TRENDS

Created: 5/24/1989

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In this if sat..

Chinese leadership struggle Gorbachev's visit to China Soviet retreat on missile issue Opening session of new USSR congress Ligachev vs. corruption investigators Hungarian leaders on defensive Syrian endorsement of terrorism

Trends

FBIS TRENDS FBTM

Contents

China

Hardliners Gain Upper Hand in Leadership 1

Provinces Give Mixed Reviews lo Martial 6

USSR-Ohm

Glow of Gorbachev Visil Dimmed by Chinese 10

East-West Reunions

Moscow Retreats Fromhrcai. Hits NATO7 USSR

Power Struggle Looms at Congress of Deputies Session19

Embattled Corruption Investigators Attack2J

Hungary

Leadership Faces Accelerating Demands for Radical29

Syria

Broadcasts Endorse Rafsanjani'i Call for Killing 35

(REVERSE BLANK)

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bS( OKI

USSR-China

Clow of Gorbachev Visit Dimmed by ChincM Turmoil

Both Moscow and Beijing's treatment of President Gorbachevs historic visit to China, marking the end of three decades of interstate and intrrparty estrangement, emphasized areas of agreement and indicated thai continuingoverwill not prevent the further development of relations. In an effort to sustain the impression that the visitajor success fororeign policy and to avoid offending any of the possible "maw I" 'he current Chinese power struggle. Soviet medio deemphasited the massive demonstrations in China during the visit and showed sensitivity toward the Chinese leaderships dilemma in dealing with the unrest.

The WW. dlspulc waaurjo|ma to ai.na-.ibe first Sino-Soviet summit since Nikita9 trip. Gorbachev met separately with several senior Chineseirst with im official host. Prestdem Yang Shangkun, and the following day with senior leaderXiaoping. Premier Li Peng, and finally parly General SecretaryXiyanf ln acommunique issued at the end of the visit the sides

rTl^J.UT'1ormalisation of{Pravda Renmin Rlbao, ,9

Deng jo,nlly announced" the realization of normalization, agreeing to

,oward".lateral ties

{Renmin Ribao,ay).

Despite the two sides' expressed intention to disregard the past.heand to subtly fi,

roposin* ,he ,deaummit, although he alsofor Pooling the idea in his6 Vladivostok speech which Deng said had demonstrated "new content" in Soviet foreign policy {Renmin Ribao. Pravda.lthough both sides stressed their des.re to close the book on past problems and look to the future (Beijing

to

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television.ay; Pravda.hinese media accounts of the Deng-Gorbachev meeting nevertheless cited Gorbachev as acknowledging certain unspecified past Soviet "mistakes" (Renmin Ribao,ay; Beijing television.emark not reported in Soviet media.

Cambodian Issue Beijing's treatment of the Deng-Gorbachev meeting glossed over continuing differences about Cambodia and made it clear that bilateral relations will continue to develop despite disagreement on this issue. Renmin Ribao reported no objection by Deng when Gorbachev said that Chinas longstanding "three obstacles" to normalization had beenotwithstanding Deng's stern lecture on Cambodia to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze during the latter's visit just three months ago and the recent stiffening of Beijing'senmin Ribao only tersely reported that the leaders' discussion of Cambodia failed to reach agreement "on all points" and that the two sides' foreign ministers would continue to exchange opinions on the issue. In line with Moscow's usual emphasis on the positive, the Pravda account of the Deng-Gorbachev meeting reported only that they had agreed to seek "the swiftest political settlement" in Cambodia.

Nevertheless, the summit did nothing to resolve the longstanding disagreement between the two sides over the termsambodia settlement, and the communique on the visit pointedly noted that despite "all-around and

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in-depth exchanges" on Cambodia, the iwo sides "still havehe communique made it clear that, in additionontinued disagreement over international aspects of the question, such as the UN role in an agreement, the two sides still disagree substantially on the difficult issues concerning an internal settlement in Cambodia. Spelling out these divergences, the communique indicated lhat Moscow maintains its position lhat the "internal" problems of preparing for an election should be solved by the "Cambodianshile Beijing, in keeping wiih its longstanding policy, "favors" the formation of an interim four-party coalition government headed by resistance leader Prince Sihanouk to manage the elections.

Military Detente In contrast to the lack of movement on Cambodia, progress appears to have been made on reducing the level of military confrontation, although Beijing is reluctant to acknowledge anything beyond unilateral actions. The communique noted that the two sides had agreed to "take measures" to reduce military forces along the borderinimumut it did not mentjonany consultations or joint actions. In hisay Beijing press conference, however. Gorbachevecision to setworking negotiating mechanism" for troop reductions along the border {Pravda,uch an agreement was also mentioned in the Pravda account of Gorbachevs meeting with Premieray) but not in Chinese media reports of that session. During the two foreign ministerial visits in8 and9 the Soviets appear to have presicd for some type of negotiations on military issues, but the Chinese have yet to publicly endorsetep.'

Despite its reluctance to be seen to be involved in military negotiations, Beijing was quick to applaud further unilateral Sovicl steps toward military detente. According to the communique. Beijing welcomed the sun of Moscow's most recent troop withdrawal from Mongolia onay. In an interview with Soviclave the impression that Gorbachev had told him Moscow intends eventually to withdraw all of its troops from Mongolia (TASS,ay; Renmin Ribao.ut Soviet media did noi quote Gorbachev as making this pledge. The communique did note Beijing's hopecomplete" withdrawal would take placeshort" time.

Border Demarcation In an apparent indication that serious horsclrading over various disputed sectors of the border will now begin, the communique noted thai,pirit of mutualegotiations on eastern and western sectors of the border will be reunited and

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thai discussion will be held at the foreign ministerial level "whenCommon understanding" was reporledly reached on "most" of the eastern sector last fall and joint aerial surveys of the western sector have been conducted sincereviously, negotiations on the eastern and western sectors of the border had been held separately and only at the deputy foreign minister level or below.

has long been the case for high-level Sinc-Sovicl

meetings. Beijing's reporting on tbe visit appeared less upbeat than Moscow's. Pravda'% editorial assessing the visit characterized tbe atmosphere of tbe talks overall as "open (oikrylyy) and friendly" {Pravda,hile the Renmin Ribao wrapup editorial published onh did not describe the atrnosphere at all. Descriptions of Gorbachev's individual meetings likewise differed.

Renmin Ribao called the meeting with Deng "friendly andhile Pravda the same day added "constructive" to that characterization.

Rtnmin Ribao also characterized the meeting with Li as "frank andut Pravda described the atmosphere as "warm anday).

Curiously. Renmin Ribao's more upbeat description of the meeting with Zhao asay) was not echoed in Pravda. At the endeport on the Zhao meeting. TASS onh had described Gorbachev's "meetings and talks" in general as "warm andut this description was omitted in the next day's Pravda.

eliberate gesture to Gorbachev in tbe

Newsphere. He favorably mentioned

Gorbachev's "new politicalnd the communiqueeference to it together with Deng's conceptew international political order. Renmin Ribao's account of Gorbachev's press conference carried his remarks on the consonance of the two concepts. While some Soviet officials and media commentators have linked the two approaches, thi| marks the first time Chinese media have reported any Soviet as making that point.*

'See the TrtnththeISage 6.

PartyMoscow and Beijing; treated the lummil as

constituting Ihe resumption of partytics. The communique confirmed that "contacts and exchanges" between the CPSU and CPC would "develop" on the basts of "independence, complete equality, mutual respect, anduriously, there were discrepancies in Chinese reports on just which meeting constituted the formal restoration of ties. Most Chinese media accounts of the Deng-Gorbachev meeting quoted Deng as saying that the Soviet leader's later meeting with Zhao would "mark" normalization of party tics (Xinhua, Beijing television,ay; Renmin Ribao,owever, Chinese accounts of the meeting with Zhao also noted his assertion that party ties were normalized during Gorbachev's earlier meeting with Deng (Xinhua, Beijing television,ay; Renmin Ribao,he context of Zhao'slong explanation of Deng's continued role as paramount leader and "helmsman"that Zhao may have intended his remarks for Chinas domestic audience, however.

i -i reflecting Moscow's desireuccessful

onas well as its uncertainty about the future of

China's leadership. Soviet media did not take sides in reporting the massive protests during and after Gorbachev's visit. Disruptions to Gorbachev's official schedule were reported briefly, without any criticism of Chinese handling of (be changes (Moscow television, IS May; Pravda,ay; Komsomoltkaya Pravda,orbachev himself was careful to keep his comments on the domestic upheaval in Beijing low key and inoffensive Several times during his press conference, when pressed to comment on the demonstralions, he maintained his position lhat it was not his

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pass judgment" on the "difficult political dialogue" talcing place. In the clearest sign of Soviet annoyance that ihe demonstrations were competing with the summit for Western media and public attention. Gorbachev saidhort interview with Moscow television before leaving Shanghai that his program there had been "completely wreckedut he immediately added that his plans had been "wreckedood way" because it had allowed him to have contact with the "people of Shanghai" (Moscow television,fter Gorbachev's return to Moscow, media coverage of the situation in Beijing became more detailed and began to report the demonstrators' concrete demands, but both during and after the summit the media have pictured the protesters as having acceptable intentions (Moscow radio.ay; hvesiiya, Sovetskaya Rossiya,ay; Pravda*ay).

has gone out of its way to indicate that the

Futurefoundation for the further development of

Sino-Soviet relations will not be swept away by any leadership change in Beijing.

Theay Pravda editorial wrapup on the visit did not referingle Chinese leader by name,

The Izvtstiya editorial published the same day mentioned Deng only once, citing him as urging Gorbachev to disregard the past and look to the future, but it did nottmention any other Chinese leader by name.

Borisember of the Foreign Ministry collegium and editor in chief of the journal Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,hetorical question about the stability of the new Sino-Soviet relationship during Moscow radio's weekly roundtablc discussion onay. He answered optimistically, but equivocally, that "there, are grounds" for believing that ihe normalization is based on "fairly firm foundations."

A report on the Beijing demonstrations broadcast on the main Soviet evening television news onay included short recorded interviews with protesters, all of whom disclaimed any connection between the protests and Sino-Soviet relations. The report ended on the reassuring note that although the situation in Beijing is "highlyne thing that is clear is that "equally in the top leadership and at the grassroots level" Chinese attitudes toward the USSR are "good."

forjse oniy

uncertainly over the final outcome of the

leadership struggle In Beijing may put Sino-Soviet relations on hold temporarily, the USSR will undoubtedly continue to push for improvements in relations over the longer term. Moscow can take heart from the fact that the Chinese leadership at all levels appears solidly behind improving bilateral relations. Nonetheless, until the Chinese leadership resolves its current domestic political problems, Beijing will not be able to respond to further Soviet initiatives.

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