SOVIET FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT TH

Created: 12/1/1988

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9

Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the

National Intelligence Estimate

Key Judgments and Executive Summary

These Key Judgments and Executive Summery represent thc views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.

Director of

Centra)

Imelligenci

Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the

Information available as8 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following inteOyence organ>:auons participated

hi the preparation of tins Estimate:

The Central IntelWporice Agency

Thy Dolense Intelligence Agency

The National Security Agency

The Bureau of Intefcgence and Research.

Department of State

The Office of the Deputy Ass-stani Secieiary lor Intelligence. Department of Energy

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Stair lor Intethgence

Department of tho Ar my

The Director ol Naval Intelligence

Department of the Navy

The Assistant Cruel of Staff. InieLtgence.

Deoatirneni of the Ar Force

The Direclor of IntolliQence.

Headquarters, Marine Corps

Tins Esunate was approved lor publication by the National foreign Intelligence Boaia

NOTE

This Estimate is issued in several volumes:

Key Judgments and Executive Summary.

ontains Ibe Key Judgments, an overview of major Soviet strategic force developments in,ummary of Sovicl programs and capabilities believed to be of greatest interest toand defense planners.

Volume II contains:

Discussion of the Soviets' strategic policy and doctrine underincluding their objectives in thc eventS-Soviet nuclear conflict and how the Soviet national command authority would operate.

Descriptions of Soviet programs for thc development and deployment of strategic offensive and defensive forces and supporting systems.

Projections of future Soviet strategic forces.

Description of Soviet command, control, and communicationsand discussion of the peacetime posture of Soviet strategic forces.

Discussion of Soviet concepts and plans for the operations of strategic forces during the several phases ofa global conflict.

Trends in the USSR's capabilities to carry out some missions of strategic forces in nuclear conflict.

III contains tables with detailed force projections and weapon characteristics.

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1

Key Judgments

Wc have prepared this year's Esiimaie againsi the backdrop offerment in the national security arena in the Soviet Union that could over time resulthange in the Soviets' military outlook. Gorbachev has shown himself willing and able to challenge long-cherished precepts in this as in other policy areas. The evidence presented in this Estimate indicates, however, that, in terms of what lhc Soviets spend, what they procure, how their strategic forces are deployed, how (hey plan, and how (hey exercise, the basic elements of Soviet defense policy and practice thus far have not been changed by Gorbachev's reform campaign.

Given the turmoil that Gorbachev has set in motion over many of theseSoviet slrategic goals and priorities over thc long term have become more difficult for us to predict,ajor changeess threatening nuclear doctrine and strategic force structure could occur. However, wc believe it is prudent toait-and-see attitude toward the prospects for longer term change in the Soviets' fundamental approach to war. Many key doctrinal issues arc far from settled among thc Soviets themselves. Furthermore, if we areransition in Soviet military thinking, substantial tangible evidence of any change in some areas may not be immediately forthcoming.

Ongoing development and deployment efforts indicate that all elements of Soviet intercontinental nuclear forces will be extensively modernized between now and the. The Soviets will moveorce that has primarily consisted of fixed, silo-based ICBMs lo one in which mobile platforms constitute well over half the deployed forces:

ICBM a.8 thc Soviets began lo deploy two new silo-based ICBMs that will be increasingly more vulnerable as US countcrsilo capabilities improve, but will enhance the Soviets' capabilities for prompt attack on hard and soft targets. The Soviets also began to deploy their first rail-mobile ICBM, and continued deploying road-mobile ICBMs, which will significantly improve Sovicl force survivability.

SLBMs. The Soviet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force of the future will contain fewer submarines bul more long-range missiles and more warheads, and will generally be much more survjvable. The Soviets have recently deployed their firsl submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with some capability to attack hardened iargcts, but SLBMs during lhc nextears will not be nearly as effective for this role as Soviet silo-based ICBMs.

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llombers and cruise missiles. Thc heavy bomber force willreater role with more weapons and greater force diversity.8 the Soviets began to deploy their new supersonic strategiccapable of carrying long-range, air-launched cruise missilesnd supersonic short-range missiles]^

he Soviets launched their second Yankee Notch submarineedicated launch platform for long-range, land-attack, sea-launched cruise missilesn addition, ALCM and SLCM versions ofa large, long-range, supersonic cruise missile arc likely lo9espectively.

The Soviets continue to invest about as heavily in active and passive strategic defenses as they do in offensive forces, and their capabilities are improving in all areas:

Air defense. Soviet capabilities against low-flying bombers and cruise missiles arc increasing because of continuing deployments of all-altitude surface-to-air missiles and fighter and support aircraft.

Ballistic missile defense. The new Moscow antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses should be operational9 and will provide an improved intercept capability against small-scale attacks on key targets around Moscow. It is unlikely through at leasi lhehat thc Soviets would make widespread ABM deployments thai would exceed treaty limits, although they haveapability to do so. Also, improving technology is blurring thc distinction between air defense and ABM systems.

leadershiprimary Soviel objective is to protect and support the leadership from thc outset of crisisostaitack period. The Soviets haveyear program for leadership prelection thai includes facilities deep below Moscow and elsewhere lhat would be very difficult to destroy.

weapons. There is strong evidence offforts in high-energy laser weapons for air defense, antisatcllilcnd ballistic missile defense (BMD) applications. Thc Soviets appear to be considering space based lasers for BMD. but wc do not expect (hem to be able toan operational system until well after thc

Antisubmarine warfarehe Soviets currently lack an effective means of locating US SSBNs in the open ocean. Wc judge thai they will noi deployapabilily in, and wc sec no Soviel solution to

lhc problem on ihc horizon. On lhc Olher hand, lhe Sovicis will increase the threat to US aitack submarines attempting to operate in areas close to the Soviet Union.

Without START constraints, if the Soviets were to modernize iheir forcesanner lhat generally follows past efforts, in thc nextears intercontinental nuclear weapons would probably grow from the current level of0 lo0n lhc absence of an arms control process, thc Soviets would not necessarily expand iheir intcrconlincnial attack forces beyond Ihese figures, but Ihey clearly have the capabilily for expansion in the0 or0 if, for example, they decided to expand forces in responseS deployment of strategic defenses.esult of lhe assessed operational payloads of Soviet bombers and assumed rules for counting bomberoviet forceccountable weaponsTART agreement would in fact probablyeapons.risis or wartime situation, the Soviets might be able toew thousand additional weapons, by augmenting their force with nondeployed mobile missiles and by uploading some missiles to their maximum potential payloads, higher than the accountable number of warheads on these missiles. Wc note lhat efforts lo deploy additional warheads in crisis or wartime would involve some operational and planning difficulties.

An alternative view holds

^deploying

additional warheads in crisis or wartime (assuming (hey were available) would be time consuming, disruptive to force readiness and operations, and potentially detectable.'

The Soviets apparently believe that, in the present US-Soviei strategic relationship, each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that could devastate the other after absorbing an attack and that it is highly unlikely cither side couldecisive nuclear superiority in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, they continue to procure weapons and plan force operations intended to secure important combat advantages and goals in the event of nuclear war, including, to (he extent possible, limiting damage to Soviet forces and society. Although wc do not have specific evidence on how the Soviets assess their prospectslobal nuclear war. wc judge that they would not have high confidence in thc capability of their strategic offensive and defensive forces to accomplish all of (heir wartimeparticularly limiting the extent of damagehe Soviet homeland.

' The hotder of ihls view is the Assistanttate lor Intelligence and Research. Department ot State.

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I hus far, we sec no convincing evidence lhat the Soviets under Gorbachev are making basic changes in their approach to actually fiehting nuclear war. Our cv,dcnce points to conlinuing Soviet programs to develop and refine options for both conventional and nuclear war. and the Soviets arc preparing their forces for the possibility that both conventional and nuclear war could be longer and more complex than they previously assumed.

There is an ongoing debate among thc leadership concerning how much is enough for defense, focused on the concept of "reasonablellhough couched in doctrinal terms and aimed in part at Western audiences, the debate at this point appears to be primarily about resource allocations. (Sec pageor an alternativeo date, as demonstrated in the strategic force programs and resource commitments we have examined, we have not detected changes under Gorbachev that clearly illustrate thai either new security concepts or new resource constraints are taking hold.

The large sunk costs in production for new strategic weapons and the fact that such production facilities cannot readily be converted to civilian uses mean that Gorbachev's industrial modernization goals almost certainly will

loonTrtralC8iCmid-

. Gorbachev rmght attempt to save resources by deferring some strategic programs, stretching out procurement rates, and placing more emphasis on replacing older systemsessasis. Major savings could be achieved in thc next several years only through cutbacks in general purpose forces and programs, which account for the vast majority of Soviet defense spending. Further, for both political as well as military reasons, Gorbachev almost certainly would not authorizecuts in the size of thc strategic forces. Nevertheless, concerns over theerformance, as well as perceived foreign policy benefits hc.ghtcn Moscow's interest in strategic and conventional arms control agreements and have contributed to the greater negotiating flexibility evident under Gorbachev's leadership. Wc judge, however, that Soviet lorce deds.ons. including potential arms control agreements, wille more strongly influenced by the requirement to meet miliiary andobjectives than by economic concerns.

The Soviets' recent posiiions on strategic arms control should not be taken as an indicator of whether or noi they are implementing fundamental change inpproach to nuclear war. The asymmetric reductions and acceptance of intrusive On-site inspections entailed by lhe INF Treaty"cccP> deep strategic force reductions in?narkcd chanec Political atlitudc on securitv issues under Gorbachev. Overall, however, wc do not sec Moscow's recent arms control posmons resulting in strategic forces lhal the Sovicis would perceive as less capable ofuclear war.

Executive Summary

Time of Change in Soviet Strategic Policy? We have prepared this year's Estimate againsi the backdrop of considcrable ferment in thc national security arena in the Soviet Union thai could over time significantly alter Soviet strategic programs and policies, and thus the overall strategic threat. We lake the possibility of such change seriously becausehas shown himself willing and able tolong-cherished precepts in this as in other policy areas. We conclude that sufficiently compellingis lacking toudgment in thisthat the Sovieu already have begun tofundamental changes in their approach to warfare under Gorbachev. This year, in our assess-menu of the various clcmenu of Soviet strategic programs and capabilities traditionally presented in this Estimate, we have paid particular attention to indications from thc available evidence of whether major change is in thc offing. In terms of what tbe Soviets spend, what they procure, how their strategic forces are deployed, how they plan, and how they eiercise. the basic elements of Soviet defense policy and practice appear thus far not to have been changed by Gorbachev's reform campaign.

Given the turmoil (hat Gorbachev has set in motion over many of these issues, Soviet strategic goals and priorities over (he longer term have become more difficult for us to predict,ajor changeess threatening nuclear doctrine and strategic force structure could occur. Wc believe, however, it is prudent toait-and-see attitude toward thc prospects for longer term change in the Soviets' fundamental approach to war. Many key doctrinal issues are far from settled among the SovieUFurthermore, if wc arcransition in Soviet military thinking, substantial tangibleof any change in some areas may not be immediately forthcoming.

Strategic Offensite Forces

Evidence and analysis of ongoing development and deployment efforts over the past year have reaffirmed

our judgment that all elements of Soviel InlrniMii cental forces will be extensively modernized now and the, and will be more capable, diverse, and generally more

"Tine Sovieu will moveorce (hat Im* primarily corisistcd of fixed, silo-bated ICBMsorce in which mobile systems (mobileLBMs, and bombers) constitute well over half ihc deployedTART agrccmcm could havesignificant impact on the sire and composition uf Soviet strategic offensive forces, although wc cancel most of these modernization efforts lo continue in any case. Major changes in the force include:

ICBMs. The Sovieis began deploymentK nf two neweavy ICBM with an improved capability to dniroy hardened largcU and lheodedium, solidICBM witharheads thai is replacing the six-warheadiquid-propel Urn ICBM- The new si'to-bascd systems will bemore vulnerable as US counicrsilo capabilities improve, but will enhance thc Soviets' capabilitiesrnpt attack on hard and soft targets Over ihe past year the Sovieu abo deployed theail-mobile ICBM. These rail-mobilcontinued dcploymcnu of the road-mobilea singk-warhead ICBMk and expected improvements and follow-ons to both missiles will significantly improve Soviet force survivability.

SLBMs. The proportion of survivaWe Sovielalso will grow through ihe deployment of much better nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBSs) and new sobrnaiine-launchedhc new submarines are quieter and arc capable of operating from deep under the icepack. Equipped with new long-range SLBMsave many warheads (four. the Soviet SSBN force of the future will contain fewer submarines

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mote warheads and will be mucb mote sumv-able We expect tbe Soviets to build additional Typhoon ande judge ibey will alto introduce al least one and possibly Iwo new SLBMs in, andew class of SSBN. The Sovieu' receniiy deployedn tbe Delta-IV gives them an emerging sea-based capability to destroy hardened targets Wc expect, as the SovieU improve (he accuracy and responsiveness of their SLBMs, Ihat (hey will have greater confidence in their ability to attack US ICBM silos, but SLBMs during thc nextears will not be neatly as effective for ibis role as Soviet silo-based ICBMs.

Bombers and cruise missiles. Oo goingwill give the heavy bomberreater role in intcfconiinental attack, with mote weapons and greater force diversity. Production ofthe Bear ll. which carriesong-range, subsonic, air* launched cruiseeems io be windingorce size ofs projected The new supersonic Blackjack, which can carry ALCMs and short-range air-to-sucfacc missiles, achieved initial operational capabilitybe Soviets will likdy deploy somey the. Thc Sovieu continue io deploy Ihcfirst modernsuppori of the heavyforce We expect up toidas to be built by ibeo support both strategic offensive and defensive operations^

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Sovieu launched their second Yankeeedicated platform for upong-range, subsonic, land-attack, sea-launched cruise missilesn addition, ALCM and SLCM versionsarge, long-range, supersonic cruise missile arc likely lo become operational9espectively.^

esiimate (hai they may develop low-observable orruise missiles for deployment in Ihe

St metric Defensive forces

The Soviets continue lo invest aboul as heavily in active and passive strategic defenses as ihey do in offensive forces, and iheir capabilities are improving in all areas:

Au defense. Soviel capabilities against low-flying bombers and cruise missiles are increasing because of continuing deploymeoU of Ihell-altitude surface-to-air missile and Ihree different types of new lookcown/shootdown aircraft.ll be suppoilcd by tbe Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, which became operational

' Ballistic missile defense. The new Moscow aniibal-listic missile (ABM) defenses, eventuallynterceptors, should be operational9 and will provide an improved intercept capability againsi small-scale attacks on key targets around Moscow. The Sovieu have developed all the requiredfor an ABM system that could be used for widespread deployments that would exceed treaty hmiu However, we judge thatidespread deployment is unlikely through at least Ibe

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iome new rlopmcm and

might begin testing in (be neat year or two; ifew ABM system could be ready for deployment as early as theor Moscow or possibly as pariidespread system. Also, improvingis blurring thc distinction between airand ABMexample, tbeof lheysicm.

Leadershiprimary Soviet objective is lo protect and support the leadership from the outset ofsostal tack period. Thc Soviets haveyear program for providing

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Antisubmarine warfarehe Sovicislack an effective means of locating in the open ocean cither US SSBNs or rnodern attack submarines (SSNs) carrying land-attack cruiseWe see no Soviel solution lo this problem on the horizon We base this judgment oo the difficulty we expect ihe Soviets to encounter in exploiting the basic phenomena of wake detection, and Ibehurdles they face in sensors, high-speed signal processing, and data relay.

Thereossibility lhal Ihc Soviets willpace-based submarine detection system duringhat, while it would have little or no ability io detect properly operaied SSBNs, mightery limited capability against US SSNs, under favorable conditions Missions forystem would be lo detect SSNs operating in Soviet SSBN bastion areas or seeking to launch land-aiuck cruise missiles near (he USSR. Technological and operational difficulties associated withomplete ASW system would push systemcapabilities well inio the first decade of lhc next century Surface-towed passive surveillance sonar arrays and low-frequency active sonars will likely be deployed by (heor local-area ASW surveillance. Weoderateto lhc deploymenl of an airborne radar by thc, intended to detect submarine-induced surface phenomena.

1 Judgments on future Soviet ASW capabilities must be tempered by the difficulties inherent inSoviel ASW advances^

Projected Offensive Forces

This year, we have projected five alternative Soviet strategic forces to illustrate possible force postures under various assumptions aboul the strategic envi-ronmcni the Soviets will perceive over the nextears

TART agiccmcnt.esult of (he assessed operational payloads of Sovicl bombers and

assumed rules for counting bomberoviel forceccountable weapons would in fact probably coma ineapons.risis or wartime situation, the Soviets might be able toew thousand additional weapons, by augmenting tbeir force with nondcploycd mobile missiles and by uploading some missiles to (heir man mum potential paytoads, higher lhan thcnumber of warheads on these missiles. We note that efforts to deploy additional warheads in crisis or wartime would im-ohe some operational and planning difficulties.

An alternative view holds

^leploying additional warheads in crisis or wartime (assuming ihey were available) would be time consuming, disruptive to force readiness and operations, and potentially delectable'

Two of the other projected forces are premisedoviet belief ihat relations with the United Slates arc generally satisfactory and,TART agreeas noi been concluded, arms control prospects look good. Intercontinental weapons would probably grow over thc next five years from ihe current00 depending on modernization and growth rates and military spending levels. (Online weapons, those availablehort generation time, would beewer, because of submarines in overhaul or empty ICBM silos beinghe increase in weapons results from deployment ofsystemsollow-on,J. Blackjack, Bear ll) with more weapons than the systems they replace and not fromincrease in launchers. We would expect no additional growth in warheads through ihe.

* In ihe absence of an arms control process, the Soviets would not necessarily expand iheirattack forces beyond these figures, but they clearly have thc capability for significant further expansion In an environment where thc Sovieu see

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relations with the United States as generally poor and arms control prospects bleak. Ihe number of Soviet intercontinental weapons could grow to0 in the next five years and0n all of these cases, the introduction of modernized systems will resultecline in the number of launchers.

Werojection for an SDI respouse force thaireater offensive force expansion0 weapons. The projection is basedostulated US decision in theo deploy land-based ABM interceptors and space-based SDI assets, with actual dcploymenU beginninghe projection depicu Soviet measures aimed oritnarily al overwhelming US defenses through sheer numbers of warheads. In addition. Soviet responses could include increased ASAT efforts. BMD deploy-menu, and advanced penetration aids. Whilethee of iheir offensive forces would be thc SovieU" most viable near-lerm response, advanced technical countermeasures would be critical to dealing with SDI in the long term. The size of the force could be lowerepending on the timing of thc introduction of technological counicrmcasurcs. Given ihc uncertain nature of the US program and the potential disruption of Soviet efforts,

3WC Judge

thai the deployment of significant numbers of coun-lermeasutet is unlikely before the

Strategic forceand Operation*

We judge that, in part, the Soviets view their straiegic forces as effectively deterring adversaries froma nuclearwith lhe USSR and as underpinning tbc USSR's superpower tutus. Tbc Soviets also have been preparing iheir siratcgic nuclear forces to meet two basic miliiary objectives:

To intimidate NATO from escalating to nuclear useonventional war. so lhal Warsaw Paciforces have some prospect lo secure NATO's defeat without such escalation

If global nuclear war occurs, io wage it atas possible as mandated by their nuclear war-

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Some Soviet public statements now seem to espouse certain longstanding Western strategic theories such as tbc concept of Mutual Assured Destructionhich, in part, in order toationale for emphasizing second-strike nuclear forces andgrowth in Ihc US strategic force structure, drew sharp distinctions between deterrence and war-fighting requirements for strategic forces. Thcin our view, despite some recent public differences on thc mailer, arc continuing to build their forces on thc premise thai forces that are belter prepared to effectivelyuclear war are also better able to deterar.

Thc Soviets apparently believe thai, in (he present US-Soviet strategic relationship, each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities lhat could devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Thus, tbe Soviets have strong incentives to avoid risking global nuclear war. Moreover, thc Soviets apparently do not believe that this strategic reality will soon change or that cither side couldecisive nuclear superiority in thc foreseeable future. Nevertheless, they continue to procure weapons and plan force operationsto secure important combat advantages and coals in the event of nuclear war. including, to tbe extent possible, limiting damage to Soviet forces and society.

In planning for the possibility of actually having tolobal nuclear war. the Sovietsassive strikes on enemy forces, passive defenses.

and active defenses to limit lhc damage lhc enemy

can inflict.

Highly redundant and extensive command, control, and communicationsapabilities and leadership protection to ensure continuity of control of thc war effort and the intcgintion and coordination of force operations both al thc intercontinental level and in Eurasian theaters

In general, preparations for more extendedafter thc initial strikes.

Thc Sovicis lutve been increasing lhc realism in their force training to more fully reflect lhc complexity of both Urge-scale conventional and nuclear warfare. Since Ihchere hasontinuing Soviet appreciation of ihc extreme difficulties in

uclear campaign in (he European theater. Wc believe that lhe Soviets have become more realistic aboul tbe problems of conducting'operationsuclear environment, but (lie requirementarry oui nuclear combat operations as effectively as possible is still one of Iheir highest prior it its. Indeed, (he Soviets continue to prepare (bur strategic forces to conduct continuing nuclear comba( opcralioni for upew months following thc initial nuclear strikes.

Nuclear War Initiation and EscaUtion

In peacelimc, Ihe Soviets' lack of high confidence in accomplishing all of their wartime missions, and their appreciation of thc dcsiructivcness of nuclear war. would strongly dissuade them frombolt-from*lhc-blue" strategic attack. Thc Soviets also would probably be inhibited fromirect clash with the United Stales and its NATO Allies lhat could potentially escalale to global nuclear war.

The Soviets believeajor nuclear war would be most likely to arise outATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict thai it precededolitical crisis. Thc Soviets see little likelihood that thc Uniied Slates wouldurprise nuclear ailackormal peacetime posture

onventional war in which the Soviets were prevailing, they would have strong incentiveseep (he war from escalating. Nevertheless, we coniinue to judge (hat lhe Soviets generallyATO-Warsaw Pact war as likelyscalate lo (he nuclear level; tlte Soviets recognize, Iwwever. that escalationATO-Warsaw Pad conflict would be strongly influenced by (he course and perceived ouicome of the conventional war in Europe. This Sovicl assessment appears to be driven, in large part, by lhe Soviet expectation thatwith official NATO doctrine-ighly likely to resortuclear weapons io avoid (he defeat of its forces on the

c Soviets arc capable of executing

preventive/first-strike nuclear option inwhere they do noi anticipate an imminent NATO nuclear strike. Despite our uncertainties about how this option his into overall Soviet strike planning, we judge that it would be attractive for thc Soviets to consider only if Warsaw Pact forces lufTered serious setbacksonventional war. Tbe Soviets would not expect, in any case, to be able lo forestall acounterstrikc by Ihe United Slates or NATO forces

The Soviets apparently also haveimited nuclear option lhat focuses on thc brief use of small numbers of batilcficld nuclear weapons. However, this option has noi substantially evolved since thehen ii was first developed. Also, we lack clear indications of limited nuclear options involving strategic weapons despite thc growth andin lhc entire array of Soviet nuclear forces, from battlefield weapons to intercontinental weapons. Id tbe event NATOew small-scalestrikes in Ihe ihealer that do notarsaw Pact conventional offensive, lhc Soviets mighl be willing to absorb such strikesuclear response

We judge that, if the Soviets had convincing evidence that the Uniied Stales intended toarge-scale strike with its straiegic forces (in, for example, an ongoing thcaiet war inhey wouldto preempt. It is more difficult to judge whether they would decide lo preempt in situations where they see inherently high risks of global nuclear war but have only ambiguous evidence of (he United States' intentions to launch ils strategic forces. The Soviets have strong inecniives to preempt in order iodamage to US forces and limit damage to Soviet forces and society. Exercising restraint couldthe Sovicis' chances for effectively wagingwar. Because preempting on (he basis of ambiguous evidence, however, could initiate global nuclear war unnecessarily, thc Soviets would also have to consider such factors as: Ihc probable nuclear devastation of their borne land that would result; the reliability of "heir olher nuclear er.iplovineni option* (launching their forces quickly upon warningS ICBM attack is under way and retaliating aflcr absorbing enemynd their prospects for eventualon thc conventional bolilefield. We cannot

ultimately judge how the Soviets would actually weigh these difficuli trade-off*.

Slralceic Force Cnpabilitlea

Because of lhe Soviets' demanding requirements for force effectiveness, (hey are likelyaw (heiras lower in some areas than we would assess (hem to be. They are probably apprehensive about tbe implications of US strategic force modernizationsignificant improvements in US Carc especially concerned about tbe US SDI program and iu potential to undercut Soviel military strategy. Allhough wc do not have specific evidence on bow tbe Soviets assess Iheir prospectslobal nuclear war, we judge lhat (hey would not have high confidence in (he capability of their strategic offensive and defensive forces lo accomplish all of their wartimelimiting thcof damage io ihc Soviet homeland.

Thc SovieU have enough hard-largct-capable ICBM reentry vehicles today to attack all US missile silos and launch control ccnlcrs wiih al least iwo warheads each. Thc projected accuracy and yield improvements for theCBM now being deployed would resultubstantial increase indackQ

judge that heavy ICBMs will coniinue to be lhe primary and most effective weapons against US missile silos during the nextears, but some SLBMs and probably olher ICBMs are expected toapability to kill hard targets and thus supplement heavy ICBMs in carrying out lhc overall hard-target mission.

Over (he nextears, we expect that Sovietforces will not be able to effectively target and destroy patrolling US SSBNs. alert aircraft, aircraft in flight, or dispersed mobile ICBMs. However, we judge lhat,omprehensive Soviet attack againsi North America, the Sovicis currently have enough warheads to meet mosl and probably all of their olher targeling objectivesreemptive strike This would also be the case if the Soviets couldeasonably successful launch-on-toClical-warnineowever, we judge that lhe SovieU would have insuflicicnl warheadschieve high damage goals againsi USilos if (hey were to retaliate

afierg inUS atuck because ol ea peeled Soviet losses in ibeir silo-based ICBMs. Onudge thai, even with implement .Hon of Ihc INP Treatypcrccnt reductionsAHT Ircaty. combined with severe comtrainis on thc deployment of ballistic missile defenses, thecould probably meet their worldwide fixedobjectives as effectively as with currcnl forces.

Strategic Policy Issues Under Gorbache. The Soviets claim that they are reorienting their military doctrine to focus more on defensive opera-iions the concept of "defensivearcore stringent criterion of "reasonablen determining military force require-menu. The Soviet military appears to be reexamining the natureolare war. la addiuon, sutemenu by key polilical and miliury leaders indicate lhat ihey are examining such issues as ihc winnabiliiy ofwar. the basisredible strategic deterrent, prcempiion, and how much is enough for defense. Allhough wc have considerable uncertainty aboul where these matters stand, we make the following judgments:

Naturtuture war. Nuclear warfareominant factor in lhe Soviets' war plans, allhough Ihey have been devoiing more attention over thc past several years to the possibiutyrolonged conventional war. Thus far.see no convincing evtdenee that tbc Soviets under Gorbachev are making funds men Ul changes in iheir approach to actually righting nuclear war. Our evidence pointsontinuing Soviet programs to develop and refine options for both nuclear and conventional war. including loiter conventional combat and defensive opcraiions. in order to cope with NATO* improving conventionalas the Soviets have wrarked sincen improving iheir opiions for more extended strategic nuclear operations.

i'oviVi nuclear warfighting objectives. Among other achons. Soviet leaders haveno nuclear victory" position in thc recent parlysome miliiary writings, however, haveto cite the victory objective. There arem Ihc US Intelligence Community over what this means. We judge that, in any case, thc Sovicis continue to be commuted to acquiring capabilities

thai could be important in achieving the best possible outcome in any future war. There is no indication that the Soviets were ever sanguine about lhc consequences Ihey would expect to sufferar no mailer which side struck first. Al thc same lime, they have continued to believe lhal nuclear war is possible, and ihey have consisicntlyarfighting strategy that goes beyond deterrence and includes thc acquisition of both offensive and defensive warfighting capabilities.

Superiority, sufficiency, defensive defense. We judge that the Soviets continue to place high value on combat advantages in nuclear war. but believe it is highly unlikely that decisive nuclearchievable by eilber side in lhe foreseeable fulare.n ongoing debate among lhe leadership concerning how much is enough for defense, focused on (he concept of "reasonable sufficiency.-couched in doctrinal terms and aimed in part al Western audiences, the debate at thu point appears to be primarily about resource allocations. An alternative view holds thai, while Soviclaboul "reasonable sufficiency" involve, in part, resource allocation issues, Ihey are designed primarily io reduce US/NATO force modcrnianion efforts byess threatening Sovietuch of thc Soviet public discussion about "defensive defense" appears aimed at influencing Western opinion, particularly to allay Westernabout the Soviet conventional threat in the context of nuclear arms reductions. The concept, however, also may be perceived by Soviel miliury leaders as another device for political leaders to challenge tradiiional miliury outlays. To date, aa demonstrated in tbc strategic force programs and resource com reinserts we have examined, we have not detected changes under Gorbachev lhal clearly illustrate that either new security concepts or new resource constraints are taking hold

Resources

Heavy invesimcnl in lhe defense industries since theill enable thc Sovietsroduce the strategic forces projected in (his Esilmaic at leasl

aw,ht rj,rtfar. Oeffur ImitUpi,

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the carly-ioGS For some basic materials and intermediate goods used in the produc-(son process, however, competition within tbe defense sector and between the military and civilianmight be stiff during this period. It is possible these factors could somewhat affect the rate at which some strategic systems are introduced and the levels deployed. Nevertheless, the large sunk costs infor new strategic weapons and the fact that such production facilities cannoi readily be converted to civilian uses mean that Gorbachevs industrial rrxxlc-m'jt;co goals almost certainly will not have major effects on strategic weapons deployments through the. However, new construction of defense plants and retooling of existing facilities will be required in ibendo produce new weapons for thcnd beyond.

Gorbachev might attemptave resources bysome strategic programs, stretching outrates, and placing more emphasis on replacing older systemsessasis. Major savings could be achieved, in the next several years, only through cutbacks in general purpose forces and procrams, which account for the vasi majority of Soviet defense spending. Further, for both political as well as miliury reasons. Gorbachev almosi certainly would not aatbonic unilateral cuts in tbe site of lhe strategic forces. We expect, therefore, (hai Gorbachev will choose lo continue his vigorous campaign for deep cuts in both strategic and convenlional forces through anus control and for slower growth in defense

Although wc do noi believe ihat the Soviets' economic difficulties are the primary reason for (heir in(eres( in arms control.elieve that concerns over theperformance, as well as foreign policy benefits, heighten Moscow's interest in stiaiegic as well as conventional arms control agreements and haveto (he greater negotiating flexitMlHy evident under Gorbachev's leadership. Wc judge, however. (hat Soviet force decisions, including potential arms conlrol agreement, will continue lo be more strongly influenced by the requirement to meet military and political objectives (ha* by economic concerns. The Sovieu tee arms controlay of avoiding Ihc cos is of an Cvcalarcd miliuiy COmpclKion with (hc Uniled

Stales (hai would, by requiring increased defense spending, force (hem to reduce (hco elsewhere in (he fu(urc. Restraining or eliminating SDI, for example, could free enormous amounu of technical and industrial resources viul to other Soviet military and civilian programs, which would other-vise be spent on countcrmcasures, and tbe Sovieu could pursue advanced technology clfoiis at their own pace In addition, tltcy apparentlysavings from strategic arms contra] agreement, which, while small in comparison with the economy's needs, could be used to help alleviate critical boKlc-nccks and help advance priorily programs such as those for industrial modernization Some of thesavings, however, might be used for other miliury purposes In tbc neat term, thc civilian economy would accrue only small benefiu from reducing or even eliminating particular strategic systems (hat are well under development and for which production facilities have been constructed: alto, strategicprograms account for only abouterceni of tbe Soviel military budget.

Arms Conlrol

The SovkU' recent positions on strategic arms control should not be laken us an indicator of whether or not they areundamental change in their approach io nuclear war. On (he one hand, (be asymmetric reductions and accepunce of intrusive on-site inspections entailed by ihe INF Treaty and apparent Soviet willingness to accept deep strategic force reductions in START doarked change in poliiical aliunde on security issues under Gorbachev. Oa ihc other hand, ibe Sovieu' stance on arms control thus far allows them to continueursue certain combat advantages, while seekingonstrain US and NATO force modernizationin sucb areas ai ballistic missile defense, space warfare, and advanced technology convenlionalai the same time seeking to protect lhe key capabilities of iheir own forces Further, the Soviet see ihe INF Treatyotenlial STARTas helpingore predictable envuonmcni in whichlan strategic forceOverall, wc do not sec Moscow's recent arms control positions resulting in slraiegic forces (hat (he Sovieu would perceive as less capable ofuclear war.

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Original document.

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