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Gorbachev's Reorganization of the Party: Breaking the Stranglehold of the Apparatus

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Gorbachev's Reorganization of the Party: Breaking the Stranglehold of the Apparatus

Gorbachevs Reorganization of the Party: Breaking (he Slraogieholcl of the Apparatus *

ScopeResearch Paper deals wiihrganization of the main bodies

constituting- (he apparatus of ibe Communist Party of the Soviet Union, including the Central Commiitce Secretariat andprocess that has made considerable headway since the8 Central Committee plenum.uilds on lwo earlier Research Papers.

J, and

orbachev's Reform of ihe

Stale Institutions^arliamentaryhich aaessed ihe

nllcmpt lo shift some party funciions and power lo stale institutions, forthcoming papers on ihe parly's role in the economy and on parly electoral reform will evaluate how Gorbachev's reform program affecu the authority and responsibility of the party apparatus.




Mwnan.ii- avalUblt

m of9

i In ihU npofi.

S Rrorganiraiion of Ihe Party: Breaking Ihe Stranglehold of ihe Apparatus

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev hasajor reorganiza-lioQ of the party's bureaucracy that has changed Ibe decisionmaking structure and could resultistoric redefinition of (he party's place in Soviet society. The reorganization weakens Gorbachev's institutional rivals in the parly and augrnenls the nowcrs of bodies (hat he nowon Ibe party side and the Supreme Soviet on (he state side. In addition, changes in the structure, functions, and size of key party bodies appear designed to reduce the party's control of several areas that it previously supervised closely, thus restricting the party's role as strategic planner, political vanguard, and force for cohesion ia the country. Tbe party reforms may also be intended to complement wide-ranging reforms that will enhance Ihe decisionmaking power of state bodies, from legislative and governing councils (sewnets) to individual enterprises.

A key eiemeni of this sweeping reform was the creation in8 of sis. polk7-oriented party commissions composed of Ccnlral Committee and Ccnlral Auditing Commission members. The commissions correspond to the main foreign and domestic sectors of Soviet policy and have taken over some of the powers of the party Secretarial. The reorganization could fundamenully reorder Soviet politics. It represents the mosttransformation of the party's structure since Khrushchev'sbifurcation of the apparatus into industrial and agricultural sectorsorbachev may hope thai ihe commissions will facilitate reform of Ibe Soviet aystem, bul his overall goats appearo far beyond simplya new admlnislrative apparatus, extending to reducing party control in general and enhancing his own power

We believe Gorbachev is using ihe commissions to keep power (hat wasconcentrated in (he Secretariat diffused among individual "senior" pari) secretaries who no longer have the forum of weekly Secretarial meetings to formulate positions thai run counter to the Politburo's. Erstwhile "Secondegor Ligachev is particularly alTected by Ihe reorganization. His formal restrictionversight of agriculture weakens hii political power and authority. Thethe formation of the specializedonly limit the range of issues thai my of the party secretaries other than Gorbachev can address bul also effectively eliminateecond secretary" position

The commissions supposedly have assumed Ihc responsibility forpolicy optionshc Politburo but apparently will play little, if any, role in policy Implementation. It is unclear whether the commissions will be active in the appointment of party personnel, or if tbe Cadre Department will have greater influence in that area. It is also possible that the Secretariat, meeting infrequently, will continue to perform that function. The commissions' size (large by commission standards, but small when compared with the Central Committee) may allow Gorbachev and hiit supporters tothemay that the Soviet leader could not manipulate the Secretariat

In addition to creating Ihc commissions, the reorganization:Consolidates overunctionally specific Central Committeeinto nine departments with broad responsibilities designed to support the commissions.

Reduces party staff positions byercent at the CPSU level

At least in theory relieves the party of some majorparticular for the day-to-day management of theareintended to be assurned by.other institutions.

The reorganization of the party's structure represents athort-term political victory for Gorbachev because it undercuts his pou'tical rivals and gives him greater control over the party bureaucracy. On the other hand, signs of confusion and unresolved questions about the reorganization may indicate high-level political disagreement over how far party reform should go. Rivals in thethose within the Politburoundoubtedly belose eye on how far the erosion of party functions is allowed to proceed. Moreover, (he party apparatus is now reeling from the vote of no confidence it received in the March elections for the new Congress of People's Deputies. That experience may galvanize resistance to Gorbachev's attack on the party bureaucracy and make it more difficult for htm to strip it of key powers.



the Need for Reform

of ihc Commissions

Limit the Secreiuri at


In the Ranks

the Apparatus


Will Change?

for Political Reform


for Gorbachev

Uncertain Outlook



Ihe Party: BreakingIhe


RecogTJilng Ik* Need (or Reform

The Soviet partyt tbe party'itearm, hai in effect run tbe Soiel Unionny-lo-day baiit throughout matt of Soviet hitiory ll grew tiuickly inand reaporuibilily, especially under Stalin, who expanded iuroledranuiicatly. Under Br the apparatus grewugewith ctiabliihod prerogativeseiled inlcreai in opposing change. When Gorbachev waa rumeil General Secretarye waa saddledarty apparaina that had developedg. intensely oonaervatire bureaticracy thai kept tute {the Supreme Soviet and other iJOminaDy leg ula liveand government (the Council of Ministers) bodieshort leash

Since ihe beginning of Gorbachevs tenure, reformist Soviets have advocated reorganizing and trimming ibe party apparatus to make it more reaponiiveon temporary needs, diminate duplication of the itale apparatus, and force Ihe party to play moretrategic political leadership role. Gorbachev, too, has been on recordutback in Ibe site and influence of the party apparatus. Al theI pony conference, be emphasized in hi* report tbe need io reduce the influence of the partyis itale organs and backed ibe transfer of more power lo the sovieu--ihe network of local, regional, and republic legislatures. Similarly, his report to the8 Central Committee plenum called for "completely relieving ihe party apparatus of economicfunctions" and nuking it "considerablyThe conference resolution oa tbe aisle and

'Th*aroaram" lefengrnarwnByrrLivrwlutdt. ofXtOOC CiNil1 'I"ho fcaad and aulaarlr wtiniia'uva aX

mm ihi Se-wi Union. More narrowly, iht loran Ii aaa*aa reler

io ihr Mmm baled Central Ccir.mm ekptiirumi aad ihr*

a reeat of0O0 ion naif hnuicni.

aua] ol "hum arethr aoit

ol the parlr'icieculive boltu

govcrnmcm endoiaed reorganiraiion of (he party"in (lie very nearnd ihe plenum resolution ordered the Politburo to come upew tirueitire for the Ccnlral Committee apparatus as well as for the republic- and oblast-lcvcl party'

Although ihe conference and plenum approved the reorganization ia principle, the lack of personnel turnover at the conference led many observeri to coodoek that Gorbachev was not tuoog enough to see through ibe reform of an entrenched and careerist party apparatus. Even the July plenum resolutions proposal to coniplele tbe reorgaoiiaiioa of theby tbe end ofauthoritative endorsement of reform- -did not ensure the practicalof reforms thai threatened so many vested

Within two months of the July plenum, however, Gorbachev proved that be bad the political strength to impose radical change on the parly apparatus. Tbe8 Central Committee plenum created tix party com millions' to oversee the reorganized apparatus. Signs of (he reorganization appearedimmediately ia (he Soviei media, when aof Central Committee llaffers were identihod in new pout ions oaJy days after (he September plenum. By the time theovember plenum ccavmcd to spefl out the duties of ihe orarnmtulonx. the shape of ihe reorganized Ccnlral Committee apparatus bad been determined (tecnd figt back of paper)

' The (eirtniiaao ate Piny BalUtfa aad Cadre Policy (Chairman;

Genrtiyleeotof rial (Chairman. Vi dim

Soooreoaonue Pulley (Chilrawa. Mintiy1grarian Pullerifor Ugaea-v; Detwiy Caakirua. Yftiarimy IQiairman, Alehiandr YitrxMvtl(Chairman. Vlaior Caehilkort AU aie party

Tabic i

Party Secretaries' Responsibilities.

realtor! of tbe Commissions

The November plenumesolotioo -On Ibc Commissions of the CPSU Central Commit lee" (hat lined (he names of (he commission members and outlined tbe commlsiioos" functions. Ii instructed ihe commissions toe meat important issues" facing tbe party and (he country. "weigh theheir lilleahe policy recommen-dalloni to tbe Polilburo and Central Committee. The com millions will meet io full icsilon "as required, but not leal frequently lhan every threend ihey can lasoet in smaller working groups between sessions They will have al iheir disposal ihc services of iheir corresponding Cenlial Committee departmenu at

well ai ei peril aad sea denies who. accord lag to parly secretary Medverlev. may cccauiortally be asked lojornmisason with specific policy proposals. Tbewill retort directly to the Politburo (tec inset)

PrimaryLlosll Ihe Secretarial

The comniUilont were formed ostensibly at pan ofrive to "democratize" thegive non-Politburoreater policy role. Bui GesrbaeheVi moat immediate political purposewas to limit Ihe repesrssibililies of thewhich was chaired by Li.achev at iu wcckly meetings and wai emerging as moreindrance

Cammistions ft Soviet Deciilonmnklng

Commissions have traditionally been formed ioorpecific area of concern, and ihey have usually been chaired by ihe parly secretory in charge est ihe relevant area. Commit tions untie used extensively during the Brcihnev era. which relied heavily on consensus building and nonconfron-la/tonal policy decisionmaking. Commissions from thai period, several of which are still working, had both advisory responsibilities and limitedpower.ommission's rer rsrrtrtiendallons probablywill eotalnue toInfluence In shaping Politburo policy decisions.


The commissions, like those thai served BretHnev. may afford Gorbachev ike opportunely ta circumvent full Politburo consideration af terialn Issues or to prejudice the outcome of Politburo deliberations by preliminary actions taken within the commissions It is more likely, however. that Gorbachev will use Us commissionsevice to transfer power thai had been wielded by the Secretariat back to iheAl the same time, they may afford the Generaleans of byotentially hostile Central Committee on some contentious Issues.

There arc still references lo the Secretarial in ihe Soviet media, bul iu conole remains unclear. In ibe pan. ihc Sou eta rial's narrow official mandate "to direct current work, chiefly in (he ielection of cadres and (he verification of the fulfillment of parlywas translated into broad executiveiiiliea. including

FormuUtioa. with ihe support of ihe Centraldepartments, of policy recommendalions to Ihe Politburo.

Management, by Iu vetting authority, of ibc Utiles thai were pat before tbe Politburoinal decision.

Supervision, also through (hef policy eieculion by governmental and other institutions.

Control, via the party's mymenilolura. of the tekc-tron and placement of personnel in party aodmem posts.

In his controversial speech to ihe7 Central Committeewas (anallyin ihe9 edition of the party's Informal ion journal, Irvtstlya TlKthen Moscow party chief Boris Yel'uin charged (hat changes in (be work of ihc Secretariat that had been agreed ran at the7 plenum still bad not been implemented. "Even (bough five months have elapsed sinceel'ttin charged,ust say (haihas changed, especially as far as (he tlytc of work of (be party's Central Coennitttee Secretarial aod ibe style of work of comrade Ligacbev arcy laic summerthe "AndreyevaGorbachev may have lakco Yeltsin's wordseart and decided that his political interests would be bcller servedeak Secretariat ibat be coo Id dominate through ihc Politburo and ihe commissions thanirong, independent Secretariat chaired by Ligachev.

* Tat "Andreyevs affair"1 when a

ositnaialv mitten Nina

actcope aad pace of ioV" appeared -a

Smetileru Stositya. ihe Rnaaaia Rcpntac'i pari)-i)i- lelt onIlIpilabk tvidinct indicate! ihil liaachtvi|or ink in irltlni tht lutir pabliihed 1 -eeki aflar Iu paMiialian. hnaacvtf. PrortelU iBIn ai (tpHataUaa 'aaeiramcUalMBtpotua ibal Lifacatv had hica traaaiiri bsPDt-buro lor ha mioni. aad tht niroaa prortlotm battlaihilurmcrs mvntaiuaa cuing kilo the Itlh Piny Conference

Newly appointed International Department cliief Vn-kntio Falin told Tokyo Shlmbun in early8 that the Secretarial was beingio make clear the line, ol* retponiibiiay among tbe party secretaries. He Doted that "unnecessary arguments and diuircemeau hadecause there was no clear-cut dialinction in area: ot* responsibility amon* Kcrcuncj and because many scctcttrics took charge of the samereation of the eoorrw-saoos has formally delineated the duties of the remainparty sea-claries, eliminating much of the overlap bet-een individual portfolios Increasing the aumber of senior aeeretnries1 from five to aeven (not counting Gorbachev) has diffused power among tbe pany secretaries nnd. in effect, "cheapened" the post of pany secretary.esult, no onethe exception of General Secretaryappreciably more power than the others. I

ress confereocc following the8 plenum, party secretary Medvcdcv would cryptically say only that -the commitiioni do not intendto replace (be Central Committeeccording to some C.

the commissions arcotal beilon"

and operate similarlyhe Btethncv-cri((ha( is. tbey meet infrequently and havemembership, but no real power)the coirimtasioni mostlyon (heil members and play no genuine roleTbey alto noted that ad hoc(on nationalities and education, for example)by individuals from various Centraldepartments, suggesting ibat policy it made oninformal basis than in (he forum of ibecommiisk.ru

The creation of ihe commissions almost Certainly was coniroversial, and there arc tome signs thatkept tbeecret until (he last miiijie to avoid an outcry from (bote in Ihe leadership -So stood io lose power.etter wriilrn to ibe Politburo on8 outlining his conception of the leotgsnired apparatus. Gorbachev did not even men-lion Ihe estaWishmeni of commraiiont By keeping the

' Parly urinariaairalliaufo fullair

'clci'idioaiaeruor irerdaiieanmrici tav* iiadniotil

I.comidciablc auihomi -iltiin iheandmally ouliinlr iheir nonwddnrikii bodr.

i.i under hit hat for ns long as possible, Gorbachev may have denied opponents in ihe leader snip (tineomider (he implications of their creation and pteventel hit opponents from offering analternative. *

Creanng ihe eommittions offered Gorbachevpolitical bcacfiu The commissions will assume ibe Sccreuriai's pobcymaLiog role, but ii ii doubtful ihai they will play asose as theat Moreover, it it unlikely that the cocncnkiKxi arienibert- who have fuD-lime jobs, are scaiiered all ovei ihe country, and meet only ooce every three months--will be as politically effective as feweroicn full-lime pany secreUria would be meetingeek, lleeauie of the sire and decentraliu lion of the commissions, it appears that Gorbachev will have an entier time controlling ihem than he did theecause (he Politburo will review ihe commissions' work.'

The commissions apparently will pUy li,de if any rote id policy implemenuiioo and perhaps none in (any organizational work. Reanotuibility for implemeoia-lion wiH tbeoreCioally be shifted from ihe Secretarial and its ekpartrnenu (allhoogh tbe ckpanments wan probably continue lo verify impkmenutioo) io ihe Council of Ministers, local sovieu, and individual enterprises. Some evidence indicateseakened SecreUrial. meeiing infiecjuently. will continue to moniloe implcmcnUlion of sonic parly decisions nndignificant role in party personnelFirst Deputy Minister of Foreign AITatrx Dciamertnykh said in8 thai the com-mitsiom would have responsibility for formulating general policythe job of iheSeereur-isi-nnd KammuaJii editor Nail Bikkemn added in December thai (be Secretariat still cxisU but ihal iu function* are nowcot analyticalHo- ihe commissions develop probably wjj have ihe Cicatesl influence on Ibe role the Secretarialhe future Should the eonimissions--wiib ibeii Ucklearly defined mission and without itac inttitu-tional cohesion of theio be irvef-leelive forums foi policymaking, some of thefoimei powert could bo revived.



will face tome obstacles in ihce commission chairmen, ill of whomarty secretaries and authoritative political acioia In theie own right, may not prove easy io manage. On ibe on* hand, the new distribution of rctpe>niibilitiea among the chairmen limit) iheir influence over ivsucs outside their direct purview. Oa the other hand, within their areas of reiporulbility, the chairmen will clearly be in charge, and relevant deport me nl per von nel and academic spccialitti will be accountable lo them. The chairmen will almost certainly lake the lead in assigning aod carrying out lasts between Quarterly commission meetings, givingleal deal of authority over their policy areas '

The distribution of duties among ihealso suggest* compromise. Thelook Ligachev out of his role as "second secand restricted him to oversight ofil also took Alcksandrofcloses! at of tocology and put himof foreign policy, where Gorbachevthe support of Foreign Ministerwho is less outspoken than Yakovlevkey ideological it sues, was placed In chargeand Chcbeikov, while giving upof the KGB. was put in charge of legal

Despite the benefits ihey offer Gorbacbev. the com-minioni aie not without iheirith seven senior secretaries, (here istrong nucleus of the Secretariat remaining, Because of their infrc queni meetings and widely scattered membership, ihc eommiiiiontacuum thai could be Riled by the Secretariat andil lo reassert its traditional authority.

Co mm Let ion Membership

According lo several Soviet officials, Ihc mcmherihip of ihe commissions wat chosen following Ihe JO6 plenum Nomi nations were proposed by the commission chairmen, and the* probably debated at Ihe Politburo level Reports in Proiindicate that ihe Polilbuio discussed Hie com roan ion ol Ihe commissions al lenit twice, al regular meetingsctober andovember. Although themembershipsypical CTOM icction

of Soviet officialdom, apparently there wasover their competition For oampJc.toeditorwas shifted at ihe last minute fromkkcotockal Cotnmisuor to Voaovte*'sPolicy Commission.'

Tbe members of Ihe commissionsil ol paety and slate officials, eullural figures, ejporu. md workers similar to lhal of the cut rent Centra 1elected ath Parly Congress6 (seehe8 plenum resolution stales thai Ihe commissions were formed partlyeans of "restoring the principle of collectiveand adopting ofeference to the June conference's suggestion to increase ihc icvolve-ment of Central Committee members in ihe decision-making process.'

[nsuiutional aflilialtoo and occupation wereimportant factors in deciding com nuts ionand political patronage probably figured in some appointments, but the primary prerequisite for membership was appaiemly membership on theCommit lee or Central Auditing Commission. The commissions are staffed overwhelmingly by fullCommitteeumber of important officials, including teveral newly appointed depart-meoi chiefs wbo are not Central Committee members, were eaclinled from the commm-ini and only eight ofS cctmmissioe members have no Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission status Medi-edevress conference after ibe November plenum thai five ol Ihefust secretaries from the Lithuanian, Estonian, Armenian,and Uzbekincluded oobecause they fill positions thai normally merii Central Committee membership. The inclusion of ihc five non-Russian republic parly chiefs on Ihc commissions may alsooken gesture to ethnic ptidc

Regional party and state rsflScialt (ibc provincial apparatus) compose tke brgest group of al tbemembers, surpassing even their high rente sen la (ion on ihc Central Committee. Over one-third arc oblom Aral secretaries from ihc Russian Republichare thatradiiional bias in


Composition of loo Commission*

iKioeoinonie rWlcy.lairtfrariinnternationalegal Policy.

'republic pany and aui* omeaall. obtui and loral Official*.

* Includn memben of crcatirE union. Imitaia. andrduea Miliary. KGB. and |

1 lactuda mrnbtri of Kornaoaaol aad tradeaeludt) eommajiaa DHmben anokere km their oflmal porn lira Ibe aommtuioru acre formalfi ai eomnaiKn membenretired from the Central Conuaflec ai tbe9

CiMral Onmlliee plraum. Both (roup* probably -SI hne ibnr

link* menberihip.

oviei party bodies. Repi taenia lion of the ccnlral government apparatus is sigosIicanUy lower on ihe commissions than ia the Cential Committee, and ilie proportion of cultural officials on Iheearly triple Ihal In Ihe Ccnlral Committee. Pre-tumnbly. ihe low proportion ofroup for (heir consemtitm- -and ihe high proportion ofwhom support for reform is generallywell for Gorbachev in ihe commiitiom

The Ukraine is heavily represented on the commit-lions, aa ii Moacow. Leningrad, aad Krasnodar, tbe home region of Politburo candidate member Raiu-movikiy. Pressaic represented on all bul one

commission. Although none of the commissionstoajority of reformers oreachumber of Moscow-based supporters ofeir presence should ensure Ihal hit interests will be welt represented on the

Some group* within the Central Committee appear lo have been purpotcly excluded from crsmmission repre-senUiion. Most striking is the lack of represent*Iirei

' Two enrirni and one (ormir aide io tMithaeholt- nonj roll M


ofy imluitrial ministries ind Halefoim (he overwhelming majortly of ibe Council of Ministers (see irtsetl Their tow represent!-lion on Ihe commiisioei probably rcficcts Iheirnegative attitude toward economicmong Ccnlral Commiiiee fall members,fficials luisocialed wiih IH Council of Ministers weee csciud-ed from commission membership. Of Ibeepeesen-latives of the Council of Ministers on commissions, only one (the Minisier of the Electronics Industry) heads an industrial ministry. ReprcaenUlives ofministries and state eooimitlees (forample. Foreign Affairs, Defease, Culture, aadwhichmall minority ia tbe Council of Minis-ten but which also are less likely to be eliminatedeorganization of Ibatmucb more heavily represented on the commissions.

Restricting comrrtlssioo membership toraction of the Centra! Committee membership may, in the near term,ostile faction within tbe Central Committee completely out of tbe decattonmakicg process. Over lime, the cootrrussiotu couldit the entitc Central Committee as theyreater Institutional role or as theirthrough theto ihe Ccnlral Committee as fait* acoomplis. Neutralizing the power of the Central Committee con Id work lo Gorbachev's advantage because it win doorcase the influenceody that has beencharacterized by Wtatern and Soviet observers alike as hostile to reform. Moreover, Gorbachev may hope to use thets ions to "divide ami conquer" the Central Committee, assuming Ihal several smaltw(Ih an apparently highofbe more compliant andof reform than one larger, mote onhodot body.'

'et the oonomlt miaulrtea aad aaaie rvmniiitecs wouM

i deal egwall al Itaamra and

torn* of ir* reforrni Ihal ara cumally brim; debated

are enacted. Maramrr, prapoeall to naiolldalaora manateBomber of minlatrlci llucalca ike ray iiaiina al mtc* italelaelxw Ihe aawoaiiioa ot many ol theaa ra ln-rin(in|

' TV coiailaaiaaa awebefore tk* aaaia Aaai al wi

thanlhan ar ike

Aprilta Bilk their eiodaa.wit. ia eftwi.puree of Ihii Wrmull onbiloi awmbrn. boarwi. ihe Cenlial Comir-itee remalaa notably more onhodoa In Ml anyruaeh to

refrm than QorbactW* and hla aflita

Personnel. The Uri. Bunding ind Cadre Policy CommSuiona mixed bat; of reformers, wilh close lies lo either Gorbachev or Rizumovikly, andmany of whom are associated wilh Uga-chev. Theember commission is chaired by Rain-rrsovtkiy. who has close career liesorbachev and is ihe only commission chairman who isol it be ro fall member. There may be resistance In the Politburo to the promotion of Raaamovskiy lo fall membership on ihc grounds thai il would giveuiiconlesied authority in ihe critical cadres field or lhal il would give Ragumovskiy, who also heads ihc corresponding Cadre Department, loo much power. Dcspiie bis being of lower rank lhan Ihc Oliverchairmen, Raiuraovskiy holds one of the most important positions. His oversight of personnelparticularly now thatestricted IO agriculture, givestronger hand inlb* asspoinimeai of officials al all levelsill implement bis reforms.

The majority ofcommission'sarc republic and regional officials, mostly drawn from Ihe RSFSR, and seven commission members are either current or former officials in (be party's Cadres Department. Of these,year-old flrsi depuly chief, Ycvgeniy Razumov, was promoted when Uga-chev headed the department and has appeared uncn-tbosiasitc about reform. The centralbo represented by Vskriy Isoldm. who has close career lies lo Gorbacbev and whose General Department will, accordinghc November plenum resolution, playmajor supporting role in the work of the com missions

ideology. The Ideological Commission, chairedMedvedev,iilinctly reformistMedvedev. who previously worked asfor iclaiMns wiib the Bloc nations,supported political reform bul hashimself willing lo set limits onHe wasotiibuto fullihe September plenum, making him the mostthe full members.reported in

early8 that Yaktyvlev. who handled ideology before ihc September shakeup and hasull member forear, continues io involve himself in ideological mailers

Whereas Ibe Party Building and Cadre Policydraws ritual or lis membership from regional officials and members of the central party apparatus, who have hands-on eipcsience,hird ofember Ideological Com mi is ion consists ofofficials. The heads of one ministry (Culture) and two siale com mil tees (Education and Television and Radio) are com miss ton members. Nine members represent various creative unions, ihe Academy of Sciences, sod party and stale institutes. Several of this number arc noted reformists. Institute ofrector Gcorgiyan aide tond Ivanrogressive and one of two current aides lo Gocivchev onare both members Union of TheatreheadVyannvadicallyspeech at IbeParty Conference and has repeatedly eiprcsscd support of perertroyko..'

Others, such aa Academy of Selencei head Guriyhas been criticized by Academy members for hisTlkhon Khren-nikov (Composers' Union) haveorepaced rate of reform. Alcksandr K. chief of the Central Committee Ideological Department,eputationo-nonsense approach to ethnicand recently eiprcsscd mild reservations about some aspects of poteform. The conservative editor of Prarda. Viktoralanced on the com mm ion by ihc editor of ihe staunchlySoniikay* kul'luro. Alcert Belaya yev.

TheNikolay ShiaWi Socioeconomic Policy Commission hasembers, of whomrc either regional leaden or central stale and partywo ministries (IJectiooxa Industry and Health) and three stale committees Siaibtict, Got-plan, and Nature Protection) ate represented on the commission. Three of Ibc commission members. Alek-sandra Bityukova (deputy premier for light industry, consumer, and socialuriy Maslyukov (lint deputy premier and Goaplannd Alcksandr Vlasov (RSFSRll candidate members of ihethe commission Ihe greatest con-cenualion of senior officials in any of theindicating ihe importance of the economyhe

current phase of political rtfofiB.trong supporter of Gorbacheveform toftbiives; Maslyu-kovublicly supported the conversion of some defense tndcstrial enterpriseseetsumer production, and Riryu.ora haatcadr. if uninspired, supporter of peresiroyka.

Agrlclwe. LiiacheVa Agrarian Policy Commission,raws moat of ita mem ben from the traditionally orthodox, tt,localai arcforiaia cut.he only commliiiori tooI.tbt.ro full member. Viktor Nibno.o ibe comrrussioa's deputyther thai the chairman.dutiea as Ugachevs deputyaoi yet clear, although be may be intendedountcrwdghl to Ugaehev. NikoncVs presence on the commission is awkward for Llgacbev becaUK |, ully qualified pcaxntial rnslaeement as hb deputy.

Tbeornpoaed cn-erwbdminfly ofof tbe Central Committee and bRSISR party chiefs. Eight of itsemberssecretaries of RSFSR obkoms andrcgiooal party bosses on the commissionreform. Boris

Volodinlekaey IVsoomare. (Bdnd hg* Pofozko. (Kr^nodsr) have all spoken outIn favor of agricultural reform, going well beyond

> *n*

Vladimir Kalashaikov (Volgograd) have abo been

pttilsed in ihe central press for successfully imple. meniing informs in predominantly agriculturalns. Stroyev. in fact, liu been nsentionedikely candidateenioroscow. The eommbaion also hai rep-reseotativea from the heavily agricnl.uml Belo.us.un,Winiio, Moldavian, and Kirghiz

Former Gosagroprom Chairman Vsevofodorbachev protege from Stavropol',ember of (he commnsion.nclear -heiher Mu.nkascwskiy. whoead of the no- abolished

_ A.cWra*inBn,ofiZ

agricultural lupcrministry was criticized for every-thing fromoor administrator lo incompe-icrsce, has fallen from favor suflkiemly to cost him his place on ibe cr-eamrrsion Agrarian Department chief Ivan Skiba also ails on tbeossible manifestation ofccasional antipathyihe centralhe lackedia represen-tatrve on tbe commission, despite ibe fact that Akk-sandr Kharlainov. editor ofarm'flbe Central Committee's agriculturalember of ibe Central Auditing

Foreign Foliey. The International Policy Commb-ston, chaired by Yakovicr. appears io apan ibespectrum, but it Includes many notedFour ofof Sciences Vice President Yevgcniy Vdikbov. Tajik Second Sec-retary Petr Uchinskiy. World Economics andial sort. Institute (IMEMO) Director Yev-geniy Pnnukov. ind International Department Chief Film-were promoted from Central Committee can-didateull membenihip at the9 Plenum. All are at least moderaiely reformat, and Vdlkbov appeari very close to tbe General Secretary. Tbe commission has two representai.vct from Ibe Mtmstry of Foreign Affairs (Depuiy Ministers Valeo-lia Nikiforo- aad Anatoby Konlev. but notster Edna id Shevardnadze or First Deputy Min-ister Yuliy Vorontsov. both of -horn are higher ranking) and one each from tbe KGB (Chairman Vladimir Kryucbkov,orbachev ally) and the military (Gen. Sergey Akbromeyev. who retired as Chief of (he General Staff to become an adviser to ihe Supremeeoegiylso on the commission, but hb continuedn doubt since he retired as director of ibe USA aad Canada Ineri-lutefJUSACi Gorbachev aide Analoliyember

A high number of regional official! arc on YakovleVs commission. Including four republic fust aeeretaries--from Armenia. Azerbaijan, Estonia, aadaso Central Cotnemtiee oriliation. Of these, three served as ambassadors before returning lo iheir home republics, which suggests thai they were appointed for their foreign policy expertise as well asf their positions as republic piny chiefi


Letal Polity,olicy Commission appear.ot (he lowest number of clearly idcnlifi-ableraws nearly halTofiu II members from regional officials and the "administrativesocuelly organs and ministries thai will be responsible for Implementing reforms of Ibe legal ond judicial systems. Among ihe regional leaders are Leonid Bobykin. the Sverdlovsk Obkom first secrelary who denounced Ycl'liin's luppoeiets at the Party Conference, the Lithuanian and Tajik republic first secretaries,lev (Ukraine) Obkom First Secretary Vladislav Mysnichenko. who hadandidate lo succeed Sbeherbiiikty until Kharaov came under Le foe alleged widespread corruption. The security organs are representee! by Vadim Bakatia, the newly appoinlod chairman of the MVO who offered strong support of Gorbachev's proposals ath Partv Conference, as well as Filipp Bobkov. First Deputy Chairman of the KGB. Minister of Justice Boris Kravtsov. and Main Political Administration chief Gen. Aleksey Liikhev. The commitment to reform of Itobkov. Kravtsov. and Lizlchev it much leu cetlain than Bakalin's.

The Legal Policy Commission matches the Cadre Commission's total of three genuine proletarians Among the workers on Chebrikov's commission is Vladimir Zaivotnitskiy, from Moscow. Sincea scathing aitf Yel'tsin ai the7 plenum that removed him at Moscow party chief. Zaivornitskiy has prospered.onth after tbe Moscow plenum, he accompanied Yeltsin's nemesis. Ligacbev. to Paris io attend the French Commuaist Party congress, la addition lo being named lo Cbebrikov's com mission, he Is abo one of the token workers on ihc Central Committee'.Coeruniuion

DeftKit IniuurylC

Moscow party chief Lev Zaykov. who remains awithout portfolio, is rumoredhaircommission, parallelhe others, forAccording toIhc rumored

commission also includes party secretary for defense industry Olec Daklanov and Minister of Defense Dmiiriy Yarov. neither of whom wot named locommission. Although there is no evidence io corroborate this rumor, it it plausible. The existence

ofommission would probablyajot role In Gorbachev's planwilcb some defense industry enterprises to ihe pccclucdoa of coniumei geoda. lis cabieoce would also captain why thedid noi abolish ibe Defense Industry Department when other industrial departments were abolished. The failure to publicizeommission would be in keeping with traditional military secrecy but would seemon trad id other signs lhal Gorbachev Is cztending gtainou lo the defense sector. In addition, ihe Soviet media have acknowledged the continued existence of the Central Committee Defense Induiiryrenamed the DefenseIdentified its chief. It wouldublicize this department while keeping secret ihe commission that oversees it.*

ConfusiM la (he Ranks

Soviet cehcub have said that much remainse decided concerning ihc new commissions, suggesting confusion aiheir aliirmie form and role" JlohJtC

Jthat. although the commissions would maintain the Central Committee's policymaking role, even he did not know how, in practice, the new parly structure would Interact with the constitutionally en hi need stale apparatus Inr

ihat the commb-

saons were intended lo assist the Politburo bul would haverole" at well. Such high-level uncertainty suggests that ihehave yeiully develop ihe authority of (be commissions and may be working from liule moreeneral blueprint.

Gorbachev haiold move by limiting ihe authority of the Secretariat, thereby uridcrcultlng ihe institution that has traditionally been Ihc General Secretary's strongest base of support. Gorbachev's

- th. Cf.aiSuMfUcKi Urn ttUtmrni(in maalaln aan

0>ai therewI

than wnnliaM. ladodine ihe Central Ikninnvm.haa-llta Pi*lh*ro paptrwerk and ihe parti's mail, ami isc

Ad manaintain! the parlf'l iilllMies

and bml|.i



"packing" of ihe Secretariat with. ii that he would use ihsil bods' lo build his power ia ihe traditionaltunning the panytrong Sec ecu fit! lhal is suboidioatc lo Ihe Politburo, thus crasurlruc the implementation of and bureaucratic coenpliiocc withcentral diiccthca. 1iga-cbeVs ability IO docninate the Secretariat pecctiptcd Gocbacbev to lake more drastic measures, including curtailing the Secretariat's activities and iu weekly meetings

The Soviets have noi been consistent In describing Ihc Secretariats function! since the shakcup. Pohlieat comment a'.nr Feasor Burtatskiy said8 interview In the Japanese press that the"has ceased toater thai month. Yci'uio lotd anof Konuomol aetmiti Ibal Ibe Secretariat had not met in three months, and he strongly irnpticd ibal Ligachev's unofficial position at second secretary had been elimina'cd Gorbachev aide Georgly Shakhniiarov abo told an iolerviewer in November lhal "regular sessions (of therc no longer held as they were in ihe pail,"thai Ii will continue lo meet only on an ad hoc basis. Shakhnazarov added, "From now on. meetings of the Seetetariat will be held, whenever necessary, with Ihe party's General Secretaryumber of reports that there is nosecond secretary" running ibe Secretariat and man aging its apparatus

A number of seniordor Burial sidy. AT be it Vlisov, and Gen-nadiylhal the noil of second secretary has been eliminated al ihe highest level, at least for (he limeuggests thaiossible ilut the icnior secretaries rotate in chairing Politburo meetings in Gorbachev's absence, and. witegularly meetecretarial, ibe post of secondtseo-inlly meaainglcas la any event. Gorbachev ma, have intended foe the "elimination" ol the poste tempotaiy onvenient maneuver loga-chev'ind perhaps set the stageew second secretary who is mure attuned to ihe reloimitt political agenda

The variety and ambiguity of Soviet interpretations of Ihe reorganization indicate lhal its full implications are noi yet dear lo the Soviets themselves. Il is possible ibat ibe Secretarial will be limited topersonnel appoint menoriginal duty following? icvolulion. Althoughn important function, Il does not approximate Ilic range of powers formerly enjoyed by the Secretarial. *

First meetings of the central and various republic commissions have detrsonitratcd reluctance to tabic ibc policy initiatives for which ihey were essieosibly created. Rather, (he tendency has been lo play it safe, restricting discussion to general outlinesepel! lion of centrally approved guidelines on crsnuiussion prc*ccol and policy. The first meeting of ibe central Ideological Commission, for eiample,riefing on the structure of its corresponding department aod recommended the publication foe discussion of the long-awaited law on the press. Similarly, C

(hat ihr Agrarian Policy Commbtion had accomplished very little at lis first meeting. Unless ihc commit irons carried oui other, unreported duties, Il does noi appear lhalihe other commitsiow willarticularlypolicymaking role, al least in ilie shott tettn.

Meanwhile, ihe tepublic patty organisations seem to be foflo-tng Motcow'i lead in forming then commie-moos; rcorganired republic party structures havetrong resemblance lo ibc new Central Commit tec slruciure (seche compos.-nor of tbe Ukraine'sonly ones that have been poUiciud SOstiikingly sisrntar lo thai of the Central (eunmii tec's commissions, and the resolution creating them virtually duplicates word fm word thai drafted tot the national level apparatus

Streamlining Use Apparatus

I heworking staff of ihe partysupport ihe oommissions byto provide substantive eipciltsc in Iheir areas of


Cutiing Regional Parly Organization,

in iht regional parly apparatuses have parol-Irltd ihoit propotrd in Montour,ihtIf/"'million rtf Central Committeeand with the number af departments cut by more than half at all levels. The number of personnel laidfiredesult of the cutbacks, however, appears to be substantially louree.umber of pattyfrom the branchapparently slated forto the stale economic apparatus. '

So far, plenumsumber of non-Russian republic! have proposed reorganisations comparablehose made at the national level, and the remaining rrpub-Iki are certainollow thtlr Uad:

A Ukrainian pltnum,ctober, created five republic Central Committer eommiisionsto the CPSU Central Committee commissions llkere will be no Ukrainian commissionhe numbte of departments will be cut from tt so nine and the number ef republic-level "icsponilble workers- will be reducedecrease of less than JOtcond plenum, heldecember, listed ihe membership! of the five republic eomnilislons: ihe personnel chosen lo staff tht Ukrainian commissions were strikingly similar In background to the member! of ihe eeniral party commliilons.

ovember Kaiakh plenum also establishedommiisions and cut the number offrom IT to eight. Thr plenum noted. or JO percent, of the republic, obkem. and gorkom personnel had been transferred lo "strengthen grajsrootl party, soviet, and economic organs

firctober Ijstvtan plenum decided to cut ihe number of republic departments frorrto eight and lo reduce the republic pony apparatus by JO percent. The plenum decided not to trim the slaffi uf city Igor horn) and district (raykom) party committees

The Moscow City committee reduced the number of department! fromo seven and decidedut ihe gorkom staff by JO percent at itsctober plenum. Of that figure, one-third will be distributed among Moscow's raykorns. while otheri will be usedreinforce local governing and economic bodies In the city.

As af January, every repttblie had held Itsplrnum. The results were uniformly similar to those drierlbed above, wiih very liulr deviation

The8 plenum ftbe commtmcoi io "rely hi ibcir wort, onof Ihe relevant CPSU Centralindicating thai the depart menuio play an important polllicat role,owever. Ihal the reorganization willpower of the departments insofar as tbornol be as all encompassing as ihey wereindieated thai some of ihemenu caobabty "iH be down traded iolliene (hat reman.

ue the intrusions of the No-ember plenum, the role of ihe lemainmg departmentsii the com-minions it Kill unclear, ll appears thai thewill niTJole in polietmaking, but the Soviets are lending miicd ii trials on ttiri point. In Novembci C ,

thai his depart-

ment -ill no longer deal with operative qucatinrtt otin drawing up policy papers Accordinghowever C-

3thai the departments will

ai (he "working organs" of Ibesome son of policy support rose.an audience of culturaln earlyihe apparatus's functions had been alteredtoward pcitiey- rather than day-to-dayinihe departments will serve as "standinglo iheir correspooding commissions and willthe party's daily research" in theircompetence.

The apparatus bai been consofidalcdentral Committee depart menu into nine" (see rsetj.o tbe seeaDesldepartments in overears. Severalmostly with specific sectors ofbeen abolished. The number ofCommittee department personnel has beenby aboutercent,o about

jf_ Vindicated that anentral parly workers may he cut ia the future" Most of ihe personnel cuts hare apparently been in threpartments. One immediate erTeci nf the overall personneleduction will be to increase slightly ihe site of ihe hew departments, as ihe beal party workers in ihedepartments are shifted io Ibtne thai remain

Gorbachev loW cultural officialsanuaryspeech thai "a' decision has been made on culling the patty Central Committee apparalu) byercent,irablc pari of ihe workis area has already beenhe proportion of personnel being eui decreases for tower-level party or aim tat ions Al ihe republic and oblasiO-pcrcenl reduction of the party apparatus has been tbe norm, and lower-rfvei part) rganiuiiont-cit) and districteiperienced link or noductions

n<-run iF< in i. pioDibi.f

tlgi, Ot(rom one

" Ii ii unclearttla bu| |h(chi

W"Co" Cl ill ii mi iilu mil)'.entral Cnn


tit" itiii,ir,

mbeds." e'-nr il il,.

mild .r

<hlfljin Intent tut vn.(l.n

Parly Building and

Cadre Work State and Legal Agrarian

Defense International




rty Work

Administrative Organs Agriculture and Food


Defense Industry International Bloc liaison Cadres Abroad Propaganda Culture

Science and Educational

Institutions Lecmomlc


thousand* of parly workers for reassignment. As il is. (he Soviets arc having difficulty reassigning cadres released from (he ccnlral and republic party"

Regardless of Ihe departments' precise role and size, Ilic reorganization has brought aboul an apparcnl decrease in Siaius associated with work in the Central parly apparatus. Speaking laleC


C * Jlhai it was probable ihal no department would be headedarty secretary. Of iheepartments in eiiiiencc ioive (Cadre. International, Bloc Liaison. Economic, andOrgans) were headed by party secretaries. Now. only the Cadre Department remainsarty secretary. This exception may be temporary, bui is probably because of the importance of Ihe cadre portfolio, since il still oversees the appointment of the highest ranking party and slate official'

Employees of the central party apparatus who arc not retained by the party arc being given work elsewhere. In an October interview in the Czechoslovak press, then Cadre Depanmeni Deputy Chief Gcoigiy KryuchkaY impliedubstantial shareaiely one-third) of those leaving the centralwould be shifted lo tower-level pany organiza-lions; another large group would transfer- along wiih itsIhe stale apparatus (for example, Dobrynin and Zagladin. who were transferred from the party's foreign policy apparatus tohe Supremepparently,mall minority will retire. Ironically, Kryuchkov himself was dispatched from Ihe Cadre Department into head the regional parly organization in Odessa only lwo weeks aflcr his Interview.

Soviet officials have admitted that ihe icorganiration lias caused some problems in ihe parly apparatus. Gorbachev himself hinted during his February lour ol Ihe Ukraine ihal ihe party apparatus was having difficulty attracting good people. Presumably, the greatest problem ihe party faces in aiirscting suitable cadres is ihal there is loo much competitionimited number of jobs, wiih veteran parly employees scrambling to ensure themselves of the choicestthereby freezing out new blood. Others

currently outside ihe party apparatus may be thinking twice beforeob with an uncertain future.

Moscow Obtast party chief Valentin8 Pravda Lnierview thaiworkers to lower-level pany organizations was not proceeding smoothly. "Truth toesyats admitted, "so far not many people wish to assume the responsibility of workingorkom (city) or raykoin (district) apparatus. Qualified specialists do not like the wages or. more important, the workload and the frequent lack of freehis altitude canbe eiicnded to those who have tost their jobs in Ihe central party apparatus as well.

The cuts have undoubtedlylow to the prestige associated with parly work, and ihe morale of the remainingwith the threat of furtherprobably low. One speaker at Ihe9 Central Committee plenum noted thai some regional party organizations had been forced to drafl parly workers. Dissatisfaction has probably also spread to other institutions ihal have been forced io absorb the party's surplus personnel. Resentment in ihese institutions, which includeacademic institutes, and lower-level Soviets and party organizations, is probably fueled by thehigh salaries of ihe newcomers; C


who had goneower-paying job* were being allowed to keep iheir high party salaries.

"New" Departments

The reorganization, by reducing ihe number and sire of ibe depanments and subordinating them io the commissions, has probably enhanced Gorbachev's ability to control them. Although they have been described in the Soviet media ashe remaining departments arc built from the remnants of their predecessors. In tome cases, not even the names have been changed

The Central Department has come to be closely associaied with Ihe office of General Secretary. The department's head. Valcriy Dotdin.ember of (he

Cadre Policy Commission and bu clean career tie* io Gorbachev, for whom be worked ai in aide for ail year* before attaining hi* correal petition. The Ad-ministration af Affairs, which is reiponiible for pro-vidlng logistic supporthe party, Is headed by another apparent Gorbachev ally. Nikolay Kruchina (who isember of the Cadre PolicyTbe General Department and the Adminislra-tion of Affairs were apparently unaffected by (he reorganization. Both will play critical supporting roles in the apparatus and. accordant; to tbe November plenum resolution, tbey will provide "the organira-tional nnd technical conditions for the functioning- of the CPSUommit lee's comroiu.ocu.""

Although the rcJc of tbe Adminlslralion of AlTairs in regard to the chnmissions will probably be-restricted to one of making arrangements for their meetings, the role of Ihe General Department could be especially importantorbachev's control of and influence over the commissions. With lis responsibilities for Politburo support and maintenance of partyIhe General Department could serveean* foi Gorbachev to influence not only the "i'i:-das of ihe quarterly commission meetings, bul also tbe decisions reached at those meetingsll.

The Parly Building and Cadre Work Department (formerly Organ!rational-Party Worl) will continue lo be, wiih the General Department, one of the mos; important dements of the apparatus. The Cadre Department will retain most, if nol all. of iu broad responsibilities for personnel placement in pany and other organizations. Although other departments have ceded some of iheir influence over lower-level party organizationi, representatives of (Jin Cadre Dcrinri-menl hive continued lo attend the many republic- and oWist-level furKtioos fallowing ibe reorganization Indeed, the Cadre Department may be the chief beneficiary of the overall redaction of (he Ccnlral Committee apparatus, pouibly adding personnel in an already elisting sector for personnelarea that some Soviets have identified as one of the regime's priorities. Although some of litei la (Ten have been assigned to jobs outside Moscow, (be infUx of workers from ihe abofisbed departments should easily fill ihetr vacancies. The continuation of Ihe more orthodox Rarumov as Ihe

Tke Ideological Department Uleeareky Chief; Alekiondr Kapio First Deputy Chief: Atekiandr Degtyarev Deputy Chiefs:

Fundamental Scientific Research; Ofeg Oiheretytv

Parly Propaganda:.

Mass Media: Unburn*

Foreign Propaganda Hi kola, Yejismyr

Training and. Ryatxrt

Culture and Arts: Vladimir Yegoeov

depanmcnt't first deputy chief may be an indication of Ligacbcv's continuing influence, batays in the apparatus are probably numbered. There has been significant turnover belowof six of the department's deputy chiefi have been identified sinces have several new sector chiefs

Like the reorganized Cadre Department, theDepartment willroad rattge of rmpoosi-bilities, because ii incorporates (he three formerfor Propaganda. Culture, and Science and educational Insiilulions.9 Pravda interview, department chief Akksandr Kapto said ihil tbe departonsisted of si*apparently headedeputychtef and corresponding to (he major areas of Soviei social life (see inseiL The consolidation of the traditionalepartments into one signals the regime's desire tonified party line doenestically and abroad. At the same lime, the division of the department into only six general subuniu indicates ibat it will exercise less direct conirol over detaih of ibe regime'* tdeetogicnl robcy.

Kaptoentral Committee fall member whose toots are Ln ihe Ukraine and whose political onenu-lion is unclear. Kapto servedumber of importsni


posts under Shchcrbllskiy In Ilie Ukraine, but Sheherbilskiy reportedly engineered hit removal from the republic and appointment at Am (urn doc loraditional diplomaticit (our at Amor to Cuba ended after two yean in ihe summerhen be returned to Moscow, he was identified as first deputy chief of acertainly Bloc liaison, which was then headed by party Secretary Medvedev, and which was abolished In the reorganization.ead (he parly's Ideological Department suggests that be had ihe sponsorship of ai least Ideological Commission Chairman Medvedev

Kapto't public persona suggests (hai betrong believer in party discipline and (hai be may have some reservations about how for gtsuasoir has already gone: In his Fravda interview, he lamented "ihc stridency, the sensationalism,estructive (brail" of some wriiings that had gotten out of hand and caused "contusion in people's minds" Daring bis lea are in Ihe Ukraine, Kapto bad chief responsibility for tbe republic's hardline policy against nationalism. In the post of Ukrainian ideology secretary, Kapto'tand articles were conservative and Includedcitations of both Shcberbrtikiy and Mikhail Sus-lov. Brezhnev's how discredited Ideology chief. Because (he Ideological Department probably will have at least indirect responsibility for the regime's nationality policy. Kapto't appointment and track record raise the possibility lhal he was selected lohelpougher line on nationalism

Kioto's first deputy chief. Alcksandr Degtyarcv,In late November. Degtyarcv. who wasstar in the lenlngrad ideologicalowe his appointment to Medvedev. who Isfrom that region. Among (bechiefs, allegiances are less clear, butworkedunder Yakovtev, Medvedev,

or both.

Of ibc nine branch economicbal rusted before Ihe reorganization, only

" Tke lerat "triacli coiuiiiiichuw dtnsrt-

hat deal)icvciAc areas ol Ikeami, "lataaaiW iraifaauiiwa are.advstrj.sad foaerl.fehi lad-HQ aad Cafanin Ceods. Cenilrssctien. Chrmicit l'du<m. Trade and Donttaiie Smke. aad risaapooalUn and Coinmiinsaikui

Agrarian Department (formerly Agriculture andand ibe Defense Department (formerlymore or less ir.taciseven have been abcJitbcd, aod pcttsibtyas sectors of the new Socioeconomic(previously the Economic Department,ScciX"Depanmcoipecialist in the defenseworked previously lo ihe Soviet Union'sin the party's Defenseiter of (he Radio Industry, lahead of tbe Socioeconomicpassed aver Vladimir Moafain, (hedeputy chief of (he Economic Department.remainsirst deputy. Nikolayheaded the defunct Trade aad Domesticwas also identifiedirst deputythe department in December

The sytiemalic elimination of ihc branch economic departments became apparent early last summer, as senior officials were reassigned io jobs outsideand not replaced in (he Moscow posts (seehlt exodus from ihe highest levels of ibc party's economic apparatus is the clearest indication that Gorbachev's efforts to take the party out of the day-today minagcment of the economy arc sincere. Even if the new Sccacecrjetonsic Department increases its size. It cannot possibly hope to follow ihe many sectors of the rscooomy In the depth thai ihe old branch department! did

Few details of ibe Arrarian DepoJintent wereimmediately after the reorganization, but, sincef ihc year, il has becetmc increasingly dear lhat ihe dcistnmcnt is almost (he same as Its prcreor-ganiration predecessor. Documents ofentral Committee plenuman Skiba, tbe incumbent, as department bead.ordviat-sev. who had served under Skiba io the old Agricul-lure and Food Industry Department, remains as first deputy chief, and ihrec holdovers remain as deputy chiefs at well

Table 3

ead for (be Hlrtiertands -



Arl.Ji, VulMiy .

Vcniimln Afo-.n


_f Uffcl ladBuryObaaro ftm secretar>


Sorfri rrorcscatailvc la the Ciiian

Cfckf, Chemical ladvitry



Chief. Machine-epartmcM

Prim Oblotn inl aocrctary

Iiantjqilattoa aad

licalioni Olpanmenl

Khatarovit Kra Thorn tut


Coaneiiwn Dcpanmeat

Probably inspector.i

Obkom 6il

Drhambolataibai in! first aeeretary

Uel'yakov, chief cn* ihe De/tiue Dtp-t'trnrnt. is ibe only official of Ibai department io be ideaiieed publicly aince Ibe rcoegamiaiioti BeTyakovtrained ai en engineer and probably tpeni hii early career workin; in (he Leningrad miltUry-ifldustriai complci. He hai spent most ofyear party career in Itc Defense Irxioiiry Departmcet or ill derivative, and. in the. be served at an aidehen parly Secretary for Defense Industry Gfigoeiy Romanov. Although It lately receives alien-lion in the tried La, BeTyakov'i depuiiment will beatiicuLarly sensitive position, becaaae itajor role in oveiieeing ibe changeover of iomc defense cnterprisci to civilian consume!The shortening of Ibe department's name mayesire to deemphasire the department's managementector of the Soviet ccoocony It does not indicate ihst (he department will asiume any direct supervision of the military,rt)'

The chief difference in tbe Itarrnaitonalthai it has subsumed the former Blocheaded byAbroad Department- whose aging chief,Chervonenko. has retired. Newly appointedchief Filin has been involved for moil ofin European aflairs.ossiblethe cmphisii on US-Soviet relation thatunder talrn's oredeccssor, Dobrynin-fT 3that, although hii depart-

ment would no longer deal with "operative" questions, it would now work with the Ministry of Foreign Aflairs when draf tin*policy sUtemenii on inter rational attain

An apparent supporter of Gorbachev! domesticalin has been more conservative en iAtcrnatlon-al issues; be haaefended Ibe Stalin-fiii.es nonaggrusion pact and blamed Ihe Weal lorihe Coldlhal deviate from those in ihc forefront ol* "no thinking" lib Sm deputy chiefs, Karen DruicnUfa former deputy chief in the "old" International Department) and Rafsil Fedorovormci deputy chief in tbe Bloc Liabonbring new regionallo ihe depart-mcnl's leadcnhlp. Former lint deputies Gcoagiy Kce-niyenko and Vadirn Zagladin both focused on Can-West tela lions through much of Iheir careers, whilerominent Third World specialistn East European expert. At lean sia deputyariety of backgrounds have been identified, indicating ibat the International Department will continue lo be broken into regional and functional rectors

1 Jute about the Siait and Legal Department has been publiCiud. suggestingoniinualion ofreluctance to identify scene of its personnel ot lhal Ihe Anal structure and SUIT of the departmentstill be unsettled. Theesponsible for many of the same functions as iu predecessor, ihe Administrativehich monitored ihe military, security appelates, judicial system, and ihe peeiee. The State and legal Department has apparentlyector, which previously existed In the Cadre Department, for oversight of nationalities issues. The sector's bead, Vyacheslav Mikhsylov, was Identified In the presseputy chief of ihc Stale and Legal Department


Alcksandr Pavlov, wbo had previously servedeputy chief of Ihe Administrative Organswas identified as chief of ihe new department in early November. Pavlov has worked for overears in ibe party apparatus, overseeing tbe national and rermbhe procuraciespeechashkent voters in Maich, Pnvlov said liltlc to distinguish himself aseformerradilionalbl, but emphasized ihe themes of law andd updating (he Soviel legal code Thai Pavlovegal esperi, rather Ihnn a

miliiaty or tecuriiy specialist, is probably indicative of Use importance of Ihe foeihcesmiag legalew hrsi deputy, V. Ye. Sidorov. abo appears loegal capect. Pavlov Icapfiogged over I, A.iliiaty officer wbo remains at ihe department's other fitsi deputy

Whal Will Change?

Although the apparatushole has sustained major Cuts in iu overall sire, the remaining dcrtari-menu actually appear to have been strengthened by an influx of persooftel fioni ihe dbbanded depart-menu. Unless power can be successfully shifted from ibe parly appaisius to tbe corrcspoodiog stale bodies, there may be little real changeytiem in which ihe parly apparatus has been responsible only to itself. Reformist party wor* gr Leon Ocikov.ravda interview, illustrated the absurdity of Ihesystem:

In effect, moil draft resolutions were preparrd In secret by the party commit lee apparatus After adopting the resolutions ihe samecarried them out, then It-verified how thr relocations II wets executing were being txetul-rd. and finally thai same apparatus reported bock on how It had executed ihem. Thispractice Is clearly contrary to theof restructuring and means that many af the CPSIf Central Corrnttlliee's general party resolutions are destined lo have little

Il ii difficult io gauge Ihc level of support for Ihe old way of doing things described by Onihov, but there undoubtedly remain apparalchlkl who arc jealously defending their authority. Although ihc technical subordination of the apparatus to ibe commissions severs tbe apparatus's direct link io the Politburo, it remains unclear whether tbe separation can be main-Mined In practice. The Soviets appear uncertain and even cor.fused over how tbe restructured apparatus will function when the reforms ate implemented

Implications foi Political htfanii

Gorbachev's reorganization of ihe pany apparatus haa (he potentialhance the -ay Soviet pcaittci it practiced. It represent! the most comprehensiveof tbe pany'i structure since Khrushchev's bifurcation of the apparatuslthough it is clear the reorganization was hastily contrived and motivated in pan by Gorbachev's desire to enhance his power and circumvent Liiaehev'i conirol of ihe Secretariat, it also fits within Gorbachev's overall political reform scheme Its impact on ihe distribution of powcii in ihe Soviet poliitcal system remiini to be seen, but Gotoacbev apparently hopes it will help his long-term effon to reduce porty imotvemenl in day-to-day decisionmaking and management and enhance ihe ability of stale institutions and economiclo assume those functions, ll remains unclear, however, how tbe newly created Supreme Soviet committees end standing commissions will interact with the party's executive bodies, in panitulat. the Politburo and the Central Committee commissions.

Gorbachev appears determined to curtail some pany functions and eliminate others altogether. He seems to have concluded that ibe party's supervitron of so many areas of daily Soviei life hasey source of sucnaiMa aad that pany control snaat be relaxed, if noi across ihe board, at least in certain important areas, including*

Tht economy. Eliminating the party's day today supervision of the economy and simultaneouslythe government bureaucracy's roleihe greater play bring given to market force) in the Soviet economy. The party has eliminated all but lwo o! its departments thai correspondedectors of (he economy.

Thr medio. The party it withdrawing from in directive role. As gtainoir has expanded, ihe pany's ideological departments have shifted to providing, at most, general guidance ralher than specificThe party has consolidated three ideological departments into one

Personnel selection. To the exlem thai reforms cf Ihe electoral process succeed and expand, the role of the parly apparatus in personnel selection willdecline, leaving cadre departments wiih lesso and less in need of large Hafts The national cloctioa for the Congress of Peopk'ain March was ibe most dramatic example to dale of ihe party's shrinking abilitytur appointments to officii! posts

Redistributing Power

The reorganization of the pany apparaius hasrofound impact on ihe party's highest executivePolitburo. Secretariat, and Centralon Gorbachev's abilityominate them. It appears that ibe commiuions will perform much ibe tameote as ibe Secretariat did, but they will probably formalize the fines of authority - the leadership, making the Politburo the uncontested decassonnuking body. Tbemakes ihe partythe exception of Gorbachev, who stands clearly above the rcsi--formal cqunli nnd will make it difficult for Individual secretaries other than Gorbachev to dabble In fields other than iheir own

Gorbachev would almost certainly take advantageposition as chairmantroager Politburosapport forotential problemfacet in strengthening the Politburo,is that it could become even more boggedadminittraiive minutiae than il already is Csecretary

Yakovtcv c'ptrssed annoyance chat the Politburo was "overloaded with the management uf detailsto lis function,o focus on largerhe commissions' infrequent meetingprobably will not lessen the Politburo's heavy adnainaiiralive load. and. without the Secretarial lo tiller out the less important "issues, the Politburo could find itself overwhelmed ia detail

Gorbachev hopes to prevent overloading the Politburo by leaving administrative details lo the Centrnldepart mcnis. ihe government slrueture, and


the new stale institutions. In theory, both Ihcand Secretarial arc being stripped ol some ofresponsibilities Bul, ji


Politburo "willC supreme Occitionmaktngllbouth bolh Ihc Polilbuio and Secrciariai will rcircaluraletjiche Secreiarlal't iclc ii suppcuale clearly subordinate io lhal ol* ihc Politburo '

Gorbachev may hope io use ihe commissions:divide and tnnoucr" what is led of ihe Central Committee,a' several small commiiwith aa apparently high concentration ol* re forbe more compliant and supportiveeform lhan one laigci, more orthodox body. Clear Opponents of ccoitomie reforms on Ihe Centralthe heads of industrial ministries and slate committee) wbo would be most threatened by theiralmost completely ea-eluded from commission membership. Gorbachev's purge of ihcommii tec al ihc"9 plenumarge bloc of Ureahnev-era bold-overs wbo presumably were not enthusiastic about reform

Implications for Cor barber

process of shifting power from Ihe parly ioGorbachev has laid Ihc groundwork forwill bolster his own position Thehandicapped potential rivals by shifting, ingreat deal of power not only io Ihc slateindividaal enterprises, but also lo aposi lhal Gorbachev conveniently nils.

likely that, with ihc parly's continuedihc policymaking process, the stale presidencybe as powerful as Ihc parly's Generalmake il

ndicates thai Gorbachev intends to go beyond undermining the Secrciariai loweaken ihe role of Ibe General Secretary"is the presidency. Il is conceivable lhal Gorbachev would eventually trade Ibe enormous institutional power of party leader for the censt iiuiional powertrengthened stale presidency The lime whenrade-off will be politically tenable, however, appears io be substantially down ihe toad II is more likely

thai Gorbachev will wail until he is sulTicicntly confident of Ihc powers of the presidency and equally sure of his Politburoespect of those powers before he acts lo oadcrminc ihe authority of ihe party lo such an eiireiue

An Uneerials Outlook

Like many of his reforms. Gorbachev's reorganiulion of ihe party apparatus bears lellialc signs ofon the march Ahhougt Gorbachev has tried toohesive tision of how power should be distributed between ihe Communist Parly, Supicmc Soviet, and Council of Ministers, in realiiy ii Is doublful thai even he knows ho- itwork in practice There is considerable confusionamong senior officials close toIbcired pally apparatus In fact, social noted reformers have eiprcsscd confuiton over how the new parly and lisle structures will interact:

i that tinot yei

cleat lo him bow ibc new party siruetuieis ihe reformed Supreme Soviet.appar-

ently unsure of how (he commissions aridinteract,

oenmons ia airmail ihe same sentence C

ihc leadership had not provided any cleat guidelines onIhe commissions were to function. Moreover, all ibc commissions had not met for ihe first limeneatly loci months iftcr tbeir mcrnbcnh'oacon fumed al Ibc II November plenum

The failure of the Soviets to work out wme of ihcof Ihc recegaaiulio* maycgiecand resistance within the partyshortly after ihe8

plenumdler fromiheugustelicitedlorm" of opposition within ihc Politburo and Central Com-rruiice over ibc proposed emasculation of ihe Score latiai. Moreover, Jindteaied ibat.ibetc wasbroad circle" of dissatisfied party

member* opexooJ io tbe proposal* conuloed in live letter, tbey were netd did not dire oponly ilnte their cnjspcrdllon.

Although their coexern* onooobeediy find eipresaion through the more orthodor mem ben of ihethe pany apparaituayor blow when itspcncv. was removed as second secretary. ligairic*'s removal and the overall decline In prestige associated with party workt-reeejq tnorak problem La the apparatus Threats of further cuts, whether genuine or not. have probably galvanized the apparatus In itsto clin; to its few remaining prerogatives

Now that (be Secretariat and the bulk of (be Central Committee are cast oat of the policyiitakinj pact are. Gorbachev win have to ensure that they stay out. If Ibe commissions falter as policymakingesurgent Secretariat could rccstabttsb itself at the center of the policy process. For reform lo aucceed, Oorbachcv will need commission* andpartythat are cornrnittod to carrying oat not only the klter of hi* policies, but also the spirit as well.

Anwar itu-i

^Seertf 1


Original document.

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