Created: 7/1/1989

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Prospects for National Reconciliation in Mozambique

Prospects for National Reconciliation

in Mozambique

A political solution to Mozambique's insurgency will remain elusive but aot impossible over the nextonths!

Wt expect no decisive shift in the military balance.

The West lacks leverage, particularly ever the insurgents, to force compromises on power sharingX-

* The two sides are exploring terms for talks, but active Soviet and South African involvement would be requiredettlement. African mediation might ease the process,

iMrc* af InvtmtiUmlm Key


away from tdarilnlamnUt Claim lo Mummon wkeit WBal- mile IdeeJi oj writuman ris+ir

note,fiammaeiroposing if arm* for grraitr

Colli for free matilporty etocfomocal altoriryurrently hoa ami, a,

from folia* socfalUt moil-das. Erotvtag tawrd greater role for privatendfonts* Idoail-mam.

M-deateudge depth of amtmlttntm Of mderiiamdlnt-


thai RENAMO emdftghj. Int. renounce violence, andueumity. Opfoaos officialiMKAMO oe granting lajmrgemtiimarty or negotiating

Seeki direct, amen talks withthat woald enhance Ui ktgllh maxyotUMal entity. DamamdimovaJ of foreign fareai.

Key Judgments

A peace settlement in Mozambique will remain elusive but cannot be entirely ruled owl within the nextonths. While tbe Marxistand the RLNAMO insurgents recognize thaiyear conflict cannot be resolved militarily and arc moving toward direct talks, both sides will be reluctantompromise on the key issue of power sharing)

External Lerrraze

The United Slates and other Western nations, even collectively, lack sufficient leverage toettlement in Mozambique; RENAMO's international isolation makes it particularly unreeeptiveesternActive South African and Soviet involvement would bealbeit notforce the compromises io make reconciliation possible. African interest in resolving regional conflicts also could help move ihe process forward.) i

Military Standoff

The military balance is unlikdy to shift decisively. RENAMO will periodically launch countrywide offensives but will not threaten the capital Meanwhile. Maputo's efforts to improve its military effectiveness will continue to have little successl

Talking and Fighting

Moxmmbican President China no may be able to enlist sufficient domestic support for direct and serious negotiations with RENAMO. but be will have to tread carefully. Some senior officials oppose any moves tbat would legitimize tbe insurgents or undermine the ruling party's preeminence.

Meanwhile. Chissano will persist in his political and military effort to undermine RENAMO. He will continue to foster Mozambique'swith neighboring South Africa, while also working to bolster international pressure on Pretoria to end its limited, albeit important, covert assistance to RENAMO. At the same time. Chissano will solicit increased military assistance from both East aad Wesi.l 1

RENAMO leader Dblakima. who publicly demands elections, wants talks with the government to bolster the group'* claims to legitimacy at home and abroad. Nevertheless, the insurgent leadership is likely to have serious difficulty inoherent negotiating team in light of disagreements

uml poor couimunuations between ihe forcign-baicd political fine and ihe group'* military leadcnliipMozambique. While pursuingENAMO will prosecute its military strategy of demoralising governmentrippling the economy, undermining rural support lor Maputo, and further isolating the government's urban strongholds '

Alternate Scenarios

Changes in scleral key variables could alter oar prognosisrotrastcd and inconclusive peace process:

ramatic change in iht military situation. Major RENAMO gain* could pressure Chissano to compromise on key demands, while serious insurgent setbacks would revive the government's hopesilitary victory and harden its stance toward negotiations.

A shift in South Africa's policy. Pretoria coald decide to abandon its rapprochement withbecause cf increased ANCNational Congress) infiltration through Morambtcansharply increase assistance to RENAMO. whkh would enable more aggressive iniurgent operations and strengthen the movement'sposition. Alternatively. South Africa could optolitical solution to the conflict and cease assistance for RENAMO. which over time would decrease the insurgents' effectiveness somewhat. Pretoria could even decide to intervene directly by removing RENAMO leadersto beettlement.

A ehangt In Soviet policy toward the Chissano government. Moscow could decide to pressure Maputo to more aggressivelyoliticalinstance, by threatening to further reduce arms aid.

Implications for the United Stattf

A political settlement in Mozambique would contribute significantly to stability and economic development in southern Africa and alleviate widespread suffering and famine in Mozambique. The more the United States becomes directly involved, however, the more It risks charges that it


doiag enough to pressure South Africa to end support for RENAMO.

with the internationally ostracized guerrillas.Furtheroviet role in the rcgion.l




_Likely Scenarios

Implications and Opportunities for theiato

Annti: Othar Kay Players


ean ol conflict betweenuling I'RELIMO government and the RENAMO insurgency, neither tide Itom ion toilitary victory. Meanwhile, the war hatroad economic recovery and ciuicd large-scalefamine, population dlilocatioct. aad humani- abuses.ts are now under pressure totiotiatcd settlement,ar each hit been unwillina or unable to projwte preliminary settlementacceptable to the other.j

International interest inettlement to the ton flici his initialed in recent months, engendered in part by tbe tripartita agreements on Angola and Namibia reached in1 aad the recent cease-Are in Angola. South Africa hsseace initiative involving the United States and (he Sot let Union. The United States subsequently has explored possibilitieseconciliation effort in concert with South Africa. Zimbabwe, and other more loosely coordinated external actors such as the United Kingdom. Kenya. Portugal, and the USSR. Kenyan and various Moiamblcan church officials already ntc mediating indirect lalki between RENAMO and the government to cotmder settle-mcnt tctru

The gotcrnmcat of President Joaoutm Chissano. meanwhile, continues toroad economic, political, ind military reform program that has;

Attracted economic aid from virtually everyrapean country, the United States. Canada, and Japan, and led to greater World Bank assistance

and the first IMF program. The reform program has helpedimned economic recovery fot-lowing several years of decline.

Expanded Mozambique's sources of militaryand materiel to inelude modest protrarm from several Westernncluding the UnitedPortugal. Spain, and Italy, without infringing on Maputo's crucial supply rdalioaship with its traditional Soviet Bloc aod Cuban allies.

Improved relations with South Africa in an effort to provide an incentive for Pretoria to end covert assistance to RENAMO and promote economic cooperaiion.

Introduced several initiatives designed io improve the FRELIMO patty's suppoit among Mozambique's rural masses.

Promoted younger officers Into the senior ranks of the Armed Forces of Motambiquc (FAMl and attracted Western military assistance, but as yet without improving the Army's performance substantially.

For its part, RENAMO, led by Afoaso Dhlakama. has increased guerrilla activity in ihe pastparticularly aroundin widespread destruction that has virtually nullified the goicin* ment's progress on the economic front Dhlaksma's recent efforts, however, to improve RENAMO aand domestic image and unify the divided and inept foreign-baird political wing have so far been ineffective.

that it cannot defeat While they are


adre of leverat hundred pinonati at Hi formaitoni. yAMO grew rapidly tu00it strength may now have Habilittd Decauie tit combat louts, desertions, and ret'uit-ins diUk-Mes posed by the war, drought, and government relocation policies^ ]


embership has traditionallyethnic groups wlih disparate interests, aligned by common opposition to FRELIMO poitdei. Moil lenior officers in tht military wing are reportedly Shona. reflecting the atgantiation'tunder Rhodesian sponsorship, bat we pr-Here RENAMO hot broadened Us ethnic bate.

Man, external, politico! wing cadre are Poriu-

tueieotombiean rtsidenis. Following politl-col changes9 in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. South Africa assumed sponsorship ol RES AMO. Ill oven links to the Insurants were severed after4 Nkomaii Accord between Pretoria and Maputo. but covert supply comimtei. RENAMO probably receives communications end medical supplies and training. Intelligence support, and potsibly small arms and ammunition from South

Africa. Pretoria may alio assist internal and external RENAMO leaden with iraaspvciaiion. la addition, ihe insuigents also receive tome lux's-ttt support from South African-based lupportert. particularly ethnic Portuguese, and frombackers based in Western Europe, ihe United States, and possibly elsewhere. Nonetheless. RENAMO hoi been largely self-sustaining since


rganization indudti political and miliary dectiianmaktng bodies, both heeded by .tfonso Oklahoma. The polUtcal wing consists afoudimentary departments, half foreign bated. The military wing Is based in central Moxamblaut. Dhlokama.eneral Staff cf untodulters, plans and directs major military campaigns. The military is organized under threeCentral, anddivided and subdivided along territorial Unci.EN AMO hoi developed at lean nine iedeptndeni battalions, tubordlnaie to the General Slat,umber of small, specialized until, probably under Ohlakamai direct control^ j

toecisive military advantage curing ihe period of ibis Memorandum, thewill maintain strong military prciiure on the government. Dhlakama probably calculate* lhat Maputo eventually "ill be compelled toialogue oct ibe Insurgents* larmi.eri-odic regional and countrywide ope tal ion. will contin-ue io cripple ihe economic infra* ir wet me. undermine rural support Tot FRELIMO. demoralize government torcea. and farther isolate the government'i urbanperating tn allhemi mount frequent raid* oa lightly defendediniiallailom and economic fadlttlcs. RENAMO also will probably continue lo conduct small-scale cross-border raids into Zimbabwe, and to

a lesser extent Zambia. Malawi, and Tanzania, to gather supplies and increase the cost to countries providing military au-itancc to MoaambtqucJ

fro-pecu ate good thai the insurgents will increase attacks age inn higher profile urgetransportation route* ond theCahoraro-ctcctricmay succeed iniiirlci or proviusal capital. RENAMO is gradually reorganiiinf ill SO.OOO-man force into larger units for ooeigtions against more heavily defended targets and has expanded ils presence around the major cities of

ruTFIife-Tftea-'s tot air defense artillery It has captured, the government's ability to maintain lit pretence in the countryiide would diminish and would feece the fam to wiihdraw even furtherelcniiie roiiure around major urban area*.

In (he event of Dhlakama't death, mustprobably would remain underbut the number or renegadeincrease There is no known order ofto Dhlakama. but the movement'sof command suggests thai Commanderof Dhlakams's keywell placed to assume

External support Is important but not vital to tho movement's continued viabilityilitaryso outside influence on the group isomplete cessation of South Africanaid from private backers in Western Europe, the United States, ami Portugesepatriate* in Southgradually erode RENAMO's eemmu-nicat>ou advantages, but the loss of oecaiionsl deltv. erica of small arms and basic necessities probably could be overcome without seriously hampering Ihe insurgency. The loss of outside financial support would have its greatest impact on RENAMO's abilityInane* the operation* of the foreign-based political wing.utoff also would increasingly isolate the movement's Mozambique-basedto have difficulty leaving the country to solicit international support, police the external wing, and participate inwould notchange the course of the war.] |

South Africa is unlikely lo end tu limitedio the iniurgenu during the period ofRENAMOey element in"carrot and sttok" policy towardthat combines military pressure andto obtain secariiy concessions fromparticularlyis the African NationaltANC).

froa likely next president. P. W. da Klerk, may rriy !csi heavily 'han hli predecessor cn military means for regional policy.

figure 2

Ethnic Composition of Morambtqut

Indoctrination techniques. KliNAMO hat promoted traditional structures toestend its influence in much of rural Mozambique, but alto has relied on fear, coercion, and Intimidation to administer areas under its

During the neat It months. RENAMO will not be able tu establish morsymbolic shadowand will have diflkulty preacntlag itselfEUMO and the international communityredible alter native national leadership. Dhlakama presidsaominal government as president and military commander, and several of his most trusted advisers serve in political capacities on RENAMO's National Cavncil. Nevenheless. the organization's administrative and institutional structures arc still rudimentary

papuiaton is war weary and

trie only opposition to .'AMOl

FREUMO. RENAMO hat benefited from wide-spread dissatisfaction with government policies and. until recently, FRELIMO's heavjhanded political

apaihetscor reaentful toward both RENAMO and the government. The Insurgents have made aomc efTorta toolitical bateote of supporter* from tha Shona* speaking tribe* and Maeua-Lomue ethnic group in the central provi neea.!-

The MoiaaftbtcaaCo.anuneBt'oder Preiser.

Counter! asunencr Effort

Maputo's efforts to improve the FAM's effectiveness have bad little eucccas, and government couoperations will continue to inear manpower and


Hey Players


Je^uim Ckisiano

resa mo

A/D'to Dtlikama

of IHatantbitua

Jeotuim Chissano is an exeentncrd negotiator

/in kh owm io pupanjar aa eventual negotiated endinternal strife while et thrattempting ie exploit dMtlonsA MQJ

An cxpcrieeced toldier and netful taeiieian, Aforaoat lined themilitary and pelt * Header a/ REKAMO tlnee he took9 after the death ef the movements fir,leader.without being authoritarian, he is mott comfortable among his troops in vhom he ttuiUrrs intense personal loyalty. Driven by personal ambition, as well as ideological and ethnic opposition io thed primarily Shangana government.continues to reject FREUnfO's amnestyNonetheless, he realises that the war Is destroying the country and hasillingness to eater negoilationsT

Tkr llaman Rigkit Situation

Both gvtrnnvnt forces ana RENAMO instsf. trail have committed serious human rights notations. Information un the extent af abuses has uften been lacking, however, and in some cases it has been difficultstac-ith blame.

he Mosambtcan Ministry of the Interior and ike FAM political commissar triti-died the army for abusing eMltans. These abuses reflected pour training end discipline in Ihe army, police, and milille: there is nothat they had government sanction, la fact. President Chissano has emphasised the need for the security forces to respect civilians, and the government hat approved new codes af military conduct end

have declined, but

ore Still continuing.

RENAMO'S human rights record is even worse. Although RENAMO leaders have made aa effort to control abates, ihey view intimidation of civilians at an integral part ofr effort. The Insurgents force civilians to carry arms and supplies. At with government forces, imarestmenl of jiviliam for military service is com

mr tnsurienis ofien disfigure eiviliani and have murdered civilians who tried to escape from insurgent ba.e, or did not obey orders. Local FIt ELI MO or government officlali ore oflm killed, and. In some cases. Individuals wtth distani connections to the regime have also been selected for assassination. RENAMO has tor-geied government schools and health clinics.

materiel losie* becauseitanyurt con ungi. Morale continues to deteriorate because units often iwithout (cod.nd supplies for months at asome cases forcing troop*stablish(aims, looi localteal international rcliel supplies, desert, or even delectENAMO. KAMI iacffectiveno* and abuics ot cniliansto popular disenchantment with ihe lovernnient. In addition, efforts io promote younger eHieers into the tcp leadership rank* have run into oppositionroup ol veterans of Ihe4 independenceby Minister of Defensewho resent the threat to ibeir power, prestige, andhese veteranserious hin-drance to Chissano* ability io promote military re-

Meanwhile, ihe government's amnesty program has had Itltle success and is unlikely to affect RENAMO's military strength. The program, devised in pan lo demonstrate the government'so reintegrate Individual RENAMO combatants under the theme of "nationals well as to croda insurgent manpower andcoaa high-levela* had only limiied success. Although Maputo claims to have attractednsuigents under the amnesty offer, allew have beta noneombat-ants forced to flee areas of intense ftghtiag.l-

Foreignespite dissatisfaction with FAM's inabdity to make progress against RENAMO. th*primary source of militarynot abandonalthough ii already has taken steps lo (educe turihtr the cost of il* commitment. In addition io tbe recent dcciiton to withdraw moat ofilitary advisers. Ihe Soviets neat year will cut back deliveries of heavyat jetand(ocus on lighter weapons more suited to the FAM's needs and capabilities. Chissano has wanted to leuen Maputo's dependence on Soviet support, which he considered largely inappropriate fcr ihe counter insurgency. Bui undoubtedly he recognizesthe West is unlikely toommitment oa


I IL" i

Kilt ofeduced Soviet eflctl;SIBO million in military aMliiancc inwhile Western support hasillion simx

North Korean* have been deplo>td in the Map*-io area, and several more batialioni are undergoing training.

oin preienis maylo facilitate training of tbe militia.

Mozambique over the pail year hat bun successful in attracting wider foreign military an mo nix. The United Kingdom recently announced that it Mould double the number of company-size Mozambscan units it naiai in Zimbabwe. Private iccuritynave been trainiaa forces (or protecting tine* of communication and hey economic sites. Chissano alto ha*local defense initiative- using *everal hundred Cuban advisers toan militia over the neal two years. Furthermore, the I" AM plans tointh brigade, probably with the assistance of North Korean trainer* and Chinese supplies. "Elite" unit* trained by the Soviet* and the

Nonetheless, these ambitious plans have drawback* and are unlikely to be implemented fully or have ihe desired effect:

Mozambique licks wruble manpower or resources for additional undertakings, suchinth brigade, militia, or other training programs.

Most Western assistance is aimed at defending vital regional transport routes or protecting economic projects, and will have little impact on Maputo's

By arming civilians to provide local security, the government wouldajor increase inand provide RENAMO with additionalto capture |


Thr ruling Front Jot the Ubtration ofcame to power at independence5anguard Marxist-Lenimsi party. Major decisions are made byman politburo whose black members are primarily of iht southern Shengana tribe of President Chissano. The politburo oper. atei oa consensus. Since assuming leadershiphissano has replaced key governmeni ftf ures with tike-minded pragmoiuti who ore uiual-ly black, conforming with Motamlttauei intention lo "Africamtt"thegovernment-^ j

FRELIMO is trying to broaden lit bate of support and expand participation tn mast organisations, and membership tn ihe party hot doubled over ihe past five years. The government exercises control through party cells that probably only operate in the urban areas, given the chaotic stale of the couniryiide. Most af ihe population probably has lillle ideological allegiance to FRELIMO, and appears removed from the country*lealThe Moiambican military Is an Important component of Ihe FREUMOMln-Itttr Chipendeember of0 partyolitical structure that reaches throughout the military it responsible for Ideological purity and tecurliy at all levels.


-Iht Armed Forces of Mozambique is dominated byC*mon grauitd force, which Includes the SfkJO-man Border Guard and ai leanobilized mllilia serving under FAM command. Army brigades art deployed tn eight of thtrovinces. Regular army organization Includes four to five Donations trained for counterinsur-genty operations. In addition to Ihe ground force, the FAMOO-man airan air detente force,an navy, all marginally efficient. In addition, anotherlllila may sent tn local defense or othersupport |

One of the least effective armed forces in Africa, the FAM hoi been able to secure major population eemers but he, been unable roprevem RENAMO front operating throughout rural Motambiaut.any of the lignificant counlerinsur-ttney offensivesoccurred when the FAM was augmented by combat forces from Zimbabwe or Taniania. and have largely centtrtd ontowns sacked and dtitrttd by RENAMO. Some limited improvement in capability will reiulifrom Britlih. Soviet, Cuban, and North Korean training of specialised countennsurgency baiiallons^

result, the government will remain (client on other foreign troops. The withdrawal of Tain contingent from Zamber'a Provincelast rear, and the dramatic expansion in RENAMO activity that ensued in lhat region, demonstrate* how potentially damaging the loss or external support can be.ikely lo miintain at least in BOO-man contingent to protect the Nectla (til line- Zimbabwe is vmlike.'y to withdraw-anforce, which is crucial to the Moxambican counteriawrgeney effort and to Zimbabwe'sown veoeomie sccuniy.

Ecoeoenlc Measures

ChiUano isajor reform program that Ii aimed atrotracted period of ecwHwnieDeepiic limited gains generated by the reforms and increased foreign aid. however.

from shipments by neighboring countriesthreetargets ofThe iniurgent threat ha* scared awayforeign investor^

ng to moreotal budget outlays, thus di.emng fundsand capital investment projects.

Aside from an end lo Ihe insurgency, sustained eco nomic recovery alto wouldore eatewive abandonment ol failed socialist policiesreater effort to regenerate privateAlthough Maputo's economic reform program goes pari way toward redressing some cf the principal faults of the socialist system, the formidablecontinues to obstruct reforms and theirMoreover, while the population has been quiescent toIhe esception of recentIreforms risk provokingunrest and increased opposition wiibin theand party. Austerity measures designed to cut budget deBcits have increased hardship, for Ihe in-empioysd and peon more0 of0 workers that have been fired to increase the efficiency ol government-run operations have not been able to-ozambican Government sludy shows thai, while the reform program has led to increased supplies of food in urban stores, it also has undermined the purchasing power of ihe urban poor and led to increasing level* of urban malnutrition. Popular perceptions o'mismanagement andcould contribute to economically motivated

The reform program has attracted major support from Western nations and international financial Institutions, however, aad,esult, is likely lo continue to contribute to economic growth over the neat few rears. Heavy foreign aid has openedBeira railroad and port for Zimbabwean shipments, and could lead io the beginning of limited

3 .'SW



non. disbursements of economic developmentjumped sharply toearta compared with7 millionncluded were SSO million in disburse-menu under the terms of Moiambiaue's first IMF structural adjustment loon. Finally, donors agreed ina4 billion io meet cilimated atd requirement!verercent of total dhburiemenss of foreign economic aid to Mosambiqat7 hare been from Western nations and aid organisations such at ihe World

The economic reform program is nol yet reducing Moiomblean requirements for food aid and Is unlikely to do so as long as the insurgencyAlthough food aid has prevented widespread starvation, malnutrition is increasing. The number of people dependent on Imported food in the year beginningas Increased toillion lover half ihe total population! fromillion in the preceding year. Food shortages stem largely from distribution problemswith the unsettled security situation In the central provinces, where corn production has been relatively high, as well as from Insufficient ramfall in southern areai of the coumryS

dal traflk on tht country'sOtherrailroads later ibis year. The government moreover, appears to bc com mil led to expanding the reform program in some promising ways.or example, it has begun considering measures toumber of nationalised farms and industrial faciliiies to private South African and Portuguese corporal iont that had owned and operatedeturn of such nationalised properties that are now virtually moribund could

provide an important boost to economic activity if csrried quiignificant scale and shielded from RENAMO. It could also decrease private support to RENAMO from disgruntled former owners.

Political Dynamics

Ii is unclear whether the top decisionmaking bodies in Maputo haveonsensus on ending the



i " |




and how lo do ii. but there iv broad support fur ChWng's, "comprehensivef political ,md ccuiuymic reforms, military reorganization,r.udening of diplomatic contact* to facilitate an eiunumic recovery and Ihe defeat of. ideological hardliners. notabt> Marcel tno do* Santos, are less than enthusiastic proponents of improved ties to South Africa and the Wen, however, and are concerned that further economic and political reforms will undermine FRELIMO's authoriij.they have lost influence ana are currently ia no posiiion to challenge Chissano's leadership, the hardliner* will continue to actake on bolder policyoreover, if Chissano i* toettlement with RENAMO. he also will have to cultivate the support of Defense Minister Chipande and. by extension. *ome of the more highly placed war

. by ar.iointii'

Givenenchant for consensus building, major progress on national reconciliation t* unlikely until aftci the party congress later this month, where Chissano almost certainly will icek approval for his policy goal* for the next fourecause the issue of national reconciliation is so contentious, there has been link formal debate so far within party structures on whether and how ioegotiated saiile-ment. Chissano. however, ha* encouraged Kenyan-and church-brokered exploratory contacts with RENAMO thai could lead to direct talks, and he almost certainly ha* sought the approval of other senior party officials for this initiative. In any case, we expect Chissano to furtker entrench hit conirol at Ihe cungres* by appointing' like-minded pragmatists to the politburo.

Chissano alto will propose political reforms designed io overcome tbe disaffection among ihe predominant ly rural populace that has allowed RENAMO to exploit anti-FRELIMO sympathies. Constitutional revisions allowing for popular participation in Indirect presidential elcctlom are being discussed. FRELIMO also plans to promote membership in mess org*nita-uonsihai will be cmpo-ered to represent the interests ot' ihcirhe party already ha* greatly improved relation* with religious institutions to enjoin Ihvir cooperation in providing social service* and

improving the regime's reputation.tslopuihun* initiative* that threaten FKEI.IMO'sule, however, and thewill not be ableake inroad* into rural arras so long as RENAMO remains the dominant military

Diplomatic Pressures

International support Iront both Western and bail Bloc allies will continue. Nevertheless, ihe growing comensus amongllies that avictory over RLNAMO is remote will pot Chissano under increasing donoregotiated settlement with the insurgent*.

Sana Optioni. Moscow will retain significam locr-age over the Chissano government. Despite ihe recent adjustment of its military ard program, the USSR will remain Mozambique'* primary supplier ol arms assis* lance and oil. Moscow ha* generally supportedefforts to attract economic aid from ihe West aad. to limit further the cost of its own involvement, will continue urging Chbsano to searcholitical solution to the conflict. Moscow also hasillingness to participate ia multilateral peace talks.

Deipiie it* influence over Maputo, Moscow does not *eem inclined io heavily pressure Chissano or leave it*lnerabk. Undoubtedly aware of theconfronting Chissano in trying tu negotiate with RENAMO, the Soviets do not appear to expect an early political solution. Moscow I* likely to playecondary role in any Moeambtcan reconciliation effort, but might well be willing io exert greater pressure on FRELIMO at critical junctures.the Soviet* will continue to provide enough arm* to ensure that Moaambican Government forces retain their hold over Maputo and other urban ctn-

HVireM Titi. Chissano has responded positively to efforts by the United Stales and the United Kingdom io explore possibilitiesettlement He almost certainty rccogniies that economic development

frican President Botha's summit inI9X& with President Chhiano was she capstone ufa yearlong effort by both nations tu improve relationsJ

Preturia's dual policy has achieved its primarydecline in ASC guerrilla operations launched from Maputo-and also has enhanced prospects for economic and political gains. But regional developments could undermine ike emerg-mg -good neighbor"policy towardollapse of the8 tripartite accord on Angola ond Namibiaecurity crisis arising from political upheaval in Namibia would retard further progress in the rapprochement by under-mining both Pretoria* ond Maputo* fragile confi-dence in their ability lo forge an enduring bilateral relaiionshlp.ise in doineitlc onrest would compel the South African Government to secure in right political flank by resorting to greaterevelopment that would make Maputo uneasy about continued cooperation with

additionalee and doesto appear obstructionist. China bo hasso the need ioessagenda, and his elToruio improvawith the church ate likely io result inrelations with the

Portugal also is encouraging negotiation but isto exert sigraftcani influenceeace process given the political sensitivity of dealing with in former colony. Lisbon Is providing limited military assistance, including logistic trainlag and occasional small-arms deliveries, but conservative opposition io improved relations with Maputo remains licrcc.| |

The Regional Factor. Mozambique'* neighborsa national reconciliation process. Zimbabwean President Mugabe, however, is resisting involvement in any US-led peace initiative out of fear of being drawnublic dialogue with South Africa. He aupport* Chissano'* efforts te explore contacts with RENAMO through Kenyan and churchhowever, and would probably be willing to actacilitator or mediator if requested to doy Chissano. In any case, Zimbabwe would seek io protect its economic interest* in Mozambique.

Kenya's President Mas wants looresettlement effort. Zairian President Mobutu also has expressed willingness to mediate peace talks, although his leverage over both the government and Ihe insurgent* will be limited. Depending on the

of Angolan reconciliationfrican leuiler* mightummit to promote peace In Mozambique at they did last month ia Zaire regard-,ng Angola.| |

China no hepe* (hai rappr ochemeni with Souiheventually will convince Pretoria lhai ii is no longer In lu interests to use RENAMO to destsbilUc Me-/arnblque aad lhatithout South African assiitanc* ihe insurgency Mill wane. To this end he will probably continue to eipand bilateral economic cooperation, resirici ihe presence and aciniiie* of the ANC. and restrain harsh anti-South African rhetoric in the governnvcni-conirolled press.esire loa more constructive approach to the region and Maputo's urgent need for economic cooperation probably will keep the rapprochement on track.probably overestimates Pretoria's willingness and ability to influence RENAMO. however, and liesouth Africa will come under increasing criticism from hardliner* aod Fromline! leaders as RENAMO activity continues unabated. Pretoria and Maputo generally have shown great reilraint, confining pcien-tially damaging allegations to joint economic and tecurit) commissioas established lastajor ANC incursion from Mozambique or irrefutable proof of large-scale South African suraiorl to RENAMO. however, could setownturn in relation*'

ha* publicly demanded that the government agree to hold freeroiibly calculating thai the majority uf the rural populace would have Utile choice but to lupf-ondominant militaryan, |

Although both RENAMO and the government have undertaken preliminary itep*egotiatinghit may repreienthort-term strategy by both parties ratherong.ierm commitment to national reconciliation:

undoubtedly would sect lore on any formal peace procei* to improve hii movement's badly tarniihed image and appeal for international support.

Chiuino probably would work to translate interna-tional inicicitcitlerncni proces* into increased Western aidozambique and pressurend in support for RENAMO.

also could calculate lhai eoniaeii with insurgent representatives would fuel dissension within RENAMO'i political rank* and stymie pro-gressettlement. Maputo could thenfor increased foreign supportilitary solution-

Seemingly irreconcilable long-term objective* arc likely to slow progress toward mutually acceptable tcitlcmcni terms during the period of this Me dum. Although both side* may make some coi lions, neither ihe government nor RENAMO to bc under sufficient pressure to force come on the key demandsettlement:

FRELI MO aims to protect its political monopoly and hold on power, und has demanded tint RENAMO cease hostilities, renounce violence, and accept Maputo's amnesty offer.

in. ihAiltMSiiw Angola, lni'iiti. Mo'amnieut.Tanu

Uicfianal roH'irat crrun

r.miul onso.tli taimt penile ne. Sabe

. vniein.

Thereood chance that the government and RENAMO will establish direct contact. Both RENAMO and itie Chissano government probably will bc content to muddle along, however, rather ihan make the serious compromise* necessary for aMoreover. RENAMO* difficulty innified negotiating learn will hinder* will logistic difficulties and risks associated with travel outride Mozambique by Dhlakama or his represents-lives.esult, negotiations will bc protracted and probably uill be punciuaicd by periods of iatcnaiHed hostilities as both sides seek toilitaryto lorcc concessions ai the table. Negotiation* could eventually break down if neither *tdeftciibility on key demands.[

Outsidethe Vatican, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union- -will encouragebet most have no leverage over RENAMO

and are unlikelyressure Maputouliilaieial eTod lo prcisurc South Afiiea io adhere ia ihe terms of4 Nkamaii Accord is likely. For if* pan, Pretoria will seek to emure thai iiole in any peace process or thai iit, interest! are proiecied. Allhouih many in Pretoria preferide out Ihe Noniibinn Independence procct*uccessful conclusion before launching intoMeumblean peace initiative, Forcian Minuter Bcths might uy to draw Ihe United States and the USSR into on active diplomatic effort sooner. In any event. Pretoria will face continued allegation*of ongoing support for RENAMO. | j

Let* Likely Scenarios

Key variables that could alter the outlook for nationalor indramatic change* in the military situation thai would livor one tide or thehift In South African policy toward Mozambique,harp change in East Bloc support lor the Chissano regime:

Major RENAMO gains could fuel furtherin the morale of government forces, possibly resulting In the fallajor brigaderovincial capital orider fragmentation of ihe FAM. Relatively better supplied and equipped iroopa around Maputo probably would be able to staveatastrophic government defeat. Neverthtlcu. ChiuaiiO might be compelled by war-weary elements of tht FAM to compromise on key deiunds in order lo achieve an interim

e event of Dhlakama's death or, even lessuccessful government offensive, some RENAMO uallt could opt to surrender under the government's amnesty program or form renagade units lhat would not be subject to any formalized peace process. While under such circumstances the Insurgency would not disappear, lis capabilities could be undermined temporarily, boostingconfidence that time was on Its side. Any negotiations would become more difficult.

South Africa comld decide to stress more hcavilyonc or Ihe other aspect of it* "carrc* and nick*1to Ike Moiamblcan Govern mini. Complete cessation of aid lo RENAMO. for example, would

reduce the insurgents' effectiveness over time and could encourage themake concessions. Pretoria could also opt lo intervene directly to remove RF.NAMO leaders it perceived as blocking aShould Pretoria decide to jcuiMidi'c itswiihesumption of ANCAfrican assistance to the insurgents could increase snarply, enabling RENAMO to more aggressively threaten the government and strengthen it*posiiion in negotiation*.

A sharp change in Soviet policy toward thegovernment would have art importantthe outlooketilemcni. Moscowlo pressure Maputo to pursue morea political settlement. For instance,urther reduce arms aid. Dependingin the Sonet Union and In Sail-West

relations, on the other bind. Moscow could revertardline attitude and encourage Maputo loard bargain in talks while continuing the militaryith renewed Soviet support.f

i Opportunities fuc tbe United Stales

The possibilityolitical settlement Inholds opportunities and risks for ihe UnlicdS efforts to encourage negotiation* allow Washington to build on the momentum of theaccords on Angola and Namibia by again demon-

Hinting US iomrnilmcnt to work lor peace anO

development in southern Africa. Moreover,with other key actors, such as Zimbabwe, would help bolster US relations with the Frontlinehich stand to benefiteaceful resolution of the oonRict. Improved stability in southern Africa would alto enhance the prospects for effectiveof key regional transport* lion route* lhat run itrauih Mozambique. Many southern African state* look lo Washington toeading financial and poUiical role in Western donor alToru to develop tbe uxniporuiMn networkay to reduce the


(ugion'* ccunuiiiw tinpcinkrr^ onetliniicni uoufd icniuvc thcprim.iry obstacle to biixitl and Ioneconomic recovery, and help(lie tide u! Civilian

WeMernowever, luck Millie tent leverage toettlement While Maputo almost certainlygunner Wsncr* pressure un Pirioru ion-.tot RfcNAMO. the government un avoid iMintul conecsvortt to longMoscow doc* notit* tni'ucilcc through lit ciucial military tup pi> rela-

tionship. So long a*nternal leader*

(emu in inter nationally isolated, tho West's ability to encourage RENAMOettlement will be limited. Moreover, the more Washington become* directly involved, the more ihe Lnitcd State* will be vulnerable lo charge* that it is;

Not doing enough to pressure Souih Africa to endfor RENAMO.

Dealing wills tbe internationally ostracised RENAMO guerrilla*.

luriheroviei role in the region.

Alberto Chlpaisdt

Detente Ministeranks third in partyortherner, helps ethnicormerly aligned wilh Marxist hardliners, defersresident on mosiccedes lo overtures to West and may supper' negotiationslosely allied with old guard in ihe military; feels threatened hy younger, better educated officershave risen underas made Utile headway in improving military's performance agairtttp |

MarccHnc. d.

President, Peoples" Assembly, largelyemains powerful figure in party, rank*Inocialist ideologue,!



Primeanks seventh Inop bureaucrat and presidentialn administrativenlikely successor to Chissano despite highack of liberation struggle credentials diminishes clout and influence withollows Chissano's lead cut policy decision, including talks wilh RENAMO..belongshangana-speaking ethnic group,,. critic oi Southegal interim successor lo Chissano.

Armando Guttata

Minister of Traaipon andank* fourth in poSlburo. but most likely presidentialetired general, is extremely popular in military, party, and hia own Macua ethnic group-largest Inrdent block nationalist and Chissanoould back negotiations withd-ocatcs improved relations with the Wcstl

t next mmc Mmitler or1


Mariano Malslnac

Minister ofank* sixth in politburo; rising Mar in Chissano govern metrong support-er of economic

Ndau ethnic group

aw 3

imember small itna tribe. hulcn

allied With Dhlakam*"*

Vlaceata Ulolu

Named secretary for information and propaganda during recent RENAMOas Mourn-btquc-baaed secretary for internal admimttiBtion .,

allien'speech writer, and Engliahaintains low personal

Original document.

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