roRH NOGOHTRAGT OUUUU
Ccolra! InieftfyiKe; Agency
. th
*
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE9 Moscow's Diplomatic Presence:
The Record Under Gorbachev
*
Summary
Soviet efforts to expand th,eir foreign diplomatic presenceeans of promoting influence have increased substantially under General Secretary Gorbachev. oscow has scored some ainor victories by negotiating increases in ifs diplomatic presence in two countries and establishing new relations with five others. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet diplomatic service also has set higher standards for its foreign service officers and extended the "openness" campaign to the operations of Soviet embassies and consulates. Soviet efforts to increase thiir diplomatic presence probably will remain frustrated by Moscow's continued use offoreign embassies and consulates for intelligence activities. m
1
This memorandum was prepared by-jj PMkVMHJJH}cf the OfficeIssues. Comments and queries are welcome, and may bethe Chief,
sin, ft rflporiH noconTriftCT oncoii
Moscow's Diplomatiche Record Under Gorbachev
ary Gorbachev hasumber of initiatives se the Soviet diplomatic present
influence andeetint
made it clear that hiTintended to energize the Foreign Affairs and to prod Soviet diplomats into lve in broadening their contacts overseas and in ve, professional image of the Soviet Union. At the inued efforts to negotiate an increased presence in nd establish relations with several others
Little Increase in Presence
Under Gorbachev, the USSR has substantially increased its efforts to add diplomats to existing foreign embassies and consulates, expand existing facilities, and open diplomatic relations with new countries. These efforts appear to have scored some minor victories and include:
The establishment or reestablishment of relations withNauru, Vanuatu, andbrings the numberin which the Soviets have embassies and consulatesfive more than when Gorbachev assumed power6
"ft" increase in Soviet diplomatic presence in Colombia In Colombia the_Sovi their embaos
Growing informal contactsumber to more formal ties in the future. Moscow is making overtures to Bahrain, Israel South Korea, among others.
SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE
presence in at Jordan, Kuwait, Lanka. Sweden,
Mexico, Tunisia
Netherlands, and Zambia.
Pakistan, Spain, Sri (see figure two)
o Growing efforts to increase their diplomatic leasttherFinland,
Mexirrn. nn<; Pal-n : -
shed
Several factors continue to limit Soviet efforts tootal foreign diplomatic presence. Because embassies are establis on the basis of bilateral treaties, any increase in the number of Soviet diplomats in an existing embassy must be negotiated. Negotiations are usually time consuming and increases have been granted infrequently asof Soviet
officials turnedeptember^TB^^Soviet^re^uesT: to increasepresence because the Kuwaitis believed that more"increase the prospects for mischief andefforts are further hinderedarge number0otalovietexpelled withercent of the expulsions occurring since resultthe Soviets willon the part of most countries to allow an increased
Focus on Quality and Image
Although the total number of Soviet diplomats stationed abroad appears to be only slightly higher than when Gorbachev took office, we believe Gorbachev is hopeful that quality improvements in his foreign diplomatic corps will improve its reputation and assist Soviet efforts to increase its foreign presence. One of the most significant changes in the Soviet diplomatic service under Gorbachev has been the higher standards set for its foreign service officers. Changes seem aimed at both increasing the efficiency of the foreign service, as well as extending Gorbachev's "openness" campaign to the operations of Soviet embassies and consulates. Gorbachev has tried to improve the operations of Soviet embassies by recalling some ambassadors, and havino others retrained in place,] _
Under Gorbachev, the
for all soviet ambassadors abroad include:
outqoino
o air Soviet diplomats mi condemning past isolationist policies whereby SovfaF" .plomats considered themselves in "enemy" territory while overseas. The directive required Soviet diplomats to actively pursue personal contacts in order to foster friendship and confidence with host country officials.
A requirement that they submit balanced,ndithin their countries.
was angry aiplomats rarely forward negative reports to Moscow, especially concerning public and private reactions to significant Soviet proposals and initiatives. Gorbachev claimed that Soviet diplomatic reporting had crippled his ability to carry out foreign policy effectively.
A refusal to tolerate Soviet diplomats.
Soviet diplomat stated that disciplinary measures were taken6 against several Soviet ambassadors following criticism by'Gorbachev that Soviet officials were using overseas assignments to amass personal wealth.
These measures were supplemented by changes in the diplomatic career service and in the training of new diplomats. Moscow recently took steps to eliminate nepotism andew, more competitive
system for careers in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
ov^etf"oreign Minister
Shevardnadzeolicy8 that prohibitsof Soviet diplomatic personne^^on active service asor assigningeady in the diplomatic also set up
a training program for new Soviet diplomats which resembles the US foreign service system.
Moscow's attempts to improve the quality of its diplomatic corps SMS been coupled with attempts to improve, the corps image.
. _ new Soviet image has been
particularly noticeable in Europe, where Soviet diplomatshigh-level European officials, travel frequently aroundcountries, and show up at more diplomatic functions thanpast. In the Third World, Soviet diplomats stress issues suchright of the Third World to participate fully inprotection of the environment. the Soviets launched an unusuallycampaign on the issue of dumping hazardous waste inthe summer8 in an effort to score points wKhAfandedge between them and the
The USSR also has used its diplomatic corps more aggressively to turn international issues and negotiations to its advantage. It has consistently pushed such objectives as:
Moving bilateral issues to the multilateralmWmtm> the Soviets hope that the involvement of many nations in issues currently under bilateral discussion will bring pressure on the United States to show more flexibility in its negotiations. Moscow's use of its diplomats in..this effo.rt has primarily targeted the Third World. VHMIMfc many Third World nations, ndia, Indonesia and Zaire have reported aggressive approaches by Soviet ambassadors attempting to increase Third world participation in the negotiation of sensitive arms control issues.
Weakenino Western support for deterrence.
ajor goal of Gorbachev is to unaermine Western support for nuclear deterrence. This effort has been assisted by the extremely active and outgoing diplomacy of Soviet ambassadors assigned to Western Europe, who are attempting toess threatening view of the USSR throughout Europe ,1
o Setting the international agenda. Under Gorbachev,corps has attempted to discourageof issues which cast the Sovietsadthey promote issues which reflect poorly onStates. For example, Moscow has attempted toof its human rights record by promoting the rightpeople "not to livehandelierofexpticthe Strategic Defense
Espionage: Same Old Story
Despite numerous Soviet pronouncements stating that the USSR is engagedew approach to international relations, the record shows that Moscow has not slowed the use of its foreign embassies and consulates for intelligence purposes which probably will continue to be the single most important limiting factor in:^panding joviet
diplomatic presence
governments in eight countries publicly expelledoviet diplomats
Of these nations, seven had expelled Soviet diplomats in
previous years, and at least five of these diplomats were believed to
affiliated with theoreovermmmWkW^
new political
mentality" which Gorbachev wants to inject into his relations with
the West, theylear resurgence of operational activities by
the Soviet GRU and KGB residencies, in France. Prench expulsion in
f six Soviet diplomats accused of recruiting agents, illegally
gathering economic and national defense data, and gathering
information on the Ariane IV rocket reflected this belief.
Other evidence of Soviet foreign diplomats engagedngence.ince
o The acquisition of sensitive ZairianZairian counterespionage service
emberoviet spy network, who confessed that he had passed several sensitive documents to the KGB.
SU-HU'l iUKN iguJOHTnftGfT BftfiOM
Three Soviet diplomats were sent home over this incident in August
Political and economic espionageirst secretary at the Soviet embassy in Switzerland in
WMV this Soviet diplomatomputer expert "considerable sums" to gain access to the secret bank accounts of both Swiss and foreign businessmen who could then presumably be blackmailed.
Moscow has also continued its efforts to acquire additional diplomatic facilities in sensitive ar gathering activitie
7
H liitrnrrrnAGT cmcou
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: