USSR:ame Plan for Six-Power Meetings on German Unification' "
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USSR:ame Plan for Six-Power Meetings on German Unification
Toil paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis.queries are welcome and may be direcied
USSR:ame Plan for Six-Power Meeting'; on German Unification <
Moscow is probably still formulating iu game plan for the six-power, or two-plus-four, sessions. Contradictions in Soviet thinking are apparent in the public and private remarks of Soviet officials aod academics on security Issues related to unification, such as Germany's ties to NATO, the status of foreign forces, and whether the united state must be neutral.'
The Soviets will approach these discussion! with two central objectives: to ensure that Soviet security interests are taken into account and lo gain agreement on procedures and arrangements that will be accepted at home, where the recent injection or this emotional issue into the public political debate has added to its sensitivity. Moscow'! security concerns have not changed substantially in recent months. It wants:
Internationally sanctioned assurances that the new German government will not challenge postwar borders.
Effective constraints on Germany's ability to threaten stability ill Europe.
plan for German security ties that does not appear to favor (be West. Moscow also hopes to use the six-power forum to rein in the process ofsoSCE conference later this year willarger role than merelyeal between the Gcrmanys. The Soviets hope to find more support al the conference for moves torameworkew European security order and enfold German unification into this process..
Recent high-level Soviet statements indicate thai Moscow will initially argue for German neutralityeace trcaly that guarantees the postwar borders. Moscow probably will insisteace trcaly or some other type of legal declaration by Germany will be required at some point in the unification process lo assuage East European concerns about future German territorial demands and to disarm domestic critics. In our judgment, however, the neutrality demand willegotiating tool, ratherinimum condition. The Soviets hope to induce Bonn and the Western allies to move beyond the plan proposed by Foreign Minister Genscherompromise oo German ties to NATO,hased ap-'proach along Ihe following lines:
I. Doth Germany* would remain in their respective alliances during the initial steps toward unification. US and Soviet forces would remain on both sides at or below the level stipulated in the
Stagehe (wo Germany* would be unitedonfederal stale, and the United States and the Soviet Union would sharply reduce their forces. East German lies to the Warsaw Pact would lapse, and no NATO forces would be stationed in East Germany.
Stage S. As full unification approached, Germany would withdraw from the NATO roiliury command but retain political ties to the alliance.
Stageew European security order that wouldrominenl role for both the United Slates and the USSR would displace NATO.
Moscow might ultimately agreerench-style NATO membershipnited Germany, or even something akin to Genschcr's plan, if President Gorbachev concluded there was Itltk chanceetter deal and if ho were confident of withstanding criticism from domestic hardliners. As part of the bargain, however. Moscow would insist on border guarantees, an extended timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops accompanied by significant reductions in US forces,estern commitment to press ahead withew security order in the CSCE. The Soviets might also hold outettlement or cornmittnent to negotiate on nuclear weapons in Germany and for some restrictions on German national forces and arsenals.
View of Su-Power Ccoiuluuoc* Way Suucm lo a
Polilical. Econoenic, and Legal IWue*
World Warerman Peace Treaiy and Related
on German Notional Force.i
Force* in Germany Denucleariiaiion
The Hardline Option
USSR:ame Plan for Six-Power Meetings on German Unification
Vlrw af Six-Power Coeoalutloas: Way Station toFuropcan Summit
Tbe Soviet* bare iended pou livelye prospect of linking Ibe two Germany! and ibe four wartime allies in talks on German unification They undoubtedly view agreement on Ihe two-plus-four meetingsirst step in implementing the underilanding reached between Gorbachev and Kohl in Moscow last month: the Germaoys will exercise self-deiermination over internal maliert. but unification will take place in an all European context and with adequate consider*(KB
of the laterals of Germany's neighbors. Indeed, Moscow's focus on getting these commitments in place may account in pan for the limited attention devoted thus far lo defining tbe necessary concrete steps toward unification. AccordingC
3 Moscow has onlybegun to focus on these.
Moscow probably views the six-power meetingsean* lo limit any perceptioe in tbe (ISSR that tbe leadership "lost" Eastnificationchanneled Ibrougb the two-plua-four format woyld appear moreerger tban an absorption of East Germany by Weal Germany. Soviet officials have repeatedly staled that unification must not mean annexation Moscow probably also bope* thai starting the process agreed to in Ottawa will ease pressures for immediate unification in both Germany!
While trying to avoid tbe appearance of obstruction-ism. tbe Soviet* will probably attempt to draw out tbe process, both lo gain time for more fully formuUiing their own policynited Germany and to complement other clTorts to stave offlan for unification until in all-European summit takes place Moaeow wants tbe summit to help shape ibe terms of unification, not merelyail accccnpii between ibeespite their agreement to the lwo-plus-fi ur meetings, the Soviets remainthat ihe process is moving too quickly. In a
ipeech to tbe Canadian Pariiatnenl last month.Minister Shevardnadre criticizedho want toame of political speed cbeaaime limit of fiveethaiessential lo progress only one stepime, stage by stage on this mailer, to abandon ooe thing only when the consequences arehe Soviets willattempt to play on simitar fears among the Othersome in East Germany. i
Reviewing Political, Fxeooenle. and legal basse*
Although tbe agreement reached in Ottawaassigned only negotiation of the international aspects of utiroeatioo to Ihe six-power forum, the Soviets may call for initial aeaaioas to review the internal arrapgemenit foe unification that are decided by ihe twooviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said West German Chancellor Kohl had exaggerated the "green Ught" on unificationGorbachev gave in Moscow, and the Soviet* have repeatedly crilicxead Boon for forcing the pace. The more eoaccreicd Moscow become* about the course of independent German actions, the more likely it will be to argue thatecisions have an impactxternal issues and ihould be closely monitored at six-powerndeed, the Soviets and the East German Government may already be preparing tbe ground forove. Prime Minister Modrow toad then Moscow early this month that be would request Soviet help in iccuring property rights in the GDR and lhat thisroper subject for two-plus-four negotiations because of the Soviet role lo shaping GDR land reform and property blue* during the.
The inua-German discussion* will del ermine, among Other t' .ihe llcps to be taken to integrate the two German economies. Shevardnadze and oihen have
Id that the economic union of the (krmanyt willenefit the USSR, but the Soviet* nonethelcu will want assurance* that rapid BCnemcat tow nJ economic integration will not hum their tntcretii The ODR it tbe USSR'* Largest trnding partner and provide* large quantities of machinery andgood* that are lovcctant to Oorbacbev'i doerves-uc ecoacetuc program Motoo* will be coootroed that tbe newly uoiled Germany honor the GDR'tto tha Soviet Union. '
The Scwlets will also try to get agreement onand insbiulsoai for approving political change* in Germany a* an additional safeguard agaiaiiGermanhile all participant! agree that Ihe two-plu-four inectiagirelude to in aU-European summit, Moscow appears anxious for parallel dttcnsnops in other forums to take place aeon, la hit Speech to the Canadian Parliament shortly after the six-power meeting* were annouoced,proposed that preparatory meetings for (he Pan-European summit might begin as early as March. These nursings would involve the foreign minister* of aDsxropcan Hale* La drafting tbe decumcots for the summit and its agenda,be said must locludo the German question. He also suggested that tbe Four Powers continue consultation* alongside the six-power meetings and the preparations for thecaul the Sonets have since repeatedMoscow has uJisied that Four Power right* and rtsporuibililies are Dot superseded by the six-power forum. The Soviet* may anticipate that tbeae forums would serveedge against uruoccpiabk decisions by the Germans in their bilateral eichanges
In the sir-power scswious. tbe Soviets will probablyairly long timetable for unification,that security arrangements must have lime to catch op with the pstce or political change. Indeed,ecant Irrailya interview Sberardnidte said uadfi-caUOa would "moat liid, take severalome Soviet commentator* bare said it may now be too late to Induce the Germans to agreeonfederal and federal stage* oa the way to full unification, Moscow may ttoeetbeles* try to fan French and British concerns and any anxieties It perceives In the Germanys to build pressureore controlled process.
Eating World Warerman Peace Treaty and Related Security Lssoe-s
The Soviets will certainly use the sii-power forum to pteaa for negotiationence treaty. Gorbachev stressed In rVflvdo onebruary that the six power* would examine the foundationseace treaty, which be described as necessary under international law. Gorbachev want* andeace treaty a* part of then process. He and bis spokesmen have related in the starkest terms tbe impactof World War II continue to have on the Soviet public. Unificationeace treaty would sharply irritate thcta exposed nerves and heighten domestic fearsesurgent Germany wouldthreaten the security of Ibe USSR.
If Bonn it reluctant to moveeace treaty, the Soviets will look to the West for support. They probably believe thai Paris and Loodoo share (heir inierestinal settlement. They will use ihe argument of appeasing the Soviet public to try to convince the Germansreaty is the price for settling outstanding security issues, toch a* thewithdrawal of Sovietid for Oerman agreement, they might tuggeat that the treaty be negotiated and signed by both Germanys, endorsed in CPE, and then ratified by tbe unified sUU t*o ihe new Germany's internaUorial acccptinc*.
Discussiooreaty wDl raise security questions otherase related to Germany '* future relations with NATO:
Soviet* will lotittreaty include provi-sions recognising the postwar borders, arguing thatidespread tuppon throughout Europe for suchny reluctance oa Boon's part toritten commitment on border* would be portrayed as evidence of bad faith.
b also likely to raise la the two-plus four forum tbe issue ot* Limits on German national force* andhe Soviet* may mutt to Lncorporale any lucb negotiated conditionseace treaty to lend them additional legal weight
Tbe status of foreign force* in Germany will also be addressed, with Moscow seeking an extended lime-table for the withdrawal of Soviet force* from Easl Oermany.
Moscow undoubtedly want* the issue of nuclear weapons In Oermany resolved alongside unification. Tbe Soviet* might view CSCE-coovcned mandate talks for negotiations on strategic nuclear forces (SNF) as sufficient lo guard their interests,
Soviet public statement* on the conditions necessary for unification have increasingly put the greatest emphasis on forma) German recognition of thoof postwar borders. The Soviet* have claimed that such guarantees are essential to calm fearsesurgent Germany in tbe USSR and elsewhere, and gaining them is aim OS) certainly one of Moscow's minimum securityorbachev said in Pravda onebruary that only an "act of Intcma-lional law" could provide the necessary guarantees. Tbe Soviets' preferredeace treaty fonnally ending World War II, which could also incorporate other constraintsnited Germany. Faced with stubborn German oppositionreaty, the Soviets might ultimately accept an alternate act of international law, such a*ecmeoi under the auspice* of the CSCE. They have insisted, however,nilateral act by (he Germans would not be adequate to meet tbe legitimate concerns of the USSRmxny'i other neighbor*.
limit* oa German National Forces
Tbe Soviets almost certainly warn to sec restrictions oo the manpower and arsenals of tbe German armed forces. Although CFE Ambassador Grioev*kiy told tbe NATO Secretary General that the six power* should "raise and resolve" the mailer, tho question of tics to NATOigher priority, and the Soviets probably will not introduce this Issue early inpower process. Restrictions oo German national forces could legitimately be dealt with in newarms reduction talks, which may drop the bloe-to-btoc approach in favor of nationalhe Soviets might fedix-power coramilment lo
negotiating such limits in CFE would be moreto the Germans and leas likely toesidue of hard feelings between Moscow and the new state.
Foreign Forces Id Genauay
Tbe resolution of the Issue of foreign forcesarticularly sensitive ooe for Moscow. The Soviets need to avoid the appear*we of being expelled from East Germany and losing it to the West. Mcnwver.as Shevardnadze and other Soviets have said publicly, tbe immediate absorption of so many troops from Eastern Europe would pose severe social, political, and economic problems domestically. Grioevskiy has5 as the date for having all foreign force* out of Europe, and Moscow dearlyimetable at least that long, particularly for Its troops in East Germany. Shevardnadze delineated Moscow'sposition on this issue in bis address to theParti*merit, saying that Soviet force* in Easl Germanyifferent matter than those elsewhere in Eastern Europe and that "they areight prefer to leave settlement of tbe issue to another forum but wooid probably at Icait seekower endorsement of Ihe recent provisionalbetween the United Slates and the USSR on ceilings for stationed forces in Europeeans of preempting counterproposals al tbe Viennaor demand*ew Eastuick unilateral Soviet withdrawal Faced with demand* forwithdrawal of tnetr troopa, Ihe Soviets might claim that recent CFE agreements oa stationed force* had settled the Issueewammered out in that forum. They probably would also argue that the question should be resolved as parteace treaty orSCE conference.
Moscow would prefer that foreign forces in both part* erf Oermany be reduced recqxocaUy. Unking Soviet and NATO forces In Germany remain* Moscow's best argument for the legitimacy of its ownoreover, an asymmetric reduction would be more
to kII al home thanoneine-Icaa, Moscow might be abac lohased uymnfinc reduction, provided other fundsecurity guarantee* had been agreed. Soviet wilting-nea* to acquiesce could be enhanced ifespeciallyin Germany were tubatamially reduced while Moscow retained atrtce throughout mow of ihe unificationn this case. Moscow would argueirm commii-menteadline for withdrawal of all foreign forces and uansiuonew sccuriiy order.'
The Soviet* undoubtedly want tac caseation of nuclear weapon* in Germany settled before unificaiioo is finalized and may ultimately turn to theprocess If they have made no progress elsewhere. They may expect that antmuckar secuoeat in Germany will prevent modemiratice ofheaterforces and eventually lead to aa independent German commitment against any nuclear weapons in Germany. Some SPD member* are already calling for the removal of all am dear warhead* as pan of tbe security arrangementniied Germany. The Soviet* may also calculate that other player* will respond positively to renewed proposals for SNF negotiations now that there has been progress oa conventional force cuts. Soviet rsnVials are examining opticas to bring SNF to the fore, and Moscow mayet up CSCE approvalandate for SNF negotiations this fall.'
The overriding Question for Moscow is Germany's future security status, including whether the new German state can continue its lies to NATO.ensitive domestic issue for Oorbachcv. who riakj tbe charge of saddling tbe USSRajor strategic defeat. Politburo member Ugacbev's recent warning about German onincattouentral Committee debate and reports that some military leader* are critical of Gorbachev'* policy illustrate the point. Although there ba* yet toroundtwell of criii-ctsm of Gorbachev'a German policy, some Soviet oSciali and trade asses hare expressed the fear that Oerman unification could trigger aa offensive bated
on the cry, "Woo lost Easternhe Soviets therefore will weigh carefully the political andtrade-offs.'
TV liuHluM Outiwa
Several Soviet spokesmen have slakedtrong public position favoring German neutrality and firmlycontinued membership ia NATO. That al-mosl certainly will be MoBcow't oprtung ttaece ia (be two-plua-four talks. German neutrality would clearly be eatier to sell to tbe Soviet public than any scheme permitting continued German lie* to NATO and might defuse leas ions within (he Soviet leadership Moreover, the Soviets undoubtedly believe that the pretenceowerful united Germany in NATO could deatabilixe the military balance in Europe likely to resultFE agreement. particularly If unification takes place before the "rHrttriratiTn" of NATOhift to new European securityhave begun.'
If the Soviets decide the advantage* of neutrality onlweigh the potaitsk drawback* and pushn--lyeutral Germany, they might expect that unfruitful talk* at the six-power level would move tbem to the CSCE forum, where they would hope to generate tupport for Ihb optiontep towardroad European security order. They might also calculate thai they couldtrong showing by the SPD In the East German elections andIn favor of neutrality among socialists in both East and West Germany to increase pressure on Kohl to change his position If Kohl remained firm, ibey might even try to delay resolution of security iaatsca until after the Weal Oerman election* inhe bope that tbe SPD would win and offerettor deal
A decision to stand fanemand for German neutrality would nonethelea* have serious drawbacks. Moscow could not espect to find support among the three Western allies, all erf whom have pubbcry opposed the option. Poland.nd Hungary have alto spoken against German neutrality, although they probably would not favor full NATO
What Do ihe Soviets Mean my Nemtr+lityT
Moscow hot not clearly defined neutrality. Soviet commentary on the four-step plan for unification proposed early In February by Easl German Prime Minister Modrxnr emphasised his references toneutrality. This may have been Intended lo equate niutrallly with nonmembershlp In military alUancm or In the military components af such alliances. Soviet statements have not, however, com-stsieMly linked neutrality and the question ofties to SATO. Then hoy alto been fewto neutral status on the model of etlsilng neutral statu.,'
CPSU International Department head Valentin> his definition of neutralityid-February interview In
The term neutrality has been defined tooFor us. neutrality means that any new military danger must not emanate fromGermany Itself or from foreignneighbors. Europe, or anybody else. This is all.
membership dibet. Moraough stand -told fiik damaain* future relationsGermany if tbe USSR wer* perceived by the German public as trying* to block unification. Tbe Soviet) wouldalto worry that their insistence on neutrality would build German public support for rtihtwing extremistnd for unilateral action to unite the Germany's.
eed to hare good rctetionaailed Germany moat likely will leadexibte approach i- the talks. Despite their scaled preference forShevardnadze and others have laid publicly
FaJln's comments ruggest that the Soviets ere more Interested In restrictions on Germany's abilityilitary threat to stability In Europe than in Its formal statuseutral.
that the Soviets arc willing to discuss various options. Private Soviet comments indicate that the issue still has not been finally settled inew Soviet OcTVciarl bare laid that they do not regard neutrality aa obtainable or necessarily in tbe best interests of tbe USSR. They have expressed uneasiness atermany unconstrained by any alliance ties and said thai the continued presence of some US forces mightositive influencepossiblyhileunification process. Moscow therefore migbt ultimately view some ties between Germany and NATOseful constraint on independent action by the new state
The Soviet* are probably prepared to uae the six-power forum to determine what the (rattle will bear and are likely to raise neutralityargaintng chip rather thantinifnum condition. They may hope that an extreme opening position will induce the other participants to searcholution more pa'a table to Moscow than the demilitarization of the eastern partnited Oennaay In NATO peopoaed by Foreign Minister Genacher. They may also expect to exploit any differences among tbe Western powers on the extent and duration of Germany's lies to NATOompromise '
The Soviets probably expect that the other player, will raise some of the alternatives to the Genscher plan thai have surfaced in the international media and that the Soviets have undoubtedly debated among themselves. These include continued ties to botholitical membership In NATO on tbe French model, and Ihe desubtariraiioa of tbeThere is btlle evidence oa which to base predictions about the development of (be Soviets' position during the end game, and much will depend on how events in Germany evolve.lan that called for Germany to move sequentially through several of ibe luggeaiod schemes might be viewed by the Soviet! si meeting their security and domestic CMicemi:
For example, during the first stage, the Germanys would maintain ties lo (heir respective alliances while carrying out tbe initial stage* of economic and
pouuoaJ uait^cariaa. US ud Soviet force, would remain oo both ndo al or below (be level stipulated la the US
During the leeood stage, the (wo Germany, would be unitedonfederal state, and both alliance* would aharply reduce their force* In Germany. The Soviet* might complete their withdrawal while tome NATO ircop* remained, although they probably would Insistoken Soviet presence at least until (be neat stage. At Ibis point. East German tic* to ihe Warsaw Pact would lapse, but no NATO force* would be itationed in eastern Germany Tbi* rnigfal resemble the plan proposed by Geeucher in which (be eastern portionnited Germany remaining In NATO would be demiUuriiod.
Aa full unification approached. Wot Germany would withdraw from tbe NATO military command but retain political tics to the alliance the "Frenchoreign troop* would be reducedoken pretence, and eventually all foreign forces would leave. Moscow might expect ibai the ouwome would be. Ineutral Oerminy because thewould wither away or be altered beyond recojiutice.
cade ocoordiag to thecalled for bystable iraradiaonnified Germany would pave the way for
o* European security order thatlud-prominent role for Ihe United Sutra and tie USSR.'
Tbe Soviet* are probably not prepared to tabk the detail*equential approach a* aa opening move, bat woo Id view an Barecment on transitional anange-ment*caaible outcome of bargain Int. with the other player* during negotiations. Whatever their initial position, tbe Soviet* are likely to tee some aort of phased approach leadingholly new security order -either by desagn ora aatisfac-toryompromise on trans itiooal artangc-rricnti would meet Mcstcow't deaire to remove lit forces from the ODR gradually and avoid the image of giving up the spoiltof war. Theoken Sovietremainonstraining isficexsoc throughout tbe unification pro* ceat, but at force levels that could not be described as tin eatening. Germany would retain ties to the West and actonduit to Ihe Past. Soviet rclaiioD* with tho new German state would not be undermined.
Moscow would come under coosKlcrabU preasuie to settle for leas if the other key pit yen coaletoe around something akin bt the Genacber plan. Gorbachev's penchant for making sudden asymmetricalwhen facedough Western negotiating itancc luggeatt thai ho would acquiesce to the French model orenschcr-lilre plan if there were little chanceetter deal and If he were confident of wiihttaading the Inevitable criticism from hardliners In the party and the rasakary. A* part of that erraagc-ment. however. Gorbachev would insist oa provision* for formal border guarantees, as extended timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troop* from Bastaccompanied by significant rcductlont In USestern commitment to begin the constructionew security order. Tbe Soviet* might alto head brm oa securing ressrscsjeos on German national forces tad arsenalsettlement of the question of nuclear warheads in Germany. IOriginal document.