(ESTIMATED PUB DATE) WE WATCHED THE GULF

Created: 1/1/1989

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

the timely and accurate exploitation ob

an orKanitabonal has been tasked with

his support Includes but Is not limited to providing imagery-derived intelligence assessments of current or potential threats to the security of the US. hex allies by treaty, US military and civilian personnel abroad, and US military, political, and ecooomic interests. In the springowever, decisions made by tbe President and supported in Congress modified fJflPJJktnissian. thereby altering not only tbe livesgency, military, and government contract personnel but also the course of US involvement in the Persian Cult War.

InmW as provided Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed support for limited periods in those areas which have traditionally been considered tactical and short term in nature, including support to US forces in Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama and to|

it came asrofessionalultural shock when tbe US Pacific Command, and. liter, the US Central Command (TJSCENTCOMJl

"he memories of the VSS Stark, struck by two Iraqi Eaocet missiles inere still fresh in everyone's mind.

In coniunction with the Congressiooally approved US policy to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf.

Intelligence support to naval forces under the auspices of USCEMTCOM. initially as an alert to the Reef Point reconnatsaocepeciallyaritime recorinaitsance aircraft that was to precede the reflagged tankers.

The major threat to these convoys was assessed to be from the Iranian Silkworm antiship cruise missile sites near the Strait of Hormuz and in the northern Culf, near Al Faw. Additional threats, which included the mining of international waters and the anhaUpping attacks by Iranian forces, were no lets serious from ther so Iranian naval and air bases, the numerous Iranian RevcJutionary Guard (IRC) small-boat facilities, and the IRCs on the offshore islands and drill rigs.

for Rtkjtse

stu dies in intelligence O. i yr

Meeting the Challenge

inhen out support evolved into direct assistance to the entire Operation Earnest Will (the escorted convoys),

took the form of General Service

Another element of support provided

with critical information.

(Secret-level) messages to USCENTCOM and major field components, including those naval ships on station in tbe Gulf region. Usually, two messages were produced each night They supplemented the continuous telephonic cornmunications with USCENTCOM. the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIQ the Defense Intelligence Agency, and tbe Strategic Air Command. These calls provided an immediate alert to impending or potential threats to the convoys.

7 toomeS-escorted convoys passed through thePersian Gulf targets

werearnest Will cables were issued,riefing boards on significant intelligence items were produced. These numbers, however, do not take into account the volume of pre-Earnest Will message support, the number of telephone calls to clarify specific USCENTCOM and other questions from Department of Defense elements, or the volume of messages issued on non-EarnestW issues. This tactical support included the near-undivided attention of an average of eight personnelwas accomplished regularly in addition to other national-level reporting requirements.

The Silkworm Threat

In addition, the

While several of the Silkworm sites along tbe Strait of Hormuzspecific Earnest Will support was required, no fewer than si* new sites

We were not aware of any convoy passing through the danger zone that day but, givenand the ail-too-possible lack of complete coordination inherent in any newfound that, while no convoy had passed that day,S ship

was in the threat envelope at tbe time and that the message was relayed to the correct parties. The ship in question, the crippled VSS Stark, was being escorted home.

The December message and the events leading up to it provide some additional atmospherics. In October, two tankers, the Sungart and the Sea Isle City, had suffered Silkworm attacks while offshore at the Kuwati oil terminal of Mina al Ahmadi. That time, these ships, as well as most of the Intelligence Community, assumed that they were just beyond the reach of Iran's Chinese-manufactured missiles pointed their way from the captured Iraqi sites and the newly constructed Iranian sites on or near the Faw Peninsula. Drawing on that experience,

thai vital

JTCOM and NMIC It also was relayed lo Ihe Ui'iwaiti forces on Favlalcah Island off Bublyan Island just south of Al Faw. When the missile was bunched, it was engaged bynd HAWK surface-to-air missiles. Although theydid not bit the target the Silkworm itself failed in flight and fell into the sea. At least the warning process had worked'

hort time, these Silkworm attacks also managed to dissuade the Soviets from using the port of Ash Shuaybah,ile or so south of Mina al Ahmadi. for transferring their war cargo* bound for Iraq. Suddenly, barriers were rising in front of the petroleum export facilities at Shuaybah. radar reflector barges were being deployed offshore to deflect any more missiles, and air defenses were strengthened. Warning was being heeded.

In February 1*

offensive and the recapture of the Al Faw area, the question remained of whatafe distance to keep out of the range of the Silkworm.

i. Operation

Perhaps the most newsworthy and certainly most policy-relevantjjig)|iMPJBMMB

during the entire crisis was related to the events leading up to the seizure of the Iranian naval ship Iran Ai' when

to USCENTCOM analysts, and I

i When she was noted by our forces as being well beyond her normal patrol area off tbe coast ofpecially configured helicopter was deployedS frigate Through the helicopter's infrared sensors, several objects being dropped

overboard were filmed. It did no* lake long (or these objects to be identified as old-style, chemical-hom naval mines, and the warning to desist was issued. When the Iranians resumed their sowing of the mines, the helicopter opened fire and Iran Ajr was hit. It subsequently was abandoned,EAL contingent from another ship took it into custody the next morning.

SEC/tET

While the newspapers were full of accounts of initialipoBs" leading up to the seizure, the commanding officer of USCENTCOM stated that this military success and its resultant effect on international opinionirect result ofsupport. Television films broadcast around the world of the Iranian action provided US policymakers with their most important, best-documented piece of evidence that not even the most brazen denials could quash.

Thwarting Small Boats

A belle-touted but equally important contribution to the safety of US and allied personnel in the Gulf revolved around tbe aborted IRC attack on Saudi offshore oil platforms inuring the summer and early fall, the IRC small-boat forces, which had continued to harass Gulf shipping, were massing in the northern Persian Culf. After the summer exercise, termed Martyrdom, many of these smallwith automatic weapons and capable of launching rocketat IRG bases in theushebr and Khark Island;

accounts told of. the Royal Saudi Navy turned back an attempted attack onoil production facilities by as many asf these smallith no loss ofeither side. Subsequent discussionsin the affair revealed

that the

provision ofJJ**J'hvras much more typical of that support.esult of the assistance renderedJ|and by several other intelligence organizations, many of which must remain unheralded, the military commanders charged with the implementation of Operation Earnest Will were able to incorporate the highest-quality intelligence reporting into their successful efforts to keep open international sea lanes in the Persian Culf.

JE^ET

Original document.

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