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Central iTtdlgrnce Agency
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:1
Of INTELLIGENCEovember9 The German Question and Soviet Policy (U)
Summary
The changes that have occurred over the past month in theCzechoslovakia, following ihe transformations in Polandare consistent with Gorbachev's overall geostrategy andlo Eastern Europe, and probably would not have takenpeacefully as ihey did without his own involvement-alihough thewhich they happened has taken him by surprise. These changes<zSVn the accelerated disintegration of Communist rule in Eastern Europe.uhave set in train processes which-Gorbachev hopes-will improve
Soviet security, alleviate external pressures on the USSR, and allow Moscow to deal more effectively with its internal crisis. |
The new situation poses wiih fresh intensity the problem of two Germanys. There are signs of disagreement within tlie Soviet policy advisory community over how to deal with the German Question, and Gorbachev himself has said different things about the issue at different times. His preference is almost certainly toeparate GDR, to dampen talk about
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reunification, and lo slow down any movemeni toward formal
interconnecliveness of the twostabilizing the GDR by means
of expanded West German economic assistance. However, lie realizes thai
pressures in the GDR for greater unity with the FRG could well increase
dramatically as Communist influence further erodes. He is therefore probably
repared toimited confederal relationship between East and West
Germanyeans oflide of the GDR into the Western camp and
preserving Soviet leverage over Germany and European security relationships.
He would only consider reunification in the near-to-mid-term-before an
appropriate security environment existed-ifit looked as if this was going to occur
anyway, or if he felt thai the urgency of the crisis in the USSR demanded, I
ove.
At Malta, Gorbachev will seek to avoid any impression tliat the upheaval in the GDR has placed him on the defensive. He mil want to come out of the meeting lookingtatesman who has advanced Soviet and global security interests and induced the President to exercisespecially on the west Germans. He is most likely to say the sorts of things about the German Question he has been saying lo other interlocutors over the past month, emphasizing stability and the need to deal wilh the issue only within the broader framework of continuing relaxation of East- West tensiow,Jorce reductions, the gradual dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and East-West economic integration.umber of reasons important to him, he is unlikely to be candid about his assessment of what the trends are likely to be in intra-German relations and how far the USSR would go toward accepting structural rapprochement. While he is unlikely to spring any surprises directly related to reunification, thereuch greater chance that he will put forward proposals associated with changes in those aspects of the European security environment noted just above that he implicitly holds out as conainonsjo^veritiuuiy overcoming the barriers between the two Germanys. I
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There is no problem to which Soviet diplomacy has addressed more thought7 than that of how to influence events in Germany. Recent developments have radically changed the contours of the German issue but not its bearing on central Sovietdomestic, security, and foreign policy concerns. (ui
Before Gorbachev came to power, Soviet policy toward Germany sought to:
the USSR's great power status and guardenewed threateunified Germany byommunist-controlled separate German state.
Moscow's security interests and guarantee
socialist Unity Party (SED) rule through the presence of
large soviet forces in tbe German Democratic Republic (GDR) and participation of the GDR in the Warsaw Pact.
Because Gorbachev has assigned top priority to cutting military spending and reducing the burden of empire in order to effect perestroyka at home, because of his perception of the gains to be realized from an intelligent conduct of foreign and security policy (Newecause of his deliberate fostering of (hopefully) controlled change in Eastern Europe,because of the revolutionary upheaval in theold approaches no longer fit the existing German realities.
For several years Gorbachev has been moving to implementnew security strategy toward Europe less geared toof physical force and more reliant onof political interests. At thethis shift has manifested itself in the downplayingpower and the push for force reduction, withtoigh price in military coin topolitical effects, within the Bloc, Gorbachev has sought
r$ to replace an unstable equilibrium based on party monopolycoercionhopefully) more stable equilibrium based
on popular consent. The price Gorbachev has been willing to pay here is also high: when pushed, he hasillingness to accept political competition, multipartyism, and power sharing or even the formation of non-Communist governments, while attempting to retain Communist control in the security area and continued membership of East European states in the Warsaw Pact.
In the meantime, Moscow has less leverage in dealing The Soviet Union has, at least in themoved from being the Eastern hegemonower besetcrises1 and imperial decay. Where, before, its power
rs position in the GDR gave it enhanced influenceonnthe route to expanded intra-German ties leading through
Moscow, now GDR openness to the FRG and the East German and Soviet needest German economic transfusion have shifted this balance of advantage.
The more sophisticated foreign policy pursued by Gorbachev, the domestic crises in the USSR and disintegration of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the accelerating pace of events in GDR-FRG relations are forcing Moscow to review its entire approach to the relationship between the.two"German Question." Gorbachev's emerging posture seems to be one
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trying to deflect newly energized trends toward reunification while attempting to use the processes he himself has set in train to promote Soviet long-term security and political interests.
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Sions of Ferment in German
Until rocently, at least, outside analysts and knowledgeable Soviet observers alike agreed that Moscow neithernified Germany nor anticipated reunification in the foreseeable future. Public or private hints by Soviet officials of flexibility on reunification were interpreted by the Intelligencetactical ploys intendod to exploit West German desires for unity. Now, however, interpreting the ovidonce is trickier.
For the past year, there have been signs of uncertainty and discordant opinions voiced about the German Question within the Soviet policy community. In8 Gorbachev assembled "kitchen cabinot" of advisers to examine this issue.
The expression of differing views about reunification does not necessarily mean that policy has changed, or that it will change, or that people believe it must change quickly; and the purpose behind some expressions of opinion may be less to stakeosition in principle than to pursue other objectives such as reducing Gorbachev's political vulnerabilitynfluencing Germansr manipulating antireunification sentiment (Yakovlev3). Nevertheless, an element of policy debate ia certainly present. Basically, those favorably inclined toward closer association of the two Germanys argue that the division of Germany works against the long-term security and economic interests of the USSR by perpetuating NATO and an unbearable defense burden. Those who oppose talk of reunification argue that the Western military threat still remains, that there is not much support for reunification in either half of Germany anyway, and that oven raising the issue is destabilizing.
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Following Chancellor7 electoral victory, which Moscow hoped would not occur, Soviet interest in cultivating the CDU/FDP government rose appreciably.
est Germany. First, Gorbachev has seen West German public opinion and Genscher's perspectivetrategic lever for advancing the Soviet arms control agenda in Europe. Second, Gorbachev has sought, through patient cultivation of West German sensibilities, to promote the goals of reducing US influence in Europe, weakening NATO, andore Eastward tilt by thehe publicly and privately characterizes the objective of driving the United States out of the continent as being unrealistic and counterproductive. Third, and highly important in his view, has been the attempt to harness West German economic might to Soviet and East European needs. In this context he has increasingly
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Central Committee Secretary and key Gorbachev foreign policy adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev declared onovemberthat "Reunification of GermanyMttertna^snouTcT^mong Germans" and that "Divided nations are heading for peaceful unification." In the past, Yakovlev strongly supportedivided Germany, ossible that his thinking has evolved, Yakovlev also stated that he thought the United States, Britain, and France did not want reunification of Gemany and hoped the Soviet Union would prevent such ais to say, were placing this monkey on the back of the USSR.
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emphasized the desirability of deeply engaging West Germanyeans ofnified European Economic Community (EC) from narrowing East Bloc access to the European market
On the question of reunification, Gorbachev has said various things to various audiences
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ambiguity that leaves open the possibility Ql reunification sometime in the remote future but focuses on the existing territorial. Juridical, and politicalmphasizes the present need fornd setsrecondition the achievementew security environmentrms reductions and liquidation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and construction of the "European House." Most of Gorbachev's statements on reunification,ronouncement onovember, fall under this heading.
Reunification is up to the two countries themselves tP decide.
Gorbachev's "real" position with certaintyand interpreting what he means is further clouded by
rsquestions of motive and audience.4 What is striking is theabsence of ideological language or rationales in any of the
positions he has taken and the pervasiveness of oraomatic
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is also the vexing question of "What could Gorbachev have been thinking?" the argumentmart person like Gorbachev have been preaching in Eastern Europe the New Thinking principles of "freedom ofnd "nonintervention" under "anynd accepting free elections in Poland and Hungary, without seeing that this would ultimately fosterpressures toward the reunification of Germany?
There are some answers to this question: eEastern Europehole and neglected to considerfeatures of the GDR;e figured that the SEDstrong enough to block moves toward reunificationbeenby Polish and Hungarian
ndersas overestimated the staying power of their parties under conditions of open politicale felt that the USSR could exert pressure in the crunch;e did not expect public opinion in either Germany ultimately to supporte badly miscalculated how fast political change would occur in the GDR and the rest of Eastern Europe once the reform process began;e saw the danger but was willing to countenence greater freedoa ln the GDR and closer links between the FRG and GDR, in the hope that this would lead to an infusion of West German economic assistance that would strenthen the USSR as well as the GDR and make it easier in the long run to resist any Incipient drive for reunification. In other words, he bet on short-tent aid to be able to handle better the long-term political threat, but in fact was confronted with the long-term danger first while Kohl moved to make the "short-term" benefit contingent in effect on structural change in the GDR that intensifies the long-term danger. But these answers stillantalizing residue of doubt.
The Hew Situation
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strategy for Germany will be determined as much by the new circumstances that confront him as byolicy vectors. But here, developments over the summer and fall in Eastern Europe create short-term imperatives that may be at odds with long-term policy considerations. |
Short-Term Factors. rice that would have been high but bearable, Gorbachev might have been able to close off the East German refugee problem before it spun out of control. Instead, he pressured Berlin to give in while moving rapidly to help engineer the destruction of the Honecker regime. On top of his acceptanceolidarity-led government in Poland, and of multiparty competition in Hungary, this episode surely must be seen by many in the Soviet elite as still another sacrifice of "socialisthat has gravely damaged Soviettriumph of "stormy* East European perestroyka. "Who lost Germany?'" (and Poland, Hungary, andof the rest of Eastern Europe) is, in short,harge that now hanas over Gorbachev in the Kremlin.
Eastern Europe, the political transition that is under way in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and is probably beginning inprocess that Gorbachev desperately needs to succeed, and succeedreach in security links to thebe highly delicate over the next year. Serious economic problems multiply the chances of instability and impose the necessity of expanded East European economic ties with Western Europe. Meanwhile, Moscow's weakened traditional means of leverage over the region have not been replaced by patterns of stable long-term influence:
is no prospect of joint Warsaw Pact armed
intervention to save Communism anywhere, and there is heavy discounting throughout Eastern Europe of Soviet unilateral intervention under most conceivable circumstances *
"bargain" inore or less free political process leading to the formation of non-Communist governments has been accepted by Moscow in return for Communist control of security and defense portfolioseal of questionable sustainability and one that, in any event, further depreciates the already low possibilities of direct Soviet leverage.
pace and
for using economic influence to control the direction of change is weak, and attempts to do
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so would work against its own domestic imperatives.
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the GDR, the collapse of the Honecker regime and the concessions that Krenz has been compelled to make haveritical political struggle to determine the midterm fate of the SED and the balance of power that will be struck in controlling the GDR. Krenz is not volunteering to commit political suicide, and the Soviets are angling to get the most favorable outcome possibleituation lhat currently holds
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what Gorbachev fears most
spontaneous mass anti-Soviet violence that would sweep away Moscow's remaining political assets and challenge the presence of Soviet military forces in the GDR. Gorbachev also needs to avoid developments that would undercut the legitimacy of the Soviet military presence on GDR soil or weaken Soviet legal rights arising out of the postwar situation and1 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (see
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In Western Europe, the short-term need is to dampen talkfor reunification, and especially to halt anythis direction in the FRG. This Imperative meansperception that too high demands will provoke instabilityEurope and the GDR, possibly triggering the downfalland of perestroyJa in the USSR. It alsoother resistance to German
reunification.
Longer Term Factors, Within the USSR the need to deal with the East European/Gorman problemomestic economic, political, social, and ethnic crisis thatull concentration of Soviet effort:
cannot spare resources to bail out a
floundering Eastern Europe. Heisfurther cuts in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe to reduce military resource commitments.
rsalso needs economic "cooperation" with Easternwhich the regimes there are loath to agree. (It
would seem that during Krenz's annointment trip to Moscow, Gorbachev may have extracted consent to extend cooperation that Honecker had resisted.)
In Eastern Europe overall, given present trends, the Soviets must foresee non-Communist or shared-power rule over most of the region within tho noxt several years. Long-term internal stability in East European countries will depend, in the first instance, upon improved economic performance, which in turn will
require debt relief, marketizationajor infusioncapital and managerial skills. Germany will play ahere. Tho Soviets hope to benefit directly andWest German aid, while exploiting the FRG's involvmentEast to prevent closure of the ECarket toand actually to foster EC-wide interest in expanding ties
rs uith tno East. It is in the Soviet interest for Germanof the region to be balanced with other Western ties
and, where possible, to flow through multilateral channels that weaken German political leverage and enhance that of the USSR.
Given Soviet threats and, in some cases aterception of their own national interest. East European states will probably not hasten to renounce membership in the Warsaw Pact. But they are likely to:
their own military budgets drastically.
strategic "threats" and force requirements in terns of their own national security interests.
Soviet domination of Warsaw Pact command and control arrangements.
for reductions in and limitations onstationed forces.
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an extreme question to Moscow of force reliability in terms of most East-West conflicts that one could anticipate.
Maintenanceiable Warsaw Pact will dependits real-life relevance to non-Soviet member states andSoviet intimidation. An important East-West dimension,nEK#ain' DBBOd on Polish and perhaps Czech fear of"ttOTachov has assiduously cultivated. But longer termwill probably ride equally onechanism to
deal with resurgent nationalist tensions within Eastern Europe.
In the GDR over the longer term, Gorbachev must calculate--provided there are freeloss of SED hegemony isatter time. The residual SED role and posture of the emergent succession regime toward structural integration with the FRG, howevar, must be seen by Moscow as still highly uncertain and subject to Soviet influence. In the meantime, paradoxically, the GDR will require expanded West German economic involvement to avert further destabilization and restructure its economy. ajor increase in commercial, political, and social interaction
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the two Germany's, and an increase in West German influence in the GDR, are inevitable and, in some respects, desirable from the Soviet standpoint. How all of this will play out in terms of the structure of political institutional relations between the FRG and the GDR is now up for grabs: toward increasing structural integration, up to reunification? Orinimal increase in formal ties? From the vantage point of Moscow there are considerations here that point toward both poles of this analytic spectrum.
The Arguments for Minimal Structural Integration. In the near-to-middle term, the Soviets are not likely to be faced with any clear-cut choice of accepting or rejecting structural integration between the two Germanys; yet steps they take now, in attempting to manage the German problemurrent basis, will undoubtedly affect their longer term posture. And so they must consider where their long-term interest lies.
Irrespective of the will of any non-Communist GDR government, the Soviets are strongly positioned to block formal unification of the GDR and the FRG: they have powerful military forces in place; legal rights (seend surely a
congruence of perspective on this issue
Hpj They will not willingly accept any outcome they believe "JmTJurrc^"to de facto East German accession to NATO. Thus, at the extreme, the choice from their standpoint turns on whether or not it would be desirable tonited Germany that is neutral and demilitarized.
arguments Gorbachev has probably heardnited Germany are strong:
united Germanyopulation ofillion wouldew pole of economic, political,might of global significance, and subtraction of the GDR wouldig loss to the socialist camp.
in one of the post-World War II borders
theoretically could raise questions about the continued legitimacy of other postwarthe western border of the USSR.
unified Germany would have enormous attractive influence throughout Eastern, Central, and Northern Europe, establishing de facto regional economic-political hegemony at the expense of the USSR.
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-How its continued demilitarization (and denuclearization) could be "guaranteed" wouldajor problem.
-Itsnder crisis conditions, would be even more highly suspect than that of other European neutrals.
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neutralization would also destroy NATO as a
negotiating partner and perhaps excessively marginalize the US capability to servetabilizer in the West's relations with the East.
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if its terms of neutralization did include
withdrawal from the European Community, its economic power would, on balance, weigh in with the West. Thus, the Soviet Union would lose leverage and could potentiallytill larger dilemma economically in dealingurope,
The Argument for Accepting structural Integration. There are two types of reasons the Soviets might decide to opt for acceptance of structural integration: pragmatic and strategic. The pragmatic argument assumes that the situation itself is likely to impose some type of institutionalized unification, with possibly some good as well as ill resulting. The task from the pragmatic perspective is to "get ahead" of moving events, cut one's losses, or even turn defeat into victory.
The strategic argument links how the soviet Union handles the German Question to Gorbachev's broad overall "political" approach to East-West relations. It is geared to an explicit articulation of "national security interasts" that discounts short-term gain and power politics in the here-and-now.
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Options. From Gorbachev's standpoint, we can posit three theoretically conceivable positions he might start Iron or arrive at in considering where he hoped to wove (or leave) the German question:
Status Quo: The least increase in institutionalized interconnectedness that is realistically possible, with this restricted essentially to the economic sphere.
Confederation: Significantranging from what Central Committee adviser Nikolay Portugalov publicly described in9special relationship [between) two states that belong to different social systems" in which there are "potential federative structures in areas such as the economy, ecology, culture, and many otherore full-blown confederation.
Presumably with provisionsederation that recognized in some way the unique identify of each partner.
Gorbachev at Malta
His Personal Stakes. In Gorbachev's own eyes, he comes to discussions about Germany with the President notloser" in the struggle between Capitalism and Communism, buteader who has been running high political risks to actively destroy the entrenchedconservative Communistthat stand in the way of peaceful political adaptation and economic improvement in the East. And thereot of truth in this self-perception. art of his broad strategy, Gorbachev has prodded the East European regimes to reform themselves and has taken critical decisions all year long that made possible or expedited formationolidarity-led government in Poland, the emergence of multiparty competition in Hungary, the leadership succession in the GDR, and now the collapse of the conservative leadership in Czechoslovakia. He has assumed responsibility for what he laconically calls the "drama" of mass demonstrations and has run the risk of tolerating non-Communist rule.
ersonal standpoint, it is important to Gorbachev that he:
out of the meeting with his image burnishedaster statesman who has advanced Soviet and global security, notevisionist who "lost" Germany.
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be portrayed to Moscow and Bloc audiences as having influenced the President to exerciseespecially on the West Germans.
Gorbachev is making the claim now that the changes under way in Europe, including the events in East Germany and the opening of the Berlin Wall, reflect the "end of the Cold War"istoric transformation of East-West politics. Naturally, he is aware of the President's words on this score and would like the Malta meeting to validatelaim, either verbally or symbolically.
In dealing with the President, Gorbachev will seek, in the first Instance, to discover what the US position reaj.ly. is on the German question. Does the United states, in fact, actuallyeasoned position? (There is considerable evidence of lack of understanding among the Soviets on this score.) He will also be interested inense of how the President feels about the Germans and reunification. At the same time, he will probably attempt to communicate thethrough stressing the common interests of both the President and himself in assuring stability in Easternhis own position and perestroyka, in the USSR are at risk if the German problem goes awry, even while conveying the impression that he is fully
in charge, is confident in the future, and knows where he is
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Keeping His Own Counsel. It is possible that Gorbachev may be candid in discussing the German Question, but there are good reasons why what he says will probably not reflect exactly what he thinks. The key ones are these:
--Unless his assessment of the situation in the GDR now is that the chance of movement toward structural rapprochement on the partost-election GDR is negligiblenless he assumes either that the SED will be able to control things somehow or that the population will opt forrisky propositions indeed) he has to have begun considering Soviet options in the event that momentum docs develop later ln the GDR toward closer structural relations with tho FRG.
ho is even considering Controlled Confederation, much less Reunification, he must set the time horizon for this in the remote future to guard his flanks, whatever time framework he privately thinks is likely or acceptable.
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assessment of the overall dynamics of the Gorman question depends also on how the Western powers will constrain or fail to retard movement towardby influencing the political process in the FRG. Obviously, the requirements of candor and of influencing the number-one actor in this regard, the US President, are likely to diverge.
of what he thinks, he needs towith his present declarative postureon dealing first with the "realities" ofstates, existing borders, twoand treaty rights, in order not to whetGerman appetite for change, totally demoralize the
andandwagon psychology toward
reunification.
In short, unless his behavior demonstrably proves otherwise, Gorbachev's presentation on Germany is likely to beerformanceransparent representation of firmly held views and intentions.
Substantive Aspects. The chances are that in discussingQuestion Gorbachev will take as his starting pointwo have seen him expressing recently in public andon the subject. He will probably developthat this question needs to be set within the contextrelaxation of East-West tensions, assurance ofat radically reduced military force levels, theof military alliances, and developmentenseEast-West economic ties. In this context offor movement on the German Question, hedisplay his pro-active penchant. For example, hemovement on tho German problem with completion of theand establishmentramework of objectivesII talks. He might present prospective large cuts instationed in East Germany, which Moscow is projectingof agreement in Vienna,ontributionsettlement of the German Question that the Unitedemulate. Or, he might suggest that the German issueplaced on the agenda of the Helsinki-II conference he has
alluded to on sevoral occasions recently.
From the standpoint of short-term considerations, Gorbachev will certainly seek to:
the US perception that he believes thereisk of dangerous instability in the GDR and Eastern Europe, and that explosions there would be profoundly detrimental to US and Western interests.
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US assistance in reining in the FRG: to soft-pedal talk there about reunification, not exploit Soviet discomfiture in the GDR, prevent the FRG (and the GDR) from dominating the elaboration of Western positions on German issues, and foster multilateralism in the transfer of economic assistance to the GDR and the rest of Eastern Europe.
Brraon the President that Moscow takes seriouslyrights in Germany and Berlin acquired through
post-world War II undertakings and1
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The preferred solution to the German Question for many Soviet foreign policy practitioners (for the time being, at least) is probably the Status Quoif ons sets aside Gorbachev's "time will tell how things come out" caveat, corresponds fairly closely to the admonitory element in his references to the subject. But even if he himself preferred this position in the best of all possible worlds, he would have good reason to think it is unstable, and could well calculate that it has already been outstripped by events:
happens now, there will be strong ties between the FRG and the GDR which, even if not formally codified, could bo viewed as shifting the GDR toward the Western camp.
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Given the likelihood of free elections in tho GDR, the probably ensuing massive electoral rejection of the SED combined with economic failure could lead to an unstoppable political movement in the GDR toward structural integration with the FRG. ^
Gorbachev surely wants at least to postpone both of these developments. But it is likely that he has thought ahead to the "whatnd the possible costs and benefits of accepting some form of Controlled Confederation. alfway solution could, in the longer term, pave the way for full reunification. But in the moantime it might:
an uncontrolled drift of the GDR into FRG orbit.
the Soviet Union, perhapseace treaty,uarantor of arrangements in Germany.
a situation in which the USSR could attempt to impose acceptance of security guarantees it favors.
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strains in the EC that could favor the Soviet Union and the East European countries.
The operational key here would be acceptance of some initiativeto some extent, institutionallyFRG/GDR relations. olution, along the lines suggested by Portugalov, would be in keeping with the more encouraging, future-oriented part of Gorbachev's standard response to the reunification question. It vould also be compatible with the arguments put forward by Dashichev--which probably do appeal intellectually to Gorbachev. HHifl
Reunification, is highly unlikely to be on Gorbachev's hidden agenda for intensive discussion otsigns that he has given it some thought, despite some of his own words, and despite his attraction to the bold breakthrough in international relations. There are two conditions, however, that might conceivably prompt Gorbachev to throw the dice on German reunification: udgment that events were moving ineluctably in this direction anyway, impelling Moscow to get on board, gain Germany's long-term gratitude, and seek to shape the conditions under which it was going to occur;ecision that the economic crisis in the USSR demanded crash dismantlement of Soviet forces abroad and payment of the maximum political price to Bonn for maximum West German economic assistance. Neither contingency now seems at hand*
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Gorbachev's thoughts on the two Germanys turn out not to be transparent, his words may still supply some clues as to where he thinks things are going. Were Gorbachev leaning sharply toward maintenance of the Status Quo, one might expect to hear "Grande Entente" arguments intended to reinforce Wcstorn fears of the security threat posedeunited Germany, fears of the economic challenge it would present, and fears that reunification would obstruct progress toward East-West accord, arms roduction, and perestroyka in the USSR and Eastern Europe. If, on the contrary, Gorbachev were nog dead set against Controlled Confederation, one might expect to hear less of the "fear" arguments and more evocations of the benefits of growing European integration and the breakdown of East-West barriers. Finally, if Gorbachev were indeed actually considering Reunification, one would expect the same noises as in the confederal case, but supplemented with more serious probing of the security dilemmas and geopolitical-economic challenges that would arise with this outcome.
Major dangers confront Gorbachev in Germany* Anti-Soviet violence could occur that might force him to intervene
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only locally and for the protection of Soviet lines. Momentum could build for reunification and outpace security negotiations. Loss of power by the SED could be used against Gorbachev in his own Politburo, Yet Gorbachev has reason to be pleased with the tumultuous course of events so far.
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changes in East Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Europe have probably, from his standpoint, crystalized atecisive turn in US defense policy toward major force reduction in Europe that will permit him convincingly to argue at home that his risky security strategy has paid off. These changes have also killed nuclear modernization in Germany. They are prompting large-scale Western participation in bailing out the stagnant East European economies and averting instability from which Moscow would probably suffer, while opening up conduits of economic assistance to the USSR and probably loosening up the EC in They have confirmed once and forprobablycorrectness of Gcnscher's ostpolitik in the eyes of the West German electorate.
Within the Eastern Bloc the upheavals that, and those in prospect, are locking inestruction of the olda major reason why Gorbachev has displayed such equanimity over recent developments
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forward, Gorbachev's approach to the German question will not be simply passive, reactive, or defensive. His likely strategy will be to support the existenceeparate East German entity that, whatever enhanced linkages it has to the FRG, has not been absorbed by thethen to use this new situation to exert continued leverage in the pursuit of his preexisting security and geostrategic aims in Europe. As long as Gorbachev continues to place himself on the side of reform in Eastern Europe and pushes arms control. West Germany will see increasing benefits in working cooperatively with the USSR.
The preconditions that Gorbachev has been floating for Soviet consent to structural change in relations between the two Germanys suggest great continuity with the main goals that underpinned Soviet policy toward Germany before the crisis in the GDR, and indeed before Gorbachev took office Reduction of East-Westemilitarization of Europe, the dissolution of alliances, and achievement of pan-Europeanaddress Soviet security interests. But, at the same time, their realization would promote the enduring Soviet objectives of sharply reducing the US military presence and political influence in Europe, destroying NATO, eliminating
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COCOM, and tilting West Germany's economic and political orientation more toward the East* Yet, in gaining this positioning, Gorbachev has abandoned Communist hegemony in East Germany, accepted large reductions and possibly eventual removal altogether of Soviet forces in Germany and elsewhere outside the USSR (therebyilitary posture that could be used to intimidate Western Europe or, some would argue, to conquernd acceded where necessary to non-Communist rule in Easternvast change from the point at which he began
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appendix a
major accords governing uie sutus of berlin
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rights in Berlin are original rights, deriving from tbe defeat of (he German armed forces, tbe unconditional surrender of Germany, and the joint assumption by the Four Powers of supreme authorityhese rights can be modified only through unanimous Four-Power agreement. They do not derive from the following Four-Power wartime or postwar agreements, which do, however, provide the framework in which the Allies ciercise their rights.
In the London Protocolseptember andhe United States, Ihe Unitedand the USSR divided Germany into three zonespecial Berlin area for Ibc purposes of occupation, irrespective of the areas actuallyor overrun by the forces of each power. (In delineating these areas, the Allies used7 boundaries and regarded its absorption ofafter that date as null and void).ally was allocated one zone; the special Berlin area was not part of any zone and was to be occupied andjointly through an Allied Kommandatura, or inter-Allied governing authority. Onhe London Protocols were amended to add France as an occupying power and toourth sector for Paris in both Germany and Berlin. Although tbe London Protocols contained no provision for providing Western access to Berlin, they are the foundation of tbe present Four Power-mandated status of the city.
Eictrpu from the4 Protocol:
ermany, within her frontiers as ihey were ontill, for tke purposes of occupation, bt divided into four lonrs. one of which will be allotted io each of the four Powers,pecial Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the four Powers.
n Inter-allied Governing Authority fKirr.cn-datuial consisting of four Commandants,by their respective Commanders In
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Chief, will be established to direct jointly iht administration ofreater Berlin" Area^
Excerpts from the4 Protocol:
Article I. Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from theirGovernments, bymandeit-in-Chief of ihe armed forces of ihe United Kingdom, Ihe United Slates of America, ihe French Republic and ihe Union of Soviel Socialist Republics, each In his own tone of occupation, and also jointly, in mailers affecting Germanyhole, in iheir capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under ihe present Agree mem.
Articleke four Commanders-in-Chief,togetherody, will constitute aorgan af control called thers
In (be Declaration of Berlinhe Four Powers (ibe United Kingdom, the United States, the USSR, and (he Provisional Government of tbe French Republic) jointly assumed supreme authority inIn tbe Declaration, the Four Powersweeping assumption of power beyond (he authority that had been theirs as the belligerent occupants of Germany before thai dale. Before ihc Declaration, for example, Allied authority had been subject toderiving from German law. Tbe Western Allies have not relinquished any of their supreme authority in Berlin since the publication of the Declaration, althoueh normally they exercise their rights only in
mailers affecting the status and security of the city.
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Eicerpt from5 Declaration:
The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional
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of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect toincluding all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for tht purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany. J
Tbe Potsdam Agreement5 was designed Io resolve tbe German Question, and treated the countryingle economic unit. Although the Agreement did not specifically deal with Berlin.has argued that the Western Allies' rights in Berlin were forfeited because of their "failure" lo implement the Potsdam Agreement. Tbe Soviet*that tbe creation of ibe Federal Republic was an abandonment of the Potsdam Agreements principles and assert that il destroyed ihe basis of Four-Power decisionmaking on Germany and Berlin, therebythe wartime and postwar agreements. Theseallegations have no legal basis; none of ihe Four Powers can be deprived of its rights andexcept by agreement with tbe other three powers.
Excerpts from the Protocol of the Proceedings of ibe Berlin (Potsdam)
o for as Is practicable, there shall bt uniformity of treatment of the Germanthroughout Germany.
uring the period of occupation Germany shall be treatedingle economic unit. BJ
Tbe Allied Control Council Decision ofS approved tbe establishment of three air corridors from Berlin to the Western-occupied zones in
Excerpt from the5 Control Council Decision:
Ofa) {The Meeting/ approved iheof three air corridors from Berlin lo the
Western gones as defined inm
Onhe Allied Control Authority Air Directorateet of detailed "Flight Rules" ihal also defined the three air corridors, the Berlin Control Zone, and the functions of ihe Berlin Air Safety Center. These rules remain valid today and tbey are the only Four-Power ruling governingto. from, and around Berlin. BJ
Excerpts from tbe6 Air Directorate Regulations:
ir Corridors in Germany. Tht following air corridors have been established:Bueckeburg-Btrltn. Hamburg-Berlin. Each of the above corridors isnglishilometers).ilometers) each side of the center lint.
3a. Tht Berlin Conirol Zone Is defined as tht air space between ground level0 meters)adius ofilometers) from the Allied Control Authority Building in which is established tht Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC/.
he Berlin Air Safely Center has been estab-Ushtd In the Allied Control Authority Building wiih tht object of ensuring safety of flight for all aircraft in the Berlin area. The safety Center regulates all flying in the Berlin Control Zont and also in the corridors extending from Berlin lo the boundaries of adjacent control tones. BJ
Tbe withdrawal of ibe Soviets from the quadripartite administration of Berlin8 ledumber of tripartite agreements, including declarations of an Allied security guarantee for Berlin.ommuid-aut of0 and in tbe London Three-Power Declarationbe Western Allies reaffirmed ihal they would treai an attack against Berlin as an attack onH
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Eiccrpl from ibc0 Communique:
The Allied Governments consider ihai iheir forces in Germanyn addition to their occupation duties also the important role of acting as security forces for the protection and defense of the fret world, including tht German Federal Republic and the Western sectors of Berlin To make this protection more effective tkt Allied Governments will incrtast andtheir forces in Germany. They will treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as on attack upon lAf/niWifiB
Excerpt from4 Three-Power Joint Declaration:
The security and welfare of Berlin andof the position of the Threeare regarded by the Three Powerselements of the peace of the freethe present international situation.they will maintain armed fortes within the
I.NcMI<7lYnt territory of Berlin as long as theirrequire It. They therefore reaffirm that
ihey will trtat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and thtmnlns.tM
Following the Soviet Commandant's withdrawal from the Allied Kommandatutaby tht Western Commandants ot8 announced that the Kommandalura wouldits work, even though iu dcciiions couldbe implemented only in tbe Wealern scctora of the city. Tbe Allies declared that their legal rights ia Berlin derived from conquest and not fromselling up the machinery of the Four-Power oocapatioo government. |
Excerpt from ibe8 Declaration by Three Wesiern Commandants:
The Temporary Constitution of Berlin, which was approved by all four Allies6 requires that legislation and certain other acts of the
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Allied approval. Tht refusal of thetlend meetings of the Alliedcannot any longer bt allowed to obstruct tht proper administration of Berlin, aetordlng to the law.
The Allied Kommandatura will thereforeits work forthwith. If the Sovieteither now oruture dale, decide to abide by the agreements to which the four Powers are committed, the quadripartiteof Berlin could be returned. During their ebsenilons the three Wtsttrn Atltts will exercite ihe powers af the Alliedalthough It is realized that owing lo Soviel obstruction it will only bt possible for them to carry out their decisions in tht Western Sectors foe the prttent B|
The quadripartite Sew York and Paris Agreements9 ended the Berlin blockade. They removedon transportation between Berlin and ibe Western tones of Germany and obliged tbeto ensure the normal functioning of transit traffic in their respective zona. |
Excerpts from9 New York Four-Power Communique:
ll the restrictions imposed sinct March8 by tht Government of the Union of Soviel Socialist Republics on communications,and trade between Berlin and tht Wtstern zones of Germany and btlwttn the Eastern zone and the Wtstern tones will bt removed on.
ll the restrictions Imposed since March8 by the Governments af France, the United Kingdom, and tht United States, or any one of them, on communication, transportation, and trade between Berlin and tht Eastern tone and between the Western and Easternf Germany will alto be removed on
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Excerpt from the9 Paris Four-Power Communique:
he Governments of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Unitedand the United States agree that the New York Agreement of9 shall be maintained. Moreover, in order to promote further the aims set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in order to Improve and supple-mens this and other arrangements andas regards the movement of persons and goods and communications between the eastern sone and the western zones and between the zones and Berlin, and also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities, each in his own zone, will have an obligation to take thenecessary to ensure the normaland utilization of rail, water, and road transport for such movemeni of persons and goods and such communications by post,and ielegniphiW
The Bonn and Paris Conventions2 andoften referred to by the West Germans as tbeinto force5 and placed relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republicew basis. The AUiea were henceforth to work with the Federal Republic toward the goaleunited Germany. The conven-ticoj provided that the Allies' position in Berlin would not be altered until the country wasrocess which would simultaneously solve the problem of Berlin. |
Excerpts from the2 Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany as amended by tbe4 Pari* Protocol:
Articlen view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusioneacethe Three Powers retain the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exercisrd or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germanyhole. Including the reunification of Germanyeace settlement.
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Article 6.
he Three Powers will consult with the Federal Republic in regard to the exercise of their rights relating to) The Federal Republic, on its part, will cooperate with the Three Powers in order to facilitate the discharge af their responsibilities with regard to Berlin.
Article 7.
he Signatory States are agreed that an essential aim of their common policyeace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundationasting peace. They further agree lhal the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await) Pending the peace settlement, the Signatory States will cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aimiberal-democratic constitution, like ihai of the Federal Republic, andwithin the European) The Three Powers will consult with the Federal Republic on all matters involving the exercise of their rights relating to Germanyhole.
Excerpts from the2 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and Occupation as amended by the4 Paris Protocol:
ChapterAviation-Article S.
n the exercise of their responsibilities with respect to Berlin, Ihe Three Powers willto regulate all air traffic to and from the Berlin air corridors established by the Allied Control Authority. The Federal Republicto facilitate and assist such traffic in every wayasts no less favorable lhan ihai enjoyed on the entry Into force of the present
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it undertakes to facilitate andunlimited and unimpeded passage through Its air space for aircraft of the Three Powers en route to and from Berlin,
Articlen the exercise of their responsibilities relating to Germanyhole, the Three Powers will continue to exercise conirol with respect to aircraft of the Union of SovietRepublics utilising the air space of ihe Federal Republic^
Western Berlin will be permitted on the basis of the existing four-power agreements:
On the Berlin-Marienborn Autobahn;
The Berlin-Helmstedt ratlwayllne, with the return of empty wagons on the Berlin-Oebis-felde railwayline;
On the air corridors: Berlin-Hamburg. Ber-lln-Bueckeburg and Berlin-Fronkfurl-am-hfaln.
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Bolz-Zorin letter describes Moscow's decision Io devolve control over ibeSoviel sector of Berlin to East German authorities-^
Excerpt from Ibe letter from East German Foreign Minister Bote lo Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zortn,
In connection with the carrying out of protection and control on tht lines of communication between the German Federal Republic and Western Berlin, running through ihe ttrrliory of Ihe German Democratic Republic, the German Democratic Republic wilt ensure tht stttltmtnt with tht appropriatt authorities of the German Federal Republic of all questions pertaining IO iht transit of rail, road and water traffic of tht German Ftdtral Republic or Western Berlin, their citizens or residents, and also of foreign stairs and their citizens, excepting the personnel and freight of the United States, British and French troops in Western Berlin.
Control over the movement between the German Federal Republic and Western Berlin ofpersonnel and freight of tht French, British and United Slates garrisons stationed inBerlin, will for the time being,orresponding agreement has been reached, be Implemented by the command of the group of Soviet forces In Germany.
The movement of military personnel and freight of the garrisons of the three Western powers in
The Quadripartite Agreement1 entered into forcehe QA did not alter tbe legal status of Berlin, which remains based on tbe Four Powers' original rights and on wartime and postwar agreements. The QA primarily was intended io regulate Ihe practical matter of access by ihe West Germans and the Allies to the Western sectors of Berlin and to improve the quality of life in and around tbe city for its inhabitants.|
Excerpts from1 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin:
Part I,ht four Governments agree lhat. Irrespective of the difftrtnets In legal views, the situation which has developed in ihe area, and as Ills defined In this Agreement as well as in the other agreements rtftrrtd to in this Agree-mtnl. shall not be changed unilaterally.
Part II. A. The Govtrnmenl of Ihe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between tht Wtstern Stctors of Btrlin and tht Ftdtral Republic of Germany will bt unimpeded; that such traffic will bt facilitated so at lo take plaet in Iht most simple and expeditious manner; and that It will receive preferential treatment.
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II, B. The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America declare that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that thesecontinue notonstituent part of tht Federal Republic of Germany and not tobt governed by 'rfl
Tbe three Western Alliesrlpanltt Letter to the UN Secretary General on5 to recmpbasixe ibai Berlin remained subject to Four-Powerariety of unilateral Soviet and East German actions notwithstanding. The Allies have since cited Ihe letter on occasions when they believed it was necessary to underline the inviolability of their legal status in tbe cityi
and postwar agreements and decisions based on these rights and responsibilities stipulated that greater Berlin was topecial area under the Joint authority of the four Powers tntirtly distinct from tht Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.
ny change in tht status of greater Berlin as reflected in these agrttmtnts and dtcisons would require the agreement of all four Powers. So such agreement altering tht status of Berlin or providingpecial status for any of Us sectors has ever beenM
from ihe5 letier regarding the status of Berlin:
he quadripartite status of greater Btrlin sttms from the original rights andof the four Powers. Quadripartite wartime
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Appendix B
Soviet Legal Views on Germany*
The USSR contends that the creation of the FRG waa an abandonnent of the Potsdaa Agreement principlenified Germany and asserts that this destroyed the basis of Four-Power decisionmaking on Germany [andhe three Western powers contend that these Soviet allegations have no legal basis and that none of the Four Powers can be deprived of its rights and responsibilities eicept by agreement with the other three powers. I
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Ihe Soviet view appears to be that Germany ceased to exist in, and that the FRG and the GDR have taken its place. The Soviets have nevertheless periodically Joined the Western allies In publicly reaffirming the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers ln Germany. |
FRG and GDR legal views largely parallel those of the three Western Allies and the USSR^respectlvely. In practice, however, the CDR resents Soviet Insistence that East Germany should not unduly interfere In the Western Allies exercise of quadripartite rights, such aa the right to move freely within all four sectors ln Berlin. The FRG occasionally differs with the three Western Allies on the degree of integration of West Berlin Into the FRG, but these questions are regularly resolved at working levels.
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Original document.
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