Near East and South Asia Reviefr|
Near Kasl and South Asia Review I
Since iu inception ia the, Iraq's missile program has focused onaBbtic missile that could st-ke Tehran or Tel Aviv. Iraq achieved this goal with lhe introduction of the Al Hqsayn missilend il soon may be able to strike Israel with its more powerful AI Abbas miuiles
IraqsSyria^rm-ke^ Prospect* for Conn Id Over Euphrates Rhw
TeoHons over the sharing of Euphrates river waicrs between liaq,Turkey are not Ukely to lead to hostilities io the near term, butwill increase ibe potential for conflict toward the cod ofA water-sharing agreement would help defuse the issue,of lhe slates is willing tn com promise.
IV AmU Cixiprn.Il.ia Council: .Sunlnu Vm To-
The AxtU CoopcrationtoumSImoving into inyearecord ofccomplish roc nl. Fm the neat Icrm Egypt. Jordan, and Notifa Yemen will concentrate on implementing tccltnica)
scientific accortU. while Ir.iqthe organi/aiionolitical
and islookingovreater military fole.l
Military Form Intatus Report
Syria continuesaintain enough military troops in Lebanon to impose order in the area* il occupies and loossible Israeli attack through the Bckaa Valley. These forces are experiencing morale problems due to extended deployments, prolonged periods of inactivity, and sporadic attacks by Lebanese and Palestinian groups.
I^Uu-n: Theot li.rly.bui Noi Ond
The nalional reconciliation agreement ncgoliai.dAl Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, has become an im) nrtant factorotiliitt. Although the prospects for until iral reform in Unanor. are not promising, the Al Ta'if accord has proven wr prmnglr resilient.
Sudan; Implications ot an Uljmic Fundamentalist
niuUry government is heavily influenced hy Islamic fundamf malisi* who favor extending Islamic law throughout the country. The regime's determination to retain Islamic law will impede its efforts to cod Ibc civil war in the south as well as estrangeonfundamenialist political parties and much of the military.)
Irani Internal Development, and Oppa.lil.ia IV.uprtU
The Iranian regime remains deeply divided over the fundamental course it if lo pursue in the pnai-Khomcmi era. Although ihc clericaln danger, the lack of consensus among its members and Ihe decline in living standards will give increased mojic Id ant Regime actions by dissident groups.!
Among the Afghan Insurgenttatu* Report |^
Innghling hu plagued the Afghan resistance for yearsikelyover ibe near term at about ihe same level as in previousprobably will escalate when the Kabul regimelapse.
Troubled Future for India's Communist Parties
India's Communist panics have looming problems thai could leadeclipse in national politics by centrists and the resurgentmovemenl. The unwillingness of the parties' agingadapt (heir hardline mdeology to the changes in worldplayed an important role in iheir decline.
Sri Lanka After the Indians Leave
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Echun, the most powerful Tamil group, are cooperating with the Sri Lankanhe wake of the Indian withdrawal from the island, but they arc likely lo renew their struggle for an independent Tamil homeland ia Ihe longer term.!-
Royal Nepatrsc Army: Progress and Problems on Hie Road
The Royal Ncpalcsc Army can protect the governmenl from internal threats, but it would probably he incapaMc of ollenngmvieh resistanceoreign invasion. Recent efforts io modernize the Army are unlikely to have much impact on improving Nepal's defensive capabilities.
The Threat lo Israel
Ht inception in (he cai tyIraq's iumuu program has fiieuscd onallistica range of ati the capability in strike either Tehran ot Tel Aviv. Iraq achieved this goal with (he introduction of the Al Huuya miMik ir. ITKK. hut the missile's small warhead diminKlKd Us valuetrategic counter in Israel's long-range strike aircraft and missile
The Threat to Israel
Iraq has been able strike Israeli territory with the Al tJusayn3 using.
ft Ap-il TWO
AMumgh ha./t%andmasticsitB^tcn. us first and mmt
modifiedhe Al Huxvyn ami ihr Al
Che Al lluseyn. Inns announcedthe firxi left luuiuhwwitrfrWZ Baghdad used iihr fust
time against Tehran inR dcnwnutuling ihot the missileange of at least OOOkihumien as opposed to the MO kilometer,rgular Scud B. We rVfinrncreased range *as aehiewd by reducing the "right of thekU.uyenq of high explosiwto appnirimatcfo'80kilograms. I
TlieAIAbbas. Iraa announced it had tested ihe Al Abbas innd claimed the missileangekilometers. The At Abbas displayed ot tlie arms exhibition in Baglidad in9 waseter longer than the At Iltuayn. suggesting lhat pan of la modification imxmvs extending and increasing the capacity of Us fuel tanks. Iraq has not used ihe missile
Spr.ubH.in on Iraqi MIim> IWtr.nr
at pnwided no public statement,million vntoig hitoandissile *vrfore.nit mitotei ami mrxruft during Hie war himMjgrir:
news concenimiiw of,'hi/tuns as noble targets.
ob/ecthrs in attacking Chilians were toenic sunpcvi/or mr hotr/Jlwo foment xipposHion against the clerical regime in Tdiran
a Atiofks on eivimns were sporadic and increased in relation lo Imqrrttbacks on Ihe battlefield. Baghdad Stressed Ihe retaliatory nature of Us anacks In iu
The Iraqi military leadership probably recognizesof -strategic bombing'becauseonly marginal success wiih iu missile
We estimate Iranian Chilian casualties firm all Iraqi motile and air attacks were between IHOOOand. According ut Iranian claims, the wont attack of the war occurredSivilians we killedoundedarrage of four Scud missiles on Bakliiaran.
Baghdad, hinrever, may perfect its mm csprnenie with morale problems resultmgfrtwn Imman miwilt attacksISandovrnoluelltemefulneni^wi jusujymg their use aeamtt inher cinmiru-i
W Iraq succeeds in developing nnconventional war heads for id missiles, Baghdad's ability to ncuiralirc point targets would increase, although collateral damage would he high and would inviic additional Israeli attacks in kind. Daghdad probably will be wary of using chemical warfare against Israel, hut Iraq is likely to try to cultivate the impression that
mightetaliatory chemical attack in thewill strengthen its deterrent posture.
IraqOtjrU-Turkey: Prospects Tor Conflict Over Kaphnile*
nwort* over then( Euphrateswalci
between If aq. Syria, sadTurkey arc aa* Uci)lead lit houililici ia lhem. hut rising dtmmd -ill
increase ihe potential Tor Cnnflicl toward ihr end irf lheater-sharing agreement would help defuse lhe icsue. bul Turkeyis
water dcvchiprncnt plana Moreover, oilier relations aad conflicting economic ialcrcaUbetween Iraq aad Syria make agree stem oa water sharing difficult. More likely, Iraq and Syria will separately press Turkey to negotiate concessions,imbinaiioo of political and economic pressure and pcibaps sabotage. II there is do agreement and water saraiagesbecorne more severe, at is Lkely in ihe late
1 wc believe Iraq and Syria will consider military
Over the past two snonnts tension between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey has increased as Ankara temporarily cut lhe How of the Euphrates river lo seal diversion tunnels in the newly constructed Aiaiurk Dam For Iraq sad Syria ihis ever* brooghi >alo iharp foeoi iheirwaier resource vulnerabilities. The problem is likely to increase over ihclteat decade as Turkey implements its ambitious Southeast Anatolia Protect and Syria goes ahead with proposed dams and irrigation facilities or. lhe Euphrates and the Khabur River, its major tributary. Wc believe financial and technical problems will delay completion ol lhe Turkish aad Syrian projects,but evea partial deveJCrpracnt would significant ty reduce the fUr* of Euphrates waiei, especially to Iraq. ]
There is no water snaring (icaty or clearly defined mechanism to setlle disputes among the Euphrates riparianow-level tripartite technical dimmiitcc meets periodically, but ils aole mandate is In compare data and discuss water flow issues Tbr key claims sovereign rights to Euphrates water because the headwaters, which account fur overerceni of lhe river 'sflow, art io fcsltrritory. laoui view. Ankara sees Utile reason to acgotiale away use nf water originating in Turkey unless il is allowed In
he Icrnuater-sharing agreement.e tub, Ankara has blocked Iraqi and Syrian proposals lo use the technical committeeorum lo discuvs Ihe firing (if water shares,!
Kuphral cs Kivor Use
Tola! Annual N'al iiimI flow cm/voar
believed Damascus was siphoning off more (ban its share of Euphrates water, j
A Military Solution?
Barring an agreement, the Euphrates water supply will become increasingly tight toward tbe end ol* theooner ifevere droughtas upstream water projects in Turkey and Syria come on line Iraq would be hurt most, and Baghdad's ire probably would be directed al Damascus because ihey arc long) imc adversaries and Syrian water diversions have ihc most dircci impact on Iraq. Although wc believe the prospects for miliiary action would be small. Iraq or Syria could consider more seriously ibc use of military force to resolve ihe dispute:
Iraq could mass troops on the Syrianeans of intimidation, as it did in Ihe water crisis of the.
Iraq or Syria might eventually resort to military threats to try to force Turkey lo Ihc bargaining
The rwiactjtal xulicalm nfmilitary opcr Hums would he ihe rcoVpiayrneM of nufforces in Iraq ami Syria and ihe buildup olcapabilities, including large quantities nl supplies, near cororoajl horde's to sustain coavl'ji forces Toac.iwnpCsh this, Syria, which hasvt>iujll> no ground forces on eilher the Turkish or Iraqi border, prohaMy would need to /educe its forces in Lebanon, ere ate new cbvisions, or draw down forces facing Israel Iraq would abo have lo re deploysome of its elite Republican Ouard
The Arab Cooperation.Year TWo
Thehiik'I is moving >uinii% secondyear withodi U i'vca ihe'separation andeconomicand peaiikal dinerraeesorihc eeaaaeiT* mcmherv li-s.orthherfnctt achievement* alter only oneo tuipiisc Th* lacl lhat the organisation has held together despite the centrifugal force* actingndicate* thai iti members see ihc councilsefulon Fiv ihc near term Egypt. Jordan, and North Yemen will concentrate on Irying o> make progress implementing over two dozen technical and scientific accords lhal have been signed Iraq, on the other hand, win use the organualionolitical sctunduujhoard aad look lor opportunities lo givereaterle
MUiUry Cooperation: Iraq's Ambition Wc believe Iraq had hoped the Arab Cooperation Council would emerge as an alliance with military and strategic ngnificaacc lhat would help Baghdad fulfill US regional amtnliom and, involile its archenemy. Syria. Iraqi ambitions have been stymied mainly by tbeho are trying to juggle iheir relationship with Israel and their leadership role in the Arab world.'f
Economic Cooperation: Lesi Than Meets the Eye
The Arab Cooperation Council wasear agoweeping statement of economic objectives:
i 11 ommon ouiikililx i
nn li'il .
among ihe ntcmtvik through ihe dcwkrrtmcnt ot rail, road, and iclccommuoica'ioa faolitiev
lhat will case movement among the memhei* and enhance emphivmcni
am! cultural cooperation lo promote mutual understanding,
Legal and judicial agreement to unify kguJilivc practice* and facililalc cooperation in fighling illegal drug traffic and consumption.
Althoughccords have been signedariety uf
oneof them hu been impkmcmed in
be devoted to puitutgliw scco'tli into or ad ice, but any movement probably will beailt pace. Technical committees must first draft proposals and then refer them to member governmenu foe approval.
Behind the smokescreen of ceremonial signing*,first year has beenextbook casenoncoepcration, as the economies ofstates do noi jibe in ways thai lend themselvesProposal to merge airlines,and expand trade ties have been stymiednational interests:
The summit meeting held in Amman in February IWi to mark the organi/ation's first anniversary
in roara incirsiphasi/cd both the council's roleolitical podium and the likelihood that members win try to use it for different purposes, j
jlraqt president saddam huoyn exploited the
occasion toiatribe against the US presence in ihe Persian GuK, which probably embarrassed ihc other three leaders aad contributed lo the early brcakupofihe meeting Saddam's speech reflected his reluctance io let ihe Fgyptutro lake the lead in de fining council policy or even to deler lo deep-seated Egyptian sensibilities. Cairo does ootiarty io inflanunaiorythat might conceivably injure ihe already crippled Arab-Israeli
withdrawal in fav.it of US inftot nti ca among tradriionsl friend* of lhe Uniled Slulcs, that WaOungtnn haa tintand may reinforce Aiali efforts loefctxe tanks The <iulf Conrwratiiinil and, to aextent, lhe Maghreb Arab Union lane as example*hecgioaal urganiralmm in mulUfVying influence, lulling the gcngtuptiK cxhruiin of ihcse tan groups, the Arab t'ociperation Council will probablyarder lime (ululating formal membership into commona* modest past successes will encourage new
Political beat Tin io litethree owmknbeen fewer;
tci lorrrm pina'i.ihip wiih Iraq amTit inlluential "big brothers."
Iraq probably tees the council giving Baghdadforum to incicasc.it> involveracot in regional ruuesay to keefjSyiia off balance. To lhe extent lhat lhe military relationship* among lhe mcmbcrt can be translated into enhanced political clout, Iraq will see (he council as. an asset in its drive tor regional prominence
Wc do not sec the rivalry between Iraq and Egypt Leading lo the council's ruptuic in the near term,because the organisation Is unlikely lo tackle tbe tough bancs involved in economic integration and Baghdad wtfj probably not push itsagenda lo the point of an open break with Egypt. Moreover, member ualeswiD sec tbe councilseful too1 in pursuing their individual foreign policy goals, turning (oil pragmatically when they cipect lhe agreement and assistance of (heir colleagues and avoiding ll when they foresee friction aad criticism
Despite US friendship with Egypt and Jordan, Ibe United Stales can expect the council toorum for criticism of US Middle East policies. Saddamnti-US diatribe al the summit meeting in Amman illustrated the danger. Although Saddam's remarks probably were an embarrassment to Egypt and Jordan,]
and Implications for OS Interests The council's role may grow as regional players react to lhe Soviet Union's more moderate stance, which has been perceived in the area as effective Soviet
I'leason io expect similar
performances in (he future.)
Syria's Military Forcestatu* Kcporl
concentrated sufficient force' in the area loocccu'ul. ajhek cuaily.ffiant (ajiatian strongman Michel Awn Syrian force* in Lebanon arc cipciicncing morale prohkms. however, largely due locdcndcd deployments- up lo three yean for manyuniti-p'olonged periods of inactivity, andacks by Lebanese and Palestinian groups. Moreover, llie ccasvbni readiness of Syrian troops ia Lebanon has suffered because iheir operational mission, which requires constant high alert, precludes regular training. Despite ihctc problcma and the economic cost of supportingrge fotce beyond ks borders, wc believe Syria will maintain enough troops in Le banco lo support ksliant government in Beirut and defense against the Israeli threat. (
Mildicrilu lleirut in dbtuiryo support u- SKi. Amal ally, which was fighting ihc Palestinians Syrianmined into urban areas, they tamerfiHnt with Lebanese groups and frequs nil) wets' the1 target of attacks. .Syrian troops became entangled in fighting Ik iwccn the Amal and Hizballah Shia militias in I'rKH and slugged it out with Awn's forces for several months last year Damascus deployed
ronpa lo Lebanon late law year assassination of Lebanese Fresidenia>adjo, Novensbct. I
So far ihey hive managed lo avoiJ
Dccoming directly involved in the Christian infighting lhat erupted earlier this year, I-
Syrian Forces oa the Ground There arc more Syrian troops in Lebanon now lhan at any other lime
Syria first sent troop* to Lebanon in earlyaboutfficers io Beirut io helpol many cease-fires in Use rapidly growingtioops were in
Lebanon supporting the Maronite Chiisliaos against leftist Muslims, the Drurc, and Palestinians. The Syrian military presence reached! by the end of the yearecision by the Arab League toredominantly Syrian manned Arab Deterrent Force to tcslorc peace
amascus switched Us supportibe Muslims, Drure, and Palestinians and clashed with Christian militias lhat were crpanding their lies to Israel. Syria's military presencehe Israeli invasion*!
lorecd Damascusithdraw its forces from Beirut and the southern Bckaa "valley and concentrate them in western Lebanon to protect the approjichcs to Damascus. I
flySyria's troop fcvel hadul Damascus dcpUiyedl-
Syrian Mllllurj Intolvrraeni InKV
SO .Sanaa ullaiitlfmaih>caMrlitbaaaa'a gnmna <wtl
rii.ii ah ii lUm
troop baddup reaOieiJ
i,Ufi rofrtiti .
i 'ir.-Ar.ti IVfiernM
In cm' judgment, the Syrian troop pretence ir Lebanon is intended lo promoteong-term goal ofnified, nonscctariun Lebanese government that bt amenable to Sytia'the Syrian troop* abo liensure relative slaWky in the region and increase Syria's leverage over Lebanese politic* by eoharscirtg Syria's control over the Lebanese milit'u and,easer degree, the Muslim elements ol the Lebanese armed forcei President Assad uses Syria's military prevenecnfluence and, when necessary, dictate Lebanese peJiey.'
Beyond protecting Syria's strategic interests in Lebanon, Syrian forces support tactical eoab. in our
iwtrh USu lajKIaiaOruliaii bruate of fQintiUa ix> io UohL Muchimiwd invuBnof aoufhem
libanoa in Mind and vithdrrvin luly
) lint i
Problems at Ihc Front Sagging Morale morale of Syri
ow mainly due
aad a* MmIub ampia intitaia artaViy
*arioreea at Or*onpaaa Aw
A-aMwaaae oa MaSa part*
Al pan ol Nil Al Ta'llDixn-i
urt iiu rcdeptoy la toim lo theiW(uii (oOmiui toematlim ot aIim nl
toleiV uui'i'i'i* oTt jtiawaar DmOeai Hraa
lo prolsmged depUt)tns*iu> and poorndkioMv Most ol ihi troop* have been inr cmr two year* evenhey arc supposed lo rot ale oof every six mow as. Morale ia further eroded* lining conditions. /
I'oniB arc poorly ltd. clothed, aivd shelteredirffieers have complained that senior officers arc aware of these problems bul are unwilling to address
Cortttor Readiness Degraded. The combai readiness of Syrian foren Lebanon has been adversely
affected by prolonged deployments and lhe
maintenanceonstant high alert.
normal training standards
The Lebanese parttomrni ownednatumal 'iViKin/iufdiri eiyeemem fair Oelober in Ai 7aV/ Saudi 4rebia, ihai calls for lhe electionew president and for the centralgurrrnment to extend its tovfreignt)-oil Lebanese territory using Lebanese internal security widmilitaryfiuxes The avcfvJstipulates thusSrnonrtanan win anist In Ihe process. The Lebanese Oatemrnent will us ntmc lhe security dutiesearned out by Syrians following die consolidation id ks internal security and armed faeces. This process is ui he cc ^pteird mVtin two yean of the agreement's ratification,ch Damascus and Beirut ore to thscuxr the rrdeploymem of Syrian rmopi to the Bekaa Volley and theirh the Lebanese
remedial action by Damascus. If Damascus hopes lo redress these problems, ii will have to implement regular troop rotations and provide better logistic support. Syria is unlikely lo Implement such telativcly expensive measures because of saa poor economic sit nation
lo lhe near term Syria will maintain ils military presence ia Lebanon to support the Hawaii government and to Veep prcssuie oa Awn. fresident Assad probably will not commit Syrian troops to remove Awn as long as the Christian infighting drags on, preferringet Awn and Lebanese Forces militia chief Samir Jija weaken each other. Syrian troops, ia accordance with the Al Ta'if accord, could help Harawi extend bus control over Lebanese lerrilnry if lhe Awa sit nation is lescmed Darnascas probabty would iheaignificant number of troops, particularly from the Beirut area, to the Bekaa Valley.
In lhe long lerm, Syria probably believes it has no choice but to occupy pctetioas of Lebanon permanently to protect its security interests, particularly against ibe Israeli military threat. The Syrians probably would consider withdrawing completely Irom Lebanon crdy if an sgr cement were reached wiih Tel Aviv lhal guaikotrcs the simultaneous withdrawal of Israc't forces from soot hern Lebanon andubservient government is established in Beirul. Even then. Daraascus't caancern over Hizballah's military capabilities would tempt it to maintain forces in earl era Lebanon to prevent the emergencetrong, uncontrolled pro Iranian presence there.
mcaalc and combat readiness of Syrian troops in Lebanon will continue lo deteriorate without
I .cii ite Al Ta'if Proves*clv. bul Noi De.id
national reconciliation agrccmeni negotiatedTail. Saudi. ian im| 'l.ii'v politic Although al reformjb.ib lieccord hai proven su'|*i'iri-(lT rc'lbsm.id tf* death aic exaggerated,
If lhe firvt step urn political reform isii conversion, ihe cadhanon's civil war may haw begun when Cluiuian and Mudim JcguJalors opened iheir dialogue in Saudi Arabia
he polaical menage nf lhe Ac TVaf accordaaiarulawiialfajority -tbanon" Christians arc willing lo share powerMuslim counter parts within the (ramcwuik ofLebanese stale and lhal important Arabwilling lo support ihe process ofThe Christian decision toarrange menu arvj lhe Muslim decision toaligns for the sake ofecision ioew
The negotiations in At Ta'if- with some assistance fnun Saudi Arabia -represented the efforts of lhe Lebanese political cstaNnhmeal lo orchestrate an orderly process of political reform. Since the Lebanese civil war hasispute over sharing political power, Al Ta'if represented the potential end of the civil war. The ncgrnlalionsai Al Ta'if and the accord, however, were desperate acts. There had been an president ofince the cod of Amin (iemiyel's term innd Interim Prime Minister Michel Awn, appointed to facilitate the election of Gemaycli successor, was obit rncimg lhe process he was charged with carrying cnit. The political system tccieied near collapse as the Lebanese despaired of sWving Iheir problems alone.
The Arab League repeatedly attempted inolution lo Lebanon's misery. The vituperative Casablanca summit meeting int which Iraqi President Saddam lluuyn stormed out of lhe
prsKccdingsappeared litaudi King fahdet another effort lo reconcileudims andn ttlSeptemUt IWi. Lebanon'surviving legislaitie*n At Ta'if. where theyompromise thain*ornerstone for national political rcci ion.
Speaker of the Lebanese parliament llusnyni and Phalange Party leader Sadah were the main Lebanese actors during lhe de liber at ions. Each participated on behalf of his own sect, rcprcsentina Lebanon's major confessionalhia and Christina Despite ihe widely held perceptioc lhal merelyernfercncc among Lebaouo's legislators was enoughuccess. Hint; Fahd and the Saudis apparently invested considerable prestige in pushing for meaningful results, in our judgment *
In our view, there was real give and lakewell atetween (he Muslim and Christian camps tbrougbosM the Atonference During the fini week of the talks, Kusayni and Maronite Patriarch Slayilan for political reform thai they intended lo present iflls bogged down, preempting the widely anticipated deadlock over the thorny issues of Lebanese politics.egislators called for (he end of all Christian political privileges and ao Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon Mi&lia leaders lunbtait and Bairi etaievred the laLks tor aot going far enough, |
JunblMt would not accept the ooteomc ot the laBrs unless more tadical reforms, such as restructuring the
Ami) and di jslk'alkJi*1 willi'
The Christian* had Amimli ot*ihcii <mn. Phalange chief Sadah. unofficial kadrt of the1 ,'. i'i asserted there could be no accord mi pofctk'll reformorresponding agreement (in Syrian wilbdr aural from Lebanese toil Rtmghly Ihiee weeks into the deJahcr it mm. Saclah kft the talks to protest what he regarded as escalating Muslim denunds m. response to the Christian p> nit ion on Syrian wiihdiawaLJ
The Saudis stepped in liTtjrcaV ihc impaisc.
jdaUncd Saudiith Syria
Minister Sa'ud met with Syrian President Assad, and Assad agreed to Lebanese Government mrerviooa of Syrian forces while ihey withdrew lo the Be haa Valley The two alto agreed on redeployment tiles for the Syrian forces. Sadah rejoined the fold, and the legislators overwhelmingly approved the agiccmeni, paving the way for the ckation of fVesideni Muawad last November and the re constitutionentral governing twlheiritv.
The Outcome: Big Flattes,uses
The talks produced an agreement thai providedelatively small reduction in the powers of the presidency, evenly divided the teats in the unicameral legislature between Muslims and Christians, called for the phased withdrawal of Syrian fearers, andlueprint by which Ihc Army could be unified and Lebanon's sectarian militias disbanded and disarmed.
Lebanon's Muslims rejoiced at fust, but theyia the moenirg Since otenlindicate the Muslimsajority ofsplitting the seals in ihe legislatureihe outnumbered Christians was aJunblatt and Ibe Dniu publiclyconcern that the Drurc community7 percent of Ihehave hs political clout diluted inso divided. Nabih Barri, pto-Syrisnthe Shia Amal militia, made generally vaguesi a: erne nit coraccrniag Al
Hizballah clearly signaled its displeasure with the At Ta'if accotd. In out view, the murderaudi diplomat in West Beirut in early November and lhc il.iim of responsibility by Islamic Jihad, accompaniedhotographS hostage, was intended lo conwy the fundamentalists' opposition lo both renewed Saudi imolvcrocot in Lebanese polilics and ihc agreement itself.'
Michel Awn's opposition to Ihc Al Ta'il accord it ihc backbone of his political appeal. Ksru though Al lad
the Christians more representation in the kgivlaturc than their share ol Ihe population wotrJd warrant. Awn claimed lhal. since lhc accord docs ma ulu/aci'smly guarantee ibc withdrawal of Syrian lor cec. il ia unacceptable. Moreover. Awnat, since be had dissolved the parliament before Muawad was elected President, ihe ckclioa and thef8 electoral crisis were nullified.
Recent clashes between Awn's forces and Ihe Christian Lebanese Forces militia in East Beirut raise doubtt about tbe efficacy ol Awo't obstructionism. If the trends observed ia0 bold. Awn wiU be unable to remove theoUieal force.oncervabk Awn may modify hit (osatioo on the Al Ta'if accord in the course of negotiations aimed at reducing tlw level of violence in the Christian encU>
Syrian Attitudes Toward Al Tail
For Damascus, ibc At Th'if accordep toward its goalnified, pro-Syrian Lebanese government strong enough io stand up to Israel bul pliant lo Syrian wishes. The accord alsoeprieve ft cm Arab and iotcrnaooaal criticism ol Sytia't apparent wabihtylo resolve the coofUci io Lebanon despite its prolonged nvilatary mvorw.meni. Growing doubt over future levels ol support from ihe Sennet Union and economic probkms have compounded Damascus'* perceptions of isolation and weakness,eassessment of relalioat with the Arab world f
/Damascus almost certainly bcficves lhal promoting ihe Al Ta'if process will improve relations
with ihc Arab stales.
Auhough.the accord probably docs not promote Muslim political interests to lhc degree the Syrians
ctor'. IV-dltntu noV'I'
ytara attor it-form
It:nal wtth-Jr awing
prefer, ilI enaRcs Damascus lo put off (he question of Syrian troop withdrawals while portraying itself as (he champion of peace in Lebanon. If Ihe Ai Ta'if process progresses, Syria eventually will have io honor iu commitment to withdraw troops to the Bekaa Valley and uliimalcry pull out iu forces entirely. Because Damascus regards the pecsence of Israeli and pro-Israeli forces in southern Lebanonhreattsill be loath lo withdraw its troops entirely from Lebanonimultaneous Israeli withdrawal. If Al Ta'if fails or bnguishes, Assad will consider his previous commitmcnls concerning troop withdrawals null and void. Tbe View from Baghdad
In Iraq's eyes, the At Ta'if agreement is seriously flawed because itritten guarantee of Syria* withdrawal fromajor Iraqi foreign policy objective. The Iraqis view Lebanon largely through ihe prism of seeking revenge for Syria's
support for Iran and Iraq) Kurdish rebels during the Iran-Iraq war. Despite limited military, financial, and political support for iheir anti-Syrian Christian allies. Awn and Jaja, the Iraqis are frustrated by Syria's continuing occupation of Lcbaooo!
Baghdad has not endorsed the At Ta'tl agreement but bas grudgingly agreed not lo oppose it and has tfisowtfinued financial and military support to Awn. Baghdad wishes to avoid being viewed by its allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, as the spoiler of the fragile Lebanese agrcensent.
We believe Baghdad is biding iis time io the hope that some event in Lebanon will undermine foreign support for the agreement or for Syria's predominant positioo there. The Iraqis apparently have temporarily shelved efforts to bolster their Christian and Palestinian allies and enhance their own influence in Lebanon. In our judgmcnl. lhe Iraqis hope to
ilCatt an uni.inviinuiii.il military optionlutu ui
hly Syrialodrier Syrian actions against their Lebanese and Palestinian allies.!
Prniprctt for Viiocm
The assassination of Pi evident Muawad underscores the difficultyreform faces ia Lebanon. Several Lebanese and non Lebanese groups arc capable ol carrying out aeis al violence and poUieJ obstruction that can paialyvc Ibc political i -Muawad's death, howcwi, was followed bylhc swift election of llyasKarawi as his successor, and Ihe reform process moved forward Despite continuing opposition, the At Ta'a* accord remains Ibc center of political" and the issue around which Lebanese politicians array themselves*1
Wc believe the consensus forged in Al Tail', now represented by Presidentew factor in
Lebanese politics. For example,
Iran (omect publicly with members of Harawi's government as an informal sign of recognition. Wc believe even the Lebanese factions that oppose national reconciliation may alter iheir positions concerning Atan icularly If Lebanon's
strongest advocate of an Islamic republic can aivommodalc itself to the At Ta'tf process. Ncverthcless, the rapid rcconslitutiooentral government under Harswi,hifts of sortie factions, and the resiliency of Ihc At Ta'if consensus do not imply the reform process wilt avoid daunting chaL'cngcs.l
IrnpOeatleaa hr Ihe United Sutrs Therelimmer of hope that Washington would cont.'ibutc to Lebanoni resttseaaiioa after the At Ta'il confercnee. The discreet support Washington provided the Al Ta'il negotiation! almost ecttainly helped broaden the basis for political acconsraodation among Lebanese groups. Wc believe Washington's low-icy approaches to hey participants boosted the chance that Ihe Al Ta'if accord would resolve the electoral Impasse, begin anational reconciliation process, and iniuutiooaliie political reform. Increased US involve me oi, however, might jeopardize gains the Lebanese have made by providing an emotionally charged focus of activityaried group of anti US players: Hizballah, era re mist Christians, and ihe supporter* of Michel Awn-P
militaryheCouncila heavily indue need hywhotamieihe country andinimumto implementinga ia the north.also is trying lo marginaliseolitical pa nice. Ii hailo the National Islamic Fronl.share this goal aa well asoeiety based on Islamic lawdetermination to retainformer Presidentcriminal prcMsion* -will impedethe civil war iothe south. Theto the National Islamic from also estrangealisi parties and much of iheSudan's st abdrey.
Islam and Retolotlooary Command Council DvnamleJ
Iilsmic fundamcrualuii heavily influer.eemcmbcr Revolittiooary Command Council, which seized power lastc believe Chairman Umarevout Muslim, but he governs
govern by cooscosvis and has felt increasingly compelled to compromise with the more militant Mtislirnsoothccraiiricil. Hardliners led by Deputy Chairman al-Zubayr Muhammad Salth advocate governing Sudan under Islamic law.f-
Holding the Uar oa lilnmle Law
The Revolutionary Command Couoed bas signaledlo an Idaaaic Malt by rejcciingsouthernn rt peal Islamicformer President Nianciri'sIslamic criminal penalties.*'Bashir took power, he repudiated anegotiated in8 byUnionist Party and thethat proposed freeing applicationlawonstitutional conferencecouncil has
rece tin cSTyvng out corporalsentences imposed after Nianciri's ousterThe government also commutedor fines sentences cdby the
Wc do aot believe tbe decision to comrouie corporal and capital punithroeDts signals an intention to abandon Islamic Law.
requirements Ihut such leniences be quietly carried out mandated the commutations. Ouninal trials continue to be conductedslamic law.|^ J
We douN the regime wUl make cooecuiooa on this issue be rood thcae iu National Diatogne Conic rence oa Peace proposed last fall. The conference proposal* would allow regionsoo Muilrm majority to repeal Islamic law but would not exempt religious minorities who live ia Miislim majority areas such as Khartoum. The delegate* ruoposcd:The federal assembly pass criminal and civil laws after considering regionalnd customs.
* tkfo.udanear covtu upeoM Utanue Law in
biu f-m - .L lullljj,.
andimv.replacedemtn-drrwW rntnuial cod* wua iiiim.-
pnaabir-enlahanging, and beheading Itir a
rv"ia NlmtW'* reform* also nmpfcdetiera commercial law rrncnj
The regional asscntNics crempt residents fiotn -puivly religions" Laws Thei uj it nua-MiKlinu could he exempted from lihmit er iminj) laws.
A couple's religion or custom govern marriage. divorce, adoption, and inheritarm.
Jamie law must be enshrined in theredicted civil war in the north if the Revolutionary Command Council (rot or rcisrakd it. Wc believe Bathlr lews hardliners on the council would depose him if he abandoned Islamic law.
Hostility lo Sudan'i Sectarian Purl let The Revolmiooary Command Council is Iryiag lo dismantle (he aoa/aadarneotahst Unni and Democratic Unionist parlies, which ran Sudan during ill eras of civilian rule. Party members who are willing to cooperate with lhc regime couldha* Sudan'i new Ambassador to the United Stales says would replace Sudan's previous multiparty system^
We believe hostility in the Revolutionary Command Council to the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Pany is heightened because ihey arose from IslamicAnsar andhose heads eiptoiled theit status as rcatgiout traders to gain power bul operated ll"j> panic* as competing family
patronage nciwnrlv. both parties viJaed power over ideology Inspeechei justifying ihc coup Basilar has repeatedly eked Umma and Democratic Unionist leaders' political opportunism lo accuse them of betraying Sudan's Islamic heritage. He charges they divided Sudan's Muslim majoriiy by promoting the un Islamic concept nf "poUicalsed Islamic law asa bargaining chip, and cneouraged corruption.
WorUitg With the National Islamic front The Revolutionary Command Council has dclcgattJ authority to me ashen uf the banned Nationalvicoagcst fuaaJamentalisi movement
hve speculaic that lhc
council Kelt to recruit front members ratherpower with the fronl. Wc believe many ini.hare with iheimilar vision ofSudan, front leaders, unlike their rivals,power primarily lo turn Sudan into ania our judgment.
ihc fronl views Islam as ihc key to rehabilitating Sudan prjUieslty, economically, aad socially and rejects rest'Mimas oa Islamic law (or Sudan's Muslim majoriiy. Basbir and other council memberspressed similar sent intents ia speeches and iniervkws.1
Iran: Internal Developments and Opposition Prospect's]
Iranian regime remains deeply divided irvei ibc fundamental coorac It it It) pursue in the pint Wvomcini era. President Hashemi Rafcanj.mi. withritical limes (ram Supreme leader Ayalollah Khamenei, has made pie^rew inbold over caccutnc issstilutioru and is gradually redefining Iranian policy. Rafsanjani musi move caultouary^jKiwcver. in ihe face ofi .imto hu policies by hit more militant oppone nianotably Assc mbly Deputy Mohiaihemi-Pur and (he late AyatoQahonAhaod Thb factionalarried onackdrop of deteriorating economic conditions. Although wc do not believe Ihc dental regime it in danger, the lack of consensus among tit memben and the decline tn living Wends/da will give increased scope for anliregime actions by Iranian
Rafsanjani has been most successful In advancing his domestic agenda Since hb inauguration as President, he has scored two important victories over hardline opposition in Ibc ConsufcaiiseIhe confirmation of bis Cabinet in August and the passage of hb foe-year economic plan in January. Confirmalioo of the Cabinet gaveeam with which lo implement hb policies and allowed him to remove potential rivals Hue Moblashcmi Pur from an execosaioa. The five-year plan allows Rafsanjani lo begin rnoving Iran away from Ihe slalisi economic policies of ifcs: past decadeore liberal market system. It alio sanctions the acceptance of large foreign loans for economic development despite intense opposition from Iranian revolutionaries concerned about foreign penetration of Iran^Even with ihu authorization, Rafsanjani has been at pains to portray such credits not as loans, but as part of the price of purchasing new technology.
These victories did not come cheaply. In both instances Rafsanjani required the open and unequivocal support of Khamenei to help overcome nrmosition in the Consultative Assembly. Although
Ihb intervention skmonsirates ihc power of lhc loose alliance between lhc Iwo men, it dlustrates Rafsanjani'sdependence on Khamenei's support lo tarry out key aspects of his program. In January, when Khamenei strongly censured thets criticism of the government. Khamenei probably bruised ihe ego* of many legislators who believed the Assembly was exercising its constitutional powers In ovr judgment, Khamenei may be less inclined in lhc future in expend hb political capital on Rafsanjani's controversial programs, unless, like the foe-year plan, iheyear benefit lo the country and radical opposition can be overcome J
In ihc sphere of foreign relations Rafsanjani has not scored the dramatic victories he has achieved in domestic affairs. We believe thb is because he does not enjoy Ihe tame support from Khamenei on foreign mailers lhal he docs in domestic policy. Khamenei'sa relations with the Weal, and especially ihc uailed States, have been more uoeofflpromising and militant lhan Rafianjuu't in our view,ecause ol Khamenei's Wronger commit men! to fulfilling Khomeini's legacy, which almost certainty would suffer if be loo eagerly embraced belter relations with the West. The neto cucumjcribc Rafsanjani'i freedom to maneuver.|
Rafsanjani's most notable foreign relations successes have been "in gradually opening relations with Western Europe, Including Turkey, and building on Ihc opening lo the Soviel Union tbat Ibe late Ayalollah Khomeini bad sanctioned Sinceran has received several Wcsi Earopean economic aad commercial delegations and obtained greater access to West European ereehl. Iran's relation* with Turkey, which last year were especially poor as Ankara complained of Iraaian interferenceomestic dispute over the wearing of Islamic dreaa by women college students, have also improved. Thb year Raftaojani'i reception of Turkish Prime Minister aias not marked by ihe aati-Tuikbh vitriol that characterized much of lhc Iranian pressafsanjani'i restrained reaction lo Ihe unrest among
6 April 1VO0
i i. in Soviet Azerbaijan ami Central
ehran officially onlyovwf actions
erious uraia In Tehran's relations wiih Moscow.^
Nonetheless, domestic politics place severe Umiis on RafsanjanibiEly lo dwmpbasizcprinciplca io Ibc roost critical aspects of Iranian foreign policy. Regardless of occasional (rial balloon* floated in (he pro-Rafsanjani press or by hisIn ihe Consultative Assembly. Rafsanjani has been unable or unwilling to expend the political capital necessary io overcome tbe bitter oppositione((er relations with tbe United Kingdom and United Stales or to make significant progress toward fadlitaring (be release of Western hostages in Lebanon. The regimes unwillingness to modify Khomeini's auiboriraiion for tbe killing of Salman Riishdicerious drag on Rafsanjani's ability to obtain tbe relations be desire* with tbe European Comrounirys docs Iran's cootinued use of terrorism as an arm of slate policy.
armed al Velayati who isrotege ol the supremehe criticism impliciily questioned Khamenei's judgment because Khamenei, when he was President, had issued the original invitationeauscscu fa)hamenei's initial appeal in laic December for the Assemblynd Ui attack oa Velayaii went unheeded, forcing him to moKlire support for his position. For example, merchants dosed the Tehran bazaaranuary in in explicit show of support for Khamenei.anuary, Khamenei declared that criticism that undermined trust in tbe government was un-lslamic and demanded obedienceis position as supreme juriicoosult. The assembly backed down grudgingly but reminded Khamenei in an open letter that Ihe deputies were exercising their constitutional prerogatives. I
In January, Ayatollah Montajcri, who until9 had been designated successor to Khoroeioi. spoke ool against Ihc government /
Monlazcri publicly questioned Khamenei's religious quaufications lo be supreme jurisconsult)
pMoolazcri also attacked the government lor its plans lo undertake foreign borrowing]
In late February, Ayatollahhamenei partisan, went oo the offerjsivc, asserting Khamenei's right as supreme jurisconsult lo be tbe final and absolute arbiter of Iranian policy. Assembly Speaker Kambi,ore radical view,ew days later by declaring tbe question was not Khameneis authority but whether Iran would continue to be guided by lhc principles laid down by Khomeini. The acrimony has continued through late
Karubi have accused each other of foDowuig
The militant elements in Iran have been carefulhallenge Khamenei directly, bui ihey clearly arc warning ihey may no* atcepiuthority il he diverges greslly from Khomeini's legacy. Ala minimum, thb may make Khamenei more carcfui aboui opcruV aupport ija- Rafsanjani on owarovcicial
Al woim, criticism ofveoluallyioa real erosion of his
auihorky. which wc believe would increase lhe factional infighting and deadlock over policy io Tehran.
ili to .Stabilityy debate within the clerical establishment has ocean edarVening economic back drop Iran faded to maintain its economic base during lhe fust decade following Ibe revolution, rcsulling in
ill i Igliiii'ir;:Ji-
oil revenues, the financial demands of the Iran-Iraq war, and political exposition lo large foreign loans forced Use regiatsc to slash civilian spending Tehran also bad to cut imports of both consumer goods and raw materials, fuelingoughlyercent, according io ournd Mack-market actrrityr- ^
Rampant population growih also is seriously damajpng economic prospects. Iran's population grewaO perrxal9ggravating unemploymentcurreailyaboutnd severe bouiing shortageserceni annual population growth rate is ansoag uie world's highestdckecked, will double Iran's estimated population of SS millioo by theo keep up with the burgeoning population. Iran will have io create at leastvewjoba each year for an indefinite period. It will aliorowingen imported food, the cost of which equals aboutercent of Iran's export earnings, aad continued deterioration of the country's educational, health care, transportation, and electrical power systems aa greater demands aic placed on them
In our judgment, Rafsanjani will ih" he able to rcinvigorate Iran's economy quickly enough lo satisfy rising public expectations Hardliners such as Mnhiasbemi Pur oppose many elements of Ihe five-Vear plan, particulaily foreign borrcrwing and decreasiag government control over ihe economy Most foreign govei nmcnts and* well as domesticill beubstantial amounts of capital in Iran until ihey tee clear signs of political stability ihr rr
[Iranian businessmen arc pessimistic aboul Iran's economic pacnpccu despite Raisanjani's efforts at reform. Rafsanjani probably will have to waier dowo somef ibe plan, such as reducing governmenl spending, to case lhe impact on ihe public and lo hmit opposition to the plan by the ir guar's critics. This will in turn reduce ihe effectiveness of Raisanjani's policies.
Public frustration over poor Irving conditions has led to sporadic rioting smcc August. These have largely been spontaneous, easily contained by security forces, and usually directed against merchants, profiteers, or local authorities rather than ihe national leadership.
P>aaa>acta far th* Iranian Opposition The Iranian opposition ia esile has proven skdtful at caabarrsasiag the regime by exploiting its difficuJiies and al mllaUng th; pubbc trnage of the eziles. Nixweiheless, we beheve the leftist and monarchistargely based rrtataadcao substantial following in Iran and coeuaitute anam.hreat, to the resnnae.f-
The riotsebruary ore the most recent example of tbe ca|ndf (he infla
oniot broke out when authorities iu Tehranoccer match al tbe last minute, and angry fans wentampage. Rioters tote down -potters of Iranian political leaders and chanted antircgirtK slogans. Tehran rta'tn* tbe match was
canceled due Ui weather. In our judgment. Itanian .tJTKuh nuy have gotten windonic plans to csruW Ihe axscmbled crowd lorotest. The cxilc rnedia reacted quickly and effectively in reporting the riot,aying it as the first spark of an anlickfical lulion and urging the Iranian people to rise up.
tiaaumiM liifuslguvcrnmcol AbthfUgJi (heaaaybesecure, ntdrvadaal Wader* umkiuhicdry remember the widespread and deadly tenor campaign thehalq conducted in
an."many of Iran's leading revolutionaries. Thelbeitenewal of csxlc activities i*oacern to those la power aad wiV casarc theirorry about diaaideat capabdaie 1
Wc believe the Pahlavi monarchyeeply discredited institution in Iran, which limits the appeal of the nsociucfaists Even Reza Pahlavi has beea forced lo admit he is not so mncb interested io restoring the monarchy as inatalyst for the eatsMiihrnenleroocratk regime in Iran. Hb eomi it ueocy. like lhatuirdy ihe small and gradua'ty dwindling caasa of Western educated lianian rMofcssioaals and
The leftists arc probably iu even worse shape, although Masod Rajavi'shalq orga-ination has the advantage of liaqi support. The leftist groups onceerious threat to the regime's leadership, if not its bold on power. Since the, the kcenkehs and revolutionary Caards have ruthlessly uprooted most of the leflbl network* and organizations in Iran. Moreover, wiih lhe collapse and discrediting of Communism in Eastern Europe, many of Ihe left bis, especially the rsrthodoa Communist Tudeh Party, have lost their ideological appeal aad politicalerhaps lhe lianian exiles' greatesthe esaggeralcd perception of exile capabilities held by the clerical leadership. The regime has mounted attacks on amircgjrne castes in Austria, Cyprus, Turkey, the United Arabnd Pakistan sinceeath, almost certainly out of fear lhat the ciilct would exploit tbe inMatolily associated with the
m likely to resolve it* internal divisions in the act six loonths. Although we do aot bebeve any'iccatcdould seek lo overturn thehenever the debate over pobcy gets especially healed, clerical associations and Ike press begin to call forbe mTighting will probably be protracted.onsequence, Iranianikely to be erratic, reflecting (be shift Ing balance between domestic factions.
Wc believe Rafsanjani has lhe advantage over hb radical opponents in the struggle to shape Iranian policy by virtue cdbbcontiolof executive institutions, hb loose alliance with Khamenei, and ibe increasing weariness of the Iranian people with revolutionary exhortation* for sustained fervor and sacrifice Rafsanjani'a advantage,ot an great that he can rule by Hat. He mustonsensus before he can make major chaogci. As thb consensus probably will ictnain elusive,ikely lo continue pursuing incremental change, rather lhan sinking out boldly in new directions.
Suche nt ousts may aot be sufficient loi ims in Iraa as economic conditions worsen. At the people become increasingly restive over theb declining living standards, Rafsanjani may be able to usenger to cornet bis opponents and storeedirect Iranian policy ignificant danger, however, lhat Rafsanjani will come to be associated with ihe deterioration of the economy, and hi* position will be eroded Thr* probably would brake effrrts toward economic and social liberali/alion. |
Wc arc skeptical lhat the exile groups could exploit the infighting and economic decline io destabilize the regime. Their appeal bloo faded!
Infighting Among lhc Afghan
Insurgents: Ab'Ulu* Rtpurl ]
larkhar massacre in9 focused imvrrnational atlCDtioo on lhc infighting lhail has plagued the Aighan resistance for years. Ail hough many observersii incident with starra, pvfCcivingit toarbingc of an inctcasing cycle of internecine violence, we believe insurgent infightingniimit over Ihe Oca/ term al about Ihc same level as In previous years. Cooflicl probably will cscalaic when the Kabul regime approaches collapse.
The increase in the number of reported incidentsinfighting9 was due primarilyto the Farkhar massacre and docsan upward trend, in our view. Most ofwere in ihc northeast, but theas far south as Lowgar province asMasood's men sought revenge againstforces. Gulbuddin's force*to press Masood to release Sayycdinsurgent commander responsible forBy late fall the freoueocyof dasheslo levels prevailing before ibeand did not increase after Jamalin December. Although the massacreaftermath-one of Ihe worst episodes ofIn manyigh pointhas historicallyyclical phenomenon,did not ptedpitatelao increasing cyclebetween Masood's andions.
The number of incidents did not increase appreciably even though power vacuums were created by the withdrawal of regime forces from many part* of the8 sndccapccicdlo see much more conflict as local insurgent commanders fought for conirol of the newly liberated areas. With major commanders like Masood, Ismail Khan In Ihc west, and Amin Wardah in lhc cast having begun tobuikl administrative network*iheir areas, they could assume control of lhc new territories rclaiivdy easily. Elsewhere, many insurgent commanders haveack of interest in
Tht Knrhbar Massacre
In9 in the farkhar Vtalley of Takharieal Ituhi Islami-CuBtuddin commander. Sayyed Jamal. captured SO tof Ahmad Shah Masood'i menv were returningouncil ol (he North meeting, /
betweenndf the men, including important commanders who were close to Masood. The rest were set free. Abjttxtgh he agreed to cooperateonunitsion set up by Ihe resistance "interim government" to investigate the incident, Masood auickty captured /amalf hit men. most of when soon were released Afler watching the commission procrastinate for fourasood arranged for Jomol and three of his lieutenants to stand trial in Ihc traditional Afghan manner.rial byocal religious leadersfound all four guilty, Jamalandhis men were publicly executed in December
the reasons behind the attack are unclear.
die long term, Masood'spolitical and militaryhe northeast probably has been strengthened by the removal of JamaTs organization and his adroit handling of Ihe incident.
expanding their turf beyond their own districts or have formed shares (coundls) to improve cooperation and administration in the area.ew liberated areas, such as Konar province, insurgent groups have held local elections to chcovc provincial leaders
The Malaootl m
Wc believe most insurgentesultombination of local tribal, ef hnic, and personal conflicts rather than major internally rivalries, The field commanders, ihc teal sources of power in Afghanistan, arc concerned primarily with local or regional issues ratherational struggle fn predominance]
Perianal Disputes. Personal feuds betweenmmanders c* struggles fi* local prcalorni nancearge portion of (he reported insurgent eooflicL In many cases suCfTcTisputcsontinuation nfr rrralrittt Ihilnjcpl1 befo jhc war began.'
crnhic Tension. Longstinding ethnic tension between the predominant Pashtuns and oiber minority groups, especially the Tajiks andas led to coruTict in northern and central Afghanistan, f
ubi Islamiunis Khalis. the
most outlier. anti-Shis resistance leader, hasonce the regime has been crerthrown, ihewill he with (he Shia*,'
The Gulhnddla Factor Superimposed oo many of thesehe obitruei-aoisi klcology aod acticiosofiamatyaf and his Hizbi Islami faction. Hitbift en blamed for much of the intcrparty cordlia in ihe country. We believe it is involved in more incidents than any other party, but it Is not always the irrsiigatoroferWliet. Most of the uscidenit ptoraaMy are caused by local issues lhat are made worse byadical anti-Western stance, uncompromising or confrontational attitude, and
flamingit determination to tic lhe pieciruneni insurgent kadcr hai long led him Ui obstruct effort* toward greater coopcraikm with ibu other
Oulbuddin's publicly proclaimed support of foiraci regime Defense MiuUlcr Sbahaawaz Taoai't coup attempt in0 will pui funher distance between him and hia faction and the rest of the resistance. The other six resistance kadcr* based in Peshawar rejected cooperation with Tanai, insisting heorse Coram unist lhan Najibullah.r
iung Hillary uf CoanactlUM
im?betweenh Alauntdand (iutbuddin Hilsnaryar is intense andVnrw notn wear leading member*r fundamentaliu fontanelfghorustan-Both hod maior nrsponsibthtiet tn the ubortiprisingnd each blamed the other fa* contributingatlwr. Masood and Burhanuddin Kabbani split wuh (iu&uddin after the uprising to form their own party, the laiiuoHltlami. Both men, pon-iculorty Gulbuddin. peobobty see thr other as the mom nfor not tonal peeditminance after Ihe fall of the Kabul negmie Both probably recognise the other as having me strongest organisations, and each realises the unportaneetUzaoonal strengthrotracted insurgency. Gulbuddin may even secbytruggle for thr leadership nf the furutaerientahst wing of the resistance.
most intense rivalry' is with Ahmad Shah Masood and hborgatuaalion. Although this had beenivalry between the Hiibi Island Gulbuddin and Jamiat-idslamihole, the conflict has evolved over lhe post few yearsivahy thai Involves primarily Masofrri and niilhiirttlin
Although there Is little doubt Gulbuddinattacks on other resistance parties tointerests, as he docs against rivals in his ownprobably docs notonsistent,of initiating inlerpany conflict, even
SMasood has been more
conciliatory bul has quickly dealt with serious incidents that challenge his leadership, such as the Farkhar massacre. Each has made proposals to the Other to meet and improve relations between their oeganiiations, but no meetings have come to pass. Wc believe theoo strong and Gulbuddin and Masood are unlikely to settle their differences amicably.
ctions suggest he is mote
opportunisttralecist, and he appears to have do clear strategy for dealing with Masood. Gulbuddin exploits exist ing conflicts, rather than originating internecine feuds, which adds to the overall level of riokneeJ-
Over lhe near term wc expect to see periodic fluctuations in insurgent infighting, but overall it probably will remain about at current levels.vel of infighting has not seriously weakened the insurgents war effort and should not io the future. Continued infighting probably will delay some insurgent operations, however, and could help
e wardin and han Klbut sa-JIcrattacks front Othergroup* mresut of hu sappon of lhe Tanai coup
amimoat certainly will continue nt each cipamli fait organdatioa. and additional Farkhar like irneiocrtu are possible. The rivalry rt unlikely lo escalate beyood minor skirmishes unless Masoud becomes moreirect threat lo GulhudJip' chance* o'atlainiiig power in Kabul. Q
The long-termot rosy If the Kabul icrime couapsec, there wTJIbc many competing gioupi vying for control of the Afghan capital Conflict could break out along party, tribal, or ethnic line* ai the process of chooiing the next national government torts kick* out. Culbuddin almost certainly willaior role, eitherontender or atower broker. Hedeter rained to continue fighting until be and ha fcdlowersaie in
haclcrshippositions, whatever ihe titA.T
Only linuicd conflict is likely lo take place in areas far removed froaa Kabul, as ifcatcioatrafcd by theonflict when lhe regime abandoned large areas of thv counirybe amount of canflict wdl. in pan. be determined by the iclaiivc strength and cohesivenesa of the local irWar and the ability of local religious leader; snd Iribal ciders to reestablishadit iooiI role as tbe arbiters of disputes la the countryside lot erne cine cunfucl has lorgair of Afghanistan's social and political milieu and is unlifccl) lo disappear.
ATroubled I'mureommunis ParliesNKp
sfii'vi prominence as supp-ortirs of Prime Minister VP Singh'* cnffavon government.imuoiu parties haw: kweoinrg peutucmsead Io Iheir celipse in national politics by cemrniv and the rcsurgini Hindu chauvinist movement lit inn view, the unwillingness of Ihe aging leaders of Ihc ConimuniM Pariyof luda-MaxslM (CPM) and ihe Communist Pniiy of India (CPI)dapt their hardline idcoUigy io Ibc sweeping change* in world Communism has played an important role in ihc Ceanratorusts' failure lo increase their poliikal support in relections. Lc-ogstandmg rifii between Ibe two Communist panic* basic also limited their abihiy io pain decimal support and am act new members.
TtVr between India's Communist poena and Moscim haw tooled irm'e .Vaster leadt'alfrd ci them to follow Air new thinking on Communist doctrine. Politically independent. India's Comtnuniti leaden declared they wuV -study' Gorbachev'i reforms, but theyn*tk lo iheir hardline principlesHriV IS, Moscowomtnmamingits aaKlndna's Communistsihey recently invved CPM General Secretary Somboodoipod lo Moscow-probably because of ihe Coennmitutts' increased notional political stature Relations are not likely to warm oi long ai oldschoni Marxists maintain their hold over Indian Conuuunist ideology.
Communlsu' only urongbold is in ihc stale of West Bengal, where the CPM leadership has embraced pragmatic policies to keep itself in power. This businesslike approach is stimulating divisions in the party apparatus lhat may erode itsere.
Election IMsappoln tin rots
The Communists' poor showing in last year's national elect ion exposed the weal nets of the movement, in OW view. The left's performance fell far shori of its especial tons. According io (be Embassy, ihc Communists had hoped lo capitalize on the fragmentation of the ruling Congress Parly lo wina HO scats toeft-of-center coalition with Ihc Janata Dal parry. The Communists, however, woncanin West Bengaleftist coalition has ruled forecade. The CPM lost two parliamentary scats to Kerala. These defeat* came on the heels of losing control of the Tripura state gcrvernment inn Oul-of-Dnte Ideology
specially its General Secretary EMS.
ppose* GorbacheVt reforms.
particularly (he diminution of the rose of the Convovursisl Parly aad Use adoption of more
market-oriented economic poiicicj Ah hough the CPI publicly has been more posit oe on ihc Soviet
lso opposes tbe inlroducuxn of Soviel-style reforms in India]
Jin western India utclleciuals and
Wc believe ihis bard line has cost the Communists support among key interest groups. I
journaliststraditionallyere deeply cttsiltuaaooed by the CPI and CPM responses lo tbe massacre in China's Tiananmen square and the changes in Eastern Europe. In Kerala, tbe CPM-led Left Front's attempt*ustify tbe Tiananmen massacre haveecline in popular support caused by (heir economic mismangement,
Communists' setback stents partly from their unwdlirigncss to alter an increasinglyttract voter support, in our opinion. Despite the changes lo the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, India's Communist panics continue to adhereardline Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
In addition, membership in tbe CPM and CPI appears lo have stagnated. P
jthere wasoncernPI congress in9 because the party added0 members to ks roster ol
n Apnt Wi7
DO tn over two years.'
anks. Pany members arcrcKXs campaigners and vocc-Rciicrs lor both ihc CPI and CPM The
trade unions isod ihe unions- clout is increasingly challenged trypedally Hindu -groups,
The Conununisis' only coniujiiing sixxess has been in Wcsi Beag.l. where ihc CPM led Left Premt govemmenl has adopled snore ideologically fleaibic and pragmaticest Bengal Cruel* Minister and CPM regional leader Jyotl Basil reeenlly commended ihe charges in Eastern Europe and called on Indians lo learn from Ihe events there. He also has enoaurrged foreign investment and technology and (be growth of tbe private sector in
hcnvevcr, appears lo hive utile inlluenee in selling national CPM policy, and partianientary delegates -even Ihote from Westrobably would vote according to the dictates of ihe hardlincr-domlnalcd CPM Politburo.
The iwbiliiy ol* the CPI and CPM to work together further ditns prospects for greater Communist power at cither Ihe national or Hale level. '
togcmci, each party bas maneuvered to undercutcandidates in state elections in Tamiland Aodhra Pradesh.
C.iromunUt Wieiurie: lliro-Uvk lo Ikw IVNh
tht CPM Pobibum culled the events ui Pasiem tMrnpe andthcSmietUnioni
Thr official CPM newspaper praised Soviet leader Joseph Susan onth anniversary of his binh
The t'PI Piditbunj attended "warm andtings'io lhe Rumanian Commwust Purtf and rrknccd in the' successes meh*extd by Ihe Romanian people under Ihe leadershipaf Nnolaen9 while Ceausacu's security fitters
were firing on protestors across the country
CPM General Secretary Nemboodiripad extendedfull support' to China's leadership andin Tiananmen sauare 'asupported by the bourgeois-coniroOrd
Wc believe lhe CocwTvuniiu* failure loue larger* lo deep seated animositie* between CPM aad CM leaden,./
| the reonsider note personalstteasbcrs of botht not apany, while CP I. lead en similarly
condemn their CPM counterpart*.
leaders resent the CPl's past cooperation with lhe Congress Pauj innd view with suspicion more recent CP! declarations of willingness to work wiih the CPM tgjirui ibe Congress Pany This holiday has spread io the CPI and CPM rank and file, where there is tttlc support lo reunite ibe parties or increase cooperation.
unior partner, generally gives Ihe CPI few rewards for itshe coalition.
The CPM's high-handed treatment of the CPI in West Bengal bas generated further ill will.
)he CPM-led Left
Thr IPK'I'M Spill
nmi.mnm*nrment douledm lime mhen lhe left -Mf./iiir CPI wumjrewu'form the CPM. iimr fundamental politic ol and ideological dilagreemenii
the CPI. The Marxist hardliners opposedthe LPI's support of the ruhng Congress Part/ and its endortemritiSSR Geneml Secretary Kh'ru slur hex's nrrmmmmumxtideulogr/ctfciwingStatin'ideath j
In the decade following the split ihe CPIsthe Congresshandtomtu anproxf iu position in seitral statetheThe CPI
also teamed up with1 ihr Congress Party to defeat CPM candidate! noiion'ide In the longer run, the CPM's anti-Congress Pany mrstage helped it become the dominant Communist partyIndia. The CPM rode loefeating lhe Congrrsi Party and CPI in West Bengal andbecameeaer bock loth against Prune Minister Indira Gandhi's imposition of emergency rule
Emerging Difficulties In Bengal
Additional problems for the CPM are developing in JVcst Bengal that could loosen its hold on the state.
' Basu's pragmatic policies have alienatedwho have begun to challenge theinternally or to leave the partycandjdalcs in local
hardliners have forced Uasdust thousands of new CPM membcfs fiom the party on lhe grounds thai ihey were not committed to CPM doctrine. |
Additionally, CPM efforts to strengthen its hold on urban areas in West Bengal have sputtered '
JCPM efforu to
coy pacing them in West Bengal's civil service have adversely affected the operatioo ofbe police, and other parts of lhe slate's administration Corruption also is becoming more pervasive within ihe CPM after II years in power. Wc believe these problem* arc creating disaffection with Ihe CPM among West Bengal* urban population and may lead till loss of support in thestale election,
India'* CuoununUl rVtnge tinnip*
ovement, fto-h'tatt nlui broke fromin IVcA iht Narulitci adlierraoistnd advocate armedhe social pottucal ande<ononu( sovttunnaiion,on 11
Nautlaegroups octiW uieosiemin thehe most active of whichthe fi-em Bihar statebut ihey hai* no cenfol aegannamm or fcumal cooniii^ating hod) The Haialite ideol.'g, hai kale appeal in urban areas, severely limiting their political impact, bul ihey have solid support India's rural and tribal poor, especially in Bihar.
The Revolutionary Socialist Pony. Formed0 ai anIdonist pony, the Revolutionary Sociabst Pany hasmembers in VArst Bengal. Kerala, Bihar, and Tripsins. Its strength is in Bengal when? it holds IH seats in the state assembly and three in lbs notional parliament Mostly comprised of academics and intellectuals, the party is losing members to the CPM. which dominates Ihe state and hasvirtually identical ideology,]-
a- expect ibe CPMkdgtwcrnmentremain in pciwcr in Weil Ucngai Bssupopular, and the party's support in rural areas has been Mrrngthcncd by tbe successful implementation of
arian and fiscal rcfufm.sJ
nttrt tn Ihe stale i> Ti ag mend poses no threat. Recent initiatives by Oasu to aitraci foreign commercial investment and to improve Calcutta's deteriorating public services may help improve lhe ITM's popularity in India's most populous city.
India's Communistprobably are past the peak of their par Lameotarj and stale assembly power, barring an unexpected increase in mutual cooperation and enactment of ideological reforms to reenergize the movement and attract new voter support, ll it unlikely the hardliners comprising the CPM and CPI national leadership will be abk lo recoook their dilTcrcnces or reevaluate iheir commitmentarxism leninism. (
bloc estimates iu mostly in trade uniynf and
Tne Forward Bloc. Formedrom the Congress Party, ihe blocnd class struggle. Ii haseats in the Hist Bengal assembly and two in theonsulate in CekuUa. the bloc also has offices in Tamil
membership at among teachers.
Revolutionary Socialist rsny on bloc's political
manifesto is virtually indistinguishable from the CPM's and is slowly losing Hs public appeal. I
The CPM almost certainly will hold onest Bengal for the foreseeable future and may regain power in Tripnra. Without reforms, we believe the CPM will be unable to expand its influence beyond those states and thai tbe CPM-led coalition will continue to lose power in KcralaJ-
The political future of the CPI is more bleak, in our opioion.egional power base, the CPI probably will fall further behind the CPM in electoral support and may lose its more politically astute and ambil ious cadre to hs rival. I
Sri Ijinka After lhc Indians
Liberation Tigers of Tamilm, thel Tamil group, arcihenkanhe wake in" Ihc Indianfrom lhc island and have (urged an uneasy alliance with President Prcmadnsa user lhcear. Nevertheless, ih- Tigers* record, their cure tnend their inalsliiylo tolerate opposition luggcst ihey eventually win renew iheir struggle lot an ind.-pendent Tamil homelandirect challenge hi the governmeM's vitalThe result couldruiol civil war pitting lhc Tigers against the Sri Lankan Army.'
Aeeammodatloa In Ibr .Shortbelieve the Tigers have utile to lose in theby continued accommodation witheflecsivcly tonirol Ihe northeast, havingareas vacated by the Indians and routedrivals. Ami Tiger Tamil fightert andfled ihe
Tigers have begun eonetfinglaxei and matmaining order in some areas.
The Tigers also enjoy considerable popularour view. The Tamils of the northeast perceiveas defenders of Ihc Jamil cause andthe Indian and Sri Lankanin the northeast, however, arc
weary ot viMrmcc and want the Tigers lo awe the
politicalhancel" many people defied calls byline Tigers to boycott Ihc prcrvincial election in8 and the general election in9 toessage lhat they want pcaee. I
Encouraging Flral Steps
Tbe Tigers have made some positive moves that suggest their accommodation with Colombo wdl last, at least In ihe short run. They agreed to talhi with the government innd Ihe two sides have met often since then. In December (he Tigersolitical party, the People's Front of Ijheraiion Tigers The party's aamc is significant because il does not includehe Tamils' name for iheir homeland. The Tigers have publicly called for lhc
What ihr Tigers Want
The To/en tspetl Milfn madaiarii-na' lifurr that amount io independence far Ihrverythingbur name,id/mum Ii it imiiiriti that weexpect thegoiemmeit and
Tiger* eien'tially to collide, rt tutting in renewedtail war
Amendment: The Sixth Amendment
office seekers to swear an oath to peeserve then Lanka. The Tigers demand that therepealed Ptmaddsa has luggesicdhe mU atttr thr amendment to satisfy the Tigers.
Retenlement. The government has agreed to nap resettling Sinhalese in the northeast.
Police Fortes. The Ttgen demand that ihe police feces in the northeast hire many more Tamils The aeynttnment is atsempbng to accommodate this demand, bul il ii hating difficulty.
m Fprovincial Government. The Tigers insist tliat Colombo devolve more power to Ae local government of thedombo pn mlsediliis as part of7 Indo-Sri Lankan accord but failed to followocal government with tignificaiu powers mould give the Tigerswhichdoo btedly nil local elei turns ducation, loses, and
dissolution of the Northeast provincial councilew election in which they would participate. Although the Tigers have prevented police stations from reopening near Jaffnapartly to press the governmenl to put more Tamils on these forces-Ihey haw; allowed police to resume duties in irincomalce.
haps more remarkable than whal thehat they haw; not done. They haveSri Lankan forces moving into the.the Itsdian
fchc two sides nave worked put proceduresvert clashes,an on nighttime movements by armed memben of either side. Both ihe government and Ihc Tigers are seeking
^reraadasa on gel support for these, coocessioo* from his war-weary Sinhalese constituency.
og.Tem Pros peels for Peace Despite these encouraging first steps, the Tigers' record allows little hope thai tbey will negotiate seriouslyoandon iheir goal of an independent slate in the long term. The Tigers agreed to7 lodo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord but eventually turned against their Indian allies. They were given seven ofcats on an interim council, but, unable to accept two reprcscniaiivcsival Tamil group, ibc Tigers refused to participUeJ
Iheseignificant threat to Tiger cootrol of lhc northeast.
Mow VloUmu Lik'ty. Wc believe lhc accommodation between ihc government and ihc Tigersait for several months if Prcmadasa can quickly deliver lhc concessions he has apparently promised Ihc Tigers. Tbe Tigers are likely to keep ihe peace at least unldlhe provincial clcdioo is held- probably lha spring or early lumrocrlegitimize iheir popular supportictory at (he polls The Tigers abo need time to consolidate iheir position in Ihe northeast following (he Indian pullouU,
Violence io the northeast will probably continue si low levels until (he Tigers are satisfied (hey base liquidated iheir Tamil rivals. Despite ihc exodus of several thousand anti-Tiger Tamils, many remain and have disappeared into the jungle. Wc do not believe
After (be election is held, tbeTigen willColombo for almost unlimited power inincluding cootrol over laics, Ibe police,and aa end lo governmentWe believe an impasse ewer ihesc issues,between (he two tides, and Ibc Tigers willlake up arms against Colombo.
The result would probablyrutal and lengthy civil war aa tbe Sri Lankan Array, although battle-hardened after iu two-year fight with Sinhalese insurgents in tht aoulh, would be unlikely to decisively defeat the Tigers. Clashes between the Sci Lankan Azmy and the Tigen vv-osiid probably flare upfiril in ihe cast, where Use population is roughly divided between Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims. Tbe Tigers demand thai this area be adminivlr ninety lied lo ibe Tamil-dominated north. Muslim and Sinhalese inim may resist Tamil control, and clashes between
ihcsccavaLilc inm fighling betweennkan security force* and lhc Tigc"-
Andbiitt Fighting between the Set Lankan miliiary and ihc Tigers could lead loomplaints abiiul human rightsy (he security forces, which have been implicated in abuses during operation* over lhc pail year against southern rein Is. The abuses in lhc south appearlowed during ibr past several month- at lhc rebel thrcai ihcrt has diminished, bul Ihe security(orees pi 'will return to tough lactics it* fighting with Ihe Tigers erupts. Ia our view. PTcrtiadas* willilTieuIi lime containing the secw ny lorhich became more assertive during lhc campaign against the Sinhalese radical group Janalha Vimuhlhil they are pressed to light (he Tigers. TamJ cuiitanii are oohkery (otarget US officials and raciliiies id the fighling. although militants have stolen
several UStowcfaasscM whiests stoppedtwachi-
New Delhi is highly unlikely to mine troops back lo llie island even if heavy fighting erupts. Wc judge Prime Minister Singh will iry to sidestep criticism (hat ihe iniervcniioo failed by Mam-rig former Prims Minister (iandhj for initialing lhr optialiuo Vngtiost of other domestic and foreign policyncluding icruioo along the Indo-Pakislanihat will push Sri Lanka far down lab last of problems. Singh probably realizes lodia'sTamils have grown tired of (be violence in Sri Lanka and are unlikely lo press the government lo intervene again Indian Tamils have been alienated by Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India, who bane sparked rising crime and violence in India's Tamil Nadu stale ,
Royal Nepalcieesponsible lor protecting Ike monarchy and lhe Government of Nepal from internal and caic'nal threats. Years of neglect by lhe rulcn of Nepal left the Army poorly trailed and equipped. Uniting loprowdc oca token defease against Ibe ceruotrys large neigh hi *India and China. What attention has been givenilitary needs has focused on improving lhenternal iccuriiy fuocnon, to the des liracM of iu nit local defease role J
ur view, this policy has produced an army lhal can protect the Nepalesc Government from internal threats but would probably be incapable of offering riirjch resistanceoreign invasion. Recent efforts to modernize tbe Amy will probably have Utile impact oo improving Nepal's defensive capabilities.
The tiurttbar of Nepal
The Gurkha forces, while emgutaiing im Nepal. ienr onb/ with ihendian aemie, ana* te inNepalcie Army Theeputation of this
mountain-duelling people hat allowedvyii ui enjoy higher pay, pnrtttge. and better travel
'-ortet AlthoughrJ.it uiiedem
crvpj ofno Gurkha, unitsn
armies is high, allowing both countries to choose best candidates to enter
Army's equipment is received as donationsseekingjcijeraovc older equipmentiovenicxiea.1-
Nepalesc forces arc equippedisparate
mosllyoutoateuVarray of hardware acquired
Internal Role: Unquestioned Loyally Wc believe the Army's primary peacetime function is
f f* nrnv/irlr h'tt-rntl ra^iirliti
a primacy peaceiUDC fundi-to provide internal security for the government Although the Army is not involved us day-to-day internal security, it assists the doDcc in times of ioteinal crisis. Array uoili were used effectively in this role0 and againfter nobce forces proved inadequatehe task erf cc-otroiling unitw During the unrest inroops were positioned near centers of unreal but were not used because police proved able to control demonstrating crowds. These modemi provedhe Nepalese leadership that the Army was aa integral pan of its internal control mechanism that could be misled in
The distnbulidn of military forces within ihe country makes the Army aa ideal loot for controlling internal unrest, in our view. Cantonments arc located in ali large Nepalcse cilies and towns, icducing the response time of military forces cillcd oui io halt unrest.*-
The Army will support the monarchy andtruer rial crises, though the degree of supportregime varies throughout the military, in ourupper echelon of theto the King In response to reeent unrestof Staff Rana stated that Ihe militarythe King and his goveramcm regardless ofof force
"huddle and lower ecKTOWs oi the officer
corps lavor nonviolcni change within Nepal lo eliminalc corruption in the government, according to an untested source. Although ihis aliitudc may
indicate views favoring moreore likely explanation is lhat advocates of reform favor lhc removal of current senior officers, many of whom arc viewed as eorrupt by Iheir sotxwdinatcsf^
tllrnuil RcJe:Tlic.Swtli*riundorSouth Asia
Nepalcse military leaders have indicated iheirimprovingrmy's capabilities to providecredible defense againstfttaro India
forapaUlltles Wc believe the Aimy will be able to quell any man uprising cJces ia Nepal The neat ion of military lor era ncai Nepal's major cities ensures that it will be able to respond quickly to interna! threats, especially In Kalhmandu, where unrest its most likely to occur and theurvival would be al stake. The willingness of commanders to use force lo suppress unrest is not in question. Despite lhc more reform-minded views of lower echelon officers, lhc officer corps would probably support (he monarchy in an interna' con because most believe (hey havepersonal stake in the survival of the government j
Despite recent moder rural ion efforts. Nepal's forces arc unlikely to be able to offer much resistance against an eternal attack by India oran from ihc ovcfwhlcming disadvantage in numbers.
several factors inhibit (he Array's ability to defend Nepal:
The conccniratlon of military forces in major urban areas reduces Ihe Army's ability to defend border areas ia wartime.
Near East and
South Asia Review
heavy piciiuic, Niger has given Libya significantly greater access in iccenlit to expand its ptcsco-cep
crjcuiutiJx wiucwo in the northern town oferc Libya's economic presence has grown significantly since President All Saibou came to power inhis win be Libya's first consulate in Sob-Saharan Africa and is the counterpart of the Nigerien Consulate that opened in Scbha, in southwestern Libya,
Arab Airlines will begin weekly service between Tripoli and Niamey thb month,
JThe airline's staff and facilities are freejuenlly used to snppori urjryan Terrwtffand dcstabiliralion efforts.
has resumed at (he Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) complextwo blocks from the US Embassy, and three new Libyan doctors beganNiamey Hospital last
In our ittdgmenl, mostncludingre deeply suspicious of Libya, which claimsCO0 square kilometers of northern Niger. Nonetheless.cceding to Tripoli's demands because it fears offending iu more powerful northern neighbor. Saibou may be concerned that student, labor, and ethnic unrest in February highlighted his regime's vulnerability to Libyan meddling, aod be may be seeling to pbcate TripoB. For iu pari, iripoli probably hopes to use its Nigerien facilities lo make (rouble for President Habte's regime in Chad and for Libyan leader Qadbafi's other enemies in the region.!-Original document.