.Warning Page
its
Cauldron Slill Boiling
afeps to contain ethnic, violence in the Caucasus hove not yet beenjj
h /oa on Monday three civilians in Azerbaijan W dicdin mot> violence ihai ihe local press described as "massive disorder" provoked Dy exiremisis. On Sunday. Ihree soldiers andoivilians were woundederies olons as troops cleared ine central sauare in Baku ol nal demonstrators
there had been casualties in eihnic violence in rural Armenia andough curlew in live districts, faammug.
Nationalist sentiment on Doth sides remains at fever pitch. The Armenian Wriiers Union recently accused the Azerbaijanis ol genocide in the massacres al Sumgait In8 and of cowardice lor their failure to denounce it. Although Ihe Armenian and Azerbaijani parly organisations are ai Icasl going througn ine motions of trying to calm the siluaiion. neither commands muchshown by attacks on party buildings ol bolh sides In recentWgj
In oneecent series ol moves to restore order, premier Ryzhkovand General Secrelary Gorbachev haveoinl government-pariy declaration instituting penalties lor tiring workers because ol iheir nationalily. The USSR's Procurator General said criminal proceedings have boon started against mob agilalors In both republics. The Special governmeni commission on refugees under Deputy Premier Shcherblrta has also moved quicklyrovide emergency relief in bom republics. SaanaaV
ej^aaaaaaasVOespile these moves by Moscow, tensions are not abating. The continued presence Ol security forces in both republics will be required for lhe foreseeable luturo.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Soviets Urge Reform
Soviet Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev's recent visit to spur Prague's reform process may Increase tension In the Czechoslovak party, but Prague Is unlikely to abandon Its tentative approach.^bbIHbssMbssbsI Yako.iev intended to nuoga the regime toward
he asso advocated more lenient treatment oTdisstdents and an end to Jamming Western broadcasts. Czechoslovak leaders and media made gesiu'es towarp Soviet concerns during tneutarticle published during the visit callingeeveluallon of the "Prague Spring" earlier was opposedajority of the Central Committee .sflK
^ssasaatsBBsB Praguo's fool-dragging on poresltoyks and harshdissent may have prompted Yakovlev's visit, and his comments
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suggest Moscow is concerned thai Prague is backsliding. Moscow may hope to use an accord on ideological cooperation signed during the meeting to prod Prague toward reform, and Yakovlev's criticism may embolden party modorales to argue more aggressivefyjpr political liberalisation and economic restructuring. Nonetheless, (ear ol losing control, asfil continue to stow the pace of meaningfulBi ^
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CO%TA HtCA: Repatriating Nicaraguan Relugees
Cbsra Rtca apparently ledicaraguan refugees il repatriated laslol whom may nave been former Nicaraguanthey were being moved lo another refugee camp In Cost* Ricaaboutf the refugees wanted to rclurn to Nicaragua,
first aiiempl to return Nlcaraguan migrants lollows^^ecent^ agreement between lhe two COunlries lhal provides for joinl border patrols, ostensibly to prevent illegal migration ano narcotics
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aassaaaaaaaa* San Jose wants lo keep IIS international reputationaven for refugees, but it also is increasingly nervous about Ihe growing migration Irom Nicaragua since Hurricane Joan In October. Cosia Rican officials are probably concerned that political and economic conditions in Nicaragua win resultontinued heavy flow ol migrants. The Sandinistas, meanwhile, undoubtedly will try-to expand Ihe joint patrols lo detect and prevent cross-border movements by
EL SALVAOOR: Leftists May Withdraw From Election
Statements by leaders of the Democraticcoalition ol three lellist parties, two of which are anted with ihesuggesl it may withdraw Irom El Salvador's prcsidcnlial election not Marcn. Convergence candidate Guillermo Ungo has increased his antigove/nment rhetonc. Charging lhat Ihe eleclion process is undemocralli Convergence leaders also say the recent reform of ihe electoral code, passed over President Durane's veto by ihc rightist-controlled legislative Assembly, paves the way for fraud by the righl
ortraying the election asnd suggesting il may pull out. the Convergence may be Irying lo save lace afler garneringercent In recent public opinion polls. Convergence leaders may also be worried thai the rebel campaign of urban terrorism will hurl Iheir eleclorat prospects Insurgent leaders have not fully endorsed the partlcipalion of iheir polilical allies in tic election and may be pressing the Convergence io drop mlepudiationhe lelt al the polls. Lehist leaders undoubtedly realize that their withdrawal would embarrass the governmeni. which repeatedly has ciled the Convergence's participation as evidence ol El Salvador's maturing demc cr
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Topyfecrnt
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W>3h3
i Lima renewing agreement allowing Soviet* to fish Peru's territorialoscow providing portion olillion ol aid to Peruvian fishinggreement lapsed5 mmW
Burma's largest opposition parly dismissed Chairman Aung Gyl. Saturday over zealous ellorl to oust alleged Communfsis fromrobably will form rivalurther divides Opposition, undercuts Us recent progress, eajaasj
Suprome Soviet yesterday voted down proposal to discuss separatelso postponed debate on economicatlonalrsis at teas) temporarily backing away from dlreel constitutional challenge to,
1 North Yemen, South Yemen lormed company lor oil exploration development in neutral zone Invesimemanaa expected lo approvecompany hopesolicit bids In spring, would welcome US firms.
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ecret
Toprs'i
Special Analysis
Deficits Ruing Sharply
r/to SoWers" recenf announcemenr lhal theyudget delicti ot JS am/on rubles inmay be intended lo press those In eskarge ol protected spending such as defense and consumer subsidies tor budget cots. The Soviets Suggested that the financial Imbalance has subsidedS, but President Gorbachev's policies actually have been Increasing the deficit rapidly, and thc resultant Inflationary pressures are undermining both the reform process and efforts to Improve consumer-
ln October the Soviet Finance Ministerudget delicil9 ofillionUSSR's first public acknowledgmentciicit since world war ll. he also said there had been deficits in the past, indicating thai they peaked5 and were inflationary. Me attributed9 defied lo economic shortfalls and to the need lo increase spending on urgent social and ecological problems while maintaining high spending on investment, delensc. and consumer
^BBssssasasaae 'ne, deficit actually has continued io rrse rapidly5 and Is likely to reachilhon rubles next year, someercent ol Soviet GNP. (The highest US Governmentercent Of UShe discrepancies between Soviet and Western versions of Ihe USSR's budget problems arise from Moscow's definition of government loans from the State Bankevenue source. Such loans are the equivalent of simply printing more moneys
The Finance Minister offered few effective measures lor dealingdeficit. Me Implored all users of stale funds io reducecalled for.new lotteries, insumnco programs, and localto raife revenue,
in Spending and Revenue
Spending has been increasing5 because ol Gorbachev's ambitious investment program, Ihe rising cost ofxonsijQer.subsidies, and unanticipated costs sucn as tho Chernobyl' cleanup, as well as high defense spending. Revenues have been curtailed by ihe antiaicohol campaign, ihe drop in world oil prices, and reduced Imports. fllM
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9 Budget plan accentuates these trends. Expenditures areise Byccenl. orillion rubles, primarily because ol increased soendino on health, education, science, and subsidies, and possibly higher wholesale prices. Revenues, however, probabfy will incfcase byillion rubles. The Soviets project lhal their largesr taxfrom proMswill noi grow at au ts^aajj^ ^
The ennooncemeniarge deficit for next yea'eparture from Moscow's usual epproacn ol masking sensitive financial inlormelion Tne acknowledgment ol pes) delicts contradicts offlcuM statistics showing small budget surpfuses. Moscow may be goingow to put pressure on defense, consumeror other long-proiecied spending or to make the case for substantial tax increases. Any such strategy, however, w* probably produce only smal deficit reductionse near term. aWMMMM
Implications
9 denotwhich will oc aooui ": thenGorbachev's dilfculty in gettingsystem to respono to his priorities. Soviet leadersunable lo make cuts in spending to meet thedemands ol Gorbachev's consumer program. Inspeech, tho Finance Minister emphasized theculling even ihe growth in spending for existingopening up ol the political process may haveproblem; widely publicized debate in the Supreme Soviet,forced planners to retreat-Irom initial plans toin agriculture ^
The inflationary pressure generated by Ihe deficit is Increasing the difficulty ofenovmgore mam ot-oriented economy. Because bonddditional private savings can financemil fraction ol the deaat. prices wdi be under additional pressure and Moscow is Misty to be even more uneasy about relaxing price
administrate may lead hir limiting enie product mix. disgiuniiemt
lOfctHing.
iry pressures
by
select their isumer
Tfp^Kacrel Iisai
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Human Rights Score.ca.rd
Accomplishments
revelations of problems and atlacks on Stalinismestern Critics eivsn space ia Soviet media.
Direct attacks on tooexcept thosetaboo
police Occasionally disrupt
more da ring informal journals.
frond" no- tolerated in several republics, and0 "informal groups"been established.
Some radical groupslost access to public meeting halls.
now can challenge official decisions inc code may give suspects right to immediate legal counsel.
Surveillance, harassment, ille searches, and detentionseveral nationalists exiled for iheir actions.
emonstrations sineeome have had upillion participant).
New law requires advance notice and allows only marches that do not "threaten publicctivist! often detained for upo weeks.
on lhestill prevalent in
and moreenials Still bated
previous access io "state
secrets."
no longer have to be registered wiihibles allowed in through mail.
Several religious leader* oileduslims not benefiting from liberaon. and Ukrainian Catholic Church remains outlawed.
to national self-expression
demandsenlral Commitiee scheduled lo address nationality problem
next summer.
Regime refusing lo redraw polilicalejecting concept of republic sovereignly.
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Special Analysis
on Human Rights
Secretary Gorbachev is again releasing Soviet aidants and retusenlks andthe tlrttthe lamming ol Radio Free Curope/Radio Libertyoves evidently intended lo start ott on the right toot with Ihe new US administration. Ihe strengthening ot Gorbachev's political position at tha September Central Committee plenum probably gave him the leewor to leke these steps, but ethnic tension In ihe Baltic states and the Caucasus mar limit possibilities for further moves. <
The highly visible human fights moves reflect Gorbachev's current chief foreign pokey prtor.ty-.lo get reiat.ora offood start with the incoming US adrr-nislratlc*.
leadershipser.ng -he 1 ' resohjtion ol almost an ine cases on various US "represer.ljtioiinihe end ol Htmrning ol RfE/RL end Deutsche Welie. and the release of several poetical prisoners was toood atmosphere for Gorbachev's New York
Emigration Is Up, bul Picture for Dissidents Is Mixed
The publicity surrounding recent eventsrend o' increased emigration. If current rales continue,0 Jews will gel exit permlis this year, double7 level. Total emigration, which includes Armenians and-eihnlci be0 thisall lime record. Within the past week, the regime has reversed moremigration denials that were based on the person involved having had access to secret information Authorities (save also permuted Jewish cultural societies to be set up in several Soviet cities^
m additionheohUcal prisoners released last year,ave apparently been treed so farncluding many nationalist and rafigiews figures even from tne voiaise Same stales Most had been incarcerated for religious reasons; Baptists ana Pentecosialisfs account for almost hall of teem. There is good evidence, however, thatemain in labor camps, prisons, psychiatric asylums, or internal exile and weaker evidence suggesting thc total may bo as hignmm^
On balance, there hat been significant improvement In the treatment ol dissidents.iny opposition party that has sprung up In Moscow IS narassod and police brutality is slili usedew dissidents, several criminal provisions, including one punishing
Secret
continued
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Moscow's TroalmenI of Leading Activist! Still Mixed
Of tho D'omincnl Soviet dissidents. Andrei Sakharov has gotten Ihe most favorable troflimeni from Ihe government. Since Gorbachev released him from internal exile Inakharov has become somethingoyal opposition figure and has moved sleadily toward lull political rehabilitation. Me was allowed to visit the US and was elected to tne Presidium of tho Soviet Academy of Sciences in Oetooor The leadership evidently believes thai allowingravel and speak freely is good propaganda that offsets his public criticism of Ihe regime.
Other activists like Lev Timofeyev. me scholarly editor of /referendum, an unoftcji iournal. remain outsrde the rearm o' official acceptance but have advocated tne establishmentonstructive dialogue with the regme Sfi" others probe the Soviet leader'son gtasnoil and apparently remain in the traditional category ofenis
Aleksandr Podrabinek. whose newsletter Etpttts Chronicle monitors human rights abuses and Ihe status ol political prisoners across the USSR, has been char act en redearless critic who Is highly skeptical ol the regime's Intentions. He was snarpiy attacked in the official press when his name appeareduest list for President Reagan's reception of dissidents and refuseruks during8 Moscow summit. His activist father and brother have been harassed and detained several times in ihe past year.
Sergey Grigor'yanis, editor Ol lhe unofficial Journal G'asnoatigure ol reportedly boundless leal and authoritarian personality, he* made good on his pledge lo test the limils of gtasnost and has servedajor sourceolinformation to the West on disturbances in the Caucasus "Iho offices ol his journal were destroyed by Ihe police, and he has been detained numerous limes, motl recently last week in Yerevan.
"anilslander.'* arc no tongn' tm'o'CfC For me Irsi lime, me Supreme Covr. has struck down verdicts against two dissidentshe Breihnov period. Meenwh.le. victims olepression continue to be rehabililited. Despitein me new ideology chiefs receni pronouncement mat Aieksandr Soiaaenllsyn's work would not bo publishedpfasnosr continuesmm)
Such measures freeing up the system suggest Gorbachev is using the eirsowroom he gamed ui September at tne Central Committee -planum, when his more orthodox critics were Slatted to less powerlul positions, to push his human rsshis initiatives. Tne ferment Gorbachev has* creeled,ay make him vulnerable to future pressures Irom botn ends of the political spectrum. The progress that dissidents see encourages them to press for more reform, while simultaneously relnfoicing the determination ol on hod ox leaders to reasseri control over public OCIivtsm and clhnic
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Ouiloo.
The concessions Gorbachev has made show thai he is prepared lo go to great lengths to defuse human rights as an issueUS'Sovtat relations, in view ol the give he has shown so far. he may be prepared lo yield even more if the US seeksreas where change has beenas Ihe rights ol religious believers.
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At lha same time, there has toimit beyond which Gorbachev win not or cannot go Politically, he may need io show resuiss irom tng concessions he already macefl'ssiSBl
aaaBBBBSBBBBBBBa the USSR would not ho'd CSCE and conventional arms control tans hostageoscow human rights conference.raefy to press the US and the UK to agree to the meetinghe evidently bekeves would improve the USSR'S image. Moro broadly, positive movement in bilateral relations generally would vindicate his approach on human rlghis and strengthen his domestic political position.
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Special Analysis
lor Defense Spending
Tfte NATO foreign ministers stm/jinuiiraat beerrit tomorrow (aces the prospect filerAMI growth In Allied defense spending in the next severe! years will reduce defense empemlllllea in tome countries end moke lhe deOete over Cu'dtntneritig more divisive eflfl
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Non-US NATO defense spending win grow itsfercent in rea' lerms next year, based on preeminary reporlmg to NATO, and probably no moreercent annually In thoecade, well below projected growth in gross domesllc product lor many Allies9 goalerceni real annual growth probably Is not achievable the rest of thisAllies collectively achieved It only once, in vr.fi i^
The willingness and ability ol the Allies to Increais their defense budgets remains constrained by nigh unemployment, large budget deficits, and thin margins of political support The Allied perception of the threat atso has declined durings Soviet leader Gorbachev's disarmament Initiatives and concentration on internal reform have kept West European public concernsoviet atiack low. West Europeans.J*
fear spending increases ecu IS oc vicweilas^Tren^rcWve anJ could undermine
The Europeans do not agree that the UShare of the burden. Insisting that the US kycuses too much attention on financial measures.
1 Other Allies say they support Western defense in various concrete ways: hosting NATO troops or faculties, playing key logistic roles or providing essential reserves in wartime, and participating in out-of-area Operations Such aihe Persian Gulf.F)
in terms of actual NATO defense capabilities, no rna|or improvements In ground, air, or naval forces are likely unlil thet ino earliest. Even mo stfghl growth forecast In defense spending Is likely to go mainly to Increases In wages and benefits lo attract volunteers as Ihe dralt-age population declines.
'-probably will become Increasingly dependent fsjasasjgssasssjaja,reservists. Low maintenance and operati expenditures also win Impair combat readiness, and some Allies probably will try to shed NATO-assigned rolesheir reduced
TojrSeerel
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Sptfcidi Analysis
Noriega ol Arm's Length
Latin American laadert are refusing to give Panamanian Detente Chief Noriega the political respectability he covets end are ovraP/tng Washington's nest moves to resolve the crisis. In recant vteekt, the Latin leaders have signaled their disapproval Ot Noriega by snubbing Panama's overtures In regional lorumt
unless Noriega gives up power soon, regionalby recently elected Venezuelan Presidentprobably urge the'Panamanian oppotition to participatecheduled election namt yenr. lacltly legitimising Noriega's grip on power.
Panamars hrnited success Overcoming its diplomaticatin America, only Cuba. Nicaragua,esser degree. Mexico have Close relation* with the regime, whne the regime claims to nave representation Inhird World countries, probably including Latin American states
Dual Approach on Panama
With Noriega entrenched-end the Panamanian opposition weak, regional policy toward Panama seems to have setiied into keeping lormal but low-key lies lo Panama City, while holding the regime at arm's length In international organizations. Countries in tne Latin Group ol EightArgentina. Brani. Colombia. Mexico. Peru, Uruguay, andduring iheir summit in October io keep Panama suspended from the Group until progress Is madeemocratic solution to the Panamanian crisis. Despite deposed President Del va He's personal appeal to put pressure on Noriega. Ihe Presidents ffto not mention Panama In [heir
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i there tt Ml regional suppori 'or the regsser-ions ihat the US has violated iis obligations under ihe Panama Canes Treaties. During the recent meeting of OAS foreign ministers. Panamanian attacks were received with saence and probably caused Panama notesolution agansi US economic sanctions
The Latin Americana privately have criticized US sanctions as counterproductive and as doing more damage to Panama's middle class lhan Noriega. They also worry lhaf the sanctions eal precedent for Intervention.!
COnlmvnd Top secret
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topi
Original document.
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