3 75
Warning Page
cultivation, of lie* to radical Palestinian group! haaajor clcmeal ia iu turnore militant foreign policy, exemplified by the RushdieIranian radicals who now dominate decisionmaking probably view these liesefp Tehran compensate for iu international isolation and the flagging of its revolutionary crusade against Iraq and the moderate Arab states. In our judgment, Iran perceives tbe split between 'Arafat and the Palestinian radicals over, accepts nee of UN.nd Syria's episodic nervousnessbeing identified with Palestinian extremists as sn opportunity to enhance iu own role in Middle East affairs by supporting lhe radical antMsrseti eause. This policy
helps revive Iran's revolutionary credentialsune that pro-Iranianalist movement! have limited support ir. most Musluti states JH^
There is an inherent incompatibility between Iran's Pan-Islamic fundamentalism and thc secular ideologies espoused by the radicalfor the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They are united, however, on one key point: their explicit opposiiion lo the existence oftand on which they differ with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria, which profess at least thc ibility ofolitical settlement with line
We believe that Iran's support for radical Palestinian groups, particularly the Popular Front for ihe Liberation ofValesiine-General Command (PFLP-GQ.erious threat to US and West European interesu. The alliance place* the resources of the most virulently anti-Western Muslim suite behind the iroups that are most willing to use terrorism to schieve their objectives. Both the PFLP-GC and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO) have, experienced operatives, explosives,Uic'if attacks against the United States and Western Europe
.
Wc believe Iranian leaders view these assets as potentially useful beyond retaliation for the Airbus shootdown. Iran prefers using other groups to conduct terrorist operations; since the arrest of Iranian-supported terrorist* in Franceehran has not displayed the capability to conduct sophisticated operations in Ihe West- Cooperaiion with radical Palestinian groups offers Tehran the possibility of striking at its enemies while keeping iu role relativelyleast enough to reduce substantially the cliancc lhat Iran willetalia blowerrorist act in which an Iranian role is assumed bul not prov
Wc believe lhal rectal developments in Iran have lignifkaatly iacreased the prospect for Iraoiaft-radical Palestinian cooperation in conducting terrorist opera-ikxu against Western interests:
Radical leaders have gaiacd the upper hand in ibe wake of thc Rushdie affair, resultinge ia Iraaian hostility lo-ard ihe Weal aad Tehran's rejection of rignificani Western imol*emeoi in economic rocomuuciron.
Pragmatk Irsnisn leaden seem to harelim ch*nee or reversingradical tide In lhe near
These devciopmenu are likely to cause Tehran to be willing to lake increaied risks in support of terroriimatoainit the West. From iheir perspoctive, such orxraiioeis:
an outlet for Iranian anger over the Airbus ihootdowo. over the Rushdie book, and for revolutionary fervor in general. The radicals can claim Khomeini'1
endorsement for almost any anti-Western operation, even if jot
aimed at Ruihdir
Giveeaponime when hi miliury aad economy are weak and Iran feels vulnerableoreign prcssore.
Provide araising icosiooi with theshifting populary from domestic problems sod toward foreign enemies. The themeeleaguered Iran standing strong against the antWstsmk West already predomioaies in lhe rhetoric of Khomeiai.
Carry Hllle liik to Iran, since Tehran has already opted for relative internasolation, hanian rsdicaU probably believe thtt the chance of Western economic sanctions or miliury retaliation would be remote In any event, ihey believe ihat the presence of Western honages in Lebanon will help deter retaliation^(ft , 3
Iran derives practical benefits from its links to tbc Palestiaians. espeoaliy la Lebanon. Tehran's Hirbaltah allies arc lacing iacreased pressure from Syria aad AraaL ibe rival Shi's militia. Syria has tightened iu grip around Hizballah strongholds in Beirut, and Amal has cipeHed^lirballsh from much of southern Lebanon. The Iranian-radical Palestinian alliance makes it more difficult for eitheralio backs the radicalAmal to attempt sn alt-out crackdown on Hirballah.ore would be more costly for Syria and Amal because some of the radical Palestinian iroups might fight on the side of
1o
retaliate againsi Syrian interest! elsewhere *fftat wtaafe
We bdkx Irani relations with ihe radical Palestinians will grow. We do notave of terror um aaatast tbe West brxaasc of ihcac cooucti, bat wc do believe Iraa will be willingssist some Palestinians in conducting sesectNe orxratirxis that might include some srxeigcyjaiirKtdenis Iran willay ia the tirnini and Ihe choke of targets and will be wiry of providing encondiUonal assisunce to lupport indeper-Jeri operationi by the PsIdimLsm fj|^
' Syria is not likely to prevent Increased tics between Iran and radical Palestinian groups based in Syria but will carefully monitor lhe relationship. Damascus almost certainly perceives benefits from Iranian-radical Palestinian cooperation against
Israel and 'Arafat and probably would actively support some operations against theseoreover. Syria does not want to jeopardize bilateral ties to Tehrun and benefitt from Iran providing financial support to some of the groups. Syria is not likely, however, to get directly involved with any Iranian-radical Palestinian terrorist operations against Western targets in the near term. Damascus also will oppose any Iranian attempts to control the groups, fearing (hat it might lose tu ability lo prevent operations harmful to Syria's regional goals, fjaga? ^
The possibility of terrorism sponsored by Iran and the radical Palestinians will increase If Israel and the PLO are perceived as making progressolitical settlemeni^TJie radicals probably would hope that tenoriim would arouse emotions on both sides that would derail tbe political process. They would view ao Arab-Israeli peace settlementellout of the Palestinian cause and therefore would be more willing toukc risks to disrupt negotiations if4hc ulks seemedoa breakthrougli-rjNfe
Thc political dimension of the Iranian-radical Palestinian alliance willgiven the likelihood of tlow progress, at beat,eaceful solutionArab-Israeli problem. The slow pace of Ihe Middle East peace process isencourage many Palestinians lo believe that "Arafat's acceptance ofand his dialogue with the United Sutra have failed lo advance theUnder these ciicumslances, thc alliance's hard line probably will appealPalestinians
Highlights kffe-
Eur op* Franc*
I>evdopmtnls
Anest Warrants for Hizballah Umbm
Onpril investigating magistrate Gilte* Boulouquc issued international arresi warrants for seven Lebanese Hiiballah members. All are considered lo be closely linkedttaries of bombinBS in Paris6 and have been charied wiih criminal association, possession of explosives, and complicity in toej-assejiioo of explosives. French courts will try the accused in
eader Released
Onay Portuguese authorities released Otelo Saraiva de Carvalhowhere he has been held4 on charges of association withgroup Popular Forcespriltelo's release stemsand procedural questions and does notudgment of hisa substantive
decision hu not yel been made whether Otelo's case will be sent back to theappellate court, retried completely, orleastftheembers currently in prison may be released on similar grounds. 4k9
Arrests ofem ben45 crippled lhe group, which ha*errorist attack in recent years. If experienced operatives and leaders are also released on technicalities.ayeoraaniration and resur-
i3
Hammadi Comictton '
West Germany, conviction of TWAijacker Muhammad Hammadi onay increases the likelihood of terrorist atlacks against Germanammadifound guilty of participatingS In the murder of US NavyRobert Stethem. air piracy, hostage taking. and three cases of serious bodilyhe was also convicted of smuggling eiptosives and document forgery.ammadi was sentenced to life imprisonment and will not be eligible for parole for ISyears. according to press reportsQA
Hiiballah is likely lo apply tcrrorlai tactics to pressure Bonn to deport him or the state court to pardon aimer soften his sentence J
Western Europe: Debalin Inlernal Border Control
European Community (EC) Comminion isahead with efforts to dismantle the Community's internal border! by the endC mensbers^ ho-etio on ibetr lnr processugnincam aspects of it: among these who favoriiiimiiisW efforts, locrx are likely touch farther than others in si mpli Tying. if not completely removing, internalcontrols. Disagreements arc pariicutariy intense-over policies on extradition, asylum, and visa require-mcnts for non-EC countries. Allhough the abolition of the EC's internal borders is unlikely to beby the endhe process of working toward that coal it likely to encourage cooperation in policing Ihe EC'sborders Jfljfi fc3
Orlgka of OV Debate
The ECi plan to remove internal borders derives from lhe Single European ActSI requirement for free movement within theof the program toingle market by the endhe SC Commission's directive oa "open borders"5 identified phyiical barriers at customs petit, immigration controls, passports, searches of personal baggage, and police identity checks as unnecessary obstaclci. Although Ihc Commbaioa expressedover the danfers posed by terrorism, drug trafficking, and organiicd crime, il argued thatborder controls were not the only or even Ihc best solation lo these problems. The Commissionhowever, that wch controlsbe abolished only if tbc EC "stiengihened external frontiers" and enhanced "cooperation between the relevant nalionalfe tj _J
of Abolition
EC Commissioner for lhe Internal Market Martin Bangcmann has pressed for abolishing internalfollowing the first meetingroup of "national coordinators" established by the ECddress problems anting from removing the coot roh. Bjngrmsnn announced that common polioes covering asylum, extradition, and visas could be in place by
la-
7 he foundation for much of Western Europe's extra-ditto* law it found inconEuropean Convention on Extradition.nd the European Convention oet the Suppression of. Both accords nmre drafted jn theember Council of Europe rCOGhJP fa-
litotes signatories toall fugitives wantedby the reaueiting state, provided lhat the offense is punishable by atne-year Jail lerm in both of ihe countries involved. The Convention is generally regarded as superseding existing bilateral extradition treaties, but iheare free to conclude bilateral treaties that expand but do not contradict the Convention'sIn addition, each stale is allowed to extradite its own nationals If It chooses, an option thai was usually forbidden In earlier extradition treaties. The Contention's usefulness.Is limited by Arti* tie S. whichtate tot radii Ion If it contlufat that the crime In auestion was politicallyjustification known as the political affrnse3
The Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism has been signed by all COE members except Finland. Ireland. Malta, and San Marino. Il litis crimes lhat cannot be treated as political offenses and that are therefore subject io extradition The crimes areas those that are "extremely aottm"orgraveo human life. Under the Convention, each stale may still deny the extradition ofcharged with such crimes hut Is obliged to submit those imperil for prosecution in itsJudicial systemo 3
b3
Jeefet
e tiled to placate opponent* by indicating thai loot check) by mobile custom* units could be
wsed_ai bonier cceasinar*ite FX Commission belirm ihat agreement in these areas would give momentumhe plan to abolllh internal borden. which hai been lagging behind the other sspects of the tingle-market
Hi nermann is supported by Spain, which hoMi the EC presidency untiladrid has beyondeasured spproac
severe ignty.a
president, Madrid chaineviCommunity's main forum forecent unofficial meeting of the Trevi ministers pressed for accelerating the abolitiond encountered polite but adamant opoositionTo many of its proposals based
on concerns over terrorism, drug trafficking, illega
immiiralion. and national
Support for removing internal border controls also comes from lbc Schengen group]
inenf iheoriginal goals was to eliminate the control* on their shared border*0 to sour the EC into meeting2 deadline Thc Schengen group hi* made more progress thanas in loosening or eliminating border checks. The live countries, for example, giveursory check to their citizens at border crossings and the Schengen treaty calls for EC cilircai'refcicks toreen sticker on the windihickl ioimple sight check. Thc Schengen group hai also expedited transit of goodi at borden Like thc EC. however, it hai yet ioommon visa policy, harmonize drug- and gun.control laws, orniform policy regsrdmi "hot punuit" by police across national borders. Even if the Schengen group is lutcesiful in harmonising itsrequirement! and asylum procedures, we believe ir, will be difficult for thecomprises more stales wiih more diversehe result
13
recce and the
Neiherlands. oppose lhe.copipT?je dismantling ofborder controls
ihey contend Ihat totalerrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime
Police and customs authorities incotmtftesalse^ppasc ending internal border controls. ecently warned that eliminating internal borderroh would cauie "security gaps.l
lli ill |T
wide abolition of internal borders by simply posting
'fieir securityew kilometer* back from the ,
)
of "softill take advantage of lhe lack of border control* to smuggle drug* from EC countries such ai lhe Neiherlands lhal have liberal drug law*.
63
Other Factors
b3
Another complication ihat may influence tbcon border controls is Denmark'sboth oi MsBss*sMKts*V
,Copenhagen intend* io remain in ibe Union, which allows individual! io more among Denmark and four non-EC stales-Norway. Sweden, finland, andfew or oo passport checks. An EC agreement on external border control* with all five Nordu countries It
eel y
over, ifetain* its membership in thc Passport Union, the EC will find ihat what is. in effect. Denmark's external border will be beyond In
' liltac. hi
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' Dwr iuih> wvi) laNaiivt of
il ll twrimIMiSc
NaNiUMi Baietwrr. tr. iirvm flT CC effont
10
control. Complicating tbe iow furl he, iht Nordic Council'! security icr>ices sre worried thai icrroriim and drug trafficking will spill over from lhe EC. and ihtj might insist thai Denmark maintain somtfron-tier controlsill EC parinen flHgV f)
Owktoh
The EC Corrunisiion and ihe Spanuh ECwell as iu French and Irish successors--wilt continue workingismantle interns)ey see si essential to the creationenuine siogk market They will irguc lhalaad EC-wide reoperation is more erTectrre than its--tkmal border controls for fighting crime. The single-markeiequiremchl for aboliihing internal border controls probably has contributed to the growth in regions!under the Treviterrorism and drug trafficking, lhe growth has beca evident 3
Nonetheless, Ihe advocatesorderless EC era probably undciulima ling the obstacles to agreement on Uniform rules for extradition, vital, andthe rascalliI precursor* to border dnuruntliag by the end
EC members almost certainty will continue ioover extradition policies andreland, lor example, recently refused to extradite suipected IRA supporter John Ryan to thc UK became Dublin believed he would notair trial.
Tbe EC has made Utile progress onomprehensive list of countries whose iiaiionali will require visas io enter tbc EC. Moil countries now on Ihe list werelo visa rcquircmenU before passage of lhe Singk European Act. Additional debate on vita and aiylum requirements is likely lo spark controversy as EC members seek exceptions for former colonica and those nations in which they arc seeking lo acquire or maintain political or rconomk influence.
External Border Controls
The debate over dismantling. Internal border controls Is fuelingris_io_itrengthen the EC's external borders 'ny^sBBBawBaWaa^ao
the EC Commission has called for the creationordon sanitaire around the perimeter ofmember states to Intercept terrorists. traffickers, and illegal
The EC's Trevi group viewsthe sir external borders as one of Its mosl Important ob/ec-ilvts. Tke group liubgroup named Trevio handle tke srcuriiy problems thai are expectedollow tke abolition of the Community's internal borders.s tasks probably will include:
Reinforcing lhe EC's external borders bycommon policies and enforcement praces for each nation's borOer guards.
entral West Europeon data bast on ttrrori sis and drug traffickers.
ommunllywide lookout list lhal would include names of diplomats expelled from EC countries for Itrrorism-retalrd activities os well as ike names of suspected terrorists.
Encouraging incrtostd exchanges of Information between crdamont lawenforcemeni agencies of the EC
^increasing criticism by
ucc and customs omcials. and the public"*for action against drug trafficking airoostwill slow progress toward ending all conlroii Until an rJuCjcgt plan for polking external borders is deviicd, many West Europeans will believe that at least some internal border controls are indispensable.esult, many iaiernal border controls are likely to remain in place at ihc^
bo
1
Thc Kurdish Workers On (he Defensive
level of violence by lhe Ma mil-Leninist Kurdish Workers' Partythe most militani Turkish KurdishTurkey and other West. European countries has declinednkara's efforts against the PKK in southeastern Turkey, the loss of PKK operational bases in Iraq, and decreased support from the local population have contributed to the downturn!
[The PKK's ability to return ils terrorist and miurge.r. operations to at leastE levels will depend on bow much tuppori it obtains from ttatc itoosxs and th* Kurdishand on whether Turkish and otber Wensceurity efforts against the group continue. The same factors probably will determine whether the PKK continues its current targeting patterns or shifts to newto include the Unitednd otherupporters of Turkeyjj)
,CwrtW Activttks U
casualties resulting Iron' PKK activities in Turkey are declining*
total number ol civilii
; official Turkish
aat 43
deaths for which the PKK was responsible fell8ther sourcesore sigalncsni drop, with civilian deaths totaling only1 comparedlthough statistics on the total number of8 vi'y in reliability, they allignificant dtop7 figures, official Tur
figurespercent decline.
Changes in Ihe PKK's tactics probably played ain Ihe decline In PKK-ntlaied civilian
cres of civilians in isolated villages in southeastern Turkey7 belied its self-proclaimed mission to combat oppression, alienated villagers, and drewfrom other Kurdish groups and from PKK sympathizers and activlstsT
Ankara's lactics against the PKK have also changed since Mayri Koiakciogla became the first regional governor of theoutheastern provinces inhesebably have contributed to thc 4
Kcraicoglu. who is in charge of coordinaiing securi ty. has used his authorised extraordinary powers to:
Rcoiganue ibe gendarme forces into commando unit! supported by village guards and specially named police units.
Deploy these units in rural areas, where thcs most active.
Improve weapons iraining, communication!and counter insurgent tactics, includinguse of helicopters.
Increase interagency intelligence gathering andonal cooperation against thc PKK.
Encoutdkc PKK members to take advantagecpeniance law, whichardon and reward to PKK militants who cooperate with thc govcrn-
sese measures sad lhe defectionumber of PKK members have hurtapabilities andenew tactics increasingly forced thc PKK to engage Turkish security forces in shir- with less success than previously^
"jioo
::e?ied in combai8 comithn contrail] Turkish security forces' fatalilics or
-Sottas ^
b3
b3
*)3
V>3
b3
b3
fromespite ihc increased numbcf ofncd clashes. The declining casualties probably rc-fkci improved training, cquipmcnl, nnd tactics. Thc PKK has attempted to counter the governments efforts lo exploit internal strains by retaliating againsi dcfcciorsand iheir families; rtcvcilheleu.cTflajBajaaa;
adherents coniinue to desert.
PKK's combatof whom wereanseen hard to replace and that theroup'suffenng .tTawasttw^s^ mm ihe PKK continues to kidnap recruits, suggesting thai lhe (roup still has problems attracting new members, tapaataaaasswam*
Ankara has also hampered PKK attempts to cipand operations toarger citiesaaaaBBBiajBaBaajsss^^ Turkish police irresiedlleged PKK members last Auiutf who were involved in lerrorisi activities in ihe Irmir region. In January Turkish security efftcialsumber of PKK rrxnvexrs auempting to form an infrastructure in Istanbul and hadun keeping others undoin Ankara,
An additional clement of Ankara's program against thc PKK is an effort to facilitate cultural assimilation and promote economic dcvelcpmcni in ihe southeast This tactic includes establishing provincialcapanding cornmunicatiofli and electric power networks, and cons irwct ing large-scale economicsuchystem of dams on thecr caaassssss*-
Ankara's economic and cultural measures havemiied results, however ^asVaasssSJBjgaBBjBSsw
aaaaTaaTaTaiAnkara's nltsralicccleraied an assimilation process that has begun to narrow the gap between ihc more developed western region of Turkey and thc less developed eastern region The assimilation process, ner-ever. may beovement within the Kurdish community to preserve its ethnic identity.
Thc government's economic policiei, requiring thc lesctitcmenl of thousands of Kurds away from project construction areas and future reservoir sites, have
fe,aaajaaaaa^
Such dislocations have created an atmosphere of distrustuiofaciion toward lhc government and probably have generated new recruits and otber support for lhc PKK from within the KurdishaTaTasss
Other Factors Contributeecline Other developments over lhe past year have added to thc PKK's woes and forced it to relocate some activities. Thee between Inn and Iraq since list Summer has enabled Baghdad tor its-br*der_with Turkey by shifting troops from the war rone, increasing border pairols, and cooceniraiing lis forces against Iraqi Kmdt who had fought on the Iranian
b3
is action forced al0 Iraqi Kords to fkef whom remain there.esult, thc PKK hat lost its safchavens and logistic bases in Iraq, and bringing arms, supplies, and personnel into Turkey hat become more dimcult.caaaajBsjjBstw
i>3
Increased Iraqio have forced thc PKK to shift ils action away from provinces near lhc IraqiSiirt. andprovinces nearer Iranian borJer. cccHh*IMaBaaTa*aiBiiKcch BwtTtwajsjgasstjTaTaBTJjBl. PKK related inetdenit provinces ofcVan. Kars, Agri. and Eirurum Increased last *asM>*Bt
t3
The PKK icportedly eiperienced internal straintnd we believe they continue to limit the
i ' nr.ss^BSjCfJBJBBBJB^
pproaimatelyenior PKK members led by PKK spokesman Hutayn Yitdirimaction opposed lo Ocatan and his leadership style. Other reporting suggests Ocalaa't wife. Central Committee member Ken re Yirdirim. allied herself with thisppotitlonlsts' 1oalt tvliHU replace Ocalan with Hutayn Yildirtm, to intensify lheliuggic without killing women and children, and io enhance contacts wjih all
"revolutionary* of November, howcer, ihe faction had been unableursue its |oalv; the lending activists allegedly went underground after Ocalan issued death sentencestm, and ijjjir supporters were too iniimidated to JgflaVr1
Outlook
Tbe PKK will probably have to adjust its tactics to surmount the obstacles thai have recently surfaced;
newborn, fragmentary reporting suggests' that the PKK already has begun to rely mote onwith Tehran'sa safe-haven to replace its bases In Iraa: the PKK's ability to combat Turkish securityould increase should Iraa choose to provide other supporthc group The PKK probably can expect continued support aad safchavca from Syria, which regards the groupr ovta Tarkcy on bilateral issues. Damascus in the past has been the PKK's principal supporter, providing funding, training in the Syrian-controlled Al Biqa' lUekaa Valley) in Lebanon, and safehouses on which lhe group has relied heavily.
Replacing losi personnel. The Iraqi actions against Kerch in northern Iraq and the resulting large numbers of Kurdish refugees in Turkey maylessing lor ihe PKK According to consularTurkish security forces worry lhal theseof whom are experiencedcouMource of manpower for the PKK. The group's success in recruiting them will depend in part on iis ability ioisnk ideological rJifle
Circumventing Weil European security measures. Thc PKK probably will have to decide how to coniinue its neuritEurope without
mmWmm%%a"imilar Ol problems in other countries. The group may choose to terrorize host governments attempting to curb ill tt
Chronology of Terrorismfo3
Brio- are describedforeign and International rrenit involving terrorists or the use of terrorist iscties. These events have occurred or comeight since our loss issue. In some coses, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events ond developments lhal have already been dtscrtbed eltewhere In this publication ore not
oy
Turner Knrdisk Workers' Pany (PKK) terrorists ot tack sew mialbmset Eruk. Five peopleel affy3
*3
Sol members In Ankarm In four successful
Spain: Booth explodes aad severely damages the Barcelona Catalan separoiiuatEarth movememt.'BM
Spalm Car bomb kills two policemen. Basque Faiherland and liberty (ETA| are being lr'fBBBfBg [,
9 Moy
Middk Fast ^
ay
2i
^rfret
IS May
ban on: Cat bomb in Welt Beirut kllh Iht trader afana! Muslim
Community, Sheikh Hassan Khaled, and several oiker persons. No group ha* cUirned
Latin America
? El Salvador: Unknown terrorists throw two bombs ol US.
tt Salraslor: Unknown terrorists throw two bombs at US Embsuiy-varthoase in San Salvador, canting some damage but no inJurles.dBfH ft 3
iSalvador: Four people killed andounded by mime in La Herradmra
Jurisdiction, La Fat DepartmeitL/The victimsoff lbc mine when iheyign left by
Dominican Republic: Bomb is thrownchool playground In Santo Domingo,all. No one was
Ten National Liberation Army {ELN) terrorists attack aadoll
booth at_EI Playon, Santandrr Department, killing rwo police officers. Four more officers were killed and seven were wounded in an ambush while ibey were chasing the>
4Peasants from IS communities bet* to deatk seven Sendero Lamlnoto (SL)
terrorists In Ayaeurho Department. The peasants were retaliating for having their cattle stolen jff 0i
6Suspected SL terrorists kill American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
deputyrmeaa. Two gunmen shot the victim in"
8SL terrorists kill two policemen and injure four during attack on mining
center In Pasco Departmrnt.dftf, 3
Salvador: Farabundo Marti National Liberation
national electrical sysitm, leavingercent of country without>
24
ndividuals, armed with attlomatic weapons, intercept bus, force
pastemgeri off, and set it oa fire ia Santiago. They lefl pamphlets from tbe Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front andxtremist group.gat
Peru: Son of Huamto mayor is killed by three SL terrorists. The victim was shot in the head J0 j, }
Peru: Unknown terrorist, attack house of former police doctor, damaging his car. T'nc terroriststick cr' dynamiteoving carJKk> /
Terrorists attack police station in San Mateo, Injuring four national
policemen and seriously damaging the station. The SL is presumed to be
reaponsible.^l
15Parcel bomb explode, at bookihop ia Cordoba area, seriously injuring
of the Jastice af thehisThe device wai presumably
presunif
sent to themrinting shop. No group claimed responsibility.!
ISTerrorists Im Santiago armed with automatic nteapoas attack fro poiice-
mea, earning serious iajmrirs^Jne assailants stole the policemen's weapons and communications*
South/Fast AsiaApril
V
SOTerrorists throw three bombs at train in Assam Stale, seriously Injuring
three persons. Police suspect Bodo militants.^
10Bomb explodes In crowded ba, yard ia Sriaagar, killing one perton aad iti
jurimg six. Authorities suspect Muslim militant!.L
alaam militaty.aa'ptutes erne af the prime suspects in ambush -itayimg of US military officer onpriL The inspect admits being aa NPA member but denies participating in thc killingjfc ^
63
South Africa: Unknown persons attack Potsdam polite, iiaiiam la Ciskei, killi one policeman, injuring oat other person, aad coaling minor damage
Africa: Bomb domagti home of aomiaoltd Natloaat Party official ia Randfonteln. This was lhe 6rM stuckornehite member of parliament; ibe explosives used were not typical of leftwing terrorlm' dcvtoei of* fjS
Angola: Bomb expto Injuring two,
Angola claimed resporuibility.
: ar offices of ibrtt foreign oil
The National Union for the Total Indepe
9>s3
Members of Moiambieee National Resistance Movement IRENAMO) release Italian missionary In Blamtyre. Malawi The priest waa kidnapped in late Marchebel aiuck ia which eight acMicn and three other Capuchin mbiaonarics were
South Africa-Belgium: Helen*elgion-Dwiek deal notional imeris-ened in South Africa6 for -higheleased and returned sa
Brussels. Paof auiiting lbc African National Congressferrying arms, identifying urgeu. and establishing explosiverenouncing terrorism and agreed not to return to southern Africa.Brussels octAiitied the return of ihree South African diplomats$
South Africa: Supreme court In Transkei sentences two ANC*memben to death for limpet mine explosion at casinoilling two
Moiambitut-Zombia: RENAMO members kill four Zambia* eielllaas.three ckildren, in attack on Peiauke -Allege, neer Motembltan borderattf fo 3
Soutk Africa: Court find, Berend Sirydom, self proclaim rJ leader af radical rightwing group. White Wolres, guiltj efjjurder end olttmpied murder. He was
arrested last November after killing sis blackshooting spree in downtown Pretoria and sentenced to
^tel"
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