WinuB* Notice
Scnirce* ck Method* Involved (WNINTEL)
Security
Pttcloture Subjectnminal Sanction*
AtArnul
NOCONTRaCT 'NCI rltOHHffR) ORCONiOCi
to far^rioi tt^bU MOMiray orCiiwt> -froprwlgry_wtorwionii.wr ruiiiicuiiwimnail ted by or ii inw
wn
i (op*m dtkv
mem'liiiblr lioroInapio1 im AIM reaaoi io incur) CPASIMC)
CtawiBitl bv OASIS* [kitium- OADR Deiind dam
RYittmlihiid
ntellluence
El Salvador: Government and Insurgent Prospects)
The /oMomng mteOtgence oroanizattons pamainittKi
fi lhe preparation ol this Estimate
The Central Imafcgance Agency
The Defense fnietligsrice Agency
Trie Nations' Security Agerjfcy
The Bureau ot InteOigence and HeBearch.
Department ol Stale
The Ofhce ol Intelligence Support.
DoMnrnent of the Treasury
also paatctpattng
The Deputy Chief ot Start tor Intelligence.
Depiaiment oly
The Direcior ol Naval Intelligence.
Department ol lhe Navy
Tho Assrelont Clue! o! Stall. Inlefigervce.
Deportment ol lhe Aa force
Tits tsiimate ivastext iKiOhcattOfi by lhe Natnmai htutugnBoard
Key Judgments
El Salvador face* an increasingly unsettled political environmeni in theresidential election in March and changingby ihe Kuernllaa. Bvcnu could have dramatic effeci over ihrr so on El Salvador's polilical laridacape and ihe puailion and influence of the Unitedhich bar been key lo the countrypolntcal aubility during the
The resurgent rig hint Naiionatut Republican Allianceo capiurc Ihe preaidency from the incumbeni Christian Democrgtie Panyhich hai been weakened by popular disillusion ment with economic luingtion, corruption, incompetence, and deiertorai-iii ii urban iccuriiy. The Christian Dernocriis could slillomeback byore aggressive campaign with srpgrj tactical alliances, but the oddsnenium are aggiost the pany.
ARENA's candidate, busineasmgn Alfredoapablebut party President Roberto D'Aubuissan has Uken an incrcaungly pronunenl campaign role, lending subgunce tobe ind other eiucmiiu will be the real power if ARENA| |
The guerrilla-allied Democratic Convergence coniiDuea lo participate in the campaign, but apparently hat been miking little progreaa. Thereair cbinccn J> ihii it will pull out if it appears beadediirml showing, is preaaured by insurgent coounandcre, or if Ibe government fails to deal seriously with ibe gucrrillia' la test puce rxoposal If il pulls out. Ihe FMLN (Firgbundo Mini National Liberation Front) couldore conmned and at least partially successful -efttut lo disrupt thef
The election is likely to be reasonably fraud free. ind. although the turnout will probably be lower thanlvethclcas be suflkiem to buttress legitime*| ^
The war itselfornpki arena where shifting insurgent strategies have allowed the guerrillas lo mask a, weakening military capability overall with more visible and politically successful efforts in the citiea The guerrillas have lost IS loercent of their forcee last iwo years. Iheir base areas are less secure, and their ai lacks on military targets have been less effective. To compensate, they have irtplod ttwdawu in Ihe capital, attacked previously unaffected areas, and assassinated and forced large
uo^^n
numbers of officials to abandon their posts, they are increasingly likely to target US nationals andhe insurgents have the capability to boost less resource-intensive terrorist activitiesigher level and are likely to do so; they alter the psychological and political rather than the purely military dimension of Ihe wa
External support supplies more thanercent of all guerrillaand is critical to sustaining FMLN operations at currentrecent increase in eiternal supplies,
probably through Nicaragua
Salvadoran military performance has improved markedlylthough the armed forces' efforts arc still too piecemeal and not yet lied effectively to civic action Assuming current trends, we believe that the government is likely to grind down the insurgencyilitary force over the neat three to five years, perhaps reducing iu personnel size by one-Ihird h
f
Nevertheless, ihewhile unable to seizestill be able torolonged war, depending ever more heavily on terrorism, sabotage, and small-scale attacks. The terror campaign has the potential to destroy the always weak civil administration in large parts of the country, while further undermining civil defense and civic action programs. The government's inability to counter those lactic*ajor weakness of its counterinsurgency
We believe political trends in El Salvador- rtbc weakening center and nghtward drift of Ihefurther polarize politics, enhance oligarchic influence, and encourage increased insurgent support Thereelter-1han-cveo chance that an ARENA victory would signal some rollback ofougher political and mililary posture against ihe left, and less incjinsuon than ihr PDC to investigate human rights violations -attitudes thai probably would encourage
For. iheir part, the guerrillas are likely to continue toore violent and headline-grabbing military strategy to make cooperation with lhe government too dangerous, convey the image that momentum favors their side, and provoke the military into further human rights abuses If the hard right clearly dominates the new administration, ihe left would probably pursue an even more violent strategy -moref high level officials and ihc acquisition of more advanced weaponsi
In Ihe last year, ihcre has been some increase in aimed forces' snd probably rigbtwing killings, pointing to the rwieniislfofescalaiion under an ARENA administration. In such an atmosphere, the government could
lose legitimacy at home and abroad, resulting in pressures loturtailing of US assistance and growingtangible assistance hit the
Because Salvadoran Government performance is so heavily dependent on US aid levels, decisions in Washington will continue to be crucial (or the country. The Salvadoran economy will maintain positive growth only by virtue of US economic assistance end emigrantperccnt cut in US economic aid. for example, would translateDP loss oferocnVSome observers believeeep decline io annual US military aid levels would push the armyloody now-or-never ofTensive against ihc insurgents or alternativelyighly conservative defensive poll uwhich would have negaiive consequences for the government
Regional peace initiatives are likely to present growing problemsewespecially if ARENA is in power.order verification mechanism capable of interfering with Sandinista assistance to thehighly unlikelybe perceived as beneficial Otherwise, regional initiatives threaten to force negotiations with the FMLN, which ihe armed forces arc likely lo lesiiij^p
The guerrillas clearly want to abifl lhe political Utile to Washington and reinvigorate US political opposition to continuing military and oconomic support for the Salvadoran Government, and their recent peace proposals are part of thai effort. Allhough there are proUbly some linked with the guerrilla left who wish seriously lapursue ihese negotiations, Ihe insurgent leadership intends lhe peace proposals principally to stave off military pressure and it expects rejection of the proposals lo legitimate intensifies lion of the wa
Should the insurgentsroposal that has genuine promiseolitical seitlement, US involvement and preuures will be crucial to overcome institmional resistance to compromise and keep the renegade right wing from destroying the political environment. For such involvement lo be effective, however, Salvadoran authorities will have lo remainUS aidcommitment touerrilla takeover remains firm
A negotiated agreement to postpone the election for sii months in response to recent guerrilla proposals would not affect our judgment of ihe likely election outcome. In addition, we doubt lhal it would leadasting seulemem because,inimum, hardline insurgent elements would renew the guerrilla struggleW
<
Contents
Key Judgment*i
The Ecooomic Eojianon
of Ibe War
Fmure Aid Level*
The Curreni Political Dynamic PDC Ptoapecu
Tbe Cballenac From ARENA
The Left and ihe FJection Role of ihe Smaller Paniea TbeJ^Uiury and the Fieciion _The BaltoUna;
ThePcJiiical-MiliUry Sirafijy
I mplecgentmi thc Counleroffcrurre Plan FMLN Problem.
Likejy Ijiurjenl9
Eilenal Suppon
Performance Armed Foeccam Impact of ihe Electionhe War
An ARENA Victory: Two Scenario.
The Leii'a
External Factor*
Nicaragua
Tbe Peace Procca*
Implicauoiu for US jnlereau
va
Discussion 1
halting performance of ine economyuci rilU war that tbrcalcas to dragecond decade have escalated pouucsJ tension snd fed popular disen-chantment in the runup to the9 election At stake in the ejection are political, economic, and strategic issues-potentially including the bilateral relationship with the United States thai hai been key tol Salvador duringhe country's primary politicalincumbent centrist Christian Democratic PartyheNationalist Republican Alliancend the guerrilla and politicaleven the baste realities of the situation Each of (hem seek* to persuade not only use domestic populstion but also important foreign soon to embrsce iu perspective and support iu solstices for the economy and the war. Dramatically different scenario* arc possible for theUSupon who in-
evel* Again this year, we expect real (jDI1 growth at the ouuide will notercent, and will probably beout any iraprovcment in living standards (Secnd 2.
Tight credit and foreign exchange mailed orvestment and production in7he financial constrainu dantping agriculiurel and indestrialwere compounded byower and water supplies, transportation shutdowns,damage, bad weather, buteauaauc delays in construction contracts, and high invesunent risk due to Ibe war and elections. lost year, unpkmenu-tion of itnictural economicanility ralecdersl hiring freeze, aadofpercent fall In coffee tax revenue. Nonetheless, bothand unemployment remain very high, touting as much as SO percent of lhe work force, and nutrient intake forelow international luodardsfl
Ecoooaalc Eaeatioe
El Salvador, io coping with lu myrisd economic rxoWems. facta the irony of relative|n' large pan. lo US aid and emigrantnonetheless falls substantially sbon of popular aapira-tions.l Salvador's economyixth consecutive year of GDP5despite wsraxau aad teases of0 million SUII, economic advances hsve not kept pace with the rapid population growth (currently alercentk and per capita income has declined toercent of
'Tan tUumauamrxra-c. solaical.aad military naadtalvador Uriel, am iM ant mi.ml nit outturntarnhat lax beyondrwaiht InUca Mdsnaiu >nlun the Inn* work ol ihc I* Mirth praidimalraoauiia bi arihcr ihe Chrniiaa Otmonuar iheublitat AlliilVr'ltx the pcowcmMn of ihrnit*r US imcftaii in ihc ;
'liven modest growth rates remain highly dependent on revenue from external Irani fen Salvadoran remit-uncos from the United Statesaat year, contributing significanUy to consumer purchasing activity Tout USamnion for FYequrvslent to shout SO pereeex of El Sal-vsdor's budget. (Seeisbursenxaa of9 funding has been delayed due to program-malic difficulties, however, and, if lhe besflap is extended for several months, il could elitnraatceconomic growth this va:| ||
Imparl of the War
Without significant change in the domestic situation that wouldcallocaiion of resources away from the mililary and war related destrucuon and at
Figure |
H Sabedor: Selected Frooomk Usdicaiora,
cur
time lime improve the inveaiment climate, the government probably will continue iu high stacks ol ciiaraal dependency through Okadaac. macs of ibe fonagri aid atnbe direct and mdiroci economic damage date by the warotal oconostic testate arc aatastaied it nearlyiflwo. We caiimale thai9 Um out of tucb repair* trul be in tbe neighborboud ofillion (teewing to the inturgenu' aaoitomonguc targeting la addiUoa. lha vat haseeded influi of foretga in.calmest and ledetcnorauon of industrial and agncaitaral product ivecapaaiy lhal hat aenout lotig-icnti unpd cationi WmW
In addiitoo. sine* most of lac budget goes for aalanee,
the administration would alao be confronted with tbe noadake palitloally unpalatable ladecsjons in tbe public-sector wort force In roughf tbe US economic allotment ware slashed by aboutercent,ercent growih rate would probably be driven toGDP Lou -perhaps ta ibe acsgbborboodo Stba year following the aid cut In addition io aliendam polilical and social difficulties, there would bt an immediate psychological impact Left, right, and center wouldtep toward US disengagement, and the guerrillas would redouble their crToru lo acver lac remaining bonds beisvecri Washington tnd San Salvador.
Blurtb
If US econoouc aid levels were cut ngnihcaatly, this would force tbeudget deficit higher andarther restriction of credit and imports
Secret
Hgur* 2
a Salvador, hiaiul Traee, IftaAM
I I
ai PeHrkai Draaaur
Thr nagging economy, along with war weanncu and government corruption, has helped shift political Bends in Elstrengtheningeak ening. more fractious cemcr;ewlyrofuerrilla, but legal, led The national leadershipof ihe lulmg PDC hat been tarnished by scandal, inter aal dinsiont, and. mosi importani. by the lack ol* cleai success wilh lhe insurgency or the economy The
ngbiwing ARENA party,nore mode/ sie image, is the key bcnehciary ot ruing dissauafac lion with lhe Chnmsn Dcmocrsn On lhe Vert, lhe growing rcalizatioit that miliUry pressure has lillle aear-iermf overturning is* cusiiag political structure probably aaitfibuied lu the deeurao of gucrnlls allies like (iuillerino Ifnsro aad Ruben /amora to return from foreign caile and reenter Salvadoran politics fl W)
I abb 1
US economic and Military AidKH
of official narupium. failure I" do more ovei ihe last lew yean thanew cabinet ministers for alleged misdeeds has seriously damaged the parly's image and fueled the ropulai belief thai I'lK- Lorruplion is rampant
m Unified
PDC Preaawcis
Tbe divided Christian(aot an uphill ami-ale, and we doubi ihey caa laatb oo top ia tbe tint round of the election unlet, they energize thenand overcome ibe pout seal trends evidcal in Ibe Last legislative aad municipalbare they were convincingly beaten (Setocautc lacy occupy ibe political center aad becauae ibe dying President Duanr isbarumatK figure, ibe Cfarutur^Democtst* could itillomeback Theiro dea> the nifaiwingirst-round majority and then attract aorne of the tmalki panicsccoed round of balloting With asiule alliance and an aggrcativc campaign, the second round couldogfight too dose to call
To do to, however, ihe Christian Democrat! willdemontiraie chat Ihey arc more responsive toand municipal protest votes stemmingand corruption charges. Tbeyhawjowmbaclj^porten from thewant new party
govcrnmen^Ttnoug^we caiinoi fully *ntu ihe
The rhalkogr treses ARENA ARENA it now ibr cossairya laigcst and bestparty, aad its new, more moderate image, embodied by candidate Alfredo Crutiani, is ennane-ing tbe parly's election prospects ARENA'S fouotkr Roberto D'Aubuisson and others linked lo past death squad aciivliiea have allowed the moderateidened public role whik itill eicning aignificani influence Moai pany keadcrt, including Critliani, admit thai tbe party's appeal loconservativetbe busineaasnrx who arc bankrollirg the campaign would warn sigtuncantly wit bout ihe -'tbe chamroeue D'Aubuiaaon m
In addiiion to hammering Ihe Christian Inhmiihthe corruption issue, we believemayor plus for ARENA will be iu successful attack on tbe govent-rncnt'a irubilliy to provide public tecurity in Ibe race of ineicasnd kflisind iu failure to dclivvr promised development programs la contrast to the perceived inability of Use Christian Democrats to remedy tbe tectmiy tHaatsoo. we radge that ibe public perceive* an ARENA goverDmcni as more willing to taketougher posture toward viokni demons)rHon and ihoac suspected of terrorism aad sabotage ARENA also has tneni the latl sr.ru yean organizing on ihe local level and using pany reaource* toange of service* to lower income vntrrt in ihe cotjnirysidt
Ik-he FJ*cHoa Tho sawgenco oflegal isfusi party, Democratic Convergence, Wnox geeatar laghhaairy to iha cwrrani poUucaJ system, although IU sctrriues aleo assist iha iniurgaai caaac by facWuuai kaftangroups tad servingehicle for InjoriseiToo of tba thraa parties la iha Datnacratlc Convergence oaalluoa art slued wtth UN insurgent movement, and presidential caadauu lingo alraady baa aaaertad thai bis campaign iterioua quest for ibe eftcc,ehicle for ssobtluung popular
for negoitattoosay insurgent objective.
Whathar tha Cpoieigaa-iai nays hi tha fitailgiiilal raca dapaodi upon howthaiha campaign laumldauon from right*iag ut/cmitu or ths proapact of being embarrassed by ha own liighiilii parfornaaaoa at to polls couldnQoot. In addiuon, iba Convergence would likely have lo withdraw if pressured by guerrilla oommaod-ara. Or balance, there laffl pall out of lbs presidential race before election day, and, to lhe extant that neither the Christian tiemocrsu nor ARENA traati reocai Convergence-backed guerrilla negotiating proposals seriously, the odds probably riscBIB
Tkfnttedttt mmgi
itfj cm 1x2 affm fw Nominee
laUotm elements
No preconditioned negotintions with FkiLS
COMUiMiJoa o/ regional peace protoss
' Agronon reform no further landand greater itlf manage imm ol cooperaitues
flirt/ aidrockdown on la* evasion and m. now taxes, selective import substitution and aggressive export policy
Supports elate liei lo lhe United Statest)
At/redo CRISTIANI Buckkard ABISA Nominee
i
t
Key platform elements:'
Open io negotlailonj wttk FkILN
Continuation of regional peace proceii. hut moke certain Elot leen as US lackey
tirana* reform: nofuriker landrovision for private ownersklp of cooperative farm plots
Fiscal and trade policy reduce tke deficit, amplify tax code, reduction of nominal rates, expansion of lax bate, export-led development
Considers US Involvement in domtilu policy excessive fc nf>
Ihr I'midrniial Contenders and Their Platform* icootiauedl
* Gutlltrmo Manuel VNGO Heretoarer tract Nomintt
Ktylements
process: seeks ntiotiattd polilttal solution to tht wot bostd on guerrilla peace proposal, with cease-fire and msjrtemtnt to detsralatt war at first Slips Idtanwhilt, both partial to tht war err morally and Ittally bound by the Gtneva Accords
policy: "An tconomtc plan to htlp tht ptoplt. hSharply critical of VS Involvementalvador!
of lb* Smaller Partita
Other lhaa ihe main contenders and the kfiistConvergence, only ihe PDC aplintet group, the Authentic Chriiltan Movement, could play asignificant rok in Ibe election. While aof the PDC could enhance Chavez Menu haoceaunoff, we believe Ibe bitter party splitti fall willoriciliationeiiber the Aulhentk Chriitiantbe Lefiiitlikely io win more Ibinercent of the vote, but each ii vying for third place, which will entilk the winneroveted teat on tbe powerful Central Election Council. The remaining smallerrealize that they ate not likely to attractsupport, and moat appear inclined to back the fr.*nt-runner. ARENA,rojected second round
event of uncontrollable domestic violence by tbe left' or the right wouldsl resort.o rcatore order. In our vfcw. bowever,*tBeJmiliUry is wall aware that their involvement would discredit tbe election snd seopardis* proapecu for international aid.
TV fell* lag
The election luclf could be turbulent, capccsally if tbe kfi pulls out and the pesTillas ratchet up ibeir duruptive acimtieawithin ihcsr capabili-lata Otven raainctrvi voting regulatsons and aome disillusion with the national corneal Ik* turnout may be to me*ower than in past years, bat high enough to buttress legitimacy Tic presence ofobservers "ill alto lend credibility lo the process
Military and tbe Ejection We believe ihe armed forces will remain impartial, jr.piif reported attempts by some civiliansolicit military support for their party Only in the unlikely
IV Iniurgrnti Shililny.sl-Military Slralrg*
More troubling and problematic will be whether the loser acccpu Ibe reeulu. Both the PDC and ARENA have claimed publicly that the other Is preparirui to atcal Ihe election, and. while some of the rhetoric is only propagandizing, there are elemcnis in Ihe parties willing to cry foul, no mailer what the process or outcome Although it is not Ihe most likely scensrio, if one of lhe major candidates were lo denounce the returns, ihe left wouldropaganda windfall ihai could contribute lo wider polarization and vio-
Mnrr than rver, the guerrillas' strstcgy is slto focuied on ihc political and diptomsiic srenaertly because ol necessity forced upon them by improving Salvadorsn military performance sad parity because ealisaiHin mat their own declining but stillmilitary capabilities arc better com pic lemedaU/Aghl strategy lhal booau iheir IcgiiirMfUaVg the same time, their more sophuticatednly fot msnmum ft^tllaSi<<MiK< impactful also to ens iterate iheir militsry prowess Especially effective psycholog-ically hat been the boost of attacks in urban sraet andl> kulea in the countryside
Thr Farebutvdo Mam National Liberation FroatNi guerrilla coaliiioa has undergone major sirs-legic shtfu (Sac inset,ollowing iu umuc ceatful "Anal oflensiveT earlyhc insurgenu attemptedalfla^^aftrmed forces' gfOwtl: lacita in sn attempt to defeat ihem in eonvrniionalEN strength peaked0 combaunui lhe guerrillas were unable to keep pace wiih Ihe government's growing superiority in firepower, mobility, and strength- By the endhe usturgeau had rsornifiiied and shiftedtrategy of aeoVoaaW warfare that concentratedttrition of lhe military and the aconorrucure During this period, insurgent strength fellombaunu, and lhe FMLN force simcrurareater ralisnca on smaller, more
limn
Inhile continuing lorolonged war, lhe insurgenu agsin sbifiad empbatU, this time preparinglralegU couiueraSeatlta Althoughstrategic oauaierofTentive pUnning conUincd un rcalisiic ekmcnli. st hi heartilitary ofTentivr which local inaurienureatly espanded hngent of mi hi is forces would conduct widespread inibuih and uholage activity lo lie down government lorceairalegic and special forceseanwhilr sttsck mayor armed forces facilities J|
laiihando Aram National Libtraiioa /'rear
if MINI
Thrtnrrellv Martin-Leninist.hon end trudrdl, anti-US Allfive gmerril-tanr comfiiiitt ikt FMLN tract their origin, directly or Indlrtcily. to the Salvodoran Communist Forty Many In thr leadership of these groups drew ikttr political trainingIrom Salvadoran studtnl politics ol ihearxist, vtoltnct prone, and antagonistic toward thr United StaitiJ^MJ
Otspitt tht dominance ofthe FMLN. thtrt are ptrtodlcopinion ovtr urairgic pnorllits andtactics The Ftoplt'sfor tsamplt. has long sirtlitd theof military action in bringing aboutwhile tht Armed Forces ofhas placid more emphasis amorgamsaiion. Thin differences do not.reprtsens fundamental divisionsFMLN's Marxist-Leninist IdeoiogloalIn this regard, the FMLNihe Sandinitla National
latplrcneaiiagUa
Tactically.perations are influenced by both the ttratrgsc counterotTenaive atratcgy and byoperations and cap* bill tie* The iniuigeatsto rmpeasiie low-rsak actiorss lo wear down both Ihe economy and the armed forcea. and mass onlyperaiiohi iuch at attacks againal|Serhe insurgents staged II attacks against large- andargets -the same numberg allacka were lest effect iveiriterma of casualtiesrricflf kuiflj
liberation Front (FSLN) In Nicaragua Were the FMLN to ever come to power, we believe thai -as wish thewould coalesceeninsst domestic policy of one-party control end ultimate socialisation oforeign policy centered on close releiions with Cuba and hostility toward the Untied Statei
Figure S
Il Salvador:ImHrknii by Typs, IM2-WI
ililary cmpham on ihc urbanesigned lo be complemented by an incrtnaingly miliurized and active (rant group apparatus, but here lhe guerrillas have made luilr headway While from group dernormrauoot have become more violent, they remainindication ibat popularo> cspaading in lhe alias More imparlsey have sotepressive reaponsc (romsecurity force* Furthermore, ia spite of conttnu mg FMLN penetration of Isbor unioas, ibe FMLN it not significantly rioscr wheirui able lo call an effective general unkefl
likWr9
Wc nidge ilii Ihc FMLN cannotolitical -mililaryent lhe hue* of iu proposed Itraica. oounlcroflentive9
Although Ibeat devetopcoaubua uniu. Iheae lurcea arc conceniraied ib oi acai FMLN bate aiaat. do noi operatend would be of only marginal valueiraicgic couriierorTrntrve
Hgurr 6
Irr^rgeni-lruiiaird Military inridrtiU 'In San Salvador Ares,
Weolitical niiliuiy upeiaiioat over the nrii yeai willon buotiing the pcrtcpnaa of Ihe viability of thr insurgency Militarily, thi*eavy volumehighvisibilily. low-riike intuiaeni* ahead) arc
harassmeni tniect o( up to eightnglr dcparimcniingleecincal uhouge also i. being conducted in ooaceairated spun* iQeahance impact The Insurgents arc capable ofarattnieni and sabotage spreeignificant allacl lo ciceic use imprcaaaon of militarymu of logtstios and maapowcr, lhe insurgency probably caneavy volume of low-net upcraliom with only brief lulls floays! (Seee yudge that these operstions. is state of heavy publicily. will no* significanily alter the present mililsry balance They will, however, resultomewhat gieater tbicet to US facilities snd-particularly since ibecoamasg iness fccsiUntmploy icrronst tscucs and iii- .
In addmon, we believe Ibe FMLN may pubudyhifl from the pccparaiory ptuuc io the preliminary pUac of ibe strategic owaienrfiaervc. This rheioncal leap will mean nothing in urn of insurgent militaryut may recem mur-nationel aitcnuon and boUlei insurgent morskfl
Falensel Saepert
Siill key to insurgent siraicgy and current forcebe continuing Bow of citemsl sapport Suchammunition -reossias the critical fscior ia allowing ibe FMLN lo coadeel military operations ai curreni level.
Ibenlikely io abandon iu strategic couairrorTratnr iirsiear larjelf because of cotKcrni about internal anorak, we believe (he utter gent leadership reauroear-term political-military vkioo i* notWithout abandoning preparations for snctratsurl strategic countrroflen sive,ow apparently believe* it* besi Opportunity i* to expkat ihr rtistmg domcaiK and international pooitcil .iiaute ioecrease in US aid lo Ihc Salt jo-tip (unrrnmeni and prestuir the government to argiauw
nsurgenu havelleviate iheir ion linuiruj dependence on ciinnal materiel (uppori by locally manufacturing "nopul.-r" weapons These efforts have produced an impressive number of home nude weapons ihai lhe inturgenu arewith increasing luccess, but the programs produce Imle imall-amu ammunition the most critical insurgent reuuircmeni .eJJJJlk
ihc FMLN must
inmtratc al leastercent or* iueroral (ur such iirms atandocket launchers In addition,muu infiltrate large numbers of luses
he rebeli capturedounds of rihe ammunition from Ihc government -compared toounda aloradingle giacrrilUThe insurgcaU have set up small ammuaiuoe rnanufaciuring laaliuee, but these have done little lo close ihc big gsp between eipcnded ammunjtion and docneauc aourcas of supply end acquuiltno. Last year, army petrols uncovered more Urge caches oflhan>rtvtoualy, also pointing toward mayor caurnal Bows gfXfaX
Weapons of varMus types also continue to beinto Fl Salvador While wcenoaiower level than1be insurgenu need lo replace olderea. arm ibeir new forces, and replace weapons lost lo lhe governmenl. Currently, (be insurgents are losing two weapons to the government for everyone they capture (Seeaptured guerrillas also ate reporting lhat some uaiu arc now being equipped wriibe Ibe MI6/AR-I* We believe lhat Nicaragua of lea acting ia concert with Cuba continue* io be the logical conduit lot much of the indigents' togiilicvl
orce soucture, strengthction, and Type or fore*
Spcvul linn
Heal trained miaremi lam.1
imftcant rMLN aiiacfct mmM Mni> linn
rMLN rtinrvmanly
|1fd
inu ihr,
WW i-
Coniuu mi ml, of jwiTtei uaitt which oprratf whinarm cond-omt both putu&al etrentam indaniaaso
i imed mil
nua *rncn apntK in amii ihrutarn, wanuniibk (alovif> and limited obckoqm viih Meal
ramau II
r igunr 10
^.eeborw lAgitlk DeHivertee in Seltadoru limrajenu. lVT-O' libit 2
FMLN Wmimi Uivb
dooaucmi from Weeiernndudauj torn* In tbe United Suite, continuem ajjfBJtant paruea of uMu/feni doibcu) aondiTfB. ice durvertiyyo* of naancuJ udicai ured, bai iuKcicdI to underline iu conuaiicd imror lance io tbe war cFTorif.Bjyj.iVJH[hu one ofnly ooe of$:
ccurier admitted to carryingODer month, wtuch would aqvait to UtOXXC to JS40JXJ0 par yeaj traaiponcdingle individual from ooe fiction
Variou* ruua ire uaed to attna aad dnm fund. Mt la guerrilla-dominated labortourhi
in fundinge* building, and.hue !organization emmitedbire iimca the necaaaary amountc^bttMWMMf uiyooa Krviced (heguerriua-dominated human nghu group
, ee* of
the insurgentlu^ouahthe money had ongi-nally beats providedi natation to aid displaced children
Gwnuncerr (Part
Over the paal Ire ycara, the gowernrneat baiwo track cetuoteruiaurgcavcy atraicgy to defeat the auU wellmpplitd and reamnabiy well funded FMLN It ta baaed oa large *cak auauinad mlliury operalionaa lion wide one action/avil defenac prograni. the military uivk hai been much more lucceaaful ihan tbe latter f
Salvador en military performance hai improved martnd tbe aimed force* are ao* able to conduct more fiequam and effectivecp
r'lpirr II
MilitarylnMirgeal'
Am m*
lta jmn IWtoft-*
,I.Ul
throojhoiii ihr country. Farther, ihc mill-Ul> hai become lomcwhit marc sggreasivc oflcasive It, end iu development andof tactical intelligence alto hat improved measurably, contributingreater crTcciitrneetin defensive ope'aliotuell (Sec1 ^
Governmenl caiiialiiet are relaiively high in absolute tetms. but lhe army null probably have lit lie difficulty is replacing its losses in ihr nesi year or too The morsle of lhe armed forces ts good and likely 10
remain ao Officers are generally optimistic about lhe course of lhe war, although for most thil is predated on continued support from lhe United State* J
We do nut espeei this situaiion to substantially change9 The military can continue lo rnain-utn Tresiure on ihe insurgenu. to icmporahly disrupl
guerrilla havereempt insurgent prepare lions loi majoricks, andncrementally reduce guerrilla strength (See figureu manpower and firepower supcrionliea will lead lo continuedprogress that it likelyeduce the military effectiveness of ihe insurgency without dramatically reducing its scope.
Military operations lend not to be guided by overarch ing goals, however, but to beood cismplc arc ibe multibalialion offensive* that disrupt guerrilla base areas but onlyernpocary bam tincc they do not resultermanent ctpaniton ol government pretence and com nil Unevenof an ovarrclianoe on seniority rather than merit for mitiury promotion lead* to utongass-tent application of lac kind of sggtosivc small anil taciica neceasarvjo decisively engage and dcleal the insurgents
more important, the civic action/civilhat never had airong government orand continue* to rounder The civicurgeu key rural arcai with project*io esicnd govcrnmeni service* anddespite iu ostensible importance, miliUrysupport waned* Overall progressuneven over the years beraiitae of civilianineptitude, laadeqaau (unding, and thea aomeiimea iisdtnercnl miliury lo provide
Within the past year, there has been increased rbci one and emphasisew "hearts and minds" strategy, but operations have bad mised andlimited results The government and nuliliry aiirmptcd tooordinated campaign ia t'haletenango Desertisplace ibe guerrillas both militarily and politically, tbe operation hat been plagued with delays and hat been short on reaullt Colonel Ponce, the newhooncerted campaign inalvador by under using miliury/cmleinia neni military presence inones (Sec inset) The campaign provoked an intensive and ongi* ing guerrilla campaign of threais and asaasainations against civilians and elected ofncuk, however wkich the militaryjjas unprepared for and largely unable tc counter
l Ni use of terror and assassinationt against mayors and alher government officials, whileto many Salvadorans, hat underscored iheinability to protect ihose who support it. The terror campaign has the potential to destroy the always wank civil administration in large peru of the country, whik further undermining civil defense and civic action programs The government'i inability to counter these tactic*ajor weakness of iu counlennsurgency program
Wnh military tusittance declining and tbe Salvadoran econorny stagnating, it is doubtful the government could eapand curreni programs Even when USwas higher, civic action programs foundered
h HighiiriMt Violence Crating*
Ihr human rights Situation appears to haveduring the past year, although thr overall level ul politically Inspired murders remains far below that of thehile the Marxist inturgrnls continue to account lor thr majority ol killings, we believe that nghlwtng extremists and umir members of thr armrdlorcts increasingly are reacting to theeeming inability to control insurgent terrorism 'See figuresW Let
asts _
None of the confirmed cases of political killings has been attributed to the right, but ixirtrntsti.
ire responsible for some of f'iiutnaaus"klllla 'clear motive can be eiiablilhedsurrounding many of lheassassinations ky youpi. and bodies being dumped some distance from ihe scenerime are trademarks af death so/uadhe
Hana*mutrnmmntr
umimrmtam aaMwW till-as* tad mhnariair Stmt el ixmt eteteps rmemt evtiuammit mttmaaateexet. aad mmn mm tmm rmmmd m
rvm.it jar ik* Im
Us Three nr* gtovpi hurt ittrntlvtheir existence thr Revolutn-nory Ami Communist Extermination Allium, the Central American Antt-Commuaxit Hand, andstern Anli-Communisi Command and are tkreairning to kill lefusis tn retaliation /or guerrilla terrorism Rightists no doubt have perpetrated some of Ike political killings, but we kave no ridenee ikey are acting wtik tke explicit tone nan of ARENA lead art Ipari, hardliners like Roberto D'AukttlS son probably are rolttaaal to risk negativefallout through the reckless use af illegal
In contrailHank
killings, there hasiscernible increase in totefirmad political ktlliexp by the aimed forces We attribute tkese maasly to low-ranking soldiers and policemen, rather ikonrood, high-level conspiracy The officer carps generally is aware of ihe poliiical sensliivtiiot asiociated with thr human rights Issue and mentt toutoff of vital US military autPsamee Uany officers proba kly do cover up suck irtmmi to avoid damage to the armed fortes' prestigeegitimacy aenjHf
itwhewm etmrnht, art am ma pattern ikrr emrmttt mtm trntirahnml
i
of inadequate fundi In iddilion. although inert ire few officer* who advocate death njmdheie is Mill no indication that ibe oflica corps is ready lo investigate and punish human righu violation* by omccrwbovt lhe rant of lieutenant Thi* tends lo undermine efloruin and retainontested area*inset and figure* 13
Armed Force* Performance (be* lhe Longer Term
The efforts to remedy deficiencies and pursue rehile not likely toramatic short-term impact, will have an imponam bearing on the broader
oouric of Ihc war jual a* Ihey haveumulative cfleet io dale. Assuming currente believe lhal the armed force* ia likely to grind down the insurgency militarily over ihc neat three io live yean, perhaps reducing it* personnel sue by one-third That would sharply reduce the FM UN's capability to con duct medium lo latge-eeak attack* on strategic largcuhe guerrilla* will lull be sbkrolonged nr. depending ever more heavily on terrorism, sabotage, and amall-scalc ailacks lhe guerrillas, alulc unable io scire power, will continue to threaten *enou*ly tlie neurity and stability ol ibi< ligun I!
I- ipirr 13
U Salvador: Human Rlghu Sltuallori
crideal lo aay pro>acliaa remains tbe level of external aid to tbeba ttubtary if biaib.li dependcni on iianiinor froaa iba United Siatea.-akicb provide* nearly all Iu anew, muniuons. apare paru, rnaintcnanoe, training, aad rnedical auppliea US miliury aid bai bean dactuioi ijnoapan dueveliag off in the growth of the armed force* The militaryable to copeuable reduction in8 by vtiknoa unspent fund* from tbe rxevtosn year Th* praaaarl level of aid ia aumctent to meet day-to-day opera hoeal aecds, but farther reduction* would threaten to can into com bai capabtli-tie* and to provoke morale problenu Some obaerver* believeeep decline ui annual assisunc* would puih the miliiaryoody "now or never" ofleiuivc against the insurgent* and their sympatbir-criighly conservalive defemive peat are Pit ner would have elearly negative consequence* for human nghlsand the prospects of iksrsacjsuc government
t Impart of la* Election aa tae War
Rcgardlea* of which parly wins tbe presidentialibe general proaecutioa of ibe war will remain ibe province of ibe armedhuh lotemes little interference fromew Chriiiun Demo-crat government would be aspecsaliy unlikely tofrom ibe way lb* war ha* been ccasducted. While many individual and perhaps even tbe enasortiyofficers and soldiers arc pro-AKLNA. we do not believe ibe military would saursadcr very much of its authority or sublimate iu laatitaisonal intereau even to arcbconservative poliiicsaaa The armed forces win also continue toe facto veto over concessions ihe guerrillas may demand ia say future negotiaiions regardless of the government in power.ore
rigore la
li Sahadur: Confirmed Political Kilting* Oulstek ofM
I- (KBTUlM
UM if
Itl
a it Jitrn UUad ir. obmBWSO*
Ml
U
DM mtrnmltiwa Mill
nnlJn*mi OHM is
taste kf tat mim
IIorrupt andeni judicial tytiemlto likely lhalend*ncy olA would be perceived by tomr citremnlt at giving tani rn couragemenl In anti-kliilure by the nctl governmenl Inommnmeni lo democratic value* and human ttghu could retuh in tbe lost of vnal US aseiaianor and voder mine the government! popular legitimacy An ARP.NA governmenl dominaled by eilieiiiisit likebeis*on or Sigifrodo Ochoa might, in ibe name of nationalism, move to curtail or mini mite US Influence. Il alao could aeek quick, dramatic gain ageirat the insurgency by resurrecting death aquadt. prompting international condemnation of the govern tneol, and generating synvpeihv^cwsibly evensupport for Ibe guemllttlflB
Altcraaijveiy, an ARPNA adminuiration eiiber dam in*led by moderates, or ut whack the hardliners curb tbeii behavior, probably would not try lo alter the current approach to lha warovernmenl. recognizing the importance of continued US ami lance, would attempt to maintain reasonably good relation* with Washington Should US economic and tnJLItary aid levels remain relatively cntutaai and Ibe new governmenl do nothingttopardire its own polilical itapding. wa wouldurthcrof tbeet at tbe current measured pave* ARENA, which already has contacts wub rebel ka(kra,4hay continue ulks in ibe hope of building domealk support, improving iu ownmage, and maintaining US funding leveli
tcnic. however, the weakening of the political center threaten! to interrupt ibe momentum of locial and economichich eoakd lumber pokrisc Salvadoran society, enhance oligarchic inteeaau. and iimahatvec-ittly encourage increased support fee lb* iniurgcnii M
An ARENA Victory: Two Sccenvio* We believe ihat an ARENA victory could have an indirect but profound impact on ibe court* of ihe wai The protponovernment firmly in ibe handt of ibe rightoughei itand. politically and militarily, against Ihe kfl An ARENA goveinmcnl would be leu inclinedDC admiauuaiion in investigate polilical crimea by ihe rightunnhroccat complicaicd in any event by
inimum, however, we would espect an ARENA adminiairalion. whether moderate or cs Ire oust, to rcealeblish kgulatNn -which lapsed in earlycivil liberties lui tuipecied gucr-rillaiove would facilitate opcrattoni by the military and police bat also wewkd providefor human rights critic* Any AKI NAis also likely lo crack down on guerrilla front groups and pursue an aggiCMivr legitknve agenda II probably would aot move ehoksak lo undo all of I'uinr'i social and cconomK refornit. hul tbe party's
Figure 15
U Salvador Key Indkator*
lv_iDJroll
strongonservative busineaameo andwill incline it to shift the country's economic program tojoosen tUtc controlarketing and probably to roll back at kail some of the agrarian
reform.
Uniied j
-ant
The future role and agenda ol ARENA hardliners, most notably D'Aubuuaon. remain the cntscalin bow far and fast ARENA would try to moveolitically iawy. and the moderate lone of the ARENA campaign reflects bisfor the practical need to distance the party from it* eiircrmst reputation He probably understands the value of continued US assistance but is rash, and harbors deep raeniment againn ihe Uni(ej_ Stale* thai could overwhelm other interests 1
TV*orfssactloa Stralegy We believe tbe insurgents end tbcirwill permi in their effort* to delink the United Sute* from the Salvadocen Government, regardleas of which pany win* the praatdcncy An ARENA adminiiuaiion would sharpen the esisting polarisation in Salvadoran polilica and enbance the effect iveaeai of insurgent propaganda.e believe the insurgent* will pursue essentially the same postelectionan ARENADC government, albeit with some differences in degree and emphasis
jverimary determinant ol leftists' tactic* and ao limii their option*tpect they "ill attempt to intensify then urban campaign ofterrorism, strikes, and drmonitnuom in ihe capnal and other cities Militarily, the gwtrrilU* will op* Inr addilional high-vmbuiiy. low-ml atuicU on militarymilar to ihoacbe capital inS and early M
An ahi na adminutration, howevei, rugbi also prompt the guerrillas toirty vi- withssassinate high-level urgeu TV gueirillst would rcaaon lhat the real and imagined repuuuosu of ARFNA party chieft provide both. berter jatlibca iron and oflei greater likelihood or aparkatg ihc hardline reaponae they have uiuuccessfaty aougbi during tbeChrtatian temocrau' tenure la addition, the guemllai and Iheir Cuban aad Ntcertgaanmight come to believe lhat increased or more sophisticated arm*ore tuitihed gamble in auch an environment where international seminar would be directed more toward Ike govenuneni than lhe guemllai
Uirm! Fact on
fV/cisregee Under paratt lisxty acaaBtrtoaatril
Arnervca. the Sandinauii win be abtea*wu increased atlcntion to iheir goal of proaniagin the region:
In Ibe eventegionsl political tenement, the Ssodiessiss would continue to support lac FMLNkagssircs and ma tend, even if they were bound by ihc acillcment to cease such support
inding down of the Nicsrs-guan Resilience effort would have hnsrud, but positive, effect for El Salvador's insurgenu,through froiing up some Nicaragua miliury supplies for ultimate provision loome Resistance weapont might also find ikeu way lo lhe FMLN ib
Managua -in conjunction wiih Havana woeld. however, carefully assess increased sunpcai of lac FMLN, balancing iu impact in Fl Salvador with likely US and oiber international rcacitoq (See inset) Managua would probeMy regard moderate uKrcascs
in Ihr supply of equipmentin ibe FMLN inventoryelatively tale risk, although iha would prohajly notecwive imnait on lhe fighting Thr Sandinistas probably would avoid dramatic-such at the rntroduclion of rand more sophisticateditood couldccaisblishmcnt of US lethal aid to the Resilience But if ibe Keen lance were complcitiy ectitralitedif Ihe Sandmistai did not regard US atiLrtary earonrediblewould be positioned lo espand the scope of iu assuutnot The fmln wouldubauaually more dangerouswere thst assistance to irclude SA-7mimles and CTew-servad weapon* such as heavy mortars. The cried would mm simply be the militsry impsci but lb* psychological one The Salvadoran military, like (hear couatarparu ia Nicaragua. woeM. after initial loasea, adjust to the provision ofo gucnilla forces The momenium. confidence, and morale of governmenl fortes ontUd be ubstsnUslty eroded, however,ack eacabiion went unsnswered by
The fear* rVerwse Proapsarvt regional peace agrec-mcnUnuMc-cdged sword for the Salvadoran Govarnment that on baUnce are likelyreseni growing poliiical and public rslsuoru probicmi rather than practical solutions This is likely so be seeeasiiy true if anA governmenl is in paver. In almost all caeeMbc guerrilla left is the nsost obviouiMW
The only regional peace iniiisirv* lhe government would welcomeorder verificaiion mecbaniam capable of interfering with Sandman* togssiK aasts-uncehehighly iinhkely sbMCObM given dcmonilralcd problems in icrms of practical implr-menu iron and Uck of political will Otherwise, ibe i . II peace process and rciaisd regional iniiisirves threaten In force the governaseai into nego-iiaiiuni wuh the FMLN, which Use armed forces are likely io resisi strongly, adding lo cavil-militaryIndeed, il ibe Saediaitia* aad the Resistance resuftie islks under the Sspoa Agrecnteaiew
Cuban. Sotirt. and Sandinttta Ptrspttlimn on tht Insurgtacy
and Nicaragua hare long been ihr principal supporters of ihr Salvadoran insurgent! probably reflectingolilical statement in El Salvador whilt continuing lo surreptitiously provtdt ikt gutrrlllas with military aid Nicaragua'! nit con sists primarily of providing iransporiaiion,and toordinaiionfor dtlmnts allupaditi from Cuba, including arms and ammunitionIi also encompasses training safthaven. safe transit, and stcurt communications laaliliei to support ihe insurgent military network We have no convincing evidence that the Sovttis art peevid mg direci military assislanet to tht Selvadoran guerrillas However. Moscow dots pvt financial assistance and military training to the Communist Party id fl Salvador, whiek is includtd in tht FMtJ*!1
We believe Cuba and Nicaragua over ihe short term will try to keep both ihe political andoptions open. Havana's tnlirest In theirack could begin to wane in the months ahead, however, and military pressure could be utpaed: up II the political environmentIS the Central American Peace Planoradical rightist government is eletltd Similarly. If the Insurgency began to pate a
crrdiblr ihrratilitaryavana and Managuawguld throw ihnr weight behind the atttmpt^
Havana also provides military training, arms, and logistic support to the FMLN. in addition to more visible mtdital and propaganda aid Fidtl Castro, who helped the disparait factions that compnsr tht FMLN to uniteQtonlin uts to median dispultswUhln tht group and- tactical advice
For their part, thr Soviets ttt political actionmost promising means for tht lift toand to avoid being htld rtsponsibltescalation In the fighting While TASSof insurgent activity itfworabtt, Moscowof ihr gutrrlllas for being infltxlblrthtm naive for bejttvlnejhiycan dtfealSoviets
turned down an _ n
the Soviets have txpretttd Inltrett In theihe DemorraUc Convergence and haveBy
trying to build relationships with ruch leaders, the Soviets hope over the longer term to broadtn their influence In San
inurnatsonal pressure for El Salvador toarallel prot|^ouM enhance the FMLN's bargaining
The recent FMLN negotiating propoaal suggests Ihe pouibthly that the gucrnllai arc under pressure to consider moreolitical utile meal The proposal -preterited to Ihe government by the church involves postponement of ibe risctsorr rclor its ouicorne and elected officials, sod drops longstanding demands for power sharing and rcsiruc luring of the armed forcea (See insei.t is
osal
intended at lean as much for international as for domestic impact. Although there are probably some linked to the guerrilla lefl whosvuh seriously to pursuerdicaies ihe in-lurgeni leadership views ihe peace proposalas designedtave off military pressure, and it CEpects rejection of.lhc PT&posal to leguimaie intemi-fication of the war,
PirirtuUr. the armedommitment lo1 acceptable prac|,ce*,ne Ukio hingeeir dependence on US support
Given lhe ttrong aniigringo weak in IVAubuisson and hi* oohoru, il ARENA were in control ol theubaiannal reduction of US aid coulda brutal military eflortipe out the gue; nllai and then supporters, alaruj withLN auoatica Thequkk result mightempo rary but pyrrhic gain, whKh would be eliminatedinsurgent recruit* aad higher levels of cateraal aid would gradually turn the war back to M
Should the FMUNopasal lhal ha* genuine promiseolitical settlement, US involvement and pressures will almost ocruinly be crucial in overcoming institutional rctiaiance lo compromise and keeping Ibe renegade ngkl wing liom dastroyuig Ihc political environment For such involvement lo be effective, however, Salvadoran civil and military authorities will have lo remain convinced lhat IS commitmentueirille takeover remains firm
Other scenarios could tndadc
/
A neaousUo agreement to postpone the election ia response to receni guerrilla proposals Thu would not affect our judgment of ibe likely election Cut come In addition, we doutx lhat il would lead to a
laiung seiikmen: beiauirinimum, hardline clement* inould rene* the guerrilla uruggle
lhe *plinienng oll N. *nh mene faction; pursuing mieien* ihrough the lytiem and other* hghiing on
A degenerative weakening of ihc system caused b, increased poliiical polarisation and intraparty fee lionalum combinedmore rapid economic de-dine, enabling ihe FMLN lo exploit ihe ensuing pnblical chaos
la Ihe last case,bout the reliability of US economic and military support wouldey factor cooiribuiing lo government paralysiseteriorating military situation, possibly facilitate Sand inula-its It icvotulion led by ihc FMLN
Original document.
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