NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FOR SATURDAY, 29 JULY 1989

Created: 7/29/1989

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Lebanon-Syria: Raising the Stakes

Israel-Lebanon: Abduction of Hizballah Shaykh Honduras: Playing Hardball With the Contras

USSR: Preparing for Cambodian Conference

USSR; Yazov on INF Treaty

: Increasingly Sophisticated Weapons in Georgia

Rcformiit Deputies Organizing

Politburo Launches AmiCQTTUPtioohile: Plebiscite on Constitutional Reform

Sri Lanka-India: Compromise Solution Eases Tensions

Moving llcyond OAS Mediation

USSR: An Embattled Military

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ISH AI l. LEBANON: Abduction of Hizballah Shaykh

Israeli kidnapping of Hizballah cleric Ubd eJ-Karim Ubajd might

t- threats against US hostages and Inereaied attacks against

Israeli targets in Ubanon and nonhtrn Israel, aggg/ff ^

ozen Israeli raiders landed from helicopters at ihe village ofm west of thc Kr.iel. controlled security strip in southern Lebanon, and seized the Hizballah cleric, his nephew, and a

Comment: There is no confirmation thnt Ubavd was involved tn Hizballah kidnapping operations, but he publicly supported the Higgins operation. Ubayd is one of the leading Hizballah clerics in southern Lebanon and has been involved in anti-Israeli military operations for most of this decade. The Israelis probably hope the abduction will increase their leverage in negotiating for the release of the three Israeli hostages in Lebanon, particularly navigator Ron Arad. who was taken prisoner by the Shia Amal militia in6 but apparently is now in Hizballah hands. Israel mavalso hope to leant more about Hizballah activities In ihe south WWr-

Hiiballah. possibly with Iranian aid. almost certainly will tryetaliate against Israeli forces for the abduction of the cicric and miv even attempt an operation inside Israel- Hizballah-may publiclv threaten to harm USgpb

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1

Preparing for Cambodian Confcrc

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Moscow has hinted that %'ieinam and Cambodia may Ih flexible ai tht international conference, which begins tomorrow in Paris, and that It Hill continue lo work toward getting thtm to accept L'S Involvement.

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Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Senoscow for talks before going on to Paris, and thc Soviet and Chinese denuij foreign ministers recently held their first discussions oa Can lhe Sino-Soviet sum mil In ^lavjMBAHHajMbf}JHh_

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told Hanoi DN involvement is important incomprehensive settlement and that Hanoi is now moving inwardN

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aMssBjgkjaje Son leu will probaWj not pusnictnam iou fai

on internal aspectsettlement, primarily the composition of a

provisional government,hat they have normalised relations

voth China and the Vietnamese withdrawal is almost complete. The

instabilityhe Soviet position on Cambodia. *" '"

Moscow will instead probably urge Hanoi to concede on external

" 2CCCPUntUN TOlCa Peacekeeping force Moscow shares Phnom Penh's and Hanoi's concerns ihat fhe

itaa, wTe forThc hNrtdVhC Camb0difln UNb"'calculate hn' c* eacekeeping force arejojtcep thc sctilcmcnt process moving

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Possible Soviet Positions

Moscow has shown no signs of breaking with its Indochinesc allies on the key question oftlie compositionrovisional government.

Moscow is willing torominent role for Prince Sihanouk but not to dismantle the existing Cambodian Government apparatus and will probably demand ihai Hun Senosition of power.

The Soviets probably wouldettlement between Sihanouk and Hun Sen's forces if the Khmer Rouge could be prevented from continuing toivil war.

Moscow accepts thc need for some participation of the Khmernot of Pol Pot and his topavoid an immediate Khmer Rouge military resurgence but will push to have weapons stockpiles liquidated and Khmer Rouge military forces reduced.

' " 1'the Soviets hav*months ihai ihey are not opposed to s

role for the UN. Although Moscow has not been willing to break wiih Vietnam publicly on this issue, the Soviets have recently sent mixed signals and mav be pressing Hanoi to concede.

The Soviets will probably pushrovision to end military aid io all Cambodian parties in any settlement.

Moscow probably will support Vietnam's demands that the UN seat for Cambodia be left vacant and that the annual resolution condemning Vietnam's Invasion of Cambodia be dropped or that Vietnam be given recognition for tu pullout,

The Soviets will argue against the Chinese and Sihanouk's idea of reducing the troop strength of each faction0 troops. Moscow feds enforcement of any reduction is not feasible and would put Hun Sen's regimerave disadvantage.

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USSR; Yuum on INF Treat)

Soviet Defense Minuter Yazov. in an address )Csicrda> lo thc Ro>al liivuuuc of International Affairs at lhe conclusion of his visit to the UK. suggested the USSR might refusebide by thc INF Treaty if NATO proceeds with ihc Lance follow-on. Yaiov said that, if ihehori-range ballistic missile was eliminated and if ihc US began io build lhe Lance, "wc will be forced to again make this Oka" (thehe INF Treaty requires all SSto be destroyedi ccmbcr; ii bans furthct production, agfgfgagjt,,

ress conference in Uonn two months jeo. Somci Foreign Minuter Shcvardnadic threatened to hall destruction ofor toew missile if NATO proceeded with Lance modernization. After strong Western criticism. Shevardnadze publicly disavowed any intent to upset thc INF Treaty. Although Yazov's threat mayimilar misstatement, it almost certainly reflects military concern about NATO plans for nuclear modernization I

USSR: Increasingly Sophisticated Weapons in Georgia

Four bombings, all in thc past week, have been reported in ethnic clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians in the Soviet Georgian Republic. The attackseported grenade attack on nationalist leaders in Tbilisi and thc bombingrofessor's home in Abkhazia. On Thursday, troopsniper who allegedly wasubmachinegun: this is the first reported retort to lethal force by MVP troops in AbkhaziaJ

. Tactics in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict are shifting Irom random brawls, less frequent recently, to calculated attacks on prominent individuals and ihe use of high-poweredevolution that parallels tactics used in lhe Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Thc atiack on Georgian nationalist leaders suggests that groups of extremists with some sophistication in icrronsi laetics and strong political motivations have coalesced. Both sides appear to have easy access to explosives, possibly through thc regional mining industry. The extremists' willingness to use Ihcse techniques to eliminate rivals and io intimidate the citizenry will complicate efforts b) MVDlnwio suiuliresituation and to local cooperation. ^

9

USSR: Reformist Deputies

members or the Congress of People"1parts maverick Boris Ycl'tsin. are to convene into strengthen contacts and prepare for thc second session of pens late this fall. Thc group.

numbers moreeputies, is to discuss legislation on local elections, cooperatives, land ownership, consumer goods, prices, and corruption. They have already setoordinating council. The reformist deputies also intend toewspaper

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MMftga Although the reformist deputies have been lobb> ing hard to increase their numbers, and resolve their differences, the; are still much lessoherent faction. During the first Congress session. lhc> computed no moreifth ofeputies on most issues. Several independent Baltic deputies recently claimed that thev have resolved some of their policy differences and that some orthodox lenders, such as Politburo memberaveheir hostility. Many Central Asian deputies and those from the Russian hinterland remain suspicious. This weekend's talks also could stimulate deputies of other political stripes lo organize. With popular hgures like Ycl'tun among them, ihc independent deputies

coulda strong influence

CHIN'Ai Politburo Launches Antlconruptlon CampalK"

China's Communist Pany. at the end of its two-day Politburo meeting yesterday,ew program to attack official corruption. State-owned firms involved in foreign trade and domestic distribution will be audited, and two firms thought to be engaged in questionable business practices will be closed, including one that has been closely associated with Deng Xiaoping'* son. The party plans to ban children of senior cadre from working for trading companieseptember, and senior officials who use their positions to obtain favors for their relatives will be subject to party and judicial discipline. Pany officials also plan to cut leadership pjjgwjsiics. including luxury foods and the use of official cars.

regime ctearl) hopes to recapture popular suppon byhow of cleaning the pany of corruption, one of the major causes of .the *ocial discontent that triggered the demonstrations in

1 Some psny elders arc certain to ensurechildren retain lucrative posts, especially in armsThe leadership may also use the anticorruption drivefunhcr weaken pany

CHILE: Plebiscite on Constitutional Reform

tomorrow will approse the constitutional reforms agreed to by thc government and major political partiei last month, but their real focus is on the presidential election in December.ew of theroposed constitutional changes arc significant: casing nilci on amending the Constitutioa under the next government, shortening the term of the nest president from eight to four years, enlarging the directly elected membership of lhe new Senate, and softening the ban on Marxist panics. Thc Communists are the only important party callingno" vote, and even they are not mounting all-out opposition. The governmcni has triedo portray thc reforms as President Pinochet's and as reflecting his willingness "to perfect"not fundamentally to alter the

inteiisel* interested.in the presidential

windling hardline supporters probabl* will be the net losers in the plebiscite. After insisting for months on thc sanctity of the Constitution, they were forced by cabinet moderates, thc Military Junta, and senior Army officers lo accede to calls by the opposition and rightists for basic changes. Thc turnout tomorrow is likely to be lower lhan in thc presidential plebiscite last October, but polls show Chileans arc not disenchanted with the

DIA: Compromiie Solution Kasei Tensions

announcement yesterday that it will beginroops it has in Sr. Lanka will defuse much.mediate on between the two countries.

i sic. will visit Nci. Delhi today

to discuss Colombo's request thai India olio halt offensive operations against Tamil militants. The two sides also will discuss India's concernsithdrawal would open thc door for Tamil miliums to decimate thc Tamil groups in the Northeast Province that supportedJhcjndo-Sri Lankan Accord and benefited from India's

bHbbWiW Both sides compromised io resolve thePrcmadasa apparently dropped his demandrecognize him ai the commander of India's troops onand New Delhi backed away from its refusal lo resumedrawdown. The negotiations will address several of theproblems that both sides played down after thcincluding Ihc concerns about violence inand whether India will callease-fire with thein

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In Hricf

USSR

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USSR prosecutorepeated charge Ligacl top pnVials guiltv of covering up corruptioi

may have as topnnd. is under KGB Investigation for torturing

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USSR to moveillages from Chernobyl" area three yea is after nuclearecision follows many reports of radiation contamination, mutations of humans andeflects growing pressure from public dissatisfied with cleanup.,

Czechoslovaks Thursday raided homes of organizers of recent petition and reform Communist groupolder dissident actions, meeting with Solidarity delegation from Polandjsrobably triggeredegime may arrest activists soon.1

- Zimbabwe may soon open Cabinet-level contacts with South Africaommercial lies wellresident Mugabe longj^no.x. Cabinet may be pressing to keep up with neighbori

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Highlights of OAS Resolution on Panama

Last week, the OASesolution on the Panama crisis that:

Extended thc life of the OAS mediation team tougust, when thc hemisphere's foreign ministers will again meet in Washington to consider further action.

Called for negotiations between the opposition and the regime that would bringtransfer of power"eptember through democratic mechanisms and in accordance with current Panamanian procedures.

Calledew election as soon at possible.

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9

Special

OAS Mediation

The Panamanian regime is hailing 'he recent OAS decision ro prolong ilt mediation effort and ro call for new electionsefter for Washington and the dtmocrailc opposition. The regime is sprtadlmg rumors ihai Defense Chief Noriega is secretly negotiating with the t'S andiling ta step down if US pressure ends. Koritga may efftr the apposition minor concessions la avoid being blamed ia cast tatkt break down btfore the next OAS foreign ministers meeting. He will probably intensify propaganda againsl US military pressure in order lo dtfltct stronger OAS action and lo Justifyrorlslonal junta In September A

leaden have reacted lo lhc OAS decision withreports sa> they are

considering not returning to the negotiating table. Theyontinue to insist that the regime recognize their electioti_ victory and turn the government over

Negotiating Strategy

The Defense Chief probably views the prolonged mediation at forestalling, harsher OAS measures and hurtini

is also tr> lag io sow fear that the opposition's bacfc.1

he US is negotiating behind

COtittiiuccL

trategy, however, may make the opposition, already bitter Bl what il views as an OAS betrayal, walk out of thc talks. To avoid blame forreakdown. Noriega is leaking word hc would be willing to step down if the opposition would participatecgimc-domi

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le may also oltcr minor concciMOns as tne mediation deadline approaches and probably will try' to split thc opposition by cniiclni second-echelon figuresoalition'

Beyond Mediation

Noriega seems increasingly concerned about expanded US military exercises in Panama. Thc Defense Chief liasampaign to convince Panamanians and Latin leaders that the situation istruggle between Washington and Panama City, and the

regime-controlled press has recently attacked the USprecursors of an invasion. Noriega hat sent civilian militias to protest at the gates of US basei. ond the Defense Forces are again US personnel.*:

The press has also charged there are US-backed guerrillas in neighboring CosiaRica poised to overthrow the Panamanian Goicrnincnl^ajjp^pkjqatt'ao^'

Noriega probably believes his two-pronged strategy of appearing conciliatory and portraying Panamaictim of US aggression will end Ihe OAS mediation effort on favorable terms, freeing him tountaeptember. Hc probably expects that thc talks will be stalemated and that thc OAS mediators will call the opposition intransigent. He may even try to provoke an incident between US troops and Panamanian civilian militias in the hope that regional leaders will reject US efforts to impose harsherLatin count

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Special Analysis

Embattled Military

miliiary leader th iotrits of budget cuts end arms rtdmcrion agreements as well as growing public ditiesitt aad rocal anlimtlitarism.

Thcst development* stent to beivisive efftet on ihe officer corps not unlike tke effect PrtsijenuCorbachevs reforms havether institutions. aaVMsgV J'

early tins >ear thc Defense Ministry has been underioajor reform of ihc conscriptionby creating an all-voluntccr professional army or ethnic- militias. Trie military

apprehensive of plans io convert defense Industrial capacity_io goodstsV

Prime Minister Rwhkov announced io reverse theercent civiliancrccni miliiary. in thescciot

of the armed

forces is not going smoothly. SeeWI problems of familyhousing and inadequate job placement have made manvthey will be kept in theforced fromDespite promises from political and military' officials thaiwill be madehoughtful manner, thc highyet to get mailers in hand, even as criticism from militarycritics

at the Congress

Thc military' came face to face in lhe Congress of People's Deputies not only with oven public distrust and amimilitarism but also with the creationew system of public oversight of defense affairs. Some delegates accused ihc military of firing on demonstratorslhi' and- according io Andrcy Sakharov. on its own men fn Afghanistan. Thc> excoriated lhe armed forces for wasteful defense expenditures,ew delegate, oven suggested that the military wasoup. Several senior officers, includingat_^ 1 scd anger, saying lhe criticism was irrcspomiblc.

Delegates were especially hard on Yaaov. The* blamed him for thc hollow achievements of miliiary percurovku and pclied him with questions, lie deflected them defensively. "

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