DIRECTOHATK OK CKNCE
ovember8
The FttlN In FA Salvador:
inoui-gantgr-rat.oaj_Mi1 Rwnnn Plqhtn Abuae-a
Recent efforts by tho Salvadoran insurgencyintamational pressure on thato reopen paaoa negotiations ara parteffort to appaer Moderate and aoooaaodotlncjtha government aa lnf laxIbis. Inhowover, tha insurgents would notgood faith, but would uaa talks instead toatrataglo position and underline confidenceDuarta government. Meanwhile, wa believesupport arsong Salvadorsn* la waning Inof lnoraasad guerrilla intimidation,oftan indiaorUinata attaoka onin tha
JTli^atypoBcript was prepared by Offica of African and Ll gonarally raflocta tha viaws of tha
ara involved. Incraaaed political tension* related to th*prealdantlal election next year and th* continuing inourgancy will likely resultelatively high rat* of political vlolanc* In coning month*. We believe the guerrlllaa, who are frustrated by their dim proapectsolitical or military victory, probably will contlnu* to account for the majority of political killings, ffl
clous killings of civilians insharply untilo_nths.
280
n Incidents of politicalrevious year.1 (Seeevel of deaths remains far below that rflng the small increase in political doubling ofmurders, in ly established political or criminal
In the flrat aeven mohe nflrmed political motivea waa about the
the number of suspicious killing* hae nerally remained higher than
during the early lgeOa, the increase in civilian klilinga hae coincided with greater political and eUUtary activity by the Marxlat insurgenta. Tha guerrlllaa' political alllea are preparing to> participate in the9 presidential electiona, while rebel front groupa continue trying to ataga violent anti-government demonatratlona In the capital. At the aajaeuerrilla militarynotably economic sabotage and terrorlathave lncreaaed during the paat year (eee Manyandview theao rebel actlvltlea aa an attempt to exploit the country's more open political environment while simultaneously continuing thelthough government
Ststleticsi data
waa obtali
probi
reflect trends in poiiticel violence.
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operations7 heve disrupted some guerrilla activity, they have failed to make deep, permanent reductions in the insurgency. F)
The Guerrillas' Record
that tha Marxist insurgents, no doubt
frustrated by their inability to make drematic military gains or attract significant populsr support, are reaponalble for the majority of confirmed political killings. Guerrlllaa have killed civiliansotherthe government, registering to vote, having relatives in the armed forces, or defying the rebels frequent campaigna to blockade transportation. Tha rebala' indiscriminate use ofweapon adopted to compensate for tacticalhas contributed to lncressed civillsn casualties. Finally, the insurgents have kidnaped and murdered mayora, judgea. local officiate, political candldatae, and civiilana suspected of being government informers. Foruerrilla commander in Uaulutan Department recently killed two civilians suapected of collaborating with the Army and put their bodlea on dieplay to wa^^frhere in the area to avoid involvement with the military.
A major element of the inaurgente* overall atrategy ia to foment unrest and violence in the cities. Thla includea uaing terrorist attacks togovernment forces. Although we do not believe the guerrillas are deliberately and indlacriminately targeting civilians, their urban terrorlet campaign haa resulted In rorr.e civilian casualties, fffffafffkm
Right-wing Extramlata
Circumetantial aimilaritlaa to death aquad murderatheuggeat that right-wing extremieteTor at leaat aome of the recent auspiciousno one has clsinad credit for thara.
soma characterlatics of death aquaduse of :orture, execution-etyla murders, aaaaaalnatlon by groups of armed assailants, and bodlea being dumped soma dlstsnce from the scene of theincreased last year. If rlgtttlata ere Indeed involved, we believe they have bean acting primarily out of fruatration with the slow rate of progress against the inaurgsnts on the bsttlefiald and out of fesr" 'that the insurgents are participating in the political proceaa eolely to expand their urban support networks for terrorism and aubveralon.
Despite its paat association with deatrTaquad activity, we believe that the right-wing ARENA party currently doea not sanction human righta abuses. Such actlona would wreck theecent efforts toore moderate public image
and seriously Jeopardize ita prospects for wlnnin'i thf presidency next March. Indeed, we believe thai, for the tiae beinci at least, even many ARENA extremists probably are cooperating with party moderetae in an effort to strengthen their position and expand the party's popular appeal. Moat ARENA leaders probably alao are unwilling to risk the reduction or curtailment of US economic andJmi^Hary assistance thst might result from unchecked
Nonetheless, some party hsrdllners may be Involved ln the crimes, although we lack definitive proof. tssyflmeemmm^
Roberto D'Aubulsson,ounder
and honorary president, continues to mslntsln close ties with Dr. Ractor Antonio Regalado, the former chiefotorious death squad active in the, though ths two svold sppesrlng togsther in public. ARENA'S rscsnt electorsl triumph and resulting control of the legialsture msy hsvs inspired lower-ranking psrty members or Independent rightists to setficial knowledge or sanction of the party.
Trie Armed
that the number of
politically-motivstsci Killings committed by Salvadorsn soldiers Is on the rise. The armed forces have committedfonfirmed political killings so farercent--corapsred to only about two percent While ws do not believe ths killings sra officially sanctioned, they msy bo the reault of concern within the military about lncressed politics! sctlvltles by Insurgent front groups. Howsver, msny of those soldiers and poiicemsn most provoked by leftist activity probably are biding their time, calculating thst sn ARINA victory in the9 presidential election could resulttsmer stance against the guerrillas and their supporters, ffl B
Members of the Salvadorsn armed forces, moreover, probably hsvs carried out atew of the suspicious killings.
believes that frustration over the end of "state oi exception" legislation in7 has prompted some soldiers to kill suspected leftists. Without the specialwhich suspended some civil liberties for suspected gusrriilss--the Constitution permits ths suthot-itles to detain suspected guerrillas for onlyours bsfore being turned over to the civilian courts. Most Sslvsdorsn officers believeours is insufficient time tohorough lntelllgsnco interrogation and they sre frustrated by the-aaourts, which -ally release suspected guerrlllss for lack of evidence.
Outlook
The Salvador an government probably will respond lo the inctease in political killings by quietly pressing the military to be more vigilant in preventing and policing abuses. We expect the publicity-conscious Armed Forces High Command, in particular, will move to head off any sentiment or tendency among officers and troops to deal with the left through illegal means. Despite the fruetrstions arising from the many conatitutlonal and Judicial restraints imposed on tha armedime when they perceive the left ss exploiting tha hard-won democratic reforms guaranteed by the very government they seek towe believe most officers will wsnt to avoid actions that wouldhe populace or place vital foreign assistance at risk.
Similarly, politically astute moderates within ARENA probably will exhort their extremiet collesgues snd constltuenclea to avoid any actions that threaten the party's political credibility and electoral prospects. Although ths Christian Democreta may attempt to uaa the death squad iaaue to dlacradit ARENA during the months leading up to the9lmllar effort by President Duarte prior to laat March's legialative electione failed to have much Impact at the polio. Wetrategy of persuasion would be effective to some degree in reducing political killings aa the Impending trealdential election invitee greater international scrutiny.
Nonetheless, given Elong legacy of political violence, extremiet attitudes on the left and the right, and frustratlona on both aidee over the alow rate of progreea in the war, we believe political kllllnge will continue. Teneione releted to neat year's preaidentlel elections, particularly the increaaing boldneaa of the left, may provoke further violence, in our view. Theproapecte for political or military victory arecontinue to coanait most of the political kllllnge. fjj
Appendix:Armed. For ceo and Human Right"
Salvadoran armedresponsible for number of human rlqhte ahueea--have since thesignificantly improved their conduct. US aid andfacilitated the profeBsionallzation of tha Army,tocleaner" war. Today, all mornbera of thereceive human rights training from tha Internationaltha Catholic Church, and tha government's human Soldlsrs and police who commit crimes areto trial before civilian court*, llsmjsaad from 1 Bsrvles '
vsrious offanaaa. In add]: - omj
thst concern about civilian cssusitlas hss driven ths military to adopt etrlcter rulaa of engagement. Rlgoroua restrictions have been placed on tha use of air and artillery support nasr populated areas, and infantry aaldom employ "rsconnsissancs by firs"blindly into an area to determine whsther ths enemy is preeant. Moreover, despite tha likelihood that most prisoners will be releaeeduidelines ln sffect sinesovernmant tragps. .still csDturs mora guerrillas than thsy kill.
The proapoct of US militsry ssslstanca being curtsiled, fesr of negative publicity, and, in many esses,rowing realization that expanding popular support is critical to their countsrinsurgency mission, hsve compelled officers tosensr appreciation for human rlghta. Colonel Rene malllo Pones, for examplo, an influential brigade commander who probably will become tha next Chief of Staff, is working in his ssctor to promote grsster public confidence in the Army, snd hs concsdee that human rights abuses by government troopa contribute to1 le eent lment. famjsmmemlthat Colonel Mauriclolinked paat atuBee--laet year requested additional human rlghtsla>ctures for his troops anduman rights manual. V B
Deaplte the armed forces' improved performance sndof the lmportanca of human rights, abusss stillwith fsr less frequency than duringlnstltutlonsl fsetors tsnd to lmpeds Bocsuse tha militsry hss never crested anyfor Investigating human areghta abuaaa, auch probeaon ansdho^beals and thi results usually arei vet e. sasj || ut tone
nvsBtigste the armedss the Attorney General or tha US-funded specialstlomsere reluctant to pry too deeply into the "Internal affairs* of the military^ El Sslvsdor's most powerful snd coheslvs institution.ike ths government's humsn rights cosmlsslon, hsve no legsl authortt y In addition, the Salvadorsn court system relies
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t i
on confessions or eyewimyiflli lorenslc evidence for convictions, and leweisHee arc willing to testify uman rights cane--pariIa military of (ear of retribution
The insular, highly coheaive nature of th* Salvadoran officer corpa alao hampers Investigations of alleged abuses. Officers generally tolerate mlaconduct--whether human rlghta abuses, corruption, moral turpitude, or incoeipetence on the battlefleld--on the part of their colleagues, and few heve been subjected to atrlct disciplinary action. The officer corpaaaVae*asveaVaat i * "rod* of *ll*nee' when one of their owniaaccused of wrongdoing This collective protectlvenees is, we believe, fueledealre to apare the ml litary--and, by connection, themaelvee--any eaibarraaement.
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Original document.
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