CAMBODIAN DIPLOMACY: BEGINNING THE END GAME? (DELETED)

Created: 6/15/1989

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Cambodian Diplomacy: Beginning the End Game?

SUMMARY

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We believe ihe meeting last month between Prince Sihanouk and State of Cambodiaormerly People's Republic of Kampuchea. Prime Minister Hun Senurning point in efforts toolitical agreement. The two negotiators narrowed the gap between them, but. more important In our view, they now agree that Hun Sen's administration will anchor an interim government and are working to reshape it to accommodate coalition arrangements. The Khmer Rouge under duress has endorsed this approach. The negotiating framework Sihanouk and Hun Sen have established Is delicate and subject to sudden collapse, but It may culminate in early August in an international conference that ostensibly will complete en agreement Vietnam will probably ensure that the diplomatic process proceeds apace by withdrawing large contingents of troops this summer and possibly by moving up Itseptember deadline for complete ovncuation.

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threadsettlement: tha "external" issues

since the diplomatic ball began rolling nearly two years ago. vietnam has tried to distinguish between the "externalwithdrawaltnamese forces the cutoff of external aid to the four khmer factions, and international control of atheroblems of powersharingew government. although the resistance and its chinese and association of southeast asian nations (asean) backers have fought to avoid the distinction because it allows vietnam to distance itself from the conflict and does not protect resistance political equities, the uneven progress in resolving these issues has been divided roughly along the lines imposed by hanoi. ffJH|

withdrawal is vietnam's primary diplomatic tool and hanoi has used it pursue severe) objectives:

shorter timetables have helped stimulate and set the pace of diplomacy. vietnam repeatedly warns that time for negotiation will expire onci has left cambodia, for example. theeptember deadline now seems to be driving negotiations.

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has focused international attention on and abjured responsibilityossible return to power by the khmer rouge. the early withdrawal deadline helps further define the khmer rouge problem and dilutes the villainous image hanoi earned by invading.

vietnam also started the process of creating an independent identity for itshnom penh. the combination of hanoi's troop withdrawals and concern over the khmer rouae has cast the soc to some observersiable and preferable alternative.

fhe Internal Question: Powersharing

Although the external issues are not resolved, the problem of governing Cambodiaettlement andermanent regime is established is the

esult, Sihanouk and Hun Send are neootlattnq the terms. Both side:

*k vi Hun Sen'5 newmomentum substantially raises the ante to the Khmer Rouge, in our view. The guerrillas were deliberately excluded from the Ja^rtf! meeting In May Md Sihanouk separated himself from his resistance percners by claiming io speak only for his group. These factors along with the positive tonej^bieresurti ofmettrng furrher fS0>aie the Khmer ftouge

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Lookingew Months

Along with narrowing their differences, Sihanouk and Hun Sen have-tentatively

hree-step process to iron out remaining disagreements over

several months. Thoy plan to resume bilateral talks in Paris onuly, to convene a

summit of the four Khmer tactions the following day, and to open anther-

If the negotiationsolution, and we believe they will, any agreement reached most likely will be fragile and threatened by deep-seated animosity, distrust and other factors including:

by the various factions to enhance their position before restrictive provisions take effect

of the agreement thereafter.

Interpretations of the provisionsettlement

among coalition partners trying to coadminister tha country

limitations of any controlling mechanism.

The dramatic transftlon in Phnom Penh wDI also Inhibit elforts to establish order in

ml Stability and order will vary pre.iily in outlying areas as will tha relative Influence of the Khmer factions. "

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What If Diplomacy Fails?

Vietnam's withdrawalomprehensive settlement entails greaterur view, bucause th^re would bg no iramrjwcr* even on DOoer for estebKshina order or reconciling the warring factions. "

Vietnam's withdrawalomprehensive settlement, nevertheless, could eedenial agreement on at least some of the "external4

We would also not

ruie out further talksompromise among the Khmer on powersharing after September although Hun Sen probably couldtSur bargain then. He probably believes his chances for International recognition will improve substantially arter Hanoi leaves. He also says he will hold elections within three months, which would help his cause end enhance his standing if he is challenged politically.

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