The Road lo the Tiananmen Crackdown: An Analytic Chronology of Chinese Leadership Decision Makin
paperaseline analytic cbroextlogy of theetween the death of llu Yaobartg on9 and tbe oeoter of General Sccrcury Zhao Ziyang at the 4th Plenum erf the party Central Committee ont is not an auempt to look _lhc water*bed event* of April-June or assess their signi&canccHB
is an effort to rxeserve what
in one document
The paper also identifies the major players, the methods they used in assuring support, and the critical decision points in the leadership's handling of tbe simultaneous crises within its own ranks and on Tiananmen Square. Events in the provinces, troop movements, the actions of the itudem-kd demonstrators in the square, and foreign reactions areonly to give context to the leadership's actions.M
The paper draws mainly from account* in the Chinese and Hong Kong press, which both sides in the leadership struggle used to explain their actions and rally support for their
The Road to (be Tiananmen Crackdown: An Analytic Chronology of Chinese Leadership Decision Makinj
leadership decisions leading uphc crackdown on prodemoctacy
demonstrations and the subsequent purge by Deng Xiaoping and olher party hardliners of the demonstrators' supporters appear to have gone through four major phases:
From IS topril, the regime tried intimidation, making statements and publishing editorials that were so provocative, they fueled rather than cooled the demonstrations.
Frompril toay, then party General Secretary Zhao Zijang tried to soften lhe regime's tactics, causing an irreparable split between Zhao and the hardliners,
The hardliners regained control over decisionmaking in the third phase,ayune, which culminated in ihe bloody crackdown on Tiananmen Square.
beginningune the hardliners turned their attention lo consolidating power and removing potential threats to their control.
On the basis of leadership statements and press reporting durirg these four phases, we can draw several conclusions about decisiontnaktng during (he crisis. First, Deng Xiaoping probably approed of and directed (be entire crackdown. He signed the order sending the troops into Tiananmen Squareune; he brought back the old guard when the parly Standing Committee faltered; and he personally dealt with (he military. Deng was clearly worried (hat the demonstrators would lead China toward anarchy. He witnessed the crowds in the square, knowing that demonstrations had spread to cities throughout China and were increasingly supported by workers and party and government officials. When the crowds began sporting signs calling for his dismissal, the independent student and worker unions grew in size and aggressiveness, and his protege Zhao broke with the leadership and made his pilch for the crowd's stmport^eng clearly(hat Communist Party rule was in jeopardy j|
Second, next to Deng, Vang Shangkun was (be pivotal figure In Ihe crisis.
Military units under his relatives or allies appeared to figuic promiti^niiy in (he suppression, and his speech onay was urged on oiiiciars after the crackdown for study. He was involved in approving lhepril editorial in the party paper People's Daily, which laid out the regime's hardline stand on the demonstrations, and wc know that he was present al many of the pivotal meetings leading up lo ihe declaration of martial law
the decuioolOTm ihc square. Hb major rival, Zhao Ziyang. is now gone, and no one with the nature lo oppose Yang has emerged. His ties to tnehas againajor player InXhineaestrongefjhanost everyone else's except Deng's.
of the olduring the crisis, aad the homage paid to them In the pres. atnee the massacre, ladlcat, lhat tbey hare rclnse,led tbemvrim into the front ranks of the Chineserocess.
Wc believe lhat. although they areheir influence behind the scenes early in the emu was particularly strong. They did not become publicly prominent, however, until arte, oolicy had been set and martial law deaded upon onay.sCben Yuri certainly influenced dec*sionmak.ng through their proteges in the earlier stages of the cm* As tbe crisis continued to grow, Deng brought the old guarde pianoiltg and publicly hlghl,ghlcd then support for the
Zhao Ziyang appeared to believe that be could exploit tbe demoiutratlorrshalt tlse conservative Inroads oa his reform prcgraau It appears almost as though be was writing to stoke the (ires of discontent in order to regain the political advantage. From the outset of the crisis in mid-April. Zhao constsientiy set himself apart from the hardliners Zhao's allies were mainly in theeeded Deng's backing to keep other pan, tactions in Mac and to be assured of miliury backing. Where Zhao rmscalculated was on the question of Deng's support- Once he lost thai, he was fimshed politically. He then compounded his error, by going outs.de the puny Zhao and his supponers-once they rcalirod thai they could not alter the hard line decided upon onpril-tried to use the crowd to in-Jimidatc Zhaos ceyponcnls within the party and leadership.ike Deng and the old guard. Zhao and his supporters opted for informal channels to press their views, but these could not overcome Dengs ties to the military and his support from the hardliners tM
m ortboOo.ibe too* pan. theygaj hoU otnc.l
'** prominentIhr oldgaa ChenZfcen. Bo VibaZhea. and Li
Tbe regime's approach to handling Ihe crisis was fairly consilientnot yield on the question of political reforms and try to intimidate the demonstrators. Variationa ia policy st ere tike resell of: taJccis+oa, onpart af tha leadership on bos*andle the unprecedented display of popular feeling; .lulling lacilcs employed by the regime while ll assured Itselfnd Iben amassed -military supf
The regime urdemllmnled the depth of feeling Bgalnst It and the staying ssower of Ihe demons! ri toes, inkier, coring the degree lo which Itremain,-out of touch with the popuUtloeL The regime continuallym the crisis drew out and leadership frustrations increased, chose totenor of the crowd, and prolonged the crisiscries of clumsy and provocative moves lhat closer contact wiih lhe people might have prevented
Zhao* efforts to change Itotto aortic!pet!or. of has la tto derssomtratiorts- KotoMy contributed lo tto euphoria of tto Ka-
ihrir inlractnbllilj and eventually deepening tto driii'u-ptsasl tbe resjinse. Once Zhao failed in the Standing Committee, his supporters in the press and at such organizations as lhe National People's Congress tried toolicy reversal by appealing to the people and by trying to manipulaie the demonstrations This intensified the mispcrccption tbat tbe reformers were gaining strength and would change Ihe regime'iocjicvtoward thef only Ihe
Tto provincial party and government elites played only nrole In setting ttoesponse lo tto demonstrations. Deng. Yang, and Ihc old guard appear to have had most of their partisans in iheer than the provinces, where the refortnen appeared stronger.ardliner like Chen Yun could look to hb proteges in the center'* economic offices, and Yang Shangkun could rely on ha supporters apparently firmly entrenched in the PLA
between loc CMtcrand pronrjcra cannot be drawn too starkly, of course-Defense Minuter Qln Jiwci and the Beijing Miliury Region leadership
n ,hdr supporl ofcrackdown, and Zhao ^gj^natgd some economic office, and .he press and prc^wnd.
As ka atrnkats Causes* potilical crises, the fceased chaaairh failed. In
intraparty disputes where the divisions arc too deep to permit aboth Mao's struggle against the party apparatus6 anduster of the Maoist faction. forttoe tries to move the dispute outside the inner circle once it realizes that it cannot win party approval. These action* invariably undermine the party's image of unity and counteract iu attempts to portray itself as infallible. Deng tried to prevent future ouibreakj by strengthening the party andinstitutions Yet, when tbe deep splits within the pany were intensified by the crisis. Deng himself proved unwilling to allow tbe structure he helped create to function without his direction. Instead, he sought to use the continuing influence of the old guard, whose members were in theory retired, lo counter Zhl( * 1
into the political forefront went agTinji bis earlier efforts to get them out. Moreover, the military docs not appear to bc united. Some ofRccn were clearly reluctant to reenter Ihe poliin.il arena. Qui Jiwci opposed using troops, as did tbe old marshals and. reportedly, many other senior officers Indeed, we believe some officers may also resent the prominence Yang Shangkun and his family members and immediate coterie have ga ined. Yet the use of informal channels has noi resolved tbe problems of fragmented leadership thai helped produce the crisis in the tint place. What it has dorse is further weaken China's formal political institutions by undermining whatever little credibility and legitimacy Deng bad tried to restore to them. (CNF)
Road lo Ih* Tiananmen Crackdown: An Analytic Chronolog)inese
pril: Tbt Regime Trite Ultinlaailoa
Former party leader Hu Ysobang't tudden death onpril, and the tiudeni demonstration* that began two dayt later, caught the regime unprepared. While it apparently had eapeeted demonstrations around the TOth aisnivertary ofaye believe Ha't death and the unexpectedly large we and rapid growth of the dementi rat ions that followed kept the regime off-balance aad led to mrsjudgmcnis throughout the crisis. Tha ttadcata, alto, weresurprised by Iba turnout, bai moved eaorc quicklyly tucccaaea ia lac face of kadcrihip Isdeci-sivcnesi btightcned the itudentt' sense of power and probably led ibem io be more aggrcatrvc and iairacta-bk than ihey would otherwbe have baen.
We believe thii conitaat need lo catch up to events, and lhe accompanying tease lhat the situation wai continually dipping oul of control, potalbly led the regime to blunder its way through the critit by opting for unrioccasarily provocative measures lhat fueled rather than cooled tbe demontirations. As the crisis dragged on, the leadership became increasinglyby iti own internal struggles, and its attention wai continually divided between contending wilh the demonstrations and wilh lhe internal power straggle.
declaration by Ibe Bet|ing Municipal Committee lhat tbe demonstrations were illegal. Thla failed tocene of whom actually attempted to storm the leadership compound of Zhongnaabaipril. Alter that. Iba ttadcata were left alone, probably in tbe hope ihal protests would cud with Ha Yaobaag'i funeral oapril When the tioderus continued demonstrating, tbe lead en tup met ioiu CQurK of i
The regime* basicll tried to follow throughout theprobably set in the two dayt following Hu't burial According to Hong Kong and official Chinese press, ibe entire Politburo met onpril and againhe secondan 'expanded" meeting,ltended by several noy>-Potuburo members |Norn during tba- SO April) aad tha* was unable to soften theardlineeonly tbe Poiitbaro steeling onpril Hu ally on tbe party Standingpropaganda chief. Huat all Ihe meetings, but Zhao's concilia -lory touch was licking. Afler Beijing party secretary Li Ximing described the situauda, lhe Politburo tried to iailmidatc the deenoruurators, ordering Hu Qili to draft aa editorial for the parly paper. Proplt't Daily. condemning theommillee under Hu and party sccurily chief Qiao Shi to deal with the iiudcflti, and urging party cadre toto "defend" Beijio
IvIV torrotai ihr pan iruimtiM Ctusa recent* at ihe Pirnlked b, Jaffa'sit*
Deciiioni daring tbe period were stilt made within the formal party itructure The party Standi eg Commit-tec and the Politburo met at leastime,^
thii period, hardliners such as Chen Yuncd, but mainlyecoadary, lupportivc role Deng. Yang, and the Standingminusdetermined the regime'i course.
i lo implemeat thu hardline approach began almost immediately Oapril, according to Hong Kong press, the pen* Suiting Conunittee again met (without party General Secretary Zhao, who wai lull in North Korea) and under Li Peng's chairmanthip toughened iu itanec. authoriziBg the ate of "whatever means nccciiary- to end the protests Followiag that meeting. Li Pent warned Chinos* journalism to inp-pon the regime in their reporting. Thesemeasures were capped by the publication onpril of lhe hardline People'i Dalitapproved byeng, aad Yanginflamed tbe itsdents and wotiencd the cnMifaaaVVaW
Allimeoaciliatory gesture may have defused the situation, the worst fears of aheart iaioferaai of politicaltuled. Deng Xiaoping, who the Hong Kong prut stated watched the student demonstrations from the Great Hall onpril, probably saw tbeas an attack on him aad all he had built. invoking memories of the Cultural Revolution tad other periods of disorder in China!
A leading hardliner. Chen Yun.peech to party cadre on IT Ajsril, pushed for "more dis the student
ay: Zhao Presses for Moderation -attd Fails
Thi* period wu characterized by Zhao's return and hb attempts either to soften the regime's position or to publicly dissociate himself from it. As It became clear ihat hisosing effort, wc believe Zhao or hb supporters tried to fuel tbe dernonslraiions byat least nor discouraging-reform-rmnded party and government official* and organizations to participate In them. Zhao's struggle against the policy agreed upon during bis absence caused confusion within Ibe leadership and senl contradictory signals io outside observers. The period ended with the pany Standing Committee losing any rote it may have had in the decisionmaking process; tbe public resurfacing of orthodox party elders opposed to many aspects of Deng's economicnd Zhao's submission of his resignation as pany General Secretary^ ^
Imrrtediaiely following thepril editorial, the regime appears to have tried to implement lheapproach chosen at ihcpril Politburo meetings. Onpril, il held "Urge cadre meetings" to condemn the students. Tbe official Chinese press reported ibe convening of iwo meetings on the heels or thepril editorial. These were an emergency "high-level" party meeting onpril and anPolitburo meeting-whkh probably included pany old guard members among thetbe nest day. Onh, the partyStudent Affairs Committee" chaired by Li Peng and including Qiao Shi. Hu Qili. Minister for Public Securiiy Wang Fang, and Stale Educationbead Ll Tteying. Except for Hu QUI, all ibe committee members supported the hard line. On the same day, Chinese media also published Beijing pany chief Li Ximing'* harsh comments aboul the demon-sirations and on the nest day called for subility inB
When the editorial inflamed the studenls. the regime softened lis stance, playing Tor lime and trying to undermine sludeeii unily. Itolnl Central Coriunrttce-SlaU Council guidance onprilthai the students be given channels to express iheirlong as these did noi include any efforts toWesternpushing for the avoidance of bloodshed, althoughtough line" against looters and arsonists. The sametale Council representative said that the Council was ready lo talk to Ihe students "al anyovernment televbiondialogue"Suie Council spokesman Yuan Mu and lhe student* onpril, and Beijing's mayor and pany leader met lhe next day with "ofhcial" student repre-sentatires. These measures neither frightened nor mollified lheho continued to march, attracting even more supporters, including member* from proreform offices within such party think unks as tbe Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Indeed. Ihe students were either so emboldened or annoyed by the leadership's action* that they gave the National People's Congress (NPC) an ultimatumay demanding thatthe regime meet IheirHt
The leadership was clearly unprepared for the siu-OenU' intransigence and the increasing popularthey were ftxanving. During tbe first week of May, tor example. Deng apparently fell relaxed enough aboul the grjvernmenls ability lo handle lhe situation to go out of town. The Chinese presshim to be in Qtngdaoay; other press reports put Um in nearby Beidaihe during tint lame period. When Ihc measures did not end the crisis, thewithout Deng in Beijing to provideIt was during this week of indc-cision and. floundering that Zhao reentered ibe ple-
Zhao relumed onpril, he appearedto repair the da mace he believed had been caused by thepril editorial and the hardline approach built around itarly Standing Committee meetingay. Zhao began drafting his speech for the Asian Development Bank (ADB) meeting. According to Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's speech ooune, which publicly criticized Zhao's actions during the crisis. Zhao obtained neither Deng's nor the parly's approval of the teat of thb speech I
[Then, while the Slate Council was rejecting the student ultimatumay. Zhao wasproviding tbe students with an advance copy of his conciliatory ADB speech, which be gave the following day.ay. Zhaoeeting of political workers, calling for further "openness" in reporting the protests. This marks the beginning of the public split between Zhao and the hardliners over how to handle the demonstrations, fueling student hopes and masking the regime's hardline approach.
Throughout this period, the reformers supporting Zhao tried to influence events outside the inner party circles, relying oo their supporters in the NPC and in the propaganda and media areas. The day afler Ihe publication of tbepril editorial, partychief and Zhao ally Hu Qili calmed editors' fears by telling them they could report on thehonestly. Over the neat few days, the Chinese public was thus treatedairly open press.ay, Chinese journalists were so encouraged by events that moread presentedetition calling for more press
The split between Zhao and the hardliners grew qukkly. Al an enlarged Politburo meetingay, the Beijing city leadership complained about Zhao's tactics and attiiudcs. At another enlarged Politburo meeting two days later. Zhao presented his five-point
or resolving theaccording to the Hong Kong press, received support only from NPC Chairman Won Li. During the same meeting, Shanghai party chief Jiang Zemin asked for support for his firing of dissident Shanghai newspaper editor Qinthat Zhao had critkired sometime carlierH A
Zhao's persistence in presenting his case may have been caused in pan either by his misreading of Deng's position or by being deliberately misled by Deng. Zhao may have viewed Deng's apparent absence from these twowas reported by lhe Hong Kong press io have been in Wuhan on 9an indirect vote of confidence. Furthermore, if Hong Kong press reports are accurate, Deng apologized io Zhao in private for his "mtscalculations" in handling ibe student
Oaay. ihc student protestors began Iheir hunger Strike and occupation of Tiananmen Square, injecting new urgency into the crisis. At this time. Zhao made what appears to be his last attempt lo alter the Politburo's hard line. During at least five Standing Committee meetings betweengainst the background ofay visit by Soviel General Secretary Gorbachev and the student occupation of Tiananmenrepeatedly opposed the regime's handling of the crisis- He broke consensus on everyshattering Ihe image of party unity that lhe leadership traditionally tries loin the end probably icndcrcd his resignation:
Onay. according to the Hong Kong press, he called on the Committee to reject thepril editorial. Heo I.
' 'in i.aintroposed to ncgiiearilal, idiii""': Un Zhaoapoaaft-Uir far ihe oi-iiiim. m.special tanau" unckf NPCo invcuioiic ih* action of caadica ot senior officials, tacludini Iwo ions: detail UW penoaa) actmiict aad twsaecs ot as
flVcuh of net mintHciial rank orandncome and pfrts
fill*t Ha, Zhao Willi iimimi om kmn-
ff .write Ih, dayal! afM
Onay. the press says he urged lhe Committee to be more receptive lo student demands. He lost. 4I.
Onay.eeting the Hong Kong press says he called, Zhao again presented his five-pointfor dealing with ihe crls
party Standing Committee meetings fromonsensus on confronting the demonstrators. More important, il wss Zhao's actions during thesehis disclosure io the world during Li's meeting with Gorbachev thai Deng made alldecisions in China basedecret agreement laid out al lhe first plenum ofh Party Congress infinally alienated him from his mentor. Although this disclosure was hardly surprising, it was unforgivable public distancing by Zhao of himself ftom the policy decisions oo the student problem.
The pany Standing Committee's disunity over how to handle the impending confrontation with the studenls encouraged Deng Xiaoping to rely more heavily on Ibe informal Interpereooat network thai has long clutracteriied China's leadership politics. The most influential group of potential supporters were his comrades among Ibe pany's old goard, in recent years Ihe major critics of his economic reform program. The hardliners' actions after Ibe declaration of martial law onay seem to indicate thai they coordinated their efforts with Deng
Hong Kong press repotted another version in which Deng onay summoned the Standing Committee, plus Vang Shangkun and Li Xiannian. to hear Zhao'sthey rejectedote orbZhao and Hui According to Hong Kong and Chinese press,eeting onay only Zhao opposed ihc Standing Committee decision to consider the use of or to use force io Quell lhe dernonsuations. Both Deng and Vang were present for this moeting. later ihai day Li Peng met for the first timeombative televised 'dialogue'* wiih student leaders. Li lectured them bul was abruptly cut off by atudent leader Wuer Kaiii. who staled. "We don't have much lime to listen lo you. Premierhe following day. the Standing Committee decided lo puce Beijing under martial law. Zhao and Hu Qili opposed the decision!
the reformers' efforts to oven urn the decisions to act decisively against ibe studenls apparently dermmstrat-ed io Deng thai he could no longer depend on his General Secretary or the pany Standing Committee. Zhao, often wjih Huaching, prevented the
Deng also worked to ensure military backing for the hard line be was taking. He was aided by longtime associate Yang Shangkun, who had served for ihe last several years as Deng's daily link to the Chinese miliury. Even so, ihis proved to be no easy Usk as miliury region commanders reportedly ignored his ealb torackdown from Ute April lo mid-June, notwlshins to become embroiledolitical8 May, probably followingdeparture from China and the day before the pany Standing Committee's vote ofay on martial law, ihe Hong Kong press claims the "en-Urged" pany Mililary Affairs Commission met with Deng in Wuhan to discuss how to handle Ihe demon-straiors. Reportedly present al the meeting, albeit hesiuiedly, were Ihe Commission membership and all miliury region commanders. We believe they voted, with reservations, for mania) Uw.
Once he had (he military and the old guard behind him. we believe Dengoint meeting cf the party Central Committee and the State Council on the esening ofay to approve the decision agreed to earlier in the day by the party Standing Committee to use the mililary. According to official Chinese press, Qiao Shi presided over the meeting, Li Peng spoke on behalf of tho party Standing Committee in favor of martial law. and Yangspeech would, of course, indicate military support for thein support of Li. Zhao. who. in his capacity as party General Secretary and head of the party Standing Committee, should have given the speech, not only refused, but did nol attend. Thus, by the lime he again went out into Tiananmen Square for an emotional meeting with the students oo the evening cfay. Zhao was out of power. In thatearful Zhaoinal plea to Ibe students to leave and staled. "I'm sorry, we've come toohat night, units fromh Airborne Army, and fromh.d Group Armies, began moving to the outskirts of Beijing. Martial law went into effect the following day0 although huge crowds of students and citizens blocked their waykceping the military from imposing the decree. HggggB
The declaration of martial law marked the end not only of Zhao's already waning political influence, bul aho that of tbe party Standing Committee. The Committee's meeting onay to consider imposing martial law was it* last beforeune massacre. With two of itsand Hupossibly under house arrest, it* legitimacy andwere seriously weakened. Instead, Deng began to rely more and more on the "enlarged" Politburo, whkh enabled him to bring in lhe old guard aod the military. The press and tbe NPC were tlill not under control, Ihe military had yet to be tested, and the provinces had not been deeply involved in what waseijing phenomenon. But Ibe politicalbetween the "reformers" and the "hardliners" thai had characterized the last several years ofleadership poh'lics ended at least temporarily when Deng brought back the old guard to help him assert Ihc hardliners' political primacy
JO May leew. The Harsfc-er* PimU
Wlih the political ccliptc of Zhao Ziyang, ihcduring this period concern rsled on quelling the demonstrations and bringing ihc eras, lhe party, ihc lOvcrnmeni, and ihc military inlo line. The periodmarked by the regime's unwillingness to tolerate any eeiposiliofl. aad ill increasing reliance oa armed force to solve its political problems gel mm
While the world watched the dramatic opposition to the military by the people in Beijing ouay. the hardliners moved to clean out pockets of opposition among the party and government elites. The official Chinese press stated that, on eitherray, Slate Council spokesman Yaaa Mu calledpersons"hongnanbai for criticism We believe ihcae "persons" may have included Zhao aides Dao Tong, An Zhlwci, aad Da Raogshcog. who the Hong Kong and Western press reponed had been dismissed (rom their positions within Ihe party hierarchy. The 'an glimmer of hope Tor the reformers, the return from Ihc United Sutra of NPC Chairman Waa
who in theory could call an emergency session of the NPC to overturn ihe martial law
einagursbcd oatay. When Wan Li's plane
arrived in Shanghai, he immediately disappeared
from public vit>l
Th* leadership abo began pressing foe eiprcuions of support. Onh. tbe official Chinese press published letters of support from various party from groups, several provinces, and most military regions. Oaay. the party Centra! Commillee aad the Stale Council jointly urged regional officials to"iheir positions and attitude" toward Li Peng's martial taw declaration by noon Thb deadline was noi met by aU provinces, although all eventually backed martial law to scene extent. To make sure lhat provincial leaders got the message, the regime sum moncd each provincial party secretary to Baying for one-on-one sessions with top party leaders, according lo official press. Military backing for martial law was implied in the pubticaiioa catayetter of sapport given by the three People's Liber*lion Armj IPLA) General glaIT department!
Following the declaration of martial low cmay. the Chi at tt leadership disappeared from public view.
Their absenceeries af rumors lhat underline the confusion characterising the crisis as well as reflecting popular attitudes aboul theThose mentioned most often In these rumors were the tenders whose removal the crowd wanted
U Peng' rumored to be shotuneoung officer whose girlfriend and sister supposedly hod been killed em Tiananmenthe day before This wot later found toeliberate hoax fabricatedhineseas also"mot tame In his right mind' due to the stresses af the crisis.
Deng Xiaoping- rumored onay and again Immediately afterune massacre to befor "heartidney condition. Deng was also reported to hare died of cancerune and again during the fust week afn both cases, the official Chinese press wai forced publicly to refute lhe rumorsmW
press abo reported trip* by senior Chinese officiab torum up support and to inform local officials about Beijing's anessmeni of the
Tbe regime's effort* to rally sapport continued lo meet wilh resistance from members of ihc clilc. Onay. according to Hong Kong and Western0 high-ranking eehciab"eiier to the party Standing Committee calling the student*n indirect criticism of martial law. Two days later. Ibe NPC Standing Committee almost unanimously, according to lhe Hong Kong press, ctprcsscd ill opposition to martial law. Several retired military leaders, and morective militarywhich Hong Kong aad Western press reportedMinister ofrwei and commander of
martial law, the
Baiting Miliury Rcgica, /hocia-formed Deng of their ceMsoaition to using troopsthe demons!mors None of Ibeae people had my impni beyond alerting. Drag aid the hardliners of the danger they ;
From (he ouuci of martial In w. the hardliner! went after ihe press and propaganda sectors, both of which Ihey saw as either out of conlrol or in unsympathetic hands. During the flrat two dayi of martial law. the Hong Kong press reported lhal Ihe regime hadpreaa guidancet was composed of partyPeng was chairman, and iu membcri included State Council spokesman Yuan Mu. Vice Minister of the Sum EducationHe Dcoacaang, and Beijing party propaganda chief Li Zhijisn. Hu Qili was replaced as party propaganda chief by hardliner Wang Rengxhi. who himself had been removed by Zhao
Cruder methods were used against individual media ca^aiiona. Military troops occupied tbe cAees of feopU; Dmllf and China Central Television (CCTV) oaay Tha paper's coverage of the situation the following day. however, appeared split between the reform and conservative lines. Three days taier. oah. ihc regime announced ihai censors would be assigned to all newspaper omcea By then, all press escept the English language Cktm Doll, "erein the Hong Kong press as being under regime control, ln additaoa. foreign aatelliie transmission! from Beijing were Hopped (for the second limeeek) al midnight onh. and troops occupied Ihe offices of Beijing Telegraph, the Central Broad-easting Station, and Radio Beijing. Thus, by Ibe end of the first week of martial law. ihe media and propaganda sectors, which hadlatform for Zhao and hia supporters, were under hardline control]
The hardliners signaled their asceedancy and legiti-mircd Iheir ladieshree-day "closed"Politburo meetingay al Xishaa ia the wenera suburbs ef Beijing The atiendecs included moreleading party, gewcrntrsexu. aad amyccording to Hong Kong press, this meeting approved lhe restructuring of the party's proMgaed* snd press sect on. supported the hard line
taken against the demonsi rators. aad designated Drang and party elders Chen Yun. Peng Zacsu aad Li Xiar.ma r. as Ihe party leaders empowered te deal with Ibe students. Tbe meeting was dominated by theShangkun and Li Peng gave ibe major speeches, for eutopic. Although the meeting lasted untilh. It was essentiallyay earlier,eng reappeared in public greeting three Third World ambassadors. That day. the State Councilircularalt to student:
The actual decisions, however, wore made elsewhere. Onay, according lo Hong Kong press accouau. lhe "old guard" met to decidenether to place Zhao sutler house arrest. Among those reported asware Dang. Li Peng. Quo Shi, and Wang Zbcn. Prior to the opening of the Xishaa meetingmaller preparatory group-composed ofCommute, memberseijing, the Central Advisory(headed by Chenad the
fhcaded by Qiao Shil-met to plan ibe Xsshanagenda. The Hong Kong press staled thai Deng apparently spoke al Ibis meeting and then left, peari-Ny for Wuhan lo ensure military aupport forthe dernoesstraiori. Onh. CCTVpeech by Chen Yun before lhe Central Advbory Commission Standing Committee, in which be expressed support for his protege li Peng and urged ibe party to "expose Ihe plot" againsl it
The regime, faced with the unwillingness of units from theroup Army lo press through the crowd* blocking iu progress toward Tianaamcn Square, redoubled lu effort! to keep the miliury in line. Deng'i trip to Wuhan onay probably had thaiwell as caauriag ibe miliury'sto him personally. In addition, while the Xbhan meeting was under way. someonerobably Deng or Yeag Shangkun called an expanded,meeting of the party Central Military Cosnmis-saba oaay, according to the official press. Again.
reason (at ute meeting -mi probably lo cotmacc an uncertain militaryrackdown probably requiring armedecessary to tare China from snatchy. Yang Shaagkun spoke at this meeting, outlining Zhao's "crimes" againu ihc party and people and discussing lhe threat lhe demonstrator* puaed to the country. Onentraldocument *ws seal to military ur.iu around the ry. staling lhat Zhao had headed an amiparty v'lHfUe and urging theo be ready to support martialt this time, the Beijing Mihiary Region trrull) publicly supported martial
While agreeing to crack down on ibe demonstrators, the leadership remained undecided on how tond his supporters. Initially, theyard line Yang Shasgkuas speech it theayPolitburo meeting, for rumple claimed thai /hao's actions gaie ihe impression that the party hadhead.i The neat day. at the Xishan meeting.may or may aot have attend-cd--was charged with orchestrating the student un-
rest. Oneng. Yang Shangfcun.immg accused Zhao of heading anand engaging inollowing the end of the Xishan meeting, according to ibe Hong Kong press, the leadership informed "persons in charge" in the military that Zhao and his antiparty clique would bedealt witharty plenum the following week.
ForcTeral days, tbe press gave full play lo attacks on Zhao and his supporters. NPC cadres were urged soeat's aad Yang Shaogfcun's speeches made at Xishan. The media touted Ll Xian-elan's ipecch at tbeay meeting of the China People's Political Coasultaiion Conference (CPPCCs. ia which be stated the CPPCC supported Dengndividual* in leading organs" who were "one major cause" of ihe dcracabttriiiorss. Tbe leadership aboentral Committee circular outlin-ing Zhao'i crimes. The newspapers ona alsoben Yua speech criticalhao. Wan
reappeared sad hacked Li Per* Finally, onay. provincial leaden were broughteijingne-day "caalral worto bear Ibe party bacon
Bui the campaign against Zhao dad not to as planned. Tbe part* plenum. which tbe Hons Kong pre**was scheduled foray. wa* not held. Stories surfaced Ihc same day that ibe accusations againsi Zhao were being0 May enlargedmeeting atsomeccounts state was attended by Deng aad Chenapparently unable to agree oa the exact naiara of the charge* against Zhao This sneering may have beast Ihe one thai rescheduled ibe party plenum, whkh the Chinese press stated -as bow sets
Parallel with the effort* against Zhao, ibr leadership began planning us move* against the demonstrators Onay, Ihe Hong Kong press reported that ihe government was forming "im-esligatson groups" to identify parly members involved in the demonstra-
lions. The neat day. hardline party elder Peng Zhen.eamed speech before the Standing Committee cf tbeNPC.coedemnedibehere was. .ccodiog to the Hoag Koagoeeung of tbe regional military commandershe Beijing area onay. probably under Van, Shangkun. According to some press reports, some commander* detuned to come. This was followed ihc nest dayeeting of the old guard chaired by Chen Ytui.une, ihc Beijing municipal committeetatement "rec-ogninng tbe essence of the turmoil" and the "necessi. ty of manialnd claimingsmall group-was causing Ihe problems
The leadership met again oa the eveningane to cornpiete plans for attacking the demonstrator* The meeting, possibly another enlarged Pobtburo meettng. was chaired by Li Peng aad Yang Shangkun. Among those reported by the Hong Kong press to have attended were "manyfficers from the
"Various army command some of
rang sending troops into the square, accordingKong Kong
In foe ma lion about Deng's whereabouts betweenay and hu appearance in publiconflicting. One Hong Kong press report has himeart attach onay andeek after that Another has ham at Lushaa in Jiangai prorinceune. Both reports place him outside Beijing during the period around the nuisacre and are suspect for that reason. He is abo reported ia the Hong Kong press to basic been at Ihe enlarged Politburo meeting onay at Xishan. Unless he was physically Incapacitated,Deng's performance during the weeks leading up to the massacre supports tbe theory that he blew aboul.and probably orderedune crackdown.
this period, the regime CO*tinned tointo ihc area around Beijing. We arewhether bringing In so many urnsBeijing was because of leadershipihe rdUbihty of some units ofhof whom did stormdesire to have all mililary regiondctnoatslratc their support of tbe regimeidentified wiih
This period abo witnessed the public return of lhe hardliners and Ibe Open shift of sll realto informal channels No party Standingmeetings were held, and ihe enlarged Politburo meetings were convened mainlychieve acquics-eenct or. theenior otnc ab an AgejhaanM Man by Ihe inner party drele, which probably wasal ihis time of Deng, Yang, the hardliners oo the Suodiag Ceennuitec, aad lhe old guard. We believe the leadership certainly had io spend aamount of time and energy on convincing the military to agreeon iseaotUtiag the political price of its involvementfinal use of force against the population of
Hitct Uarrason Trhimphaitt
lhe now jjcenda.nl hardline leadership spent most of this period consolidating its power and puDtshing lis enemies. The regime finally held the party plenum, which registered publicly Zhao's downfall. The now-captive press put out tbe party line about thedissidents outside the parly were identified and rounded up, and the leadership strove to demonstrate its unity to tbe outside world. The major immediate question for the regime was not bow to cope with tbe international opprobrium it earned for tbe massacre, but what exactly to do with Zhao and the reform wing of the party, and who to reward for their involvement in tbe "successful" terrninatlon of the party straggle and tbe larger crisis on Tiananmen. J
The first several days following tbe massacre were dominated by nulllary action, and any political activi-ly was confined largely io disseminating Ihe regimes version of events.une, the People's Liberation Armt Daily printed an editorial supporting theThe neatoint Central Committee-State Council letter justified Ibe crackdown as saving Chinagang of ccmnterrevcJutictfuries" who were conducting an "antiparty ueitorous plot tolate Council statement on Chinese Central Television the same day essentially repeated these charges, ns didail
The regime also made efforts toeturn to normalcy.une. Xinhua reponed lhat Li Peng had presidedtate Council meeting onaffairs. Yeo YHin and Tianlatter rumored earlier to have been removedhaoalso reponed in attendance. The same day. Foreign Minister Qien Qicbco left for his scheduledo Latin America. Li Peng and Wang Zhen appeared in publicune, visiting the troops in Beijing. The provinces, however, were slow to express their sapport. During the first several days, only six of China'srovinces made sutemenls^ backing Li Peng and the military crackdownVH^L
The leadership then began moving againstune, the party Central Disciplinary Inipection Commission,elevised sutement, called for "severe punishment" for party members who look part in thehe State Education
Commission oo tbe next day ordered students io resume class, "observend exposeTwo Beijing organizations, the unofficial student union and an unauthorized labor union, were banned, and authorities began arresting people in Beijing and several outlying cities. More recently, party readers have emphisucd the need for more political education for lhe students, and the Hong Kong press reported tbe start of intense political and military mdoctrina-
With the resurfacing of Deng Xiaoping on 9the company of Ihe Mililary Affairs Commission and members of tbe oldregime signalled its victory. Most of the other provinces and the seven military regions quickly printed their expreasloas of support. Deog'a address to ihe martial law troops that day was laicr citedocument for study. Oneng saidelevised statement that the "rebeUicer
StilL the question of what to do with Zhao and his supporters remains. The plenum scheduledune was finally heldune. Zhao lost all his party posts, aad bistill under investigation. Zhao's allies in the party Standing Committee and the
cu rut have been reinovod. Recent suiemenu in
Ihe officii! Chinese press from (he old |uard
through Hi Central Advisor,d from Qiao ShTi pen, securiiy spparai appear to indicate that Use rstfmeru emphasis fromp icdenu ind intellectual, lo restoring pin, dad. pl.ne .nd scouring ou,pocket of Zhao suppcrtcrstbe piny i
The leadenhtp, forced by eventi to concern rate luoo iu miliury and public tecuriiyinally lurnedany prooiems in mid-June. Tbe regime corrrerved the plenumreparatory meet-icgof the enlarged Politburoune. The result* of Ibe plenum, however, Usow ihu the strugglenoiomplete listing of Politburohas noi been announced. No one was nominatedhao'* seat on the pivotal Miliury Affair*
CommlsaWn Sunding Committee. Finally. Zhao's continued political limbo, and Ibe almost daily public discussions about wtasl to do with himatam of, also appears to indicate thai the
> lhat it has weathered thenited than before]