent as well. For Ihese reasons, subject to an arms conlrol agreement, we expect lbc Soviets ioizable nuclear delivery force and to continue to improve thosesystems thai constitute this force,
We have not delected any changes in ihc military -technical dimension of Soviel miliury doctrine that clearly demonstrate thai the Sovieu have changed their nuclear-war-fighting doctrine under Gorbachev. Theh Five-Year Planey opportunity for himffect decisions involving thc future of thc Soviet armed forces. Consequently, if lhe Soviets determine thai thc pursuit of capabilities associated with traditional Soviet means of victory is loo elusive and cosily, we would expect, by the, to acquire evidence of basic changes in lhe structure and development of the USSR's nuclear forces.
Conventional Doctrine. The Sovieu have devoted considerabte emphasis duringo thcnature of convenlional warfare. Their interest has largely centered on three themes:
ar between NATO aad ihc Warsaw Pact occur, it mightioiracted, worldwide conflict foughl with conventional weapons and continuing for weeks or months, perhaps even longer.
Conventional weapons are becoming to accurate and lethal that tbe desiruciiveness of some now approaches that of low-yield ooclcac weapons. They can be employed, therefore, to destroy many targets that previously required nuclear strikes. Their use, however, does not necessarily incur thc risks of escalation to general nuclear war inherent in the use ofingle nuclear weapon.
Miliury advantages afforded tbe USSR by iu numerical advanUges in conventional forces against NATO may be mitigated by Weslern progress in
adva need-technology convent ional weapons,precision-guided, long-range weapons.
The acquisition of new conventions! battlefield tecb-noloEics by the West would create two problems for Pact operational plannersar. First. Ihe development and widespread fielding of such weapons by NATO could increase significantly Ihc tosses sustained by lhe Pact in conventior.il combat, thus raising the possibility of even otherwise successful operations becoming prohibitively expensive. Instead of thc previous expectation of rapid breakthroughs and high-speed exploitation operations, the Soviets are now concerned lhat offensive operations would assume thc agonizing character of "gnawing through" numerous defensive lines. Second, long-range high-technology weapons could be used to isolate (he European bnitlefield from Pact reinforcemcnls.substantial, early reinforcement by mobilized forces from the USSR, the Soviets believe that they might notufficient correlation of miliury forces toapid rate of advance.
In our view, these concerns have ledigorous advocacy by Soviel miliury leaders over Ihe last several years for modernizing conventional forces through greater exploitation of new technologies. Tbe military's concerns for thc high-technologybattlefield of the future have giventrong incentive lo support Gorbachev's industrial modernization strategy, which is intended lo keep thc Soviet Union from lagging even further behind in the development of new weapon technologies We believe, therefore, that through lhehc miliury will accept the promises of future benefits and will refrain from pushing for vigorous development and full-scale fielding of weapons incorporating cosily technologies.
ctrine on War Initiation Outbreak of War. We Judge the Soviets believeeriod ofof very short duration bu( probably lasting weeks and evena war. The Soviets generally dismiss lhc notions of an accidental outbreakajor warassive atuck launched outside Ihc conicalajor crisis. However,esult of NATO's improvedlhe Soviets haverowing concern
lhal iheir opportunity to delect enemy preparations for an atuck may have grown shorter. Sovielon defensive operations in their training, while undertakenariety of reasons, is consistent with the assessment lhat the Pact may have less warning and mobilization lime Ihan it previously believed. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviet miliury still has confidence in ils ability to detect enemyfor warreliminaryenough to Uke effective action to deprive thc West of gaining significant advantage from surprise.
Forte Mobilization. The ability to mobilize large forces rapidly instead of maintaining immediatereadiness of the entire force is the goal of Pact planners, based on their perceptionar in Europe will be pteceedederiod of crisis. The Soviets expect that lhc forces of both sides will be fully or almost fully mobilized and prepared for combat before the onset of hostilities. We judge (hat Warsaw Paci thealer forces posiiioned in Central Europe are maintained al sufficient readiness in peacetmseefendudden atuck and to actefensive shield to allow for lhc further mobilization and deployment of Pact forces.
Thc Pact would uke stepseriod of lension lo allowaster mobilization and transition io higher stages of combat readiness as thc situation became more threatening. We estimate that thecurrently need at least iwo lo Ihree weeks to fully prepare their current forces in Central Europe for sustained offensive operations a( authorized wartime strength
We judge that, at the ume lime, situations could occur during the prehostilities phase that wouldthe Soviets toreemptive atuck before reaching full mobilization. Such drcumstances might include ihe belief that their mobilization progress had pwmitledecisive, albeit temporary,in relative force preparedness. Alternatively, concern that NATO's buildup was shifting thcof forces against the Pact could persuade lhe Soviets to attack. Aflcr the announced forcearc completedowever,Sovietio attackondition of partial mobilization
will be significantly reduced. Therefore, by Ihe. Ihe likelihood iliai lhc Warsaw Paci would exercise such an option will decline accordingly.
In addition lo diminishing Sovicl capabilities forhori-warning aiuck. Gorbachev'sforce reductions in thc Alia otic-to-thc-Urals zone particularlypercent tank cut inignificant effect on lhelime required for Ihe Warsaw Pact to conduct offensive operations against NATO. Substantialof Soviet forces in Central Europe by unils from the western USSR and lhc mobilization of the logistic support structure arc already required lousuincd tbcalcr olTcnsive operation. Tank reductions in thc forwatd area on lhc announced scale will crcaic thc need for even greater reinforcement. The scale of ihe rcinforcemenl required ioeep theater ottensivc operation will vary with the structure selected for the forces remaining in Central Europe. Allhough forcesheater offensivewill still be available, the bulk of two fronts will have to be moved forward from the Soviet Union before ihe onset of offensive operations. Thiswill increase the preparation time beyond the iwo to Ihree weeks wc currently assess lhe Soviets require to prepare their forcesustained theater offensive
Resource Allocations to (he Military Allhough he came to power intent on restructuring lhe Soviet economy. Gorbachevot initially order Cutbacks in miliury programs. In fact, our estimates of Soviet defense spending5 indicate lhat il has continued to grow in real terms byercent per year. Thus far, weeen any scaling back or stretching out of major weapons development or production programs that can be directly linked to Gorbachev's ccasoomic initiatives Gorbachev') announcement, however, thai overallspending will be reduced2 percentutlays foi arms and equipment5 percent over lhc next two yearsignificant change in lhe course of fuiure defense spending. In addition, lhe defense industry has been directed to accelerate its contribution to the production of consumer andinvest litem goods The cuu arccJcarly meant io help alleviate the economic burden of defense, and ihey couldeaningful boost to Ihe civilian economy over lhe longer (run.
In transferring resources from defense to civilian programs, Gorbachev probably will noi limil lhe impact lo any particular service orost of miliury, economic, domestic political, and foreign policy considerations will influence the implernenu-tio'i of spending cols, and wc believe thai no element of the force will remain totally unscathed. Wc believe thai we will gel fairly clear signs early on of broad-based cuts in Soviet weapons procurement or changes in miliury activity, but measuring precise changes or the eaaci level of defense spending will be more difficult.
Eveneduction in defense spending, lhe Soviets will continue to maintain lhc world's highest level of weapon production through lhc turn of tbcteady slream of improved Soviet military lechnology developments will be available io Soviet planners and design engineers throughout this period. Indeed, the military's fuiure dcvelopmcnl of high-technology weapons is dependent on Ihe same technologies which pe'tsiroyka is intended to improve. Nevertheless, wc judge the major portion of Sovicl systems projected through Ibe0 will involve eveJutiooaryin systems now in service, rather Ihan dramatic technological breakthroughs.
he number of draft-age males hasreflecting lhecho" of lhe lower birthrate during World War II. The draft-agepool reached iu nadirowever, and, for the fust lime since the war, the USSR can countasically stable youlb population. The shrunken conscripl pool, nevertheless, has caused lhe Soviet miliury serious problems. Il has had lo lower iu mental and physical sundards significantly in order to provide lhe same number of draftees- In addition, the problems ofultiethnic miliury have become increasingly prominent. Soviel miliuryhave cited minorities' lower educationalRussian language deficiencies, and higher levels of ethnic tension within units. Theersonnel in Ibe Sovietnearlyercent ofillion estimate of Soviet militaiyalleviate somewhat the military's difficulties in finding suitable conscripts to fulfill manpower requirements.
d unconditionally ihat lbc
Warsaw Pact's logistic structure in Central Europe could supportoayi of com bit operations againit NATO. Wc now judge, however, that overall Paci sustainability will dependignificant extent on how long NATO's defenses hold and whether NATO can seal off any breakthroughs:
If Pact forces bieak through NATO defenses in three days and reach their immediate frontal objec-lives4e judge lhal suHicienl ammunition stocks exist within ihe Weslern TMO to support fullyampaign foroays.
If Pact forces requireeek of higb-intcnsily operations toajor breakthrough, the Pact's total stocks in thc Western TMO couldcombat operations for approximately0ays
If Pact forces require aboul two weeks of high-intensity operations toreakthrough or if NATO manages to seal any earlier major Pact breakthrough, the Pact would not have enough ammunition in Ihc Western TMO to sustain combat operalions beyondoays.
If confronted with thc prospecthortfall in ammunition supply, Pact leaders would adjustplans to avoid, or at least minimize, any adverse impact oo combat operalions. In addition, the Soviets would move stocks from elsewhere, such as theReserve, to the Western TMO.
Future Soviel General Purpose Forces
Although the Soviets have announced that ihey will cut iheir general purpose forces, defense spending, and defense production over the next two years, we believe that the Sonets are determined to maintain laige general purpose forces through the period of ihis Estimate In addition io supporting their claimuperpower, ihe Soviets believe such forces areio deter aggression, to carry out wartimeand to undci write their political objectives in lhe region. We judge lhal these factors will continue to guide Soviet force development in the futuieai-rcaching conventional arms contiol agrceiueiii. thc Soviets will maintain the capability io
conduct large-scale offensive operations deep into NATO territory, but only after general mobiliration. Funhermorc, for the period of this Estimate, Pact forces, led by the USSR, will remain the largest aggregation of military power in the world, and the Soviets will remain committed to thc offensive as tbc preferred form of operalions in wartime.
Gianni Forces. The Soviet Ground Forces arc (he largest element of Soviel general purpose forces, and their development largely determines the overallof theater forces development. We see no evidence thai either of these conditions will change. Cuts in lbc sire of the ground forces announced by the Soviets, however,ignificant change in the overall developmental path of thc force. Before the announcement, the Soviet ground forces wereto grow gradually ir, their overall site. TbeIhe most sizable since the earlyfrom existing trends, and they alterour forecast of future Soviet forves. Ambiguity persists concerning the actual implementation offorce cuts and ihe restructuring of forces remaining after ihc withdrawal into whal Ihe Sovieisclearly defensive" orientation. We now judge, nevertheless,year period of Soviet ground force growth has ended, and thai the force wiltecline in ils overall size Ihat could very well go beyond the magnitude of that already an-nouiiecd by ihe Soviets. We further judge aof force growth, barring an unforeseenin the international environment, to be highly unlikely before ihe turn of the century.
Our assessment of current trends in Soviet force development leads us to conclude thai restructured combined-arms formations based on mechanizedand tanks supported by artillery have replaced predominantly tank formations as the main compo-nenl of land combat power. We believe (his trend towsrd combined-arms formations will continue, but we cannot predict with any certainty (be finalof these units.
The Soviel ground forces are fielding new equipment in virtually every weapon category. This pattern of weapon modelnization will continue for lhefuture builower pace than in the past:
Tlie Soviets probably have begunank referred to by Ihe Intelligence Community as ihe
Fulurc Sovietuh lhe capability to fire antitank guided missiles through iu mamew design, the FST-II, is expected to reach serial production by tbe. It will likely incorporate incremental imprenrernertu overdesigns and may. in addition,arger caliber gun.*
In addition to improving the firepower andof their current infantry lighting vehicles, thc Sovieu shouldew IFV within ibe nealew armored personnel carrier also is under development. These new systems are designed to have improved protection and firepower and reflect the increasing role for these systems in Soviet combined-arms operations against NATO.
The Sovieu will field several new models of lube artillery by the end of the century. Primarywill include fully automatic ammunition loaders, new fire-control systems, increased armor protection, improved mcullurgy for lbc cannon and chassis,onger tube for greater range in some models. In addition, ihc Soviets are develop1 ag improved artillery munitions
The Soviets will continue their ambitious short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) research andprogram, and wc project ihat they will continue to expand and modernize their tactical nuclear forces by improving (be aecoraey of tbeir missiles and fielding an otended-rangeolid-fueled follow-on to lheeries of improved conventional munition warheads also are being developed lo improve the effectiveness of SRBMs in conventional operations.
> The Soviets are projected to field several new air defense weapons to maiimire their future aircapabilities againsi helicopters andaircraft. Improvements will includeseekers for better low-altitude engagement capability, multiple engagement radar, and more lethal warheads.
Dumlf C'lel oflee latethtemrr. US AS| MrSWFST-tl may have ondent* fatubli e
Air Foetet. liven beforeannouncement of force cuts, we had expected the size of the SovieU* air forces to remain idatively constant as tbeyto catch up with the West qualiutively. Wc now judge that the air forces will be mainuioed at their postreduction levels until after the tum of tbc century. We also judge that (he Sovieu will continue to modernize Iheir air forces, albeit more slowly, during the period of this Estimate in an attempt to narrow major technological gaps with lbc West.onsiderable uncertainly, nevertheless, ener bow the Sovieu will implement (he announcedin aircraft and how the air forces will implement spending and procurement cuts. Senior Sovietleaders have placed great importance onapproximate air parity tn thc Central European air balance, and ihey have emphasized ihe importance of new weapon systems in developmental programming.
Modernization of the Soviet tighter force probably will be based almost entirely on variants of the Fulcrum, Foxhound, and Flanker. We judge thai the first follow-on fighter to appear would probablyulcrum ienticement.
The Soviets will most likely continue to modernize their medium bomber force with improved varianu of the Backfire, and we esiimateew medium bomill succeed the Backfire about Ihe turn of the century. Wc further projectewjjghtbegin to replace strategic aviation Fencer aircraft in (he.
The Fencer probably will continue to replace less capable fighicr-bombers in front aviation ground atiack units into ihc early to. Weihat tlie Soviets willew lighter-bomber around the turn of the century. Tbis aircraft would probablyubsunttal payload-radius capability, incorporate low-observable technology to improve its survivability, and be equipped with advanced navigation and weapons delivery avionics.
Mystic high-altitude reconnaissancexpected lo enter service in ihc. The Soviets are also augmenting their aerialcapability byamily of drones, including theielded.
Thc Hind continues to be the workhorse of thc Sovicl atuck bchcopter force, and variants with improved capabilities continue to replace olderTwo new armed helicopters, thc Hokum and Havoc may begin deployment in thc. DevcIopmenUl programs are under waycdi-um-iiltrotoreavy-Ultrotor helicopter, but they are unlikely to be fielded in significantduring (he period of this Estimate.
TOL aircraft is under devclopmenl, and it may enter service with (he Sovicl air forces. The Soviets are also developing Stealth aircrafta bomberighter-bomber.
The Soviet strategic bomber force is currentlyits second reorEanttation of this decade. While we do not yet have enough evidence to firmly(he intent or operational significance of the latesti ration, it appears designed to give (he Soviets greater flexibility in allocating heavy bombers between theater and inlerconiioental missions.
Soviet Homeland Air Defense Forces The Soviets are continuing to modernize theirAir Defense Force including ihe air surveilUnce neiwoik, ihe interceptor force, and lhe surfacc-to-aii missile (SAM) force. This etTorl, wiih ils emphasis on systems with good capabilities against low-altitude urgcu. appearse focused oo two main objectives; the developmentong-range capabilily to shoot down cruise missile carriers before they can release thcii weapons, and thc developmenterminal defense to intercept penetrators that make il through the outer barrier. In addition to improving theof their current interceptor force, we expect lhc Soviciseploy follow-onshc Fulcrum, Flanker, and foxhound over Ihc nutoears. Performance improvements on the follow-ons willadar capable of tracking multiple targets with small radar cross scctioris in Vookdovrnbelter maneuverability,lhe
capability to intercept cruise-missile-carrying aircraft before ihey can launch iheirThcystem, including futurewill dominate strategic SAM force modernization through the nealears. Anollow-on is projected to begin deployment in, but we are unsure whether it will beew design- In addition, the Soviets will develop one or more lasers with an air defense application, including those capable of causingdamage and damage to eleciro-oplical sensors.
The Sovicis have reorganised their Strategic Air Defense Forces in lhc peripheral areas of (he USSR by giving them back to the national air defense system. This probably was brought aboul by national air defense authorities to ensure that ihey controlled lhe forces required for territorial defense, and perhaps also to improve (he responsiveness of Soviet airlo peacetime airspace violations.
'overs. Although wc do not know how ihe personnel and budget cuts announced by Gorbachev will be apportioned among Ihe five services, these reductions couldignificant effect on (he Soviet Navy's size and mix of forces. Thc Navy may be trying initially to meet some of its personnel and overall budget reductions by further reducing iu operational tempo and retiring older combaunis. and lhc SovieU have already accelerated lhc rate al which they are scrapping older surface combatants snd submarines. Retirements, however, will have noon ihe Navy's need lo cut procurementand some major programs may have lo be reduced, stretched out over lime, or eliminatedSuifacc combatants are likely to Uke lhc largest share of "hardware" cuts because of the traditional Soviet bias in favor of submarines and lite fact that surface combaUnu arc the most manpower intensive naval systems Despite such reductions, we expect io sec the Soviets coniinue lo make qualitative impiovemcnis in iheir Navy that focus on ils most important mission areas.
We see no significant opcraliocial change in Soviet naval support Cor land fMOs. We anticipate Ihe slow continuation of several nival organizational and weapon tiends thai should provide land theaterwiih more capable forces for combined-arms opctaiioiisajor wartime task of the Soviet Navy. Chief among these are;
ration of tbc newly developedong-range land-attack nuclear submarine-launched cruise missile in theater nuclear strike plans. Thc high-altiiudes now in development and it will alsoheatci mission when it is initially deployed in lhe.
Continuing efforts io develop more effectiveair defenses against enemy aircraft armed wiih air-launched cruise missiles or improved air-to-surface missiles.
gradual replacement cf older navaladgers withombers, giving Soviet naval avialion greater potential for in-thealer maritime strikes
Non-So.iel Warsaw Pact Forces Following the Sovieu' lead, and undoubtedly wiib Moscow's approval, ill non-Soviet Warsaw Paci (NSWP) countries, except Romania, announced force and defense spending reductions ins in the Soviet case, thereixture of economic, poliiical, and military considerations lo theseNevertheless, we judge thai weaknesses in the NSWP economies constituted the primary motrraiion for tbeir decision to cut forces and defense spending. Thc reductions, however, do not represent asorce and spending trends as represented by the Soviet cuts. NSWP miliury procurement began slowing in ihe, and it has dropped significantly since the. NSWP force size has been largely sutk since. For these reasons, we had projected no force growth and slow raics of modernization even before the cuts were announced
NSWI* force cuts rangenderceni of cuirently assessed foice levels, and wc judge that virtually all equipment cuts wilt be liken in older
equipment Ihat dominates thc NSWP inventory (see the table onhile considerable uncertainly cxrsu regarding (be individual impact of defense spending and procurement cuts on the armed forces* acquisition of newer equipment, we project that rates of modernization will slow beyond tbeir alreadypace. This may be offset somewhat by Ihe reduced size of Ihc NSWP forces and the elimination of lhe eldest equipment in tbeir inventories.
NSWP countries maintain Important defense indus-irici, and iheir role in weapons production hassubstantially. They now account for aboul one-fifih of total Pact land arms productionuch smaller share of aircraft andlthough lhe equipment ihey produce lends io be relatively less sophisticated and easier to manufacture than systems simultaneously in production in Soviet planU. We believe thai, over the nexl decade, thc SovieU expect NSWP industry to relieve Soviet industry of more of the burden of equipping NSWP forces while pros-id-ing increased support for the modernization of Soviet industry.
Wc foresee modest improvements in NSWP forces during the projections period that, while insufficient io dose the rnodcraizaiion gap between their forces and Soviet force standards in Eastern Europe, will enable Ihemulfill important roles in Warsaw Paci plans for war against NATO. We project NSWP forces will gradually modernize ihcir equipment and reorganize along Soviet lines through the end of this century:
Ground force cquipmenl modernization will consist primarily2 series unks, self-propelledsurface-to-air missiles, and newer infantry fighting vehicles. Major restructuring may occur in thc ground forces which could follow ihc lines adopted by the Hungarian ground foices.
NSWP air force modernization willradual process The ground attackhc Fil-ter-K, while ihe air defense forces will be improved through lhe fielding of the Fulcrum.
The NSW I' countries with naval ibices do noi appear willing or ableignificantly increase their naval expenditures. Over Ihe long term, older and less capable weapon systems in ihc inventories of the NSWP navjes gradually will be replaced by more capable systems, thoughessasis due io budget constraints.
The Soviets almosi certainly are resigned to accept NSWP force inadequacies, and we judge that they will continue tv tolerate such deficiencies whilethai the most glaring faults be rectified. The Soviets almosi certainly arc aware of lhc operational price Ihey will pay if their NSWP allies arc not able io perform iheir assigned missions alongside Soviet forces. Thc impact of these force deficiencies on operational planning will become more apparent to thc Soviets aflcr their force reductions in Central Europe and lhe western USSR are completed. In general, we forecast thai tlie uneasy, and at times strained, relationship that exists between tbe Sovicis and their allies regarding force modernization and reorganization will remain for Ihe foreseeable fuiure.
Soiiel Policy Toward NATO
The major objective of Sovicl policy toward NATO is to reduce European governmental and popularfor increased defense spending lhal wouldNATO's force modernization program. If this policy is successful, it would reduce internal Soviet perceptions of lhe NATO threat, thereby enabling Gorbachev to make major shifts of resources from (he defense to (he civil secior wiihout being accused of reducing Warsaw Pact security.
Soviet and Warsaw Paci policy toward NATO for lhe foreseeable future will likely follow two interrelated (racks. First, thc Pact will engage the West in arms conuol negotiations al all levels. Second, it will pursue an aggressive course of public diplomacy, activeand unilateral initiaiives aimed at influencing NATO governments and electorates to reduce defense spending and slow NATO modernization. Warsaw Paci public diplomacy will also exploit popularin Western Europe to current NATO oul-of-couniry basing policies and publicly burdensome NATO military training pronrams.
Waisaw Paci foreign policy over lhc period of this Estimate can also be ei pec ledupport another Soviet objectiveATO: the weakening of lhe position of the Uniied Slates and Canada within (he North Atlantic Alliance. In addition to reducing the apparent threat from tbe Soviet Union in the eyes of West Europeans- -thus reducing the need for NATO's continued dependence on the UnitedSoviets will encourage other NATO members io deal directly wiih ibe Soviet Union. Warsaw Pact foreign policy will also complicate NATO'seach agreement on positions for (he Conventional Stability Talksnaccommodating Soviet security policy willtough Western bargaining positions in the CST and increase pressure on the NATO allies lo meet Soviet negotiating concerns, such as NATO groufvd attack aircraft and forward based systems.
A critical issue confronting NATO over lhe next decade is lo identify, interpret, and react correctly toarsaw pad general purpose forces. As decisions on Ihe size and composition of Pact fuiure general purpose forces become apparent. NAIO will have to sort out tbe real from the declared changes in Warsaw Pact capabilities and intentions. Fuiihermorc, NATO will have to accomplish this in an environment of increasing public skepticism aboul ibe Warsaw Pad "threat" and sagging support for NATO defense spending.
Even under lhe most favorable conditions of East-West relations over thc course ot ibis Estimate. NATO can expect toormidable Pact military force. Wc judge that miliiary forces will remain, from ihe USSR's perspective, Ihc primary basis of its superpower status. Thus. cVspitc significant shifts of resources from the defense sector, lhc Soviet Union will continue to plan for and invest heavily in ils general purpose forces while seeking toore capable economy io underpin Sovicl military capabili tics in ibe future.
Attrnmthe Judtmtat. The Director, DefenseAgency, while recognizing thc significance of ihc ongoing changes in the Soviet Union, believes the
likelihood of large unilateral reduction* in miliiarybeyond those already procuirnod by Soriet leaden is not as high as implied by the majority view in the Estimate, particularly for the longer term. Notwithstanding the potentialof new developments in Soviet military policies discussed in this Estimate, thc Director. DIA, believes that present evidence and future uncertainties make the elements of continuity in Soviet miliury policy as important as the changes for US national security and defense planning.Original document.